Court of Appeal · Decided 10 March 2021
Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 23 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 75 of 2020 · 10 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] This appeal arose from a workplace accident suffered by the appellant, a male Bangladeshi worker. He was employed as a general worker by the respondent at the material time, and his job was to feed pieces of plywood through a wood laminating machine (“the machine”). We dismissed the appeal and now furnish our grounds of decision.
Background to the appeal
- [2]
[2] On 28 June 2015, the appellant and his co-worker were instructed to remove dried glue from the connecting rollers of the machine. While doing so, the appellant’s hand got caught in between the moving rollers. His thumb and two of his fingers were fractured as a result.
- [3]
[3] The Workmen’s Compensation Board awarded the appellant $43,464.88 in compensation. Dissatisfied, the appellant sued the respondent for negligence and alleged that the respondent had breached its common law duty of care to take reasonable steps to ensure his workplace safety. He also alleged that the respondent had breached its statutory duties under ss 11 and 12 of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (Cap 354A, 2009 Rev Ed). The appellant originally commenced proceedings against the respondent in the High Court, but the case was transferred to the District Court, ostensibly because the value of his claim was less than $250,000.
- [4]
[4] In Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2019] SGDC 172 (“the District Judge’s decision”), the District Judge held that the respondent did not act negligently towards the appellant. The District Judge found that the appellant’s injuries were not caused by any negligence on the respondent’s part, but by the appellant’s own ill-advised actions in using his hand to remove waste material from the moving rollers while the machine was switched on. The District Judge also rejected the appellant’s claims that the respondent had failed to provide a safe system of work or adequate supervision and training.
- [5]
[5] The appellant’s appeal against the District Judge’s decision was dismissed by the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) in Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 69. The appellant then filed the present appeal against the Judge’s decision.
Our decision
- [7]
[7] The appellant’s failure to obtain leave was even more inexcusable given that he was alerted to this very issue at a case management conference. At that case management conference, the appellant’s counsel, Mr Subbiah Pillai (“Mr Pillai”), asserted that “[t]he [a]ppellant takes the position that the [a]ppellant can appeal as of right”. Mr Pillai did not cite any authority for this somewhat astounding proposition. He also claimed that “… the value of the suit is more than $250,000”. A cursory glance of the record of appeal and record of proceedings revealed that Mr Pillai’s claim was baseless. As mentioned at [6] above, it appeared from the Statement of Claim that the value of the appellant’s claim was about $190,000. Moreover, it was unfathomable that Mr Pillai could have asserted that the value of the appellant’s claim exceeded $250,000, in light of Mr Pillai’s own oral submissions before the Judge:
Mr Pillai had informed the Judge that the appellant’s claim was for a sum of $180,000, which was more or less consistent with what had been pleaded in the Statement of Claim (see [6] above). The figure of $180,000 was, however, a far cry from the threshold of $250,000 set out in s 34(2)(a) of the 2020 SCJA, and there was as such no factual basis at all for Mr Pillai to assert that this threshold had been met. At the hearing before us, he continued to suggest that the value of the appellant’s claim exceeded $250,000, yet he adduced no evidence to support such a quantification. When he was reminded of his own submission before the Judge, he then changed tack and asserted that he had merely informed the Judge that the appellant’s claim for general damages amounted to $180,000, ie, that the $180,000 figure was not inclusive of special damages claimed. This assertion did not stand up to scrutiny in light of his unambiguous submission to the Judge that “… [the appellant] would have been claiming about [$]180,000”.
- [8]
[8] At the same case management conference referred to at [7] above, Mr Pillai appeared to suggest that the appellant was entitled to appeal as of right as the action was originally commenced in the High Court. We found this to be another astonishing argument. The matter was heard in the District Court, and the appellant did not protest when the matter was transferred from the High Court to the District Court, ostensibly because the value of his claim did not exceed $250,000.
- [10]
[10] Mr Pillai’s final salvo was to argue that the appellant did not require leave to appeal as the respondent did not apply to strike out the notice of appeal. His submission was, once again, misguided. Failure to obtain leave goes towards this court’s jurisdiction to hear the present appeal and renders the notice of appeal invalid (see Singapore Civil Procedure 2020, vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed, 2020) at para 57/16/12), independent of whether the respondent applied to strike out the notice of appeal. It was not open to either party to waive the leave requirement, and the fact that the respondent did not apply to strike out the notice of appeal did not, ipso facto, dispense with the need for the appellant to obtain leave since leave was otherwise required.
- [11]
[11] We stress that the leave requirement is not a mere procedural step that has to be observed for its own sake. Rather, s 34(2)(a) of the 2020 SCJA (or s 29A(1)(b) of the present SCJA) provides for a process to screen appeals to the Court of Appeal, in line with the legislative intention to allow only one tier of appeal as of right for civil claims of up to $250,000 (Virtual Map (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority and another application [2009] 2 SLR(R) 558 at [19]). The overarching need to conserve the finite resources of the Court of Appeal explains why leave to appeal is required if, inter alia, the amount in dispute does not exceed $250,000, as well as the limited situations in which leave will be granted (see the conditions laid down in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 (“Tang Liang Hong”) at [16]). At the second reading of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Bill, the then Minister for Law, Prof S Jayakumar, explained as follows (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 November 1998) vol 69 at col 1629 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law)):
- [13]
[13] On the whole, we were troubled by Mr Pillai’s conduct of this appeal. First, it was shocking that the leave requirement could have escaped him. The need to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal where a claim is less than $250,000 is a rudimentary point of law that any reasonably competent lawyer should be aware of even without prompting from the court. Second, the leave requirement was specifically and repeatedly drawn to his attention at numerous case management conferences. However, he chose to insist on the appellant’s purportedly unqualified right of appeal without any proper legal basis. Third, he aggravated matters by attempting to assert before the court on at least three occasions that the appellant’s claim was in excess of $250,000, even though a significantly lower sum was pleaded in the Statement of Claim. His conduct of this appeal left much to be desired and fell short of the standards expected of officers of the court.
(a) Has the legal representative of whom complaint is made acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently?
(b) If so, did such conduct cause the applicant to incur unnecessary costs?
Conclusion