Terrence Fernandez v Tan Aik Hong Thomas [2026] SGDC 5

This is a defamation action. The claimant, Mr Terrence Fernandez, was the president of the Serangoon Garden Country Club (the “Club”) at the material time. He took issue with various statements made by the defendant, Mr Thomas Tan, after the conclusion of an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) conducted on 8 September 2019.

I heard the trial of this action. On 7 January 2025, I issued a written judgment which is reported at Terrence Fernandez v Tan Aik Hong Thomas [2025] SGDC 1 (my “earlier Judgment”). In that judgment, I held that I did not have jurisdiction to hear and try the action, and in the alternative, that the claim should be dismissed because the defendant would have succeeded in the defence of justification.

The claimant appealed. On 22 August 2025, the General Division of the High Court issued its judgment in Terrence Fernandez v Tan Aik Hong Thomas [2025] SGHC 169 (the “HC Judgment”). The High Court allowed the appeal on jurisdiction and remitted the case back to me to deal with the merits.

On 3 September 2025, I convened a case conference where, amongst other things, the parties agreed that the evidence taken in the original trial was to stand and that it was sufficient for the parties to make further submissions.

Having considered the same, I remain of the view that the claimant’s case should be dismissed. These are grounds of my decision.

Facts

I start with the background facts. These have been set out at [5] to [29] of my earlier Judgment; I will not repeat myself. It suffices to summarise only the key facts.

The parties

The defendant is a former Club President. He served for four terms of two years each, namely from 1998 to 2000, 2000 to 2002, 2006 to 2008, and 2008 to 2010. He was a Club member at the material time.

The claimant is also a former Club President. He was elected on 24 June 2018 and his term ended in September 2020.

Requisition of the EGM for a vote of no confidence

On or around 8 November 2018, the Club received a requisition dated 2 November 2018 (the “Requisition”). The Requisition came with the names, membership numbers, telephone numbers, and signatures of 111 members. Amongst other things, it sought to convene an EGM to pass and adopt a motion of no confidence against the claimant and to remove him as Club President.

The Club sought legal advice from its solicitors, Lee & Lee, who advised:

(a) The Club must convene the EGM if it received a requisition of more than 100 members. In their 14 November 2018 letter, Lee & Lee stated:

(b) Unless there is evidence that the signatories did not support the Requisition, the Club must accept it at face value and convene the EGM.

(c) It is not common to seek a requisitioner’s acknowledgement that they understood and signed the requisition. But if the Club sent such a letter, it cannot refuse to call the EGM on the basis that fewer than 100 members acknowledged the same.

The initial decision not to convene the EGM

On 20 November 2018, the General Committee discussed the Requisition at its 6th General Committee meeting. This included the legal advice received. Accordingly, the Minutes of the 6th General Committee Meeting stated at [7.2.1]-[7.2.2]:

Following the discussion, the General Committee decided to send an acknowledgement letter to the requisitioning members. The acknowledgement letter was sent on 21 November 2018 (the “Acknowledgement Letter”). Broadly speaking, the Acknowledgement Letter:

(a) referred to the Requisition and the stated purpose of the EGM;

(b) requested that the requisitioning members acknowledge that they understood and signed the Requisition; and

(c) asked the requisitioning members to respond by 5 December 2018, failing which the Club “will consider that you are not aware that the letter dated 2 November 2018 is to requisition for an Extraordinary General Meeting for the aforesaid purpose”.

On 11 December 2018, the results of the Acknowledgement Letter and the decision not to convene the EGM were published:

The subsequent decision to call the EGM at the 62nd Annual General Meeting

On 5 June 2019, notice was given that the 62nd Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) would be held on 30 June 2019.

On 20 June 2019, the Club’s secretary received a letter. The letter was signed by 12 members, and it gave notice for the following matters to be transacted at the 62nd AGM:

On 30 June 2019, the Club held its 62nd AGM. I do not propose to describe the entire AGM. It is sufficient to focus on subparagraphs (a) and (c) of the 20 June 2019 letter.

I start with subparagraph (a) of the 20 June 2019 letter (see [15] above) and the discussion as to why the EGM was not called. In this discussion, Mr Toh Kok Seng from Lee & Lee (as the Club’s legal adviser) stated, amongst other things, that:

(a) The Constitution did not provide for the Club seeking confirmation from signatories on whether they signed with full understanding.

(b) Legal advice was given to the Club that the EGM need not be called, if for example, 20 members stepped forward and said that the requisition was fraudulent and that they did not sign it. However, Lee & Lee understood that “there was no such situation” and that the “Club had to take the requisition at face value as there was no evidence that there [were] actually less than 100 signatures”.

(c) While there was no deadline for convening an EGM, it should be done within a reasonable time. Here, it was opined that two months would be reasonable.

(d) The Club would breach its Constitution if it did not call the EGM.

The minutes of the 62nd AGM also showed that there were Club members who were upset with the General Committee’s initial decision not to call the EGM. The discussion ended with Mr Benjamin Wong, the then-vice president, stating that the management would advise on the date and timeline for the EGM.

I turn to the vote of no confidence set out at subparagraph (c) of the 20 June 2019 letter (see [15] above). In this respect, Mr Toh explained that a motion of no confidence vote did not automatically remove the President. Instead, if a vote of no confidence is passed, the President would usually step down and set the time for fresh elections. Notwithstanding, the vote of no confidence against the claimant as President proceeded with 101 of the 241 members who remained at the AGM. The results were:

Results of Votes

For

72

Against

14

Motion

Carried

The claimant did not step down.

The EGM on 8 September 2019

The EGM was convened on 8 September 2019 at 2:00pm. 292 voting members attended, of whom were 80 of the 111 requisitioners. This was an issue because Clause 31.3 of the Club’s Constitution required “not less than three quarters” of the requisitioning members to attend (i.e., 84 members, rounded up from 83.25):

As such, Mr Wong (who was chairing the EGM) addressed the members. He reminded them of Clause 31.3 of the Club’s Constitution and gave a 30-minute grace. When the quorum was not met at the end of the 30-minute grace, the claimant took the stage and cancelled the EGM. He said:

The claimant then departed.

After the claimant’s departure, the defendant addressed the remaining members:

The aftermath

Several media outlets reported on the incident, noting that the opposition faction had labelled the claimant a coward.

Procedural history

The first trial

I heard the trial on 10, 11, 13 and 14 June 2024. Thereafter, the parties filed their closing and reply submissions. In these initial submissions, the parties focused on the substantive merits of the claimant’s defamation claim and the defendant’s defence to it:

(a) On 2 August 2024, I received the parties’ closing submissions. The claimant’s Closing Submissions numbered 114 pages and the defendant’s Closing Submissions numbered 72 pages.

(b) On 23 August 2024, I received the parties’ reply submissions. The claimant’s Reply Submissions numbered 32 pages and the defendant’s Reply Submissions numbered 61 pages.

As it was not clear what the claimant was claiming in special damages, I issued a Correspondence from Court directing him to clarify the point. On 20 September 2024, his solicitors wrote in stating that the claimant was claiming S$375,262 as special damages, and that the claim was made in his AEIC.

As this led to the claimant’s claim exceeding the District Court’s monetary jurisdiction, I called a case conference on 27 September 2024. In that case conference, the claimant’s counsel sought to abandon the excess, whereas the defendant submitted that it was too late for the claimant to do so. Accordingly, I called for further submissions on jurisdiction and the issue of abandonment. These were filed on 11 October 2024.

On 7 January 2025, I issued my earlier Judgment—Terrence Fernandez v Tan Aik Hong Thomas [2025] SGDC 1. In summary,

(a) I held that I did not have jurisdiction to hear and try the action: see [37] to [85] of my earlier Judgment.

(b) I also held that even if the District Court had the requisite jurisdiction, the claim should be dismissed. Even though the claimant had made out a prima facie case of defamation, the defendant would have succeeded in the defence of justification: see [86] to [163] of my earlier Judgment.

The appeal

On 29 April 2025, the claimant filed his Notice of Appeal. The appeal was heard on 13 August 2025. On 22 August 2025, the General Division of the High Court issued the HC Judgment – Terrence Fernandez v Tan Aik Hong Thomas [2025] SGHC 169.

On jurisdiction, the General Division held at [10] that “[g]iven the fact that the claimant made no claim for [special damages] in his Statement of Claim, [I] ought to have dismissed the claim for Special Damages outright. There would therefore have been no need to rule that [I] had no jurisdiction to hear the case.”

On the substantive merits of the defamation claim, it appeared from [15]-[16] of the HC Judgment that the parties had not “clearly understood” the substantive case and they had made “inadequate submissions” in the appeal. This might have led the General Division to think that “[t]here were no detailed arguments below nor before [the General Division] as to the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege” and that I had only made “superficial references … as to whether the [defamatory] statements were justifiably made”.

On this basis, the High Court remitted the case back to me to deal with the merits:

The “re-trial”

On 3 September 2025, I convened a case conference for the matter. At that case conference, the parties agreed that there was no need for a re-trial, and that the evidence taken on 10, 11, 13 and 14 June 2024 should stand. This made sense given the High Court’s holding that I had the jurisdiction to hear the matter from the start. There is thus no reason to disregard the evidence taken at the initial trial of the matter. In the premises, all that was required was for the parties to make further submissions.

That said, I was initially concerned about how far I could depart from my initial decision. Accordingly, I called for submissions on the point. These were received on 24 September 2025. Having read them, I am persuaded by the claimant’s submissions that it is open to me to reconsider the issues that the High Court had remitted back to me, and to depart from my earlier decision if warranted.

(a) On 24 October 2025, I received the parties’ further written submissions.

(b) On 28 November 2025, following the defendant’s subsequent request for reply submissions, I received the parties’ further reply submissions.

(collectively, the parties’ “further submissions”)

My views are as follows.

Issue 1: Which, if any, of the five statements were defamatory

I start with the first issue which the High Court remitted to me—namely, “which, if any, of the five statements were defamatory”. These statements were made in the defendant’s address (see [23] above). I set out below the statements that the claimant took issue with as pleaded in his Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1) and the actual words that the defendant used in the address:

Statement

Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1)

Address

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In considering this issue, I bear in mind the High Court’s comment at [18] that calling the claimant a “coward” would not be defamatory unless “it is proved that the use of those words had lowered the reputation of the claimant.”

The first statement

The first statement is:

The claimant submitted that I should reconsider my decision regarding the first statement and find that it meant the claimant was “someone of ill repute and/or with a notorious background” and therefore “the members ought to be careful of” the claimant. According to the claimant, the first statement “was nothing less than a continuation of the tirade against [him]” when taking the entire address as a whole. In particular, the claimant sought to rely on the following “salient circumstances”:

(a) that the claimant had exercised his discretion to cancel the EGM;

(b) that a person identifying himself as ‘Roger Yap’ had addressed the room and claimed that the claimant ‘refused to step down’ after being ‘voted out’ at the previous AGM; and

(c) another man identifying himself as the “immediate past president” had cast aspersions on the claimant by:

(i) accusing the claimant of dishonestly taking credit for work done by “[his] team”; and

(ii) reminding the room that SGCC was a “member’s club” and then stating that “this is not a proprietary club where someone can go there and make decisions”. According to the claimant, this carried the “criticism of unilateral decision making.”

By contrast, the defendant submitted that I should maintain my decision regarding the first statement.

I agree with the defendant’s submissions.

The first point to note is that the claimant’s position is not that the first statement is defamatory in and of itself. Rather, his position is that the first statement must be read in context. I agree. As I held at [98] of my earlier Judgment:

I also agree that the first “salient circumstance” identified by the claimant—the claimant’s exercise of his discretion to cancel the EGM—is context that I should consider when interpreting the first statement. It is evident that the claimant’s cancellation of the EGM formed the main subject matter of the address (see [23] above) and indeed the statements that the claimant took issue with. I had done so in my earlier Judgement at [99] to [106] before summarising at [107] the defamatory meanings of the statements.

However, I do not agree that the remaining “salient circumstances” identified by the claimant should be considered. First, the Rules of Court 2021, O 43 r 3(1) requires the claimant to give particulars of any such facts and matters if he wishes to rely on them:

However, as the defendant submitted, this has not been done. The claimant cannot now seek to expand his case by reference to matters never pleaded, particularised, or even mentioned during trial. Nowhere in the claimant’s Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1) does the claimant refer to any earlier speakers or allege that the first statement was a “continuation of the tirade against [him]”. In fact, the claimant did not even refer to these additional “facts and matters” in his AEIC or at trial. Indeed, the defendant was not even cross-examined on the point. The relevant part of the claimant’s cross-examination of the defendant reads:

Under these circumstances, I reject the claimant’s new submission that I should consider what earlier speakers may have said when interpreting the first statement. Instead, I rely only on the fact that the address was made after the claimant cancelled the EGM as well as the text of full address to interpret the first statement and the remaining four statements.

The second and third statements

The second and third statements are:

Second statement

Third statement

In my earlier Judgment, I had explained why these statements were defamatory and why I was of the view that these statements, taken together, meant that the claimant did not cancel the EGM because it was in the members’ interests to do so or for some other justifiable reason. He cancelled the EGM because he could and because he wanted to. Thus, at [101] of the earlier Judgment, I said:

The claimant’s further submissions were largely in line with the above.

By contrast, the defendant submitted that the second and third statements simply meant that:

(a) the claimant had chosen to proceed in a manner which best suited him; or

(b) the claimant had chosen to cancel the EGM of his own choice.

I accept that the meanings submitted by the defendant formed part of the meanings of the second and third statements. However, they went further than that. They contained the phrases “cherry pick the constitution”, “he can cancel, so he cancel” and “suka suka do things” which bear the negative connotations that I had set out in [101] of my earlier Judgment (and reproduced at [48] above). These phrases clearly imputed improper conduct that goes beyond the defendant’s restrictive reading of these statements. Nevertheless, the defendant did not engage with these reasons substantively. Accordingly, I maintain my initial views.

The fourth statement

The fourth statement reads:

In this regard, I held at [104] of my earlier Judgment that this statement was defamatory. As I explained:

The claimant’s further submissions were in line with my views above.

The defendant, however, did not substantively address my views above in his further submissions.

Accordingly, I maintain my initial views above.

The fifth statement

I turn finally to the fifth statement:

In this regard, I have considered [18] of the HC Judgment and remain of the view that the fifth statement is defamatory.

In making this decision, I reject the defendant’s submission that the fifth statement was mere “verbal abuse” and that the fifth statement “cannot be said to be targeted at the Claimant’s office as president, in particular that there was corrupt or dishonest or misconduct of the Claimant.”

The defendant’s interpretation might have been viable if the statement had been taken in isolation.

However, the defendant made the fifth statement in an address (see [23] above) where he criticised the claimant’s cancellation of the EGM. Amongst other things, the defendant had alleged that the claimant had “cherry pick[ed] the constitution”, “troubled” the Club’s members, and “wasn’t willing to carry on the meeting and let the members decide”. Given this, I maintain my earlier view that the fifth statement is defamatory because it meant that “the claimant was afraid of getting voted out as Club President and therefore had unjustifiably used his powers to cancel the EGM”: see [106] of my earlier Judgment.

The defamatory meaning of the five statements

For the reasons above and those set out at [87] to [107] of my earlier Judgment, I am of the view that the second to fifth statements bear the following defamatory meaning:

(a) The claimant did not cancel the EGM because it was in the members’ interests to do so or for some other justifiable reason.

(b) The claimant cancelled the EGM because he could, because he wanted to, and because he was afraid of getting voted out as Club President.

(c) In so doing, the claimant had acted without regard for the members’ interests. He had troubled the members by preventing them from voting at the EGM.

As for the first statement (“so, you know who we are dealing with, ok? You know? What we are dealing with. Ok”), I maintain the view that it is not defamatory when considered alone. Further, having considered the relevant context, I also do not accept that the first statement meant that the claimant was someone “of ill repute and/or with a notorious background”. Indeed, nothing in the rest of the address referred to the same. Instead, the remainder of the address simply concerned the cancellation of the EGM. In the circumstances, at the most, I would have found that the first statement meant that the claimant was a person who would cancel the EGM even though there was no justifiable reason to do so, and doing so was against the members’ interests because he was afraid of getting voted out as Club President. However, as this was not part of the claimant’s case, I do not think it is appropriate to allow the claimant to rely on this interpretation. That said, even if I did, it would have made little difference.

Issue 2: Which defence(s) are being relied upon

I turn to the second issue identified in the HC Judgment, namely, which defence or defences are being relied upon. In the earlier trial and the current remitted trial, the defendant relied on the following defences:

(a) the defence of fair comment;

(b) the defence of justification; and

(c) the defence of qualified privilege.

In the remitted trial, the defendant raised a new issue—namely, that the claimant’s defamation claim in slander is not actionable because he had failed to plead or prove special damage or establish an exception under section 5 of the Defamation Act 1957.

Having set out the defences relied upon by the defendant, I turn to the third issue identified in the HC Judgment—namely, which, if any, of the defences succeeded. I will start by considering whether the claimant’s claim is actionable before turning to the remaining defences.

Issue 3A: Whether the claimant’s claim in slander is actionable pursuant to section 5 of the Defamation Act 1957

It is trite that slander is only actionable on proof of special damage unless it falls within certain exceptions: Doris Chia, Defamation Principles and Procedure in Singapore and Malaysia (Lexis Nexis, 2nd Ed, 2024) at p.1. This was not contested.

In this case, the HC Judgment makes clear that the claimant had not pleaded or proved special damage.

Accordingly, the question before me is whether the claimant can establish one of the exceptions, and in particular, whether section 5 of the Defamation Act 1957 applied because “the offending words were calculated to disparage the claimant in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of publication”. Section 5 reads:

The defendant submitted that section 5 did not apply because the five statements were not directed at the claimant’s profession or business. Further, whilst the five statements were made in the context of the EGM, they were not targeted at the claimant’s office as president, in alleging corruption, dishonesty or misconduct. In support, the defendant relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Goh Chok Tong [1985-1986] SLR(R) 856 (“Jeyaretnam CA”).

I am not persuaded by the defendant’s submission and am of the view that Jeyaretnam CA can be distinguished. In that case, the defendant had held a conference with the media at which he said, inter alia, that he was “inclined to believe” that the plaintiff (the secretary-general of the Workers’ Party) had engineered an exodus of some two-thirds of the audience who had attended the inauguration of the Singapore Democratic Party, a political party which was friendly to the plaintiff and which had invited the plaintiff as its guest speaker. The plaintiff sued the defendant on the basis that he was disparaged as secretary-general of his political party.

The trial judge found that the words complained of were defamatory. The defamatory stings found by the trial judge are set out in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Goh Chok Tong [1983–1984] SLR(R) 745 at [10]:

Notwithstanding, the trial judge held that section 5 of the Defamation Act 1957 did not apply because the words complained of were not calculated to disparage him in his office as secretary-general of the Workers’ Party.

The trial judge’s decision was appealed. After tracing the evolution of the law on this issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that section 5 of the Defamation Act 1957 did not apply and that the trial judge “was correct in finding in effect that quite apart from not being calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, the words were not actionable because they did not impute to the plaintiff the kind or quality of misconduct which have rendered the words actionable without proof of special damage”. Critically, the Court of Appeal held that the alleged misconduct would not have resulted in the plaintiff being deprived of his office. Thus, the Court of Appeal stated at [27]:

The present case is different from Jeyaretnam CA. In Jeyaretnam CA, the Court of Appeal doubted that “straight-thinking members of the WP would in all the circumstances have removed the plaintiff as secretary-general for having exploited the SDP inauguration to his and to the WP’s political advantage.” However, as I have summarised at [62] above, the five statements assert that the claimant had exercised his discretion to cancel the EGM to further his own self-interest even though there was no justifiable reason to do so and even though doing so would trouble the members by preventing them from voting. Such conduct, if true, would be precisely the kind that could result in the members voting to remove the claimant from his office as Club President.

Accordingly, I hold that the claimant’s action in slander is actionable without proof of special damage.

Issue 3B: Whether the justification defence succeeds

I turn to the defence of justification.

Having re-read the parties' earlier submissions, reviewed their further submissions, and reconsidered the evidence, I remain of the view that the defence of justification is meritorious. I explain.

My earlier views on the defence of justification

I had previously found that the defendant would succeed in the justification defence based on the defamatory meanings identified at [107] of my earlier Judgment. My detailed reasoning appears at [109] to [163]. The key findings were that:

(a) the objective evidence supported the defendant’s case that the claimant did not cancel the EGM because it was in the members’ interests to do so or for some other justifiable reason. In particular, the claimant knew that the decision to cancel or proceed with the EGM was his decision to make. Further, it was not his case that the EGM was poorly attended or that its results would be unrepresentative. To the contrary, on his own evidence, attendance was good. Furthermore, the claimant would have contemplated that cancelling the EGM would only result in wasting time and costs--the requisitioning members could simply requisition another EGM: see [114]-[123] and [160] of my earlier Judgment.

(b) The matters above, coupled with the claimant’s admission that he was keen to be President, supported the defendant’s case that the claimant was afraid and did not want to face the outcome of the EGM. Indeed, it did not help the claimant that his cross-examination suggested that he cancelled the EGM for tactical reasons: see [124] and [161] of my earlier Judgment.

(c) The claimant’s stated reasons for cancelling the EGM contradicted his past behaviour. According to the claimant, he cancelled the EGM because of his desire to adhere to the Club’s Constitution. However, when the Requisition was first received, the claimant personally approved and influenced the General Committee into sending the Acknowledgement Letter, which led to the initial decision not to call the EGM. This contradicted the legal advice received that this would contravene the Club’s Constitution: see [128]-[158] and [163] of my earlier Judgment.

The claimant’s position

In this decision, I will focus on the submissions that the claimant made in his further submissions. Unless necessary, I will not repeat my views on the claimant’s earlier submissions as they have already been addressed at [109] to [163] of my earlier Judgment. In his further submissions, the claimant invited me to reconsider my decision. The claimant submitted that:

(a) The defendant failed to plead the defence of justification adequately. In particular, the claimant submitted that the defendant failed to properly plead to the stings identified by the claimant. Accordingly, the defence should be “rejected for failure to plead justification of the charges particularised [by the claimant]”.

(b) The defendant failed to establish that the cancellation of the EGM was unjustifiable.

(c) He (i.e. the claimant) was justified in cancelling the EGM.

I am not persuaded.

The defendant had sufficiently pleaded the defence of justification

I start with the pleading point. The claimant submitted that he had alleged three stings but that the defendant had only addressed one of them:

(a) The first sting which the claimant accepted the defendant addressed is that the claimant “was afraid and/or lacked courage to allow the [EGM] to proceed which could have resulted in a motion being passed removing him as the President of [the Club].”

(b) The second and third stings, which the claimant asserted that the defendant failed to plead to are respectively:

(i) that the claimant “had acted unjustifiably when exercising his discretion to cancel the [EGM]”; and

(ii) that “it was a well known fact that the [c]laimant was dishonest/inept and/or evasive in his professional and official capacity”.

I do not accept the claimant’s submissions.

First, the claimant’s submissions regarding the alleged third sting fail because it was never pleaded. The defamatory meanings that the claimant ascribed to the five statements that he took issue with are set out in his Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1) at [6] and [7]. Nowhere in those paragraphs is it alleged that “it was a well known fact that the [c]laimant was dishonest/inept and/or evasive in his professional and official capacity”. The closest that the claimant comes to the point is at [7(a)] of his Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1) where he pleaded that the first statement (i.e. “So you know who we are dealing with. Okay, you know what we are”) had the following meaning:

Given that the alleged third sting was not pleaded, even if true, the defendant cannot be faulted for not addressing it in his defence.

In any event, the defendant has adequately pleaded that he intended to rely on the defence of justification to all alleged defamatory meanings identified by the claimant. The claimant's alleged defamatory meanings are set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1). The corresponding paragraphs of the Defence (Amendment No.1) are:

The claimant did not cancel the EGM for any objectively good reason

I turn to the claimant’s submission that the defendant failed to prove that the claimant had cancelled the EGM unjustifiably. In support, the claimant submitted that:

(a) the defendant failed to establish what a justifiable exercise of the claimant’s constitutional discretion would comprise; and

(b) in any event, that the defendant failed to prove that the claimant had acted unjustifiably. In this regard, the claimant submitted that it was insufficient to simply prove that the claimant had acted out of self-interest. According to the claimant, the defendant had to prove that the claimant had “purely factored in personal considerations when opting to cancel the [EGM]”.

I am not persuaded by the claimant’s submissions even on the threshold that he proposed. Critically, the claimant’s submissions ignored the reasons I gave in my earlier Judgment at [114]-[123] for concluding why the defendant had proved that the claimant did not cancel the EGM for any objectively good reason. In particular, the claimant did not address the following factual findings and matters:

First, as I explained at [115] to [120] and summarised at [160(a)] of my earlier Judgment, it is not the case that the claimant was (or felt) compelled to cancel the EGM. It was common ground that the claimant had the discretion to cancel or proceed with the EGM and was not compelled to cancel the EGM under the Constitution. Further, as I noted at [120] of my earlier Judgment, on the claimant’s own evidence he knew that the decision to cancel or proceed with the EGM was his decision to make:

The question is therefore why he chose to exercise his discretion the way he did.

Second, as I held at [121] and summarised at [160(b)] of my earlier Judgment, it was difficult to see how the claimant served the members’ or the Club’s interest by cancelling the EGM. Critically, it was not the claimant’s case that the EGM was poorly attended or that its results would be unrepresentative. As I had further noted at [121] of my earlier Judgment, his own evidence was that the attendance of the EGM was good:

(a) The requisitioning members had already demonstrated their persistence. When the Club initially decided not to call the EGM, they did not give up. Instead, they gave notice to, amongst other things, consider and vote on a motion of no confidence at the Club’s 62nd AGM, where they were successful.

(b) Furthermore, 80 of the 111 requisitioning members showed up to the EGM. This was 4 members short of the quorum required under Clause 31.3 of the Club’s Constitution, a shortfall of less than 3% (i.e., 75% - 80/111 x 100%).

Fourth, as I explained at [124] and summarised at [161] of my earlier Judgment, the matters above supported the inference that “the claimant was afraid and/or did not want to proceed with the EGM”. The requisitioning members’ actions showed that “there was a reasonable chance that the claimant might be voted out if the EGM proceeded.” Further, as I stated at [124] of my earlier Judgment, it did not help the claimant that his cross examination suggested that he cancelled the EGM for tactical reasons. This “strengthened the argument that the claimant cancelled the EGM for his own personal interests as opposed to the members’ or the Club’s interests.”

Fifth, as I explained at [125] to [126] and summarised at [163(b)] of my earlier Judgment, it did not assist the claimant to submit that the motions sought to be passed were ultra vires the Constitution. While I agree that it would have been a good reason to cancel the EGM if the claimant had cancelled the EGM believing that the motions were ultra vires, this was not the case. This factor did not operate on his mind when he cancelled the EGM on 8 September 2019. As I explained at [126] of my earlier Judgment, everyone accepted as correct Lee & Lee’s advice and believed that the relevant motions were constitutional. On that basis, a second EGM was convened two months later, on 3 November 2019. As the claimant’s Closing Submissions make clear at [29], the claimant only learnt of the inaccuracies of Lee & Lee’s advice thereafter:

The “ultra vires concern” therefore does not assist the claimant in establishing that he cancelled the EGM on 8 September 2019 for an objectively good reason.

Given that the claimant had the benefit of my earlier Judgment to understand my specific concerns, I would have expected the claimant to directly and substantively address the same by either providing evidence to contradict my earlier findings or explaining where I had erred. Instead, the claimant chose to simply repeat his previously rejected arguments without any meaningful engagement with my findings. In the circumstances, I hold that the defendant has established, on an objective basis, that the claimant had acted unjustifiably when he cancelled the EGM on 8 September 2019.

That said, as I had stated at [129] of my earlier Judgment, the sting of the defendant’s defamatory statements goes to the claimant’s subjective reasons for cancelling the EGM. It is thus important to examine the considerations that the claimant claims to have acted upon, which I turn to now.

The supposed considerations which the claimant claimed that he acted upon

The claimant submitted that he had the following other considerations in mind when he exercised his discretion to cancel the EGM:

(a) That the claimant had acted in accordance with the Club Constitution;

(b) That the initial postponement of the EGM and the subsequent cancellation of the EGM of “was based on proper governance and the Constitution”. In particular, the claimant had cancelled the EGM because he wanted “to adhere to the Club’s Constitution”;

(c) That the claimant’s continued presidency represented his supporters’ interests, who were present at the EGM;

(d) That it was in the best interest of the Club to cancel the EGM because the requisitioning members failed in their responsibility to show up for the meeting;

(e) That cancelling the EGM did not deprive members of their right to vote. At most, it only postponed the vote to a time when the quorum was met; and

(f) That the claimant had been voted in through a proper and legitimate election.

I do not accept these submissions.

It misses the point for the claimant to simply assert that he has the discretion to cancel the EGM

I start with the claimant’s submission that he was acting in accordance with the Club Constitution (see [96(a)] above). This submission misses the point entirely. It is not disputed that the claimant had the discretion to cancel the EGM. The real question was why he exercised his discretion the way he did. Simply saying that he had the power to cancel the EGM under the Club Constitution provides no explanation as to why the discretion was exercised the way it was.

No basis to find that the claimant cancelled the EGM to adhere to the Club Constitution

I turn to the claimant’s assertion that he cancelled the EGM to adhere to the Club Constitution (see [96(b)] above). Namely, the sixth supposed consideration which the claimant took into account when cancelling the EGM.

At [129] of my earlier Judgment, I stated that I would have dismissed the justification defence assuming it were true that this was what motivated the claimant to cancel the EGM. As I said in my earlier Judgment,

However, as I found at [130] to [158] of my earlier Judgment (as summarised at [163] of the same), the claimant did not cancel the EGM because he wanted to adhere to the Club Constitution.

Having considered the claimant’s further submissions, I remain of the same view. I explain.

First, the claimant failed to address my observation that the first time that he raised this supposed fidelity to the Constitution was at trial and that this suggested that this supposed consideration was an afterthought made up as his evidence was being tested: see my earlier Judgment at [130(a)]. If this was incorrect, I would have expected the claimant to pinpoint specific references prior to trial where he gave such evidence. This, however, was not done.

Second and more critically, the claimant did not adequately address the matters that led to my finding that his supposed fidelity to the Club's Constitution when cancelling the EGM on 8 September 2019 contradicted his earlier conduct. In particular, I had explained at [135] to [158] of my earlier Judgment that the claimant had taken steps the year before, between 8 November 2018 and 11 December 2018, which resulted in the initial decision not to call the EGM contrary to the legal advice received as to what the Club’s Constitution mandated. This contradiction undermined his credibility on this issue severely.

Notwithstanding, the claimant simply rehashed his earlier submissions and made bare assertions as to how his “testimony at trial” and the “contemporaneous evidence” showed that “the cancellation was entirely based on the Claimant wanting to adhere to the Club’s Constitution”. I highlight just two points which I found particularly revealing.

(1) The claimant’s failure to address the contradiction with legal advice

First, the claimant failed to adequately address my concerns that the initial decision not to call the EGM in 2018 contradicted the legal advice received as to what the Club’s Constitution mandated. In this regard, the claimant submitted at [66] of his Further Written Submissions that there was nothing wrong with delaying the calling of the EGM after receiving the Requisition on or around 2 November 2018 so that the Club could do its due diligence.

This submission misses the point. I was not concerned about the Club wanting to conduct “due diligence”. I was concerned that:

(a) the “due diligence” was conducted by issuing the Acknowledgment Letter (as set out at [12] above and reproduced at [136] of my earlier Judgment); and

(b) the subsequent decision not to call the EGM as set out in the EGM Notice (which is reproduced at [13] above and [138] of my earlier Judgment)

contradicted the legal advice received as to what the Constitution mandated.

As I stated at [137]-[138] of my earlier Judgment, the Club had received unequivocal legal advice stating that even if the Club sent a letter requesting the acknowledgement of the requisitioning members, the Club cannot refuse to call the EGM on the basis that fewer than 100 members acknowledged the same. Despite the clear guidance received, this was precisely what the Club did when it issued the Acknowledgment Letter and the EGM Notice:

(emphasis mine)

Most tellingly, the claimant did not adequately explain the above. Indeed, it has never been the claimant’s case that he believed Lee & Lee’s advice to be wrong. And notably, the claimant no longer asserts that the issuance of the Acknowledgement Letter (see [12] above and reproduced at [136] of my earlier Judgment) and the EGM Notice (see [13] above) contradicted the legal advice received as to the operation of the Constitution.

Instead, the claimant submitted that “Article 26.2 of the Constitution allows for the Committee to determine all questions relating to SGCC and all questions arising out of or not covered by the Constitution.” However, if the claimant was as loyal to the Constitution as he painted himself out to be, it would be difficult to imagine him agreeing to a course of action which he was expressly advised would contravene the Constitution. This brings me to the claimant’s role in the initial refusal to call the EGM.

(2) The claimant’s role in refusing to call the EGM

In my earlier Judgment, I had rejected the claimant’s attempt at distancing himself from the decision not to call the EGM for two reasons:

(a) First, I had explained at [151] of my earlier Judgment that given the issue is whether the claimant’s actions were consistent with his supposed fidelity to the Constitution. As such, the key question is whether the claimant approved the sending of the Acknowledgement Letter despite thinking that doing so would violate the Constitution. Crucially, as I noted at [152] of my earlier Judgment, the claimant had expressly testified when cross examined that he “personally approved” the wording of the Acknowledgement Letter, and in particular, its last paragraph which set out the consequences of failing to respond:

(b) Second, and in any event, I had at [153]-[157] accepted the evidence of Mr Benjamin Wong (the then Vice President) that the claimant had actively influenced the Club’s General Committee into deciding the way it did.

Given that the claimant had the benefit of my earlier Judgment to understand my concerns, I would have expected the claimant to directly and substantively address them in his further submissions. However, he did not do so. Instead, the claimant simply repeated in his Further Written Submissions his earlier attempt in his Closing Submissions to blame Mr Daniel Ho for the decision, despite my express rejection of the same. As such, my view remains unchanged.

No evidential basis for the remaining supposed considerations

I turn to the remaining supposed considerations that the claimant submitted he took into account when cancelling the EGM. Namely,

(a) That the claimant’s continued presidency represented his supporters’ interests, who were present at the EGM (see [96(c)] above);

(b) That it was in the best interest of the Club to cancel the EGM because the requisitioning members failed in their responsibility to show up for the meeting(see [96(d)] above);

(c) That cancelling the EGM did not deprive members of their right to vote. At most, it only postponed the vote to a time when the quorum was met (see [96(e)] above); and

(d) That the claimant had been voted in through a proper and legitimate election (see [96(f)] above).

In my view, there is no evidential basis to find that he had taken any of these supposed considerations into account when deciding to cancel the EGM.

First, there is no evidence that the claimant cancelled the EGM because his continued presidency represented his supporters’ interests, who were present at the EGM.

I have no doubt that the claimant’s supporters were present at the EGM. However, the claimant did not lead any evidence that he cancelled the EGM because that would further their interests:

(a) His AEIC makes no such reference.

(b) As for the evidence taken at trial, the only reference made by the claimant in his Further Written Submissions (i.e. “Transcript (13 June 2024), page 26 lines 5 to 8”) does not support the submission. The reference provided is to the claimant’s cross examination of the defendant where the claimant’s counsel asked the defendant if he was a supporter of the claimant:

Second, similarly, the claimant has no evidence to substantiate his assertion that he cancelled the EGM because it was in the best interest of the Club to do so.

As above, the claimant makes no such claim in his AEIC.

I turn to the evidence taken at trial. According to the claimant’s Further Written Submissions, the matters which he wanted to rely on to support this contention are set out at [129] of his initial Closing Submissions. That makes various references to the trial transcript. However, none of the references support his claim:

(a) The first reference in [129] of the claimant’s Closing Submissions is found at footnote 147. This footnote refers to the claimant’s cross-examination where, critically, the claimant does not say that he cancelled the EGM because it was in the best interest of the Club to do so. Instead, he had simply stated that requisitioning members should attend and that cancellation was his discretion:

I note further that after the exchange above, the defendant’s counsel continued to ask whether it mattered that there were four members short and who would have been prejudiced to allow the meeting to proceed. The claimant provided no substantive answer.

(b) The second reference in [129] of the claimant’s Closing Submissions is found at footnote 148. This footnote referred to the defendant’s counsel’s cross examination of the claimant where he simply stated, without explanation, that he cancelled the EGM after the requisitionists failed to show up and that the requisitionists could requisition a second EGM. He did not state that it was in the best interest of the Club to cancel the EGM.

(c) The third and fourth references in [129] of the claimant’s Closing Submissions are found at footnotes 149 and 150. Both these footnotes referred to one of the claimant’s answers in re-examination. Again, the claimant does not assert that it was in the best interest of the Club to cancel the EGM. Instead, he stated that the requisitionists “had to demonstrate to [him] why they had a lack of confidence in [him]”:

(d) The final reference in [129] of the claimant’s Closing Submissions is found at footnote 151. This footnote referred to a portion of the claimant’s counsel’s cross-examination of the defendant. In that line of cross-examination, the claimant’s counsel asserted that by cancelling the meeting, the claimant was “sending a message … to all members that ‘if you choose to requisition a meeting, you jolly well show up, because otherwise it may be cancelled’” and that this was “good for the club”. This line of questioning cannot establish the claimant's motivations. Questions asked by counsel is not evidence of the claimant's state of mind. Notably, the claimant never once asserted that he cancelled the EGM because he wanted to “send a message” to the members. And as seen from the references above, the claimant had multiple opportunities to do so.

Next, the claimant mischaracterises the evidence by asserting that he considered the members’ continuing right to requisition another EGM when deciding to cancel it.

In the line of cross-examination which the claimant relied, the claimant did not say that he had cancelled the EGM assured that he was not permanently denying the members their rights or that he had considered broader implications. Instead, he had simply acknowledged the logical consequence that “because this [EGM] did not go through, [the members] have to call another [EGM]” after the defendant’s counsel put the point to him:

Likewise, the claimant’s submission that he relied on last supposed consideration (i.e. that he was voted in through a proper and legitimate election) when deciding to cancel the EGM rested on a mischaracterisation of the evidence taken at trial.

The relevant part of the transcript relied upon was part of the beginning of defendant counsel’s cross-examination of the claimant. In that part of the cross-examination, the defendant counsel was simply establishing the background facts. And critically, the claimant makes no assertion that the legitimacy of his presidency influenced his decision to cancel the EGM. No connection was drawn between the claimant’s electoral mandate and his decision to cancel the EGM:

For completeness, I should note that the claimant also did not identify this as a supposed consideration in his AEIC.

The defendant succeeds in the defence of justification

For the reasons set out at [109] to [163] of my earlier Judgment and [77] to [122] above, I find that the defendant has succeeded in the defence of justification for the defamatory meanings set out at [62] above. Namely that:

(a) The claimant did not cancel the EGM because it was in the members’ interests to do so or for some other justifiable reason.

(b) The claimant cancelled the EGM because he could, because he wanted to, and because he was afraid of getting voted out as Club President.

(c) In so doing, the claimant had acted without regard for the members’ interests. He had troubled the members by preventing them from voting at the EGM.

Given the above, even if I were to allow the claimant to rely on the interpretation at [63] above, I would have also found that the defendant had established that the claimant was a person who would cancel the EGM even though there was no justifiable reason to do so, and doing so was against the members’ interests because he was afraid of getting voted out as Club President.

Even though my decision on the defence of justification disposes of the entire action, I will set out my brief thoughts on the remaining defences relied upon by the defendant because the High Court had framed the third issue as “which, if any, of the defences succeeded”.

Issue 3C: Whether the fair comment defence succeeds

This brings me to the defence of fair comment. To succeed, the defendant needs to prove that:

(a) the words complained of are comments, though they may consist of or include inferences of facts;

(b) the comment is on a matter of public interest;

(c) the comment is based on facts; and

(d) the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

See Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing”) at [139].

The defendant failed to establish this defence. In particular, I am not convinced that the statements in question are comments made on a matter of public interest.

The defendant referred me to Loh Siew Hock and others v Lang Chin Ngau [2014] 4 SLR 1117 (“Loh Siew Hock”) for the proposition that a matter will be regarded as one of public interest if it is one that affects people at large so that they may be legitimately interested in what is going on or how they might be affected. I accept this proposition. Indeed, this much is clear from [89]-[90] of Loh Siew Hock:

However, the defendant failed to explain why people at large or a significant number of people would have a legitimate interest in the matters that transpired at the EGM. Unlike in Loh Siew Hock, where the clan association's charitable activities gave the broader public a legitimate interest in its governance, the defendant has not shown that this Club's internal governance matters affect anyone beyond its own members. The furthest he went was to explain why the matters stated would be of interest to the Club members. Thus, the defendant submitted as follows at:

(a) At [138] of his closing submissions, the defendant submitted:

(b) In a similar vein, the defendant submitted as follows in his reply submissions:

I am fortified in my view that the limited scope of the defendant’s submission does not pass muster by Gao Shuchao v Tan Kok Quan and others [2018] SGHC 115 (“Gao Shuchao”). In that case, a subsidiary proprietor at a condominium's Annual General Meeting alleged that members of the management council had "deliberately concealed" or "misrepresented" the receipt of payments from defaulting units. The trial judge held that the words in question were defamatory, and this was not challenged on appeal to the High Court. What is critical for present purposes is the High Court’s rejection of the subsidiary proprietor’s fair comment defence because the comments were not on a matter of public interest. In particular, the High Court did not agree that “the receipt of payments and collection of the Special Levy were matters of concern to other MCSTs and SPs”. Instead, it held that these issues “only pertain[ed] to the specific circumstances of this MCST and the [subsidiary proprietors] in question”:

I am thus of the view that the defendant failed to establish the public interest element of fair comment. As such, this defence failed.

Issue 3D: Whether the qualified privilege defence succeeds

I turn to the defence of qualified privilege. As explained in Doris Chia, Defamation Principles and Procedure in Singapore and Malaysia (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2024) at para 11-7, there are two stages to consider when examining the defence of qualified privilege:

(a) First, the defendant has to plead and prove all facts necessary to show that the publication was made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

(b) Second, if the above is established, the defence can still be defeated if the claimant shows that the defendant was actuated by express malice at the time the publication was made.

I consider the two stages in turn.

Whether the address was made on an occasion of qualified privilege

I start by examining whether the address was made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

In Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2008] 2 SLR(R) 1004 at [164], the High Court identified four occasions where qualified privilege attached:

The defendant relied on the first two categories. He pleaded that he “had a legitimate duty and/or interest to communicate the [Statements] and/or the matters therein to the members of [the Club], who had a legitimate interest to receive and/or be informed of the same” because the Statements:

The applicable principles are illustrated in Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor [2000] SGHC 111 (“Arul Chandran”). In Arul Chandran, the plaintiff (“Arul”), a member of the Tanglin Club, sued the defendant (“Chew”), another member of the Tanglin Club, for the publication of three letters. In the second and third letters, Chew had described Arul as “a vicious and most dangerous fraud”. The second letter was sent to the president and committee members of the Tanglin Club. The third letter was sent to the president of the Tanglin Club.

The High Court held that the publication of these two letters was protected by qualified privilege because they purported “to raise the issue of Arul’s fitness to hold office in the Club”. In this regard, the High Court held:

(a) at [237]-[238] that being a member of the Tanglin Club, Arul’s suitability to serve in the Tanglin Club’s General Committee was a matter of proper and legitimate interest to Chew:

(b) at [253] that the matter raised was also “a matter of common legitimate concern to both the GC and Club members”. As the High Court explained at [253]:

Applying Arul Chandran, the defendant’s address is covered by qualified privilege. The EGM was called to adopt a motion of no confidence against the claimant and to remove him as Club President. The defendant’s address in general (and the Statements in particular), which concerned its cancellation, raised the issue of the claimant’s fitness to hold office. Furthermore, the defendant (as a Club member) and the attending Club members had a common and mutual interest in such communication.

This was not seriously contested by the claimant. Instead, he argued that the defendant was merely expressing his personal opinion that the claimant was a coward. And as such, neither the defendant nor the attending members had any interest or duty as to the publication or receipt of the same.

I am not convinced. No authority has been placed before me to support the contention that the defence of qualified privilege does not apply to personal opinions. Indeed, I note that it has been held that concerns raised by subsidiary proprietor(s) over a fellow subsidiary proprietor’s conduct in the annual general meeting about matters concerning the Management Corporation Strata Title has been held to be protected by qualified privilege: see John Robertson Gillies v Suresh Balan (also known as Sureash Balan) [2017] SGDC 324 at [74]-[76]. It is thus not clear to me why the defendant’s concerns should be excluded in the first stage of the analysis.

I further note that it is well established that the focus of the first stage is on the occasion on which the words were published, rather than the words themselves. As the Court of Appeal stated in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another and another appeal [2010] 4 SLR 331 (“Lim Eng Hock Peter”) at [34]:

I therefore find that the defendant’s address was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. I turn to consider whether the claimant established that the defamation was actuated by malice.

Whether malice was established

It is well established that the defence of qualified privilege is defeated by malice. In the context of qualified privilege, the court looks at the motive of the defamer. The defence is not available if the defamer does not make the defamatory statement for the purpose of protecting the interest or discharging the duty which gives rise to the privilege: Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110 at [60].

As explained in Gary Chan Kok Yew, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 13.085, the claimant can establish malice by proving that:

(a) the defendant did not believe that the statement was true or was reckless as to the truth of his statements; or

(b) the defendant’s publication was actuated by an improper or ulterior motive.

In the present case, the claimant sought to establish the latter. He submitted that the defendant “had acted with malice when he said those words as he had an improper motive which was to oust the [claimant] as the President of [the Club] and because he had personal spite against the [claimant]”. In support, the claimant relied on:

(a) various messages which the defendant sent in a Telegram group chat between 15 July 2019 and 2 August 2019; and

(b) the defendant’s admission that his personal wish was for the claimant to be removed.

In my judgment, the Telegram messages do show that the defendant held negative views about the claimant and supported his removal as Club President. Amongst other messages, the defendant stated:

(a) On 20 July 2019 at 23:03, and in reference to the vote of non-confidence taken at the 62nd AGM on 30 June 2019 (see [16]-[20] above), the defendant stated:

(b) On the same day at 23:15, the defendant continued to state:

(c) On 22 July 2019 at 12:25, the defendant stated:

(d) On 2 August 2019 at 21:32, the defendant stated:

I also accept that the defendant’s preference for removing the claimant as Club President was a motivating factor in making the address (see [23] above). One does not assert that another person “cherry pick the constitution”, “suka suka do things”, had “troubled” the members, and was “a coward” because of goodwill towards that person. It is also difficult to understand why the defendant would request the remaining members to “please come and sign now and we will immediately requisition for another EOGM” unless the defendant supported the vote of no confidence against the claimant as President and his removal from that position. That was, after all, the point of the 8 September 2019 EGM which the claimant cancelled.

However, I am not convinced that the claimant has established malice. To establish malice, it is insufficient to show that the defendant disliked the claimant and knew that the defamatory statement would injure him. It is only where the defendant’s desire to comply with the relevant duty or to protect the relevant interest plays no significant part in his motives that express malice can be found. In Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2013] 1 SLR 1016, the High Court quoted at [69] the following passage of Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135:

The law is clear that when ascertaining the defendant’s motives, one takes reference to the occasion that attracted the qualified privilege. It is where the purpose is “foreign to the occasion and actuates the making of the statement” that express malice is established. Thus, in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331 at [40], the Court of Appeal approved the following explanation given by the High Court of Australia in Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1:

Applying these principles, it is difficult to see how express malice can be established. The defendant’s negative views about the claimant and his desire for his removal as Club President aligned with the purpose of the cancelled EGM. It would be recalled the EGM was requisitioned specifically to pass and adopt a motion of no confidence against the claimant as Club President and to remove him from that position. As for the defendant’s dislike of the claimant, it appeared that this operated alongside the aforesaid interest as opposed to being divorced from it. At the most, the evidence shows mixed motives as opposed to the defendant operating out of personal spite. This is insufficient to defeat the defence of qualified privilege.

Conclusion

For these reasons, I dismiss the claimant’s claim. Although the claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation, the defendant has succeeded in the defences of justification and qualified privilege. As such, the claimant is not entitled to any of the remedies sought.