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Grounds publishedDecided 6 Mar 2020

Court of Appeal

Retrospect Investment (S) Pte Ltd v Lateral Solutions Pte Ltd and another

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[2020] SGCA 15Case no. Civil Appeal Nos 147 and 148 of 20197 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. Procedural history

  3. [2] In Suit No 236 of 2017 (“Suit 236”), the Appellant commenced a minority oppression action under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) against the Respondents, among other defendants. The parties were shareholders in Sei Woo Technologies Pte Ltd (“SWTPL”).

  4. Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction or power to amend the Consent Order in Suit 236 after its discontinuance

  5. [11] In our judgment, the starting point is that the High Court was functus officio once Suit 236 was discontinued (see Tan Kim Hai and Sons Enterprises Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tam Kim San and Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors (Hiap Lee (Choong Leong & Sons) Brickmakers Sdn Bhd & Anor, Interveners) [1996] 5 MLJ 593 at 600).

  6. [12] Nonetheless, it is well established that the court possesses the inherent jurisdiction and power to clarify the terms of its orders and to give consequential directions (see Godfrey Gerald QC v UBS AG and others [2004] 4 SLR(R) 411 (“Godfrey Gerald”) at [18] and Goh Yihan, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers of the Singapore Courts: Rethinking the Limits of their Exercise’ [2011] SJLS 178 (“Goh”) at 186).

  7. [13] In this regard, we refer to the following principles set out by the High Court in Godfrey Gerald at [18]–[19] (and endorsed by this court in Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2011] 4 SLR 791 at [5]):

  8. [14] We also refer to the following extract from Jeffrey Pinsler, Principles of Civil Procedure (Academy Publishing, 2013) at para 21.007:

  9. [15] In short, the functus officio doctrine exists to ensure finality in litigation. However, notwithstanding this, the court is able to make non-substantive amendments to its orders after the conclusion of the matter, as contemplated by O 92 r 5 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). This is not an uncommon occurrence (see for example, Thu Aung Zaw v Ku Swee Boon (trading as Norb Creative Studio) [2018] 4 SLR 1260 (“Thu Aung Zaw”) at [23]).

  10. [19] We do not accept the Respondents’ submission. In Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2020) at para 57/1/22, the extra cursum curiae doctrine is described in the following terms: “where, at the request of the parties, a judge decides a question outside the regular course of judicial proceedings … no appeal lies”. In other words, the essence of the doctrine is that no appeal shall lie against any decision so rendered. In the present case, there was no such request by the parties for the Judge to decide the valuation date outside the regular course of judicial proceedings. In our judgment, it is crystal clear that the parties had proceeded on the basis that the valuation date was to be decided in the regular course of judicial proceedings, albeit erroneously. The Judge heard the evidence, considered the parties’ submissions and certainly would not have regarded her decision as not being subject to appeal. There is no suggestion that the parties intended for the Judge’s decision to be final in the sense that they would waive their right of appeal against the decision (see Liew Kit Fah and others v Koh Keng Chew and others [2019] SGCA 78 at [27]). In fact, the conduct of the parties in the appeals is itself contrary to the applicability of the doctrine in this case.

  11. Conclusion