Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 6 August 2025
Serving court papers on a lawyer who filed a notice of appointment was invalid here
Malayan Banking Bhd v Zhang Zhencheng
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC(A) 11 · Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 39 of 2025 · 21 paragraphs
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Serving court papers on a lawyer who filed a notice of appointment was invalid here
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [19], [32]
There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Facts
- [3]
[3] On 29 August 2024, Malayan Banking Berhad (the appellant) commenced HC/OA 870/2024 (“OA 870”) for the enforcement of two mortgages granted by Mr Zhang Zhencheng (the respondent).
- [4]
[4] On the same day, the appellant’s solicitors, Shook Lin & Bok LLP (“SLB”) wrote to the respondent’s solicitors, LVM Law Chambers LLC (“LVMLC”), to ask whether LVMLC had instructions from the respondent to accept service of the originating process for OA 870.
- [5]
[5] On 3 September 2024, LVMLC replied that it had no such instruction.
- [7]
[7] On 18 September 2024, LVMLC filed a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor in OA 870 (the “NOAS”) which states that the named solicitors from LVMLC “ha[d] been appointed to act as the solicitor of [the respondent] in this action”.
- [9]
[9] After SUM 2795 was served, it was heard on 11 November 2024. An Assistant Registrar (the “AR”) reserved judgment and adjourned the hearing to 18 November 2024 at 2.30pm.
- [12]
[12] On 12 December 2024, LVMLC filed HC/SUM 3639/2024 to set aside the Service. The AR dismissed that application.
- [13]
[13] In HC/RA 30/2025, the respondent appealed against the entirety of the AR’s decision. The Judge allowed the appeal.
- [14]
[14] The appellant then filed AD/OA 9/2025 (“OA 9”) to seek permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. We granted the appellant permission to bring the present appeal. This was on the grounds that the matter concerned a question of general principle decided for the first time and a question of importance upon which further arguments and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public’s advantage.
Decision below
- [15]
[15] In his brief grounds of decision (“GD”), the Judge identified the “core issue” as whether O 4 r 8(2) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”) supersedes the requirement of personal service of an originating process under O 6 r 4 (at [7]). Specifically, O 4 r 8(2) provides that a party’s solicitor “is deemed to be acting for the party in the action until the final conclusion … and his or her business address is deemed to be the address for service of all documents in the action until such conclusion”. A “[c]onnected” issue was whether filing the NOAS amounted to the respondent’s agreement for LVMLC to accept service on his behalf (GD at [7]).
- [16]
[16] The Judge answered both issues in the negative. While the “plain words” of O 4 r 8(2) supported the appellant’s position that the respondent should be deemed to have agreed to accept service of all documents on the respondent’s behalf upon filing the NOAS (GD at [7(a)]), the following suggested otherwise:
(a) First, if the appellant were correct, O 6 r 12(5) of the ROC – which states that filing an affidavit to challenge jurisdiction does not amount to submission – would be rendered otiose. As the respondent submitted, the NOAS cannot “automatically determin[e] the existence of the court’s jurisdiction … when the filing of an affidavit to challenge that jurisdiction (a pre-requisite of which is the filing of the NOAS) is not treated as a submission” (GD at [7(b)]).
(b) Second, as the respondent pointed out, the rules in the ROC that depart from the requirement of personal service under O 6 r 4 do so expressly, which was not the case for O 4 r 8(2) (GD at [7(e)]). In his supplemental grounds of decision, the Judge added that the word “service” in O 4 r 8(2) does not include personal service because the rule only contemplates “service on an address”, whereas personal service requires “service on a person” (at [2(a)]).
(c) Third, the authorities relied on by the appellant did not support its position. The commentary that “[s]o long as the solicitor to a party in an action remains on the record, service on that solicitor is good service” (Singapore Civil Procedure 2022 vol I (Cavinder Bull SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2022) (the “White Book”) at para 4/8/6), was not on point. As to the Law Society of Singapore’s Practice Direction (“Practice Direction”) 8.5.4 which states that a solicitor on record is not entitled to refuse acceptance of service of any documents, it took on “a completely different complexion when read with [Practice Direction] 8.5.10 addressing the peculiarities of personal service of originating process” (GD at [7(d)]).
(d) Moreover, the case of Madison Pacific Trust Ltd and others v PT Dewata Wibawa and others [2024] SGHC 184 (“Madison”) suggested that filing a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor in itself, without more, does not mean the party had instructed his solicitors to accept service (GD at [7(f)]).
(e) There was “little sympathy” for the appellant’s argument that LVMLC had created ambiguity in filing the NOAS without clarifying whether it had instructions to accept service (GD at [6]). A prescribed form was prescribed for a good reason, so substantial changes are not expected to be made to it (GD at [5]). The “logical course of action” was for SLB to clarify with LVMLC if the previous instructions from the respondent had changed (GD at [6]).
Issue to be determined
- [17]
[17] As the Service was effected through eLitigation, the requirements for electronic filing service under O 28 r 12 of the ROC are applicable. It provides that a document requiring personal service may be served via eLitigation if: (a) the party to be served is represented by a solicitor who is an authorised or a registered user of eLitigation; and (b) the party agrees to service using the electronic filing service. Such agreement is deemed if he has instructed his solicitor to accept service of a document requiring personal service.
The court’s decision
- [19]
[19] In our view, the Service is invalid as the NOAS, filed in the circumstances of this case, does not suggest that LVMLC was instructed by the respondent to accept service of originating process on his behalf.
- [20]
[20] The appellant placed much emphasis on O 4 r 8(2) of the ROC. For context, we set out O 4 rr 8(1) to 8(4) below:
- [22]
[22] However, the appellant accepted that this argument in the preceding paragraph was subject to the following qualifications:
(a) if the NOAS itself had been qualified in some way; or
(b) if LVMLC had informed SLB that the NOAS was qualified prior to the service of any document pursuant to the NOAS.
Importantly, the appellant did not suggest that the qualification after the NOAS had been filed and served had to be in any particular form. In other words, although O 4 r 8(2) refers to notice being given according to the rule (ie, by filing a Notice of Change of Solicitor under O 4 r 8(3) or by filing a Notice of Intention to Act in Person under O 4 r 8(4)) and there are prescribed forms for such a notice, it is the substance of the notice and not the form which is important especially if the notice is not given under either O 4 rr 8(3) or 8(4).
- [25]
[25] As for the scope of O 4 r 8(2), we note that in the usual course of things, a claimant would have validly served an originating process on the defendant, in one way or another, before a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor is filed. Although the parties’ arguments on appeal focused on whether “service” in O 4 r 8(2) referred to both personal and ordinary service or only the latter, there is some merit in the argument that “service of all documents in the action” in O 4 r 8(2) was not intended to apply to the service of an originating process in the first place but to other subsequent documents (eg, pleadings, interlocutory applications, affidavits and written submissions). In particular, the word “action” is defined in O 1 r 3(1) of the ROC as “proceedings commenced by an originating claim or an originating application”. As an originating process is a document that initiates the action itself, it gives rise to an action, rather than being a document arising “in the action”. This reading also seems consistent with the purpose of O 4 r 8 which is to ensure that the status of a party’s legal representation is properly communicated to the court and the other parties, and that any changes in the course of the proceedings are accurately reflected on record in the interest of effective communication and service of documents (Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Singapore Civil Practice (LexisNexis, 2022) (“Singapore Civil Practice”) at para 12-118). Specifically, it appears to us that O 4 r 8(2) provides for a presumption of ongoing representation and a deemed address for service to preserve continuity and avoid any confusion or disruption caused by unnotified changes in a party’s solicitor-client relationship in the midst of the proceedings. In other words, O 4 r 8(2) arguably only contemplates a situation after service of an originating process has been validly effected.
- [26]
[26] The appellant also referred to the following commentaries on O 4 r 8(2):
(a) Singapore Rules of Court – A Practice Guide (Chua Lee Ming ed-in-chief, Paul Quan gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2023) at para 04.028 which states that O 4 r 8(2) is a “new” provision providing for a default position that “the solicitor’s business address is deemed to be the service address for all documents in the action”;
(b) the White Book at para 4/8/6 (cited at [16(c)] above); and
(c) Singapore Civil Practice at para 12-118 (cited at [25] above), para 12-120 (which states that the rebuttable presumption that a party’s solicitor is deemed to be acting for the party “arises pursuant to the appointment”) and para 12-123 (which states that in the absence of a notice, “the opposing party (if he is unaware of the change) would be entitled to continue to serve documents on the previous solicitor (because he is still on the record)”.
However, these commentaries are general statements which do not specifically take into account the particular facts before us and do not assist the appellant.
- [27]
[27] In any event, in the circumstances before us, it is unnecessary to reach a definitive conclusion on the scope of O 4 r 8(2). Even if it does apply to an originating process, as noted above, the circumstances in the present case made it clear that the NOAS was for the purpose of SUM 2795 and subject to its outcome.
- [28]
[28] We also note the Judge’s view that O 6 r 12(5) of the ROC supported the respondent’s position that the NOAS does not necessarily mean that service of an originating process may be effected on the solicitor in question because service would determine the existence of the court’s jurisdiction when in fact that jurisdiction was being challenged. We reproduce the Judge’s reasoning below (GD at [7(b)]–[7(c)]):
- [30]
[30] For completeness, in so far as the Judge was of the view that the case of Madison lent support to his conclusion (see [16(d)] above), we note that the point was not argued in that case. It is also unnecessary to address the Practice Directions (see [16(c)] above) as the parties did not rely on them on appeal.
Application to dispense with personal service
Conclusion
- [32]
[32] For the above reasons, we agree with the Judge that the Service is invalid. While the appellant complained that the respondent was evading service to delay the hearing of OA 870, the requirements of service must still be followed.
- [34]
[34] The usual consequential orders will apply as regards any security provided by the appellant for OA 9 and for this appeal.