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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Feb 2019
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General Division of the High Court

Attorney-General v Ong Wui Teck

[2019] SGHC 30Case no. Originating Summons No 871 of 2017

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] At the heart of SUM 3979 is Mr Ong’s criticisms contained in two affidavits that formed the basis of Mr Ong’s application for Woo J to recuse himself as the assigned trial judge of Mr Ong’s mother’s estate (see [16] below). The debate here is whether Mr Ong’s criticisms of the individual judge were fair criticisms as claimed by Mr Ong, or whether his criticisms went outside and beyond the allowable legal scales for recusal applications that are typically addressed to the individual judge. This judgment will also consider whether what was said could be criticisms of the system of administration of justice, attacks against the individual judge and attacks against the court as a whole. In this elevated dimension, the legal principles this judgment will examine are based on the law of contempt of court rather than on the law on recusal.

  3. Events leading to the recusal application

  4. [3] Mr Ong filed his recusal application on 22 February 2016 to disqualify Woo J from hearing all actions related to his mother’s estate. In support of the recusal application, Mr Ong filed two affidavits (“OS 165 Affidavits”), one dated 18 February 2016 (“the 1st OS 165 Affidavit”) and one dated 2 March 2016 (“the 2nd OS 165 Affidavit”). Mr Ong listed the grounds for seeking to disqualify Woo J to be “[c]onflict of interest”, “absence/ lack of independence”, “[b]iasness”, “[p]rejudgment/ predetermination”, “[c]ondoning the actions of the opposing party/solicitor that are contrary to and/or an obstruction to justice” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 5). It is in these two affidavits that the alleged contemptuous statements are found.

  5. [4] Woo J was the trial judge in an earlier action relating to Mr Ong’s father’s estate. I will begin by narrating Mr Ong’s grievances with Woo J in the proceedings involving the father’s estate.

  6. Father’s Estate Proceedings

  7. [9] On 17 March 2014, two appeals, RA 54 and RA 72, were listed for hearing before Judicial Commissioner Lee Kim Shin (“Lee JC”). The Sister’s counsel submitted that the two appeals were best heard by Woo J as he was the trial judge, and Mr Ong did not object. Thus, Lee JC adjourned the two appeals to be heard by Woo J.

  8. Mother’s Estate Proceedings

  9. [14] After the Sister brought DC 483 but before it was heard, Mr Ong filed Originating Summons No 365 of 2014 (“OS 365”) on 16 April 2014 claiming $75,000 as executor’s commission, and Originating Summons No 763 of 2014 (“OS 763”) on 7 August 2014, claiming, inter alia, that various deductions be made from the beneficiaries’ shares of the mother’s estate, that the Sister pay rent in respect of her occupation of the mother’s flat and other reliefs arising out of her obstruction and delaying of the administration of the estate, that certain sums be set aside from the estate, and for the court to give directions on the distribution of the mother’s estate.

  10. [15] On 26 January 2016, Mr Ong and the Sister’s counsel attended a pre-trial conference (“PTC”) for OS 11 before Assistant Registrar Miyapan Ramu (“AR Ramu”) who informed that Woo J would be hearing OS 11 and DCA 21 together. OS 365 and OS 763 would be listed for hearing only after DCA 21 was decided.

  11. The recusal application

  12. [16] On 28 January 2016, Mr Ong sent a letter to the Chief Justice of Singapore, complaining that Woo J’s “independence is compromised”, and seeking to disqualify Woo J from hearing the actions related to the mother’s estate. In the same letter, Mr Ong also stated that “a strong criticism of the way Woo J conducted the [Father’s Estate Proceedings]” was that he had awarded $10,000 to the Sister, “despite knowledge of an absence of a residuary estate as pleaded”. On 2 February 2016, AR Ramu directed Mr Ong to file a formal recusal application. Subsequently, Mr Ong filed OS 165 on 22 February 2016 to disqualify Woo J from hearing all actions related to the mother’s estate, ie, OS 11, DCA 21, OS 365 and OS 763 (“Mother’s Estate Actions”).

  13. [17] At the hearing of OS 165, Woo J decided to recuse himself. In his grounds of decision, Ong Wui Teck v Ong Wui Swoon [2016] 2 SLR 1067 (“the Recusal GD”), Woo J explained his decision to step aside as the assigned trial judge of the mother’s estate was “not because there was any merit in Mr Ong’s allegations against [him] but because, in the interest of justice, [he] was of the view that [he] should not hear [Mr Ong’s] disputes with [the Sister] in respect of [their] mother’s estate since [he] was contemplating making a complaint about [Mr Ong’s] conduct to the appropriate authorities” (at [81]). Woo J observed that Mr Ong’s allegations “were not made bona fide and … in contempt of court” (at [81]).

  14. [18] Subsequently, in May 2016, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) wrote to Mr Ong to inform him that the allegations he made in the OS 165 Affidavits were in contempt of court. The letter stated that the allegations were “completely baseless”, “not made in good faith”, and had “scandalised the Court”. The AGC notified Mr Ong that he was liable for contempt of court, which is a serious offence, and invited him to “wholly withdraw [his] contemptuous allegations and unreservedly apologise to Woo J and the Supreme Court” if he had come to regret his actions. It was also stated in no unclear terms that the AGC would take appropriate action if he did not do so. Mr Ong refused to withdraw his allegations and apologise.

  15. Allegations made in the OS 165 Affidavits

  16. [20] The allegations made in respect of the Father’s Estate Proceedings are as follows:

  17. (a) “There is extreme biasness in the way Woo J had conducted the trial of [the] father’s estate” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 13);

  18. (b) “Although it was brought up to Woo J in S 385/2011, he vehemently refused to recognise the material fact that the opposing party had obstructed the accounting of the estate” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 49);

  19. (c) Woo J “was steering towards a biased finding of failure to give proper account in any event” and Woo J “[e]ither … failed to recognize … relevant material evidence … or … biasedly chose to ignore it”, “was clearly biased in favour of the opposing party/solicitor” and “was granting the solicitor impunity on a silver platter” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 28 and 34; 2nd OS 165 Affidavit at para 35);

  20. (j) Woo J “had allowed the nature and function of the court to be transformed from a court dispensing justice into an instrument of injustice, condoning oppression by the opposing party in subjecting [Mr Ong] to unnecessary time, effort and costs at the main trial and at the inquiry” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 55); and

  21. [21] The allegations made in respect of the Mother’s Estate Actions are as follows:

  22. (a) “Evidence in [the] mother’s estate that are in [Mr Ong’s] favour but which impinges on [Woo J’s] findings and rulings on [the] father’s estate will be disregarded [by Woo J] at [Mr Ong’s] expense”. Woo J “would not bring an impartial mind to the issues relating to his prior findings [in the Father’s Estate Proceedings], thereby making fair hearings [in the Mother’s Estate Actions] unattainable” (2nd OS 165 Affidavit at para 35);

  23. (b) “Woo J has a vested interest to uphold his rulings in S 385/2011, even though they are plainly wrong against the weight of the evidence, which he biasedly refuse [sic] to acknowledge” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 48);

  24. (c) “Woo J had conducted himself [such] that a high probability arises of a bias inconsistent with the fair performance of his duties … There is a miscarriage of justice in [Woo J’s] conduct of the action on [the] father’s estate and given [Woo J’s] vested interest to uphold his ruling, he would, in all likelihood, rule to [Mr Ong’s] detriment and to the detriment of [the] mother’s estate” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 54);

  25. (d) “Woo J, in this instance, has morphed from a judge into a supernumery [sic] opposing lawyer.” He cannot “fully remove all trace of odour from the air of impartiality. Indeed, the more he seeks to justify his position, the stronger the smell may grow” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 58). “The perception of bias is more real than apparent. The stench from the air of impartiality is overbearing” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 59);

  26. (e) The Supreme Court’s system of allocation of cases has been “violated” by Woo J’s “procurement” of cases relating to the father’s estate and the mother’s estate to be heard by himself (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 6);

  27. (f) Woo J had “violated” the principle of judicial impartiality in his “conduct of the trial/hearings … in the action on [the] father’s estate as well as in his attempt to hear the appeal on the action of [the] mother’s estate in [DCA 21] regardless of the outcome in [OS 11]” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at para 14); and

  28. (g) The Supreme Court’s fixing of OS 11 and DCA 21 to be heard on the same date shows “a prejudgment or predetermination of a dismissal” of OS 11, and “clear biasness, not to mention the obstruction of justice being condoned” (1st OS 165 Affidavit at paras 17 and 19).

  29. [22] The thrust of the AG’s case is that all the Allegations go beyond and exceed what is fair criticism typical in a recusal application to constitute contempt of court, ie, scandalising contempt and contempt in the face of the court. In contrast, Mr Ong maintains that the Allegations constitute fair criticisms irrespective of his bluntness and choice of words since there are rational bases for the Allegations.

  30. [23] Mr Khoo Boo Jin (“Mr Khoo”) for the AG, submits that the motive of Mr Ong in including the Allegations in OS 165 was to forum shop, ie, to prevent Woo J from hearing the Mother’s Estate Actions. This was evident, inter alia, from Mr Ong’s substantial delay in raising Woo J’s allegedly biased conduct that happened in 2012 only in 2016.

  31. Mr Ong’s case

  32. [24] As I have alluded to earlier, Mr Ong’s position is that there are rational bases for the Allegations and they were made bona fide. They are “legitimate criticisms” and constitute a “respectful dissent towards a flawed judgment riddled with biasness”. They were made within the confines of the court and presented as part of the conduct of the proceedings for his recusal; they were not in the public domain and any inspection by a member of the public would have to be explicitly authorised. He argues that the Allegations point out the bias of Woo J, which was “more real than apparent”, and “are not ad hominem attacks”. As his focus in OS 165 was recusal premised on the preponderance of biasness, vested interest and conflict of interest, the criticisms would have to be delivered in a manner commensurate with the premise of biasness; the statements may be “strongly worded” and “robust, direct and outspoken”, but “certainly warranted under the circumstances”. He also claims that the Allegations were directed not at the court as a whole, but solely at Woo J.

  33. [26] Mr Ong submits that contempt in the face of the court is said to compromise the unlawful interruption, disruption and obstruction of court proceedings (You Xin v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2007] 4 SLR(R) 17 (“You Xin”) at [18]), which did not occur in the present case.

  34. Preliminary points

  35. [27] At the outset, I will address Mr Ong’s argument that the Allegations made are acceptable and justified because they are presented as the basis for his recusal application. In other words, Mr Ong submits that his criticisms of Woo J are necessary for him to succeed in his application. I disagree. Where criticisms are coloured to the extent that they attract the law of contempt, the litigant cannot claim protection under the realm of recusal. To illustrate, in R v Collins [1954] VLR 46 (“Collins”), the Supreme Court of Victoria rejected the respondent’s argument that the matters alleged to be contemptuous were relevant to the proceedings, and therefore were incapable of constituting contempt. The court held that “violent abuse, unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty, and attempted sarcasm or ridicule, directed at the Court and its Judges, cannot be relevant, because they cannot be regarded as reasonably and honestly put forward as the foundation of a serious and genuine argument” (at 55).

  36. [28] Mr Ong raises two peripheral points. First, he claims that Woo J had found that he was in contempt of court in the Recusal GD, and that finding had to be set aside first. Mr Ong has misread the Recusal GD. It is clear that Woo J did not make a finding of contempt against Mr Ong. Woo J made an observation (not finding) that Mr Ong’s “allegations against [the] court were not made bona fide and he was acting in contempt of court” (at [81] of the Recusal GD). While Woo J held the view that Mr Ong’s Allegations were groundless, he nevertheless decided to recuse himself because the severity of the Allegations warranted a referral of the matter to the AGC for investigation. Woo J highlighted that the question of contempt, if any, “is to be dealt with separately”. This means that the AGC was to come to its own decision whether to bring contempt proceedings against Mr Ong. The contempt proceedings are now before me, and as the judge hearing the proceedings, I have to decide whether there is any contempt of court. There is no merit in Mr Ong’s argument that he is prejudiced by virtue of the Recusal GD and that it should have been set aside before this committal proceeding is heard.

  37. Scandalising contempt

  38. The law on scandalising contempt

  39. [30] The applicable law in the present case is the common law, because the Allegations were made before the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (No 19 of 2016) came into force on 1 October 2017. The applicable principles for scandalising contempt in common law have been laid down in Shadrake Alan v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 778 (“Shadrake Alan”) and reaffirmed in subsequent cases such as Au Wai Pang v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 992 (“Au Wai Pang”). The fundamental purpose underlying the law relating to contempt of court in general and scandalising contempt in particular is to ensure that public confidence in the administration of justice is not undermined (Shadrake Alan at [22]). The doctrine of contempt of court is not intended, in any manner or fashion whatsoever, to protect the dignity of the judges as such; its purpose is more objective and is (more importantly) rooted in the public interest (Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518 at [22]).

  40. [31] Scandalising contempt of court is made out when the statement intentionally published by the contemnor poses a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice (Shadrake Alan at [25] and [57]). The only mens rea required to establish a scandalising contempt of court is that the publication is intentional, and it is not necessary to prove an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice (Shadrake Alan at [23]). The court must make an objective decision as to whether or not the particular statement would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, as assessed by the effect of the impugned statement on the average reasonable person (Shadrake Alan at [32]). In this regard, the precise facts and context in which the impugned statement is made is crucial (at [35]). A “real risk” does not include a remote or fanciful possibility (Shadrake Alan at [36]).

  41. [32] The Court of Appeal in Au Wai Pang expressed the view that any statement that impugns the qualities of judicial independence and impartiality and suggests that they have been compromised would necessarily as well as undoubtedly undermine public confidence in the judiciary (at [37]). In my view, the question is whether there is a real risk having regard to the facts as well as the surrounding context (Shadrake Alan at [30]).

  42. [33] Where an impugned statement constitutes fair criticism, it is not contemptuous (at [80]). To determine whether the statement is fair criticism made in good faith, the court can take into account a wide range of factors, including but not limited to (Shadrake Alan at [81], citing with approval Attorney-General v Tan Liang Joo John [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1132 at [14]):

  43. (a) whether there is some reason or basis for the criticism and the extent to which it is supported by the rational basis – otherwise, it would amount to an unsupported attack on the court;

  44. (b) the manner in which the criticism is made: the criticism must generally be expressed in a temperate, dispassionate and balanced manner, since an intention to vilify the courts is easily inferred where outrageous and abusive language is used;

  45. (c) the party’s attitude in court; and

  46. (d) the number of instances of contemning conduct.

  47. [34] On the concept of fair criticism, the Court of Appeal in Shadrake Alan (at [84]) also held that an imputation of judicial impartiality or impropriety was not ipso facto scandalising contempt because the contrary position overly limits the ambit of fair criticism.

  48. [35] With these principles in mind, I now turn to the facts of this case.

  49. Whether there has been publication

  50. [36] I accept Mr Ong’s evidence that he did not disseminate the Allegations outside court documents. Nonetheless, Mr Khoo submits that it would constitute sufficient publication for the purpose of establishing scandalising contempt where contemptuous statements are made in documents filed, tendered or read in court. On the other hand, Mr Ong takes the position that the Allegations were made within the confines of the court and presented as part of the conduct of the proceedings for his recusal application; they were not in the public domain and any inspection by a member of the public would have to be explicitly authorised.

  51. [37] In Collins, the Supreme Court of Victoria held that contemptuous allegations in affidavits placed before the court could constitute both classes of contemptuous material: first, publications which are calculated to embarrass a tribunal in arriving at its decisions, and second, publications which tend to detract from the authority and influence of judicial determination, and publications calculated to impair the confidence of the people in the court’s judgments because the matter published aims at lowering the authority of the court as a whole or that of its judges (at 48, 49 and 52). The affidavits constituted the first class because they were placed before and published to the judge, so even if they were published no further (and not read out), such an attack constituted a criminal contempt, because of the tendency of the affidavits to embarrass the tribunal itself arriving at its decisions. The affidavits also amounted to the second class known as scandalising the court. The court held that to place a document on a public file is prima facie a publication to all (including the press) who may thereafter inspect the file (at 52).

  52. [38] Similarly, in Re Wiseman [1969] NZLR 55, the Court of Appeal of Wellington held that allegations contained in four affidavits and one notice of motion on appeal to the Court of Appeal constituted contempt of court, because the allegations clearly had the tendency to lower the authority of the Courts and the judges.

  53. [39] In Hong Kong, the Court of First Instance in Secretary for Justice v Choy Bing Wing [2005] HKEC 1971 held that the respondent to be in contempt for allegations of dishonesty of a judge in his affidavit filed in support of his application for recusal of the judge, individually and taken together with the abuse which he heaped upon the judge in court (at [89]).

  54. [40] Mr Ong cites the case of McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1058, where the Supreme Court of New South Wales agreed with the holding in Collins that placing an affidavit containing contemptuous allegations before the court may satisfy the technical requirement for publication. However, that is not the end of the inquiry. The Supreme Court reminded that the court still has to determine whether the matter published has, as a practical reality, a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice in a particular case (at [252] and [260]). Although the test in New South Wales is different from the law in Singapore, Mr Khoo similarly has to satisfy the inquiry as to whether the publication poses a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

  55. [42] In the present case, Mr Ong had intentionally affirmed and filed the OS 165 Affidavits in court, and also served them on the opposing party and her counsel. The OS 165 Affidavits were used and relied upon at the recusal hearing. Accordingly, I find that the Allegations in the OS 165 Affidavits filed in court amount to publication, and the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt is satisfied. Subsequently, Mr Ong also tendered the OS 165 Affidavits to Judicial Commissioner Kannan Ramesh (as he then was) for the hearings of DCA 21 and OS 11. That is again publication of the Allegations.

  56. Whether the Allegations pose a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice

  57. Whether the Allegations constitute fair criticism

  58. [46] Following the prevailing view of the Court of Appeal in Shadrake Alan at [80] and Au Wai Pang at [18], fair criticism is an element of the offence rather than a defence. It is worth noting that temperate, balanced criticism allows for rational debate about the issues raised and thus may even contribute to the improvement and strengthening of the administration of justice. Scurrilous and preposterous attacks, on the other hand, are likely to have the opposite effect (Shadrake Alan at [81]). Above all, balanced and temperate criticisms have to be in good faith.

  59. [47] Mr Ong contends that the Allegations constitute fair criticisms because there are rational and credible bases for them, in that there was apparent bias or actual bias on the part of Woo J. On the other hand, Mr Khoo submits that there is no basis or reason for the Allegations, and that they were made in bad faith because they were driven by his motive to judge-shop.

  60. Allegations of extreme bias

  61. Allegation of Woo J ignoring the purported fact that the father’s estate was negative

  62. [51] It is pertinent to note from the outset that Mr Ong won in relation to the most valuable assets in dispute in S 385/2011, namely the Sea Avenue Property and the Pemimpin Place Property. In the 2012 Judgment, Woo J made findings as to which properties were part of the father’s estate. Woo J found that the OCBC shares were part of the father’s estate, since he did not accept Mr Ong’s testimony on how the shares had been used to reimburse the mother for paying the estate duty liabilities (at [84]). Any bonus share issues or scrip or cash dividends relating to the shares would also have to be accounted for by Mr Ong (at [145]). At that stage, Woo J was unable to determine the quantum of the estate without ordering the Inquiry. He made no decision as to whether the estate was positive or negative in value. Mr Ong did not appeal against the findings of Woo J on the various assets held to be part of the estate.

  63. [52] At the Inquiry stage, AR Leong found that the total value of the OCBC shares was $25,975.47 as of 31 March 2013, and taking into account all the assets of the estate and the same amount of the estate’s debt ascertained at the main trial, AR Leong found that “the estate is in fact positive to the sum of $15,756.47” [emphasis added] (at [11] of his brief grounds of decision). I pause here to note that it was in fact AR Leong, and not Woo J, who made the finding that the estate was positive. AR Leong then considered whether interests should be awarded on the amount to be distributed to the Sister and decided that none should be awarded. AR Leong explained that this was because without the component of the OCBC shares in the estate, there would be no positive value in the estate for any interests to be calculated upon.

  64. [54] Mr Ong relied on Shadrake Alan at [85] to argue that not appealing the judge’s decision should not be taken into account as a consideration because it would be unfair to those who do not have the means to pursue an appeal. Mr Ong’s reliance on the paragraph is misplaced. The Court of Appeal in Shadrake Alan, in rejecting the argument that allegations made outside the formal avenues can never amount to fair criticism, opined that it would be too onerous a limitation on the right to free speech because an alleged contemnor should not be precluded from proffering fair criticism merely because he or she did not have the means or did not choose to air his or her rationally supported criticisms via any of the formal legal avenues (at [85]). This does not mean that where a party chose not to appeal against a judge’s decision, it cannot be taken into consideration among all the circumstances to determine whether the allegations of bias against that judge amount to fair criticism. The party’s decision not to appeal, along with any purported reasons behind his or her decision, can be taken into account.

  65. Allegations of bias in relation to the administrator’s expenses and the costs of the Inquiry

  66. [61] Mr Ong accuses Woo J of misrepresenting his position in the 2014 Judgment at [59], where it was stated that Mr Ong had wrongly attributed a value of $3,893.75 to the OCBC shares instead of $25,975.47 as found by AR Leong. This statement is misleading according to Mr Ong because it did not take into account the different times at which the OCBC shares were valued. At the death of the father, the value was $3,893.75, and using this value, the estate would be negative. The value only rose to $25,975.47 in 2013. In my view, Woo J was being consistent with his own decision in the 2012 Judgment that the OCBC shares formed part of the estate and with the findings made by AR Leong in the Inquiry.

  67. Allegation that Woo J condoned the misbehaviour of the Sister and her counsel in relation to the UOB bank account

  68. [62] Mr Ong alleges that he had a basis for calling Woo J biased because Woo J had allowed the Sister and her counsel to get away with their fraud in concealing the Sister’s possession of the United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) account passbook, which prevented Mr Ong from putting up a complete account of the father’s estate. Mr Khoo’s treatment of this allegation falls under Mr Ong’s broader allegation of Woo J’s extreme bias, to which Mr Khoo submits that it is devoid of any rational or credible basis. Mr Khoo mainly argues that these allegations were made in 2016 only to stop Woo J from being the assigned trial judge of the Mother’s Estate Actions.

  69. [63] At this juncture, it is convenient to state that the UOB account was found by Woo J in the 2012 Judgment to be overdrawn and closed and no longer a part of the assets of the father’s estate. Subsequent to the 2012 Judgment, the Sister requested the court to include the UOB account in the Inquiry. Woo J decided to include the UOB account in the Inquiry only insofar as the account might provide information about any cash received by the estate in respect of the shares it owned. The shares concerned were the Kenwell Freight and Mecman shares (“the Shares”), which were realised in 1988 at the value of $10,073.68. The Sister claimed that the Shares were wrongly stated as being unrealised in the 2011 Account. This was not disputed by Mr Ong (at [74] of the 2012 Judgment). His position was that the realised monies from the Shares had been used. Woo J rejected Mr Ong’s position on the basis of lack of evidence; thus, the realised monies were still part of the estate. It appears that Mr Ong’s complaint now is that because the Sister had information about the UOB account and did not share that with him, he was impeded in the preparation of the 2011 Account. Mr Ong accuses Woo J of bias because he had turned a blind eye to the purported withholding of information of the UOB account by the Sister and her counsel, and to the lie of the Sister and her counsel that she did not have information of the UOB account prior to 3 September 2011 (which was the date the Sister claimed she found out about the account). He based his claim on the Sister’s testimony prior to the hearing for S 385/2011 that she had discovered files on the father’s estate when their mother passed away, and the Sister’s failure to dispute his claims that documents relating to the father’s estate were in her custody in his affidavits filed to strike out the Sister’s statement of claim in Magistrate’s Complaint No 10516 of 2010. Mr Ong also relies on the Sister’s List of Documents dated 9 December 2011 filed in S 385/2011, which included a handwritten note allegedly showing her knowledge of the UOB account and a withdrawal of $10,000 from the account in 1988.

  70. [64] In any case, the Sister disclosed the letter dated 3 September 2011 from UOB on the UOB account to Mr Ong at the exchange of documents stage for S 385/2011.

  71. [65] It is evident that Woo J had taken on board the parties’ differing positions on the UOB account in his description of the account under the heading “Missing United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) account” in the 2012 Judgment. The question that was relevant to Woo J in the 2012 Judgment was whether the UOB account was an asset of the father’s estate. By the time of the hearing, while there might have been disputes as to the knowledge of the account, the existence of the account was before Woo J at the trial. He held that the UOB account was no longer a part of the estate’s assets because it was overdrawn and closed (at [139(h)]). The UOB account was only included in the Inquiry to determine other relevant assets of the estate, namely the value of shares, from the entries in the account.

  72. [66] A related matter is Mr Ong’s claim that he was impeded in his preparation of a proper account by the Sister’s withholding of information on the UOB account, which was referred to by Woo J as the “missing” UOB account. Woo J did not accept it as an excuse for Mr Ong not preparing a proper account of the estate (see [138] of the 2012 Judgment). Pertinently, Mr Ong did not appeal against the 2012 Judgment. For Mr Ong to now complain of bias by Woo J in adopting this unsubstantiated allegation demonstrates lack of good faith in the criticism.

  73. [69] It is clear from the above evaluation that Mr Ong’s allegations against Woo J are wild and groundless.

  74. Allegation that the timing of the orders makes it impossible for Mr Ong to appeal

  75. Woo J’s recusal and the publication of the Recusal GD

  76. [71] Mr Ong argues that case law states that judges should only recuse themselves when there are proper grounds for doing so (Chee Siok Chin and another v Attorney-General [2006] 4 SLR 541 at [10]), so for Woo J to have recused himself, there must be merit in the Allegations. I do not agree. Woo J clearly stated in the Recusal GD that he decided to recuse himself “not because there was any merit in Mr Ong’s allegations against [him]”, but “in the interest of justice”, he was of the view that he should not hear the Mother’s Estate Actions since “[he] was contemplating making a complaint about Mr Ong’s conduct to the appropriate authorities” ([81] of the Recusal GD).

  77. [72] Mr Ong seems to ascribe an improper motive to Woo J in publishing the Recusal GD, ie, for it to be used by the Sister in the Mother’s Estate Actions, to his detriment. This is yet another nonsensical argument. Judges release grounds of decision and judgments to furnish the reasoning for their decisions and to develop the legal jurisprudence. It is entirely within the purview of the judge to publish his reasoning.

  78. [73] Mr Ong further argues that Woo J had surreptitiously made a finding of contempt in the Recusal GD, and in doing so, Woo J placed himself in a position of serious conflict of interest and was a judge in his own cause. Mr Ong accuses Woo J of making the finding before Mr Ong was given the right to be heard in defending himself. I have addressed this misguided point earlier at [28].

  79. Allegation that Woo J misled Mr Ong into thinking that he would recuse himself

  80. [74] Mr Ong raises another point to support his claim that there are rational bases for the Allegations: Woo J had misled him into thinking that he would voluntarily recuse himself from the Mother’s Estate Actions even before any recusal application was taken out by Mr Ong. He bases this understanding on what had transpired in the hearing for Summons No 3500 for CA 95 and CA 96, where he requested for a Judge of Appeal to hear the summons, and points to Woo J’s question posed: “[do] you still want another judge to hear the application?” This was merely a question posed by Woo J to confirm Mr Ong’s position. It is more than a stretch of reasoning to then argue that Woo J indicated that he would recuse himself voluntarily from any further hearings involving Mr Ong whenever Mr Ong requested so. Even if he had the impression that Woo J would voluntarily recuse himself, that alone does not support a complaint of bias.

  81. The allegations of the Costs Order being a sham

  82. Allegation of falsification of the RA 54 Order of Court

  83. Allegations of procurement of hearings

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