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Grounds publishedDecided 18 Apr 2016

High Court

IM Skaugen SE and another v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE and another

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[2016] SGHCR 6Case no. High Court Suit No 96 of 2015 (Summons No 3879 of 2015 and Summons No 5334 of 2015)

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  1. [1] A marine diesel engine manufacturer allegedly tampered with fuel consumption test results for a certain class of engines that were installed in the ships of a multi-national shipping conglomerate. The manufacturer authored promotional material in Germany, had sales meetings with the Norwegian holding company of the shipping conglomerate either in Denmark or Norway, provided fuel specifications to a Chinese builder, which installed the engines in China, and the fuel consumption tests were conducted in Germany. The ships, equipped with the engines, pass through the hands of various subsidiaries of the shipping conglomerate, some of which were incorporated in Singapore; their claims are assigned to a Norwegian company and a Singaporean company within the shipping conglomerate. The German manufacturer and a wholly-owned Norwegian subsidiary are sued in Singapore. What law governs the claim? Should the Singapore High Court assume long-arm jurisdiction? How would the recent establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court affect the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction?

  2. The facts

  3. [2] IM Skaugen SE, incorporated in Norway (hereinafter “Skaugen Norway”), and IM Skaugen Marine Services Pte Ltd, incorporated in Singapore (hereinafter “Skaugen Singapore”; collectively, Skaugen Norway and Skaugen Singapore shall be referred to as the plaintiffs), are part of the IM Skaugen group of companies (“the Skaugen Group”). Skaugen Norway is the principal holding company of the Skaugen Group. The Skaugen Group is in the business of providing marine transportation services in the oil and gas industry.

  4. [3] MAN Diesel & Turbo SE, incorporated in Germany (hereinafter “MAN Germany”), is a manufacturer of marine diesel engines. MAN Diesel & Turbo Norge AS, incorporated in Norway (hereinafter “MAN Norway”; collectively MAN Germany and MAN Norway shall be referred to as the defendants), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MAN Germany. MAN Norway provides sale support to MAN Germany.

  5. [4] Skaugen Norway entered into four shipbuilding contracts with China Shipbuilding Trading Company Limited and Zhonghua Shipyard (“the Chinese shipbuilders”) in July 2000 for the design, building, sale and delivery of four 8,400 m3 gas carriers. Skaugen Norway had the contractual right to choose the engine. The contracts contained London Maritime Arbitration Association arbitration clauses and were governed by English law. Skaugen Norway entered into discussions with several manufacturers of marine diesel engines, including MAN Germany and MAN Norway, for the supply of an engine and was assisted in this regard by Norgas Carriers AS, the Skaugen Group’s Norwegian management company.

  6. [6] In August 2000, Skaugen Norway entered into four novation agreements with Somargas Limited (“Somargas Cayman”), a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands which was 50% owned by Skaugen Norway and 50% owned by GATX Third Aircraft Corporation (“GATX”). The novation agreements transferred Skaugen Norway’s rights, benefits, obligations and liabilities under the four shipbuilding contracts to Somargas Cayman. Skaugen Norway, purportedly acting on behalf of Somargas Cayman in September 2000, opted for the MAN Engine to be installed in the four vessels.

  7. [7] The Chinese shipbuilders entered into four sales contracts with MAN Germany on 26 September 2000 for the provision of four MAN engines. An arbitration clause provided for arbitration under the auspices of The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. These sales contracts explicitly stated that “[t]he technical specification and the scope of supply as per the technical agreement signed on Aug.24,2000”. Zhonghua Shipyard and MAN Germany entered into the aforementioned technical agreement, dated 24 August 2000, with an attached technical specification dated 23 August 2000 stating that the fuel consumption level under ISO Standards 3046/1 at a load level of 85% without attached pumps was 180 g/kWh. The technical specification was in turn subject to MAN Germany’s General Conditions of Delivery, which stated that the jurisdiction for all disputes arising out of the contract was Augsburg (in Germany) with MAN Germany also having the right to bring an action at the place of the purchaser’s registered office; and that the contract was governed by German law.

  8. [8] MAN Germany and MAN Norway delivered to the Chinese shipbuilders a document on 24 November 2000 entitled “6. Kraftstoffsystem Fuel System” (“FSI”). This document represented that the fuel consumption of the MAN Engine at a load of 100% under ISO conditions with attached pumps and a tolerance of +3% was 193.64 g/kWh. The document was then transmitted by the Chinese shipbuilders to Skaugen Norway.

  9. [9] Vintergas Limited (“Vintergas”) and the Chinese shipbuilders entered into two further shipbuilding contracts in May 2001 for the construction of two 10,000 m3 gas carriers. Vintergas is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands and is 50% owned by Skaugen Norway and 50% owned by GATX. These contracts likewise contained London Maritime Arbitration Association arbitration clauses and were governed by English law. Skaugen Norway purported to act on behalf of Vintergas in all matters relating to the 10,000 m3 carriers and instructed the Chinese shipmakers to install MAN engines. The Chinese shipbuilders entered into two sales contracts with MAN Germany on 20 June 2001 for the provision of two MAN engines. These contracts also explicitly stated that “[t]he details of the specification, the scope of supply as well as Commissioning as per the Technical Agreement dated Aug.24,2000”.

  10. [10] The six MAN Engines were manufactured and delivered in 2001 and 2002. Prior to delivery, the engines were put through factory acceptance tests (“FATs”) conducted in MAN Germany’s Augsburg factory. The six engines were tested in May 2001, August 2001, November 2001, February 2002, May 2002 and June 2002. During a FAT, an engine is mounted on a test stand, also termed a test bed. The engine is operated at various settings and the performance and consumption data is collected and recorded. At the end of each FAT, a “Shop Test Protocol” would be prepared, which recorded inter alia the performance data. Representatives of MAN Germany conducted the FATs, all of whom are allegedly German nationals residing in Germany. The documentary evidence discloses that:

  11. (a) MAN Norway had representatives present at five of the FATs, but according to the defendants they were not involved in conducting the FATs;

  12. (b) Representatives from the Chinese shipbuilders were present at the very first FAT in May 2001;

  13. (c) Representatives expressed to be from Skaugen were present at three tests;

  14. (d) For those tests where Skaugen was absent, representatives from “Norwegian Gas Carriers” (one test); “Norgas Carriers A/S” and “Det Norske Veritas” (one test); and “Norgas” (one test) were present.

  15. [11] The results of the FATs purported to show that the rate of fuel consumption of the MAN engines was below the values stated in the PPM and the FSI.

  16. [12] The engines were installed in six vessels (“the Vessels”); the first four are the subject of the first tranche of contracts in July 2000 while the fifth and sixth are the subject of the second tranche of contracts in September 2000: they are the Norgas Orinda, Norgas Shasta, Norgas Napa, Norgas Sonoma; Norgas Petaluma and Norgas Alameda. The Vessels were delivered between October 2002 and October 2003.

  17. [13] MAN Germany issued a press release in May 2011 stating that there were indications of possible irregularities during the handover of four-stroke marine diesel engines and it was possible to externally influence fuel consumption values to display results that deviated from those actually measured. MAN Germany also said that it had informed the public prosecutor’s office in Munich of this and would co-operate closely. MAN Germany was eventually fined 8.2 million euros in March 2013 by the Local Court of Augsburg.

  18. [14] MAN Germany then wrote to Skaugen Norway on 31 January 2012 about the possibility that fuel consumption values displayed and recorded during handover were externally influenced and incorrect. Subsequently on 3 April 2012 MAN Germany wrote to Norgas Carriers AS (the then managers of the Vessels) conceding that there were indications that the fuel consumption values for three engines were “externally influenced in an improper manner during [FATs]”. On 22 June 2012 MAN Germany wrote to Skaugen Norway, this time conceding that there were indications that the fuel consumption values for three engines were “externally influenced in an improper manner during [FATs]”.

  19. [15] The parties thereafter attempted to settle but negotiations broke down in September 2013 and there was a dispute over whether a binding settlement was reached. While Skaugen and MAN Germany did not enter into a direct contractual relationship for the MAN engines installed in the Vessels, they did enter into such a direct contractual relationship for three other batches of engines that are not the subject of the current suit. This suit is not the first time that the parties have found themselves at legal loggerheads. One round of ICC arbitration, commenced in September 2013 between Skaugen Norway and Skaugen Singapore, and MAN Germany, concluded that the parties had not concluded a binding settlement agreement. The parties are currently separately engaged in arbitration in the Danish Institute of Arbitration, arbitration in the ICC, and litigation in the Norwegian courts. GATX and some Skaugen entities had also purportedly assigned their claims to the plaintiffs, and there is some controversy over whether the assignors had claims to begin with. I deal with these facts more fully later on in the judgment.

  20. The pleadings and arguments

  21. [16] The plaintiffs, in their statement of claim, plead that representations were made in the PPM, FSI and FATs that the MAN engines consumed fuel at a certain rate, but these were false; and the plaintiffs were induced to rely and did rely on those representations. The plaintiffs have also provided particulars of alleged negligence and fraud.

  22. [17] The defendants applied (Summons No 3879 of 2015 is MAN Germany’s application while Summons No 5334 of 2015 is MAN Norway’s application) to set aside service ex juris of the writ; alternatively for proceedings to be stayed on the grounds of forum non conveniens; and in the further alternative, for a stay on case management grounds pending the determination of other proceedings. They argue that the claim does not fall within any of the gateway provisions enumerated in O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed): the plaintiffs are not the proper claimants; none of the relevant acts or omissions constituting the alleged tort had occurred in Singapore (O 11 r 1(f)(i)); the damage allegedly suffered did not occur in Singapore (O 11 r 1(f)(ii)); and the alleged cause of action did not arise in Singapore (O 11 r 1(p)). Singapore is also not the forum conveniens – Germany or alternatively Norway is the appropriate forum. Lastly proceedings should be stayed pending the resolution of disputes elsewhere.

  23. [18] The plaintiffs resist the defendants’ application and argue that O 11 r 1 is satisfied: the torts occurred at least in part in Singapore and damage has been suffered in Singapore. The defendants have not discharged their burden of showing that Singapore is the forum conveniens – and in this respect due regard must be had for the recent establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”). The proceedings should not be stayed on case management principles because the other proceedings pertain to different subjects.

  24. The issues

  25. [19] I shall deal with the following issues:

  26. (a) What is the test for the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction by the Singapore High Court in light of the establishment of the SICC?

  27. (b) Do the plaintiffs have the requisite locus standi?

  28. (c) What is the applicable law?

  29. (d) Do the plaintiffs have a good arguable case that their claim satisfies one or more of the limbs of O 11?

  30. (e) Would the SICC have jurisdiction for the purposes of applying Spiliada?

  31. (f) Is Singapore the forum conveniens?

  32. What is the test for the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction by the Singapore High Court in light of the establishment of the SICC?

  33. [20] The parties were in agreement that O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court applies to the service ex juris of writs. But the parties differed over how the principles enunciated in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”) should apply, and in particular whether less weight should be placed on certain factors because of the recent establishment of the SICC.

  34. [21] I pause to briefly set out the law as it currently stands. Service ex juris will be allowed to stand if and only if: the plaintiff shows a good arguable case that its claim falls within one of the limbs of O 11 r 1 (Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156 (“Bradley Lomas”) at [14]); the plaintiff’s claim has a sufficient degree of merit, that is, there is a serious issue to be tried (Bradley Lomas at [14]); and Singapore is the forum conveniens (Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (“Zoom Communications”) at [26]). In this respect, if a plaintiff can show a good arguable case that his tort claim falls within one of the limbs of O 11 r 1, he would a fortiori satisfy the lower standard of there being a serious issue to be tried (Bradley Lomas at [18]).

  35. [22] I am bound to apply the above – O 11 r 1 is subsidiary legislation; while Bradley Lomas and Zoom Communications are decisions of the Court of Appeal. The establishment of the SICC does not alter the applicable legal principles, at the High Court level, in respect of the long-arm jurisdiction of the High Court (but see [141]–[145] below). But a factors-based test is applied to determine if Singapore is the forum conveniens. A factors-based test for adjudication is, according to Sunstein, marked by several features, some of which include: multiple and diverse relevant criteria; the difficulty of describing relevant factors ex ante; and pertinently the absence of a clear, a priori sense of the weight of the criteria (Cass R Sunstein, “Problems with Rules”, (1995) 83 Cal L Rev 953 at pp 998–999). This is confirmed by case law. BDA v BDB [2013] 1 SLR 607 held that the Spiliada test is a factors-based test, with the weight to be placed on the various factors varying with each factual matrix; a factor that proves to be the tipping point in one case might not be that important in another (at [24]). CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 held that the weight of the various connecting factors is not a numbers game and it is legal significance which is decisive (at [85]); as such, an appellate court would not interfere with what is an exercise of discretion by a lower court unless a judge has misdirected himself as a matter of principle; or had taken into account matters he should not have taken into account or had not taken into account matters which he ought to have taken into account (at [84]).

  36. [23] It is therefore perfectly consistent with the factors-based Spiliada test for a court to take the presence of the SICC into account in determining whether Singapore is the forum conveniens. The raison d’etre of the SICC is the provision of an “internationally accepted dispute resolution procedural framework for the resolution of international commercial disputes in accordance with substantive principles of international law” (Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 2013), last accessed on 9 March 2016 and available at https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Annex%20A%20-%20SICC%20Committee%20Report.pdf (“Report of the SICC Committee”) at para 14); and to that end, amongst other things, foreign counsel may appear in the SICC (s 36P of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed); foreign law may be determined on the basis of submissions rather than proof (O 110 r 25 of the Rules of Court); and International Judges from both common law and civil law jurisdictions have been appointed (pursuant to Art 95(4)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint)).

  37. [24] In the context of Spiliada, and depending on the exact facts of the case, it is conceivable for certain factors to have less weight because of the presence of the SICC. For instance, the ability of foreign counsel to directly submit on foreign law, without the need for the content of foreign law to be proven through expert evidence, could obviate the inconvenience of trying a claim that is governed by foreign law.

  38. [25] Nonetheless, the presence of the SICC should affect the weight assigned to Spiliada factors in the context of the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction if and only if the case is transferred from the High Court to the SICC upon the plaintiff successfully resisting the application to set aside service ex juris; and for the weight assigned to Spiliada factors in the context of a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens, likewise if and only if the case is transferred from the High Court to the SICC upon the plaintiff successfully resisting the application for a stay. This must necessarily follow – if the case is not transferred upon successful resistance then the court ought not to have allowed the presence of the SICC to influence the weight assigned to the Spiliada factors in the first place.

  39. [27] O 110 r 7(2)(a) of the Rules of Court expressly provides for the SICC having jurisdiction if a case is transferred to the SICC from the High Court under O 110 r 12. This could suggest that the question of the internal allocation of jurisdiction between the High Court and the SICC as a division of the High Court must be determined cleanly and sequentially only after the question of the (long-arm) jurisdiction of the High Court has been answered; and this could be argued to be a bar to the application of the Spiliada principles with a transfer to the SICC in mind. This is a position that Professor Yeo Tiong Min SC could be construed to have taken: the High Court should decide the question of its own jurisdiction (in the private international law sense) before deciding if the case should be transferred to the SICC (Yeo Tiong Min SC, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the SICC”, Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture 2015 at para 41, available at http://law.smu.edu.sg/sites/default/files/law/CEBCLA/YPH-Paper-2015.pdf and last accessed on 9 March 2016 (“Yeo Tiong Min”)).

  40. [28] I do not agree with such a strict separation. The application of the doctrine of forum conveniens must keep up with the times, not just in terms of technological advancement but also with respect to institutional advances in dispute resolution. The SICC is at the cutting-edge in the latter regard.

  41. [30] It would be inexcusably artificial to exclude the SICC from the Spiliada calculus. The tail should not be allowed to wag the dog; and technical intricacies should not determine the substantive content of the law where this would be contrary to common reason. I note that Prof Yeo Tiong Min SC has also taken the view that “the common law requires all factors to be taken into consideration, and this must include the possibility of transfer to the SICC” (Yeo Tiong Min at para 47), and, to reiterate, the possibility of transfer to the SICC must be considered simultaneously with the High Court’s assumption of long-arm jurisdiction, lest the court take into account considerations that it ought not have taken into account were it to transpire that proceedings would not or ought not be transferred to the SICC.

  42. [31] After I reserved judgment, Accent Delight International Ltd v Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar [2016] SGHC 40 (“Accent Delight”) was released. This decision is in fact perfectly consistent with the foregoing paragraphs of this section. The plaintiffs claimed that they were wrongfully overcharged for fine art. The defendants were served as of right, and applied to stay proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens. The High Court, in the initial portion of the judgment, did not appear to consider the SICC as part of the Spiliada calculus, but from the case report it appears that this is because the parties did not argue that Spiliada ought to be applied differently in light of the SICC. Further submissions on whether the case ought to be transferred to the SICC were requested, and the court thereafter held towards the end of the judgment that “the perceived advantages (to the defendants) or disadvantages (to the plaintiffs) of Switzerland being the forum will be levelled out if this Suit remains in Singapore but is transferred to the SICC” (at [111]). This is a clear reference to the SICC being taken into consideration as part of the Spiliada calculus.

  43. [32] I shall consider the issue of transfer alongside forum conveniens in a later section.

  44. Do the plaintiffs have the requisite locus standi?

  45. [33] The plaintiff must show a good arguable case that its claim falls within one of the limbs of O 11 r 1 and this is but an aspect of that. Nonetheless this is a threshold issue because the plaintiffs’ tort claim would fall in limine if they do not have the requisite locus standi.

  46. [34] The Vessels underwent several changes in ownership. Neither Skaugen Norway nor Skaugen Singapore have ever had direct ownership of the Vessels — the Vessels were only delivered between October 2002 and 2003; the rights under the first tranche of shipbuilding contracts were assigned to Somargas Cayman in August 2000; and Vintergas was the entity which contracted with the Chinese shipbuilders for the second tranche of shipbuilding contracts. Somargas Cayman and Vintergas entered into novation agreements with Somargas Ltd, a Hong Kong company 50% owned by Skaugen Norway and 50% owned by GATX (hereinafter “Somargas I”), in March 2002 to transfer all their respective rights, benefits, obligations and liabilities under all six contracts to Somargas I. Somargas I entered into an earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) agreement with Norgas Limited and Norgas Carriers AS in June 2002 to pool the earnings and expenses of the Vessels.

  47. [36] The plaintiffs assert that the current and former owners and charterers of the vessels have assigned their rights, title and interest in the claims against MAN, including MAN Germany and MAN Norway, to the plaintiffs. The documentary evidence discloses two agreements. A Claims Transfer Agreement was entered into between GATX Corporation (not to be confused with GATX Third Aircraft Corporation, for which “GATX” has been defined as shorthand) and Skaugen Norway on 23 June 2014, governed by New York law. This agreement does not mention anything about GATX Corporation acting on behalf of its subsidiaries, but the first clause of the preamble does say that “GATX and [the Skaugen Group], directly and indirectly through their subsidiaries, have been partners in a joint venture related to the manufacturer ownership and operation of [the Vessels] with a share of 50 % each…”. The plaintiffs have since filed an affidavit exhibiting letters from the GATX subsidiaries (dated 25 February 2016) that as at the date of the Claims Transfer Agreement, they did transfer and did authorise GATX Corporation to transfer the claim to Skaugen Norway. An assignment agreement was entered into between Skaugen Singapore, Somargas II and Skaugen Marine on 27 January 2015 and purported to assign the claims of Somargas II and Skaugen Marine to Skaugen Singapore; and one Morits Skaugen, who affirms that he is the Chief Executive Officer of Skaugen Norway and Chairman of the Skaugen Group, signed the assignment agreement on behalf of all three parties. Despite all three parties being Singapore-incorporated companies, the assignment agreement was stated to be governed by the laws of Norway. The assignment agreement does not refer to Somargas II and Skaugen Marine acting on behalf of any other Skaugen-related entity. Clause A of the preamble does however state that “the Parties constitute current or former – direct or indirect – owners or charterers of [the Vessels]…”. The plaintiffs assert on affidavit that Somargas I transferred its ownership in the Vessels as well as all its assets and liabilities to Somargas II in or around February 2011; and Somargas II was successor to the business of Somargas.

  48. [37] The defendants point out that the plaintiffs have never had any claims vested in them in their own capacity; cannot claim for reflective loss; have not adduced any evidence that Somargas Cayman or Vintergas have assigned any chose of action and the mere transfer of physical property does not transfer the chose of action in respect thereof; nor any evidence that Somargas I had assigned any claims to Somargas II. While Somargas II was a previous owner, it is inconceivable for Somargas II to have taken ownership in reliance on any of the purported representations made by the defendant.

  49. [38] I preface by analysing the conflicts of law issues thrown up by the assignments. The plaintiffs neither pleaded nor led any evidence on the content of any foreign law. The defendants have not of course filed their defences, but they have in their submissions pointed out that the plaintiffs have not shown that the assignments were effective under their proper laws.

  50. [39] The defendants’ submissions in this regard are simplistic. There are two choice of law rules applicable. The first is that the assignability of a cause of action is governed either by the law which governs that cause of action or the lex fori. In the leading case of Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (“Trendtex”), the House of Lords applied English law to determine the issue of assignability, but it is unclear if English law was applied qua lex fori or the law of the cause of action. I note that an Australian case, Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 1532, has construed Trendtex as standing for the latter, but I need not decide the point because Singapore law is both the lex fori and the lex causae (see [47] and [87] below). The second is that the intrinsic validity of an assignment is determined by the proper law of the assignment (Republica de Guatemala v Nunez [1927] 1 KB 669).

  51. [40] In any event the defendants have not adduced any evidence of the content of any foreign law; this brings the presumption of similarity into play. There is a distinction between the rule of pleading that the pleading of foreign law is voluntary and the rule of evidence that where the content of foreign law is not proved or not sufficiently proved it is presumed to be similar to the substantive lex fori (implicit in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [60] and [63]; see also Tan Yock Lin, “Rationalising and Simplifying the Presumption of Similarity of Laws” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 172 particularly at para 1). Therefore it is the second rule – the rule of evidence – that is at play here. As the authorities stand it is clear that a defendant who raises the spectre of foreign law must “prove the difference” (EFT Holdings at [61]); there is a “presumption that unless the contrary be proved the general law of a foreign country is the same as the [lex fori]” (The Parchim [1918] AC 157 at 161). It is incumbent on the defendants, having raised foreign law, to prove the content thereof. Not having done so, I am impelled to presume that the content of foreign law is identical to that of Singapore law. Furthermore I note that the plaintiffs have not been accorded the opportunity of adducing expert evidence with respect to the content of any foreign law on this issue and if the presumption of similarity were not applicable I would have adjourned the matter to allow the plaintiff to adduce the said evidence.

  52. [41] A “good arguable case” (Bradley Lomas at [14]) entails one side having “a much better argument on the material available” but at the same time the court “must be concerned not even to appear to express some concluded view on the merits” (Canada Trust Co v Stolzenberg [1998] 1 WLR 547 at 555F–G).

  53. [42] I emphasise “case”, and the word is reproduced in O 11 r 2(2) of the Rules of Court. The interlocutory battle over jurisdiction is fought over affidavits, and it would be neither proper nor opportune for a court to examine particular sub-aspects of a plaintiff’s case with a fine-tooth comb. A court ought to embark on a broad-brush enquiry into whether the plaintiff has made out a good arguable case that the claim falls within a particular limb of O 11. If a defendant contends that only certain isolated aspects of the plaintiff’s claim are questionable, this should not ordinarily be conflated with the assumption of long-arm jurisdiction, and should be dealt with after the jurisdictional stage through a summons to strike out specified paragraphs in the statement of claim. If this were not the position, the burden on the plaintiff at the jurisdictional stage would be immense, and a failure to defend a particular point would be tantamount to that point being struck out; proceedings would also be protracted due to plaintiffs being obliged to defend every single point for fear that a particular point may turn out to be crucial later. This clearly contradicts the general principle that a court cannot express a concluded view on the merits (supra at [41]).

  54. [43] Such is the case here. What is clear and beyond dispute is that Somargas II was from February 2011 to April 2013 direct owners of all the six Vessels and is currently the bareboat charterer of two; and Somargas II was one of the parties to the assignment agreement which purported to assign claims to Skaugen Singapore. On the broad point of whether Somargas I did indeed assign its claims (from before Somargas II was direct owner) to Somargas II, the defendants make much of the lack of documentary evidence. But the lack of documentary evidence at this stage is not ipso jure fatal. It is true that a statutory assignment must be in writing (s 4(8) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)) but an equitable assignment does not. There does not even need to be an agreement between the assignor and assignee: an equitable assignment need take no particular form and equity has always looked to the intent rather than the form (Coulter v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2004] 1 WLR 1425 at [12]). All that is needed is a sufficient expression of an intention to assign (ibid) and conduct may be adequate evidence of such an intention (see eg, Damayanti Kantilal Doshi v Indian Bank [1998] 3 SLR(R) 851, cited in Tan Yock Lin, Personal Property (Academy Publishing, 2014) (“Tan Yock Lin”) at para 18.047). The defendants submit that the transfer of physical property does not transfer the chose of action in respect thereof, and cited Marcus Smith QC & Nico Leslie, The Law of Assignment (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2013) in support. But the particular paragraph relied upon (para 2.72) was cited out of context and is reproduced here:

  55. The paragraph was concerned with defining what a chose of action is (as opposed to a chose in possession: see also Tan Yock Lin at para 01.11). Indeed as conduct may be adequate evidence of an intention to assign, the fact of transfer may be sufficient to ground an inference that Somargas I did intend to assign its claims to Somargas II. Morits Skaugen did aver that all assets and liabilities – not just the physical Vessels – were transferred from Somargas I to Somargas II, and it was the understanding that Somargas II would thereafter operate or continue the business interests of Somargas I. The defendants do not raise any evidence to contradict this. It would have been unlikely for Somargas I to have been liquidated in December 2011 without ensuring that all valuable assets were transferred or otherwise assigned to Somargas II, especially as MAN Germany had issued a press release in May 2011 informing the public at large about possible irregularities.

  56. [44] I do however note that there is some doubt over the claims post-April 2013. Three of the Vessels were transferred to GATX-related subsidiaries; one has since been sold to SGPC1 (which is 35% owned by Skaugen Marine); and the remaining two were sold but the purchasers were not identified. With respect to the GATX-related subsidiaries there was no mention of GATX Corporation acting on their behalf when the Claims Transfer Agreement was entered into in June 2014. The three subsidiaries which are the current owners of three of the Vessels have written on 25 February 2016 that they did indeed authorise GATX Corporation but this is almost two years after the fact. There is also neither any averment nor indication that SGPC1, owner of one Vessel, assigned its claim to the plaintiffs. But I have already stated that a court ought to take a broad-brush approach and not be bogged down in minute points.

  57. [45] I also hold that the purported assignments are not void due to maintenance or champerty. This is because there is a well-recognised exception, namely, a genuine and legitimate commercial interest in the assignment of the right to litigate (Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679).

  58. [46] I therefore conclude that the plaintiffs have shown a good arguable case that they do have the requisite locus standi.

  59. What is the applicable law?

  60. [47] This is an issue which must be determined before O 11 is considered because of the double actionability rule – the (alleged) wrong must be actionable not only under the lex fori but also the lex loci delicti (Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw Investments”) at [53]; but see also [93] below); but subject to the exception that the lex fori, lex loci delicti, or a third law may solely apply if the lex fori and/or lex loci delicti are purely fortuitous and the application of either or both would result in injustice and unfairness (“the flexible exception”) (Rickshaw Investments at [58]). As an aside, the lex loci delicti is literally Latin for the law of the place where the wrong was committed (Rickshaw Investments at [53]).

  61. [48] The plaintiffs and defendants disagreed on where the location of the tort was in the context of O 11 r 1(p), that is, whether the claim is founded on a cause of action arising in Singapore, and repeated much the same arguments in the context of the applicable lex loci delicti. The parties were agreed as to the test to be applied, but the plaintiffs submitted that this is Germany and German law; the defendants submitted that this is Singapore and Singapore law.

  62. [49] The plaintiffs have, in their statement of claim, pleaded particulars of the torts of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. I pause to note that, under the common law rules of conflict of laws, the identification of the place where the tort occurred is an issue that is governed by the lex fori (Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 at 392C); and it cannot be otherwise because the forum cannot apply a foreign law that has yet to be identified.

  63. [50] The test for where a misrepresentation has occurred is set out in JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”):

  64. (a) The general test for where a tort has occurred is looking back at the events constituting the tort and asking where in substance the cause of action arose (“the substance test”) (at [90], citing Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Laura Anne Thompson [1971] AC 458 at 468);

  65. (b) This is crystallised into a more certain rule for some torts in some circumstances. For misrepresentations, the place of the tort is in general the place where the representation is received and acted upon (at [91], citing Cordoba Shipping Co Ltd v National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey (The “Albaforth”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91 (“The Albaforth”) at 92);

  66. (c) Where the misrepresentation occurred in one jurisdiction to an unspecified class of persons and was received and relied upon in a second jurisdiction, the place of the tort is the former (at [91], citing Cordova Land Co Ltd v Victor Brothers Inc [1966] 1 WLR 793 (“Cordova Land”) at 801).

  67. (d) Where receipt and reliance occur in different jurisdictions, the court must fall back on the substance test (at [93] and [94]).

  68. [51] It may be argued that the circumstances fall within the rule in Cordova Land. But there are insuperable difficulties in ascertaining the exact location where reliance occurred. For instance it was Skaugen Norway that acted on behalf of Somargas Cayman and Vintergas initially in selecting the MAN engines – did reliance take place in Norway, where Skaugen Norway was incorporated, or did reliance take place in the Cayman Islands where Somargas Cayman and Vintergas were incorporated? Furthermore the reliance comprises not only the initial selection of engines but also the use of the ships equipped with the engines (see [79] below), and it is impossible to point to one location where the ships were used.

  69. [52] There is also some evidence that receipt and reliance occurred in different jurisdictions with respect to the FAT results. The documentary evidence discloses that representatives from “Skaugen” (it is unclear which Skaugen entity) were present at three FATs and representatives from Skaugen-related entities were present at the other three FATs. The FAT results were therefore received in Germany. However none of the pleaded acts of reliance took place in Germany.

  70. [53] I am therefore impelled to apply the substance test, and in this regard I stress that the entire point of the adoption of the substance test is avoiding the “mechanical solution involved in an outright choice between the place of acting and the place of harm” (Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws vol 2 (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Stevens & Sons Limited, 11th ed, 1987) (“Dicey and Morris”) at p 1387).

  71. [54] I have already dealt with the difficulty of pinpointing an exact location whereupon reliance occurred (at [51] above). It is also difficult to pinpoint a definitive location where receipt occurred. The Fuel Information System document was received by the Chinese shipbuilders and then transmitted to Skaugen Norway. Does receipt refer to the place where the misrepresentation was initially received by an intermediary, in which case receipt was in China, or the place where the misrepresentation was eventually transmitted to, in which case receipt was in Norway? These difficulties are compounded where what is essentially the same representation is contained and repeated in three documents, with each document being received separately. It is impossible to point to the place of receipt when the PPM was received in one of Norway or Denmark (the parties disagree on this); the FSI was received in China or Norway; and the FAT results were received in Germany.

  72. [55] Amid the miasma of uncertain connections with respect to receipt and reliance there remains one constant: all the purported representations were made by MAN Germany; the FATs took place in Germany; and the PPM, FSI and FAT results were authored in Germany, all of which essentially made and mutually reinforced the misrepresentation that fuel consumption was lower than what the engines actually consumed. Looking back on the series of events constituting the tort, the cause of action in substance arose in Germany. German law is the lex loci delicti.

  73. [56] I add that it would not be justified for me to analyse the misrepresentations on a document-by-document basis. This is wholly unsupported by the authorities. “Where a number of statements form a single representation because they are connected by express reference or identity of subject-matter, they must be considered together to ascertain whether their joint effect is a true or false representation” (Spencer Bower, Turner & Handley, Actionable Misrepresentation (Butterworths, 4th Ed, 2000) (“Spencer Bower”) at para 93). This is a fortiori for what is essentially a single representation that is repeated across three documents, and whereupon acts of reliance cannot be cleanly disentangled and attributed to individual documents.

  74. [57] Another potential counterargument is that the tort of misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or negligent, is complete only when acted upon (Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333 at 353; Goldrich Venture Pte Ltd and another v Halcyon Offshore Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 990 (“Goldrich”) at [41]); and because various entities acted upon the misrepresentation at various times, each instance of reliance by each entity must be analysed separately, and The Albaforth must apply to each aforesaid instance, namely that the place of the tort is where the representation is received and acted upon (“the separate tort thesis”). The plaintiff did not rely on the separate tort thesis explicitly, but argued that the place of the tort must be taken to be in Singapore because the Vessels were transferred to and continue to be owned by Singapore entities, continue to be registered and sail under the Singapore flag; and damage arising from excess fuel consumption is suffered in Singapore.

  75. [58] There is no authority that the separate tort thesis is applicable in general to all torts (depending on when the tort in question is taken to be complete) or in particular to the tort of misrepresentation. The only tort that the thesis applies to is defamation, whereby each instance of publication gives rise to a separate tort (Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 (“Lee Hsien Loong”) at [34] and [35], in turn citing Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 (“Berezovsky”) at 1002–1003). But publication is quantitative in a way that reliance is not. If the same defamatory article is published 500 times in Malaysia and 500 times in Singapore, it is easy to conclude that 500 torts have occurred in Singapore and 500 in Malaysia. Acts upon representations cannot and should not be counted in the same way. Take the simple case of a seller misrepresenting that his goods are of a better quality than they turn out to be. The buyer acts upon that misrepresentation by entering into a contract with the seller in Singapore stipulating that payments are to be made in two tranches, and thereafter remitting funds situated in Swiss bank account for the first tranche and funds situated in a Hong Kong bank account for the second tranche. It would be contrived to state that three torts have occurred. On the instant facts, these difficulties are exacerbated by the plaintiffs acting upon the misrepresentations through the use of the Vessels (see also [79] below), which consume fuel at a higher rate than that represented. Is a court to count each trip taken by each of the Vessels as a separate tort? What should be construed as a trip?

  76. [59] Quite apart from the artificiality and difficulty in counting distinct torts, allowing a plaintiff to avail himself of the separate tort thesis would undermine the raison d’etre of our jurisdictional rules as to when a defendant outside of the jurisdiction may be sued in Singapore. The entire point of these jurisdictional rules is the recognition that a foreigner should not easily be put to the inconvenience and annoyance of being brought to contest his rights in Singapore (see [28] above). A plaintiff, defamed on an Internet blog, as a starting point will be able to claim in defamation in the Singapore courts so long as if he can show that the article was downloaded and accessed once in Singapore, and he confines himself to claiming for that one publication. If the article has been published a thousand times in Malaysia but only once in Singapore, recourse may of course be had to the doctrine of abuse of process (Lee Hsien Loong at [30]); but the doctrine is one of last resort, and if the root of the problem is the separate tort thesis then it would surely be simpler to not apply the thesis in the first place. This is exactly what was done in England after Berezovsky was handed down by the House of Lords. The separate tort thesis has been overruled legislatively in England by s 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 (c 26); this was passed partly in response to criticism that the English courts were becoming the preferred location for defamation actions (Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Draft Defamation Bill: Report (HL Paper 203; HC 930-I, 19 October 2011 at paras 54–56).

  77. [60] Indeed the separate court thesis was not applied by the Court of Appeal in JIO Minerals. The first appellant sent a letter of offer via email to the respondent, which contained a representation that the first appellant had a high grade iron ore reserve amounting to one million tonnes. The respondent acted upon the representation twice, by remitting funds from India and conducting drilling works in Indonesia. The court applied the substance test and concluded that the “place of the tort was Indonesia” (emphasis added), thereby holding that one tort governed by Indonesian law arose. Significantly, the court did not hold that two torts had arisen from the two acts of reliance, as this would have necessitated each tort being governed by its own lex loci delicti.

  78. [61] I therefore decline to extend the separate tort thesis to misrepresentation; and particularly in the light of the different direction English law has taken, it may perhaps be opportune for a future Court of Appeal to relook the applicability of the separate tort thesis to defamation.

  79. [62] I conclude this section by declining to apply the flexible exception. I do not see any unfairness or injustice that would be occasioned by the application of either Singapore law or German law; and Rickshaw Investments makes it clear that a Singapore court “must not be quick to apply the exception” (at [57]).

  80. Do the plaintiffs have a good arguable case that their claim satisfies one or more limbs of O 11?

  81. [63] The plaintiffs rely on O 11 rr 1(f)(i), 1(f)(ii) and 1(p). I deal first with whether a tort has arisen before dealing with each of the above limbs seriatim.

  82. Has a tort arisen?

  83. Lex fori

  84. [65] The elements for fraudulent misrepresentation are: first, there must be a representation of fact made by words or conduct; second, the representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff, or by a class of persons which includes the plaintiff (restated, there must be inducement); third, it must be proved that the plaintiff had acted upon the false statement (ie, there must be reliance); fourth, it must be proved that the plaintiff suffered damage by so doing and fifth, the representation must be made with knowledge that it is false; it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true (Panatron Pte Ltd v Lee Cheow Lee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [14]).

  85. [66] The elements for negligent misrepresentation are: first, the defendant must have made a false representation of fact; second, the representation induced actual reliance (see e.g. Fong Maun Yee v Yoong Weng Ho Robert [1997] 1 SLR(R) 751 at [52]); third, the defendant must owe a duty of care; fourth, there must be a breach of that duty of care; and fifth the breach must have caused damage to the plaintiff (Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100).

  86. [67] I deal first with whether there were false representations of fact; this is an element common to both species of misrepresentation. The PPM and FSI represented that fuel consumption was at a certain level and the FAT results represented that fuel consumption was lower than that stated in the aforementioned two documents. MAN Germany then admitted in a press release that there were possible irregularities during handover of four-stroke marine diesel engines, in that it was possible to externally influence fuel consumption values. MAN Germany then wrote to Norgas Carriers AS and Skaugen Norway, admitting that three MAN engines were externally influenced in an improper manner during FATs. I note that all the six MAN engines were identically designed, and all were manufactured and tested in the same factory operated by MAN Germany; it is therefore highly probable that the fuel consumption values for the other three MAN engines were similarly tampered with. The plaintiffs have undoubtedly shown on a good arguable case basis that there were false representations of fact.

  87. [68] I turn to inducement and reliance, issues which the parties had devoted much time to. Both are common elements to both species of misrepresentation. I deal first with the events surrounding the initial acquisition of the Vessels. Skaugen Norway, acting on behalf of Somargas Cayman, selected MAN Engines for the first four shipbuilding contracts after receiving the PPM. Skaugen Norway, acting on behalf of Vintergas, then selected MAN Engines for the subsequent two shipbuilding contracts after receipt of the PPM and the Fuel Information System document. The six engines were tested prior to delivery in 2001 and 2002. The FAT results showed fuel consumption at certain levels, and Skaugen Norway accepted the engines.

  88. [70] The defendants had another string to their bow, and argued that the FSI was provided to the Chinese shipbuilders for the purpose of enabling the Chinese shipbuilders to choose the correct components for the construction of the vessels. They place much weight on the proposition that an indirect recipient of a statement can only bring a claim in misrepresentation if it can be shown that the representor intended for him to have acted in reliance on the statement (see also [77] below).

  89. [71] I have no quarrel with the mentioned proposition but it is inapplicable to the instant facts simply because Skaugen Norway directly received the PPM and Somargas Cayman and Vintergas (for which Skaugen Norway was acting on behalf of and whose claims have been assigned to the plaintiffs) directly received FAT results, and indeed the defendants do not dispute this. With respect to the FATs, the documentary evidence discloses that representatives from “Skaugen” (it is unclear which Skaugen entity) were present at three FATs and representatives from Skaugen-related entities were present at the other three FATs. As I have mentioned the representations were such that they were essentially repeated across three documents, and the plaintiffs directly received two of them. What I do take issue with is the defendants’ implicit position that the misrepresentations as to fuel consumption must be analysed on a document-by-document basis (a point I made at [56] above and repeat here).

  90. [72] Furthermore misrepresentations are regarded as continuing until they are acted upon (Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333). Looking at events holistically, the plaintiffs (or Somargas Cayman and Vintergas which had assigned their claims to the plaintiffs) acted on the misrepresentations not just by initiating the chain of contracts that led to the installation of MAN engines in the Vessels, but by adhering to and causing the Chinese shipbuilders to adhere those contracts all the way to fruition and ultimately accepting the MAN engines when they were delivered (instead of exercising their contractual right to reject the engines, see [75] below).

  91. [73] The misrepresentations as to fuel consumption were undoubtedly material. The fuel consumption of a marine diesel engine is one of its important attributes: “[m]ateriality may be so clear and the probability of inducement so great that actual inducement may be found with little or no other evidence” (Spencer Bower at para 127). Additionally fuel consumption was of enough importance to the plaintiffs that the shipbuilding contracts with the Chinese shipbuilders contained provisions that provided for certain consequences to follow if fuel consumption was higher than expected (nevertheless see [75] below).

  92. [74] I now analyse the events after delivery, particularly the transfers of ownership to various Skaugen-related entities. The defendants essentially argue that representations were not made directly to subsequent successors in title, and the successors could not have relied on the representations in taking ownership or possession of the vessel and it was never within the defendant’s reasonable contemplation that any successors would place any reliance. If at all only Somargas Cayman and Vintergas relied upon them; and the successors in title only took ownership because of corporate restructuring and not representations as to fuel consumption levels. The plaintiffs argue that misrepresentations do not have to be made directly; the defendants did intend for the misrepresentations to be received by successors in title; and the said successors did rely on the misrepresentations.

  93. [75] The defendants argue that the six shipbuilding contracts contained clauses which limited the loss suffered if fuel consumption was higher than expected and therefore successors in title cannot claim for their losses. Clause 5 of article I of the initial four shipbuilding contracts between Skaugen Norway and the Chinese shipbuilders which stated that “the [shipbuilder] guarantees that the fuel oil consumption of the Main Engine is not to exceed the chosen Main Engine Supplier’s guaranteed specific fuel consumption…” Clause 3 of article III of the same spells out certain consequences if the fuel consumption “as determined by shop trial” (a clear reference to what in this judgment’s parlance is a FAT) was greater than certain percentages:

  94. [76] I do not see how this assists the defendants. Firstly, the defendants are not privy to the contracts between the Chinese shipbuilders and either Skaugen Norway or Vintergas. Secondly, the clauses refer to fuel consumption “as determined by shop trial” and therefore implicitly assume the veracity of the FAT results. The clauses do not envisage the FAT results being tampered with and do not apply to losses flowing from such a scenario. Thirdly, assuming arguendo that the defendants can avail themselves of clauses in shipbuilding contracts despite not being privy to them, the clauses are not exclusion clauses that purport to exclude or limit liability for fraud or negligence on the part of a third party engine manufacturer.

  95. [77] The cases establish that the fact of a representation being made indirectly is not a bar, provided that the representation is made in the contemplation that the representation will continue in force and be acted on by that indirect representee (Goldrich at [43]). There is evidence that the defendants did not draw any distinctions between individual entities within the Skaugen Group, and knew that representations would be transmitted to and acted upon by those individual entities. There were indications right from the outset that Skaugen Norway would be acting on behalf of related entities. The first four shipbuilding contracts were novated by Skaugen Norway to Somargas Cayman prior to the Chinese shipbuilders entering into the first four supply contracts with MAN Germany; and it was Vintergas that entered into the subsequent two shipbuilding contracts. Despite this representatives from “Skaugen” were the ones who attended the FATs. Furthermore when MAN Germany wrote about the possible tampering, they wrote not just to the managers of the Vessels, but also directly to Skaugen Norway; and one letter dated 22 June 2012 even explicitly stated that “[a]ccording to our information you [Skaugen Norway] were the initial owner of the engines…” despite the initial owners being Somargas Cayman and Vintergas. Therefore the successors in title, so long as they are Skaugen-related entities, are indirect representees within the contemplation of the defendants.

  96. [78] Nonetheless the manner in which a representee acts upon a representation must also be within the contemplation of the representor. Thus in William Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377, a fraudulent share prospectus circulated to the public was calculated to induce reliance only in initial subscribers and not purchasers who had bought through the stock exchange; but in Possfund Ltd v Diamond [1996] 1 WLR 1351, another case concerning a fraudulent prospectus, the court refused to strike out an action brought by aftermarket purchasers because there was expert evidence that the established purpose of a prospectus was no longer confined to inducing investors to become placees and extended to inducing the public to make aftermarket purchases.

  97. [79] However, a share in a company is not equivalent to a marine diesel engine. The former is an incorporeal chose in action (Pacrim Investments Pte Ltd v Tan Mui Keow Claire [2005] 1 SLR(R) 141 at [20] or at least something incorporeal and sui generis (Tan Yock Lin at para 19.002); the latter is a corporeal chattel. A distinction may have been drawn between initial subscribers and aftermarket purchasers of shares in companies; but it is doubtful if a similar distinction can or should be drawn between an initial purchaser and subsequent owners of marine diesel engines. A marine diesel engine is a corporeal object that is used to propel ships; and despite the defendants’ protestations to the contrary the utilisation of a marine diesel engine to propel ships is surely something that was within their contemplation. Indeed there is case authority that the use of a corporeal object that is the subject of a misrepresentation constitutes an act upon that misrepresentation. In Langridge v Levy (1837) 2 M & W 519, the plaintiff’s father bought a gun from the defendant who fraudulently warranted the gun to have been manufactured by a reputable gun manufacturer and to be good, safe and secure. The plaintiff “used the gun, and thereby sustained the damage which is the subject of this complaint” (at 532); the defendant was held liable.

  98. [80] The plaintiffs have therefore shown a good arguable case that they were induced to rely, and did rely on the defendants’ misrepresentations.

  99. [81] It also goes without saying that the successors in title have suffered damage: either from having had to purchase more fuel, or from a diminution of the market value of the Vessels due to the now public knowledge of the actual higher fuel consumption levels. The appropriate measure of damages is of course not an issue that is before me.

  100. [82] I now analyse elements specific to each species of misrepresentation. For fraudulent misrepresentation the plaintiffs must also show that the representation must be made with the knowledge that it is false or in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true. MAN Germany has admitted that there were indications that the fuel consumption values of three engines were “externally influenced in an improper manner during [FATs]” (at [14] above). It appears that MAN Germany had systematically tampered with FAT results, not only for the six engines that are the subject of this suit but for a plethora of other engines, as evidenced by the May 2011 press release and the subsequent criminal proceedings whereby MAN Germany was fined 8.2 million euros. The plaintiffs certainly have a good arguable case in this regard. Therefore the plaintiffs have shown, on a good arguable basis, that all the elements for fraudulent misrepresentation have been met.

  101. [83] I turn to negligent misrepresentation. It is well established that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to end users (Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562). It is factually foreseeable that end users will be harmed if the fuel consumption of a marine diesel engine is represented to be less than what it actually is; there is sufficient proximity because first, the defendants possessed greater knowledge of its own products; second, the plaintiffs were in a position of vulnerability because the defendants were the ones with the requisite skill to conduct the FATs and were in full control of the whole testing process; and third the plaintiffs were actually present during the testing process and the defendants knew full well that Skaugen entities would be the end users of the MAN engines. There are no policy considerations which militate against the imposition of a duty of care. There were obviously breaches of this duty of care, in that the fuel consumption values represented were inaccurate. Therefore the plaintiffs have shown, on a good arguable basis, that all the elements for negligent misrepresentation have been met.

  102. Lex loci delicti

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