[2026] SGDC 113

District Court Originating Application No 1169 of 2025 (District Court Summons No 2329 of 2025) District Judge Chiah Kok Khun

Introduction

The claimant is a law firm that had previously acted for the defendant. The claimant rendered invoices for its fees there were disputed by the defendant. The claimant commenced action against the defendant for the invoices and obtained a judgment in default. The claimant then took out an order for examination of enforcement respondent (“EER”) against the director of the defendant, Mr Manickam Nagarajan (“Naga”).

This is an application by the claimant for a committal order to be issued against Naga. The application stems from the absence of Naga at the adjourned EER hearing on 29 October 2025, and his failure to furnish answers to the questionnaire that EER examinees can fill up in lieu of the examination (“EER questionnaire”). For the reasons set out below, I am dismissing the application.

Issues to be determined

The issues to be decided by me in this case are as follows:

(a) Whether Naga had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process.

(b) Whether Naga’s conduct was contumelious.

Analysis and findings

The legal principles

The starting place would be the statutory provisions found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“AJPA”).

Section 4(1) of the AJPA provides as follows:

It is seen that s 4(1) of the AJPA provides that any person who intentionally disobeys or breaches any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court commits a contempt of court. In other words, contempt of court is committed if there is intentional disobedience or breach of a judgment or order of court.

Section 21 of the AJPA should also be noted. It reads as follows

It is seen that if it can be shown that the person’s failure to comply with the order was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the order, that person ought fairly to be excused, and he will not be guilty of contempt.

It is also well established that to show that there has been a contempt of court, the complainant will need to show that in committing the act complained of or in omitting to comply with an order of court, the alleged contemnor had the necessary mental element. In the case of PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2018] 4 SLR 828 at [46], the High Court set out a two-step approach to determine whether contempt has been committed:

As seen, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. Whilst it is not necessary for the complainant to show that the alleged contemnor appreciated that he was breaching the order, the failure of the contemnor to comply with the court order in question must be intentional. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. The Court of Appeal provided valuable guidance as regards what the requisite mens rea might look like. In Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (“Mok Kah Hong”) at [86], the Court of Appeal stated:

Therefore, the breach by the alleged contemnor must be intentional. In other words, it is not to be approached in the same way as a strict liability offence, and any suggestion to the contrary is misplaced.

It should also be noted that the applicable standard of proof is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: The Court of Appeal stated in Mok Kah Hong at [85]:

Naga had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process

The EER took place on 10 October 2025. Naga attended the EER. Naga informed the deputy registrar (“DR”) hearing the EER that he did not receive the EER questionnaire. He then provided his email address as directed by the DR. The DR adjourned the hearing to 29 Oct 2025 for the claimant to send the questionnaire to Naga by email. The DR also directed Naga to provide the answers to the EER questionnaire by 24 Oct 2025. Pausing here, it would be noted that this is not a case of an unresponsive enforcement respondent who does not show up at any EER. Naga turned up at the very first hearing of the EER.

After the first EER and just before the adjourned hearing on 29 October 2025, the defendant appointed the defendant’s solicitors to act for Naga for purposes of the EER. In view of the pending EER, the defendant’s solicitors filed an application for a stay of execution of the default judgment pending the hearing of the setting aside of the judgment. This was filed on 28 October 2025. It is seen therefore that Naga took active steps in the face of the EER proceedings. He arranged for solicitors to act for him in respect of the EER and filed an application to stay the EER proceedings.

On 29 October 2025, the solicitor for Naga attended the EER. He informed the court that a summons for stay of execution had been filed and thus sought an adjournment of the EER. Naga had a medical appointment at Tan Tock Seng Hospital and was not able to attend the hearing. A certificate of attendance confirmed that Naga did attend at the medical appointment at the time of the adjourned EER on 29 Oct 2025. The claimant however responded by asking the DR hearing the EER to suspend the EER, in order for the claimant to apply for committal proceedings against Naga. It would be seen that the claimant’s application would be on the basis of Naga’s absence at the adjourned EER on 29 October 2025 and his failure to furnished the completed EER questionnaire.

Naga’s case is that he did not anticipate that the claimant would take out a committal summons, as there was a setting aside summons pending in court and also a stay of enforcement proceedings. He had not at any time refused to provide any documents and information for the EER. His position was that the EER should proceed after the applications for stay of proceedings and for setting aside of the default judgment.

As seen, whilst Naga was absent at the adjourned EER, he had appointed solicitors to attend and to address the court on his position. He also had a valid reason for not being in court. Naga contends that s 21 of the AJPA is applicable. As discussed above, under s 21, if it can be shown that the person’s failure to comply with the order was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the order, he will not be guilty of contempt. In this regard, I note the following in the present case:

(a) Whilst Naga was not present at the adjourned EER on 29 October 2025, he had appointed solicitors to attend the hearing.

(b) Whilst it did not comprise a certificate of unfitness to attend court, a certificate of attendance from Tan Tock Seng Hospital confirmed that Naga did attend at the medical appointment at the time of the adjourned EER on 29 Oct 2025.

(c) There was a pending application to set aside the default judgment at the time of the adjourned EER on 29 October 2025.

(d) There was a pending application to stay execution proceedings at the time of the adjourned EER on 29 October 2025. The purpose of the stay application was to determine whether the court should proceed with the EER pending the hearing of the setting aside application.

(e) What was sought on behalf of Naga on 29 Oct 2025 was an adjournment of the EER pending the hearing of the above applications.

Naga submits that he had honestly believed that the EER would be adjourned pending the applications that had been taken out. Thus, his failure to attend court was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure which ought to be excused by the court. In view of the matters I noted above, I find that there is at least a reasonable doubt raised that Naga had honestly believed that the EER on 29 Oct 2025 would be adjourned and his solicitors could attend on his behalf on 29 October 2025.

Naga’s conduct was not contumelious

Further, in my view, Naga’s conduct cannot be said to be contumelious. As discussed above, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. The breach by the alleged contemnor must be intentional. In the present case, it cannot be said that Naga deliberately chose not to comply with the order to attend the EER. He had taken reasonable steps in regard to the adjourned EER on 29 October 2025. As detailed above, he was fully engaged with the court proceedings relating to the EER. He attended the first EER, and had solicitors instructed to attend the adjourned EER and to file the necessary applications under the Rules of Court. There is no evidence that he was uncooperative or that he was evading the EER process.

The requisite mens rea for contempt is therefore not made out. As alluded to above, the applicable standard of proof in committal application is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. I find that the claimant has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that Naga was in contempt of court.

For completeness, I would add that it is pertinent to keep in mind the objective of EER. The EER process is for the purpose of obtaining the details of the financial state of a judgment debtor. The sole objective is to determine if the judgment debtor is able to satisfy the judgment debt, and if so, in what ways the judgment debt can be satisfied. In this regard, the claimant could have sought for a short adjournment at the adjourned EER on 29 Oct 2025 for Naga to furnish the completed EER questionnaire. In fact, Naga solicitor’s sought such an adjournment at that EER. The claimant however, chose to suspend the EER and apply for committal proceedings.

As well for completeness, I would refer to the case of Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 (“Tay Kar Oon”). Although the decision concerned a case where contempt was made out and the Court of Appeal was considering the appropriate sentence, the Court of Appeal’s approach is instructive. The Court of Appeal stated as follows at [55]:

It is seen that in deciding on the appropriate sentence for civil contempt, the Court of Appeal considered the following factors as framework for analysis:

In Tay Kar Oon the Court of Appeal in sentencing considered the above factors and found them in favour of the contemnor. The Court of Appeal held that the contemnor had substantially purged her contempt by complying with the various orders and directions in question (at [57]).

In the present case, as I had made the finding that contempt is not proved in the present case, these factors are relevant only to provide an insight to the approach of the courts in civil contempt proceedings. In this regard, I note that the defendant in the present case have fully paid on the judgment on 29 January 2026. As the purpose of the EER was to ascertain the assets and resource of the defendant to satisfy the judgment, there is no prejudice suffered by the claimant. As for the degree of culpability, it follows from my discussion above that Naga’s culpability is low. Likewise, my analysis above showed that he had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process: he attended the first EER; had solicitors instructed to attend the adjourned EER; and filed the necessary applications under the Rules of Court. There is no evidence that he was uncooperative or that he was evading the EER process. It is clear Naga appreciated the seriousness of any breach and he had co-operated. In my view, it is plain that in the present case it can be said in any event that Naga had purged his contempt.

Conclusion

The burden is on the claimant asserting contemptuous conduct on the part of Naga to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The claimant has not adduced any evidence to persuade me that Naga possessed the requisite mens rea for contempt. I therefore find Naga not guilty of contempt of court. The application by the claimant to commit him is dismissed.

I would add some remarks of general application to committal proceedings. Committal proceedings should be brought as a remedy of last resort. That there is a distinction drawn between using committal proceedings as a remedy of last resort and the requirement of having to exhaust all other alternative remedies before resorting to committal proceedings does not dilute the accepted principle that they remain a remedy of last resort. In Mok Kah Hong at [96] the Court of Appeal held as follows:

As seen, committal orders are recognised as orders of last resort. Whilst the applicant does not bear the burden of establishing that all alternative enforcement mechanisms have been exhausted before taking out contempt proceedings, they should be employed only in the last resort. This is clearly reinforced in Mok Kah Hong. There should first be meaningful attempts made to enforce the court order in question by less draconian means.

There has been an increase in the filing of committal proceedings in the State Courts to enforce court orders. There is a need to curtail the proliferation of committal applications for breach of court orders. There are other remedies for breach of court orders that would serve the purposes of the orders breached. In my view, as a matter of law, committal proceedings should not be taken out at the first instance of enforcement proceedings. In particular, where the court order is for payment of monies, the judgment creditor has a variety of available remedies under procedural laws to aid recovery of such judgment debt. There is no reason why these remedies should not be pursued instead of committal proceedings. In other words, committal proceedings must serve the purposes of the court orders. They should not be used for the purpose of exerting pressure on judgment debtors. The courts need to guard against the misuse of committal proceedings.