[2026] SGMC 67

Magistrate’s Court Originating Claim No 5777 of 2025 (Magistrate’s Court Summons No 111 of 2026) District Judge Chiah Kok Khun

Introduction

The parties in this application are related to the parties in a similar application that was argued before me (the “earlier application”). The nature of both applications is also similar; they seek to commit the directors of judgment debtor companies for their absence at examination of enforcement respondent (“EER”) hearings. I dismissed the earlier application, and my reasons are set out in Cairnhill Law LLC v Royal's Engineering & Trading (S) Pte Ltd [2026] SGDC 113 (“Cairnhill Law”).

The claimant is a law firm that had previously acted for the defendant. The claimant rendered invoices for its fees that were disputed by the defendant. The claimant commenced action against the defendant for the invoices and obtained a judgment in default. The claimant then took out an order for EER against the director of the defendant, Ms Subramanian Deepa (“Deepa”).

As alluded to earlier, the application by the claimant is for a committal order to be issued against Deepa. The application stems from the absence of Deepa at the adjourned EER hearing on 16 December 2025, and her failure to furnish answers to the questionnaire that EER examinees typically fill up in lieu of the examination (“EER questionnaire”).

For reasons similar to the earlier application, and as elaborated below, I am dismissing the application.

Issues to be determined

The issues to be decided by me in this case are as follows:

(a) Whether Deepa had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process.

(b) Whether Deepa’s conduct was contumelious.

Analysis and findings

The legal principles

I had set out the relevant legal principles governing committal proceedings in Cairnhill Law. For ease of reference, I set them out again. The starting place would be the statutory provisions found in the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (“AJPA”).

Section 4(1) of the AJPA provides as follows:

It is seen that s 4(1) of the AJPA provides that any person who intentionally disobeys or breaches any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court commits a contempt of court. In other words, contempt of court is committed if there is intentional disobedience or breach of a judgment or order of court.

Section 21 of the AJPA should also be noted. It reads as follows

It is seen that if it can be shown that the person’s failure to comply with the order was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the order, that person ought fairly to be excused, and he will not be guilty of contempt.

It is also well established that to show that there has been a contempt of court, the complainant will need to show that in committing the act complained of or in omitting to comply with an order of court, the alleged contemnor had the necessary mental element. In the case of PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2018] 4 SLR 828 at [46], the High Court set out a two-step approach to determine whether contempt has been committed:

As seen, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. Whilst it is not necessary for the complainant to show that the alleged contemnor appreciated that he was breaching the order, the failure of the contemnor to comply with the court order in question must be intentional. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. In Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (“Mok Kah Hong”) the Court of Appeal in discussing the requisite mens rea reiterated that the breach of the court order must be intentional. The Court of Appeal stated at [86] as follows:

Therefore, it must be shown that the alleged contemnor intended to breach the court order. In other words, it is not to be approached in the same way as a strict liability offence, and any suggestion to the contrary is misplaced.

It should also be noted that the applicable standard of proof is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: The Court of Appeal stated in Mok Kah Hong at [85]:

Deepa had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process

With the above legal principles in mind, I return to the present case.

As alluded to above, the parties in this application are related to the parties in the earlier application. The claimant in the present case was also the claimant in the earlier application. The claimant had acted for the defendant in the earlier application and like in the present case, rendered invoices for its fees that were disputed. The claimant commenced action against the defendant in the earlier application for payment of the invoices and obtained a judgment in default. The claimant then took out an order for EER against the defendant’s director in the earlier application, who is Deepa’s husband.

In the present case, the claimant likewise took out an application for EER after obtaining the judgment in default against Deepa. The application was fixed for hearing, and Deepa attended the EER hearing on 11 November 2025. She also submitted the EER questionnaire that was forwarded to her by the claimant prior to the hearing. It would appear however that the EER questionnaire she submitted had two missing pages. The EER questionnaire sent to her was printed on double-sided pages, whilst she had printed only one side of her completed EER questionnaire when she submitted it at the hearing. Deepa also informed the court at the hearing that she needed time to provide further documents.

The deputy registrar conducting the EER hearing then adjourned the matter to 16 December 2025 for further hearing. Deepa did not turn up at the 16 December 2025 hearing. Deepa explained that as she had no pen and paper with her when the deputy registrar gave the date of the adjourned hearing, she did not write down the date but instead committed to memory the adjourned date. She had however mistakenly remembered the date as 19 December 2025.

When Deepa did not turn up at the 16 December 2025 hearing, the claimant did not ask the court for an adjournment of the hearing or take any steps to determine why Deepa, having turned up for the previous hearing, was absent. Instead, the claimant asked to vacate the EER hearing so as to commence committal proceedings against her.

Upon realising that she had missed the further EER hearing, Deepa wrote an email to the court on 22 December 2025 to apologise. She also set out her explanation for missing the hearing. She reiterated that it was not her intention to disregard the court’s directions and emphasised that she was fully prepared to comply with any further instructions the court may issue. The email to the court was copied to the claimant. The material portions of her email are as follows:

It is seen that Deepa upon realising that she had missed the court date rendered her apology in writing to the court immediately. She also went on record to state that she stood ready to abide by any further directions from the court. About a week later, on 30 December 2025, Deepa forwarded to the claimant all the documents sought for by the claimant in the EER process.

In my view, Deepa had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process. At the outset, it should be noted that she attended the first EER hearing. She had also by then completed the EER questionnaire that was forwarded to her by the claimant prior to the hearing, which she handed over at the hearing. As for the two missing pages in the completed EER questionnaire, I accept her explanation for those missing pages. I also note that Deepa informed the court at the hearing that she needed time to provide further documents. She was clearly seeking to cooperate with the claimant in the EER process.

As discussed above, under s 21 of the ACPA if it can be shown that the person’s failure to comply with the order was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure to understand the obligation imposed by the order, he or she will not be guilty of contempt. In this regard, I note that Deepa’s failure to attend court was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure which ought to be excused by the court. I also note that upon realising that she had missed the court date, Deepa rendered her apology in writing to the court immediately. She further went on record to state that she stood ready to abide by any further directions from the court. Moreover, about a week later she forwarded to the claimant all the documents sought for by the claimant in the EER process. Plainly this is not a case of a person who blatantly disregarded court orders and directions. In my view, Deepa ought fairly to be excused for her failure to attend the 16 December 2025 hearing.

Deepa’s conduct was not contumelious

Further, in my view, Deepa’s conduct cannot be said to be contumelious. As I have discussed in Cairnhill Law, not all failures to comply with court orders are deemed contemptuous. The requisite mens rea for contempt must be proven. The breach by the alleged contemnor must be intentional. In the present case, it cannot be said that Deepa deliberately chose not to comply with the order to attend the EER hearing. She had attended the first EER hearing and provided documents, although she had missed out two pages of the completed EER questionnaire. The failure to provide a fully completed EER questionnaire in the circumstances cannot be said to be intentional. She also sought time to provide further documents, which the court granted. As for Deepa’s failure to attend court on 16 December 2026, I have found that her failure was wholly or substantially attributable to an honest and reasonable failure which ought to be excused by the court. It cannot be stated that she had the requisite mens rea to intentionally breach the EER Order.

In my view, in assessing whether any disobedience of court orders is tantamount to contempt of court, a distinction has to be drawn between conduct that is calculated to disrupt the due process of the court and unintended non-compliance of court orders. The discussion above showed that Deepa had taken reasonable steps in regard to the EER process. She attended the first EER hearing; she had by then completed the EER questionnaire that was forwarded to her by the claimant prior to the hearing, which she handed over at the hearing; and she also sought time to provide further documents. Upon realising that she had missed the court date, Deepa rendered her apology in writing to the court immediately. Moreover, about a week later she forwarded to the claimant all the documents sought for by the claimant in the EER process.

It is clear Deepa appreciated the seriousness of any breach and she had co-operated. In my view, it is plain that in the present case it can be said in any event that Deepa had purged her contempt. The requisite mens rea for contempt is therefore not made out. As alluded to above, the applicable standard of proof in committal application is that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. I find that the claimant has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that Deepa was in contempt of court.

Conclusion

I would repeat my remarks on committal proceedings that I made in Cairnhill Law. Committal proceedings should be brought as a remedy of last resort. That there is a distinction drawn between using committal proceedings as a remedy of last resort and the requirement of having to exhaust all other alternative remedies before resorting to committal proceedings does not dilute the accepted principle that they remain a remedy of last resort. In Mok Kah Hong at [96] the Court of Appeal held as follows:

As seen, committal orders are recognised as orders of last resort. Whilst the applicant does not bear the burden of establishing that all alternative enforcement mechanisms have been exhausted before taking out contempt proceedings, they should be employed only in the last resort. This is clearly reinforced in Mok Kah Hong. There should first be meaningful attempts made to enforce the court order in question by less draconian means.

As I have noted in Cairnhill Law, there has been an unhealthy increase in the filing of committal proceedings in the State Courts to enforce court orders. There is a need to curtail the proliferation of committal applications for breach of court orders. There are other remedies for breach of court orders that would serve the purposes of the orders breached. In my view, as a matter of law, committal proceedings should not be taken out at the first instance of enforcement proceedings. In particular, where the court order is for payment of monies, the judgment creditor has a variety of available remedies under procedural laws to aid recovery of such judgment debt. There is no reason why these remedies should not be pursued instead of committal proceedings. In other words, committal proceedings must serve the purposes of the court orders. They should not be used for the purpose of exerting pressure on judgment debtors. The courts need to guard against the misuse of committal proceedings.

In regard to committal proceedings taken out against EER examinees for absence at EER hearings, it is pertinent to keep in mind the objective of the EER process. The EER process is for the purpose of obtaining the details of the financial state of a judgment debtor. The sole objective is to determine if the judgment debtor is able to satisfy the judgment debt, and if so, in what ways the judgment debt can be satisfied. I would add that the EER process itself should not be misused to hound a judgment debtor into paying up. In this regard, where an EER examinee is absent at a EER hearing, enforcement applicants should not be too quick to suspend the EER proceedings and file for committal proceedings. Instead, they should consider seeking a short adjournment to give an opportunity for the EER examinee to turn up for the EER hearing and furnish the requisite information. The EER process is after all for the purpose of obtaining the details of the financial state of a judgment debtor. In the present case for instance, the claimant could have sought a short adjournment on 16 December 2026 for Deepa to turn up for the EER hearing and to furnish the completed EER questionnaire. The claimant, however, chose to suspend the EER and apply for committal proceedings.

It should be noted that committal proceedings are draconian measures which are quasi-criminal in nature. They are not a tool to be misused to harass judgment debtors into paying up on their judgment debts. It is pertinent that all users of our civil justice system see committal proceedings for what they are: remedies of last resort.