General Division of the High Court · Decided 5 December 2024
Claimants could not add claims for losses suffered overseas to their libel action
Maag, Daniel and another v Lalit Kumar Modi
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 311 · Case no. Originating Claim No 660 of 2023 (Registrar’s Appeal No 77 of 2024)
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Claimants could not add claims for losses suffered overseas to their libel action
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [150], [6]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] HC/RA 77/2024 (“RA 77”) is an appeal by the defendant in HC/OC 660/2023 (“OC 660”) against the decision of the learned AR in HC/SUM 3888/2023 (“SUM 3888”). SUM 3888 was an interlocutory application by the claimants to amend their statement of claim in OC 660. The learned AR allowed the application in SUM 3888. The defendant, being dissatisfied with the AR’s decision, has appealed.
Facts
The parties
- [2]
[2] The defendant in OC 660 is Mr Lalit Kumar Modi (“Mr Modi”), whom the claimants aver is an Indian national. Mr Modi is the appellant in the present appeal. It is common ground between the parties that Mr Modi runs a page on the social media platform “X”, which had 3.8 million followers at the material time (the “Twitter Page”). Mr Modi also runs a page on the social media platform “Instagram”, which had 5.2 million followers at the material time (the “Instagram Page”).
- [3]
[3] The first and second claimants in OC 660 are Mr Daniel Maag (“Mr Maag”) and Mrs Gurpreet Gill Maag (“Mrs Maag”), respectively. Mr and Mrs Maag are hereinafter referred to as the Maags. The Maags are married to each other and are the respondents in this appeal. Mr Maag, a Swiss national, is a private banking and wealth management professional based in Singapore. He is resident in Singapore and is engaged in his vocation in Singapore. The Maags aver that Mrs Maag is an Indian national and notable venture capitalist. According to the Maags, Mrs Maag is resident in, and conducts her business principally in, Singapore.
Background to the dispute
- [4]
[4] It is accepted by the parties that on 5 May 2023, Mr Modi published a post on the Twitter Page (the “Litigation Post”). The precise contents of the Litigation Post are immaterial for the purpose of this appeal. The Maags aver, and Mr Modi does not admit, that the Litigation Post was also published by Mr Modi on the Instagram Page on or around 5 May 2023. The Maags aver that the Litigation Post contained: (a) malicious falsehoods directed against the Maags; and (b) defamatory material directed against the Maags.
- [5]
[5] It is also accepted by the parties that on or around 5 May 2023, Mr Modi published another post on the Twitter Page (the “Political Hatred Post”). The Maags aver that the Political Hatred Post contained: (a) malicious falsehoods directed against the Maags; and (b) defamatory material directed against the Maags.
Procedural history
- [6]
[6] On 28 September 2023, the Maags filed OC 660 against Mr Modi. OC 660 was the Maags’ action against Mr Modi for libel and malicious falsehood based on the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post.
- [7]
[7] On the same day, the Maags sought leave to serve the originating claim and statement of claim in OC 660 on Mr Modi in the United Kingdom (ie, out of jurisdiction). Leave to effect service out of jurisdiction was granted.
- [8]
[8] On 28 December 2023, the Maags filed SUM 3888 for leave to amend their statement of claim. Mr Modi objected to two amendments which would have amended the SOC to plead that the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Posts were published in India and/or the United Kingdom in addition to Singapore.
The parties’ cases below
- [9]
[9] In SUM 3888, Mr Modi objected to the proposed amendments on several grounds. First, such amendments would not enable the real issue in controversy to be determined as they were liable to be struck out for being an abuse of process. The Maags were required to limit their claims in defamation and malicious falsehood to damage suffered in Singapore. It was argued on the authority of Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 (“Review Publishing”) that it would be an abuse of the court’s jurisdiction for a claimant to seek relief for publication and damage to reputation occurring in other jurisdictions. Further, the court had no jurisdiction under O 8 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) to grant leave for service out of jurisdiction in respect of a tort which occurred in a foreign jurisdiction with no nexus to Singapore. It was argued that the Maags had only obtained permission for service out of jurisdiction by repeatedly emphasising that their claim was based on the alleged publication of the relevant posts in Singapore. It thus followed that the Maags should not be allowed to amend their claim, after having obtained permission for service out of jurisdiction, to seek relief for publication and damage that occurred outside of Singapore.
- [10]
[10] Second, it was argued that the relevant amendments should not be allowed as the Maags failed to obtain the court’s approval to apply to make such amendments. Specifically, the Maags did not inform the court that they intended to make the relevant amendments to widen their claims in OC 660, when they sought approval to file SUM 3888. The relevant amendments were not stated in the Maags’ Form B9 and letter to the court dated 18 December 2023.
- [12]
[12] Second, the Maags argued that they had never limited their claims to publication of the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post in Singapore. The language of the Maags’ statement of claim and affidavit in support of their application for service out of jurisdiction did not limit the Maags’ case to damages sustained in Singapore and publication of the relevant posts in Singapore.
- [13]
[13] Third, the fact that the Maags had not reflected the relevant amendments in their Form B9 was not fatal to their amendment application. Form B9 merely required the Maags to state the nature of the application sought, ie, that it was an application to amend their statement of claim. This requirement had been fulfilled by the Maags.
- [14]
[14] Fourth, even if the Maags had to confine themselves to damage suffered in Singapore, the damage suffered by the Maags occurred in Singapore as they were resident in Singapore.
- [15]
[15] Fifth, even if the Maags had obtained permission to serve the defendant out of jurisdiction on the basis that damage was only suffered in Singapore, the Maags were entitled to re-apply for leave to effect service out of jurisdiction.
- [16]
[16] After written submissions were tendered below, the learned AR directed the parties to file additional submissions to address paragraph 19.3 of Doris Chia, Defamation: Principles and Procedure in Singapore and Malaysia (LexisNexis, 2016) (“Doris Chia”) and the two Australian authorities cited at footnote 10 of the same paragraph.
- [17]
[17] The Maags consequently argued that paragraph 19.3 of Doris Chia supported the view that a claimant could bring defamation and malicious prosecution claims for: (a) publication made overseas; and (b) damage sustained overseas arising from such overseas publication. This was supported by the Australian case of Toomey v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 173 (“Toomey”), which was cited at footnote 10 of paragraph 19.3 of Doris Chia. While the subsequent case of David Syme & Co Ltd v Grey (1992) 115 ALR 247 (“David Syme”) appeared to depart from the position in Toomey, the decision in David Syme was based on the specific wording of an Australian statute and should not be followed in Singapore.
- [18]
[18] In response, Mr Modi submitted that paragraph 19.3 of Doris Chia was not written in the context of a claimant seeking leave to effect service out of jurisdiction. Rather, para 19.3 was confined to scenarios where a defendant was served within jurisdiction. It would run counter to the principles in Review Publishing if damage from foreign publication could be claimed under damages for a local publication. It would be too easy for a claimant to circumvent the principles in Review Publishing as such claimants could simply pursue foreign publication under the claim for damages for a local publication, instead of pursuing foreign publication as a separate cause of action. The unsatisfactory nature of such a position was recognised by the English court in Clarke (t/a Elumina Iberica UK) v Bain [2008] EWHC 2636 (QB) (“Clarke v Bain”) at [66]. It was also submitted that Toomey and David Syme did not form part of Singapore law and should not be followed as they run contrary to the principles in Review Publishing.
Decision below
- [19]
[19] The learned AR applied the three-step analytical framework for the amendment of pleadings as stated by Goh Yihan JC (as he then was) in Wang Piao v Lee Wee Ching [2024] 4 SLR 540 (“Wang Piao”). Nothing turned on the first step of the framework as SUM 3888 was taken out early in the proceedings.
- [20]
[20] In relation to the second step of the Wang Piao framework, the AR held that the Maags’ proposed amendments would enable the real questions or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. First, Review Publishing was decided under a previous iteration of the Rules of Court. However, the jurisdictional gateways under the old Rules of Court are now found under paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021, which is non-exhaustive in nature. Second, while Review Publishing cited Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 for the proposition that each instance of publication gives rise to a separate tort, the separate tort thesis had been legislatively overruled in England by s 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 (c 26) (“UK Defamation Act”). This created some uncertainty over the applicability of the principles espoused in the older line of cases cited by the court in Review Publishing. Third, it was unclear whether the position stated in Review Publishing remained good law in the light of the English decision of FS Cairo and the local decision rendered in IM Skaugen SE and another v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE and another [2018] SGHC 123 (“IM Skaugen(HC)”). While an amendment would not be allowed if it was liable to be struck out in any event, the proposed amendments could not be said to be “plainly or obviously unsustainable”. As the law was unclear, the Maags should not be shut out from seeking relief for publication or damages occurring outside of Singapore. Accordingly, the second step of the Wang Piao framework was satisfied.
- [22]
[22] The court held that the Maags had never restricted themselves by stating that the publication of the relevant posts only occurred in Singapore or that damages only occurred in Singapore. There was no evidence of bad faith by the Maags. Further, while the proposed amendments were not specifically identified in the Maags’ request for permission to file the amendment application, the Maags were not faulted as they merely had to state the nature and essence of their intended amendment application, and they had done so.
The revised statement of claim
- [24]
[24] During the hearing of RA 77 on 17 May 2024, I allowed the Maags to furnish a revised draft statement of claim for the purposes of RA 77 (the “Revised Statement of Claim”). The statement of claim that the Maags initially relied on did not appear to me to achieve the objective that the Maags sought to achieve through SUM 3888. Bearing in mind the ideals enshrined in the ROC 2021, I allowed the Maags to rely on a revised draft statement of claim in the interests of expediency and the efficient use of court resources. I now summarise the amendments sought by the Maags in the Revised Statement of Claim. However, given the convoluted manner in which the Revised Statement of Claim has been pleaded, the following paragraphs merely set out a summary of the Maags’ claims and are not intended to be exhaustive.
- [25]
[25] The Revised Statement of Claim seeks to claim the following in relation to the claims in malicious falsehood for the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post:
(a) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage to Mr Maag and/or Mrs Maag in respect of each of their trades or businesses in Singapore (“A1”). In this regard, the Maags rely on s 6(1)(a) and/or s 6(1)(b) of the Defamation Act 1957.
(b) That the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage to and/or damage to the reputations of Mr Maag and/or Mrs Maag in India and/or the United Kingdom (“A2”). The Maags rely on the fact that each of them has an overseas reputation which has been damaged overseas by the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom. The Maags plead, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, that the following are “elements of their overseas reputations”:
(i) Mr Maag has forged his career on the basis of a global network of Indians and/or persons of other nationalities which he has built up. Such persons from Mr Maag’s overseas network have social and/or professional ties to Mr Maag. Further and/or in the alternative, some of those persons have social and/or commercial ties to Singapore where Mr Maag is resident. Further and/or in the alternative, Mr Maag’s overseas reputation includes any or all of the elements comprising Mrs Maag’s overseas reputation by virtue of his marriage to her and/or introduction to her network thereby.
(ii) Mrs Maag has a reputation with persons resident in India and/or the United Kingdom and/or Singapore. Mrs Maag has leveraged her reputation with such individuals to build her social and/or business network upon which her business interests are based, which includes her business as a venture capitalist and/or entrepreneur in Singapore. Further and/or in the alternative, various members of Mrs Maag’s social and/or business network have ties to Singapore.
(c) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause Mr Maag and/or Mrs Maag to suffer pecuniary and/or reputational damage in Singapore (“A3”). In this context, and by virtue of the facts stated at [25(b)(i)]–[25(b)(ii)] above, the Maags rely on their overseas reputation for the purposes of their vocation/business in Singapore and/or social reputation in Singapore. Thus, damage sustained to the Maags’ reputations in India and/or the United Kingdom through the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom gives rise to reputational damage and/or pecuniary damage in Singapore. Further and/or in the alternative, the Maags rely on s 6(1)(a) and/or s 6(1)(b) of the Defamation Act 1957 in so far as those provisions are applicable to any of the publications in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom.
- [26]
[26] The Revised Statement of Claim seeks to claim the following in relation to the claims in libel for the Litigation Post and the Political Hatred Post:
(a) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom caused Mr Maag and/or Mrs Maag to suffer reputational damage in Singapore, as well as distress and hurt to their feelings (“B1”). Further and/or in the alternative, the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage and/or reputational damage to the Maags in Singapore. In this regard, the Maags rely on their overseas reputation for the purposes of their vocation/business in Singapore and/or social reputation in Singapore. The Maags rely on the facts stated at [25(b)(i)]–[25(b)(ii)] above. Thus, damage sustained to the Maags’ reputations in India and/or the United Kingdom through the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom gives rise to reputational damage and/or pecuniary damage in Singapore. Further and/or in the alternative, the Maags rely on s 6(1)(a) and/or s 6(1)(b) of the Defamation Act 1957 in so far as those provisions are applicable to any of the publications in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom.
(b) That the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom caused Mr Maag and/or Mrs Maag to suffer reputational damage in India and/or the United Kingdom, and each of them to suffer distress and hurt to their feelings (“B2”). The Maags rely on the fact that each of them has an overseas reputation which has been damaged by the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom. The Maags also rely on the facts stated at [25(b)(i)]–[25(b)(ii)] above.
(c) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause the Maags to suffer pecuniary damage in respect of each of their trades or businesses in Singapore (“B3”). The Maags rely on s 6(1)(a) and/or s 6(1)(b) of the Defamation Act 1957.
(d) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause the Maags to suffer pecuniary damage in India and/or the United Kingdom and/or Singapore (“B4”). In this regard, the Maags also plead and rely on the following facts:
(i) That the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage to and/or reputational damage to the Maags in India and/or the United Kingdom. The Maags rely on the fact that each of them has an overseas reputation which has been damaged overseas by the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom. The Maags also rely on the facts stated at [25(b)(i)]–[25(b)(ii)] above.
(ii) That the publication of the posts in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage and reputational damage to the Maags in Singapore. The Maags also plead the following particulars:
(A) The Maags rely on their overseas reputation for the purposes of their vocation/business in Singapore and/or social reputation in Singapore. The Maags rely on the facts stated at [25(b)(i)]–[25(b)(ii)] above. Thus, damage to the Maags’ reputations in India and/or the United Kingdom through the publication of the posts in India and/or the United Kingdom gives rise to reputational damage and/or pecuniary damage in Singapore.
(B) The Maags rely on s 6(1)(a) and/or s 6(1)(b) of the Defamation Act 1957 in so far as those provisions are applicable to any of the publications in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom.
- [27]
[27] The Revised Statement of Claim also seeks to plead the following:
(a) That, for the purposes of a claim for malicious falsehood, the Litigation Post was published in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom (“C1”).
(b) That, for the purposes of a claim for libel, the Litigation Post was published in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom (“C2”).
(c) That, for the purposes of a claim for malicious falsehood, the Political Hatred Post was published in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom (“C3”).
(d) That, for the purposes of a claim for libel, the Political Hatred Post was published in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom (“C4”).
(e) That, for the claims in malicious falsehood and libel in relation to the Political Hatred Post and Litigation Post, the Maags are entitled to damages sustained overseas (“D”).
- [28]
[28] C1 and C3 are the initial amendments that were disputed by the parties below. It appears that C1–C4 set out the underlying facts that will allow amendments A1–A3, B1–B4 and D to be pleaded, ie, they plead the fact of republication outside of Singapore.
- [29]
[29] For completeness, the Maags also propose to amend certain headers in the Revised Statement of Claim. The Maags also seek an amendment to particularise the aggravation of their damages through the grapevine effect. Mr Modi generally does not object to these amendments, save for one amendment at para 65.6 of the Revised Statement of Claim (“E”) that I will return to later (see [151] below).
The parties’ cases on appeal
- [30]
[30] Given the somewhat unusual manner in which these proceedings have unfolded, I will first discuss the parties’ initial arguments on C1 and C3 (which are equally applicable to C2 and C4). Thereafter, I will briefly summarise the parties’ additional arguments on A1–A3 and B1–B4.
Amendments C1–C4
Mr Modi’s arguments
- [31]
[31] On appeal, Mr Modi advances largely the same arguments as he did below. As a preliminary matter, Mr Modi’s position is that he does not object to the amendments in so far as they relate to foreign publication which caused damage to the Maags in Singapore. However, Mr Modi objects to the amendments in so far as they relate to foreign publication which caused damage to the Maags entirely outside of Singapore. He raises the following arguments.
- [32]
[32] First, he submits that the proposed amendments should not be allowed as they are liable to be struck out. He argues that the Maags are required to limit their claims to publication and loss of reputation in Singapore. Mr Modi contends that Review Publishing is authority for the proposition that, for the purposes of a claim for defamation arising from material posted online, a claimant who seeks leave to serve the claim out of jurisdiction on a foreign defendant should be limited to claiming for injuries arising within the home jurisdiction. As each publication is a separate tort for the purposes of defamation and malicious falsehood, a claimant who sues in respect of the publication of a post in foreign jurisdictions is thus suing in respect of injury arising abroad. If the claim was expanded to include publications and loss of reputation outside of Singapore, those claims would have no nexus to Singapore and would be outside of the court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, the proposed amendments would be liable to be struck out for being an abuse of process.
- [33]
[33] Second, Mr Modi contends that Review Publishing is still good law even though it was decided under the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2006”). A claimant who seeks leave to serve a court document out of Singapore under O 8 r 1(1) ROC 2021 must show that the court is the “appropriate court to hear the action”. This still requires the claimant to establish, amongst other requirements, that “there is a good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore”. The requirement for a “nexus to Singapore” is consistent with the principles espoused in Review Publishing, notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdictional gateways under paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021 are now listed as “non-exhaustive”. Accordingly, a claimant who seeks to sue a foreign defendant for defamation in proceedings governed by the ROC 2021 cannot include publications outside of Singapore that do not cause loss in Singapore. Such claims would not have “sufficient nexus to Singapore”.
- [34]
[34] Third, it follows as a matter of logic that if a claimant cannot obtain permission to effect service out of jurisdiction for a claim relating to publication and damage incurred outside of Singapore, he should not be allowed to amend his claim to seek such relief after he has obtained permission to effect service out of jurisdiction.
- [35]
[35] Fourth, Mr Modi submits that the AR erred in his criticism of Review Publishing for the following reasons:
(a) The separate tort thesis had not been legislatively overruled in England. Section 8 of the UK Defamation Act only provides for a “single publication rule” for the purposes of the law of limitation. It does not overrule the common law principle that in the law of defamation and malicious falsehood, each publication gives rise to a separate tort. The English Court of Appeal had recently upheld the separate tort thesis in Banks v Cadwalladr [2023] 3 WLR 167 (“Cadwalladr”). In any event, the separate tort thesis has not been overruled in Singapore.
(b) There is no conflict between Review Publishing and IM Skaugen(HC). While the court in IM Skaugen(HC) held that the jurisdictional gateway under O 11 r 1(f)(ii) of the ROC 2014 allowed a claimant to claim for “indirect damage”, this holding was made in the context of damage flowing from the single tort of misrepresentation. Mr Modi argues that the court’s reasoning does not apply to the present case, which involves claims for several separate torts where some torts cause damage in Singapore and others do not. Further, the Court of Appeal in MAN Diesel & Turbo SE v IM Skaugen SE [2020] 1 SLR 327 (“IM Skaugen(CA)”) held that each claim had to be considered separately for the purposes of assessing whether the claims fulfilled the jurisdictional gateways under O 11 of the ROC 2014. Thus, the Maags must establish that each cause of action (ie, each publication) has a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
(c) While the jurisdictional gateways listed in paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021 are no longer exhaustive, this does not give the Maags free rein to introduce claims for all publications made overseas, including those which did not cause any loss in Singapore and have no connection to Singapore. The Maags must still establish a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
- [37]
[37] Sixth, the Maags had initially sought leave to effect service out of jurisdiction on the basis that they were suing only in respect of publication in Singapore:
(a) The Maags’ original statement of claim only referred to publication of the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post in Singapore.
(b) The supporting affidavit for the application for service out of jurisdiction indicated that the claims in OC 660 would be limited to publication in Singapore and damage incurred in Singapore. While the supporting affidavit made certain references to the publication of the posts in the United Kingdom, the statement of claim and the “critical parts” of the affidavit made it clear that the Maags were pursuing claims in respect of the publication made in and damage sustained in Singapore.
The significance of this argument appears to be that the Maags’ proposed amendments should not be allowed as they are liable to be struck out for being an abuse of process.
The Maags’ arguments
- [38]
[38] In response, the Maags submit that the proposed amendments should be allowed. They contend that the real issue in the present appeal is whether the amendments sought would enable the real question or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. The Maags make several arguments, which I outline below in broad strokes.
- [39]
[39] First, the Maags submit that their proposed amendments are not liable to be struck out for abuse of process as their claims have a sufficient nexus to Singapore. They advance three alternative arguments:
(a) There are compelling reasons to abolish the separate tort thesis for claims in defamation. Further, there is no authority to suggest that the separate tort thesis applies to claims for malicious falsehood. The relevance of this argument appears to be that if all publications of the posts can be considered as a single global tort, the Maags will be able to establish a nexus to Singapore under paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the SCPD 2021.
(b) Even if it is accepted that the separate tort thesis applies to claims in defamation and malicious falsehood, there will be a sufficient nexus to Singapore under paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the SCPD 2021 so long as the claim is partly founded on indirect damage suffered in Singapore. The Maags submit that in so far as the publication of the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post overseas harmed the Maags’ reputations overseas, this amounts to indirect damage sustained in Singapore which falls under paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the SCPD 2021. This is because the concept of an individual’s reputation is “very broad”, and it is conceivable that the foreign publication of the social media posts to an “overseas audience” resulted in some damage to the Maags in Singapore as they are resident in and do business in Singapore.
(c) It is argued on the authority of Cadwalladr at [49] that even if the separate tort thesis applies to claims in defamation, the common law allows the court to consider the reputational damage caused by all the publications of a post when assessing the damages of a single cause of action which relates to that post. Thus, the Maags contend that it is possible for them to bring a claim for the publication of the relevant posts in Singapore but have the impact of the foreign publications considered when assessing damages. In other words, the foreign publications can be relied on as matters merely going to damages and not as separate causes of action. The Maags also cite the Australian case of Toomey and Doris Chia at paragraph 19.3 to support this proposition. The significance of this argument appears to be that if the Maags are correct, they will be able to establish a nexus to Singapore under paragraphs 63(3)(f)(i) or 63(3)(f)(ii) of the SCPD 2021.
- [40]
[40] Second, the Maags submit that Review Publishing does not stand for the principle that a claimant who seeks leave to serve the claim out of jurisdiction on a foreign defendant, should be limited to claiming for injuries arising within the home jurisdiction. The remarks in Review Publishing were obiter dicta. Further, the cases cited in Review Publishing were decided in the context of foreign legislation that was narrower than the jurisdictional gateways under ROC 2014 and the SCPD 2021. In any event, Review Publishing was only concerned with defamation and not malicious falsehoods.
- [41]
[41] Third, the jurisdictional gateways for service out of jurisdiction under the SCPD 2021 are expressly stated to be “non-exhaustive”. Instead, the focus under the SCPD 2021 is on whether the case should be heard in Singapore. This expansionary approach strengthens the position that there is no principle that damage sustained outside Singapore cannot be included in a claim for tort.
- [42]
[42] Fourth, the Maags did not act in abuse of process as they did not restrict themselves to a claim based in Singapore in their application for leave for service out of jurisdiction.
- [43]
[43] Fifth, the fact that the proposed amendments were not raised in the Maags’ Form B9 is not fatal to the amendment application.
Amendments A1–A3 and B1–B4
Mr Modi’s arguments
- [44]
[44] Mr Modi objects to A1–A3 and B1–B4 on the following grounds:
(a) A1 suffers from a lack of particulars as the Maags did not plead the particulars of the nature of the pecuniary loss allegedly sustained and the mechanism by which such loss was likely to be sustained.
(b) A2 has no nexus to Singapore as it relates entirely to foreign publications causing foreign damage.
(c) A3 discloses no reasonable cause of action as damages for injury to reputation cannot be recovered in an action for malicious falsehood. Further, A3 suffers from a lack of particulars as the Maags did not plead the particulars of the nature of the pecuniary loss allegedly sustained and the mechanism by which such loss was likely to be sustained.
(d) B1 discloses no reasonable cause of action for several reasons. First, the Maags’ contention that the foreign publications damaged the Maags’ reputation in Singapore goes against the fundamental principle that damage to reputation is done in the place where the material is published. There is no case law which supports the Maags’ contention. Second, injury to feelings does not amount to “damage” within jurisdiction that will justify bringing an action against a foreign-domiciled defendant.
(e) B2 has no nexus to Singapore as it relates to a cause of action that arose outside of Singapore which caused damage outside of Singapore.
(f) B3 and B4 are defective as the Maags did not provide sufficient particulars relating to the pecuniary loss suffered. Any special damages claimable in an action for libel must be referrable to reputational damage. However, the Maags have not particularised the nature of the pecuniary loss and how such loss relates to the Maags’ reputational damage.
The Maags’ arguments
- [45]
[45] The Maags advance the following arguments:
(a) A1 should be allowed as it effects clerical amendments to the initial statement of claim. The amendment clarifies the Maags’ claim for direct damage in Singapore flowing from all publications of the relevant posts. According to the Maags, this amendment should be “uncontroversial”.
(b) A2 and B2 should be allowed for various reasons. First, Review Publishing does not preclude a claimant from amending his claim to introduce further claims on matters occurring outside the jurisdiction after he has obtained leave to serve a claim out of jurisdiction. Second, the mere fact that a claim does not fall under any of the factors in paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021 is not determinative as such factors are meant to be non-exhaustive. Third, Cadwalladr is authority for the proposition that the common law may evolve to consider multiple publications collectively when assessing the harm caused for a single cause of action for defamation. Further, there are strong policy reasons to support such a collective assessment of multiple publications.
(c) A3, B1, B3, and B4 should be allowed as the Maags suffered indirect reputational harm in Singapore from the foreign publications. Given the “indivisible” nature of a person’s reputation and the ubiquity of the internet, it is artificial to distinguish between reputational damage suffered in jurisdiction and reputational damage suffered out of jurisdiction. Thus, there is a sufficient nexus to Singapore under paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021. Alternatively, this should suffice as a “new gateway” which demonstrates a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
Issues to be determined
- [46]
[46] In considering whether the amendments should be allowed, the following issues arise for my consideration:
(a) Whether a claimant is entitled to amend his pleadings to plead a claim that has no nexus to Singapore after leave has been granted for service out of jurisdiction.
(b) If so, whether the amendments in question seek to introduce claims which have no nexus to Singapore. In this connection, the following sub-issues arise:
(i) Whether the amendments introduce claims that fall within paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SCPD 2021.
(ii) Whether the amendments introduce claims that fall within paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021.
(iii) If the amendments do not fall under any of the paragraphs of paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021, whether they introduce claims that have a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
- [47]
[47] If the amendments introduce claims which have a sufficient nexus to Singapore, the following issues arise:
(a) Whether the amendments should be disallowed on any other basis.
(b) Whether the Maags restricted their claims to publications in Singapore and damage incurred in Singapore in their application for leave to effect service out of jurisdiction.
(c) Whether it is nonetheless just to allow the amendments.
The applicable law
- [48]
[48] In determining whether a claimant should be permitted to amend his pleadings under O 9 r 14(1) ROC 2021, the court will apply a three-step framework: see the decision of Goh Yihan JC (as he then was) in Wang Piao at [16]–[19]. In particular, the court will:
(a) First, determine the stage of the proceedings in which the amendment application is sought. The later an application is made, the stronger would be the grounds required to justify it although no hard and fast rules may be laid down: Wang Piao at [16].
(b) Second, determine whether the proposed amendments would enable the real question and/or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. A pleading that is bad in law and liable to be struck out will not amount to a real question or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined: Wang Piao at [14] and [17].
(c) Third, even if the proposed amendments would enable the real question to be determined, the court will consider whether it is nonetheless just to allow the amendments. The court will consider various factors, such as whether the amendment would cause any prejudice to the other party which cannot be compensated in costs or whether the applicant is effectively asking for a second bite at the cherry: Wang Piao at [18].
- [49]
[49] The principles which govern striking out applications are relevant to the second stage of the Wang Piao framework. For present purposes, it suffices to note that a pleading may be struck out on, amongst other grounds, the following bases:
(a) It is an abuse of process of the court: see O 9 r 16(1)(b) ROC 2021.
(b) It is in the interests of justice to do so: see O 9 r 16(1)(c) ROC 2021. This ground allows for “plainly or obviously unsustainable” claims to be struck out: Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General and another [2022] 2 SLR 1018 at [19]. A “plainly or obviously unsustainable” action is one that is either legally or factually unsustainable. Legal unsustainability is established if it is clear as a matter of law that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove, he will not be entitled to the remedy sought. Factual unsustainability is established if the factual basis for the claim is entirely without substance, such as where the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents that it is based on: The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 at [39].
- [50]
[50] Having set out the legal principles that govern amendment applications and applications for the striking out of pleadings, I turn to consider each of the issues in the present appeal.
Issue 1: Whether a claimant who has been granted leave to effect service out of Singapore is entitled to amend his pleadings to plead a claim that has no nexus to Singapore
- [51]
[51] Mr Modi contends, on the authority of Review Publishing, that a claimant who wishes to sue a foreign defendant for defamation will have acted in abuse of the court’s process if he relies on foreign publications and/or seeks to recover damage sustained overseas. Each publication amounts to a separate tort under the law of defamation and malicious falsehood. Thus, a publication that occurs overseas will have no nexus to Singapore. It will be an abuse of process for a claimant to seek leave to effect service out of jurisdiction on a foreign defendant in relation to such claims. Mr Modi submits that, by logical extension, it will be an abuse of the court’s process for a claimant to amend his claim to seek relief for foreign publication and foreign damage after he has been granted leave to serve a defendant outside of Singapore.
- [52]
[52] In response, the Maags submit that there is “no principle that a plaintiff who serves a defamation claim out of jurisdiction and subsequently seeks to amend the claim to recover damages sustained overseas would in any way be acting in abuse of process”. However, the Maags appear to have adopted this position on the basis that their proposed amendments introduce claims that have a sufficient nexus to Singapore. In other words, the Maags do not appear to contest the broader principle that it would be an abuse of the court’s process for a claimant to seek to amend his pleadings to plead a claim that has no nexus to Singapore after he obtains leave to effect service on a foreign defendant out of jurisdiction. Their contention is with what amounts to a claim that has a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
- [53]
[53] I agree with Mr Modi’s submission. In Review Publishing, Menon JC (as the Chief Justice then was) elaborated on the significance of the jurisdictional gateways under O 11 r 1 of the ROC 2006. The jurisdictional gateways under O 11 r 1 of the ROC 2006 related to specific situations where the claim, cause of action, or relief sought had a sufficient nexus with Singapore. The need to establish a nexus with the home jurisdiction served to prevent the unwarranted extension of the jurisdiction of the court beyond the territorial limits of the country: Review Publishing at [23].
- [55]
[55] In my view, the continued requirement for a claimant to establish a “sufficient nexus to Singapore” under the new regime for service out of jurisdiction indicates that there remains an interest in preventing the unwarranted extension of the jurisdiction of the court beyond the territorial limits of the country. This, in turn, supports the proposition that it will be an abuse of process for a claimant to seek to pursue claims against foreign defendants that have no nexus to Singapore. Indeed, the primary mechanism to ensure that a claimant does not abuse the jurisdiction of the court is found in the need for the claimant to seek leave to serve out: Review Publishing at [30]. In my judgment, allowing a claimant to amend his pleadings to introduce a claim with no nexus to Singapore after he has been granted leave to effect service out would render this control mechanism otiose. Such an amendment application will amount to an abuse of the court’s process. For the avoidance of doubt, this holding is confined to circumstances such as that in the present case, ie, where service out of jurisdiction has been granted under O 8 r 1 of the ROC 2021 on the basis that the Singapore court is the appropriate court to hear the action. With this principle in mind, I turn to consider whether the proposed amendments seek to introduce claims that have a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
Issue 2: Whether the amendments in question seek to introduce claims which have no nexus to Singapore
- [56]
[56] The amendments seek to plead, in relation to the claims in defamation and malicious falsehood, that the Litigation Post and Political Hatred Post were published in India and/or the United Kingdom in addition to Singapore. Mr Modi’s primary contention is that the Maags’ proposed claims do not have a sufficient nexus to Singapore and are thus an abuse of process. In determining whether the proposed claims have a sufficient nexus to Singapore, I will consider whether the amendments seek to introduce claims that will: (a) fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the SCPD 2021; (b) fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the SCPD 2021; or (c) despite not fulfilling any of the subparagraphs under paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021, will establish a nexus to Singapore.
- [57]
[57] It is apposite to state the relevance of paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021 in leave applications for service out of jurisdiction. This court’s jurisdiction to hear a civil matter is governed by s 16(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), which states that:
- [60]
[60] First, the non-exhaustive nature of the factors in paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021 cannot be taken as a license for claimants to introduce claims which plainly have no nexus to Singapore. Paragraph 63(2) of the SCPD 2021 still requires the claimant to establish a sufficient nexus to Singapore when establishing that the Singapore court is the appropriate court to hear the action. The factors in paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021 go towards establishing this requirement of a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
- [61]
[61] Second, I am of the view that an applicant will generally be able to establish a sufficient nexus to Singapore if he can bring his action within one of the factors listed in paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021. The factors in paragraph 63(3) are near verbatim reproductions of the heads of jurisdiction under the previous regime for service out of jurisdiction: Yeo Tiong Min SC, Commercial Conflict of Laws (Academy Publishing, 2023) (“Commercial Conflict of Laws”) at para 02.041; Halsbury 6(2) 2024 at para 75.040. Under the previous regime for service out of jurisdiction, a claimant needed to establish that his case fell within one of these heads of jurisdiction: Commercial Conflict of Laws at para 02.032. While the test for specific heads of jurisdiction under the ROC 2014 has been superseded by the more general test of “sufficient nexus” under the ROC 2021, it is unlikely that the ROC 2021 intended to take away from a claimant a case which would have satisfied a jurisdictional gateway under the ROC 2014. The intention in effecting a change to the regime of service out of jurisdiction was to simplify matters, for example, by obviating the need for a claimant to scrutinise a list of cases in which service out of jurisdiction is permissible: Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2023] 3 SLR 1191 at [89]. Indeed, our courts have observed in the context of paragraphs 63(3)(a), 63(3)(i), and 63(3)(p) of the SCPD 2021, that a claimant need only show a good arguable case with respect to one of those factors to establish a sufficient nexus to Singapore: see Justice Chua’s decision in Cheong Jun Yoong v Three Arrows Capital Ltd and others [2024] 4 SLR 907 (“Cheong Jun Yoong”) at [42] and the observations of the Appellate Division of the High Court in Three Arrows Capital Ltd and others v Cheong Jun Yoong [2024] 1 SLR 419 at [32].
- [62]
[62] Nonetheless, I recognise that some of the factors stated in paragraph 63(3) SCPD 2021 may indicate a rather weak connection to Singapore: see Commercial Conflict of Laws at para 02.043. However, such factors are not engaged in the present case. It will suffice, for the purposes of establishing a sufficient nexus to Singapore, that the claimant’s action falls within either paragraphs 63(3)(f)(i) or 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021. It is to this inquiry that I now turn to.
Paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the SCPD 2021: Act or omission occurring in Singapore
- [63]
[63] Under the ROC 2021, a claimant who wishes to effect service out of jurisdiction must show a “good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore” (see [54] above). The claimant should refer to any of the non-exhaustive factors in paragraph 63(3) of the SCPD 2021. Paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) is one such factor, which states:
- [64]
[64] Mr Modi’s principal contention is that paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SCPD 2021 is not satisfied as each publication of the relevant posts amounts to a separate cause of action. This principle is referred to as the “separate tort thesis”. Thus, in so far as the Maags wish to rely on the foreign publication of the relevant posts, each foreign publication relates to a separate cause of action which is comprised entirely of acts occurring outside of Singapore.
- [65]
[65] The Maags’ argument in relation to paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SPCD 2021 is two-fold. First, there is no “separate tort thesis” in respect of publication under the law of malicious falsehood. The Maags, citing the Court of Appeal in Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639 (“Low Tuck Kwong”) at [104], argue that the tort of malicious falsehood is of an entirely different character from an action for defamation. Second, the “separate tort thesis” within the law of defamation should be abolished. The thrust of these two arguments is that all publications of the posts should be treated as a single global tort under the law of defamation and malicious falsehood. The effect of this argument is that the Maags will be able to establish a nexus to Singapore under paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SCPD 2021, ie, that a single global tort for both defamation or malicious falsehood is founded in part by a publication in Singapore.
- [66]
[66] Mr Modi makes two submissions in reply. First, the separate tort thesis applies in relation to publication under the law of malicious falsehood as the principles of publication for defamation and malicious falsehood are the same. Second, in the context of claims in libel, the separate tort thesis has been affirmed locally in Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”) and continues to be good law in the United Kingdom.
Whether the separate tort thesis applies to the tort of malicious falsehood
- [67]
[67] I begin by addressing the Maags’ contention that the separate tort thesis should not apply to the tort of malicious falsehood, which “is of an entirely different character from an action for defamation”. In my view, there is much force in Mr Modi’s submission to the contrary.
- [68]
[68] First, while the Court of Appeal in Low Tuck Kwong stated at [104] that the tort of malicious falsehood was of a different character from an action for defamation, that statement must be read in its proper context. In Low Tuck Kwong, the court noted that the torts of malicious falsehood and defamation vindicate different types of losses suffered by a claimant. The latter is concerned with words that injure the reputation of a person, while the former relates to words that were intended to cause, and which did cause, pecuniary loss to someone: Low Tuck Kwong at [104]. A claim for malicious falsehood need not relate to words that injure the reputation of the claimant: Low Tuck Kwong at [104]. It was in that context that the court recognised that both torts were of an entirely different nature; the court was simply referring to the fact that both torts vindicate different types of losses. However, this does not mean that the separate tort thesis should not apply to the tort of malicious falsehood.
- [69]
[69] Second, Mr Modi refers to the Australian decision of Australand Holdings Ltd v Transparency and Accountability Council Inc [2008] NSWSC 669 (“Australand”), where the New South Wales Supreme Court observed at [98] that “[t]here [did] not seem … to be any relevant distinction between the concept of publication for the purpose of defamation and for the purpose of injurious falsehood”. This is a reference to the tort of malicious falsehood; the High Court of Australia has recognised that the tort of malicious falsehood is sometimes referred to as the tort of injurious falsehood: see Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2002] 2 LRC 674 at [58]. Mr Modi argues that since the same principles of publication govern the law of defamation and malicious falsehood, the separate tort thesis necessarily applies to the latter.
- [70]
[70] I agree with Mr Modi’s submission. In my view, the same principles of publication apply to the law of defamation and malicious falsehood. The observation of the court in Australand is congruent with the Singapore decision of TWG Tea Co Pte Ltd v Murjani Manoj Mohan [2019] 5 SLR 366 (“TWG”), where Audrey Lim JC (as she then was) referred to principles relating to the concept of publication under the law of defamation, in the context of a claim for malicious falsehood (see TWG at [90]–[91]). The Maags did not raise any authority to the contrary.
- [71]
[71] Under the law of defamation, matter is published when and where it is received. Each time an individual views a post on his computer, it counts as a publication: Golden Season at [55]. Given that the same principles of publication apply to the law of defamation and malicious falsehood, such a conclusion applies equally to claims in malicious falsehood.
- [73]
[73] This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the English High Court in Ruta v Department for Work and Pensions [2022] EWHC 1535 (QB) recognised at [37] that “[e]ach publication is a separate cause of action in libel or malicious falsehood” [emphasis added]. I am thus of the view that the malicious falsehood claims introduced in the amendments (ie, C1, C3, and A1–A3) do not fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SCPD 2021 as each foreign publication is a separate cause of action that is comprised entirely of acts occurring outside Singapore.
Whether the separate tort thesis continues to apply to the law of defamation
- [74]
[74] Next, the Maags submit that the separate tort thesis should be abolished for defamation claims. The Maags rely on the following to support their argument: (a) comments of the English Court of Appeal in Cadwalladr at [49]; (b) the presence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a relevant control factor; and (c) the artificiality of the separate tort thesis when applied to online torts.
- [75]
[75] Mr Modi submits there is no basis to argue for the separate tort thesis under the law of defamation to be abolished. The separate tort thesis has been accepted and applied in Singapore in the context of defamation: Golden Season at [55]. The separate tort thesis has also been affirmed in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
- [76]
[76] In my view, Mr Modi has the better argument. Our courts have endorsed the applicability of the separate tort thesis in Singapore: Review Publishing at [34]–[35]; Golden Season at [53]–[55]. Further, the separate tort thesis continues to apply in the United Kingdom for the following reasons:
(a) First, the English Court of Appeal in Cadwalladr expressly affirmed the application of the separate tort thesis in the context of a mass publication scenario and rejected the notion of a “single publication rule” where there is only a single cause of action in respect of a mass publication: Cadwalladr at [41].
(b) Second, contrary to the views of the Maags and the learned AR, the separate tort thesis has not been legislatively overruled in England by s 8 of the UK Defamation Act. This much was expressly recognised by the English Court of Appeal in Cadwalladr, which noted at [43] that s 8 of the UK Defamation Act only enacts a “single publication rule” for the purposes of the law of limitation – and for that purpose only. In other words, while each communication gives rise to a separate cause of action for defamation, s 8(4) of the UK Defamation Act operates to treat the limitation period for the subsequent publication(s) as having commenced on the date of the first publication. However, this does not change the fact that, conceptually, separate causes of action arise from each communication of the material.
(c) Third, while [49] of Cadwalladr left open the possibility of analysing several publications collectively when assessing reputational harm, this observation was made in the specific context of s 1 of the UK Defamation Act. Section 1 of the UK Defamation Act imposes a statutory requirement for a claimant in a defamation claim to establish that the publication of the purportedly defamatory material has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. However, s 1 does not import the single publication rule into English law as there is nothing in the UK Defamation Act or its legislative history to suggest that it was intended to adopt the single publication rule or depart in any other way from the common law meaning of the word “publication”: Cadwalladr at [42]–[43]. Thus, the court’s observations on the collective assessment of publications should be confined to the specific inquiry of whether the requirement of serious harm under s 1(1) of the UK Defamation Act is satisfied.
- [77]
[77] The Maags refer to Hannah Jones, “New Zealand’s Zombie Defamation Survival Guide: Solving the Grave State of Defamation Law with a Single Publication Rule” (2020) Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 22/2020 to support their argument that the advent of the internet and social media necessitates a departure from the separate tort thesis. However, I note that the separate tort thesis has been affirmed in the context of the internet and social media in recent decisions from New Zealand: see Rafiq v New Zealand Customs Service [2022] NZHC 1756 at [11]; Sellman v Slater [2017] 2 NZLR 218 at [34]–[38].
- [78]
[78] As the separate tort thesis continues to be good law in Singapore, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, it is legally unsustainable for the Maags to contend that the separate tort thesis should be abolished in the context of the law of defamation. Accordingly, each publication of the relevant posts amounts to a separate cause of action in libel. The consequence of this is that each foreign publication of the relevant posts relates to a separate cause of action which is comprised entirely of acts occurring outside of Singapore. Such claims do not fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) SCPD 2021.
Paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the SCPD 2021: Damage suffered in Singapore
- [79]
[79] I turn to consider whether the amendments introduce claims that fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021, which states:
- [80]
[80] The Maags submit that the amendments introduce claims that fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021. In this connection, the Maags advance two alternative arguments. First, they argue that paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021 is satisfied as the Maags suffered indirect harm to their reputation in Singapore arising from the foreign publication of the relevant posts. The Maags cite IM Skaugen(AR) and IM Skaugen(HC) as authority for the proposition that paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021 can be satisfied if part of the damage, such as indirect damage, is suffered in Singapore. The Maags also rely on the English case of Jameel (Mohammed) and another v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] 3 WLR 642 (“Jameel”) to argue that the court should recognise a “broad concept” of reputation, which can be damaged in the home jurisdiction by the publication of defamatory material overseas. Second, the Maags argue that the common law allows the court to consider the reputational harm caused by all publications of a post wherever occurring when assessing damages under a single cause of action which relates to that post. In other words, the publication of the posts overseas is merely a matter that goes to damages and is not relied on as a separate cause of action itself.
- [81]
[81] Mr Modi raises several arguments in response. First, he argues that the relevant statements in Jameel were made in the specific context of determining whether a trading company could recover general damages for libel without pleading that the relevant publication caused it special damage. Jameel does not stand for the proposition that an individual’s reputation should be considered broadly such that foreign publications can cause reputational harm to a claimant in the home jurisdiction. Further, the established principle is that damage to reputation is done in the place where the material is published: Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co, Ltd and others v Goh Teck Beng and another [2016] 4 SLR 977 (“Qingdao”) at [39]. Second, Mr Modi argued in the proceedings below that it would be artificial to treat an overseas publication as only going to damages and not as a separate cause of action itself as this would allow a claimant to side-step the jurisdictional rules for seeking leave to effect service out of jurisdiction.
- [82]
[82] It is apposite to briefly state the principles relating to paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021. The equivalent provision under the ROC 2014 was interpreted in IM Skaugen(CA) at [77]. This jurisdictional gateway allowed the court to assume jurisdiction based on damage suffered in Singapore and encompassed two kinds of claims: (a) claims founded on damage, where damage is part of the cause of action; and (b) claims for the recovery of damages, where damage is not part of the cause of action. Crucially, the Court of Appeal endorsed the following passage at para 75-051 of Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) which clarifies the significance of such a distinction:
The foregoing passage makes it clear that where a tortious claim is founded on damage that is partially or wholly suffered in Singapore, the claimant may claim for all the damage wherever occurring. In contrast, where the claim is only for the recovery of damages, it is restricted to the damage suffered in Singapore.
- [83]
[83] In my view, the tort of libel falls under the latter category of claims, ie, a claim for the recovery of damages. The claimant in a libel suit is presumed to have suffered reputational damage by reason of the publication of the defamatory material. A claimant who is an individual is not required to prove that he has suffered financial loss or even that any particular person has thought the worse of him as a result of the publication complained of: Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party and others and another suit [2009] 1 SLR(R) 642 at [151]. In other words, the tort of libel is actionable even without proof of reputational harm. It is perhaps for this reason that the court in Review Publishing, in analysing whether the claims for libel fulfilled O 11 r 1(f)(ii) of the ROC 2006, focused its inquiry on whether the claims were confined to damage sustained in Singapore: Review Publishing at [5], [31], and [48].
- [84]
[84] In contrast, the tort of malicious falsehood requires a claimant to establish that he suffered special damage (see [72] above). This would ordinarily mean that it is a claim founded on damage as damage is part of the cause of action. However, s 6(1) of the Defamation Act 1957 sets out certain circumstances in which it is not necessary for a claimant to plead and prove special damage in an action for malicious falsehood. In my view, it is unclear whether the tort of malicious falsehood should be treated as a claim for the recovery of damages where the claimant also relies on s 6(1) of the Defamation Act 1957. However, I do not have to resolve this question in the present case as the claimant’s amendments which relate to the tort of malicious falsehood are either confined entirely to damage suffered in Singapore or do not plead any damage suffered in Singapore. The claims which concern damage suffered solely in Singapore will fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) regardless of whether the claims are claims founded on damage or claims for the recovery of damages. In a similar vein, the claims which do not plead any damage suffered in Singapore will clearly not fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii).
Amendments relating to malicious falsehood
- [85]
[85] I pause briefly to note that Mr Modi’s arguments do not address the amendments that relate to the tort of malicious falsehood. In my view, C1 and C3 seek to introduce claims which fall within paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021. The consequential amendments (ie, A1 and A3) allege that the foreign publication of the relevant posts caused the Maags to suffer pecuniary damage in Singapore. This plainly falls within the scope of paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) as it relates to claims that are wholly or partly founded on damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act wherever occurring.
- [86]
[86] However, this does not necessarily mean that C1, C3, A1, and A3 should be allowed; it merely means that they should not be disallowed on the basis that they introduce claims that have no nexus to Singapore. For reasons that I will return to later, these amendments may be disallowed on other grounds. For present purposes, it suffices to conclude that C1, C3, A1, and A3 should not be disallowed on the basis that they seek to introduce claims that have no nexus to Singapore.
- [87]
[87] In contrast, A2 alleges that the foreign publication of the relevant posts caused the Maags to suffer pecuniary and/or reputational harm abroad. In my view, A2 does not satisfy paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021 as it relates entirely to damage sustained in India and/or the United Kingdom, ie, outside of Singapore. The relevant portion of paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021 requires a claim to be either wholly or partly founded on damage suffered in Singapore. Further, for reasons elaborated on below, I am of the view that A2 does not have any nexus to Singapore (see [128]).
- [88]
[88] Having dealt with the amendments relating to the tort of malicious falsehood, I turn to consider whether the amendments relating to the tort of libel fulfil paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021.
Amendments relating to defamation claims involving pecuniary loss
- [89]
[89] As a preliminary matter, I note that the Maags intend to introduce several defamation claims that relate to pecuniary loss (as opposed to reputational damage). These claims are reflected in amendments B3 and B4. In my view, amendment B3 falls squarely within paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) SCPD 2021 as it only pleads that the Maags suffered pecuniary damage in Singapore. Thus, amendment B3 should not be disallowed on the basis that it introduces claims with no nexus to Singapore. It follows then that amendments C2 and C4, which plead the fact that the Political Hatred Post and Litigation Post were published outside of Singapore, should not be disallowed on the basis that they introduce claims with no nexus to Singapore.
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