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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Nov 2021

General Division of the High Court

Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney -General

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[2021] SGHC 270Case no. Originating Summons No 664 of 202121 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. (a) First, has the counsel “acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently”?

  2. (b) If so, one moves on to the second consideration, which is whether such conduct by counsel caused the other party to incur “unnecessary costs”?

  3. [3] Of the three steps, the first is probably the most contentious. In what circumstances will the court consider that counsel has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently? The Court of Appeal in Tan King Hiang v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 529 (“Tan King Hiang”), while recognising that these terms are not amenable to precise definition, endorsed some useful guidelines laid down by the English Court of Appeal in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 on how they may be interpreted (see Tan King Hiang at [18]):

  4. [5] The originating summons in this case (“the OS”) was fixed for hearing before me on 28 October 2021. It was an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The Attorney-General was named as the defendant. At the start of the hearing, Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy (“Mr Ravi”), counsel for the plaintiffs, informed me that he wished to withdraw his application in the OS in its entirety. Mr Tan Chee Meng SC (“Mr Tan”), counsel for the defendant, expressed no objections.

  5. The Originating Summons

  6. [8] The plaintiffs are all prisoners at Changi Prison Complex. All of them, save for the fifth plaintiff, had been convicted of drug trafficking under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed). The fifth plaintiff had been convicted of murder under the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). For their respective offences, all the plaintiffs had been sentenced to the death penalty, but the second plaintiff’s death sentence was subsequently set aside following a successful criminal review application to the Court of Appeal.

  7. [10] Following the decision in Gobi, and during the course of criminal review proceedings concerning the first plaintiff’s conviction for drug trafficking in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 159 (“Syed Suhail”), the lead counsel for the prosecution, DPP Francis Ng SC (“DPP Ng”), disclosed that its file for the first plaintiff contained copies of personal correspondence, including legally privileged material, sent to or received by the first plaintiff. These had been sent to the defendant’s chambers by the SPS. In response, the first plaintiff applied to disqualify the entire corps of officers at the defendant’s chambers from acting for the Public Prosecutor in the criminal review proceedings (see Syed Suhail at [12]). This application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal after it obtained confirmation from DPP Ng that he had not been involved in the previous appeal against conviction by the first plaintiff which had been unsuccessful and that he did not have sight of the contents of the personal correspondence of the first plaintiff (Syed Suhail at [12]). The Court of Appeal held that the first plaintiff had failed to show any basis on which the entirety of the defendant’s chambers should be disqualified from appearing in the criminal review proceedings, nor any prejudice that may have been occasioned by the disclosure of the first plaintiff’s personal correspondence in the context of the criminal review proceedings (Syed Suhail at [12]).

  8. [12] In the course of OS 975, through affidavits by Deputy Attorney-General Hri Kumar Nair (“DAG Nair”) filed on 18 November and 16 December 2020, the defendant disclosed all the correspondence sent by or to the plaintiffs which was in the possession, custody or power of the defendant. This was based on a review conducted by a team of officers from the defendant’s chambers after OS 975 was filed.

  9. [13] OS 975 was heard and dismissed by See Kee Oon J. In his judgment issued on 16 March 2021, See J found that it would not be appropriate for the court to allow the plaintiffs’ applications for pre-action discovery and pre-action interrogatories given that any civil proceedings against the government had to be commenced in any event against the defendant (see Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General and another [2021] 4 SLR 698 (“Syed Suhail OS 975”) at [14]-[18]). See J also held that pre-action discovery was not necessary because the defendant had already made voluntary disclosure of all the plaintiffs’ correspondence that was forwarded by the SPS to the defendant (see [42]-[44]). The judge also observed that the defendant had “categorically affirmed” that his chambers had not used the plaintiffs’ correspondence or otherwise gained any advantage through the use of such correspondence in any legal proceedings against the plaintiffs (at [43]).

  10. [14] I should also point out that, in Syed Suhail OS 975, when addressing the question of whether the plaintiffs in OS 975 had possible claims for breach of statutory duty, See J observed: “[t]hat there has been a breach of the relevant provisions in the Prisons Act and [the Prisons Regulations] is not in question, as has been determined by the Court of Appeal in [Gobi ([9] above)]” [emphasis added] (at [48]). There was no appeal against the decision of the High Court in Syed Suhail OS 975.

  11. [15] Mr Ravi was the counsel for appellants in Gobi. He was counsel for the applicant in the criminal review proceedings in Syed Suhail ([10] above). He also acted for the plaintiffs in Syed Suhail OS 975.

  12. [16] On 2 July 2021, the plaintiffs, represented by Mr Ravi, filed the OS. This was an application brought under O 53 rr 1 and 7 of the Rules of Court. In other words, it was an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. In the OS, the plaintiffs prayed for leave to be granted to them to seek the following reliefs:

  13. (a) a declaration that the defendant acted ultra vires and unlawfully when his chambers requested the personal correspondence of the first, third and eighth plaintiffs, without their consent;

  14. (b) a declaration that the SPS acted ultra vires and unlawfully when it disclosed the plaintiffs’ personal correspondence to the defendant’s chambers, without their consent;

  15. (e) a declaration that the defendant and the SPS had “breached confidence” in the case of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and 11th plaintiffs.

  16. (g) damages for breach of confidence in the case of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and 11th plaintiffs;

  17. (h) a declaration that the SPS had infringed the copyright belonging to the first, fifth and seventh plaintiffs; and

  18. (i) nominal damages for breach of copyright in the case of the first, fifth and seventh plaintiffs.

  19. [17] For ease of reference, I will refer to the reliefs in [16(a)]-[16(b)] as “the Declarations”, those in [16(c)]-[16(d)] as “the Prohibitory Orders”, and those in [16(e)]-[16(i)] as “the Private Law Reliefs”.

  20. [22] On 25 October 2021, Mr Ravi replied to state that the plaintiffs were amenable to withdrawing the OS but only on certain conditions that were set out in his letter (which was dated 22 October 2021). Among these conditions was one that required the defendant to confirm that he would not challenge “the procedural basis of [the plaintiffs] seeking declarations under O 15 r 16”.

  21. [24] There was no reply to Wong Partnership’s letter of 26 October 2021. As already mentioned (see [5] above), parties appeared before me on 28 October 2021, where Mr Ravi expressed his intention to withdraw the OS. This was not subject to any conditions. Given that the defendant had no objections, I granted leave for the withdrawal accordingly.

  22. Whether there was a proper basis for the reliefs sought

  23. [25] I agree with the defendant’s submission that the OS was one that should never have been brought. It was presented as an application under O 53 of the Rules of Court for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. However, there was in fact no genuine attempt by the plaintiffs to seek any form of prerogative relief in the OS and, given what had already transpired by the time the OS was filed, it was devoid of any proper legal or factual foundation.

  24. [27] Even if there were any lingering doubts about the matter, the affidavit filed by DAG Nair in the OS would have put matters beyond any serious argument. As already noted, DAG Nair explained that, as of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi, the SPS and the defendant’s chambers had implemented a policy that a prisoner’s correspondence will not be sent by the SPS to the defendant’s chambers unless the safeguards as set out in Gobi have been complied with (see [19] above). With that affidavit, any concerns about such correspondence being shown by the SPS to the defendant’s chambers should have been addressed. It would have driven home the point that there was no basis at all for the plaintiffs to still proceed to seek the Prohibtory Orders as reliefs.

  25. [32] Second, the court’s power to grant declaratory relief is discretionary in nature. Declarations will not be granted where there is no need for them, even if the court has the requisite jurisdiction to grant them (see, eg, Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1995] 3 SLR(R) 233 at [18]; Legis Point LLC v Tay Choon Ai [2018] 3 SLR 1269 at [35]). Given the legal proceedings that preceded the OS and the developments which transpired, it is clear that there was no necessity for the Declarations. Since Gobi, neither the defendant nor the SPS has taken the position that the defendant’s chambers has any legal right to copies of the correspondence of the prisoners in the custody of the SPS. As of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi, the SPS and the defendant’s chambers had also implemented a policy that a prisoner’s correspondence will not be sent by the SPS to the defendant’s chambers unless the safeguards in Gobi have been complied with (see [19] above). That being so, I cannot see how the plaintiffs would ever be granted leave under O 53 to seek the Declarations (see [16(a)]-[16(b)] above), even if one is to leave aside for the moment the question of whether there was any prerogative relief being sought in the OS.

  26. [35] In sum, it is quite clear that the OS was one that was “entirely devoid of legal foundation”. Since there was no genuine attempt by the plaintiffs to seek any form of prerogative relief, what the plaintiffs effectively sought in the OS were “freestanding” declarations, which are procedurally unsustainable as a matter of law under O 53. In any case, with the position as to the parties’ legal rights with respect to copies of the plaintiffs’ correspondence already settled in the earlier litigation, it was quite pointless for the plaintiffs to have embarked on this application for leave to seek judicial review over the same issue. As for the Private Law Reliefs, the plaintiffs are well entitled to bring any such civil claims against the defendant outside the purview of O 53, if they are of the view that any such claim is viable in law. However, to assert such private law claims under O 53 was simply untenable because there was no possibility of leave being granted for any of the plaintiffs to seek any form of prerogative relief.

  27. The plaintiffs’ counsel’s liability for costs

  28. [38] I also reject Mr Ravi’s submission that he was only taking a “cautious procedural approach” by filing the OS under O 53. An applicant for judicial review who seeks prerogative relief is limited to proceeding under O 53. On the other hand, an applicant who seeks declaratory relief is not so constrained – he may still proceed under O 53 if he wishes to also obtain prerogative relief by the same application, but if not, he may simply proceed under O 15 r 16 with less hassle (see Vellama ([30] above) at [53]). It would only have been open to the defendant to argue that the plaintiffs were circumventing O 53 if the relief which the plaintiffs were seeking leaves them with O 53 as the only available procedural option - that is, if they were seeking some form of prerogative relief in the OS. Conversely, if the plaintiffs were only seeking declarations but not any form of prerogative relief (as it was the case here, and which Mr Ravi well knew), there would have been no basis for the defendant to make that same argument because the plaintiffs’ procedural options would not have been similarly limited. If indeed Mr Ravi was genuinely in any doubt as to whether the defendant would take up any procedural objections about his preferred course of applying for the intended declaratory relief under O 15 r 16 rather than under O 53, he could have written to the defendant, before filing the OS, to seek clarification of the defendant’s position. Regrettably, this was not done.

  29. [39] Another reason Mr Ravi raised to explain the plaintiffs making an application under O 53 was that he claimed that they considered the Prohibitory Orders to be necessary because of the defendant’s “lack of contrition”. According to Mr Ravi, this made the plaintiffs doubt that “unlawful acts” in relation to their correspondence would not happen again. I do not accept Mr Ravi’s belated attempt to re-characterise what the plaintiffs were in substance seeking by filing the OS. This excuse plainly contradicted his earlier position in the supporting affidavit filed for the OS where he had stated that the Prohibitory Orders were not necessary (see [18] above). In any case, as I have explained earlier, there is no factual basis whatsoever for the Prohibitory Orders (see [26]-[27] above).

  30. [40] Further, the majority of the remedies sought in the OS (see [16(e)]-[16(i)] above) were based on some of the plaintiffs’ private law claims, including a claim for substantive damages for breach of confidence. That much is confirmed by Mr Ravi in his two affidavits filed in the OS. In such a situation, the proper course to take when one is not genuinely seeking any form of prerogative relief is not to file an application under O 53, but to proceed by way of a civil action against the defendant.

  31. [42] In any case, I find that any such expressions of concerns by the plaintiffs are not sufficient to show that there still remains a controversy to render the Declarations necessary. The defendant is not only the guardian of the public interest, but also an officer of the court. He must be expected to comply with the law, and with all court decisions as to what the law requires of him and of the government. There is no reason to doubt that the decision in Gobi ([9] above) on the rights to prisoners’ correspondence has been followed, as already confirmed by DAG Nair in his affidavit (see [19] above). As for the alleged “lack of contrition”, that is an irrelevant consideration, even if it were true. The law demands compliance in action, and not merely in words, thoughts or feelings.

  32. [43] Applying the three-step approach in Munshi Rasal ([2] above), I first find that Mr Ravi’s conduct was plainly unreasonable. Despite his recognition (and admission) that the plaintiffs had no basis for obtaining the Prohibitory Orders, and being well aware that the plaintiffs were in reality not seeking any prerogative reliefs in the OS, Mr Ravi filed the OS seeking leave to obtain the Declarations and the Private Law Reliefs. Given Mr Ravi’s years of experience in dealing with judicial review matters, and the fact that he was also counsel in Vellama ([30] above), he would have known that the latter two sets of reliefs prayed for in the OS were procedurally unsustainable as a matter of law (see [30] and [33] above). A solicitor should not be held to have acted unreasonably simply because he acted for a client who has a bad case, but it would be quite different if a solicitor gives his assistance to proceedings which are an abuse of process (Tan King Hiang ([3] above) at [20]). In my judgment, there is no doubt that the present case falls within the latter situation as the OS was a wholly ill-conceived application which Mr Ravi could have had no justification to file on behalf of the plaintiffs given its total absence of any legal foundation (see also Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v King, Ann Rita and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 1 at [76]).