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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Sep 2021

Court of Appeal

Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor

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[2021] SGCA 89Case no. Criminal Motion No 21 of 202140 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] Generally, the issuance of a final judgment by this Court brings an end to the legal process available to parties in relation to a criminal conviction or sentence. Whilst the law provides an avenue to review a concluded criminal appeal, it is not disputed that this is an extremely limited avenue. In fact, the Applicant acknowledged that he would not be able to seek leave to make a review application under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), as the Applicant’s constitutional arguments would not presently satisfy the requirement that the Judgment was demonstrably wrong.

  3. [3] In addition, the Applicant also recognised that he would no longer be able to bring a constitutional challenge against s 300(a) of the Penal Code by way of an originating summons in the High Court. Such an application would constitute an abuse of process because it would be invoking the civil jurisdiction of the court to mount a collateral attack on a decision made by the court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction.

  4. [4] We observe that these two acknowledgments are not controversial as they are the consequences arising from the principle of finality. Confronted with this situation, the Applicant filed the present application, CA/CM 21/2021 (“CM 21”) for leave to intervene in a completely unrelated criminal proceeding, namely, CA/CCA 36/2020 (“CCA 36”). The ostensible purpose of the leave application was to enable the Applicant to raise an additional argument to support the constitutional challenge mounted to ss 299 and 300(a) by the appellant in CCA 36, Teo Ghim Heng (“Teo”). If the challenge by Teo is successful, the Applicant intends to use that decision to mount a review application under s 394H of the CPC.

  5. [5] We heard and dismissed the application on 16 August 2021. In our view, this Court has no jurisdiction to permit the Applicant to intervene in an unrelated criminal appeal on account of his interest in the point of law under consideration in CCA 36. Litigants, including accused persons, do not have a right to intervene in an unrelated pending proceeding just because they have a common interest in a point of law which is being considered in that proceeding. To hold otherwise would open the floodgates to litigation, as a point of law canvassed in almost any given case may ultimately affect the decision of any other case. But that, in our view, is merely a function of the common law and not a licence to intervene.

  6. Brief procedural history

  7. [6] As mentioned above, the Applicant was convicted by the High Court of two counts of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty.

  8. [7] On appeal, the Applicant challenged his convictions on the basis that his actions did not show an intention to cause death, but merely reflected an intention to cause injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death under s 300(c) of the Penal Code. He also relied on three exceptions under s 300 of the Penal Code, namely, (a) Exception 2 (private defence); (b) Exception 4 (sudden fight); and (c) Exception 7 (diminished responsibility).

  9. [8] On 3 February 2017, this Court dismissed the Applicant’s appeal and issued the Judgment. More than a year later, on 14 February 2018, the Applicant wrote to the Law Society to file a complaint against his trial counsel alleging that they had failed to comply with his instructions in the conduct of his defence. A four-member Inquiry Committee unanimously recommended that no formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal was necessary and that the complaint should be dismissed. The Council of the Law Society (“Council”) thus informed the Applicant, by way of a letter dated 20 March 2019, that the Law Society would not take further action on his complaint.

  10. The parties’ submissions

  11. The Applicant’s submissions

  12. [11] The Applicant averred that he had filed CM 21 because there was no other avenue for him to obtain the relief he sought. As highlighted above, he acknowledged that he could not have brought a constitutional challenge against ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code. Nor could he have obtained leave to make a review application under s 394H of the CPC as his constitutional arguments would not presently satisfy the requirement that the Judgment was demonstrably wrong.

  13. [12] In relation to procedure, the Applicant argued that he was correct in filing a criminal motion to seek leave to intervene in CCA 36. Citing Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 841 (“Amarjeet Singh”), the Applicant argued that CM 21 was brought to seek relief ancillary to the conduct of a primary criminal action, namely CCA 36 (being an action that invoked the appellate criminal jurisdiction of the court).

  14. [13] The Applicant further contended that the court had the jurisdiction and/or powers to grant the orders sought under s 6 of the CPC, which allows the court to adopt “such procedure as the justice of the case may require, and which is not inconsistent with [the CPC] or such other law”, as regards matters of criminal procedure for which no special provision has been made. In this connection, the Applicant submitted that the court could adopt a procedure modelled after the rules for intervention in civil actions provided under O 15 rr 6(2)(b)(ii) and 6(3) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”).

  15. [14] Finally, the Applicant argued that this Court should exercise its powers in favour of granting the relief that he seeks, as he would satisfy the requirements under O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) of the ROC if they were adapted for the criminal context. Furthermore, the Applicant’s intervention would not be redundant or unnecessary as he seeks to raise an argument on the constitutionality of ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code which has not been raised by Teo in CCA 36. In particular, he seeks to argue that ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code violate Article 12 of the Constitution on the basis that an offender convicted under s 299 has a “right to mitigate”, whereas an offender convicted under s 300(a) would have no such right, even though the requirements for the two offences overlap.

  16. The Prosecution’s submissions

  17. [15] The Prosecution submitted that the Applicant’s motion did not validly invoke the court’s criminal jurisdiction. The Applicant was not involved in any proceedings over which the court could exercise criminal jurisdiction, as this Court had already dismissed his appeal against his conviction and there were no pending criminal proceedings involving him. The mere fact that the Applicant took an interest in the arguments being made in CCA 36 was insufficient to overcome the fact that his application lacked any jurisdictional basis. If the Applicant’s contentions were accepted, an offender who had already exhausted his legal options would be allowed to completely bypass the strict conditions governing review applications under s 394H of the CPC and mount a collateral attack on the correctness of his conviction.

  18. [16] In any event, the Prosecution argued, there were no compelling or principled reasons to justify the Applicant’s intended intervention even if this Court was prepared to overlook the absence of jurisdictional basis for his application. Section 6 of the CPC was also of no assistance to the Applicant as his intended intervention in CCA 36 would be inconsistent with the CPC. Nor were there any exceptional circumstances that necessitated the court exercising its inherent powers in the Applicant’s favour. There were sufficient safeguards to ensure that all arguments going towards the constitutionality of ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code would be fully ventilated and, if the Applicant or his counsel truly believed that they could add value to the proceedings, there was nothing to stop them from sharing their arguments with the counsel in CCA 36.

  19. Issues to be determined

  20. [17] Having regard to the parties’ submissions, the sole issue before us was whether this Court had the jurisdiction to grant leave to the Applicant to intervene in CCA 36.

  21. Analysis

  22. The court’s criminal jurisdiction

  23. [18] A court’s jurisdiction refers to “its authority, however derived, to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it”: Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 (“Re Nalpon Zero”) at [13], citing Muhd Munir v Noor Hidah and other applications [1990] 2 SLR(R) 348 at [19]. This Court’s criminal jurisdiction is statutorily conferred by s 60D of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), which provides:

  24. [19] Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) above can generally be categorised into matters falling within the court’s original, appellate, revisionary or supervisory criminal jurisdiction: Amarjeet Singh at [14].

  25. [20] Beyond matters which directly invoke the four types of jurisdiction set out above, the court also has the jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for specific reliefs which are incidental to or supportive of a primary action invoking its original, appellate or revisionary criminal jurisdiction: Amarjeet Singh at [34]. In such a case, the court, in hearing the application, would simply be invoking (albeit indirectly) its original, appellate or revisionary jurisdiction (as the case may be). Examples of these applications include applications to vary bail, extend time for steps to be taken or adduce further evidence, which are invariably brought by way of criminal motion. In each instance, the subject-matter of the motion is “fundamentally tethered” to the conduct of the primary action, in the sense that it goes towards ensuring that the correct outcome is reached in that action: Amarjeet Singh at [27]. However, it was plain and obvious that the present application did not directly invoke the court’s original, appellate, revisionary or supervisory criminal jurisdiction. Nor was it incidental to or supportive of a primary action falling within the court’s criminal jurisdiction.

  26. [23] We agreed with the Prosecution’s submission that to grant the Applicant’s intended intervention would be tantamount to allowing an offender who had already exhausted his appeal options to completely bypass the strict conditions governing review applications under s 394H of the CPC and to mount a collateral attack on the correctness of his conviction. This would amount to an unprincipled circumvention of the safeguards in the CPC.

  27. [24] Given the above, we were of the view that CM 21 was entirely without jurisdictional basis and also procedurally improper in so far as it had been brought by way of a criminal motion.

  28. Whether the court may allow intervention in criminal proceedings under s 6 of the CPC

  29. [25] In the Applicant’s quest to identify a jurisdictional basis to ground CM 21, he invited this Court to adopt O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) of the ROC which provides as follows:

  30. [26] The Applicant submitted that this Court has the power to adopt the procedure in O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) by virtue of s 6 of the CPC which provides:

  31. [27] The Prosecution argued that granting leave for a third party to intervene in appellate criminal proceedings would be inconsistent with the CPC and therefore could not be allowed under s 6 of the CPC. In support of this argument, the Prosecution relied on two provisions (namely, ss 377(1) and 387 of the CPC) which, in the Prosecution’s view, indicated that third parties would not be permitted to intervene in a criminal appeal. The material portions of these two provisions are reproduced below:

  32. [29] In any event, we found it unhelpful to examine the propriety of intervention in criminal proceedings by narrowly focusing on the issue as to whether O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) is “inconsistent with” the CPC. Even if O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) were not inconsistent with the CPC, it did not necessarily follow that it should be adopted in criminal proceedings. Focusing on whether the adoption of O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) is inconsistent with the CPC would completely overlook the more fundamental inquiry as to whether the adoption of O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) is required by the “justice of the case”, which is also a precondition to the invocation of s 6 of the CPC.

  33. [30] We briefly examine several cases where s 6 of the CPC has been successfully invoked to determine how our courts have previously applied the “justice of the case” requirement. In Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”), this Court considered that the wide scope of s 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed), which was the precursor to s 6 of the CPC, supported the imposition of a duty on the Prosecution to disclose a limited amount of unused material, where no such statutory obligation to do so was prescribed in either version of the CPC. In Kadar, this Court held that the reference to what “the justice of the case may require” must include “procedures that uphold established notions of a fair trial in an adversarial setting where [such procedures are] not already part of the written law” (at [105]). Thus, the invocation of s 6 of the CPC to impose a duty on the Prosecution to disclose a limited amount of unused material was warranted because “[t]o hold that there is no such legal obligation would be to effectively sanction unscrupulous methods of prosecution with the court’s stamp of approval” (at [110]). Subsequently, in Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984 (“Nabill”), this Court held that the Prosecution ought to be under a duty to disclose a material witness’ statement to the defence, pursuant to s 6 of the CPC (at [40]). The court found that it would not “reflect a satisfactory balance between ensuring fairness to the accused person on the one hand, and preserving the adversarial nature of the trial process on the other”, if such statements were not disclosed (at [47]).

  34. [31] Another case where the court accepted that it would have been appropriate to invoke s 6 of the CPC is Public Prosecutor v Goldring Timothy Nicholas and others [2014] 1 SLR 586 (“Goldring (CA)”). In that case, this Court held, in obiter, that if there had been no common law right permitting an accused person access to documents over which he had ownership or legal custody or a legal right to control immediately before the lawful seizure, such a right to access would have been recognised pursuant to s 6 of the CPC. This Court observed (at [85]) that the “adoption of a procedure in the context of s 6 amounted (in substance and even form) to the promulgation of a new common law rule (albeit made in the context of a gap in the criminal procedure laid down in a statute)”. The court also endorsed the High Court’s reasoning in the decision below that allowing an accused person access to such documents would be “entirely consistent with notions of a fair trial” and that, if a common law right of access did not exist, it would have been in the interests of justice to recognise the existence of this right pursuant to s 6 of the CPC: see Goldring Timothy Nicholas and others v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 SLR 487 (“Goldring (HC)”) at [74] and [78], endorsed in Goldring (CA) at [85].

  35. [33] Turning back to the facts of the present case, it was our view that allowing intervention in criminal proceedings was not required by the “justice of the case”. Indeed, instead of ensuring that a fair trial would be conducted, the intervention procedure being sought to be introduced would be susceptible to abuse. We elaborate on the reasons for our view below, with reference to both unrelated and related criminal proceedings.

  36. [34] In so far as unrelated criminal proceedings are concerned, we have already explained at [21]–[23] above that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant leave to an unrelated party to intervene even if the applicant has an interest in a point of law under consideration. As such, an application for intervention in an unrelated criminal proceeding cannot be necessary for the purposes of justice. Nor can there be any question of injustice arising from the denial of such an application.

  37. [36] This notwithstanding, we note that there is no precedent or legislative mechanism allowing a party – even a related party – to intervene in another criminal proceeding, save in one very limited exception. That exception is the Attorney-General’s power to intervene in private prosecutions, as provided for under s 13 of the CPC and reflected in Art 35(8) of the Constitution (see Attorney-General v Tee Kok Boon [2008] 2 SLR(R) 412; Cheng William v Loo Ngee Long Edmund [2001] 2 SLR(R) 626 at [15]–[17]). This stems from the Attorney-General’s “unique and integral role as the guardian of the public interest vis-à-vis the institution and conduct of all criminal proceedings” (Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246 at [53]).

  38. [37] It appears to us that the complete absence of any prior attempt by an accused person to intervene in another criminal proceeding can be attributed to one very sensible reason. Although intervention allows the applicant intervener to participate in another criminal proceeding, the outcome of that proceeding would not determine the applicant’s criminal liability. This is because s 132 of the CPC provides that, subject to exceptions such as that of joint trials, there must be a separate charge for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, and every charge must be tried separately. As such, where an accused person intervenes in another criminal proceeding, he still has to be separately tried for each of the charges that he faces and is not bound by the outcome of the intervention. Unlike in a civil proceeding where intervention allows the court to determine any question or issue arising between the intervenor and any party to the cause or matter (see O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) of the ROC), intervention in a criminal proceeding serves no such purpose. Intervention may also be a fruitless endeavour where, for instance, the Prosecution chooses to run a different case against the applicant, or the applicant’s liability is based on certain grounds which are not in issue in the proceedings in which intervention is sought. In such instances, the applicant’s intervention may not help to advance his own case. Furthermore, if the case against the applicant proceeds after the intervention is spent, the conduct of the case against such an applicant may be subject to subsequent events or developments which may or may not be anticipated in the criminal proceeding in which the applicant intervened.

  39. [38] The fact that intervention does not determine the applicant’s criminal liability also means that it is potentially subject to abuse. Instead of applying for a joint trial, an offender might seek to intervene in a related criminal proceeding for strategic reasons, such as to obtain a preview of the Prosecution’s evidence, the cross-examination questions and the reaction and responses of the judge which the offender would be expected to face in his or her own separate trial. This may lead to offenders tailoring their evidence with the benefit not of hindsight but of foresight.

  40. [40] In the present case, the only reason given by the Applicant to justify his intervention was that he would be able to raise an additional argument to support Teo’s constitutional challenge in CCA 36, ie, that ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code violate Article 12 in that an offender convicted under s 299 has a “right to mitigate”, whereas an offender convicted under s 300(a) would have no right to do so, even though the requirements for the two offences overlap. However, this purported justification suffered from a serious drawback. It ignored the fact that it is the prerogative of Teo and his counsel to decide on the arguments which should be placed before the court in CCA 36. Teo may wish to disassociate himself from the “additional” argument for whatever reason. But if he chooses to adopt it, there is no reason why that argument cannot be made by his own counsel.

  41. [41] In this connection, we note that similar observations have been made in the context of intervention in appellate civil proceedings. The applicable provision in this regard is O 57 r 10 of the ROC, which empowers the Court of Appeal to direct that the record of appeal and cases be served on any person who is not a party to the appeal proceedings, and to allow that person’s participation in the appeal. The principles governing O 57 r 10 were recently clarified in Golden Hill Capital Pte Ltd and others v Yihua Lifestyle Technology Co, Ltd and another [2021] SGCA 85, where this Court endorsed (at [51]) the following remarks by the English Court of Appeal in Berg v Glentworth Bulb Company Ltd (English Court of Appeal, 30 September 1988, unreported) in the context of the UK equivalent of O 57 r 10:

  42. [42] Therefore, the justification for the Applicant’s interest to intervene in CCA 36 could simply be addressed by the Applicant sharing the “additional” argument with Teo’s counsel and leaving it to him to decide whether it should be adopted. After all, the Applicant has no right to unilaterally impose the “additional” argument on Teo in the latter’s appeal in CCA 36.

  43. [43] In the circumstances, the justice of any criminal case would not justify intervention in related or unrelated criminal proceedings, a fortiori in appellate criminal proceedings.

  44. [44] Furthermore, even if the Applicant’s case was taken at its highest and it was assumed that O 15 r 6 of the ROC could be adopted in criminal appellate proceedings (which we disagree with for the reasons set out above), the Applicant would not have satisfied the requirements under that provision.

  45. [45] In applying O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) of the ROC, the court must undertake a two-step inquiry (Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compania De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“Ernest Ferdinand”) at [84]):

  46. (a) First, the court must ascertain whether there exists a question or issue having the requisite relationship with the main dispute. This is the non-discretionary stage of the inquiry.

  47. [46] In our view, the Applicant failed to satisfy the first element of the non-discretionary stage because there was simply no “question or issue” between him and any party to CCA 36. The Applicant’s appeal had long been concluded, and there were no live or existing criminal proceedings against him. Thus, there was no “question or issue” between him and the Public Prosecutor, who is the respondent in CCA 36. Similarly, there was no “question or issue” between the Applicant and Teo, who is the appellant in CCA 36. The Applicant’s case and Teo’s case are factually unrelated and they are not involved in any proceedings with each other.

  48. [47] Even assuming that there was a live issue between the Applicant and the Public Prosecutor as to whether ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code are constitutional, we did not think that such an issue could bear the requisite relationship with the relief or remedy claimed in CCA 36.

  49. [48] At the hearing before us, counsel for the Applicant cited Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2020) (“Singapore Civil Procedure”) in support of his argument that the Applicant could rely on O 15 r 6(2)(b) to seek intervention in the present case. With respect, however, that authority did not assist the Applicant as the authors of Singapore Civil Procedure comment, at para 15/6/2, that the purpose of O 15 r 6(2) is to empower the court to “secure the determination of all disputes relating to the same subject matter, without the delay and expense of separate actions” [emphasis added]. As to what the phrase “subject matter” entails, the authors go on to state (at para 15/6/8) that O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) “is not wide enough to permit joinder of a party who is merely interested in the case in so far as it determines a question of law” [emphasis added].

  50. Conclusion

  51. [52] For the reasons set out above, we were satisfied that there was no merit in the relief sought by the Applicant and we therefore dismissed CM 21 in its entirety.