Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 53

Background

We begin with a summary of the background facts, which are set out in greater detail in the Judgment at [4]–[10]. The applicant had been found in possession of not less than 38.84g of diamorphine. Despite his initial account in his statements, the applicant’s defence at trial was that all of the drugs found in his possession were for his personal consumption. His defence therefore focused on his consumption habits, his financial means, and attempts to explain his inconsistent statements (see the Judgment at [6]).

The trial judge (“Trial Judge”) rejected the applicant’s contentions on his financial means. In the circumstances, he found that the applicant had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the drugs were for his personal consumption, and hence failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking under s 17 of the MDA. In terms of sentencing, the Trial Judge held that the applicant was not a mere courier and that s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA did not apply as the applicant had not claimed that he was suffering from the requisite abnormality of mind. In addition, no certificate of substantive assistance was issued. Hence, the Trial Judge imposed the mandatory death penalty (see the Judgment at [7]–[8]). On 18 October 2018, in CCA 38, this court affirmed the Trial Judge’s decision (see the Judgment at [9]).

CM 28

On 17 September 2020, the applicant applied for leave in CA/CM 27/2020 (“CM 27”) under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) to make a review application. He raised two grounds, which we quote from the Judgment at [11]:

Leave to commence the review application was granted on 19 September 2020. CM 28, the review application, was filed on 21 September 2020 and was heard on 22 September 2020. We summarise the key aspects of the hearing before us as follows:

(a) Mr Ravi argued first that Mr Francis Ng SC (“Mr Ng”) and his team should be disqualified from representing the Prosecution because the Prosecution had come into contact with a letter from the applicant to Mr Ramesh Tiwary (“Mr Tiwary”) (his then-counsel) and four letters from the applicant to his uncle (“the Disqualification Application”). We declined to disqualify Mr Ng and his team from representing the Prosecution, finding that “Mr Ravi had failed to show the court any basis” for his application especially given that neither Mr Ng nor any member of his team in this matter had sight of any such letters (see the Judgment at [12]).

(b) Mr Ravi confirmed that he would not be relying on the Inheritance Ground, acknowledging that “he had no real basis to advance this ground” (see the Judgment at [13]). We observed that if that was the case, then the point should not have been advanced at all, and that “as officers of the court, counsel are bound not to advance grounds that are without reasonable basis, for if they do, they face the prospect of being sanctioned for abusing the process of the court” (see the Judgment at [13]).

(c) In relation to the Abnormality of Mind Ground, after we pointed out that the applicant’s involvement needed to be restricted to being a courier in order to qualify for the alternative sentencing regime, Mr Ravi sought permission to address the court on this issue, which we granted. Mr Ravi filed further submissions on 25 September 2020 accordingly to raise his argument on the point (“the Courier Argument”), which necessitated a written response from the Prosecution.

In relation to the Abnormality of Mind Ground and the Courier Argument, we found that all of these were materials that could have been adduced previously with reasonable diligence (see s 394J(3)(b) of the CPC) as ample opportunity had been afforded to the applicant to introduce materials relating to the alternative sentencing regime (see the Judgment at [23]–[24]). Further, there was no change in the law since the prior criminal proceedings which would give rise to new legal arguments (see the Judgment at [25] and [28]). We also found that these materials were not compelling, as defined by s 394J(3)(c) of the CPC. First, the applicant’s involvement had to be restricted to being a courier to qualify for the alternative sentencing regime, but the Courier Argument could not be sustained given the language of the provision and the Trial Judge’s finding of fact (which was not reversed on appeal) that the applicant was not a mere courier and intended to repack the drugs for sale to third parties. Further, his argument that he was merely a courier would have been inconsistent with the defence of personal consumption he ran at trial. The applicant had also confirmed in the prior proceedings that he was not pursuing that argument. There was no evidence at trial, and no new evidence was adduced, to support any argument that the applicant was a mere courier (see the Judgment at [32]). Second, the evidence at trial suggested that the applicant was not in fact suffering from such abnormality of mind that would have substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the offence (see the Judgment at [33]). Hence, we found at [37] of the Judgment that “the Abnormality of Mind Ground and the Courier Argument [did] not come close to fulfilling the requirement of compellability under s 394J(3)(c) of the CPC” [emphasis added].

We also dealt briefly with the Inheritance Ground, finding that it was a “non-starter as it [was] neither a legal argument nor evidence that [fell] within the ambit of s 394J(2) of the CPC” [emphasis added]. Ample opportunity had been given to the applicant to pursue this route of inquiry and to adduce further evidence on appeal, but the applicant had chosen not to take the opportunity (see the Judgment at [39]). Again, we cautioned counsel “against raising points or arguments that they do not have a reasonable basis to submit upon as to do so would be an abuse of the process of court” (see the Judgment at [40]).

Parties’ arguments on the issue of costs

The Prosecution’s arguments

The Prosecution made three arguments in particular. First, Mr Ravi had misrepresented or materially omitted facts concerning what had taken place in prior proceedings in his affidavit and raised legally unsustainable arguments. Second, Mr Ravi had made unjustified allegations against the applicant’s previous counsel, without notifying them that he was going to make those allegations and giving them a chance to respond. Third, Mr Ravi’s real purpose in bringing the review application “appears to have been to frustrate the lawful process of the execution of the sentence provided by law”, and he had adopted a “blunderbuss approach” that amounted to an abuse of the court’s process.

Mr Ravi’s arguments

In response to the Prosecution’s allegations, Mr Ravi contended that the insinuation that he had chosen not to invite the applicant’s prior counsel to respond because he knew that they would contradict his case was a baseless one. Further, he was instructed only after the warrant of execution was issued on 8 September 2020, and there was limited time to assess every piece of material in the applicant’s case. When it became clear that there was no merit to certain arguments, specifically the Inheritance Ground, he conceded the point. Mr Ravi also noted that this court did not go so far as to find in the Judgment that there was an abuse of process in raising the Inheritance Ground.

Applicable law

As this court observed in Abdul Kahar, the intention behind an order under s 357(1)(b) of the CPC is “to penalise and discipline the solicitor in question for the sort of conduct set out in that provision” (at [77]) and “to show disapproval of the solicitor’s conduct in the proceedings in question” (at [80]).

Further, there is an additional formal requirement under s 357(1A) of the CPC for matters under Division 1B of Part XX of the CPC, which applies to the present proceedings:

We observe here that the Prosecution has contended that the commencement and conduct of CM 28 amounted to an abuse of process. If we choose to make a costs order, therefore, this formal requirement will apply. We return to this as part of our findings below.

In determining how to exercise the power under s 357(1)(b) of the CPC or the court’s inherent power, we find that the principles developed in the context of civil cases are of general application here as well. This is so given the clear similarity in language between s 357(1) of the CPC and O 59 r 8(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). We also respectfully agree with the pronouncements made by V K Rajah JA in Zhou Tong and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 534 (“Zhou Tong”) at [25] that these two provisions “are based on the very same practical and ethical considerations”, and with his apparent adoption, in a criminal case, of the principles derived from civil cases at [28]–[30] of Zhou Tong. Indeed, Mr Ravi also adopted the same principles in structuring his submissions to us.

As summarised most recently by this court in Munshi Rasal v Enlighten Furniture Decoration Co Pte Ltd [2021] SGCA 23 (“Munshi Rasal”) at [17]:

Our courts have also repeatedly adopted the following observations by Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in the English Court of Appeal decision of Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 (“Ridehalgh”) at 232–233 concerning the approach to be taken to each of the words, “improper”, “unreasonable” and “negligent” (see the decisions of this court in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 at [71]; Tan King Hiang v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R)529 (“Tan King Hiang”) at [18]; and Zhou Tong at [29] and [32]):

Issues before this court

We adopt the three-step approach in this case (see [19] above). The issues for our determination are therefore as follows:

(a) Has Mr Ravi acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently? In this regard, the specific allegations give rise to the following questions:

(i) Did Mr Ravi omit material facts, misrepresent facts or advance arguments which were factually or legally unsustainable?

(ii) Did Mr Ravi make unsustainable allegations against the applicant’s previous counsel without giving them a chance to respond?

(iii) Did Mr Ravi act in such a manner to frustrate the lawful process of execution in abuse of the court’s process?

(b) If so, did such conduct cause the Prosecution to incur unnecessary costs?

(c) If so, is it in all the circumstances just to order Mr Ravi to compensate the Prosecution for the whole or any part of the relevant costs?

Step 1: Improper, unreasonable or negligent conduct

We find that Mr Ravi had acted improperly in the manner in which he commenced and conducted CM 28. In this regard, we deal with each of the Prosecution’s allegations in turn.

Omissions, misrepresentations and unsustainable arguments

The Abnormality of Mind Ground and Courier Argument

In relation to the Abnormality of Mind Ground, the Prosecution first argued that Mr Ravi had omitted to mention in his supporting affidavit in CM 28 that the applicant’s trial counsel had confirmed in court that the applicant was not relying on s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA and that there was unchallenged evidence in the form of a report produced upon the applicant’s psychiatric examination which found that he had “been free of psychotic symptoms for many years” and “was not of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offence”.

With respect, we do not agree with the Prosecution’s view of Mr Ravi’s affidavit. It is true that the applicant’s trial counsel had confirmed in court that the applicant was not relying on s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA. In fairness to Mr Ravi, however, his assertions in his affidavit did not contradict that fact, nor was that point material to the way in which he had approached the case. His point appears to have been that the counsel had failed to properly consider whether s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA applied to the applicant and had failed to pursue the inquiry, thus leading to the position taken in court that the applicant would not rely on s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA. In other words, Mr Ravi sought to argue that it was the previous counsel’s, and not the applicant’s, decision not to pursue the issue of whether the applicant suffered from the requisite abnormality of mind (see para 6.2 of Mr Ravi’s affidavit). Hence, the mere fact that the applicant’s trial counsel had confirmed in court that the defence was not pursuing s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA was not, strictly speaking, material to Mr Ravi’s point, since he was seeking to go behind the counsel’s confirmation. Whether these were sustainable allegations or arguments that should have been made at all is, of course, a separate matter, which we deal with below.

As for the omission to refer to contrary evidence, the Prosecution’s argument appears to be predicated on its view that there is a duty to make “full and frank disclosure” in the affidavit. No authority was cited for that proposition, and we doubt that such a duty exists in this context. Such a duty generally arises in the context of ex parte applications: see the decision of this court in The “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 at [83]. CM 28, being the substantive review application, is clearly not an ex parte application. The leave application was also not determined ex parte as s 394H(4) of the CPC gives the respondent the right to file written submissions. In the circumstances, we do not think that counsel in filing such a supporting affidavit is under such a duty to make full and frank disclosure in the sense in which it is traditionally understood. That said, the fact that counsel makes certain allegations or arguments in the face of contrary evidence and without dealing with that contrary evidence is a relevant consideration, which we also deal with below.

The Prosecution was on very much firmer ground, however, when it argued that a reasonable defence counsel would have known that there was no basis for the Abnormality of Mind Ground and Courier Argument. First, in order to get around the fact that trial counsel had expressly confirmed twice that the applicant was not alleging that he suffered an abnormality of mind for the purposes of s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA, Mr Ravi had to allege that the trial and appellate counsel had simply failed to pursue the inquiry. However, Mr Ravi provided no basis for these allegations. As is clear from the Judgment, these allegations found no traction with us. At [23] of the Judgment, we proceeded on the basis that the applicant had in fact confirmed to the Trial Judge through his counsel that he was not relying on an argument based on an abnormality of mind as that was the only plausible approach on the facts. Once the applicant’s confirmations to the Trial Judge were taken at face value, it was clear beyond doubt that the applicant had failed to take what was an ample opportunity afforded to him to introduce materials to argue that he could rely on s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA. This was also true on appeal as this court had also given the applicant the opportunity to consider whether a further psychiatric report was required on appeal, but he chose not to adduce any such evidence (see the Judgment at [24]).

Second, in formulating the grounds for review, Mr Ravi did not appreciate the legal requirements under s 33B(3) of the MDA and the fact that the requirements of abnormality of mind and of being a courier were conjunctive requirements. Although the issue of whether the applicant was a courier was noted in passing in one paragraph in the applicant’s written submissions in CM 27, this was not a ground for seeking a review of CCA 38 and appeared instead to be a description by the applicant of the prejudice he had suffered as a result of his alleged abnormality of mind not being pursued at trial. Apart from the fact that we had to point out to Mr Ravi at the hearing that these were conjunctive requirements – a point which we think should have been apparent to any reasonably diligent defence counsel – the Courier Argument itself was wholly without merit. There was no basis for raising any new legal argument in that regard (see the Judgment at [25]). There was also no basis for any factual argument – the Trial Judge had made a clear finding that the applicant was not a mere courier, and once the Inheritance Ground was abandoned, there was no factual basis for interfering with the Trial Judge’s finding of fact (see the Judgment at [24] and [32]). This, in turn, meant that any application based on s 33B(3)(b) of the MDA was fatally flawed from the outset. There was never any chance that the applicant could have succeeded on the review application since he could never have shown a miscarriage of justice given the facts of this case – even if he were suffering from the requisite abnormality of mind, he would not have qualified for the alternative sentencing regime under s 33B(3) of the MDA.

Third, the Abnormality of Mind Ground itself was without merit, and this would have been clear from the outset. The argument could have been made with reasonable diligence at trial or the appeal – Mr Ravi’s arguments on the scope of Mohammad Azli bin Mohammad Salleh v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 1374 at [34] were misconceived (see the Judgment at [28]), and, in any event, would not have applied to the facts given the express confirmation by the trial counsel that the applicant was not advancing a case of abnormality of mind. As to whether that argument was compelling, we found that none of the medical evidence in the case supported the allegations of abnormality of mind, or even suggested that the applicant “might have any mental or behavioural disorder, or any other related disorder that might possibly have supported the finding of an abnormality of mind which had substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the offence” [emphasis in original] (see the Judgment at [34]). Both Dr Kenneth Koh’s report and Dr Munidasa Winslow’s (“Dr Winslow’s”) report (which the applicant also relied on) clearly stated that there were no psychotic symptoms at the material time.

The Inheritance Ground

Coming to the Inheritance Ground, we agree with the Prosecution that Mr Ravi had misrepresented certain facts in his affidavit. At para 5.22 of his affidavit, in particular, Mr Ravi deposed as follows:

This gave a false impression of the applicant’s previous counsel’s conduct of the matter. The history of the proceedings demonstrated that counsel had in fact pursued the inquiry as to the uncle’s evidence. We observed in the Judgment at [39] that on 3 May 2018, an adjournment was granted to allow the applicant to adduce evidence from his uncle, by way of a statutory declaration to be filed within two weeks. In fact, it was Mr Tiwary, the applicant’s appellate counsel at the time, who communicated the applicant’s desire for such evidence to be adduced on appeal. No such evidence was filed within that time. Subsequently, on 16 August 2018, when Mr Amarick Gill had taken over conduct of the appeal, the court gave the applicant a further opportunity to file a statutory declaration or affidavit by the uncle. This opportunity was not taken. This was not a situation where counsel had failed to seek opportunities for further evidence to be adduced. Instead, this was a case where counsel had communicated the applicant’s intent to adduce further evidence, but, for reasons best known to the applicant, no steps were ultimately taken to do so in court. Mr Ravi’s attempt to cast the blame on the applicant’s counsel was not just without basis, but was clearly contradicted by the record and amounted to a misrepresentation of the facts. We find this lack of candour to be particularly worrying.

On a related note, we find Mr Ravi’s attempt to characterise his concession of the Inheritance Ground at the hearing as a point in his favour to be entirely implausible. This was not a matter of potentially contradictory evidence, or material that was difficult to assess without detailed investigation or inquiry. Neither was this a case where Mr Ravi initially had some basis for advancing the argument which was then rebutted by the Prosecution. This was a case where there was simply no basis at all for advancing the argument in the first place. His concession is not a point in his favour.

Allegations against the applicant’s previous counsel

The allegations against the applicant’s trial and appellate counsel formed a central pillar of CM 28 and Mr Ravi’s arguments. However, as is clear from the Judgment, the allegations against counsel were baseless and advanced without any evidence or factual basis. Rather, it seems clear to us that the allegations against counsel were only made because the applicant had, in truth, confirmed through his counsel that he was not pursuing certain grounds before the Trial Judge and the Court of Appeal. As an attempt to get around inconvenient facts, however, such allegations were entirely inappropriate.

Further, in making these allegations, Mr Ravi had failed to abide by his professional duty to give counsel whose conduct he was criticising in court an opportunity to respond. Rule 29 of the PCR reads:

Similarly, in Farid at [137], this court observed, in relation to complaints against previous counsel:

Mr Ravi never gave the applicant’s trial and appellate counsel an opportunity to respond to what were very serious allegations. In doing so, he had breached r 29 of the PCR and had failed to abide by this court’s guidance in Farid.

We find that Mr Ravi’s failure in this case was particularly egregious. First, the making of unsubstantiated allegations in this case was a significant factor in the commencement of an unmeritorious case. As this court observed in Farid at [136], such attacks on counsel are “collateral” and the court must be particularly careful to prevent abuse of its process arising from such allegations:

In the context of reopening concluded criminal matters, the making of unsubstantiated allegations that previous counsel had failed to pursue the necessary inquiries is particularly egregious conduct. As is clear from the Judgment, such allegations in this case were ultimately distracting and gave rise to arguments based on false premises – once the baseless allegations in Mr Ravi’s affidavit were disregarded, it became clear that there was simply no merit to the contention that the decision in CCA 38 had to be reviewed.

Second, counsel’s explanation for their conduct in the prior proceedings would have been essential to assessing the truth of the account that Mr Ravi was ultimately putting forward in his affidavit. In failing to seek counsel’s explanations, we find that Mr Ravi had failed to take reasonable care to ensure that he presented the truth to the court. In other words, his failure in relation to his fellow lawyers also led to a failure in his duty to the court. If Mr Ravi had given counsel an opportunity to respond to his allegations before filing the affidavit, he might have been able to present a more accurate picture of what had happened in the prior proceedings.

Collateral purpose

Conclusion on step 1

Having regard to the findings above, we find that Mr Ravi has acted improperly and that CM 28 was brought in abuse of process. Mr Ravi had acted improperly as his conduct fell short of what is expected of reasonable defence counsel, and was “[c]onduct which would be regarded as improper according to the consensus of professional (including judicial) opinion” (see Ridehalgh at 232). He had brought an application without any real basis and without due regard to the statutory requirements for the alternative sentencing regime and for the review application process, lacked candour in misrepresenting what the applicant’s prior counsel had done to pursue the inquiry relating to the Inheritance Ground, and failed to comply with the PCR and principles of natural justice in relation to giving the applicant’s prior counsel a chance to respond.

None of Mr Ravi’s counter-arguments warrants drawing a different conclusion. Mr Ravi’s argument that he was instructed only after the warrant of execution was issued on 8 September 2020 and had limited time to assess the applicant’s case is not, with respect, a compelling one. The problems with the case did not concern issues that required a significant amount of time to assess. The central problem with the Abnormality of Mind Ground was one that would have been apparent from a plain reading of s 33B(3) of the MDA. A reading of the record would also have shown that counsel had repeatedly confirmed that the applicant was not relying on an argument based on an abnormality of mind, and a reading of the psychiatric reports (which Mr Ravi did manage to do as evidenced by para 5.4 of his affidavit where he referred to Dr Winslow’s report) would have made it clear that there was no evidence to support the applicant’s new claim. In relation to the Inheritance Ground, there was no attempt to identify what the evidence was, and it would also have been clear from a reading of the record that the issue was already considered but that the applicant had chosen not to pursue the matter further. All of this could have been properly assessed between 8 September 2020 and the filing of CM 27 on 17 September 2020.

Indeed, these were the circumstances under which leave was granted in CM 27 (see the Judgment at [16]) (Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA was the judge who heard this particular application):

Granted that Mr Ravi was not privy to the perspective of the court as set out in the above quotation. However, it will be seen that the preliminary views of the court in CM 27 demonstrate that the mere granting of leave was not necessarily correlated with and, therefore, did not necessarily support a belief (which Mr Ravi claims to have held) that CM 28 was not bound to fail. In any event, regardless of what the court thought of Mr Ravi’s case, as already emphasised in the preceding paragraph, it was his duty as defence counsel to consider the merits of his case. In these circumstances, the grant of leave could not be treated as an encouragement to bring CM 28 – it only meant that the matter would proceed to be determined by a full coram and nothing more. If anything, the grant of leave in CM 27 was a boon to the applicant as it had actually permitted Mr Ravi to take his case forward to a hearing before a full coram of judges in CM 28, despite the reservations that the judge hearing the leave application had about the merits of the case. However, that brings us back full circle to the crucial issue at hand – which is that Mr Ravi should only have proceeded if he had a reasonable basis for advancing his case. Instead (and as we have already noted), he chose to raise arguments to see what would stick.

We state here clearly that such haphazard and irresponsible attempts at reopening concluded appeals will be looked upon with disfavour. In this context, the manner in which such an unmeritorious application was brought gives rise to the conclusion that the application was brought in abuse of the process set out in Division 1B of Part XX of the CPC. This is so because the statutory requirements reflect the principle that finality is an important aspect of justice, upheld by the high threshold for review. The arguments raised by Mr Ravi lacked any merit in this context because they were effectively attempts to relitigate what had already been conceded or determined in prior proceedings, or for which there was simply no new evidence or argument to be raised. In that regard, it was entirely contrary to the very rationale of the statutory requirements for the application to have been brought. We therefore have no hesitation in finding that the application was brought in abuse of process, a finding which we make explicit pursuant to s 357(1A) of the CPC.

Step 2: Incurring of unnecessary costs

Step 3: Whether it is just to make the order

First, this is justified by the particular context of a review application. The strict requirements before a review application will even be entertained reflect the interests of justice – finality itself is, as has been repeatedly stated, a principle of justice as well. As we observed in the Judgment at [1]:

In the context of criminal proceedings, “an extremely limited legal avenue” has been provided to review even a concluded appeal (see the Judgment at [2]):

The prescribed statutory procedure under Division 1B of Part XX of the CPC reflects and puts into operation these principles.

Defence counsel have a very important role to play in this context, both in relation to their general duties as well as in relation to their duties in the context of specific statutory requirements. As r 14(1)(a) of the PCR states: “A legal practitioner who represents an accused person in any criminal proceedings is under a fundamental duty to assist in the administration of justice” [emphasis added]. Part of the administration of justice, as noted at [52] and [53] above, lies in the maintenance and preservation of finality in the legal system. In the context of review applications, the role of defence counsel is specifically highlighted by r 11(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2018 (S 727/2018) which sets out the requirements for an affidavit by the applicant’s advocate, if the applicant is represented. The affidavit is not merely a matter of formality, but must include specific averments about the advocate’s belief as to the merits of the review application. We must emphasise this point. This is an exceptional requirement in criminal procedure – in no other instance under the CPC is the advocate required to file an affidavit as to his or her belief in the merits of the application. The requirement underscores the principles that (a) review applications are to be exceptional; (b) the threshold for review is high; and (c) defence counsel are expected to play their part in the administration of justice by ensuring that unmeritorious applications are not brought. In the present case, Mr Ravi stated in his affidavits for both CM 27 and CM 28 at para 6.14:

Third, on the facts of this case, we find that the improper conduct was particularly egregious. We would even go so far as to characterise much of Mr Ravi’s conduct as grandstanding, which is wholly inappropriate in a court of law. We found the complete absence of merit in the application worrying, to say the least. As detailed above, the Abnormality of Mind Ground was brought on the basis of a complete misapprehension as to the requirements of s 33B(3) of the MDA, and in complete disregard of the evidence that was presented in the record of proceedings. The Inheritance Ground, as well, was brought without reasonable basis. Mr Ravi also misrepresented the efforts made by prior counsel in relation to the Inheritance Ground. Further, Mr Ravi failed to abide by his professional duties in relation to allegations against prior counsel. This was not merely a weak case on the merits (which counsel cannot generally be faulted for trying to pursue), but a case that was completely misconceived from the outset and improperly conducted.

However, we do not find this consideration to be significant in the final analysis. Mr Ravi’s improper conduct is not being assessed according to a new standard that was introduced in the authorities referred to above. What he did was improper on the basis of principles and standards that had already been made clear in various statutes, rules, and authorities. The high threshold for applications under Division 1B of Part XX of the CPC would have been apparent from decisions of this court such as Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135; indeed, much of the statutory language was based on the principles enunciated in those decisions. Further, his improper conduct also went to the fundamental duties of a solicitor as an officer of the court and as a member of the legal profession. On the basis of these facts, it would be wholly inappropriate for Mr Ravi to escape the consequences of his conduct just because of the timing of the application.

Finally, we also do not give weight to the fact that leave was granted in CM 27 to enable a full coram to provide guidance in future cases. CM 27 and CM 28 were Mr Ravi’s applications. The responsibility for bringing the application remains on the applicant and his counsel. We have already rejected this argument at steps 1 and 2, and find no more merit to this argument in step 3.

Quantum of costs

Conclusion