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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Apr 2022

Singapore International Commercial Court

Lao Holdings NV v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and another matter

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[2022] SGHC(I) 6Case no. Originating Summons No 5 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. Background

  3. Background to the dispute

  4. [3] The plaintiffs in OS 5 and OS 6 respectively are Lao Holdings NV (“LH”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sanum Investments Ltd (“Sanum”). The plaintiffs had partnered with a Laotian conglomerate, ST Group Co Ltd (“ST Group”) and its related entities and individuals to conduct business in the Laotian gaming and hospitality industry. By late 2011, relations between the plaintiffs and ST Group had deteriorated substantially, resulting in litigation in Laos and a disruption to the plaintiffs’ business. Subsequently, the plaintiffs pursued claims against ST Group in a separate set of arbitration proceedings at the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (what we referred to as the “ST SIAC Arbitration” in the Judgment). Those proceedings spawned a series of proceedings in the Singapore courts as well, resulting in the decisions in Sanum Investments Limited v ST Group Co, Ltd and others [2020] 3 SLR 225, ST Group Co Ltd and others v Sanum Investments Ltd and another appeal [2020] 1 SLR 1 and ST Group and others v Sanum Investments Limited [2022] SGCA 2.

  5. [4] Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that officials from the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“GOL”), the defendant in the Applications, had reneged on earlier commitments and conducted themselves in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion, enriching themselves and ST Group at the plaintiffs’ expense. As such, on 14 August 2012, the plaintiffs initiated two arbitrations against GOL (the “BIT Arbitrations”): (a) LH initiated the ICSID Arbitration under the Laos-Netherlands BIT; and (b) Sanum initiated the PCA Arbitration under the Laos-PRC BIT. In the BIT Arbitrations, LH and Sanum raised various allegations concerning GOL’s conduct in relation to various projects that they had embarked upon. In response, GOL raised a threshold defence that their claims should not be entertained given the evidence of bribery, corruption, and embezzlement, in addition to arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims lacked merit.

  6. [5] While no specific finding has been made on the amounts due from GOL (since the BIT Tribunals ruled against the plaintiffs on all their claims), it is worth noting that on the plaintiffs’ own case, the relief that they would have been entitled to would be in excess of US$690m (for LH) and US$891m (for Sanum), as indicated in the relief requested in their pleadings for the BIT Arbitrations. These figures show that at least US$1.58bn – a sum that did not include what would likely have been substantial interest – was at stake in this dispute.

  7. Procedural history

  8. [11] Ahead of the hearings that were fixed for 15 and 16 January 2021, the parties filed and exchanged two sets of submissions for the Applications. On the plaintiffs’ side, their written submissions totalled 202 pages in length (excluding the cover pages and tables of contents), with references to 41 authorities. GOL’s submissions totalled 231 pages in length (similarly excluding the cover pages and tables of contents), referring to 44 authorities.

  9. [12] In terms of affidavits, the plaintiffs filed two affidavits per application, while the defendants filed one affidavit per application. We note here that the plaintiffs’ first affidavits in OS 5 and OS 6 were filed on 6 November 2019, and GOL’s reply affidavits in each of the Applications were filed in June 2020, ie, before the Applications were transferred to the SICC. The parties helpfully prepared an electronic Joint Bundle of Documents (“JBOD”) that came to 8,725 pages in length (including the cover page and index), comprising the cause papers in these matters and the total of six affidavits filed by both sides in both Applications.

  10. [13] We heard the parties on 15 and 16 January 2021. The matter was fixed for two full days, but parties managed to complete their oral submissions by 2pm on 16 January 2021. This was due partly to the effort that had already been put into the preparation of the written submissions, which we relied heavily upon, the use of hyperlinks in the written submissions to the various documents in the JBOD and various bundles of authorities, as well as counsel’s effort in keeping strictly to their time allocations for the hearing. As we will note below, the mere amount of time used for oral submissions in a case like this is sometimes not a helpful indicator of the amount of work that has been put in – indeed, speaking from our experience, it is in fact when counsel put in more work prior to the hearing that such complex hearings can be expedited. Having heard the parties, we reserved our judgment.

  11. [15] We handed down the Judgment on 10 September 2021. We turn now to summarise our findings in the Judgment and make some observations on the nature of the Applications.

  12. This court’s decision in OS 5 and OS 6

  13. [16] The plaintiff had applied to set aside the BIT Awards under the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”), on the grounds that:

  14. (a) the BIT Tribunals exceeded their jurisdiction and dealt with matters beyond the express scope of the parties’ submission to arbitration (under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law) (i) by considering GOL’s new allegations of fraud or illegality and admitting the Bribery/Fraud Allegations Material; and (ii) (in relation to the ICSID Tribunal only) considering expropriation claims relating to Paksong Vegas, the Paksan Club and the Thahkahek Club which were not submitted to it and had only been submitted to the PCA Tribunal;

  15. (b) the arbitral procedure in the BIT Arbitrations was not in accordance with the parties’ express agreement (under Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law) as the BIT Tribunals had admitted additional evidence in breach of Section 34 of the Settlement Deed; and/or

  16. (c) the plaintiffs were not afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on determinations made in the BIT Awards (under Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law and/or s 24(b) of the IAA).

  17. [17] In the Judgment, this court dismissed both OS 5 and OS 6. The key holdings were:

  18. (a) Insofar as the plaintiffs’ argument on Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law pertained to the Tribunals’ reliance on new “evidence”, this was not a matter that came within that provision: Judgment at [68]. The additional allegations of bribery and fraud forming the basis of the plaintiffs’ challenge against the BIT Awards were not “new claims” as they formed part of GOL’s existing defence of corruption, bribery, illegality and/or bad faith, and were not new causes of action. They were also not “new reliefs” as GOL had always sought a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims: at [70].

  19. (b) While it was true that the expropriation claims in relation to Paksong Vegas, the Paksan Club and the Thakhaek Club were only made in the PCA Arbitration, it was evident that the issues of illegality and bad faith relating to the three projects were raised in the ICSID Arbitration, both in the pleadings and the evidence. The ICSID Tribunal had in mind that it did not have the jurisdiction to consider the issues of expropriation raised in relation to those three projects. It was entitled, however, to consider and make findings on the issues of illegality and bad faith relating to the three projects, which were within its jurisdiction as part of GOL’s defence: Judgment at [104], [106] to [108].

  20. (c) By referring the issue of the interpretation of Section 34 of the Settlement Deed to the BIT Tribunals as part of their submissions on GOL’s Application to Admit Additional Evidence, the parties had given the BIT Tribunals jurisdiction to decide that matter. On that basis, the BIT Tribunals’ decision on the interpretation of Section 34 would not be a matter which the court could consider de novo. In any event, it was not appropriate for the court to do so as the interpretation of Section 34 by the BIT Tribunals involved findings of fact as to foreign law. In the further alternative, the BIT Tribunals did retain the residual power to admit additional evidence in exceptional circumstances, notwithstanding Section 34: Judgment at [130], [142] and [144].

  21. (d) In any event, the plaintiffs had not suffered prejudice. Even though the BIT Tribunals could reasonably have reached a different conclusion on two of the four findings concerning bad faith (the “Four Findings”), the BIT Tribunals could not have reasonably arrived at a different conclusion on the plaintiffs’ conduct in terms of illegality, corruption, bribery and/or fraud. As for the BIT Tribunals’ decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, their conclusions were not made on the basis of substantial reliance on GOL’s new evidence, and were not tainted by the Four Findings and the finding of manifest bad faith on the plaintiffs’ part: Judgment at [235], [262], [276] and [278].

  22. (e) The plaintiffs were afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case: Judgment at [312], [322]–[323], [339]–[340], [350]–[351], [359], [385], [392], [398] and [400].

  23. [19] Secondly, the brief summary above should not disguise the fact that these Applications were on the more complex end of the spectrum of arbitration cases that come before the Singapore courts. In this regard, the parties’ submissions were both extensive – ranging over a number of different grounds and involving various principles of law (including novel issues) – and intensive, requiring a great deal of detailed attention to the procedural history of the BIT Arbitrations as well as to the facts of the underlying dispute as they were discussed by the BIT Tribunals. We highlight certain aspects of the parties’ arguments and, consequently, the Judgment that exemplify this complexity:

  24. (a) In relation to the plaintiffs’ argument that the BIT Tribunals had acted in breach of the parties’ agreement on procedure by admitting new evidence, GOL argued that the plaintiffs had waived reliance on Section 34 of the Settlement Deed. This argument required close attention to be paid to the procedural history of the BIT Arbitrations (see the Judgment at [156]–[196]) in the light of the legal threshold for waiver.

  25. (c) The plaintiffs’ arguments on natural justice, ie, whether they were afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard, were made in such a way that focused this court’s attention on the minutiae of the BIT Arbitrations and the BIT Tribunals’ reasoning. They had mounted six complaints against the BIT Awards on this basis (see the Judgment at [289]), and both parties made extensive submissions on each of these six complaints. For example, the plaintiffs had submitted that the BIT Tribunals had failed to give them a reasonable opportunity to be heard on whether an arbitral tribunal could disentitle an investor from treaty relief on the basis of bad faith alone, established on a balance of probabilities. As our recounting of the parties’ arguments and our own analysis shows, this argument required a very careful perusal of the arbitral record, including the parties’ respective submissions in the BIT Arbitrations and the BIT Tribunals’ approach to the issue (see the Judgment at [361]–[401]).

  26. The parties’ positions on costs

  27. (b) In relation to the Sealing Applications, the plaintiffs are entitled to their costs as the successful party, which would be S$12,000 plus S$836.59 in reasonable disbursements.

  28. [22] GOL takes the following position:

  29. (a) GOL should be paid S$400,000 in costs and S$31,212.07 in disbursements for OS 5 and OS 6.

  30. Issues to be determined

  31. (a) In relation to OS 5 and OS 6:

  32. (i) What is the applicable approach?

  33. (ii) How much should the plaintiffs pay to GOL as costs for OS 5 and OS 6?

  34. Costs of the Applications

  35. The applicable approach

  36. The distinction between pre- and post-transfer costs

  37. [27] The applicable principles relating to this distinction were recently set out by the Court of Appeal in CBX as follows:

  38. (a) In relation to pre-transfer costs, the Court of Appeal held (CBX at [28]):

  39. It is for the party asking the court to depart from Appendix G to provide justification for doing so. This is because “[t]he policy reasons behind the adoption of Appendix G for cases filed in the High Court do not cease to apply to steps taken there simply because it is later considered appropriate to transfer the case to the SICC for adjudication” (CBX at [28]). O 110 r 46 of the ROC is inapplicable to pre-transfer costs (CBX at [29]).

  40. (b) In relation to post-transfer costs, O 110 r 46 of the ROC would generally apply. In applying O 110 r 46, the court may have regard to Appendix G, although the role it has “will depend on the circumstances of the case” (CBX at [28]). In CBX itself, the Court of Appeal held that, on the facts of that case, Appendix G “should have remained one of a number of factors which should have been kept in mind when considering the very high amounts of costs” that the successful parties were asking for (CBX at [39]). We will return to the question of how post-transfer costs should be assessed below.

  41. As the Court of Appeal observed, given this difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer costs, costs should be assessed in two distinct stages (CBX at [40]). This follows from the very different approaches to costs in the High Court generally and the SICC that have been briefly described above.

  42. We are bound by this pronouncement of principle by the Court of Appeal and, in any event, respectfully agree with this approach to pre-transfer costs.

  43. The Court of Appeal also observed that CBX itself “was not very different in its features from others of its ilk heard in the High Court over the years” (CBX at [42]).

  44. Costs in the SICC

  45. (1) Considerations relating to costs in civil procedure generally

  46. (2) Costs in the context of the SICC

  47. (A) The nature of cases and parties before the SICC

  48. [50] There are, therefore, two broad categories of cases that the SICC may hear: (a) cases that are international and commercial in nature (“international commercial cases”); and (b) proceedings relating to international commercial arbitration (“international commercial arbitration cases”).

  49. [51] In relation to international commercial cases, O 110 r 7(1) of the ROC supplements s 18D(1) of the SCJA with requirements that must be satisfied in relation to proceedings that are commenced in the SICC:

  50. [52] When it comes to transfer cases that are international and commercial in nature, the requirements are slightly modified under O 110 r 12(4) of the ROC, as follows:

  51. It follows that for transfer cases, the action and claim must still be international and commercial in nature. In general, subject to the power of the General Division to transfer the case on its own motion after hearing parties, the parties will have agreed for the SICC to hear the dispute. For completeness, we note that O 110 r 12(3B) of the ROC deals with the situation where the Choice of Court Agreements Act (Cap 39A, 2007 Rev Ed) applies and there is an exclusive choice of court agreement designating the High Court or General Division as the chosen court. In such a case, O 110 r 12(3B)(b) of the ROC effectively requires the consent of all the parties before the case can be transferred to the SICC.

  52. [53] The terms “international” and “commercial” are, helpfully, defined in O 110 rr 1(2)(a) and (b) of the ROC, in the following manner:

  53. [54] Turning to international commercial arbitration cases, O 110 rr 57 and 58 of the ROC addresses the SICC’s jurisdiction over such cases:

  54. (B) The rules on costs in the SICC

  55. (a) the conduct of the parties, including in particular –

  56. (i) conduct before, as well as during the application or proceeding;

  57. (ii) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; and

  58. (iii) the manner in which a party has pursued or contested a particular allegation or issue;

  59. (b) the amount or value of any claim involved;

  60. (c) the complexity or difficulty of the subject matter involved;

  61. (d) the skill, expertise and specialised knowledge involved;

  62. (e) the novelty of any questions raised;

  63. (f) the time and effort expended on the application or proceeding.

  64. [60] As the SICC summarised in Kiri at [66]:

  65. [67] We have already noted the nature of cases that come before the SICC and that they are narrower in range as compared to cases that come before the High Court. Specifically, whether they are international commercial cases or international commercial arbitration cases, we have noted the reality that parties will be relatively knowledgeable or at least sophisticated enough individuals or companies, with experience in cross-border transactions. It can be assumed generally as well that the parties’ motivations will be commercial (even if secondary motivations may come into play at times). Further, as noted above, in general, parties submit to the SICC consensually, with transfer cases (on the court’s own motion) being an exception. Even then, however, experience has shown that parties tend to consent to the transfer of cases to the SICC.

  66. [68] For the reasons we have set out above, litigants in the SICC invariably have access to competent legal advice and will have a clearer picture of the risks and rewards of participating in commercial litigation.

  67. [70] The TPF framework was initially only applied to international arbitration proceedings, as well as court or mediation proceedings connected with such arbitration proceedings (see r 3 of the Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 2017). In 2021, the regulations were amended by the Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) (Amendment) Regulations 2021, which extended the application of the TPF framework to all arbitration proceedings (including domestic arbitration) and related court proceedings, as well as “proceedings commenced in the Singapore International Commercial Court for so long as those proceedings remain the Singapore International Commercial Court”, appeals arising from decisions of the SICC, and mediation proceedings relating thereto.

  68. [72] As Mr Edwin Tong SC (“Mr Tong”), Minister for Community, Culture and Youth and Second Minister for Law noted in his speech at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts on 12 March 2021 at para 7:

  69. Mr Tong continued, at paras 9–13:

  70. [73] It is of course important to recognise that the primary motivation of funders is commercial and judgements about which cases to fund are based upon assessments of potential commercial gain, and risk. In these circumstances it is fair to assume that only cases assessed as likely to have a commercially acceptable prospect of success are likely to be funded.

  71. (C) The proper approach to costs in the SICC

  72. (a) transfer cases, and

  73. (b) cases commenced in the SICC.

  74. The latter poses no problems as costs are clearly awarded in accordance with O 110 of the ROC or the prevailing costs regime in the SICC.

  75. [77] As for the former, we need to further distinguish between those transfer cases where:

  76. (b) those cases where the court orders the transfer to the SICC but orders that costs up to the transfer shall be governed by O 59 of the ROC and Appendix G where applicable, but that costs in the SICC shall be governed by O 110 of the ROC, in which case the costs in the SICC, after transfer, is awarded solely under O 110 of the ROC, unless for some unusual or special reason the SICC considers it appropriate to have regard to Appendix G in deciding the reasonableness of costs under O 110 of the ROC; and

  77. (c) those cases where, as here, the court orders that O 59 of the ROC (and where applicable, Appendix G) shall apply up to the point of transfer and costs awarded after transfer shall be left to the discretion of the SICC.

  78. [78] In transfer cases falling under [77(c)], the Court of Appeal in CBX has laid down some guidelines and we have already referred to this above (see [26]-[32]). In transfer cases under [77(a)] and [77(b)], the position poses no problem.

  79. [81] However, O 110 r 3 of the ROC provides that:

  80. This gives the SICC a wide discretion.

  81. [82] Further on transfer from the High Court to the SICC, O 110 r 12(5) of the ROC provides that:

  82. Attention should also be given to those factors set out in the new O 22 r 3(2)(a)-(j) of the SICC Rules.

  83. (D) Costs in investor-state arbitration cases

  84. Assessment of the quantum of costs and disbursements

  85. Relevance of points on which GOL was not entirely successful

  86. [93] The plaintiffs argue that the court should account for the fact that there were issues on which GOL did not entirely prevail in OS 5 and OS 6. They point to three instances: (a) the court’s finding that Mr Anousith’s bank statement was a factor on which the BIT Tribunals had based their conclusions on the Alleged Thanaleng Bribe, and so the Tribunals could reasonably have arrived at a different result on this point (Judgment at [220] and [222]); (b) the court’s finding that the BIT Tribunals could reasonably have arrived at a different result in relation to the Alleged MaxGaming Fraud (Judgment at [231] and [234]); and (c) the issue of whether the plaintiffs had waived any breach of Section 34 by their conduct was determined by a majority of two, with one member of the coram dissenting (Judgment at [195]–[196]).

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