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Grounds publishedDecided 17 Jul 2024

General Division of the High Court

Madison Pacific Trust Ltd and others v PT Dewata Wibawa and others

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[2024] SGHC 184Case no. Originating Application No 894 of 2023(Summons No 387 of 2024)59 paragraphs

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  1. Background facts

  2. [2] References in these grounds to “applicant”, “applicants”, “defendant” or “defendants” will refer to the applicant/s or defendant/s in the present proceedings unless otherwise specifically stated.

  3. [3] The applicants and the defendants were parties to an agreement (the “Agreement”) under which:

  4. (a) the second to fourth applicants granted a loan to the first and second defendants;

  5. (b) the first applicant was the security agent;

  6. (c) the third defendant and two other entities, DS Global Holdings Pte Ltd (“DS Global”) and Rodamco Indonesia BV (“Rodamco”), were guarantors of the first and second defendants.

  7. [4] The Agreement contained an arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”) that provided for disputes to be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (6th Edition, 1 August 2016). The seat of the arbitration was to be Singapore.

  8. [5] In December 2021, the first and second defendants commenced arbitration proceedings against the applicants (the “Arbitration”). The main contention by the first and second defendants was that the Agreement had been discharged. Subsequently, the three guarantors (the third defendant, DS Global and Rodamco), were joined as the third, fourth and fifth claimants, respectively, in the Arbitration.

  9. [6] In January 2023, the arbitral tribunal (the “Tribunal”) issued a partial award in which the Tribunal dismissed the claim that the Agreement had been discharged (the “Partial Award”).

  10. [7] By way of letter dated 8 February 2023, Gabriel Law Corporation (“GLC”) informed the Tribunal that the defendants and DS Global would be “appealing” against the Partial Award and they would not be participating in the Arbitration until the “appeal” was finally resolved. The letter did not refer to Rodamco as the applicants had taken over operation and control of the company. Although the letter used the words “appealing” and “appeal”, it was clear that the defendants and DS Global were referring to their right to apply to set aside the Partial Award under the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed). Shortly after, GLC sent an email informing the Tribunal that they had been discharged from acting for the claimants in the Arbitration.

  11. [8] On 17 February 2023, the third defendant sent an email to the Tribunal making a number of serious allegations concerning the Tribunal’s conduct and impartiality. The Tribunal denied the allegations. In the same email, the defendants and DS Global also withdrew their claim in the Arbitration against the second to fourth applicants for malicious prosecution of the 1st and 2nd PKPU Applications (see [11] and [12] below).

  12. The applicants’ PKPU applications in Jakarta

  13. [11] In November 2021, the second to fourth applicants commenced Suspension of Debt Payment Obligations (known in Indonesia as Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang (“PKPU”)) proceedings in the fourth applicant’s name in the Central Jakarta District Court against the first and second defendants to enforce their rights under the Agreement (the “1st PKPU Application”). As stated earlier, the first and second defendants commenced the Arbitration in December 2021. The first and second defendants relied on the existence of the then ongoing Arbitration for their objection to the 1st PKPU Application. On 19 January 2022, the Indonesian court dismissed the 1st PKPU Application.

  14. [12] In March 2022, the second to fourth applicants again commenced PKPU proceedings in the fourth applicant’s name in the Central Jakarta District Court against the first and second defendants to enforce their rights under the Agreement (the “2nd PKPU Application”). The first and second defendants again relied on the existence of the then ongoing Arbitration to successfully obtain a dismissal of the 2nd PKPU Application.

  15. [13] Both the 1st and 2nd PKPU Applications were submitted to provide an opportunity for the first and second defendants to submit a settlement plan for the repayment of their debts. The petitions for both Applications were signed by one Mr Jason Tabalujan (“Tabalujan”) on behalf of the fourth applicant.

  16. [14] Following the issuance of the Partial Award, on 6 February 2023, the second to fourth applicants again commenced PKPU proceedings in the Central Jakarta District Court against the first and second defendants to enforce their rights under the Agreement (the “3rd PKPU Application”). The proceedings were again commenced by way of a petition filed by the fourth applicant except that this time, the petition was signed by one Mr Ranjan Lath (“Lath”).

  17. [15] On 9 May 2023, the first and second defendants successfully obtained a dismissal of the 3rd PKPU Application by relying on the existence of the Setting Aside Application, which was then still pending. As stated in [10] above, the Setting Aside Application was dismissed on 21 August 2023.

  18. The defendants’ court actions in Jakarta

  19. 1st Jakarta Court Action

  20. [16] On 9 February 2023 (after the Tribunal issued the Partial Award), the defendants commenced a claim in the Central Jakarta District Court against the second to fourth applicants and Tabalujan (the “1st Jakarta Court Claim”). As stated in [13] above, Tabalujan had signed the petitions in the 1st and 2nd PKPU Applications. The defendants claimed that the second to fourth applicants had acted in bad faith and had committed an unlawful act in prosecuting the 1st and 2nd PKPU Applications because the Applications were in breach of the Agreement and the Arbitration which was ongoing then. The defendants also sought the “confiscation” of all bills/receivables due to the second to fourth applicants pursuant to the Agreement, and the suspension of the second to fourth applicants’ rights under the Agreement and related security documents including guarantees.

  21. [17] On 18 December 2023, the second to fourth applicants and Tabalujan submitted a jurisdiction challenge by which they contended that the Central Jakarta District Court had no jurisdiction in respect of the 1st Jakarta Court Claim as the claims were subject to the Arbitration Agreement. On 4 March 2024, the Central Jakarta District Court dismissed the 1st Jakarta Court Action on the ground that it had no jurisdiction.

  22. [18] On 7 March 2024, the defendants appealed against the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court dismissing the 1st Jakarta Court Claim.

  23. 2nd Jakarta Court Claim

  24. [19] On 11 May 2023, the defendants commenced another claim in the Central Jakarta District against the second to fourth applicants and Lath (the “2nd Jakarta Court Claim”). As stated in [14] above, Lath had signed the petition filed in the 3rd PKPU Application. The defendants’ claim was again premised on allegations of an unlawful act by the second to fourth applicants. As in the case of the 1st Jakarta Court Claim, the defendants also sought the “confiscation” of all bills/receivables due to the second to fourth applicants pursuant to the Agreement, and the suspension of the second to fourth applicants’ rights under the Agreement and related security documents including guarantees.

  25. Anti-suit injunction

  26. [20] On 4 September 2023, the applicants filed the present originating application, HC/OA 894/2023 (“OA 894”), seeking (among other things) an anti-suit injunction against the defendants.

  27. (a) The defendants, whether by themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise howsoever, shall immediately each be restrained from:

  28. (i) proceeding with or continuing with or assisting or participating in the prosecution of the 1st Jakarta Court Claim other than to take steps to withdraw and/or discontinue the same;

  29. (ii) proceeding with or continuing with or assisting or participating in the prosecution of the 2nd Jakarta Court Claim other than to take steps to withdraw and/or discontinue the same; and

  30. (iii) commencing and/or proceeding with or continuing with or assisting or participating in any other claims in the courts of Indonesia against any of the applicants (including their directors and/or former directors) pertaining to any subject matter which falls within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

  31. (b) It is declared that the 1st and 2nd Jakarta Court Claims are in breach of the Arbitration Agreement.

  32. [22] On 11 March 2024, the defendants filed HC/OA 245/2024 (“OA 245”) in which they sought the following orders:

  33. (a) The service of the originating application in OA 894 be set aside and that pending the final disposal of the application in OA 245 (including any appeals therefrom), all proceedings in OA 894 be stayed.

  34. Committal proceedings

  35. [23] On 11 December 2023, the applicants filed HC/SUM 3802/2023 seeking permission to make an application for committal.

  36. [26] On 15 March 2024, the defendants applied, by way of HC/SUM 736/2024, to stay all proceedings in OA 894 (including the Committal Application) pending the final disposal of OA 245 (the “Stay Application”).

  37. The Stay Application

  38. [31] Section 21 AJPA states:

  39. [32] It appeared from the third defendant’s affidavit filed in support of OA 245 that the grounds for OA 245 were as follows:

  40. (a) the service of the originating petition in OA 894 was invalid because it did not comply with Indonesian law;

  41. [35] Accordingly, I dismissed the Stay Application. The defendants have not appealed against my decision dismissing the Stay Application.

  42. The Committal Application

  43. [36] The Committal Application was against only the third defendant (see [24] and [25] above). The applicants alleged that the third defendant committed contempt of court in his personal capacity, pursuant to s 4(1)(a) AJPA, and in his capacity as the first defendant’s sole director, pursuant to s 6(2) read with s 4(1) AJPA.

  44. [37] Section 4(1) AJPA states:

  45. [38] Section 6(2) AJPA states:

  46. [40] The third defendant submitted that he should not be punished for contempt of court because:

  47. (a) the service of the Committal Application was not valid; and

  48. (b) he was entitled to rely on the defence in s 21 AJPA.

  49. Whether service of the Committal Application was valid

  50. (a) the application for permission to make an application for committal and the supporting affidavit;

  51. [42] In the present case, the applicants served the Committal Documents:

  52. (a) by leaving copies of the same at the registered address of GLC; and

  53. Service on GLC

  54. [43] One of the ways of effecting personal service is to effect service “in any manner agreed with the person or entity to be served”: O 7 r 2(1)(d) ROC 2021.

  55. [44] The applicants relied on cl 43.3 of the Agreement which provided as follows:

  56. The term “Obligor” included the third defendant. The term “Finance Document” included the Agreement. The term “Agent” referred to the first applicant.

  57. [46] I disagreed with the third defendant’s submissions. Clause 43.3(a)(ii) applied to service of process “arising out of or in connection with … any proceedings before the courts of Singapore arising out of or in connection with any Finance Document …” The words “arising out of or in connection with” are words of broad import, which should be given their natural meaning in the context in which they are found: Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2004] 3 SLR(R) 184 at [12].

  58. [48] The third defendant next submitted that the applicants could not rely on cl 43.3(a) because the defendants, DS Global and Rodamco had revoked the appointment of GLC as process agent in an email to GLC dated 25 May 2023.

  59. [49] I rejected the third defendant’s submission. Under cl 43.3(a)(i), the third defendant’s appointment of GLC as his process agent was irrevocable. The third defendant was not entitled to unilaterally disavow cl 43.3 by simply informing GLC that its appointment as process agent was revoked.

  60. [50] The third defendant sought to rely on cl 43.3(b), which dealt with the situation where the appointed process agent was unable for any reason to act as process agent. In my view, cl 43.3(b) did not come into play. The third defendant’s revocation of the appointment of GLC was in breach of the cl 43.3(a) and was not effective as against the applicants.

  61. [51] In my view, the applicants had validly effected personal service on the third defendant by way of service on GLC pursuant to cl 43.3(a) of the Agreement.

  62. Service on DRD LLP

  63. [53] It should be noted that it was sufficient for the applicants’ case that service on either GLC or DRD LLP constituted valid service.

  64. [57] What then would constitute an “appropriate case” for the dispensation of personal service? Personal service has traditionally been viewed as the most effective means of ensuring that the recipient is notified of the documents: Singapore Rules of Court – A Practice Guide (Chua Lee Ming editor-in-chief) (Academy Publishing, 2023) at para 07.004. In my view (without in any way limiting the scope of O 7 r 1(2)), it would be an appropriate case to dispense with personal service if personal service can reasonably be expected to be difficult or disproportionately time-consuming and the mode of ordinary service to be employed would be as effective in ensuring that the recipient is notified of the documents. Such an approach would be consistent with the Ideals of achieving expeditious proceedings and fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties: O 3 r 1(2)(b) and (e) ROC 2021.

  65. [58] Under O 7 r 3(e), ordinary service may be effected in any manner which the Court may direct, including the use of electronic means. This provision gives the Court a broad discretion as to the manner in which ordinary service may be effected, subject of course to the overarching consideration that the manner of service can be expected to notify the recipient of the documents.

  66. [60] I was satisfied that this was an appropriate case for me to exercise my discretion under O 7 r 1(2) ROC 2021 to dispense with personal service on the third defendant and to permit the applicants to effect ordinary service by way of email to DRD LLP. In my view, ordinary service by way of email to DRD LLP would be effective in ensuring that the third defendant was notified of the documents.

  67. Approval for service out of jurisdiction was not required

  68. [61] The third defendant further submitted that the applicants had to apply for the court’s approval to serve out of Singapore (which they had not done) because he was a citizen and resident of Indonesia and at all material times was not physically present in Singapore.

  69. [62] In my view, the third defendant’s submission was misconceived. The issue of applying for approval to serve out of the jurisdiction simply did not arise. The court’s approval is required only if an originating process or other court document is to be served out of Singapore: O 8 r 1(1) ROC 2021. In the present case, the Committal Documents were served in Singapore on GLC and DRD LLP. The fact that the third defendant was outside the jurisdiction was irrelevant in this regard.

  70. Whether the third defendant could rely on s 21 AJPA

  71. [63] The third defendant claimed that he was advised and honestly believed that:

  72. (b) the service that was effected on him was not compliant with Indonesian law and did not have any legally binding effect on him.

  73. [64] According to the third defendant, the defendants were advised that under Indonesian law, legal documents for international proceedings must be served by requesting Singapore’s diplomatic representatives to request a rogatory letter to the Indonesian Supreme Court, which would in turn effect physical delivery through the relevant Indonesian court officials.

  74. [65] The third defendant submitted that s 21 AJPA afforded him a defence. It would be useful to set out s 21 AJPA again. Section 21 states:

  75. [66] To succeed under s 21 AJPA, the third defendant had to show on a balance of probabilities (see s 29 AJPA) that:

  76. (d) he ought fairly to be excused.

  77. [67] The issues before me were:

  78. (b) whether the third defendant’s mistake was honest and reasonable.

  79. There was no dispute that if both issues were answered in affirmative, the third defendant ought fairly to be excused. On the other hand, if either of the issues was answered in the negative, the defence under s 21 AJPA would not be available to the third defendant.

  80. Whether the third defendant failed to understand the obligation imposed on him by the ASI

  81. There is nothing to suggest that Parliament intended s 21 AJPA to depart from the common law position.

  82. Whether the third defendant’s mistake was honest and reasonable.

  83. [79] Further, in HC/OA 550/2023 (“OA 550”), the third defendant had, through his Singapore counsel, argued before a Singapore court against the validity of service effected pursuant to cl 43.3 of the Agreement. The applicants had filed OA 550 to enforce certain interim orders made by the Tribunal as orders of the Singapore Court. The interim orders were designed to preserve the integrity of the security under the Agreement. The court papers in OA 550 were served on the third defendant through GLC pursuant to cl 43.3 of the Agreement. The third defendant would have been aware from OA 550 that the question as to the validity of service effected pursuant to cl 43.3 of the Agreement was a question for a Singapore court.

  84. [81] Even if the decision not to seek advice from Singapore counsel was not deliberate, that decision was not a reasonable one given the circumstances of the case. The third defendant had the opportunity to consult, and ought to have consulted, his Singapore lawyers. No explanation has been given as to why he did not consult Singapore lawyers.

  85. The third defendant was guilty of contempt

  86. [82] Accordingly, I found the third defendant guilty of contempt:

  87. Sentencing

  88. [83] Under s 12(1)(a) AJPA, the punishment is a fine not exceeding $100,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both.

  89. [85] The third defendant submitted that a fine was sufficient punishment and deterrence. He argued that imprisonment would have greater deterrent effect on a contemnor who is resident in Singapore, whereas he was ordinarily resident in Indonesia. He submitted a fine of $40,000 for each offence.

  90. [87] As the Court of Appeal held in Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (at [103]), in most cases involving continuing breaches, the sentence to be imposed would include both punitive and coercive elements. In my view, although the third defendant was ordinarily resident in Indonesia, the coercive element was still an important factor. The third defendant described himself as a “reputable businessman with friends and connections in Singapore”.

  91. (a) If the third defendant’s claims in the 1st and 2nd Jakarta Court Claims were discontinued by 7 June 2024, the imprisonment term of two months against the third defendant for contempt in his personal capacity was to be substituted with a fine of $50,000 (in default, seven days imprisonment) to be paid within seven days of such discontinuance.

  92. (b) If the first defendant’s claims in the 1st and 2nd Jakarta Court Claims were discontinued by 7 June 2024, the imprisonment term of two months against the third defendant for contempt in his capacity as the first defendant’s sole director was to be substituted with a fine of $50,000 (in default, seven days imprisonment) to be paid within seven days of such discontinuance.

  93. (c) If the first and third defendants’ claims in the 1st and 2nd Jakarta Court Claims were not discontinued by 7 June 2024, the third defendant was to surrender to the Sheriff of the High Court by noon on 10 June 2024 to serve the respective terms of imprisonment.

  94. Subsequent events

  95. 1st Jakarta Court Claim

  96. [89] As stated in [18] above, the defendants appealed against the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court dismissing the 1st Jakarta Court Claim. On 21 May 2024, the Jakarta High Court dismissed the defendants’ appeal.

  97. [90] On 4 June 2024, the second defendant filed an appeal on cassation to the Supreme Court of Indonesia against the Jakarta High Court’s decision dismissing the defendants’ appeal in the 1st Jakarta Court Claim.

  98. [91] On 5 June 2024, the first and third defendants’ Indonesian counsel informed the Central Jakarta District Court that they would not file a cassation petition and waived their right to do so. The first and third defendants’ right of appeal lapsed on 6 June 2024 and, according to the first and third defendants, the 1st Jakarta Court Claim was deemed discontinued in so far as they were concerned.

  99. 2nd Jakarta Court Claim

  100. [92] On 22 May 2024, a hearing for the 2nd Jakarta Court Claim took place during which the defendants’ Indonesian counsel informed the Court that there was no change to the defendants’ case.

  101. [93] On 30 May 2024, the first and third defendants’ Indonesian counsel requested the Central Jakarta District Court to discontinue the examination process of the 2nd Jakarta Court Claim.

  102. Dispute over whether the third defendant had purged his contempt

  103. [94] The third defendant took the position that he had purged his contempt and that the sentences of imprisonment were therefore substituted with fines. On 12 June 2024, he paid the fines. The applicants disagreed. The resolution of this issue has been adjourned for further affidavits to be filed and will be dealt with in due course.

  104. Conclusion

  105. [95] For the reasons stated above, I found the third defendant guilty of contempt of court and imposed the sentences set out in [88] above.

  106. (a) $30,000 (inclusive of disbursements) with respect to the application for permission to make an application for committal and the Committal Application; and

  107. (b) $9,000 with respect to the Stay Application.