Court of Appeal · Decided 14 October 2020
CDV v CDW
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 100 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 4 of 2020 · 49 paragraphs
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Introduction
Background facts
The divorce and the Consent Order
- [5]
[5] The Husband and the Wife were married on 12 August 1973. As of 2 December 2019, the date of the first hearing before the Judge, the Husband and the Wife were 73 and 70 years old respectively: see CDV v CDW [2020] SGHC 61 (“GD”) at [16].
The Husband’s remarriage and financial difficulties
- [8]
[8] Following the divorce, the Husband married his present wife (“the Present Wife”). They co-own a five-room Housing and Development Board flat (“the HDB Flat”) which was purchased in 1998. The Husband and the Present Wife have a son who is 25 years old (“the Son”). The Son matriculated into a local university in 2016.
- [9]
[9] According to the Husband, he has been estranged from the Present Wife for the past ten years. He currently lives with his mother-in-law and the Son in the HDB Flat.
- [10]
[10] At the time of the divorce in 1994, the Husband was earning a salary of about $2,000 per month. As recently as in 2013, his annual income was $98,933.00. However, the Husband claims that he has been experiencing financial difficulties since 2015. Although he drew a salary of around $7,000 per month in 2015, he claimed to have received only $3,000 per month. Thereafter, he joined a new company. Although the agreed monthly salary was $3,000, he claimed to have received only $2,000 per month. At the time the present application was filed, he had “not been paid on a regular basis for almost one and a half years”. His current salary is reportedly $2,000 per month.
- [11]
[11] The Husband’s financial difficulties resulted in the following consequences:
(a) He was unable to pay the monthly instalments on the HDB Flat for three years, leading to the accumulation of arrears.
(b) He had to use his credit card to pay the household expenses.
(c) He was unable to pay the electricity bills sometime in 2017 and 2018, and the Son had to take over the payment of these bills.
(d) He could not pay the Son’s university tuition fees, and his sister-in-law has been providing financial assistance to the Son.
- [12]
[12] We pause here to briefly comment on the Wife’s contention that the Husband has provided insufficient evidence of his alleged financial difficulties. Among other things, she asserts that the Husband has concealed his assets in Malaysia and has “intentionally neglected to pay his HDB mortgage loans, credit card bills and late payment charges”. No concrete evidence was adduced by the Wife in support of these allegations.
- [13]
[13] We note that the Judge was satisfied that “the Husband was clearly facing extreme financial difficulty” (see GD at [41]). We see no reason to disturb the Judge’s finding of fact in this regard, and will proceed to examine this appeal on the premise that the Husband is indeed facing genuine financial difficulties.
The Husband’s debts
- [14]
[14] We turn now to set out the debts owed by the Husband.
- [15]
[15] On 13 March 2019, the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (“OCBC”) served a statutory demand on the Husband for outstanding debts of $58,352.85 on various credit card accounts. The Husband did not satisfy the statutory demand.
- [16]
[16] On 11 December 2019, the Husband wrote to OCBC, stating that he would settle the full outstanding amount with OCBC after he was able to sell his half-share in the Matrimonial Home.
- [17]
[17] On 13 December 2019, OCBC’s solicitors responded as follows:
- [18]
[18] On 25 March 2020, after the Judge’s decision, OCBC served a second statutory demand on the Husband, with the debt now amounting to $80,557.68.
- [19]
[19] Apart from OCBC, the Husband owes $5,877.07 to Standard Chartered Bank (as of 18 June 2019). He also owes his sister-in-law $70,200.00 for the financial assistance she has rendered to the Son (as of 12 November 2019).
Compulsory acquisition of the HDB Flat
- [20]
[20] As noted above at [11(a)], the Husband has accumulated arrears in respect of his HDB monthly instalments. He was informed by the Housing and Development Board of its intention to compulsorily acquire the HDB Flat. On 22 April 2019, the Husband and the Present Wife appealed against the compulsory acquisition. It appears that no decision has been made to date, and the parties concerned are awaiting the outcome of the present appeal before us. In the event that the HDB Flat is compulsorily acquired, the compensation sum would be $585,000.
Application to vary the Consent Order
The decision below
- [23]
[23] On 16 December 2019, the Judge granted the Husband’s application.
- [29]
[29] In arriving at his decision, the Judge bore in mind that the Husband was not seeking to increase the size of his existing share of the Matrimonial Home. While he appreciated that the sale would cause the Wife distress, in his view, there would be sufficient funds for the Wife to buy another property (see GD at [46] and [47]).
- [30]
[30] The Judge granted a stay of execution on 27 March 2020 in the light of the Wife’s appeal against his decision.
The issues to be determined
- [31]
[31] There are two main issues in this appeal:
- [32]
[32] We outline the parties’ respective positions on these two issues.
- [36]
[36] For completeness, we briefly comment on the Husband’s contention that the Wife is no longer living in the Matrimonial Home. The Husband and the Son had visited the Matrimonial Home on at least three occasions in July 2019 but apparently found the place to be deserted. In response, the Wife claims that she is still living in the Matrimonial Home and has adduced evidence in support of this assertion (for example, utility bills and telephone bills). We note that the Judge did not make any finding on whether the Wife is presently living in the Matrimonial Home (see GD at [13], [19] and [27]). The Husband did not invoke O 57 r 9A(5) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) to affirm the Judge’s decision on an alternative ground, and we therefore do not need to consider this point further. In any event, based on the contested affidavit evidence alone, the Husband is unable to made good his assertion that the Wife is no longer living in the Matrimonial Home.
Issue 1: Whether the High Court could have invoked s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter to vary the Consent Order
The relevant statutory provisions
- [38]
[38] Section 112(1) and s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter state as follows:
- [40]
[40] We make two brief points in relation to the two provisions which have a material bearing on Issue 1.
Whether s 112(4) applies retrospectively to orders made under s 106 of the Women’s Charter (1985 Edition)
- [43]
[43] The central question in the present case is whether s 112(4) applies retrospectively to orders made under s 106 of the Women’s Charter (1985 Edition). The relevant principles governing the retrospective application of legislation are set out in our decision in ABU v Comptroller of Income Tax [2015] 2 SLR 420 (“ABU”) (see also Li Shengwu v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1081 at [131]). There are broadly two steps.
- [44]
[44] First, the court should apply the purposive approach to statutory interpretation to determine the temporal application of the legislation. This entails a “single overarching inquiry” as to parliamentary intent, which is to be found in the words of the law, its context, and the relevant extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation (see ABU at [76]).
- [45]
[45] Second, it is only if there is ambiguity that persists that recourse may be had to the various presumptions concerning the retrospective application of legislation. In this regard, we endorsed Lord Mustill’s formulation of the presumption against retrospectivity in L’Office Chefifien Des Phosphates v Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co Ltd [1994] 1 AC 486 (see ABU at [76]). Whether or not the presumption of retrospectivity should apply is a question of fairness. This question, in turn, requires an assessment of several factors including the degree of retrospective effect, the purpose of the legislation and the hardship of the result (at 526–527).
First step – purposive interpretation of s 112(4)
- [47]
[47] There are two possible interpretations of s 112(4):
(a) First, s 112(4) only applies to orders made under s 112 of the Women’s Charter (“the Narrow Interpretation”).
- [48]
[48] In our judgment, the Narrow Interpretation is the correct interpretation, for the following two reasons.
- [49]
[49] First, the Narrow Interpretation is consistent with the historical context which led to the repeal of s 106 and the introduction of s 112. Although s 112 and s 106 both concern the division of matrimonial assets, there are significant differences between them. In introducing s 112, Parliament did not simply renumber s 106 and added s 112(4) to that provision. In this regard, a helpful summary of the historical context can be found in the decision of the High Court in UYP v UYQ [2020] 3 SLR 683 (“UYP”) at [38]–[43].
- [50]
[50] Under s 106, there was a distinction between assets acquired by the parties’ joint efforts and those acquired by one party’s sole effort.
(a) In respect of the former group of assets, the court was to consider, among other things, “the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards the acquiring of the assets”. Subject to these considerations, the court was directed to “incline towards equality of division” (see s 106(2) of the Women’s Charter (1985 Edition) at [39] above).
(b) As regards the latter group of assets, the court was to consider, among other things, “the extent of the contribution made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or by caring for the family”. The court was directed to ensure that the party “by whose effort the assets were acquired … receive[d] a greater proportion” (see s 106(4) of the Women’s Charter (1985 Edition) at [39] above).
- [51]
[51] As recognised by the then Minister for Community Development during the second reading of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 5/1996), an anomaly existed under s 106. Where the asset was acquired jointly, s 106 did not require the court to take into consideration the parties’ homemaking efforts. Section 112 of the Women’s Charter (initially s 106 of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 1996) was therefore intended to be a “new section” that “provide[d] for a more equitable and just division of matrimonial assets” (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (2 May 1996) vol 66 at col 68 (Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister for Community Development)):
- [52]
[52] Section 112 therefore jettisoned the segregation of matrimonial assets between those jointly acquired and those acquired by one party’s sole effort. It also provided a single direction to the court, which was to achieve a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets. The circumstances that the court should take into account in determining a just and equitable division were also enlarged (see UYP at [40]).
- [54]
[54] The second reason in support of the Narrow Interpretation flows from s 186(3) of the Women’s Charter. We set out s 186 in its entirety:
- [55]
[55] By way of s 186(3), Parliament had therefore explicitly limited the temporal application of s 112. However, s 186(3) is not a savings provision for all proceedings commenced before 1 May 1997. Instead, it only applies to a “hearing” which had begun before 1 May 1997 and was not fully heard as of 1 May 1997, the date of commencement of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 1996. Section 186(3) does not apply to proceedings which had been fully heard as of 1 May 1997, such as the present case. That s 186(3) has a narrow scope of application can be discerned from the phrase “shall continue to apply to that hearing”, highlighted in bold italics at [54] above. Furthermore, the word “hearing” is specifically included in s 186(3) and is omitted from s 186(1) and s 186(2). If s 186(3) was intended to apply to all proceedings commenced before 1 May 1997, then it could have been phrased like s 186(1) and s 186(2) by referring to “proceedings” as opposed to “that hearing”. It is well established that Parliament shuns tautology and does not legislate in vain. The court should therefore endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment (see Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 at [38]).
Second step – whether it is unfair for s 112(4) to apply retrospectively
Consequences of s 112(4) being inapplicable to the present case
- [60]
[60] In a similar vein, this prevailing legal position was explained by Chao Hick Tin J (as he then was) in John Chin Ah Chai alias John Chin (formerly known as Chin Ah Chai) v Hee Ee Chu and Another [1994] SGHC 16, in the following terms:
Distinguishing the cases cited by the Husband
Issue 2: Whether the High Court should have varied the Consent Order under s 112(4) of the Women’s Charter
- [71]
[71] We begin by considering three peripheral arguments raised by the parties.
Sub-orders 4 and 5 do not confer on the Wife a “life interest” in the Matrimonial Home
Sub-orders 4 and 5 are continuing orders
- [76]
[76] In our judgment, the Wife’s submission is untenable. The distinction between continuing orders and executory orders was explained by Valerie Thean J in TYA v TYB [2018] 3 SLR 1170 at [28]:
- [78]
[78] In the circumstances, there is no merit to the Wife’s submission which, we reiterate, is a change of position on appeal.
Alleged common understanding at the time of the Consent Order
The relevant legal principles
- [81]
[81] We reiterate the relevant principles which were enumerated in AYM ([24] supra):
- [84]
[84] It is clear from the passage above that financial difficulties per se do not constitute unworkability. In this regard, we also refer to the following observations of Aedit Abdullah JC (as he then was) in Seah Kim Seng v Yick Sui Ping [2015] 4 SLR 731 (at [42] and [43]):
Whether the Consent Order is presently unworkable
Whether the Consent Order will be unworkable in future
- [87]
[87] There are two points in respect of this sub-issue.
Uncertainty over whether the Consent Order will become unworkable
(a) First, OCBC commences bankruptcy proceedings against the Husband, and the Husband is made a bankrupt by the court and the Husband fails to settle the judgment debt from other sources such as from the sale of the HDB Flat.
(c) Third, the court orders the Matrimonial Home to be sold against the Wife’s objections.
- [92]
[92] We note that based on the evidence before us, the Husband is likely to be able to avoid bankruptcy if he sells his HDB Flat. We elaborate on this at [99]–[104] below. For present purposes, we focus on the third event referred to above, namely, that the court orders the Matrimonial Home to be sold against the Wife’s objections.
- [93]
[93] In this regard, the applicable principles were set out in our recent decision in Ooi Chhooi Ngoh Bibiana v Chee Yoh Chuang (care of RSM Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd, as joint and several private trustees in bankruptcy of the bankruptcy estate of Freddie Koh Sin Chong, a bankrupt) and another [2020] SGCA 83. Although the court has the power to direct a sale of land under s 18(2) read with para 2 of the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), the court must be satisfied that it is “necessary or expedient” to do so. In this regard, the court has to undertake a balancing exercise, having regard to the following non-exhaustive factors (at [24]):
- [96]
[96] For completeness, we note that the Judge considered that even if bankruptcy did not ensue, OCBC would likely be entitled to obtain judgment against the Husband and seek an execution of its judgment debt against his half-share of the Matrimonial Home. OCBC could apply for a forced sale of the Matrimonial Home (see GD at [45]). However, it should be noted that the court will still be required to conduct the balancing exercise set out at [93] above. Furthermore, there is also an anterior question as to whether a judgment creditor has the right to apply for a sale of the property under s 18(2) of the SCJA. In Chan Lung Kien v Chan Shwe Ching [2018] 4 SLR 208, Chua Lee Ming J considered that this right is only given to co-owners of the property (at [40]). It is not necessary for us to decide this question in this appeal, but this underscores the point that a forced sale of the Matrimonial Home is far from straightforward.
Self-induced unworkability
- [98]
[98] In relation to the debts owed to OCBC, we note that OCBC appears amenable to working out an “acceptable repayment plan” with the Husband. It seems to us that the Husband has not seriously explored this option to date (see [17] above).
- [99]
[99] More importantly, the Husband does have another substantial asset to discharge his debts owed to OCBC, namely, the HDB Flat. The Judge appeared to accept the Husband’s assertion that the sale of the HDB Flat would not suffice for the Husband to discharge his debts owed to OCBC. The Judge stated as follows (see [21] of the GD):
- [100]
[100] However, the Husband’s assertion rests on two assumptions.
- [101]
[101] First, it assumes that the HDB Flat will be compulsorily acquired. However, there is nothing to prevent the Husband from selling the HDB Flat in the open market, which, in all likelihood, would result in a higher selling price. Indeed, the Wife has adduced evidence that, based on comparable transactions, the HDB Flat can be sold for at least $630,000 in the case of a voluntary sale.
- [102]
[102] Second, the Husband assumes that upon the sale of the HDB Flat, he will have to refund $192,488.34 to his CPF retirement account and the entire amount will have to be restored in that account. However, given that the Husband is past the age of 55, this assumption is likely to be incorrect. Indeed, CPF’s statement dated 10 December 2019, which is addressed to the Husband, states as follows:
- [103]
[103] Further, when we raised this point to the Husband’s counsel, Ms Seenivasan Lalita, at the hearing, she did not disagree that the Husband would be entitled to the balance refund beyond the amount that has to be set aside in his retirement account.
Conclusion