High Court · Decided 2 April 2019
Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program L td
Feedback & support[2019] SGHC 68 · Case no. Suit No 795 of 2014
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] This is a dispute about the corporate governance of the defendant, PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd (“PNGSDP”). PNGSDP was incorporated in Singapore in October 2001 with two shareholders: (a) the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (“the State”); and (b) BHP Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd (“BHP”). By this action, the State seeks to establish the existence of and enforce rights of control and oversight which it claims to have over PNGSDP’s operations and assets.
- [2]
[2] The State and BHP incorporated PNGSDP to be the vehicle to which BHP would divest its shares in a mining company called Ok Tedi Mining Limited (“OTML”). OTML operates a highly profitable mine in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea. The parties intended PNGSDP to hold BHP’s shares in OTML and to apply the income derived from those shares to advance a programme of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea.
- [3]
[3] The corporate governance of PNGSDP was uneventful from 2001 until 2011. In 2012 and 2013, however, PNGSDP made several material changes to its corporate governance framework. The effect of these changes was to dilute the State’s powers of control and oversight over PNGSDP. The State brings this action to challenge and reverse those changes.
- [4]
[4] The State’s pleaded case is that, quite apart from the agreement recorded in the suite of written contracts which were executed on the occasion of PNGSDP’s incorporation, there exists an oral agreement that: (a) the State has certain rights of control and oversight with regard to PNGSDP; (b) those rights cannot be altered without the State’s consent; and (c) the State is entitled to enforce those rights directly against PNGSDP.
- [5]
[5] Underlying the State’s case is the broader argument that it could never have agreed when it established PNGSDP that PNGSDP could be free to cast off unilaterally the State’s rights of control and oversight. The directors of PNGSDP may be the guardians of its corporate interests, but those narrow corporate interests are subsumed in the broader imperative of improving the lives of the people of Papua New Guinea through a programme of sustainable development. And the State, as the democratically elected government of that people, is the ultimate and legitimate guardian of that broader interest. If PNGSDP’s case in this action is to be believed, BHP and the State intended to endow PNGSDP with such untrammelled freedom that it would have the power even to amend its own objects, to abandon the purposes for which it was established and to apply its considerable wealth to its own ends. According to the State, that simply cannot be.
- [6]
[6] PNGSDP, for its part, points out that BHP divested its shares in OTML as part of an immensely complex transaction which was documented with the assistance of sophisticated legal advisers in an suite of interlocking and interdependent written contracts. That suite of written contracts is exhaustive. The structure of the parties’ agreement simply left no scope for such a critical aspect of PNGSDP’s corporate governance framework to be left entirely undocumented in that suite of contracts and to be the subject instead of an oral agreement.
- [7]
[7] According to PNGSDP, everything that it did in 2012 and 2013 was done in accordance with that suite of written contracts. Although it is true that those written contracts clearly oblige PNGSDP to apply the income from the OTML shares to advance a programme of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea, the State’s right to hold PNGSDP to that obligation is also set out clearly – and exhaustively – in those written contracts. The common intention when PNGSDP was established was that it should eventually become a self-governing and self-perpetuating organisation modelled on the Ford Foundation. The changes to its corporate governance framework which PNGSDP effected in 2012 and 2013 – and which the State challenges in this action – is not a case of PNGSDP or its directors going rogue. It is just the next step in carrying into effect the common intention when PNGSDP was established.
Facts
The Ok Tedi mine
- [8]
[8] The factual background to this dispute starts in 1976. That is when the State and BHP entered into a contract to develop the Ok Tedi mine. The Ok Tedi is a particularly rich gold and copper mine in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea. In accordance with that contract, OTML was incorporated as a Papua New Guinean company limited by shares. Its shareholding was split as follows:
BHP 52%
The State 20%
Inmet Mining Corporation 18%
Mineral Resources Ok Tedi No 2 Limited 10%
OTML’s primary assets were and are the physical mine itself and a mining licence which gives it the right to exploit the mine until 2022.
- [10]
[10] The Prime Minister of the State in late 2000 was Sir Mekere Morauta. Sir Mekere was not keen to close the mine. The State recognised that the mine had caused significant environmental damage and that it would cause even more damage as long as it was in operation. But it felt on balance that the mine should continue operating because of the significant economic benefits it brought to Papua New Guinea and to the people of the Western Province.
- [11]
[11] In late 2000, OTML appointed NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd (“Rothschild”) to facilitate negotiations between all the relevant stakeholders on arrangements to allow BHP to exit from OTML while allowing the mine to continue operating. In June 2001, BHP entered into a merger with Billiton plc. The merged company came to be known as BHP Billiton Ltd (“BHPB”). Nothing material to this dispute turns on the merger. For convenience and except where necessary, therefore, I shall not distinguish between BHP and BHPB in the remainder of this judgment.
- [12]
[12] Negotiations proceeded apace for BHP’s exit from OTML between BHP, the State, OTML’s shareholders and OTML’s stakeholders. By the middle of 2001, negotiations had advanced to the point where parties had reached a broad, tentative consensus on key issues. That consensus is recorded in a document dated 29 June 2001 and titled “Heads of Agreement”.
- [13]
[13] The Heads of Agreement envisages: (a) BHP transferring 90% of its shareholding in OTML to a special purpose vehicle; and (b) the State releasing BHP from, and indemnifying BHP against, claims arising from all liability for the environmental damage caused by the mine. Because the parties had not yet arrived at a consensus on a number of other issues, the Heads of Agreement explicitly records that it is not legally binding.
- [14]
[14] Negotiations continued. By October 2001, BHP’s exit plan was sufficiently concrete for the parties to take steps which were legally binding. The thrust of the exit plan was for BHP to gift its entire shareholding in OTML to a special purpose vehicle in return for: (a) the State releasing and indemnifying BHP in relation to liability arising from its operation of the mine; (b) the State guaranteeing that it would not prosecute BHP in connection with its operation of the mine; and (c) the State enacting legislation giving statutory effect to these key points.
- [15]
[15] PNGSDP was duly incorporated on 20 October 2001 in Singapore to be the special purpose vehicle to whom BHP would divest its OTML shares. Singapore was chosen for a number of reasons: (a) because of its robust corporate governance regime; (b) because of its relative tax advantages; and (c) because Singapore law allows a company’s liability to be limited by guarantee.
- [16]
[16] On 20 December 2001, the State duly passed the Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplement) Agreement Act 2001 (PNG) (the “Ninth Supplement Act”). The Ninth Supplement Act gave the force of law in Papua New Guinea to the key elements of BHP’s exit plan.
PNGSDP’s corporate constitution
- [17]
[17] It is common ground that PNGSDP’s corporate constitution is set out in three documents: (a) its Memorandum of Association (“the Memorandum”); (b) its Articles of Association (“the Articles”); and (c) a document called the “Program Rules” which is annexed to and forms part of the Articles.
- [18]
[18] PNGSDP’s Memorandum is typical of the memorandum of association of a company limited by guarantee. It simply sets out in broad terms the objects and powers of PNGSDP.
- [19]
[19] PNGSDP’s Articles, too, are for the most part typical of the articles of association of a company limited by guarantee. The Articles set out in some detail the internal governance framework of PNGSDP. This includes, amongst other things, the procedures for: (a) appointing members; (b) appointing directors; and (c) holding and conducting meetings of both members and directors. In particular, Article 24 provides that BHP has the right to appoint three of PNGSDP’s six directors (the “A” directors) and that three agencies of the State identified in Article 24 by name have the right to appoint one director each (the “B” directors). The provisions of the Articles, including Article 24, feature heavily in this dispute. I shall discuss them in greater detail as they become relevant.
- [20]
[20] Unlike the Memorandum and the Articles, the Program Rules are a bespoke document, unique to PNGSDP. The purpose of the Program Rules is to govern how PNGSDP’s income – primarily the dividends declared on its OTML shares, but also its investment income, is to be managed and applied. As a matter of form, the Program Rules are annexed to the Articles as a schedule. They therefore take effect as part of the statutory contract comprised in the Articles. But the Program Rules also have independent contractual effect. Thus, although both the State and BHP are not parties to the statutory contract embodied in the Articles and cannot therefore have any rights under the Articles which are directly enforceable against PNGSDP, it is common ground that both the State and BHP have a legal right: (a) to veto any amendment by PNGSDP to the Program Rules; and (b) to compel PNGSDP to comply with the Program Rules. The Program Rules also feature heavily in this dispute, and I shall discuss them in greater detail as they become relevant.
Other transaction documents
- [21]
[21] The incorporation of PNGSDP on the terms set out in its constitutional documents was only the first of a series of steps which the parties implemented to carry out BHP’s agreed exit plan. The State and BHP continued to enter into yet more written contracts after PNGSDP’s incorporation. Now, however, PNGSDP was a party to these further contracts. The contracts which form part of this suite and which are relevant to this dispute are:
(a) a master agreement dated 11 December 2001 between the State, BHP, BHPB, PNGSDP and certain other entities (the “Master Agreement”);
(b) a deed of indemnity dated 11 December 2001 between PNGSDP and BHP;
(c) a deed of indemnity dated 11 December 2001 between PNGSDP and the State;
(d) a security deed dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP, OTML and Insinger Trust (Singapore) Limited (“Insinger”) (“the Security Deed”);
(e) a security trust deed dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP, OTML, BHP and Insinger (“the Security Trust Deed”); and
(f) an equitable mortgage of shares dated 7 February 2002 between PNGSDP and Insinger.
- [22]
[22] After the parties executed this suite of contracts, BHP transferred its entire 52% shareholding in OTML to PNGSDP. That transfer took place on 7 February 2002.
Changes to PNGSDP’s governance structure in 2012 and 2013
- [23]
[23] As I have noted, PNGSDP’s corporate governance was quite uneventful from the time of its incorporation until 2012. Its corporate constitution was amended during that period. These amendments included amendments to the Program Rules and amendments to substitute one State agency for another State agency as being empowered to appoint a “B” director. None of these changes attracted any controversy or engendered any litigation.
- [24]
[24] The same cannot be said of the changes to PNGSDP’s corporate governance which took place in 2012 and 2013. An external observer could well conclude that these changes to PNGSDP’s corporate governance were not unconnected to changes to Papua New Guinea’s national governance around that time. First, some background: Sir Mekere served as prime minister of Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2002. During that time, as I have mentioned, BHP decided to and thereafter did divest its shareholding in OTML. In 2002, Sir Mekere was succeeded as Prime Minister by Sir Michael Somare, who held office until 2011. In 2011 and 2012, Papua New Guinea was engulfed by a constitutional crisis. That crisis saw both Sir Michael and Mr Peter O’Neill claim simultaneously to be the legitimate Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea. A general election was held in July 2012 in an effort to resolve the constitutional crisis. Sir Mekere declined to seek re-election to his seat in that general election. Mr O’Neill’s party won the election. He was sworn in as Prime Minister in August 2012. Prime Minister O’Neill has held office as the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from August 2012 to the present day.
- [25]
[25] Soon after the 2012 general election, at Prime Minister O’Neill’s direction, the State began to investigate the manner in which PNGSDP’s assets were being used. The particular concern was to ascertain whether those assets were in fact being used to benefit the people of Papua New Guinea. The State took into account the prevailing sentiment of the people of Papua New Guinea that BHP, as a foreign entity, should no longer be involved in the governance of PNGSDP and that there were suitably qualified Papua New Guineans to assume all positions of authority within PNGSDP. The State therefore decided to engage BHP in negotiations on the terms of BHP’s exit from PNGSDP and a restructuring of PNGSDP.
- [26]
[26] At about the same time, PNGSDP was also in the process of reviewing its corporate constitution. In October 2012, that review culminated in the directors of PNGSDP making the first set of changes to its corporate constitution. The changes weakened the links which PNGSDP had until then had with both BHP and the State.
(a) Article 24(A) of the Articles was amended to transfer the right to appoint “A” directors from BHP to the “A” directors themselves;
(b) Articles 37(A) and 38 of the Articles were amended to increase the requirements for a quorum and for a majority at directors’ meetings to two “A” directors and one “B” director instead of one “A” director and one “B” director; and
(c) a new Clause 8A was added to the Memorandum to entrench the appointment process of the “A” directors and the requirements for quorum and majority at board meetings, such that those articles in the Articles could not be amended unless all members of PNGSDP agreed.
- [27]
[27] The chairman of PNGSDP’s board of directors in 2012, and indeed since PNGSDP’s inception, was Prof Garnaut. Together with these changes in October 2012, Prof Garnaut stepped down as a director of PNGSDP and as the chairman of its board. Sir Mekere was appointed to PNGSDP’s board and assumed chairmanship of the board that same month.
- [28]
[28] With these changes in place, the negotiations then commenced between the State and BHP for BHP’s exit from PNGSDP. In March 2013, Prime Minister O’Neill wrote to Sir Mekere (in the latter’s capacity as chairman of PNGSDP) informing him of the State’s intention to commence negotiations to purchase PNGSDP’s shares in OTML. He asked Sir Mekere to put together a negotiating team for PNGSDP. The negotiations commenced. Eventually, the negotiations involved BHP as well. The negotiations failed to yield an agreement.
- [29]
[29] When it became apparent that the negotiations had failed, the State and PNGSDP each took unilateral action to achieve their desired outcome in the negotiations.
- [30]
[30] On 19 September 2013, the Papua New Guinea Parliament passed the Mining (Ok Tedi Tenth Supplemental Agreement) Bill 2013 and the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation) (Ninth Supplemental Agreement) (Amendment) Bill 2013. The effect of these two statutes was: (a) to cancel all of the ordinary shares in OTML which PNGSDP held; (b) to issue an identical number of new shares in OTML to the State; (c) to grant the Prime Minister the discretion to declare whether the State would pay compensation for these shares, and if so, to whom, in what sum and on what terms; and (d) to give the State “all necessary powers to restructure” PNGSDP.
- [31]
[31] PNGSDP, in response, effected two further rounds of changes to its corporate constitution. In October 2013, the directors of PNGSDP appointed Sir Mekere as a member of PNGSDP, a status he was to hold concurrently with his position as a director and as chairman of the board of directors. In the same month, the members of PNGSDP resolved to delete Article 24(B) of the Articles. This removed the right of the three State agencies named in that Article to appoint “B” directors, whether afresh or as replacements for existing “B” directors. The amendment also introduced a new “fit and proper” test to assess the suitability of the existing “B” directors to hold office as a director. In March 2014, Article 24(B) was further amended to give the members of PNGSDP the right to appoint, replace and remove “B” directors.
Procedural history
- [32]
[32] In October 2013, the State attempted to appoint a transitional management team to take charge of PNGSDP. PNGSDP, being a company incorporated in Singapore, commenced proceedings in Singapore by way of Originating Summons 1036 of 2013 (“OS 1036”) to challenge the State’s attempt. In July 2014, Prakash J, as she then was, converted OS 1036 into a writ action with the State as plaintiff. That writ action is Suit 795 which has now been tried before me.
- [34]
[34] In October 2014, the State filed an application in Summons No 5440 of 2014 (“Summons 5440”) seeking to compel PNGSDP to allow the State to inspect PNGSDP’s accounts, books of account, and other records. Prakash J set aside Summons 5440 on the ground that the relief prayed for, being final relief, could not be sought by an interlocutory application but instead ought to have been sought by originating process. The State responded by filing Originating Summons 234 of 2015 (“OS 234”) in March 2015, seeking essentially the same relief as it had sought by Summons 5440.
- [35]
[35] Prakash J gave her decision on the State’s application in OS 234 in February 2016. Her decision is reported as Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd [2016] 2 SLR 366 (“PNGSDP (OS 234)”). She held that the State had a right of inspection on the terms of Clause 9 and Article 52 of PNGSDP’s Memorandum by virtue of a collateral contract, the ratification of which PNGSDP was estopped from denying. She further held that the State’s right of inspection was limited only to the documents described in Clause 9 of the Memorandum.
The parties’ cases
- [37]
[37] The essence of the State’s case is that the agreement between BHP, the State and PNGSDP in relation to PNGSDP’s corporate governance is not set out exhaustively in the suite of written contracts but is partly set out in those written contracts and partly oral. I shall refer to this partly written and partly oral overarching agreement pleaded by the State as “the Agreement”. As part of the Agreement, it was agreed between the State, BHP, and PNGSDP that the State would have certain rights of control and oversight over PNGSDP (the “Agreed Oversight Structure”), that those rights could not be changed or altered without the State’s consent (the “Consent Term”), and that the State is to be entitled to enforce these rights directly against PNGSDP (the “Direct Enforceability Term”).
- [38]
[38] The first of the State’s three main contentions is therefore that this partly written and partly oral agreement exists. The evidence that it exists includes the fact that PNGSDP was ultimately incorporated on the terms set out in its constitutional documents as envisioned by the Agreement, and the fact that various other written contracts which the Agreement contemplated being entered into were indeed ultimately entered into. Further, even if it is found that Consent Term and the Enforceability Term were not agreed as express terms of the Agreement, the State submits that those terms are nevertheless implied terms of the Agreement, because they are necessary to give business efficacy to the Agreement.
- [39]
[39] The State’s second main contention is that both the State and BHP intended PNGSDP to hold the OTML shares on a charitable trust for the purposes set out in Clause 3 of the Memorandum (“the Trust”), ie to advance a programme of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea, and in particular for the benefit of the people of the Western Province. The Trust was constituted once BHP made a gift of its shares in OTML to PNGSDP. There was no express declaration of trust, but none is needed because there is conduct evidencing the creation of the Trust.
- [40]
[40] The State’s third main argument depends on at least one of its first two arguments succeeding. The State argues that PNGSDP has breached either the Agreement or the Trust or both by: (a) effecting various changes to its Memorandum in contravention of the Agreed Oversight Structure; (b) failing to provide an account to the State of all its dealings with its assets, when it holds those assets for the benefit of the people of Papua New Guinea; and (c) dealing with its assets in breach of the Program Rules or in breach of PNGSDP’s agreed objects.
- [41]
[41] The State therefore claims the following substantive relief:
(a) declarations that the Agreed Oversight Structure cannot be amended without the consent of the State and BHP and that the State or BHP is entitled, acting alone, to seek a remedy against PNGSDP for a breach of the structure;
(b) a declaration that PNGSDP has acted in breach of the Agreement, in breach of the Trust or in breach of both;
(c) orders that the members’ and directors’ resolutions passed in October 2012 appointing Sir Mekere as director and Chairman of PNGSDP are invalid;
(d) orders directing that the directors’ resolution admitting Sir Mekere as a member of PNGSDP is invalid and consequently that he be removed as a member of PNGSDP;
(e) orders directing that members’ resolutions passed in 2013 and 2014 amending PNGSDP’s Memorandum and Articles are invalid;
- [42]
[42] PNGSDP’s response is threefold. First, PNGSDP denies that an Agreement was ever concluded in the form which the State alleges. Its case is that the State has failed to put forward evidence of any such Agreement, and moreover that the State’s witnesses have in fact conceded that the agreement between the parties on the occasion of PNGSDP’s incorporation was ultimately reduced into a suite of written contracts, leaving no scope for any aspect of the agreement to be partly oral, as the State alleges. This is supported by the fact that none of the parties involved in the negotiations was authorised to enter into purely oral agreements, and the fact that the complexity of the transaction demanded that it be documented entirely in written contracts. The State’s allegations concerning the existence of the Agreed Oversight Structure, the Direct Enforceability Term and the Consent Term are all afterthoughts and fabrications and can be contradicted or disproved by the objective documentary evidence. In particular, the fact that the State’s key witness, Dr Iacob Weis, has given evidence that the parties discussed which terms of the parties’ agreement were to be entrenched and therefore immutable and which were to be directly enforceable eliminates any possibility of now finding implied terms about entrenchment or enforceability.
- [43]
[43] Second, PNGSDP also denies the existence of the Trust. PNGSDP is neither a trust nor the trustee of a trust. It is instead a company limited by guarantee. No trust was ever declared. And it would be wholly inconsistent with PNGSDP receiving the OTML shares as a trustee for it to grant a security interest over its assets to a third party, as it was obliged to and did by the Security Trust Deed.
- [44]
[44] Third, because there is no Agreement and there is no Trust, no question of whether PNGSDP has breached one or both of them even arises.
- [45]
[45] PNGSDP therefore rejects all of the State’s claims, and further brings counterclaims for:
(a) a declaration that the State’s attempt to remove all of the directors of PNGSDP in October 2014 is of no legal effect, as is the State’s attempt to terminate Mr David Sode’s appointment as Managing Director of PNGSDP in October 2014; and
(b) a declaration that the directors of PNGSDP as appointed from time to time in accordance with PNGSDP’s Memorandum and Articles as they now stand have the full authority to manage the business of PNGSDP in accordance with corporate constitution.
Issues to be determined
- [46]
[46] The positions taken by the parties leave the following three main issues for me to decide:
(a) First, was there a partly oral, partly written Agreement between BHP, the State, and PNGSDP in or around late 2001 in respect of BHP’s exit from OTML? And if so, what were the terms of that agreement?
(b) Second, does PNGSDP hold its assets and the dividends therefrom on the charitable Trust alleged?
(c) Third, if either the Agreement or the Trust is found to exist, has PNGSDP breached either the Agreement or the Trust?
- [47]
[47] Before I turn to deal with these three main issues, however, the State and PNGSDP have each raised a host of preliminary issues. Those have to be resolved at the outset, because they have a bearing on the determination of the main issues. I therefore turn to consider these preliminary issues now.
Preliminary issues
Whether the State has failed to join an essential party
- [48]
[48] The first preliminary issue concerns PNGSDP’s submission that the State’s claims fail entirely because the State failed to join BHP as a party to Suit 795, which it was obliged to do because BHP is a party to the Agreement which the State alleges to exist. PNGSDP submits that the State’s case is that, by virtue of the Agreement, PNGSDP made a single promise jointly to both the State and BHP. It is clear that the State and BHP are joint promisees because the State’s case is that the Agreed Oversight Structure vests “oversight of PNGSDP … equally between BHP and the State”.
- [49]
[49] When a promisor makes a single promise to two or more promisees jointly, one of the joint promisees cannot sue the promisor without the other joint promisees being parties to the action: Petrie v Bury 107 ER 764; Cullen v Knowles and Birks [1898] 2 QB 380. If a joint promisee refuses to be joined as a plaintiff, he must be joined as a defendant: Johnson v Stephens and Carter Ltd [1923] 2 KB 857. PNGSDP’s position is that, on the State’s own case, BHP is a joint promisee with the State but is neither a plaintiff nor a defendant in this action.
- [51]
[51] The State’s response is that its case is not that PNGSDP made a single promise to the State and BHP as joint promisees. Instead, its case is that PNGSDP made two promises to the State and to BHP severally. Where a promisor makes a separate promises to more than one promisee severally, the law is that any one or more of the promisees is competent to bring an action against the promisor and it is not necessary to join all of the other several promisees. For this proposition, the State cites Edwin Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2015) at para 13-024.
- [52]
[52] In my view, the State’s case is one of PNGSDP making separate promises to BHP and the State severally. It is true that the Agreed Oversight Structure which is alleged by the State is said to vest oversight of PNGSDP in both the State and BHP. But when seen in its proper context, it is obvious that the State and BHP have separate interests that, on the State’s case, the Agreed Oversight Structure was intended to protect separately. The Agreed Oversight Structure was therefore intended to be enforceable by the State and BHP independently of each other. This is also true of, for example, the Consent Term. On the State’s pleaded case, the Agreed Oversight Structure would make no sense if the party whose rights had been breached would have to ask the other party, who stood to gain from the breach, for its consent jointly to enforce their rights against PNGSDP.
- [53]
[53] As a case in point, the State cites the English High Court decision of Catlin v Cyprus Finance Corporation (London) Ltd [1983] 1 QB 759 (“Catlin”). In that case, a husband and wife gave a mandate to a bank to honour all cheques and orders, but only if they were signed by both account holders. The bank paid out money without the wife’s approval. The wife sought declarations against the bank without joining her husband to the proceedings. Bingham J decided in favour of the wife. He held that although the mandate was a single document signed by each joint account holder and contained “no hint of anything other than a joint obligation”, the duty must – “to make sense” – “have been owed to the account holders severally, because “the only purpose of requiring two signatures was to obviate the possibility of independent action by one account holder to the detriment of the other”: at 771. The State says that the present case parallels Catlin.
- [54]
[54] I accept the State’s characterisation of PNGSDP’s obligations as being obligations which it owed severally to the State and BHP. It is always a question of construction whether an agreement under which a promisor undertakes an obligation to more than one promisee is a single promise made jointly to the promisees or comprises several promises made to the promisees severally. Like all questions of contractual construction, the answer ultimately depends on the intention of the parties, objectively ascertained. The best guide to ascertaining the intention of the parties is to look at the instrument itself and see what interests are intended to be protected: Palmer v Mallet (1887) 36 Ch 411.
- [55]
[55] It is clear to me that, although it is the State’s case that the State and BHP were both to have control and oversight of PNGSDP together, the State and BHP have separate and divergent interests in exercising that control and oversight. For example, the State and BHP each have the right to appoint a particular category of director. It must have been intended by the parties that a breach of this right would be actionable by the relevant appointing party, acting alone. And similarly, insofar as it is the State’s case that both the State and BHP have a right to inspect PNGSDP’s accounts and other records, it is clear that that right is intended to protect or advance the quite separate interests of BHP and the State. A party who obtains the accounts is able to use them to identify instances of corporate wrongdoing and mismanagement. The State and BHP, who answer to different constituencies and communities, would understandably have different interests in pursuing PNGSDP for any alleged wrongdoing. It is therefore neither inconsistent with the State’s own pleaded case nor a fundamental defect, in my view, for the State to have commenced this action without joining BHP as a party to it.
- [56]
[56] I also do not consider that the State’s case fails in limine simply because it seeks declaratory relief which would bind BHP even though BHP is not a party to this action. The practical consequence of that is either that the court withholds the declaratory relief from the State or cuts down the scope of any declaratory relief which is awarded by confining the relief so that BHP’s position remains unaffected. But the fact that a party may ultimately not obtain the full scope of the relief it claims does not mean that its claim is, at the outset, so fundamentally flawed that it fails in limine.
- [57]
[57] On both counts, therefore, my view is that the State’s claim is not fundamentally and fatally flawed simply because it has failed to join BHP to this action.
Dr Weis’ affidavit evidence
- [58]
[58] The next preliminary issue concerns the admissibility and, if admissible the weight, of the evidence of Dr Weis, a witness for the State. The question arises in the following circumstances. Dr Weis was already quite ill when this action came on for trial. Despite his illness, he gave evidence by video link from Israel, where he now lives. His cross-examination was cut short, however, when his condition deteriorated causing him to be hospitalised. Sadly, Dr Weis did not recover. He passed away without completing his cross-examination and with no opportunity for re-examination.
- [59]
[59] Dr Weis was, in several respects, the key witness for the State. He was the only witness called by the State who was present at the negotiations over BHP’s exit from OTML. He was therefore the only one of the State’s two witnesses who could give direct evidence, within the meaning of s 62 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), of the Agreement.
- [60]
[60] The State relies on O 38 r 2(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”) as the relevant rule in this scenario. That rule, the State submits, gives the court the discretion to admit a witness’s affidavit of evidence in chief even when the witness fails to attend trial for cross-examination. That discretion should be exercised here, with the only question remaining being the weight to be given to the parts of Dr Weis’ evidence in chief on which he was not cross-examined.
- [61]
[61] At the close of the trial, I ruled that Dr Weis’ affidavits of evidence in chief were admissible, and admitted them. Counsel for PNGSDP accepted that the circumstances were extenuating, and did not object to counsel for the State’s submission that Dr Weis’ affidavit evidence should be allowed to stand, subject to submissions on weight. I took the view that, for quite obvious and unfortunate reasons, Dr Weis’ evidence had been cut short by events which could not have been foreseen and which were beyond anybody’s control. This was not at all analogous to a case where a witness failed entirely to attend for cross-examination at trial: Dr Weis had been forced by ill health to retire from the stand and prevented by death from completing his evidence. Further, Dr Weis had given evidence for two full days out of the four days originally scheduled for his testimony and had therefore given what I consider to be the bulk of his evidence on the critical issues in question in this action.
- [62]
[62] I made my ruling in the exercise of my discretion under O 38 r 2(1) and also in light of s 32(1)(k) of the Evidence Act. That provision allows an out-of-court statement to be admitted by agreement between the parties. The question of the weight given to Dr Weis’ evidence will be analysed below when I come to examine the main issues in dispute.
Whether the State can rely on Sir Mekere’s affidavits
- [63]
[63] Another evidential issue which was whether the State could rely on Sir Mekere’s affidavits filed in this action. The question arises because PNGSDP chose not to call Sir Mekere as a witness to be cross-examined at trial even though he had filed affidavits of evidence in chief and even though PNGSDP had given every indication right up until the last minute that he would be attending trial to be cross-examined on his affidavits of evidence in chief.
- [64]
[64] The affidavits of Sir Mekere’s that have been filed in this action fall into two categories: (i) affidavits which he swore for interlocutory proceedings in this action; and (ii) the affidavits of evidence in chief which he swore for the trial of this action. Curiously, it is the State, and not PNGSDP, who seeks to rely on Sir Mekere’s affidavits in both categories.
- [65]
[65] The State submits for several reasons that it can rely on all of Sir Mekere’s affidavits, even though Sir Mekere did not testify at trial. First, because these affidavits are admissible as admissions. Second, because PNGSDP’s witness, Mr Charles Mercey, who did testify at trial, confirmed and adopted parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits. Third, because PNGSDP is itself relying on these affidavits, having made reference to Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits in its written closing submissions.
- [66]
[66] I have no difficulties with the State’s second submission. Where Mr Mercey has confirmed and adopted aspects of Sir Mekere’s affidavit evidence as Mr Mercey’s own evidence, that evidence is undoubtedly proved and rendered admissible. But the evidence is admissible only as Mr Mercey’s evidence, and not as Sir Mekere’s.
- [67]
[67] The first and third submissions of the State, however, require closer examination. A hurdle which the State must surmount is O 38 r 2(1) of the Rules of Court:
The short point here is that Sir Mekere did not attend court to give his evidence, and the default operation of O 38 r 2(1) means that his affidavits of evidence in chief, at the very least, cannot even be received in evidence by the court. In other words, they cannot be admitted into evidence without the court’s leave.
- [68]
[68] The State argues that Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits stand in a different position to his affidavits of evidence in chief. His interlocutory affidavits, not being affidavits of evidence in chief, are not caught by O 38 r 2(1). The State presumably relies on O 38 r 2(2) for support, because that rule provides that in “any application made by summons, evidence shall be given by affidavit” unless the Rules or the court so directs.
- [69]
[69] In my view, however, Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits cannot stand in a better position than his affidavits of evidence in chief. The State seeks to rely on the interlocutory affidavits at trial, and not on an interlocutory application. Any reliance on O 38 r 2(2) would therefore be misplaced.
- [71]
[71] Proceeding on the basis that Sir Mekere’s affidavits of evidence in chief and interlocutory affidavits are prima facie inadmissible because of his failure to attend at trial (save to the extent that Mr Mercey has adopted parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits as his own evidence), the next question is whether those affidavits are admissible on some other basis. Such other basis can be found only in the Evidence Act. Any parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits which amount to formal admissions are admissible despite his non-attendance, given that those affidavits are signed by Sir Mekere. Those parts are admissible under s 60 of the Evidence Act, which renders formal admissions admissible as proof of the facts contained in them. Any parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits which amount only to informal admissions, such as a statement made by Sir Mekere against his own interest or against PNGSDP’s interest within the meaning of s 21 of the Evidence Act, are also admissible in evidence, but only at the instance of the State against PNGSDP. Section 31 of the Evidence Act provides that informal admissions, unlike formal admissions, are not conclusive of proof of the matters which they admit. PNGSDP therefore remains entitled to challenge the truth of any informal admissions set out in Sir Mekere’s affidavits.
- [72]
[72] The fact that PNGSDP has relied on some parts of Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits in its submissions, however, does not in itself render those affidavits admissible. It is true that the affidavit of a witness who fails to attend at trial may be received in evidence if the matters contained in the affidavit are not contentious: Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v PD International Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR(R) 382. PNGSDP relied on Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits only to give background information about the transaction and the events leading up to this action. The State, however, uses that reliance to argue that it is entitled to rely on other parts of the affidavits to contend that the State, BHP and PNGSDP entered into the Agreement and that there was a Trust. These, however, are highly contentious questions which lie at the heart of the present dispute. Unless those parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits amount to admissions, they are not admissible simply because PNGSDP has relied on other non-contentious parts of those affidavits in its closing submissions.
- [73]
[73] The result of the above analysis is that the State is entitled to rely on those parts of any of Sir Mekere’s affidavits which amount to admissions, whether formal or informal; and PNGSDP is at liberty to challenge only those parts of Sir Mekere’s affidavits which amount to informal admissions. Other than this, Sir Mekere’s affidavits are not evidence in this action.
- [74]
[74] It is not productive at this point to identify the exact parts of Sir Mekere’s evidence on which they State may rely in this action. It suffices to point out that this is the approach I have taken in admitting and weighing his evidence for my decision.
Whether adverse inferences should be drawn against PNGSDP
- [75]
[75] The final preliminary issue concerns the State’s invitation to me to draw adverse inferences against PNGSDP for choosing not to call three of their witnesses who filed affidavits of evidence in chief – Sir Mekere, Mr Lim How Teck, and Mr Donald Manoa – to testify at trial; and for refusing to file an affidavit of evidence in chief from Mr Sode despite his position in PNGSDP and the many interlocutory affidavits which he has filed in these proceedings.
- [76]
[76] I first set out the relevant law. The Court is empowered by s 116 of the Evidence Act to presume against a party who withholds evidence that the withheld evidence would be unfavourable to that party:
- [77]
[77] The Court of Appeal recently summarised the principles governing the drawing of an adverse inference in Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 (“Sudha Natrajan”) at [20]:
- [78]
[78] With these principles in mind, I now turn to the parties’ arguments. The State’s first argument is that PNGSDP’s decision not to call Sir Mekere, Mr Lim, and Mr Manoa at trial caused severe prejudice to the State. PNGSDP consistently indicated that these three witnesses would give evidence at trial and would therefore be available for cross-examination. Senior Counsel for the State accordingly reserved certain lines of questioning for these three witnesses and did not pursue those lines with PNGSDP’s other witnesses. PNGSDP’s last-minute decision not to allow these three witnesses to be cross-examined at trial therefore caught the State by surprise, ambushing the State with a “calculated decision to shield their witnesses from cross-examination”.
- [80]
[80] The State’s second argument identifies specific reasons tied to the specific witnesses whom PNGSDP chose not to call at trial to support an adverse inference being drawn. In respect of Sir Mekere, the State argues that Sir Mekere was PNGSDP’s “most important witness”, and “main witness”. As Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2002, he had overall charge of the State’s position on the terms of BHP’s exit from OTML. As Chairman of PNGSDP’s board from October 2012 to August 2017, he was in overall control of PNGSDP during the entire period in which the alleged breaches of the Agreement and the Trust occurred. Further, the fact that Sir Mekere filed numerous affidavits in these proceedings shows that he had much material evidence to give and to be cross-examined on. In particular, his affidavits suggest that he had personal knowledge of the Agreement.
- [81]
[81] It appears that the adverse inference I am invited to draw against Sir Mekere is this: that Sir Mekere would not have been able to explain away the statements which he had so readily made on affidavit at the outset of the proceedings.
- [82]
[82] There are two reasons why I decline to draw an adverse inference against PNGSDP for not calling Sir Mekere. The first is that an adverse inference should be drawn only where there has been a failure to call a witness whose testimony would be of superior evidential value in respect of the facts to be proved than the evidence put before the court: Buksh v Miles 296 DLR (4th) 608 at [30], cited with approval in Sudha Natrajan at [26]. As PNGSDP rightly points out, Mr Mercey is a witness who did give evidence for PNGSDP and who can give direct evidence within the meaning of s 62 of the Evidence Act of the relevant facts as far as any alleged Agreement or Trust is concerned. Mr Mercey actually participated in the negotiations, whereas Sir Mekere merely appointed the negotiating team for the State. As between Sir Mekere and Mr Mercey, only Mr Mercey can give direct evidence of the negotiations in which the State alleges the Agreement was concluded and the Trust constituted. Further, I note that Sir Mekere appointed the negotiating team for the State. I consider that the State’s case in this regard is already amply supported by having Dr Weis give evidence, seeing that Dr Weis was integral to that negotiating team.
- [83]
[83] If I am wrong on the above, I also consider that a separate reason for not drawing an adverse inference is that the State has simply not identified with sufficient specificity what inference it invites me to draw. The Court of Appeal in Sudha Natrajan at [23] indicated that although the inference to be drawn is not necessarily confined to the undisclosed evidence, the court cannot simply speculate as to what the evidence may show. The court “must put its mind to the manner in which the evidence that is not produced is said to be unfavourable when drawing the adverse inference under s 116(g)” [emphasis in original]. Thus the Court of Appeal in Sudha Natrajan carefully picked through the facts to identify the precise extent to which the evidence not given would have been unfavourable to the party who did not call the witness (at [25]).
- [84]
[84] Here, the State seems to suggest that Sir Mekere would have given evidence unfavourable to PNGSDP by testifying that the Agreement had been concluded. But this might not be correct. As the State itself points out, Sir Mekere in his numerous affidavits covered a wide range of topics, and could reasonably be expected to have given evidence on any one of them. It is not clear that he would necessarily have given evidence that the Agreement was concluded exactly in the form alleged by the State. I am therefore unable to determine the precise extent to which the evidence which he would have given would have been unfavourable to PNGSDP. In any event, drawing an adverse inference simply that the State’s entire case is proved appears to me to be wrong in principle. It would effectively reverse the burden of proof in this action. That burden lies on the State, as the plaintiff, to prove through its own witnesses and evidence that an agreement was in fact reached or a trust in fact created.
- [85]
[85] For all these reasons, I decline to draw an adverse inference against PNGSDP for not calling Sir Mekere at trial.
- [86]
[86] The State has also invited me to draw an adverse inference against Mr Lim How Teck and Mr Donald Manoa. Both men hold office as directors of PNGSDP. Mr Lim was appointed in January 2003 and Mr Manoa in October 2002. The State contends that both men could have given evidence regarding the breaches of the Program Rules and could also have testified that PNGSDP ran its operations over its lifetime consistently with the alleged Agreed Oversight Structure.
- [87]
[87] The State argues that PNGSDP deliberately chose not to call Mr Lim and Mr Manoa as witnesses as an exercise in damage limitation. Mr Philip James Bainbridge, PNGSDP’s current chairman, gave evidence as scheduled before both of them. The State says that Mr Bainbridge was “thoroughly discredited” on the stand when cross-examined about a worthless investment. Mr Lim, as chairman of the Audit Committee and the Investment and Finance Committee, would have been hard-pressed to explain the transaction. PNGSDP therefore chose not to call him because it knew that the transaction was indefensible. Mr Manoa, too, would have been unable to explain the transaction.
- [88]
[88] I decline to draw an adverse inference against PNGSDP for not calling Mr Lim and Mr Manoa as witnesses. As made clear in Sudha Natrajan at [20], no adverse inference need be drawn if the reason for the witness’s absence or silence can be explained to the court’s satisfaction. Here, I accept PNGSDP’s explanation that Mr Lim and Mr Manoa were not called because a significant part of their evidence had already been covered by other witnesses, such as Mr Bainbridge. To the extent that Mr Bainbridge’s evidence was “thoroughly discredited”, the State can hardly complain that PNGSDP made no attempt to remedy the discredit.
- [89]
[89] The State has also invited me to draw an adverse inference against PNGSDP for not having called Mr David Sode as a witness. Mr Sode is currently a director of PNGSDP, and was chief executive officer of PNGSDP from March 2008 to April 2016. I decline to draw an adverse inference. The State’s aim in having Mr Sode give evidence, if he had been called to the stand, was to cross-examine him with regard to the Frontier Resources investment. Mr Panganai Daniel Mangwayana, who has served as PNGSDP’s Financial Controller for approximately six years, and who did give evidence, was more than adequately informed to give evidence on the transaction.
Issue 1: the existence of the Agreement
- [90]
[90] I come now to consider the first, and the most heavily contested, of the main issues before me in this dispute. This concerns the State’s argument that there exists a partly oral, partly written Agreement which includes amongst its terms the Agreed Oversight Structure, the Direct Enforceability Term, and the Consent Term.
The Agreement
- [91]
[91] I start with the State’s pleaded case. The State’s pleads that the State and BHP reached the Agreement in or around October 2001, before PNGSDP was incorporated. In reaching the Agreement, the State was represented by Mr Koiari Tarata, Mr Iacob Weis, Mr Kuma Aua and Mr Graeme Hancock; and BHP was represented by Mr Graham Evans, Mr Gary Evans, and Mr Bill Smith. The State and BHP contracted on behalf of themselves, and also on behalf of PNGSDP. In other words, the State’s case is that PNGSDP is itself a party to the Agreement.
- [92]
[92] The terms of the Agreement are partly captured in various documents, including PNGSDP’s Memorandum, Articles and the Program Rules. These comprise the written component of the Agreement.
- [93]
[93] The Agreement is evidenced by the incorporation of PNGSDP on the terms of its constitutional documents, the Ninth Supplement Act, the Master Agreement, and the various security deeds and deeds of indemnity.
- [94]
[94] A principal term of the Agreement is that BHP would gift its shares in OTML to PNGSDP to hold those shares for the benefit of the people of Papua New Guinea, and to use its assets to advance a programme of sustainable development in Papua New Guinea and in the Western Province.
- [95]
[95] The principal terms of the Agreement pleaded by the State which are most relevant to this dispute include the Agreed Oversight Structure, the Direct Enforceability Term and the Consent Term. The State pleads that the Agreed Oversight Structure is a principal term of the Agreement. The Direct Enforceability Term and the Consent Term, on the other hand, are either implied terms of the Agreement or terms which can be drawn out of the Agreement by a contextual interpretation of the constitutional documents. These two terms are ancillary to the Agreed Oversight Structure in the sense that they depend on the Agreed Oversight Structure being found to exist. The effect of the Direct Enforceability Term is to give BHP and the State each a (separate) right to enforce the Agreed Oversight Structure directly against PNGSDP. The effect of the Consent Term is to prohibit PNGSDP making unilateral amendments to the Agreed Oversight Structure. Put that way, it is clear that these two ancillary terms have no independent existence. They cannot exist unless the Agreed Oversight Structure is found to exist in the first place.
- [96]
[96] The State’s case is that the Agreement is binding on PNGSDP as a pre-incorporation contract which it duly ratified upon incorporation. The actions of PNGSDP which evidence ratification of the Agreement include its entry into the Master Agreement, the security deeds and the indemnity deeds; and PNGSDP’s general pattern of post-incorporation compliance with the Articles and the Program Rules.
The Agreed Oversight Structure
- [97]
[97] The State particularises the details of the Agreed Oversight Structure in its pleadings as follows. The Agreed Oversight Structure reflects the parties’ agreement that oversight of PNGSDP was to vest equally in BHP and the State. In particular, the Agreed Oversight Structure provides that:
(a) the members, directors and staff of PNGSDP are to report to, and are accountable to, both BHP and the State;
(b) the right to appoint PNGSDP’s members and its directors is divided equally between BHP and the State; and
(c) BHP and the State are entitled to information about PNGSDP and to have access to its books of account, accounting records and other records.
- [98]
[98] Evidence of the Agreed Oversight Structure can also be found in various organisational charts in PNGSDP’s Annual Reports for Financial Years 2002 to 2011, which have been depicted in substantially the same manner as follows:
- [99]
[99] The State also pleads that the existence of the Agreed Oversight Structure is borne out in various provisions of PNGSDP’s constitutional documents, in particular in Clauses 8 and 9 of the Memorandum, in Articles 24, 37 and 52 of the Articles and in Rules 4.2 and 20 of the Program Rules.
The Direct Enforceability Term
- [100]
[100] The State pleads that the Direct Enforceability Term exists either as an implied term of the Agreement or as a term which can be drawn out of the Agreement by a contextual interpretation of PNGSDP’s constitutional documents. The effect of the Direct Enforceability Term is to ensure that each of BHP and the State may, acting alone, pursue PNGSDP directly to secure a contractual remedy for any breach by PNGSDP of the Agreed Oversight Structure. Such a term must exist because, unless the State and BHP each have the legal means acting alone to enforce the Agreed Oversight Structure directly against PNGSDP, the rights granted to BHP and the State under the Agreed Oversight Structure – such as the right to appoint members and directors, or the right to inspect PNGSDP’s books – would be meaningless.
The Consent Term
- [101]
[101] The State also pleads that the Consent Term exists as an implied term of the Agreement, or can be drawn out of the Agreement by a contextual interpretation of the constitutional documents. Such a term must exist to ensure that the Agreed Oversight Structure is not defeated or undermined by the unilateral acts of either the State, BHP or PNGSDP.
The State has failed to prove the Agreement
- [102]
[102] I turn now to consider the parties’ arguments. The parties make extensive and lengthy submissions on this particular issue, not all of which meet. The State does not enumerate its submissions, but it is not a mischaracterisation to say they are numerous. PNGSDP, for its part, identifies “seven main planks” why the Agreement does not exist. Each party also attempts to marshal the facts and align them into neat narratives – or indeed, theories – to explain why the Agreement must or cannot exist, which I have summarised above at [4] and [6].
- [103]
[103] The State, as the plaintiff, bears the burden of proving its case and therefore of proving that the Agreement exists. The State must prove that the Agreement exists on the evidence available as to the parties’ intention, objectively ascertained, in or around October 2001. The focus of the inquiry is therefore on what the parties’ objective intention was at that time, so far as that intention can be ascertained from the evidence. The focus is not on what the parties objectively must have intended. A fortiori, the focus is not on imputing an objective intention to the parties with hindsight.
- [104]
[104] I hold that the State has failed to discharge its burden of proof to show that the Agreement exists. I therefore find that there is no Agreement. I will now go through the parties’ arguments to explain why this is so. I begin with the evidence given by the witnesses before turning to the circumstantial evidence.
Sir Mekere’s affidavit evidence
- [105]
[105] The State devotes a lengthy portion of both its written and oral closing submissions to reciting extracts from Sir Mekere’s interlocutory affidavits and affidavits of evidence in chief. The State says that all of these extracts constitute admissions by Sir Mekere that the Agreement exists. According to the State, Sir Mekere repeatedly acknowledges in his affidavits that PNGSDP’s structure was specifically agreed, and was enforceable both by and against the State, and, for that matter by BHP. The State says that these are significant “concessions” made by Sir Mekere, all the more important because Sir Mekere was Prime Minister at the time and would therefore be best placed to explain the State’s position and understanding in respect of the negotiations and the Agreement.
- [107]
[107] It would be unwieldy to set out in full all of the extracts from Sir Mekere’s evidence on which the State relies. I therefore go through only a selection of the more important extracts.
- [108]
[108] The first extract the State relies on is taken from Sir Mekere’s first affidavit filed in support of OS 1036. Sir Mekere says that in that application, PNGSDP seeks “certain declarations and consequential injunctive relief as against [the State] … to ensure that all actions purportedly taken in relation to [PNGSDP] and/or on behalf of [PNGSDP] are properly authorised, lawful and consistent with [PNGSDP’s] Memorandum”. The State says that in this affidavit Sir Mekere effectively acknowledges that PNGSDP and the State are “parties to an agreement… which could be enforced against each other”.
- [109]
[109] I cannot accept this submission. It is not apparent to me that Sir Mekere, by using these words, was admitting the existence of an agreement between the State and PNGSDP that the State could enforce the provisions of PNGSDP’s Memorandum against PNGSDP. Further, even taking the State’s case at its highest, it is not clear that the natural inference to be drawn from Sir Mekere’s statement is that an overarching Agreement exists independently of the Memorandum and Articles that PNGSDP was seeking to enforce. An equally plausible inference is that Sir Mekere was trying to support PNGSDP’s attempt to enforce its Memorandum and Articles against the State, which is wrong in law. Sir Mekere is, after all, a layperson, and may therefore have been misinformed as to the law that a company’s Memorandum and Articles cannot confer rights or create obligations binding on non-members: Malayan Banking Ltd v Raffles Hotel Ltd [1965–1967] SLR(R) 161. Indeed, the State in its own submissions also appears to think that PNGSDP had commenced OS 1036 “to enforce the terms of the [Memorandum & Articles] against the State”, and not to enforce a separate overarching Agreement.
- [110]
[110] The State relies on another example from the same affidavit. Sir Mekere says the following:
- [111]
[111] The State emphasises in its arguments that the structure of PNGSDP was carefully designed to promote accountability and transparency. The implication apparently is that the structure must be permanent, or at least immutable unless the parties agree. But catchwords and labels such as “accountability” and “transparency” do not amount to a legal argument that there is an Agreement that the structure would be permanent. Further, it certainly does not help the State’s case that when Sir Mekere particularises PNGSDP’s safeguards in the governance structure in the above extract, he references PNGSDP’s Memorandum, Articles and the Program Rules and how these were designed to promote accountability and transparency in the management and operation of PNGSDP. There is no allusion to a separate, overarching Agreement at all.
- [112]
[112] The State also refers to Sir Mekere’s second affidavit filed to resist Summons 1669. This time, the State relies on a lengthier extract, which I have reproduced in full:
- [113]
[113] The State’s basic points, and my analysis of those points, remain largely the same. First, the State emphasises that the structure of PNGSDP was deliberately designed to protect the monies in the Development Fund and the Long Term Fund. I agree that that is what this extract says. I would even agree that that was the parties’ contemporaneous intention in October 2001, objectively ascertained. But the extract says nothing directly, or even by allusion, about an overarching Agreement incorporating an oral agreement that that structure would be set in aspic and immutable. Much less does the extract explain how that can be the case if the constitutional documents themselves envisage and allow the structure to be changed.
- [114]
[114] Second, the State points out that Sir Mekere recognised the importance of safeguards, in that “even the most well-designed structure would be useless if there was no way to ensure that it would be complied with and strictly enforced”. It is, of course, impossible to disagree with a statement pitched at such a high level of generality. I am also quite prepared to accept that that was the parties’ contemporaneous intention, objectively ascertained. Indeed, commercial logic and common sense, if nothing else, compel me to agree with it. But Sir Mekere goes on to identify the specific safeguards. Nothing in what he says suggests anything along the lines of the Agreement, incorporating the Agreed Oversight Structure, the Direct Enforceability Term or the Consent Term. Instead, Sir Mekere elaborates on the specific safeguards which the parties intended. This includes the Memorandum and Articles being drafted deliberately to ensure a “particular emphasis on strong governance mechanisms, accountability and transparency”. This includes incorporating PNGSDP in Singapore so that the parties can have resort to Singapore’s courts in the event of a dispute. This includes the objects expressly defined in the Memorandum. This includes the provision preventing the Memorandum and Articles from being amended so as to alter the Program Rules.
- [115]
[115] The result of the above analysis is that the State appears to be putting far more weight on the meaning of Sir Mekere’s words than they can justifiably bear. Certainly, nothing in his affidavits goes as far as admitting or conceding an Agreement of the sort alleged by the State, incorporating an oral agreement to have in place an elaborate Agreed Oversight Structure reinforced and supported by the Direct Enforceability Term and Consent Term.
Mr Charles Mercey’s evidence
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