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Grounds publishedDecided 29 Aug 2022

Singapore International Commercial Court

Perry, Tamar and another v Esculier, Bonnet Servane Michele Thais and another

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[2022] SGHC(I) 13Case no. Suit No 4 of 202010 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Background

  2. The parties’ contentions

  3. [6] In their written submissions, the Plaintiffs, relying primarily on the decision in Lao Holdings NV v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2022] SGHC(I) 6 (“Lao Holdings”) at [76]–[85], contend as follows:

  4. [7] For their part, the Defendants accept that the test is one of reasonableness and submit:

  5. Considerations to be taken into account

  6. (a) that the Defendants’ costs schedule was disproportionate to the value of the claim;

  7. (b) that the Defendants were unsuccessful on the JL Transfer issue;

  8. (c) that the Defendants refused to admit numerous uncontentious points of the Plaintiffs’ case; and

  9. (d) that there were wasted trial dates.

  10. Appendix G

  11. [9] The Plaintiffs acknowledge that their submission in relation to Appendix G is inconsistent with the stance that they had taken at the time of transfer. In their written submissions, the Plaintiffs assert that as matters turned out the issues that had appeared to the parties as making the SICC the more appropriate forum for resolving the dispute had not proved to be such and that a trial in the High Court would have been just as appropriate.

  12. [10] In support of their submission in paragraph 7.6 set out in [6] above the Plaintiffs rely on observations of the Court of Appeal in CBX and another v CBZ and others [2021] 1 SLR 88 (“CBX”) and of the SICC in Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2022] 3 SLR 174 (“Kiri”). Those decisions make it plain that the onus is on the losing party to demonstrate that work that was carried out was “no different from the usual run of similar cases” (Kiri at [55]) and that “the court must have regard to the usual run of similar cases and not be misdirected by the amount a party with deep pockets and a great sense of entitlement is willing to spend” (CBX at [36]).

  13. [12] In this case, the only connection with Singapore was that the sums in question had been frozen in a Singapore bank account. No party to the action was Singaporean and the dispute was whether Swiss or Hong Kong law should apply. The claim was a novel one which required the court to focus on the possibility that one investor in what turned out to be a Ponzi scheme could seek redress from another such investor. The authorities all appeared to work on the basis that this was not the case whether under Swiss law or the common law (see the Substantive Judgment at [128], [129], [148] and [149]). The history of the matter was complex involving antecedent proceedings in Hong Kong and criminal investigations in Switzerland.

  14. [13] By no stretch of the imagination could this case be classified as a “run of the mill” commercial case. The international nature and complexity of the case was such that in an earlier decision I accepted a submission by the Plaintiffs that this case constituted an “offshore” case (see Perry, Tamar and another v Esculier, Bonnet Servane Michele Thais and another [2020] 5 SLR 245 at [64]–[75]). This enabled the Plaintiffs to instruct and be represented by an English Queen’s Counsel, Mr Paul Chaisty QC in addition to their Singapore lawyers. The complexity was reinforced by the Defendants’ decision to instruct Mr Colin Liew as co-counsel with Ms Aurill Kam of Legal Clinic LLC. I was grateful for the assistance I received from all counsel in seeking to resolving the issues.

  15. Proportionality to the value of the claim

  16. [17] I therefore do not propose to make any deduction to the sum claimed on the basis that it was disproportional to the value of the claim.

  17. The JL Transfer issue

  18. The refusal to admit uncontentious points

  19. [19] The primary objection the Plaintiffs raise in this regard is to the Defendants refusal to admit that Badilla was operating a Ponzi scheme. I considered this in [81]–[87] of the Substantive Judgment. The Plaintiffs’ claim was that the scheme had been in operation since before the Defendants made their first investment in 2014. The Defendants put them to proof of this and I was unable to go any further on the evidence than the finding that the scheme was in existence in 2016. Whilst this is a matter that could have been the subject of an agreed statement by the parties once all the evidence was to hand based upon 2016, I do not consider that the Defendants acted unreasonably in requiring proof of a matter of which they had no knowledge at the time. I do not propose to make any specific deduction in relation to the way the Defendants approached this issue.

  20. [20] The remaining issues which the Plaintiffs list at paragraph 13 of their written submissions are minor matters which fall to be considered as part of overall reasonableness below (see [22] below).

  21. Wasted trial dates

  22. [21] The trial of this action was seriously affected by COVID. Steps had to be taken to ensure that the giving of evidence by video-link from Switzerland was in accordance with Swiss law. The proposed trial date in January had to be vacated because of additional travel restrictions owning to the Omicron variant. The trial itself was interrupted because both of the Esculiers contracted COVID whilst in Singapore. True it is that some time was wasted because the cross-examination of the First Plaintiff lasted only one day rather than two and a half days but, in the overall context of this case, that is part of the vicissitudes of litigation and not something for which the Defendants should be criticised.

  23. Overall reasonableness

  24. Conclusion