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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Nov 2019

Court of Appeal

Liew Kit Fah and others v Koh Keng Chew and others

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[2019] SGCA 78Case no. Civil Appeal No 115 of 2018

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] Less common, although not unheard of, is where parties agree to dispense with the issue of liability for oppression on condition that the majority shareholder makes no admission of liability, and proceed instead on the question of valuation of the subject shares. When this happens, there has been some suggestion in the authorities that the court’s powers under s 216(2) of the Companies Act are not engaged. However, for such cases, it is typically agreed between the parties that the majority will buy out the minority leaving only the question of valuation to be contested. This appeal concerns an atypical situation. While the minority agreed to dispense with the oppression suit and to part company with the majority, both parties wanted to buy out the other. Under these circumstances, the parties agreed to contest the buy-out issue both as regards the valuation of the shares as well as to decide on the party to buy out the other.

  3. [4] In the decision from which this appeal arises, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) directed an independent valuer appointed by the parties not to apply a discount for the lack of control and lack of marketability in valuing the shares of the respondents in various companies. The Judge’s Grounds of Decision are set out in Koh Keng Chew and others v Liew Kit Fah and others [2018] SGHC 262 (“the GD”).

  4. Facts

  5. The parties

  6. [5] The respondents hold 28.125% of the shares in the 7th to 16th defendants (the “Samwoh Group”) in Suit No 125 of 2014 (“Suit 125”); the appellants collectively hold the remaining 71.875%. Suit 125 is the respondents’ action, under s 216 of the Companies Act, against the appellants and the Samwoh Group for minority oppression.

  7. Background to the dispute

  8. (i) the appellants purchase the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group, or

  9. (ii) the respondents purchase the appellants’ shares in the Samwoh Group;

  10. (the “Buyout Issue”)

  11. at a price to be determined by an independent valuer who shall be appointed by parties’ mutual agreement, or failing such agreement, by the court;

  12. (b) Failing an agreement between the parties, the reference date for such independent valuation shall be determined by the court;

  13. (c) Failing an agreement between the parties, the costs arising from and in relation to the independent valuation shall be determined by the court;

  14. (e) Parties be granted liberty to apply; and

  15. (f) Costs of the action to be provided for.

  16. [7] Thus, by consent, the parties agreed that there was no need to explore the issue of liability for oppression at the trial. The court below only had to concern itself with the Buyout Issue. Significantly, this issue was to be determined without admission of liability by the appellants in respect of any of the alleged acts of oppression complained of.

  17. (a) the shares lack control because they are minority shares; and/or

  18. (b) the shares lack marketability because, being shares in privately held companies, they are subject to share transfer restrictions.

  19. [10] The respondents disagreed. The valuer thus requested the parties to obtain the court’s directions as to whether any of the discounts should be applied to his valuation of the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group. On 5 July 2018, the Judge, after considering the parties’ respective written submissions, directed that the value of the respondents’ shares was not to be discounted for either of the above reasons. Following this decision, the independent valuer, on 3 August 2018, issued its report valuing the respondents’ shareholding at about $66m, which was a pro-rated value of the Samwoh Group based on the respondents’ shareholding without the application of any discount. On 10 September 2018, the appellants bought out the respondents at that value. Civil Appeal No 115 of 2018 is the appellants’ appeal against the Judge’s direction to the independent valuer that the relevant discounts ought not to be applied in valuing the respondents’ shares.

  20. The parties’ arguments

  21. The appellants’ submissions

  22. [11] The appellants make two principal submissions in this appeal:

  23. The respondents’ submissions

  24. [12] The respondents make the following submissions:

  25. Issues to be determined

  26. [13] From the parties’ submissions, the following issues arise in this appeal:

  27. (c) Whether discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability ought to be applied to the valuation of the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group (“Issue 3”).

  28. Issue 1: The Buyout Order

  29. The court’s powers under s 216(2) of the Companies Act

  30. Application to the facts

  31. [25] Accordingly, we disagree with the respondents’ submissions that the Judge’s decision below was made extra cursum curiae (ie, outside the practice of the court), or alternatively, that it was made persona designata (ie, by a person designated by the parties).

  32. [26] Where, at the request of the parties, a judge decides a question outside the regular course of judicial proceedings (ie, extra cursum curiae) no appeal lies (Burgess v Morton [1896] AC 136 (“Burgess”)); nor does an appeal lie from an administrative decision (Hoare & Co v Moreshead [1903] 2 KB 359): Singapore Civil Procedure 2019: Vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming, gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at para 57/1/22. The doctrine of extra cursum curiae is rarely discussed. The principle behind it however, is that where parties by consent invite a court to decide an exceptional matter that severely departs from the court’s regular procedure, they will be taken to have excluded review of that decision by another tribunal: Henry Peter Pisani v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General for Gibraltar and others (1974) LR 5 PC 516 at 522. Thus, the parties in Burgess had used the special case procedure (a procedure properly meant for decisions on questions of law when parties are practically agreed upon the facts) to submit what was essentially a question of fact to the Divisional Court for decision. The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision to allow the appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision, reasoning that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision rendered extra cursum curiae: at 145.

  33. [27] In the present case, there is no question of the court undertaking “an exceptional matter that severely departs from the court’s regular procedure”. The genesis of this appeal began with an oppression petition brought by the respondents themselves. Although parties compromised on the issue of liability for oppression, the trial nonetheless proceeded for the court to decide the Buyout Issue. The Judge heard evidence, considered the parties’ submissions and certainly did not regard any part of his decisions as not subject to appeal. There is also no suggestion that any of the parties intended for the Judge’s decision on the Buyout Issue to be final and that they will waive all rights of appeal against it. In fact, the respondents themselves filed a notice of appeal against the decision in Koh Keng Chew (No 1), although this was subsequently withdrawn. For very much the same reasons, we also disagree that the Judge’s decision was made persona designata.

  34. [28] Finally, we disagree with the respondents’ submission that the Judge’s decision was made ex aequo et bono. As we found at [24] above, the parties agreed that the principles on minority oppression can be used as a proxy to determine whether the appellants should be bought out by the respondents. It was on that footing that the Judge, in our view, erroneously proceeded to view the case from the innocent minority-delinquent majority premise to arrive at his decision. Those principles therefore supplied the legal framework for the Judge’s decision, which decision cannot then be said to have been rendered ex aequo et bono.

  35. [30] At the outset, it is important to stress that in examining whether a seller of shares should be treated as a willing or unwilling seller, the relevant inquiry is not to simply examine whether, given a choice, that shareholder would prefer to be a buyer instead of a seller. In other words, the mere fact that a shareholder would prefer to be the buyer does not, per se, render him to be an unwilling seller should the court decide otherwise. Instead, the authorities suggest that a shareholder should only be regarded as an unwilling seller if his minority interests have been unfairly prejudiced by the conduct of the majority thereby making it no longer tolerable for him to retain his interest in the company. This is borne out by the oft-quoted passage from In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] Ch 419 at 430, per Nourse J, cited by Oliver LJ on appeal:

  36. [32] Similarly, in CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd and another v Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (“CVC”) at [40], Lord Millett observed that the oppressed minority shareholder in that case “is not desirous of disposing of his shares; he would rather keep them and continue to participate in the management of the company”. It is “[the majority shareholder’s] conduct in excluding him from management that has driven him, however reluctantly, to seek to realise the value of his investment”. In those circumstances:

  37. [33] Thus, the authorities have consistently adopted the position that the unwillingness or involuntariness of a seller in this context stems from the unfair prejudice suffered by the minority shareholder. It further bears mention that this principle applies whether or not the company concerned is a quasi-partnership: Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others v Thio Syn Pyn and another [2018] SGHC 54 (“Thio Syn Kym (HC)”) at [29], affirmed on appeal in Thio Syn Pyn v Thio Syn Kym Wendy and others and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 1065 (“Thio Syn Kym (CA)”) at [17]. Where, eventually, a court orders the shares of the oppressed minority shareholder to be bought out, he is rightly treated as an unwilling seller of his shares because, but for the unfair prejudice suffered which makes it no longer tolerable for him to remain in the company, he would have much preferred to continue participating in the affairs of the business.

  38. Application to the facts

  39. Issue 3: Whether the relevant discounts ought to apply

  40. The terminology

  41. [43] We begin with a point of clarification on the relevant concepts and terminology. Although the courts have on occasion referred to the terms “lack of control” and “lack of marketability” in the context of share valuation (see, eg, Thio Syn Kym (HC) and on appeal in Thio Syn Kym (CA) ; Chong Barbara v Commissioner of Estate Duties [2005] 4 SLR(R) 771 (“Chong Barbara”)), these are not legal terms of art. Consequently, different users of the terms have different conceptions of what they stand for, even though none are necessarily wrong in their own conceptions of the terms. Thus, Judith Prakash JA in Thio Syn Kym (HC) at [21] formulated the discount for lack of control as one that arose from the minority shareholder’s inability to exert control over the management decisions of the company, while the discount for lack of marketability accounted for the difficulties one would face in selling the shares of a private company with share transfer restrictions:

  42. The Judge below did not disagree with Prakash JA’s formulation of the discount for lack of control. However, he considered that the discount for lack of marketability, which accounted for the difficulty of selling shares in a narrow market, would additionally have to be affected by the unattractiveness of a bloc of shares that does not confer upon its holder control over the management decisions of the company. In other words, he took the view that a discount for lack of marketability would necessarily take into account certain matters that would already have been taken into account when one applies a discount for lack of control, namely, the minority status of the subject shares. He accordingly thought that the term “lack of free transferability” better describes the considerations that arise from the narrowness of the market for the shares in a private company, independent of any minority status of the sale shares (GD at [5]):

  43. [44] As we have explained, there is no right or wrong answer when it comes to choice of labels, since these are not terms of art that the court is concerned with. In our view, the formulation of the relevant discounts in Thio Syn Kym (HC) as well as in the decision below were both strictly correct.

  44. [45] That said, for the purposes of this present appeal, we adopt Prakash JA’s formulation in Thio Syn Kym (HC) of the discount for lack of control, which the Judge below adopted as well. This discount refers to the one that applies as a result of the minority status of the bloc of shares being sold, which consequently do not confer on its holder any ability to exert control over the management decisions of the company.

  45. [46] As to the discount for lack of marketability, we use this term, advisedly, to refer to the difficulty of selling shares in a private company as a result of the typical transfer restrictions that apply in this context. This difficulty is independent of the status of the bloc of shares being sold, and thus applies regardless whether the shares constitute a minority or majority shareholding in the company concerned. See Re Blue Index Ltd; Murrell v Swallow and others [2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) at [48]–[49], where Mr R Hollington QC (sitting as Deputy Judge of the High Court) distinguished between a discount for lack of control and a discount for non-marketability in the same manner. After all, considerations as to the minority status of the bloc of shares on sale are already accounted for by the discount for lack of control. It appears to us that the Judge intended to adopt the same formulation that Prakash JA adopted in Thio Syn Kym (HC) at [32] when she stated that the discount for lack of marketability “arises from the difficulty of selling shares due to share transfer restrictions and the narrowness of the market, regardless of whether the shares are majority or minority shares”. The Judge, however, chose to describe this discount as a discount for lack of free transferability because he thought it better captured, without any overlap, the matters that are respectively accounted for by the discount for lack of control and the discount for lack of marketability. Nonetheless, for the sake of consistency with the authorities that have employed the term (see [43] above), we shall stick with the “lack of marketability” label. Indeed, the use of this label to refer purely to the difficulty of selling shares in a private company (unrelated to the minority status of the bloc of shares being sold) finds traction in one of the foremost authorities on the valuation of shares in private companies: Christopher G Glover, Valuation of Unquoted Companies (Gee Publishing, 4th Ed, 2004) (“Glover”) at p 188:

  46. Lack of control

  47. (a) Where the purchasing majority consolidates control of the company: see Thio Syn Kym (CA) at [38]–[39], Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 at [132], Re Edwardian Group Ltd; Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd and another v Singh and others [2019] 1 BCLC 171 at [639]. It should be highlighted that in each of these decisions, the observations were made in the context of a finding of oppression or unfair prejudice against the majority shareholders unlike the present case.

  48. (b) Where the purchaser obtains synergistic benefits from acquiring a company (or, as is the case here, existing shares in the company), arising out of cost savings or future trade between the company and other businesses which he already owns.

  49. The common denominator of the three situations set out above is that the purchaser of the shares would be enjoying some tangible or collateral benefit from the purchase such as consolidation of control, business synergy or in preventing a competitor from acquiring control. It is this collateral benefit that provides the principled basis to explain why such a purchaser should not enjoy a further benefit through the discounts. This rationale is entirely consistent with the principle that in a setting where there is a finding of oppression, the delinquent majority should likewise not benefit from a buy-out on discounted terms.

  50. [51] It is clear from the outset that neither of the scenarios in (b) or (c) above apply in the circumstances of this case. Scenario (a) likewise does not apply. It does not seem to us that the sale of the respondents’ shares will lead to any of the other shareholders consolidating control of the Samwoh Group. The Judge found that the respective shareholdings of the appellants and the respondents in the Samwoh Group are as set out below (see Koh Keng Chew (No 1) at [8]):

  51. Shareholder

  52. Proportion of issued share capital of Samwoh Corp (%)

  53. Plaintiffs

  54. [52] As evident, the “majority shareholders” in this case do not actually form a concrete bloc that will invariably vote in support of one another all the time. The respondents acknowledge as much in their submissions. Instead, the majority shareholders in the present case comprise disparate individual shareholders who are only in the majority in respect of this specific dispute against the respondents. They have found themselves to be in this position out of rather adventitious circumstances in the instant case, arising out of a falling-out, as it were, with the respondents. In other words, they are collectively and conveniently described as the “majority” in contradistinction from the “minority” only for the purposes of the suit. There is no assurance, however, that alliances within and amongst the appellants will never shift in respect of other matters that may arise in the future. It cannot therefore be said that any of the appellants in this case will be consolidating their control of the Samwoh Group through the purchase of the respondents’ shares.

  55. [53] Accordingly, in our judgment, a minority discount for lack of control ought to apply in the valuation of the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group.

  56. Lack of marketability

  57. [55] This submission is premised on the assumption that the appellants will consolidate control in the Samwoh Group. But, as the respondents themselves acknowledge, the appellants are not a monolithic majority shareholder. Also for the reasons as stated at [52] above, we do not agree with this submission.

  58. [56] The respondents also submit that the breakdown of the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the parties had forced them to exit the Samwoh Group. In the circumstances, where it is clear that the business relationship simply cannot go on, it would be unfair for any party seeking an exit to do so on terms involving a discounted sale of their shares.

  59. [57] We reject this submission as well. Where the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders has broken down because of the oppressive acts of the majority, the minority who seeks an exit from the company can have recourse to the courts by virtue of the statutory minority oppression remedy. If the court is satisfied that liability for oppression has been established, and if it orders a buy-out of the minority’s shares under s 216(2)(d) of the Companies Act, it may choose not to apply any discount to the valuation of the minority’s shares, on the basis that the minority has been forced by the oppressive acts of the majority out of the company.

  60. Conclusion

  61. [63] For those reasons, we allow the appeal on the following terms:

  62. (a) The independent valuer is to re-value the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group taking into account the discount for lack of control.

  63. (b) The independent valuer is free to decide whether the discount for lack of marketability should apply in re-valuing the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group.

  64. (c) In the event the independent valuer’s re-valuation of the respondents’ shares in the Samwoh Group returns a value less than that in its 3 August 2018 report, the respondents are to refund the appellants the difference between the sum that they were bought out with and the re-valued price of their shares in the Samwoh Group.

  65. Steven Chong Quentin Loh Judge of Appeal Judge

  66. Introduction

  67. Valuing the minority shareholding: With or without discount

  68. No-fault buyout

  69. (c) There was no basis to leave the question of whether a discount should be applied for lack of free transferability to the valuer. After all, it was the valuer who had expressly requested the parties to seek the court’s discretions on the very issue (GD at [27]).

  70. [75] In my view, the valuation of the respondents’ shares in a no-fault buyout is not to be carried out on the basis that the respondents was a willing seller and the appellants was a willing buyer, as that is an inquiry directed at the market value of the shares. Instead, the overriding principle governing the valuation of the price of the minority holding is a consideration of what is fair, just and equitable between the parties. In my judgment, fairness between the parties in the circumstances of this case would be a pro rata valuation of the shares without any discount despite the fact that the shares represent a minority holding.

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