Lingkesvaran Rajendaren v Attorney-General [2026] SGCA 4

Introduction

The applicant, Mr Lingkesvaran Rajendaren (the “Applicant”), is a prisoner awaiting capital punishment (“PACP”) who is scheduled to be executed on 11 February 2026. On 9 February 2026, he commenced two actions. HC/OC 136/2026 (“OC 136”) was filed at around 7.56am, and CA/OAC 1/2026 (“OAC 1”) was filed at around 4.49pm. Mr Derek Wong Kim Siong (“Mr Wong”) acts on behalf of the Applicant in both OC 136 and OAC 1.

In OC 136, the Applicant seeks the following:

(a) A declaration that the Attorney-General, the Singapore Prison Service, Tan Bin Kiat and Shahrom Bin Tamby Ahmad (collectively referred to by the Applicant as the “Defendants”) have breached ss 24, 29, 70(1), 71(1), 71(2), 71(3), 71(5), and 75 of the Prisons Act 1933 and regs 5(1), 6, 7, 13(2), 36, 38(2), 43(1), 47, 51(1), 60(1), 64(1), 64(2), 69, 70, 73(1), 73(2), 144, 162(3), 163 of the Prisons Regulations (the “Prisons Regulations”) as against the Applicant. The Statement of Claim in OC 136 (the “SOC”) does not clarify which edition of the Prisons Act or the Prisons Regulations it is referring to but this is immaterial for present purposes. This judgment shall refer to the relevant legislation simply as the “Prisons Act” and the “Prisons Regulations” respectively.

(b) A declaration that the aforementioned breaches of the Prisons Act and Prisons Regulations have deprived the Applicant of his right to personal liberty as set out in Art 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Constitution”), and are therefore impermissible derogations from Art 9 of the Constitution.

(c) A declaration that the aforementioned breaches of the Prisons Act and Prisons Regulations have deprived the Applicant of his right to equal protection under the law as set out in Art 12(1) of the Constitution, and are therefore impermissible derogations from Art 12 of the Constitution.

(d) Damages to be assessed.

(e) Interest pursuant to s 12 of the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed).

(f) Costs.

OAC 1 is an application under s 60G of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “SCJA”) for permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC application”). In OAC 1, the Applicant seeks the following orders:

(a) Permission to be granted to file a PACC application for a stay of execution pending the full and final determination of OC 136;

(b) A stay of execution pending the determination of the permission application and any consequent PACC application; and

(c) Any other relief the court deems fit.

For context, OAC 1 is placed before me as a single Judge sitting in the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 60G(2) of the SCJA.

Facts and History of Proceedings

The facts relating to the Applicant’s conviction have been set out in Public Prosecutor v Lingkesvaran Rajendaren and another [2018] SGHC 234. It suffices to say that the Applicant was charged with trafficking in 52.77g of diamorphine, an offence under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “MDA”) punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA. He was sentenced to the mandatory death penalty after trial. His appeal against conviction and sentence in CA/CCA 39/2018 (“CCA 39”) was dismissed by this court on 27 March 2019. However, it is important to stress that OC 136 and OAC 1 do not pertain to the legality of the Applicant’s conviction and sentence.

On 11 November 2019, a Petition of Clemency was filed on behalf of the Applicant by Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy, his solicitor at that point in time. On 11 February 2020, the Applicant was informed by the President that the sentence of death should stand, and the said Petition was therefore rejected.

The Applicant was first scheduled to be executed on 25 November 2021. However, on 11 November 2021, the President granted the Applicant an order of respite of the said execution.

Thereafter, on 13 September 2025, a second Petition of Clemency was filed on behalf of the Applicant by his sister. On 11 December 2025, the Applicant was informed by the President that the position remained unchanged, and the said Petition was therefore rejected.

Between the dismissal of CCA 39 on 27 March 2019 and 9 February 2026, the Applicant has been involved in many legal proceedings. A table setting out a brief summary of each of these proceedings is set out in Annex 1 of this judgment.

The last of the Applicant’s legal proceedings was CA/SUM 16/2023 (“CA/SUM 16”) which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 August 2025.

Mr Wong alleges that he first received instructions on 29 September 2025 to bring proceedings pertaining to mistreatment of the Applicant by officers of the Singapore Prison Service.

On 4 February 2026, the Applicant was notified that he was scheduled to be executed on 11 February 2026.

As mentioned, he filed OC 136 and OAC 1 on 9 February 2026.

The Applicant’s actions

OC 136

In OC 136, the Applicant advances a litany of complaints arising from his incarceration at Changi Prison Complex. According to the Applicant’s SOC, after he was convicted on 29 October 2018, he was detained in the A-Wing of Institution A1 of Changi Prison Complex (the “A-Wing”) for a period of approximately six months. Thereafter, according to the Applicant, he was transferred to the Solitary Housing Unit (“SHU”) within Institution A1, transferred back to the A-Wing for a period of time, and then transferred to the SHU on or around 8 October 2025. In OC 136, the Applicant claims against:

(a) the Attorney-General (the “First Defendant”);

(b) the Singapore Prison Service (the “Second Defendant”);

(c) Mr Tan Bin Kiat (the “Third Defendant”, who is described in the SOC as the Superintendent of Institution A1); and

(d) Mr Shahrom Bin Tamby Ahmad (the “Fourth Defendant”, who is described in the SOC as the Officer-in-Charge of the SHU).

The complaints made by the Applicant in his SOC are numerous. The SOC contains 166 paragraphs and more than 65 pages. For present purposes, it suffices to say that the SOC asserts that the following duties are owed by the Defendants and/or their agents and/or representatives in law:

(a) The Third Defendant, as Superintendent of Institution A1, purportedly owed duties under reg 5(1) of the Prisons Regulations to, inter alia, ensure that prison staff comply with all written laws, which includes s 29 of the Prisons Act and reg 36 of the Prisons Regulations, which set out duties owed by all prison officers. The Third Defendant and other prison officers are also said to owe certain “substantive duties” under the Prisons Regulations (“Substantive Duties”).

(b) The Second Defendant and Third Defendant, and First Defendant by reason of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (2020 Rev Ed), purportedly owe duties to ensure that all medical officers (ie, doctors) of the prison adhere to and perform all duties owed by medical officers under the Prisons Act and the Prisons Regulations (“Medical Officer Duties”).

(c) The Second Defendant and Third Defendant also purportedly owe prisoners statutory duties in relation to punishments meted out to prisoners pursuant to the Prisons Act (“Prison Offences Duties”).

The SOC goes on to assert that these duties were breached by the Defendants. In relation to the Substantive Duties and/or Medical Officer Duties, these were purportedly breached when the Defendants allegedly:

(a) failed to hear or deal with the Applicant’s complaints relating to the prison or his treatment or safety;

(b) failed to grant him a reasonable opportunity to make complaints or requests to the Visiting Justice;

(c) failed to bring him to a medical officer to be examined for injury;

(d) performed various acts which irritated the Applicant and/or may tend to irritate the Applicant, such as frustrating visits, mocking the Applicant, delaying the Applicant’s access to magazines sent to him, leaving the light in the Applicant’s cell on, and handcuffing the Applicant from the back;

(e) entrusted the duty of attending to the Applicant to a staff nurse who allegedly could not safely be entrusted with such duties;

(f) failed to examine Cell 12 of the A-Wing sufficiently to ensure that the cell was safe for him;

(g) failed to provide him with sufficient clothing and bedding;

(h) failed to ensure that he was given adequate medical treatment;

(i) failed to modify the punishment suffered by him when he complained of rashes and pain;

(j) failed to report to the Superintendent when his mind appeared to be, or was likely to be, injuriously affected; and

(k) failed to report and/or resolve certain irregularities in the prison hospital pertaining to the radiological examination of his right hand.

In relation to the Prison Offences Duties, these were purportedly breached when the Applicant was detained in what he described as “punishment cells” (viz, Cells 12 and 13 of the A-Wing, and other cells), without:

(a) granting him an opportunity to hear the charge and evidence against him and making his defence;

(b) carrying out a due inquiry of his conduct before punishing him; and

(c) giving notice to the Commissioner (of Prisons) within the required notice period.

The Applicant further alleges that the Second Defendant, Third Defendant, and Fourth Defendant, as well as prison officers under their charge, responsibility and control, acted ultra vires of the Prisons Act and Prisons Regulations by virtue of the alleged breaches. Further, these ultra vires acts were carried out with the knowledge that they were in fact ultra vires, or otherwise done maliciously.

Finally, the Applicant claims that these alleged breaches have amounted to further punishment which fall afoul of his rights under Art 9(1) and 12 of the Constitution and are inflictions of additional punishment on him which do not lawfully flow from the consequences of his conviction and sentence. They are therefore impermissible derogations from his Constitutional rights.

Under Art 9(1) of the Constitution, no person is to be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the law. Article 12(1) stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.

OAC 1

As recounted above (at [3]), in OAC 1, the Applicant seeks, inter alia, permission to file a PACC application for a stay of execution pending the full and final determination of OC 136, and further seeks a stay of execution pending the determination of this permission application.

Primarily, the Applicant submits that the proper determination of OC 136 can only take place with proper examination of the Applicant in OC 136. Additionally, the Applicant submits that OC 136 is of such particular significance as to warrant the court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to stay the Applicant’s execution, on the following grounds:

(a) First, the Applicant’s civil and constitutional rights are engaged as a consequence of the mistreatment alleged in OC 136.

(b) Second, the court has the jurisdiction and power to investigate and remedy violations of prisoners’ rights, which are central to the administration of justice.

(c) Third, allegations of mistreatment in prison, such as those in OC 136, carry exceptional public interest.

(d) Fourth, the Applicant has a substantive right to pursue his allegations of mistreatment.

The applicable law

Under s 60F of the SCJA, a PACC application is either of the following: (i) “the application is for a stay of the execution of the death sentence on the PACP”; or (ii) “the determination of the application calls into question, or may call into question, the propriety of the conviction of, the imposition of the sentence of death on, or the carrying out of the sentence of death on, the PACP”.

It is clear that OAC 1 is only in respect of the former and not the latter. Sections 60F to 60M SCJA are contained in Pt 5, Div 4 of the SCJA. Pt 5 Div 4 does not independently create and confer an independent substantive right to seek a stay of execution of the PACP’s death sentence. Instead, the provisions therein only establish the procedure by which a PACC application is to be made (see Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 1345 (“Pannir Selvam (PACC Application)”) at [39]–[43]).

As provided for under s 60G(1) of the SCJA, an applicant must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal to make a PACC application. Section 60G(7) of the SCJA prescribes several matters which this court must consider in determining an application for permission to make a PACC application (see also Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2025] 1 SLR 605 at [29]; Kishor Kumar a/l Raguan v Public Prosecutor [2025] 1 SLR 1276 at [37]; Chandroo Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 37 at [21]):

Section 60G(7)(c) of the SCJA refers to whether the applicant in a PACC application for permission has complied with the requirement in s 60G(4) of the SCJA, ie, that he or she must file written submissions in support of the application and such other documents as are prescribed in the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”), within such periods as are prescribed in the ROC.

The considerations in s 60G(7) of the SCJA mirror the considerations that the appellate court must consider under s 394H(6A) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) in deciding whether or not to grant an application for permission to make a review application (see Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGCA 56 at [64]; Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGCA 40 at [24]; Mohammad Azwan bin Bohari v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1271 at [16]).

The decision of the court

In my view, save for the procedural factor found in s 60G(7)(c) of the SCJA (elaborated upon above at [26]), which was complied with by Mr Wong, OAC 1 fails to satisfy the other factors in s 60G(7)(a), (b) and (d) of the SCJA.

Availability of material, any delay in filing OAC 1 and the reasons for delay

I will address the availability of material, any delay in filing OAC 1 and the reasons for the delay together.

Mr Wong says that he was only instructed on 29 September 2025 to make the permission application. Thereafter, he suffered an accident on 12 October 2025 which caused injuries to his right ankle and was on hospitalisation leave from 31 October to 12 December 2025. Thereafter, he needed the assistance of an interpreter who could speak Tamil or Malay as the Applicant does not speak English. His next visit to the Applicant was on 24 December 2025, 21 January and 26 January 2026. He had to take detailed instructions and comb through publicly available information to confirm the identities of officers involved in the claim in OC 136.

The explanation by Mr Wong for the delay between 29 September 2025 and 9 February 2026 is not satisfactory. Notwithstanding his injuries, he says that he was able to attend physically at the State Courts when it was absolutely necessary for criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, he must have been aware that the Applicant is a PACP and the Applicant could be scheduled for execution at any time after his last legal matter was disposed of on 28 August 2025 when CA/SUM 16 was dismissed.

He ought to have informed the Applicant to instruct another counsel if he really could not have attended to the Applicant’s complaints expeditiously. As it was, OAC 1 was filed just two days before the scheduled date for execution.

In any event, Mr Wong’s explanation misses the point. It focuses on explaining the delay between 29 September 2025 and 9 February 2026.

However, fundamentally, OAC 1 is premised on material which could have been readily adduced in court well before 29 September 2025. Many of the allegations advanced in OC 136 (recounted above at [16]–[17]) were alleged to have occurred from 2016 and also between 2021 and 2023 (the “Main Allegations”). A few pertain to 2024 and 2025. The Main Allegations relate to what the Applicant personally experienced, and thus, exist within his personal knowledge. Any need to verify his complaints with publicly available information could and should have been done in 2024, if not earlier. Yet, no explanation, let alone any reasonable explanation, has been offered as to why these allegations were not made earlier in time.

In my view, this inexplicable delay is particularly damning in light of the fact that the Applicant was represented by counsel in other matters while some of the alleged mistreatment was said to have occurred. For example, in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General and another [2021] 4 SLR 698, the Applicant, along with the other applicants in that matter, was represented by Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy.

Furthermore, in the SOC, the Applicant states that he had been in contact with Mr Wong since March 2023. At paragraph 128 of the SOC, Mr Wong is described as “a legal advisor” of the Applicant on 5 May 2023. In both the SOC and in Mr Wong’s Affidavit dated 9 February 2026 (“Mr Wong’s Affidavit”), it is stated that Mr Wong had visited the Applicant at Changi Prison Complex on five occasions in 2023, namely, on 27 March 2023, 5 May 2023, 18 May 2023, 27 June 2023, 22 December 2023. In Mr Wong’s Affidavit, Mr Wong describes the purpose of his visits as follows:

The SOC alleges that the Applicant did make a complaint to the judge hearing HC/OA 480/2022 in September 2022 (see the Annex) and to a Visiting Justice on 21 June 2023 (and on 7 October 2025) but there is no objective evidence of the complaints. Importantly, no explanation has been given as to why the Main Allegations were not made to Mr Wong in 2023. I pause to reiterate that the Applicant has, since the dismissal of CCA 39 on 27 March 2019, participated in many different proceedings. Consequently, the Applicant cannot seriously contend that he did not know how to seek advice for any alleged mistreatment in OC 136 and indeed he does not make that contention.

In my view, the facts recounted thus far (at [29]–[38]) strongly suggest that OC 136 is an abuse of process filed for the sole purpose of delaying the Applicant’s impending execution. Plainly, insofar as the alleged mistreatment continued into 2023, the Applicant could have easily filed OC 136 in 2024, if not earlier, but inexplicably, this was not done.

Reasonable prospect of success

The Applicant argues that OAC 1 is a relevant proceeding for the purpose of seeking permission to make a PACC application and a stay of execution. He cites this court’s decision in Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney General [2025] 1 SLR 237 at [51] where the court said that it suffices to say that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the contemplated PACC application. In that case, the applicant had made a complaint to the Law Society of Singapore against his former counsel and sought to pursue the proceedings arising from the complaint. That was one of the reasons for which he sought a stay of execution. However, the context of the court’s observation was not whether the applicant could succeed in his complaint but whether he could establish that the proceedings arising from the complaint was a relevant proceeding for a stay of execution to be ordered, ie, a relevant pending proceeding. There the court considered that it was appropriate to review the remarks about a relevant proceeding in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney- General [2021] 1 SLR 809 and in Attorney-General v Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah [2022] SGCA 46. However, since then, the Court of Appeal has clarified the matter in Pannir Selvam (PACC Application).

In Pannir Selvam (PACC Application) at [59], the Court of Appeal held that PACPs are persons who have been sentenced to death in accordance with law and whose convictions and sentences have been upheld by the Court of Appeal following an appeal or review. Consequently, the starting point in the circumstances is that the State is entitled to deprive them of their lives, subject to the qualification that this must be carried out in accordance with law. Though the carrying into effect of such a sentence will necessarily prevent a PACP from seeing through any pending proceedings which he may be interested (including proceedings which are brought by him and may require his testimony), this is not intrinsically objectionable, as PACPs stand in a very different position from other persons who have not lost their right to life by reason of a lawfully imposed death sentence. In short, PACPs have their rights lawfully attenuated and any proceeding which does not affect the legality of the conviction or sentence or come within a limited exception of State-brought proceedings is not a relevant pending proceeding to obtain a stay of execution. In my view, the unequivocal statements in Pannir Selvam (PACC Application) at [59] denudes the Applicant’s submissions that his civil and constitutional rights are engaged as a consequence of the allegations in OC 136, and/or that allegations of mistreatment in prison carry exceptional public interest, and/or that he has a substantive right to pursue his allegations of mistreatment (recounted above at [22(a)], [22(c)] and [22(d)]). Whether the court has the jurisdiction and power to investigate and remedy violations of prisoners’ rights, which are central to the administration of justice, is neither here nor there (see [22(b)] above).

In Pannir Selvam (PACC Application) at [66], the Court of Appeal said that the court had inherent jurisdiction and power to grant a stay of execution in exceptional circumstances. This was in the context of a proceeding not being a relevant pending proceeding. In my view, none of the grounds relied upon by the Applicant (recounted above at [22]) brings him within the “exceptional circumstances” envisaged in that decision.

Simply put, the onus is on PACPs to commence proceedings to vindicate their rights, constitutional or otherwise, as early as possible. It cannot be that every allegation of a breach of a constitutional or an important right or of mistreatment constitutes an exceptional circumstance. If that were the case, it would be easy to circumvent the need to establish that a pending proceeding is a relevant proceeding. Inexplicably, the Applicant has commenced proceedings long after his rights were purportedly infringed.

As I have observed above (at [39]), the facts strongly suggest that OC 136 is an abuse of process filed for the sole purpose of delaying the Applicant’s impending execution. I conclude that it is an abuse of process. There can be no public interest in allowing such an abuse of process to continue. I am satisfied that the contemplated PACC application does not have a reasonable prospect of success in that it is clearly not a relevant pending proceeding and there is no exceptional circumstance to warrant the granting of a stay of execution. The cases cited by the Applicant do not address these threshold issues.

Conclusion

Having considered the Applicant’s submissions, it is clear that a stay of execution should not be granted. Pursuant to s 60G(8) of the SCJA, I dismiss OAC 1 summarily without setting it down for hearing.

Annex 1: List of Matters Pertaining to the Applicant