Chong Hoon Cheong v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGCA 21

Introduction

The Applicant is a prisoner awaiting capital punishment and his execution is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 29 April 2026. On Monday, 27 April 2026, the Applicant filed the present application by way of a Criminal Motion under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) for permission to make a review application in respect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA/CCA 28/2021 (“CCA 28”). The Application is placed before me as a single Judge sitting in the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 394H(6)(a) of the CPC.

The Criminal Motion comprises two cover pages without stating the reliefs that the Applicant is seeking. However, in the concluding paragraphs of his “Affidavit and Written Submissions” accompanying his application, the Applicant states the following:

Facts

Background

The Applicant was arrested by Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) officers in the evening of 8 December 2015 in his rented room at 26B Hamilton Road. Around the same time that evening, CNB officers also arrested Eng Kok Seng in the vicinity after he was seen leaving 26B Hamilton Road earlier.

The Applicant claimed trial to a capital charge of having in his possession not less than 25.01g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The drugs were contained in 27 packets found in his rented room. Of these packets, 25 packets were found on the floor of the room, while one packet (Exhibit D1A2) was found on the bottom right compartment of a dressing table in the room.

The trial

The Applicant claimed trial to the capital charge and the trial took place over several tranches between 13 August 2019 and 2 March 2021 before the General Division of the High Court. On 13 September 2021, the trial Judge convicted the Applicant on the charge. The trial Judge found that the Applicant was not merely a courier as he was involved in repacking the drugs to facilitate distribution. Further, he was not given a certificate of substantive assistance by the Public Prosecutor. The trial Judge’s decision is set out in Public Prosecutor v Chong Hoon Cheong [2021] SGHC 211 (“Chong Hoon Cheong (HC)”).

At the trial, the Applicant did not dispute that he had possession of diamorphine or that he had knowledge of the nature of the drug (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [2]). He only disputed the purpose for which he possessed the drugs in Exhibit D1A2 which contained 14.08g of diamorphine. He contended that only the drugs in the other seized packets (containing 10.93g of diamorphine) were in his possession for the purpose of trafficking while the remaining 14.08g of diamorphine in Exhibit D1A2 was for his own consumption (“the Consumption Defence”) (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [3]). Based on his contention, he would only be trafficking in a quantity of diamorphine which was below the statutory threshold of 15g and would therefore be guilty of only a non-capital trafficking offence.

The Prosecution advanced two alternative cases at the trial. The Prosecution’s primary case was that the evidence proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Applicant possessed the drugs in Exhibit D1A2 for the purpose of trafficking. The Prosecution relied on the Applicant’s statements to support its primary case (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [11]). The Prosecution’s alternative case was that the Applicant was presumed to have possessed the diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking under s 17(c) of the MDA (because he possessed more than two grammes of diamorphine) and the Applicant could not rebut this statutory presumption (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [12]–[13]).

The trial Judge rejected the Prosecution’s primary case, finding that the purported admissions in the Applicant’s statements could not sustain a conviction (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [73] and [74]). However, the trial Judge accepted the Prosecution’s alternative case. He found that the Applicant could not establish his Consumption Defence on a balance of probabilities. The Applicant did not mention the Consumption Defence in his earlier statements, could not prove that his rate of drug consumption was proportionate to the amount of diamorphine in Exhibit D1A2 or that he was remunerated in kind by way of drugs for his own consumption in exchange for the work done (see Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [91], [136], [171], [184]). The presumption of trafficking under s 17(c) of the MDA was therefore unrebutted and the Applicant was convicted on the trafficking charge accordingly (Chong Hoon Cheong (HC) at [192]–[193]).

The appeal

In CCA 28, the Applicant appealed against his conviction and sentence. On 5 July 2022, in a reserved judgment, the Court of Appeal (comprising Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang JCA and Judith Prakash JCA) affirmed the trial Judge’s finding that the Applicant had failed to prove the Consumption Defence (Chong Hoon Cheong v Public Prosecutor [2022] 2 SLR 778 (“Chong Hoon Cheong (CA)”) at [58]). Accordingly, CCA 28 was dismissed and the Applicant’s conviction and sentence were upheld.

Post-appeal

The Applicant’s first petition for clemency to the President of the Republic of Singapore (“President”) was rejected on 19 December 2022. On 22 April 2026, the Applicant presented another petition for clemency to the President. The second petition for clemency was also rejected today.

The Applicant, together with various other inmates, was involved in several post-appeal applications before the General Division of the High Court and in appeals to the Court of Appeal. None of the decisions in those applications and appeals has any bearing on his present application or on the integrity of his conviction and sentence.

The present application

The Applicant’s case

In his Affidavit and Written Submissions, the Applicant states that the grounds for his application to review CCA 28 are as follows:

The Applicant states further:

The Applicant alleges that the Prosecution and the police failed to do a proper investigation of what he terms “Material Evidence”. This includes the records of how the Applicant’s brother was provided with money to pay for the rented premises in which the drugs were found. He alleges that the Prosecution withheld such Material Evidence from him, the non-disclosure of which was the cause of his case being found to be unsubstantiated and insufficient to ground reasonable doubt.

The Applicant also complains that there was no joint trial for him and Eng Kok Seng. Such a joint trial would shed light on how he, Eng Kok Seng and Ah Kiat (the alleged boss in the drug transactions) worked together or were otherwise involved in the alleged trafficking, storage and remuneration.

The Applicant further alleges that the Prosecution failed to disclose a certain Chong Eng Chai’s evidence about how his identity card was used for the rental arrangements for the premises at 26B Hamilton Road. This person appears to be the Applicant’s brother who was referred to as Chong Cheong Chai in an earlier paragraph in the Applicant’s Affidavit and Written Submissions.

The Applicant claims that all these matters “only came to light in recent attempts by the Applicant’s family to locate Ah Kiat’s associates, who are Malaysians and not compellable to testify”. The Applicant goes on to claim that the lack of investigation or disclosure regarding the storage and safekeeping case distorted his primary defence that the drugs he only intended to possess were solely for his personal consumption and not for trafficking. He should therefore be acquitted on the trafficking charge on the basis that there was reasonable doubt that he was in possession of all 25.01g of heroin for trafficking.

The Applicant next claims that he learnt about the matters disclosed in CA 30 (apparently the Court of Appeal’s decision in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General [2024] 2 SLR 588) that caused him to be aware that the Prosecution had not been even-handed in its investigations and treatment of his evidence about the storage and safekeeping of the drugs which he had given to the investigating officers. This decision concerned the disclosure of prisoners’ correspondence by the Singapore Prison Services to the Attorney-General’s Chambers. The Applicant alleges that this “Intrusive Access” was not disclosed to the Court of Appeal in CCA 28. He claims that his letter to the Chief Justice sent after the conclusion of CCA 28 was disclosed to the Prosecution. There was also disclosure of the documents relating to his complaints about ineffective counsel and draft documents pertaining to the present application. These documents were copied and forwarded to one another by the Singapore Prison Services, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Attorney-General’s Chambers. This “Intrusive Access” resulted in a breach of the rules of natural justice.

Finally, the Applicant claims that there is new evidence from Chia Kok Leong (see [12] above) which “may show that:

The Applicant attaches the signed statement dated 19 April 2026 of the new witness, who calls himself Chai Kok Leong (rather than Chia Kok Leong):

The Prosecution’s case

The Prosecution filed its submissions this morning. It first notes that the Applicant has provided no explanation for not making his application earlier although his appeal in CCA 28 was dismissed more than three years ago. It also notes that the Applicant is advancing for the very first time a “Storage and Safekeeping” case.

The Applicant did not name Chia Kok Leong as a witness who was relevant to his defence. In the course of one of his statements during investigations, the Applicant identified Chia Kok Leong in a photo board shown to him as Xiao Zi. He did not know the actual name. He also stated that Xiao Zi did not know about the drugs seized from the Applicant’s rented room.

The Applicant testified at the trial that he met Xiao Zi in a drug rehabilitation centre and knew him for ten to twenty years. They would consume drugs together in the rented room. However, Xiao Zi did not know about the drugs seized from the rented room.

The Applicant’s evidence during the trial was that he had been renting the room in question from September 2015. He paid a $750 monthly rental. He paid the deposit of $750 and one month of rent before he commenced working for Ah Kiat. He got this money from his mother. The room was rented using his eldest brother’s identity card without the brother’s knowledge. When he commenced working for Ah Kiat, he was given $2,700 by Ah Kiat to pay for the rental.

The Prosecution next lists the post-appeal applications that the Applicant was a party to. It notes that he was not a party in the proceedings relating to the disclosure of prisoners’ correspondence to the Attorney-General’s Chambers.

The decision of the Court

Before making a review application, an applicant must apply to the appellate court for and obtain permission to do so (s 394H(1) of the CPC). In deciding whether to grant an application for permission to make a review application, the appellate court must consider the matters set out in s 394H(6A) of the CPC.

Pursuant to s 394J(2) of the CPC, an applicant in a review application must satisfy the appellate court “there is sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments) on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made”. This may be referred to succinctly as the “new evidence” or “new law” requirement.

For the material to be “sufficient”, all three requirements in s 394J(3) of the CPC must be satisfied:

(a) before the filing of the application for permission to make the review application, the material has not been canvassed at any stage of the proceedings in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made;

(b) the material could not have been adduced in court earlier even with reasonable diligence; and

(c) the material is compelling, in that it is reliable, substantial, powerfully probative and capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter.

Under s 394J(4) of the CPC, where the material relied upon by the applicant consists of legal arguments, such material will only be “sufficient” if it is based on a change in the law that arose from any decision made by a court after the conclusion of all proceedings relating to the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. This is in addition to the three requirements set out at [28] above.

The grounds of decision in Kadar were given on 5 July 2011 and those in Nabill were given on 31 March 2020. The evidence in the Applicant’s trial concluded on 2 March 2021. It is therefore clear that these two earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal cannot constitute “new law” for the purposes of a review application.

The Applicant alleges breaches of the disclosure obligations by the Prosecution but provides no credible evidence to substantiate his allegations or any elaboration on how any alleged suppressed information or lack of investigations affects his defence at the trial. Similarly, the Applicant makes broad allegations about “Intrusive Access” to his confidential or privileged information but does not explain what the information is or how this could impact his conviction and sentence other than stating that the information “would enable the Applicant to apply to review his criminal conviction and sentencing” under the law, particularly the CPC.

The Applicant states that the correspondence to the Chief Justice that he alluded to was sent only after CCA 28 had been decided by the Court of Appeal. It could not therefore have affected the outcome of the appeal. If the letter contained material pertaining to his criminal case, it is the practice of the court to forward such material to all parties involved in the case or to include the material in its reply to the sender (and copied to other parties) as the court does not engage in private correspondence with one party in court proceedings where there are other parties involved.

The Applicant does not explain why he could not obtain the testimony of his new witness Chia Kok Leong without the Prosecution’s disclosure that it was possible to secure that witness’ attendance. He knew about this person and mentioned him in one of his statements given during the investigations and even at the trial. His evidence was that this person was his friend who would consume drugs with him in the rented room but he did not know about the drugs found therein. The Applicant does not explain why he did not or could not call Chia Kok Leong in his defence. This purported new defence witness would therefore not qualify as “new evidence” within the meaning of the review provisions in the CPC.

In any case, even if Chia Kok Leong’s evidence as encapsulated in his Witness Statement of 19 April 2026 is now considered, it is obvious that it will not aid the Applicant’s defence put forward at the trial. Seeing no drugs or drug activities during the three to five hours in the Applicant’s rented room on multiple occasions cannot mean that the Applicant was not involved in drugs. The same goes for the occasions when the two men went out for meals together. Chia Kok Leong is also obviously wrong in his impression that the Applicant was not involved in drug dealing because the Applicant did not even dispute that he was trafficking in drugs (other than Exhibit D1A2) and that he also consumed diamorphine and methamphetamine.

In so far as the rental of the room at 26B Hamilton Road is concerned, it was not in dispute that the Applicant was the one occupying it and that the drugs found in the room were in his possession and that he knew the nature of the drugs. Therefore, the issues of who the official tenant was and who was supplying money for the rent are not material to his conviction and sentence. As the Court of Appeal in CCA 28 emphasised (at [43] of Chong Hoon Cheong (CA)), “the crux” of the appeal was whether the Applicant had established his Consumption Defence pertaining to Exhibit D1A2. There was no suggestion at the trial or the appeal that the Applicant also had a “Storage and Safekeeping” defence and therefore any contention relating to it at this stage cannot possibly have any chance of success.

Conclusion

The Applicant has not shown even a remote possibility of miscarriage of justice in the appeal against his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, I dismiss his application summarily, without it being set down for hearing, pursuant to s 394H(7) of the CPC. It follows that there is no reason to stay the execution of his sentence scheduled for tomorrow.