Shanmugam Manohar v Attorney-General and another [2020] SGHC 120

Mr Shanmugam Manohar (“the Applicant”), an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court, faces disciplinary proceedings before a Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”). This DT was appointed after a request was made by the Attorney-General (“AG”) under s 85(3) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”). In referring information to the Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”) under that section, the AG disclosed statements recorded by the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) under the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”). These grounds of decision concern the dismissal of various declaratory reliefs sought by the Applicant against the AG and the Law Society in respect of the recording, disclosure and use of these statements.

Facts

The investigations

The dispute in the present case arose out of a police investigation into a motor insurance fraud scheme, where one Mr Ng Kin Kok (“Mr Ng”) assisted one Mr Woo Keng Chung (“Mr Woo”) to file a fraudulent motor insurance injury claim. On 6 April 2016 and 11 May 2016, the CAD recorded statements from Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi s/o Kolanthaveloo (“Mr Krishnamoorthi”), one of the partners at M/s K Krishna & Partners (“the Firm”), respectively. The statements revealed that Mr Ng would ask potential claimants to sign warrants to act appointing various law firms to act on their behalf. He would submit the documents to the law firms and would receive commissions from the law firms if the injury claims were successful. Mr Woo’s claim was processed in this manner and the Firm, where the Applicant was and is an Associate Partner, was the law firm appointed in Mr Woo’s case.

On 21 March 2017, Mr Ng was charged in court for one count of abetment of cheating under s 420 read with s 109 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) for the offence involving Mr Woo. On 31 August 2017, Mr Ng was convicted and sentenced. That same day, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) directed the CAD to conduct further investigations into the commissions that were allegedly paid to Mr Ng by the law firms involved, to ascertain if the conduct of these law firms and lawyers had disciplinary consequences.

Senior Investigation Officer Lie Da Cheng (“SIO Lie”) received the AGC’s request and proceeded to record a further statement from Mr Ng on his past referrals on 14 September 2017 (“14 September statement”). Mr Ng’s statement made reference to around six cases that he had referred to the Applicant between 2013 and 2015, and stated that the Applicant had given him a commission of $800 for each referral. On 15 September 2017, SIO Lie then called the Applicant, asking if he knew Mr Ng and whether Mr Woo had been referred to him in respect of a personal injury claim. The Applicant replied in the affirmative and a meeting was set up for SIO Lie to record the Applicant’s statement. On 18 September 2017, SIO Lie called the Applicant and asked him to bring the files of other personal injury claims that had been referred to him by Mr Ng. On 20 September 2017, SIO Lie recorded a statement from the Applicant (“20 September statement”).

On 12 December 2017, SIO Lie called Mr Krishnamoorthi to arrange for him to attend at CAD for a statement to be recorded. The statement was recorded on that same day (“12 December statement”). SIO Lie sought to record a further statement from Mr Krishnamoorthi and scheduled a further meeting, but Mr Krishnamoorthi stated that he could not make the scheduled appointment in an email dated 15 December 2017 and later declined to give a further statement when SIO Lie spoke with him.

The CAD was of the view that no further offence of cheating was disclosed. The findings were forwarded, together with Mr Ng’s 14 September statement, the Applicant’s 20 September statement, and Mr Krishnamoorthi’s 12 December statement to AGC.

Referral to the Law Society and appointment of the DT

On 2 July 2018, the AG referred the information received to the Law Society pursuant to s 85(3) of the LPA. In its referral, the AG relayed information about the Applicant’s alleged touting practices (a breach of r 39 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”)), and the fact that the Applicant had given copies of the Firm’s warrant to act to Mr Ng for his clients to sign without attending at the Firm. Accordingly, the AG requested the Law Society to refer the matter to a DT.

On 13 July 2018, the Law Society responded with a letter requesting certain documents and information from the AG for the preparation of the case against the Applicant. Among its requests, the Law Society requested “copies of the statements of the relevant persons”. On 27 July 2018, the AGC then asked the CAD to check if Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi would consent to be contacted by the Law Society, and to find out if the Firm would agree for the seized warrants to act to be shared with the Law Society. On 15 August 2018, the CAD informed AGC that both Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi had not agreed to these requests. The AG updated the Law Society accordingly on 16 October 2018.

In response, on 25 October 2018, the Law Society informed the AG that, without the statements, it had no evidence on which to prosecute the matter before a DT. It suggested proceeding under s 85(3)(a) of the LPA instead to first convene an Inquiry Committee, in order to consider whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a DT. The AGC then contacted the CAD to inform them of the Law Society’s position, and asked if the CAD would object to them sending the statements to the Law Society. The CAD informed that they had no objection. On 19 March 2019, the AG forwarded to the Law Society Mr Ng’s statement recorded on 6 April 2016 (“6 April statement”); Mr Ng’s 14 September statement; the Applicant’s 20 September statement; and Mr Krishnamoorthi’s 12 December statement.

On 3 July 2019, pursuant to s 85(3)(b) of the LPA, the Law Society applied to the Chief Justice to appoint a DT to investigate the Applicant’s conduct. On 18 July 2019, Sundaresh Menon CJ appointed the members of the DT. On 23 July 2019, the DT then issued directions for the filing of the Defence, the list of documents, the respective affidavits of evidence-in-chief, bundles of documents and bundles of authorities. A series of delays followed as the Applicant sought abeyance of the DT proceedings on the premise that he would apply for judicial review.

OS 1206/2019 and OS 1030/2019

On 16 August 2019, the Applicant filed Originating Summons No 1030 of 2019 (“OS 1030/2019”) applying for the DT proceedings to be held in abeyance pending resolution of judicial review proceedings against the AG. No application for judicial review was filed at that time.

On 27 September 2019, the Applicant filed Originating Summons No 1206 of 2019 (“OS 1206/2019”) under O 15 r 16 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”), for the following reliefs:

A series of pre-hearing conferences (“PHCs”) were held by the DT to resolve the issue of how to proceed. On 14 February 2020, the DT issued timelines for the DT proceedings to continue, including provision for the filing of the Applicant’s defence. At that same PHC, the DT was asked for a stay, which it refused, subject to any order of the court. On 18 February 2020, the DT issued the Notice of Disciplinary Tribunal Hearing, which stated that the DT would hear the matter from 18 to 20 August 2020. I heard OS 1030/2019 on 11 March 2020 and dismissed the application for a stay of the DT proceedings pending the hearing of OS 1206/2019. The Applicant did not appeal against that decision.

On 2 April 2020, after hearing parties, I dismissed OS 1206/2019. The Applicant has appealed against this decision, and I furnish my grounds of decision here.

Parties’ positions in OS 1206/2019

In the present application, the Applicant argued that the CAD took statements from Mr Ng, Mr Krishnamoorthi and himself for the purposes of investigating breaches of the PCR, a purpose collateral to the statutory purpose. This statutory purpose, the Applicant argued, was confined to investigating into criminal offences. He also argued that the statements were subject to a duty of confidence. Therefore, the AG was not entitled to disclose them to the Law Society; the CAD, similarly, was not entitled to agree to that disclosure. Related to this, he contended that he had absolute immunity in respect of the statements that he made to the CAD. Initially, the Applicant further contended that for the above reasons that the DT ought not to use the information, and sought a stay of the DT hearing pending the hearing of this application. After the application for a stay was dismissed in OS 1030/2019, counsel for the Applicant refined his case and stated that the Applicant was no longer pursuing the prayer which sought a cessation of DT proceedings.

The Law Society argued that the court did not have the jurisdiction to grant the declaratory reliefs requested because s 91A of the LPA ousted the court’s jurisdiction.

The AG, while aligning himself with the Law Society’s views on jurisdiction, was moreover of the view that there was no legal or factual basis for declaratory relief. His case was that the statements were not recorded for an ulterior purpose. The Applicant had no immunity against disclosure. Although the AG agreed that a duty of confidence attached to the statements, he asserted that the AG and the CAD were legally entitled to disclose the statements to the Law Society in the public interest. In addition, he argued that the LPA permitted him to refer any information, even confidential information, touching upon the conduct of a lawyer to the Law Society, and, further, immunised him from any liability in the fulfilment of his statutory role.

Issues

The issues in the application may therefore be analysed by reference to the following:

(a) whether s 91A of the LPA applied to oust the jurisdiction of the court;

(b) if s 91A of the LPA did not oust the jurisdiction of the court, how the court would exercise its discretion in respect of the various declarations prayed for;

(c) two further substantive issues were relevant in this further analysis:

(i) whether the Applicant’s 20 September statement was recorded ultra vires in relation to CAD’s power to record statements for being recorded for a collateral purpose; and

(ii) whether the CAD and the AG were entitled to disclose the statements to the Law Society.

Summary of decision

Section 91A of the LPA did not apply in the present case. Nevertheless, the statutory purpose underlying s 91A of the LPA and the disciplinary framework in Part VII of the LPA, which was to consolidate judicial review and hearings on the merit into one process in order to expedite the disciplinary process, remained relevant. To the extent that declarations were sought concerning the use of the statements as evidence by the DT, I held that there was, in the present case, no reason for the court to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief. Matters of evidence were properly to be considered by the DT in the first instance and reviewed, if necessary, subsequently by a High Court Judge or Court of Three Judges under ss 97 or 98 of the LPA, as the case may be. In addition, declarations pertaining to Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi’s statements were not appropriate as they were not parties to the application.

Considering the remaining prayers that did not traverse these areas, two substantive issues emerged: the action of the CAD in recording the Applicant’s statement, and that of the AG in disclosing the statement to the Law Society (and that of the CAD in agreeing to the same). There were no grounds to grant any of the declaratory relief sought, because the CAD had not acted unlawfully in recording the statements in question, and the disclosure of the statement to the Law Society was not a breach of the duty of confidence as it came within the public interest exception to confidentiality. The AG’s authority under s 85(3) of the LPA was correctly exercised because of the exception. Section 106 of the LPA did not immunise the AG against judicial review on the grounds of illegality, but on the facts, no illegality was shown.

Ambit of s 91A of the LPA

Section 91A of the LPA reads:

It was common ground that s 91A of the LPA would, if it applied, exclude the court’s jurisdiction. Section 91A provided that “there shall be no judicial review in any court…” Under s 91A(2)(b), “judicial review” is extended to include “proceedings instituted” by way of an application for a declaration “relating to or arising out of any act done or decision made by the Disciplinary Tribunal”. Where s 91A applied, any such “judicial review” would be through s 82A, s 97 and s 98 of the LPA. Because Part VII of the LPA sets out a “self-contained disciplinary framework outside the civil proceedings framework”, these provisions are not considered as part of court’s civil jurisdiction, but rather, part of the disciplinary jurisdiction under the LPA: Law Society of Singapore v Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 1279 at [44]–[45]. In effect, s 91A redirects “judicial review”, broadly defined, of any act done or decision made by the DT from the court’s civil jurisdiction to the disciplinary jurisdiction under the LPA after the DT has made its determination.

The dispute between the parties related to the scope of s 91A of the LPA. The Applicant argued that, absent prayer 1(h), s 91A of the LPA no longer applied to the present case as the declarations sought were against the CAD and AG, and not the DT. He argued that any impact the declarations would then have on the DT would be for the DT to decide. The Law Society, on the other hand, argued that the court did not have the jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief because s 91A of the LPA still applied. Notwithstanding the absence of prayer 1(h), the purpose of the declarations sought was to circumvent the DT’s decision on the admissibility of evidence before it.

The key preliminary question, therefore, was whether s 91A of the LPA applied in this case. In making this assessment, I drew guidance from the three-step framework used to structure the purposive approach to statutory interpretation as summarised by the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37], which may be described as follows. First, possible interpretations of the provision must be ascertained, with regard to the text of the provision and the context of the provision within the statute. Second, the legislative purpose or object of the statute must be ascertained. Finally, the interpretation that furthers the purpose of the statute is to be preferred.

At the first step, the court must be guided by the ordinary words of the provision, and endeavour to give significance to every word in an enactment: see Tan Cheng Bock at [38]. Here, s 91A(1) of the LPA concerns itself with an “act done or decision made by the Disciplinary Tribunal” [emphasis added]. These words would ordinarily be understood to refer to actions in the past, directing the “judicial review” towards a prior act or decision. Section 91A(2) of the LPA then expands the definition of “judicial review”. The specific types of proceedings referred to in this subsection deal retrospectively with past acts or decisions, rather than prospectively with future ones. Even more prophylactic orders such as the “injunction” envisaged under s 91(2)(b) of the LPA are linked to prior acts or decisions of the DT: any act that seeks to be restrained must relate to or arise out of “act[s] done or decision[s] made”.

The Law Society did not proffer any alternative interpretations of the provision. Their point was that the Applicant’s action was motivated by a wish to circumvent the provision. This argument, however, was premised on a broader interpretation of s 91A of the LPA to apply prospectively even when the issue to be considered had not yet been the subject of “any act done or decision made” by the DT. At the first step of the analysis in Tan Cheng Bock, the court must perforce be constrained by the parameters of the literal text of the provision (see Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [57]). Therefore, the broader interpretation was not possible, and s 91A of the LPA was properly interpreted to relate only to past acts or decisions of the DT. As this interpretation was not sustainable on the text of the provision, it was not necessary for me to proceed to the second and third steps in the purposive approach: see Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 319 at [39].

Coming back to the application at hand, the only prayer that referred to a prior act of the DT (prayer 1(h)) was no longer pursued before me. As the remaining declarations dealt with issues that the DT had not had the opportunity to consider, there was no “act done or decision made” by the DT, and s 91A of the LPA did not apply. The jurisdiction of the court, therefore, was not ousted in this case.

Relevance of the purpose of s 91A

Nevertheless, the relevance of s 91A of the LPA did not end there. Although the jurisdiction of the court was not ousted by s 91A, the purpose of this provision was still important to the way my discretion was exercised in granting declaratory relief. Declarations, being discretionary, must be justified by the circumstances of the case: see Karaha Bodas Co LLC v Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd and another appeal [2006] 1 SLR(R) 112 (“Karaha Bodas”) at [14(c)]). This necessitates a consideration of the purpose of s 91A.

Section 91A of the LPA seeks to prevent delays to the disciplinary process, which had previously been caused by applications for judicial review of DT proceedings while those proceedings were still afoot. The solution was to defer judicial review of a DT’s acts or decisions until after a determination had been made under s 93(1) of the LPA. As the Minister for Law stated during the second reading of the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill (No 16 of 2018) (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 August 2008) vol 84 col 3251):

Philip Pillai JC (as he then was) took the same position in Mohd Sadique bin Ibrahim Marican and another v Law Society of Singapore [2010] 3 SLR 1097 at [11]:

The provision therefore seeks to preserve the integrity of the disciplinary framework under Part VII of the LPA and to prevent collateral attacks on the DT’s proceedings by way of judicial review. Where factual matters are in issue, the section serves to bring matters within the remit of a DT first, before the High Court Judge or Court of Three Judges under ss 97 or 98 of the LPA later reviews the DT’s determination. This enables issues to be considered in an orderly manner. Where findings of fact are made by the DT, the court would then deal with them just as an appellate court would in relation to findings made by a lower court: see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [27] (approved in relation to DTs in Law Society of Singapore v Chong Wai Yen Michael and others [2012] 2 SLR 113 at [10]).

In this context, what of the converse situation, if the court decides any issue intended for the DT before the DT first deals the issue? If a court were to decide any issue intended for the DT, there is a very real possibility that issue estoppel would apply in the DT’s proceedings. Once there is identity of parties, identity of subject matter, a final and conclusive judgement on the merits of an issue by a court of competent jurisdiction, the requirements of issue estoppel would be made out: Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan No 301 [2005] 3 SLR(R) 157 (“Lee Tat Development”) at [14]–[15]. A court should be slow, therefore, to grant relief that would intrude upon the remit of the DT. Otherwise, the same historical problem of delay will recur, with every lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings attempting to impede, delay and stymie DT hearings with requests for prospective rulings over key pieces of evidence that they know will be assessed by the DT. Such action could also, in certain circumstances, amount to an abuse of judicial proceedings, because it creates multiplicity of proceedings where the intent of s 91A of the LPA is to redirect all such issues to after the determination of the DT, to the High Court Judge under s 97 or the Court of Three Judges under s 98, as the case may be.

Exercise of the court’s discretion

In that context, I come to the reliefs requested by the Applicant.

If the Law Society chooses to use the Applicant’s statement in the DT proceedings, the DT would be faced with the issue of the admissibility of the Applicant’s statement. In that regard, even though the Applicant was no longer pursuing prayer 1(h), counsel candidly admitted that the declarations obtained in this application was for the purpose of being brought to the DT’s attention. In his view, the statements obtained illegally would be a nullity and it would be for the DT to consider in that context.

In my view, the issue of the admissibility of the statements in the DT ought to be first considered by the DT, and thereafter reviewed if necessary under ss 97 or 98 of the LPA, as the case may be. For example, prayer 1(c) asked for the following declaration, that:

This issue would be squarely before the DT. If the court made a determination on this issue, issue estoppel could apply as there would be a final and conclusive judgement on the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction with identity of parties and subject matter: see Lee Tat Development ([32] supra) at [14]–[15]. This was simply a matter pertaining to the treatment of specific pieces of evidence. The appropriate course of action was therefore to allow the DT to make its findings and determination. This would prevent the framework under Part VII of the LPA from being undermined and reduce multiplication of proceedings. While I do not foreclose the possibility of a case where the interests of justice would necessitate such declaratory relief, the case at hand was not such a case.

This left me with two other allegations. These were, first, that the AG and CAD had a collateral purpose in recording the Applicant’s statement, and second, that the CAD and AG had acted unlawfully in disclosing that statement. These were actions of public authorities that the Applicant contended resulted in violations of his private rights. Such rights were enforceable against the public bodies concerned: see Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [31] and [33]–[35] and Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [69].

These two allegations did not concern s 91A of the LPA since the subjects of these allegations were the CAD and the AG, not the DT. As such, these allegations called for a different approach from that adopted above at [34]–[35]. As explained in Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh and another v Attorney-General [2013] 2 SLR 844 (“Manjit Singh”), s 91A of the LPA is only intended to apply to acts or decisions of the DT and not those of any other persons: Manjit Singh at [58]. In Manjit Singh, the Chief Justice’s decision to appoint members of the DT was held to lie outside the scope of s 91A as it was not an act of the DT. Such a finding, it was emphasised, did not undermine the purpose of s 91A since the provision simply did not apply in the first place: Manjit Singh at [59].

There is a final matter relevant to the reliefs requested. Neither Mr Ng nor Mr Krishnamoorthi were parties to the application. It was not appropriate to consider any declaratory relief regarding the taking or use of their statements since they were not before the court to receive any such relief. “[A]ny person whose interests might be affected by the declaration should be before the court”: Karaha Bodas ([28] supra) at [14(e)]. As for the admissibility of their statements, that was properly to be considered by the DT. However, I did consider their statements as part of the context and insofar as they shed light on the Applicant’s assertions regarding his own statement.

Therefore, I confine my remarks and decision to the issues pertaining to the legality of the CAD’s and AG’s conduct in respect of the Applicant’s 20 September statement.

The recording of the Applicant’s statement

I begin with the Applicant’s claim that CAD had acted ultra vires in recording his statement. I should mention that the Law Society submitted that no relief could be obtained against the CAD because it was not a party to the present proceedings. However, s 19(3) read with s 19(1) of the Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed) effectively provides that proceedings against the Government be instituted against the AG. The Applicant was correct to join only the AG in this case.

The correct exercise of statutory power

The Applicant relied, in essence, upon the head of “illegality” as explained by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410:

The relevant provision here is s 22 of the CPC. The Applicant contended that this power was exercised for a collateral purpose which was not authorised by the provision. Section 22(1) of the CPC reads:

The provision is clear. It does not matter that the statements were taken after Mr Ng’s conviction and neither does it matter that Mr Krishnamoorthi or the Applicant were never called as witnesses or charged in subsequent criminal trials. For the issue at hand, what matters is that the police officer’s exercise of statutory power is examined and that the purpose for which such a statutory power was exercised is properly ascertained.

First, the relevant power of investigation is that of the police officer, SIO Lie. Hence, the focus of the court’s inquiry on the facts was solely concerned with SIO Lie’s explanations for the purposes for which the statements were recorded. While the AG as the Public Prosecutor (“PP”) has control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings by virtue of s 11 of the CPC, neither it nor Article 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) vests the AG with power over the police. The Commissioner of the Police is answerable to the Minister: s 5 of the Police Force Act (Cap 235, 2006 Rev Ed), and operates as a separate body from the AG and AGC.

Second, it is also clear that s 22 of the CPC may only be used for the purpose of investigating a criminal offence, which is “an act or omission punishable by any written law” (see s 2 of the CPC). This statutory purpose was not disputed. The Applicant was of the view that SIO Lie’s “true and dominant purpose” in exercising his power was to investigate the Applicant’s potential breach of the PCR. The AG did not dispute that investigating breaches of the PCR would not be an authorised purpose for which statements could be recorded under s 22 of the CPC. His submissions focused on the need on the part of the Applicant to show malice, and, in any case, that SIO Lie’s purpose in recording the statements was to investigate a criminal offence.

Determining the true and dominant purpose

Where a statutory provision confers authority to obtain information for a specific purpose, that authority may only be exercised for that specific purpose. In the event that there is a plurality of purposes for which the public authority exercised its power to obtain the information, the exercise of power is lawful only if the true and dominant purpose of the exercise of the power was authorised by the specific statutory provision. This is the “true and dominant purpose” test which the Applicant relied upon, as formulated in William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 11th Ed, 2014) (“Wade & Forsyth”) at 352:

This test was adopted by the House of Lords in the case of R v Southwark Crown Court, Ex parte Bowles [1998] 1 AC 641 (“Ex parte Bowles”) at 651. Ex parte Bowles concerned a production order sought by the police from the Crown Court under s 93H of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 1998. The subject of the production order was Mrs Bowles, an accountant, whose clients included two persons who faced charges of dishonesty. She disputed the production order on the grounds that s 93H only applied to assisting in the recovery of proceeds of criminal conduct and could not apply to investigating the offences themselves. The House of Lords agreed, and dealt also with the question of legality if the police applied for a production order with two purposes, both to assist in the recovery of proceeds of crime (the authorised purpose) and to investigate into offences (the unauthorised purpose). Lord Hutton, delivering the judgment of the House of Lords, affirmed the need to ascertain the true and dominant purpose, first quoting from the same Wade & Forsyth extract (as above, albeit from an older edition), then holding (Ex parte Bowles at 651):

This approach was recently re-affirmed by the English Court of Appeal in R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another [2016] 1 WLR 1505 (“Miranda”) at [26], which involved the legality of the exercise of powers in Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop, detain, and question a person in order to determine whether he appears to be a person who “is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” (referred to as “Schedule 7 powers” or a “Schedule 7 stop”).

Mr Miranda, the claimant, was the spouse of one Mr Greenwald, a journalist, who was connected with Mr Edward Snowden. Mr Snowden had provided some journalists with encrypted data that had been stolen from the National Security Agency of the United States of America. Mr Miranda had been travelling from Berlin to Rio de Janeiro with storage devices containing these encrypted materials in his possession. On 18 August 2013, when he was en route back to Rio de Janeiro, Mr Miranda was stopped at Heathrow Airport by police officers from the Metropolitan Police. This was on the initiative of the Security Service, which had been tracking Mr Miranda’s movements, and which had contacted the Counter-Terrorism Command in the Metropolitan Police, who also wanted to investigate Mr Miranda for criminal offences. It was decided that the best way to achieve the objectives of both the Security Service and the police was to conduct a Schedule 7 stop. To that end, the Security Service issued a National Security Justification, a request from the Security Service to the police to ask them to consider using the Schedule 7 powers to conduct the stop. A second document, which was agreed between the police officers and the Security Service, concerned the “tactical aspects of the proposed stop”, and was contained in the Port Circulation Sheet (“PCS”). Both these steps of authorisation were needed for a Schedule 7 stop to be conducted. In this case, the first PCS was not actively considered by the police, and the second PCS was considered by the duty officer, DI Woodford, to be insufficient. A third PCS was then prepared and sent to the police, which was then accepted. The Schedule 7 stop then went ahead on 18 August on the basis of the third PCS. Mr Miranda applied for judicial review, claiming, inter alia, that the power was exercised for a purpose not permitted by the statute.

The Court of Appeal first considered the purpose of the stop in question. Lord Dyson MR agreed with Laws LJ (who heard the matter with two other judges at first instance) that the issue was one of fact: Miranda at [26]. In this context, Lord Dyson approved the use of the “true and dominant purpose” test, citing Ex parte Bowles ([47] supra). The Security Service and the Metropolitan Police were two separate bodies, similar to the AG and the CAD in this case. Lord Dyson MR proceeded on the basis that “although the process which led to the exercise of the stop power was initiated by the Security Service” [emphasis in original] the police also exercised an independent decision-making role: Miranda at [30]. Lord Dyson MR went on to state (Miranda at [30]):

Mr Miranda claimed that the police were simply giving effect to the directions of the Security Service, but the Court of Appeal held otherwise. The true and dominant purpose of the stop was to give effect to the third PCS, which was the document upon which the police acted. Lord Dyson MR held in Miranda at [31] that the police were alive to the fact that “the objectives of the Security Service and the police were distinct” and that “the stop power could not be exercised unless the statutory conditions for its exercise were met”. Having found that the true and dominant purpose was to give effect to the third PCS, and not the Security Service’s agenda, Lord Dyson MR observed (Miranda at [31]):

The following principles drawn from Miranda ([48] supra) and Ex parte Bowles, are relevant to the present case:

(a) the purpose for which a statutory power may be exercised must be drawn from the statute;

(b) where there is more than one purpose, the true and dominant purpose must be sought;

(c) where there is joint action by more than one agency, the purpose that is relevant is that of the person exercising the power under the statute;

(d) the burden of proof would be on the party asserting an improper purpose; and

(e) any assessment of true and dominant purpose must be sensitive to the facts in the circumstances of the case.

In relation to the burden of proof, it is worth reiterating here that this follows from the general proposition that officials are presumed to act lawfully and the burden is on the party seeking to challenge the lawfulness of such actions to prove their case: Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [47]. This presumption is merely a “starting point”, however, and the question is whether the applicant is able to prove otherwise: see Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] SGCA 43 at [154] (discussing the analogous presumption in relation to legislation).

Relevance of bad faith or malice

In this context, I should touch on the differences between an assertion of bad faith and malice, and an assertion of purposes collateral to the stipulated statutory purposes. The AG submitted that only proof of bad faith would establish that the statements had been recorded for an ulterior purpose. To that end, it characterised the Applicant’s arguments as an attack on the bona fides of the investigation and ultimately concluded that the Applicant had failed to meet its burden of proving bad faith. In truth, the Applicant’s claim was simply that the CAD had exercised its power under the CPC for a collateral purpose. This amounted to the CAD acting ultra vires and was therefore unlawful.

As a matter of the applicable legal standard, bad faith did not need to be proved for a claim of collateral purpose to succeed. The distinction between an unlawful exercise of power and bad faith was explained by the Court of Appeal in Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] 5 SLR 1222 (“Ridzuan”). There, the Court of Appeal considered the applicant’s argument that a failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations would amount to bad faith under s 33B(4) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) (see further below at [112]). The Court of Appeal rejected that argument, holding at [70]:

Applying Ridzuan to the present case, the Applicant’s claim is that the statement was recorded for a purpose that is not prescribed or authorised by the statute that gives the power to record the statement. Such an argument does not require proof of bad faith.

That being said, such an argument may effectively require proof of bad faith to succeed in certain circumstances. For example, the authority could acknowledge that its actions were motivated by multiple purposes. It could even acknowledge that some were unlawful in that they were not purposes for which the statutory power could be exercised, if taken alone. But ultimately, the authority may attempt to justify its actions by claiming that the unlawful purposes were entirely secondary and incidental to the lawful ones. In such a situation, challenging the authority's account may effectively be an allegation of dishonesty: the authority knew it was doing something unlawful but (dishonestly) sought to establish a pretext for its exercise of power and is now also (dishonestly) claiming that a lawful purpose was its true and dominant purpose. This is the case here. The contention that the statements were recorded for an ulterior purpose would, in effect, be an allegation that the CAD’s stated (lawful) purpose was entirely pretext – a cover-up, in other words, for its real (unlawful) purpose. That would be an assertion of dishonesty. Hence, to the extent that this applies to the case at hand, I agree with the AG that contentions of dishonesty are serious allegations that must not be made on mere suspicion: see Teng Fuh Holdings Pte Ltd v Collector of Land Revenue [2007] 2 SLR(R) 568 at [39], citing Yeap Seok Pen v Government of the State of Kelantan [1986] 1 MLJ 449.

Application to the facts

According to Deputy Public Prosecutor Huang Xin’en Magdalene, the AGC on 31 August 2017 directed the CAD to conduct further investigations in relation to the commissions paid by law firms to Mr Ng, highlighting that such payment of commissions was improper and contrary to professional rules, and wanted to ascertain if the conduct of these law firms and lawyers had disciplinary consequences. As stated at [43] above, in examining the legality of the taking of the statement, it is the purpose of the police officer in exercising the power that is relevant.

SIO Lie’s evidence was as follows:

It appears from the above that SIO Lie understood the AGC’s request in context, which is that professional breaches could indicate more substantial criminal activity. It raised a suspicion that fraud was afoot. He interpreted AGC’s statement to be shorthand, so to speak, that where there are knowing breaches of ethical rules, there could be a line of investigation worth pursuing into criminal offences. SIO Lie’s evidence indicated that he had exercised his own judgment on the purpose for which the statements should be recorded (see also Miranda ([48] supra) at [30]), and it is therefore his explanation that I focus on in this case.

SIO Lie explained that Mr Ng’s 14 September statement had been recorded with a view to determining the extent of the involvement of any of the lawyers and law firms in fraudulent motor insurance injury claims. If any of the lawyers to whom Mr Ng referred cases had been aware that the referrals involved fraudulent insurance claims, these lawyers and/or law firms could have engaged in a conspiracy to commit an offence of cheating against the insurance firms who had to pay out on these fraudulent motor insurance injury claims.

Further, SIO Lie stated that the Applicant’s 20 September statement was recorded to gather more information on the motor insurance injury claims made by drivers who had been referred to the Firm as well as the circumstances under which those referrals had been made. SIO Lie deposed that this had been carried out to ascertain “the nature and extent of the involvement of [the Firm] and the Applicant in fraudulent motor insurance injury claims”. This was why the statement contained a warning to the Applicant that the investigation was into an offence of “Cheating (Motor Insurance Fraud)” in the period “around 2013 till 2015”.

As for Mr Krishnamoorthi’s 12 December statement, SIO Lie deposed that the purpose of recording that statement was to follow up on a claim made by Mr Woo that he had not received a letter of acknowledgement from the Firm dated 1 July 2015, which Mr Krishnamoorthi had claimed in an earlier statement to have sent to Mr Woo. Further, SIO Lie wanted to ascertain Mr Krishnamoorthi’s knowledge of and involvement in the payment of referral fees to Mr Ng.

In my judgment, SIO Lie’s explanation was, on the face of it, plausible and logical. If the Applicant had been regularly paying referral fees to Mr Ng, and if he had done so in conscious breach of the PCR provisions, that would have been a relevant factor in SIO Lie’s determination of whether there was evidence of the Applicant’s involvement in a conspiracy to cheat insurance firms. In other words, the Applicant’s knowing breach of professional conduct rules could ground a suspicion of and link to a larger breach of criminal law. It was sensible for SIO Lie to have pursued this line of inquiry with the Applicant.

I then considered whether the Applicant had any evidence to show that SIO Lie’s explanation as to his purpose was false. First, the Applicant pointed out that the investigation into the Applicant’s involvement was belated, having commenced only on 31 August 2017 after Mr Ng had been convicted and sentenced, while Mr Ng had already disclosed the involvement of lawyers in his statement dated 6 April 2016. In my view, this delay was equivocal. AGC directed SIO Lie to look into this issue on the same day as Mr Ng’s conviction and sentencing. It was equally plausible that any investigation into a wider and deeper motor insurance fraud conspiracy could be more appropriate after the offender whose evidence would become crucial had been sentenced, or that the potential for a wider conspiracy was noticed only later after a subsequent officer noticed the potential disciplinary breaches. The Applicant’s criticism here was speculative.

Second, the Applicant invited the court to examine the statements themselves to draw the conclusion that they were taken for the dominant purpose of investigating breaches of the PCR.

In relation to Mr Ng’s 14 September statement, the Applicant pointed out that four out of six of the questions were directed at “commissions” and “referrals”. However, this was consistent with SIO Lie’s evidence that his purpose in following up from Mr Ng’s prior statements was to ascertain the scope of the lawyers’ and/or law firms’ involvement in the motor insurance fraud. In addition, the Applicant’s name was volunteered by Mr Ng, and, on the face of the statement, was not suggested to him by SIO Lie. At the hearing before me, counsel for the Applicant sought to make a point concerning SIO Lie’s indication of “N/A” in the field for “offence … alleged to have been committed”. This was equivocal because SIO Lie’s stated reason for interviewing Mr Ng was to investigate further criminal offences on the part of others in a motor insurance fraud conspiracy. That same field was filled out in the Applicant’s and Mr Krishnamoorthi’s statements and the failure to do so in Mr Ng’s first statement did not go so far as to suggest that SIO Lie was solely concerned with breaches of the PCR at all times.

It was in this context that SIO Lie then contacted the Applicant. It was the Applicant’s evidence that SIO Lie telephoned him on 15 September to ask to record a statement with respect to the referral of Mr Woo, and followed up with a request on 18 September for other personal injury files referred to the Firm by Mr Ng. On 18 September, the Applicant enquired as to the reason and was told that SIO Lie wished to ascertain whether any claims referred could be potentially fraudulent.

On 20 September 2017, at the outset of the taking of the statement, SIO Lie administered the following warning to the Applicant:

In total, SIO Lie asked seven substantive questions (Q1 to Q7). SIO Lie opened with the following question (Q1):

The Applicant’s answer to this question took up the bulk of the statement, running from pages 1 to 4, and dealt with how he came to know Mr Ng, how Mr Ng started to refer cases to him, and gave details as to the different cases that Mr Ng referred to him. The Applicant gave details of how he managed each case as they were referred to him.

The other six questions were as follows:

The Applicant argued that there were no questions concerning how the Applicant or the Firm submitted the claims, but the questions, in particular Q4 and Q7, concerned the breaches of the PCR. This was not a fair characterisation of the statement when read as a whole. First, concerning the Applicant’s specific allegation that no questions were asked about how they submitted the claims, I noted that Q1 sought details about how the Firm dealt with the cases and Q6 sought to determine his knowledge of whether the claims were fraudulent. Second, the totality of the statement showed that the purpose was to investigate breaches of the criminal law. At the outset, SIO Lie’s warning stated that he was investigating motor insurance fraud. The bulk of the statement dealt with the Applicant’s account of the cases that Mr Ng referred to him, which was clearly relevant to establishing his involvement in any motor insurance fraud. Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 then sought to particularise the relationship between the Applicant and Mr Ng: who did Mr Ng speak to at the Firm, why did Mr Ng refer to the cases to the Firm and not to anyone else, how were those referrals processed, and whether the Applicant knew what had happened to Mr Ng. These were relevant to SIO Lie’s determination of the extent of the Applicant’s involvement in any conspiracy to commit motor insurance fraud. Q6 expressly sought to determine the Applicant’s knowledge of whether the claims were fraudulent. Q7, the only question to expressly refer to the PCR, arose in this context and, following directly from Qs 2 to 6, was, to my mind, exploring SIO Lie’s hypothesis that a lawyer who knowingly breaches rules of professional conduct could have a wider criminal intent. The express reference to the PCR was justified because it was the Applicant’s own knowledge of whether he was in breach of such rules that was also relevant to the investigation. It was the last question because the Applicant stated that he did not consider that he had breached any ethical rules. He thereby closed off the last avenue of enquiry.

The subsequent conduct of SIO Lie is equally consistent with his stated purpose. SIO Lie proceeded to interview Mr Krishnamoorthi on 12 December 2017. The questions as a whole reveal that the focus was on obtaining information relating to the Firm’s business with Mr Woo, the claimant of motor insurance in relation to whom Mr Ng was charged and convicted. The majority of the questions were directed to establishing the facts relating to the Firm’s interactions with Mr Woo and Mr Ng, and the references to the PCR arose only in the two final substantive questions, which related to the same interactions. Hence, while there were references to the PCR, these references should be read in the broader context of the statement, suggesting that these questions were intended to identify possible connections between the Firm and Mr Ng’s offences. SIO Lie sought to record a further statement from Mr Krishnamoorthi but Mr Krishnamoorthi declined. The statement and SIO Lie’s follow up action showed that SIO Lie was looking for the law firm’s involvement – but without success – in a larger context of fraud.

After the statements were recorded, the CAD then considered the evidence. The CAD’s conclusion was that the evidence “did not disclose a further offence of cheating on the part of Mr Ng or an offence of cheating (or conspiracy to cheat) on the part of the Applicant”, and its findings, together with the statements, were forwarded to the AGC for review. At this stage, the CAD’s purpose was to provide AGC with the police’s recommendations concerning the criminal offences that were in question. There was nothing to suggest that the CAD’s consideration of evidence was simply a pretext for covering up the use of investigative powers to inquire into breaches of the PCR. Subsequently, when the AGC wished to disclose the statements to the Law Society, it then sought the CAD’s views on that request because the statements were recorded by the CAD. This again made sense in the light of SIO Lie’s explanation. The Applicant contended that the fact that the CAD helped the AGC seek Mr Ng’s and Mr Krishnamoorthi’s consent to be contacted by the Law Society indicated that the CAD must have been helping the AGC investigate breaches of the PCR. On the evidence before me, it appears that the request was simply practical because SIO Lie was already in contact with Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi, and SIO Lie’s assistance was an unsurprising professional courtesy. In any event, that later administrative act could have no bearing on his original reasons for taking their statements.

Looking at the evidence as a whole, the Applicant’s assertions, if true, would have necessarily meant that SIO Lie had been actively misrepresenting his true intentions in his interactions with the Applicant. It would have meant that SIO Lie’s representations to the Applicant during the 18 September phone call and the warning administered on 20 September were not entirely truthful. Concocted to facilitate investigations into breaches of the PCR, these would have amounted to dishonest misrepresentations. The CAD’s consideration of the criminal case and recommendations to AGC would also have been fabricated. And SIO Lie’s affidavit would accordingly have been an ex post facto rationalisation premised on the same sham. These allegations involving dishonesty were serious and as pointed out by the AG, advanced without basis. The Applicant bore the burden of proof and there was absolutely no evidence to support his arguments in the circumstances and context surrounding the recording of the statement. To the contrary, SIO Lie had a rational explanation of how he read the AGC’s request and how he proceeded to take statements in order to investigate motor insurance fraud. His conduct throughout was consistent and cohered with his explanation. I found that the true and dominant purpose of recording the Applicant’s statement was to investigate a criminal offence, namely motor insurance fraud.

Disclosure of the statements

I turn then to the next substantive issue, whether the Applicant’s statement could be disclosed by the AG to the Law Society. The Applicant’s contentions could be summarised into three arguments: that he had placed reliance on the police booklet which indicated that the statements would not be disclosed; that immunity could be founded on Taylor and another v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177 (“Taylor”); and that the statement was protected by the duty of confidence.

The AG disagreed, arguing that a public interest exception applied to the duty of confidence, and, further, that the statutory context allowed the disclosure and immunised him from suit.

I found that the first two of the Applicant’s arguments were not relevant and a public interest exception applied in respect of the duty of confidence. Section 85(3) of the LPA was of assistance to the AG, while s 106 of the LPA was not. I explain these points in turn.

The police booklet

The Applicant argued that “the Police Procedures states that all information provided to police officers by witnesses will not be transmitted to third parties.” The reference was to the “Information Booklet on Police Procedures” updated on June 2016 and exhibited in the Applicant’s affidavit, which appears to be a booklet provided to certain persons who may need to deal with the police. Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, however, the booklet makes no such absolute statement. The closest that the booklet comes to dealing with this issue is the statement on p 26 and p 28: “As a police statement is an official document, no copy will be provided to you or other persons unless otherwise provided for by law” [emphasis added]. The issue in this case is the scope of what is provided for by law. Page 28 also states that “[a]ll information provided to our officers will be kept confidential”, but this too, is not in dispute. The issue at hand is whether the public interest exception applied in the present case. Therefore, the Applicant’s reliance on this booklet is misplaced.

Contention of “absolute immunity”

The Applicant claimed an “absolute immunity” in any suit or action in respect of the statement that he gave to the police, citing the case of Taylor ([76] supra). Taylor, however, concerned a defamation suit for things said in the course of police investigations as recorded in police statements. The absolute immunity discussed in that case pertained only to civil suits arising out of such statements made during investigations: see also D v Kong Sim Guan [2003] 3 SLR(R) 146 at [109]–[110]. It is also “limited to actions in which the alleged statement constitutes the cause of action”: Taylor at 215C. The Applicant is not under threat of an action for defamation or any civil suit arising out of his statement to the CAD nor was that statement previously disclosed in a suit. The crux of his concern is that his statement may contain admissions or allude to facts relating to professional misconduct, but the absolute immunity claimed is irrelevant to this issue. That is a matter that pertains to the use of his statement as evidence in disciplinary proceedings and is better left to arguments on admissibility before the DT.

The duty of confidence

It was common ground that a duty of confidence applied. The dispute centred on whether the public interest exception permitted AG and CAD to disclose the statements to the Law Society. The Applicant did not dispute the existence of the exception, only its scope.

Scope of the public interest exception

As a general matter, “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity”: Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 (“Initial Services Ltd”) at 405 (see also Wee Shuo Woon v HT SRL [2017] 2 SLR 94 at [54]). Lord Denning MR went on to describe the scope of this principle as extending to (Initial Services Ltd at 405):

In the specific context of statements given to the police, the English Court of Appeal has held in Frankson and others v Home Office [2003] 1 WLR 1952 that the expectation of confidence may be overridden by a greater public interest shown on the facts of each case. Scott Baker LJ opined at [39]:

In assessing whether the CAD and AG were entitled to disclose the statements to the Law Society in this case, the court is asked to balance “the public interest in upholding the right to confidence, which is based on the moral principles of loyalty and fair dealing, against some other public interest that will be served by the publication of the confidential material”: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 269. In the context of police statements, there is, on the side of confidentiality, also the interest in ensuring that witnesses are not deterred from coming forward to assist in investigations, and of respecting the expectations of those who do.

In the present case, disclosure was to a professional regulatory body. While there have been no local authorities dealing with this situation, courts in other common law jurisdictions have treated this issue as one where the public interest is better served by disclosure.

The English case of Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2000] 1 WLR 25 (“Woolgar”) is on point. The case involved a nurse who was arrested after a patient died in her care. She was interviewed by the police under caution, but after investigations, the police informed the nurse and the local health authority that there was insufficient evidence for a charge. However, the local health authority’s registration and inspection unit referred the matter to the nursing regulatory body, which contacted the police seeking, inter alia, the nurse’s statements. The police sought the nurse’s consent for disclosure, but she refused. She then sought an injunction from the court to restrain the disclosure. The Court of Appeal held that there was no basis for an injunction. Although statements given to the police are prima facie confidential, there could be a public interest in disclosure (Woolgar at 36):

This principle was applied in R (Pamplin) v Law Society [2001] EWHC Admin 300 (“Pamplin”) in the context of disclosure to the Law Society in England. The applicant, a solicitor’s clerk, had been investigated by the police in connection with the applicant’s arrest for altering an attendance note. No prosecution followed, but the file of evidence was disclosed by the police to the Law Society. The Law Society then directed the compliance and supervision committee to consider whether an order should be made against him preventing any solicitor from employing him without consent. Newman J held that the police had not acted unlawfully. Although it may be desirable to give notice to the affected individual (see Woolgar at 37), disclosure without notice was not thereby unlawful. The action taken by the police in that case was consonant with the public interest, identified by the court (Pamplin at [19]) as:

In Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria had occasion to consider similar issues in McLean v Racing Victoria Ltd [2019] VSC 690 (“McLean”). While the decision ultimately turned on the scope of the privacy legislation applicable in Victoria, Richards J made the following observations on the common law in McLean at [47]–[48]:

The same principles were approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in MA v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 490 at [43] in the context of disclosure of information to the New Zealand Immigration Service. There, information first gathered by the police was referred to the New Zealand Immigration Service and was then used to revoke the applicant’s refugee status.

The position taken by the courts in England, Australia and New Zealand reflect sensible and pragmatic considerations, which should apply similarly in the local context. In Singapore, it has been acknowledged, albeit in other contexts, that there is a strong public interest in ensuring that errant lawyers are brought to task. In Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 4 SLR(R) 377 (“Rayney Wong (CA)”), for example, where the Court of Appeal (at [51]) accepted the Law Society’s argument that the doctrine of abuse of process did not apply to disciplinary proceedings against advocates and solicitors, Chan Sek Keong CJ stated the importance of retaining public confidence in the honesty, integrity and professionalism of the legal profession, which justified “a higher public interest in disciplining errant lawyers than in letting them off”. In respect of touting in particular, the courts have regarded touting as a serious ethical breach. Rajah J (as he then was), had strong words for the effect of such violations of professional rules on the legal profession as a whole (Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2006] 4 SLR(R) 934 at [85]):

Application to the facts

In my view, where evidence of disciplinary breaches is presented to the police in the course of investigations, or where such information is then received from the police by the AG, there is a public interest in disclosure being made to the regulatory body in question. This is even more so where the alleged breach disclosed is a serious one, as it was in the present case. Such ethical breaches lead to corruption in the fabric of the bar and, as a practical matter, can often be closely linked to criminal activity. In this particular case, the ethical breach in issue had a potential nexus with wider motor insurance fraud, even if the questioning in particular had not yielded sufficient evidence to continue with investigation into that particular offence.

The Applicant’s arguments to the contrary were not persuasive. His repeated argument, that confidentiality ought to be maintained in the interest of not deterring potential witnesses from cooperating, was neither controversial nor convincing. The real issue was whether that interest was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. The Applicant’s further argument that there is no public interest in allowing the CAD to use their powers to investigate breaches of the PCR under the guise of investigating criminal offences effectively recycled his earlier arguments on collateral purpose and fell away in the light of my views on the same.

I deal therefore with the Applicant’s specific arguments. First, the Applicant claimed that the CAD’s and AG’s actions effectively prevented the Applicant from challenging the admissibility of the statements, which he would have been able to at trial. This was not relevant. The issue of “admissibility” would be determined differently in disciplinary proceedings (in accordance with the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed): see r 23 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (Cap 161, R 2, 2010 Rev Ed)) than at a criminal trial (in accordance with the CPC) in any case. It is not the disclosure, but the nature of the DT proceedings, that affects how the Applicant would be able challenge the statements, and therefore, this argument does not serve as a countervailing factor against disclosure.

Second, the Applicant argued that the disclosure was not necessary because the matter could have proceeded under s 86 of the LPA if an Inquiry Committee had been convened to investigate the issue. The authorities did not suggest that the standard was pegged at such a high level of strict necessity. Disclosure could still warranted even if there was an alternative means of pursuing disciplinary action. In Woolgar ([86] supra) at 36H, disclosure was justified if the police “in their reasonable view” decided that the information “should be considered by a professional or regulatory body”. In John Foster Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 193 at [103] (as approved in AAY and others v AAZ [2011] 1 SLR 1093 at [71]), Collins LJ considered that disclosure could be made where “the public interest reasonably requires it” [emphasis added]. Here, the AG’s decision was reasonable, as it was clear that Mr Ng and Mr Krishna would not cooperate with the Inquiry Committee. The AG and the CAD, as a first step, sought to obtain the consent of Mr Ng and Mr Krishnamoorthi for them to be contacted by the Law Society. They had refused. It was only after this refusal and the Law Society’s indication that they needed the evidence in the statements that the CAD and AG decided to disclose the statements to the Law Society. There was no need to obtain the Applicant’s consent, because he was the lawyer being investigated. His own statement to the CAD had direct relevance, whether the proceedings were before an Inquiry Committee or a DT. Public interest would not be served in convening an additional Inquiry Committee when cogent evidence was available that ought to be considered directly by a DT.

In the circumstances, the disclosure of the statements were not in breach of confidence by either the CAD or the AG, since such disclosure was justified in the public interest.

Statutory provisions relevant to the AG

In respect of the reliefs requested against the AG, the AG advanced two further arguments relying on provisions in the LPA. The first was that the section governing the AG’s referral to the Law Society, s 85(3) of the LPA, furnished a wide power to refer any information, including confidential information. The second was that in the exercise of his statutory function, he was immunised from liability by an immunity provision under s 106 of the LPA.

The power of referral

Section 85(3) of the LPA reads as follows:

The crucial question was whether “any information” included confidential information even where its disclosure would involve a breach of the duty of confidentiality. The AG contended that, in this context, any information would extend even to information protected by the duty of confidence. There was no dispute that the word “information” included documentary information such as statements. The dispute was on the width of the word “any”. The AG advanced two arguments on this, one based on the ordinary and literal meaning of the word, the other premised on the use of the word in the LPA. This again involved the court in an exercise of statutory interpretation, and as such, I again considered the interpretative approach summarised in Tan Cheng Bock ([24] supra) at [37].

The first step was to consider the text of the provision and the context of the provision within the statute. The word “any” ordinarily has a broad meaning. In Li Shengwu v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1081 (“Li Shengwu”) at [170], the Court of Appeal interpreted “any other written law” in O 11 r 1(n) of the ROC to mean, in its plain and ordinary meaning, “any and all statutes”. On that basis, the AG argued that “any information” would mean the AG could refer “any and all” information to the Law Society.

That was not the end of the matter, however, as the phrase “any information” was also to be considered in the context of its use within the LPA. Within s 85(3) itself, the phrase is used to describe the AG’s power of referral: the AG “may refer… any information”. In Li Shengwu, the word was used to describe a range of written law. Used in that context, the breadth of “any written law” is readily ascertainable. When the word is used in the context of a power, on the other hand, it gives the power an all-encompassing breadth which is not, on the face of the statute, readily ascertainable. Because of this distinction, the interpretation used in Li Shengwu, while helpful, could not be determinative.

I went on to consider the two other instances where the phrase “any information” was used in the context of the AG’s power of referral. I bore in mind that where identical words are used in a statute, they “should presumptively have the same meaning” although that may be displaced by the context: Tan Cheng Bock at [58(c)(i)]. In my opinion, these other uses of the words “any” and “information” appeared to cast some doubt on the prima facie breadth of the phrase “any information” as it appears in s 85(3) of the LPA.

First, under s 2E(2)(a) of the LPA, the AG may furnish “any information” to the Director of Legal Services. This was a similar power to that in s 85(3) of the LPA that enabled the AG to facilitate the work of the Director of Legal Services in regulating certain lawyers and legal practice entities. Hence, the word “any” could be said, at first glance, to involve a similar usage. That provision, however, opens with the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any written law or rule of law” in s 2E(2). There is no such qualification in s 85(3) of the LPA. The manner in which this provision is framed could instead suggest that, in the absence of a similar phrase in s 85(3) of the LPA, and contrary to what the AG argued, the AG would not have any additional authority to disclose information beyond that provided within existing law.

The second reference to the words “any” and “information” is in s 66(2) of the LPA. Section 66 as a whole reads as follows:

Again, the drafting differs from s 85(3). Section 66(2) opens with “[n]otwithstanding subsection (1)”. Subsection 1 provides for the confidentiality of the proceedings of the Council of the Law Society, its staff, the Review Committee and the Inquiry Committee. Section 66(2) of the LPA was introduced to ensure that despite the confidentiality of proceedings provided by s 66(1), the Law Society would be able to disclose such information if requested: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (12 November 1993), vol 61 at cols 1165 to 1166 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister of Law). In subsection (2), the word “any” allows the AG to circumvent any confidentiality requirements. This however, is only made possible by the words “notwithstanding subsection (1)” which qualify s 66(2) of the LPA.

Therefore, both s 2E(2)(a) and s 66(2) of the LPA appear to use “any information” in different contexts, which suggests that whatever meaning “any information” has in those provisions may not apply generally to other uses of “any information” in the LPA. I further noted that these provisions were introduced substantially later than the original provision which eventually became s 85(3) of the LPA was. This is not a case where identical words in a statute are used identically. Hence, the fact that “any information” in those provisions may be broad enough to refer to confidential information would not be sufficient for the court to find that the same applies in s 85(3) of the LPA.

Further, the other provisions are qualified with the phrases “[n]otwithstanding any written law or rule of law” and “[n]otwithstanding subsection (1)” respectively. This suggests that “any information” as a description of the AG’s power of referral does not, by itself, warrant a broad interpretation covering information that would otherwise be a breach of duty or unlawful to disclose. In other words, it could be argued that the phrase “any information” was not intended to mean “any and all” in such a broad manner, as such a broad definition of “any” would render the relevant qualifications in s 2E(2) and s 66(2) of the LPA superfluous. In particular, the framing of s 2E(2) with the phrase beginning “[n]otwithstanding…” was the more relevant one for the purpose at hand, because it concerned a similar power of referral to discipline. This qualifier would suggest that in the absence of that phrase, the AG would be constrained by statute and common law.

There were, therefore, at the first step of the analysis, two possible interpretations of “any”. The first was the literal interpretation preferred by the AG. The second, which follows from the use of the word and its framing within s 2E(2), was to interpret “any information” to mean information that the AG would not otherwise be prevented from disclosing under any written law or rule of law. I refer to this as the “limited interpretation”. In the light of these two possibilities, I proceeded to the remaining steps of the purposive approach.

The second step in the Tan Cheng Bok ([24] supra) analysis looks to the purpose of the provision and legislation. At the outset, I note that the legislative history does not shed further light on the purpose or scope of the provision. The material part of the provision was first introduced by the Advocates and Solicitors (Amendment) Ordinance (SS Ord No 6 of 1936) amending s 26 of the Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance (SS Cap 62, 1936 Rev Ed), but no comment was made on it at the time. It was then adopted as s 89(2) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (Act 57 of 1966) without further comment. Hence, the focus of the present discussion is on the purpose as gleaned from the provision and statute itself. Section 85(3) of the LPA provides for a specific means by which a referral of information concerning a regulated legal practitioner can be made to the Law Society. The provision applies to judicial office-holders (as specified by s 85(3A)), the AG, the Director of Legal Services and the Singapore Institute of Legal Education (“the Institute”). Each of these offices has a special responsibility for and interest in the standards of the legal profession. In their different capacities, they would in the course of their work come upon information concerning regulated legal practitioners that would be of interest to the Law Society. Facilitating such referral of information would serve the greater purpose of regulating the legal profession through the Law Society, as this would be an important means by which information reaches the regulatory body.

At the same time, it is necessary to consider the variety of contexts in which the bodies and persons referred to in s 85(3) of the LPA do their work. Each of them may come into possession of information in different contexts, each with different legal considerations attaching to the use of that information. There are a variety of legal rules that have been developed in different areas of law that touch on the use and publication of such information to other persons. The issue of confidentiality may arise, as it has in this case, and for which the law on confidentiality has developed its own exception for such use. In other contexts, where the information in question could be potentially defamatory, the issue of qualified privilege may be raised: Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334; see also Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639 at [60]. The referral of information in s 85(3) of the LPA would operate in the context of many other rules that govern the scope of the use and publication of information. In the present context, and again in comparison with the frame of s 2E(2) which does not exist in s 85(3), s 85(3) of the LPA was not intended to allow disclosures, irrespective of the confidential nature of the information. This would amount to a new ground on which disclosure may be justified. Nothing in the provision suggested that this had been Parliament’s intention. Rather, in the framework of Part VII of the LPA, it appears to be a purely facilitative provision. It provides a statutory basis for the AG and other bodies to make referrals of information to the Law Society, with the accompanying power to make a specific request for a DT to be constituted.

Turning then to the third step in the purposive approach, I considered which of the two possible interpretations best serves the purpose of the legislation. In my judgment, the limited interpretation is most appropriate. First, it sits more easily with ss 2E(2) and 66 of the LPA, delineating a good rationale for the use of the extra words in those sections. Second, as I have noted, s 85(3) of the LPA is intended to operate in a wide variety of contexts where different legal rules may apply to protect the interests of individuals in different ways. In the absence of language to the contrary, it was more appropriate in this regard to give effect to these norms within s 85(3) of the LPA rather than to read s 85(3) as overriding all these other rules. In this regard, the limited interpretation was more suitable as it worked in tandem with the common law and other rules relating to the use of information. Third, arising from the second, this interpretation operated on the premise that each of the bodies given such power would consider the law prior to exercise of its power. This is a sound basis because the boundaries of the law should always be a relevant consideration in the mind of any person exercising statutory power. The expectation must be that such persons invested with statutory authority would seek to comply with all their duties, whether under statute or common law, whether in public or private law.

Applying this approach to the case, the lawfulness of the use of s 85(3) of the LPA in the present was therefore contingent on whether an exception to confidentiality applied. Because I was of the view that the public interest exception applied, it followed that the AG properly exercised his power of referral under s 85(3) of the LPA.

Section 106 of the LPA

In disclosing the Applicant’s statement to the Law Society, the AG was fulfilling his statutory regulatory function. The AG therefore relied on s 106 of the LPA, a wide-ranging immunity clause which reads:

The italicised words in s 106 of the LPA are found also in s 33B(4) of the MDA, which reads:

Section 33B(4) of the MDA was considered by the Court of Appeal in Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 216 (“Nagaenthran”). It was contended by the AG in that case that s 33B(4) of the MDA extended to oust the court’s power of judicial review over the PP’s determination under s 33B(2)(b) as to whether an accused had substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug trafficking activities except on the grounds of bad faith, malice or unconstitutionality, and the applicant’s claims in that case fell short of malice and bad faith: Nagaenthran at [43]. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the clause did not oust the jurisdiction of the court but operated by way of an immunity clause: Nagaenthran at [47].

Of relevance is the Court of Appeal’s summation of the approach to such clauses in Nagaenthran at [50]:

The Court of Appeal then considered s 33B(4) of the MDA, holding in Nagaenthran at [51] that:

In my view, the same approach applies in interpreting s 106 of the LPA. In doing so, it is important to ascertain and delineate both what lies within and outside its scope. Nagaenthran (at [51]) clarifies that illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety is outside the scope of such immunity clauses. If, as asserted by the Applicant, the AG has exercised his s 85(3) power outside the limits of his authority, the section would provide no protection for his action. The legality of the exercise of powers under a statute continue to be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court. As the Court of Appeal stated in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General and another matter [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [98]: “All power has legal limits and it is within the province of the courts to determine whether those limits have been exceeded.” This approach is consistent with Woo Bih Li J’s in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore [2016] 4 SLR 192 (“Deepak Sharma”) at [44]–[49], which was decided prior to and did not have the benefit of the reasoning of Nagaenthran, but which arrived at the same conclusion. Woo J there held that s 106 of the LPA did not exclude judicial review over the parties named therein and therefore did not apply to immunise the Review Committee from judicial review of its actions.

The inquiry turns to the proper ambit of the immunity that s 106 of the LPA provides. Deepak Sharma did not deal with this issue. The context of the MDA as discussed in Nagaenthran ([113] supra) is very different from the LPA, and the relevant part of s 33B(4) of the MDA, which does not feature in the case at hand, pointed to non-justiciable matters. Nevertheless, the guidance given by Nagaenthran (at [49] and [50]) remains relevant in relation to the AG’s exercise of his power under s 85(3) of the LPA. The primary purpose of the AG’s power under s 85(3), similar to the two cases on prosecutorial immunity cited in Nagaenthran at [49], is, ultimately, for cases to be brought by the Law Society before a separate fact finding tribunal. While the AG’s role in this context is not strictly one of prosecution, there are similarities which suggest that the three policy reasons and countervailing concern cited in Nagaenthran at [49] are relevant here. These policy concerns were articulated in Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2012] BCJ No 1965, 2012 BCSC 1491 at [20], and the countervailing concern was expressed in Rosli bin Dahlan v Tan Sri Abdul Gani bin Patail [2014] 11 MLJ 481 at [95]. First, such immunity encourages public trust in the fairness and impartiality of those who exercise their discretion in bringing criminal prosecutions (in this context, the referral of information for disciplinary action to be taken). Second, the threat of personal liability for tortious conduct would have a chilling effect on the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion (in this context, the AG’s discretion to refer information to the Law Society). Third, to permit civil suits against prosecutors would invite a flood of litigation that would deflect a prosecutor’s energies from the discharge of his public duties; and it would open the door to unmeritorious claims that might have the effect of threatening prosecutorial independence (in this context, there is a risk that the AG, in exercising this power, may be subject to suits from disgruntled targets of disciplinary actions). As against these considerations are concerns that private individuals ought not to be denied a remedy where they have been, for example, maliciously prosecuted. In the result, a balance is struck where prosecutors enjoy a broad immunity from suit in respect of the carrying out of their functions, but are not given carte blanche to exercise their discretion.

Applying these principles, s 106 of the LPA serves to preserve the ability of the AG to exercise his judgment freely in this statutory duty of referral without fear of liability. If the AG’s referral, exercised intra vires, is in good faith and without malice, no action or proceedings would lie. If, for example, the referred matter should later be adjudicated by the DT or the Court of Three Judges to be unmeritorious, the AG would have immunity save where malice or bad faith could be proved. The same rationale also applies to the other bodies and persons referred to in s 106 of the LPA. Each plays a role in the regulatory and disciplinary process under the LPA, and each should be free to exercise their powers lawfully without fear of liability.

Coming then to the present application, I was of the view (at [110]) that the AG’s power of referral was exercised lawfully. If, as the Applicant asserted, the AG’s exercise of his power had been unlawful, s 106 of the LPA would not have afforded any protection. That, nevertheless, was not the situation at hand.

Conclusion