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Grounds publishedDecided 26 May 2023
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Singapore International Commercial Court

Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others v Credit Suisse Trust L td

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[2023] SGHC(I) 9Case no. Suit No 4 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Bidzina Ivanishvili (“the plaintiff”) had a long and for many years trusting relationship with Credit Suisse Trust Limited in Singapore (“the defendant”). That relationship commenced in 2004 when an officer of Credit Suisse AG Geneva Branch (“the Bank”), the private investment banking arm of the Credit Suisse Group (“CS Group” or “Credit Suisse”) approached the plaintiff and offered to assist him with wealth management services.

  3. [2] The plaintiff was advised by the defendant and the Bank to use a structure pursuant to which he deposited over US$1.1 billion into the custody of the defendant to be placed on trust in “The Mandalay Trust” (or “the Trust”) with the objective of “Inheritance Planning and Asset Holding”. The responsible corporate vehicles of the Trust were Meadowsweet Assets Limited (“Meadowsweet”), Soothsayer Limited (“Soothsayer”) and Lynden Management Ltd (“Lynden”).

  4. [3] Unfortunately, the Bank had within its ranks a fraudster, Mr Patrice Lescaudron (“Mr Lescaudron”), who was appointed as the Trust’s Relationship Manager (“RM”) and over the next 9 years misappropriated many millions of dollars from the Trust. His scheming and fraudulent conduct was not halted until 2015 when market forces intervened, with the inevitable consequences of his arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

  5. [4] The Swiss Correctional Court (the “Swiss Court”) found that Mr Lescaudron had: embezzled large amounts of money; purchased securities above market price causing damage to the plaintiff and to the Trust; and operated a scheme pursuant to which he opened various accounts and transferred moneys without the knowledge of either the plaintiff or the defendant for the purpose of covering losses in other clients’ accounts which he had caused.

  6. [5] The Swiss Court also recorded Mr Lescaudron’s admission that he had forged orders by cutting and pasting the plaintiff’s signature on documents. The Swiss Court described some of Mr Lescaudron’s activities as follows:

  7. [6] Mr Lescaudron presented statements to the plaintiff which “did not reflect reality”. He moved money around to cover up the transfers made to other clients and to also cover the actual losses that were incurred by various clients of the Bank. His method of operation was at times apparently rather frantic and the money misappropriated from the Trust’s accounts was for “covering the losses generated by the trading operations that he had performed” in other clients’ accounts without their agreement. He utilised hidden sub-accounts and transferred funds into “side-pockets” in a web of fraudulent transactions.

  8. [7] The plaintiff, his wife, Ekaterina Ivanishvili, and three of their children (together “the plaintiffs”), sue the defendant in respect of alleged breaches of trust and losses in respect of which they claim damages of approximately US$1.2 billion.

  9. [8] The plaintiffs claim that the defendant breached its obligations as trustee in failing to properly administer the Trust and failing to keep the Trust assets safe.

  10. [9] The defendant took a very robust approach to the plaintiffs’ claims from the outset of the proceedings in 2017. Until August 2022, it put the plaintiffs to strict proof of the fraud perpetrated by Mr Lescaudron notwithstanding that Mr Lescaudron had pleaded guilty and had been convicted and imprisoned for the fraud.

  11. [10] Until a few weeks before the commencement of the trial on 5 September 2022, the defendant had denied that it had a duty to “[s]afeguard the Trust Assets by having measures in place to detect and prevent fraud and misappropriation on the Trust Accounts from taking place and by acting on any relevant information obtained through those measures”.

  12. [11] On 5 September 2022, at the commencement of the trial, the defendant accepted it was “under a duty to protect the Trust Assets if it had actual knowledge that those assets were not being managed properly” . However, it maintained that it “played a very limited role” in the facts which led to the fraud and on “the basis of its role, and what it was told, it could not have prevented the fraud or brought it to an end”.

  13. [12] On 16 September 2022 the defendant admitted “that it was required to take reasonable steps to protect and safeguard the Trust Assets from being misappropriated”.

  14. The parties

  15. The plaintiff

  16. [13] The plaintiff was born in Georgia and grew up in Chorvila, a small rural town in Georgia. He was educated in Georgia and graduated with Honours in Engineering and Economics from the State University in Tbilisi. At 25 years of age he moved to Moscow to study for a post-graduate degree in Economics at the Scientific Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs. He holds a PhD in Economic Science.

  17. [14] During the 1980s the plaintiff established and operated a business in partnership with a business associate, Mr Vitaly Malkin (“Mr Malkin”), importing cheap telephones and computers from Asia for sale in the USSR. This business was funded by loans from family and friends. It was a very successful business, the profits from which were used by the plaintiff and Mr Malkin to establish Rossiyskiy Kredit, one of the first privately owned banks in Russia.

  18. [15] In 1989 the plaintiff met his wife, and they were married in 1994. They have four children, three of whom are plaintiffs and the fourth is now a resident of France.

  19. [16] In 1993–1994, the plaintiff established the Cartu Group. The Cartu Group was established with the aim of attracting investment to Georgia and developing banking businesses in Georgia. In 1995, the plaintiff and his wife established the Cartu International Charity Foundation for the promotion of charitable causes in Georgia.

  20. [17] The plaintiff and Mr Malkin were part owners of a metallurgical complex in Russia, known as Mikhailovsky, which was part of a group of metallurgical businesses under the brand name “Metalloinvest”. In 2004 the plaintiff and Mr Malkin sold that business for approximately USD 1.6bn. In 2006, Rossiyskiy Kredit sold its retail bank, Impexbank, to Raiffeisen Bank for USD 550m. These sales produced significant profits for the plaintiff and Mr Malkin.

  21. [18] The plaintiff returned to live in Georgia in 2005. He has had a very successful business life and has also been successful in politics, having served as the Prime Minister of Georgia from 2012 to 2013.

  22. [19] The plaintiff’s communication with the defendant and the Bank during the relevant period of their relationship was sometimes direct in face-to-face meetings with representatives of each entity and sometimes by e-mail directly to him. However, in the later years, the relationship was also conducted through the plaintiff’s personal assistants/advisers who would deal directly with the representatives of the defendant and the Bank, consult with the plaintiff, and then respond to the defendant and/or the Bank. Those assistants were Mr Irakli Garibashvili (“Mr Garibashvili”) until about late 2010, Mr Zviad Khukhunashvili (“Mr Khukhunashvili”) from about late 2010 until 2012, and Mr George Bachiashvili (“Mr Bachiashvili”) from 2012.

  23. The defendant

  24. [20] The defendant, Credit Suisse Trust Limited, incorporated in Singapore, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse Trust AG (“CS Trust AG”), a Swiss company. CS Trust AG has other subsidiaries in other countries around the world. CS Trust AG and its subsidiaries will be referred to as the “CST Group”. The defendant was described as “well embedded into the [CST Group] Structure” which at the relevant times had around 350 employees working in 5 sub-departments.

  25. [21] CS Trust AG is a subsidiary of the CS Group. The Bank is also a part of the CS Group. The Bank has various branches around the world, including in Geneva and in Singapore. The Singapore branch of the Bank will be referred to as “the Singapore Bank”. Credit Suisse Life (Bermuda) Limited (“CS Life”) is a subsidiary of CS Bank.

  26. [22] There were three main departments in the defendant: (i) Trust & Estate Advisory; (ii) Trust Management; and (iii) Legal & Compliance. In the Trust Management department, there were four Trust Management teams and one Finance/Trust Accounting team. These teams reported to the head of Trust Management.

  27. [23] Each of the defendant’s heads of department had a “line manager” (a superior to which they reported) working in CS Trust AG which acted as the headquarters for the CST Group. The defendant’s head of Trust & Estate Advisory reported to the global head of Trust & Estate Advisory at CS Trust AG. The defendant’s head of Trust Management reported to the global head of International Trust Management, who in turn reported to the global head of Trust & Insurance Management at CS Trust AG. The defendant’s head of Legal & Compliance reported to a member of the Legal & Compliance team at CS Trust AG, who in turn reported to the global head of that department. The global heads of Trust & Estate Advisory, Trust & Insurance Management and Legal & Compliance at CS Trust AG reported to the CEO of the CST Group.

  28. [24] The CEO of the CST Group reported directly to the head of Investment Services & Products, who was part of the private banking division of the CS Group.

  29. [25] The defendant offered services as a professional trustee with the ability to utilise the investment banking arm of the CS Group for the investment of trust assets.

  30. The trial

  31. The witnesses

  32. [26] Evidence in the trial was given over 14 days between 5 September 2022 and 22 September 2022 with some preliminary oral submissions from the parties on 23 September 2022. The parties then provided written closing submissions and written submissions in reply by the end of January 2023. Final oral submissions were made on 16 and 17 February 2023 when judgment was reserved.

  33. [27] The factual witnesses who gave oral evidence in the plaintiffs’ cases were: the plaintiff who gave evidence on 5, 6, 7 and 8 September 2022; and Mr Bachiashvili who gave evidence on 8 and 9 September 2022.

  34. [28] The factual witnesses who gave oral evidence in the defendant’s case were: Mr Dominik Iwan Birri (“Mr Birri”), the defendant’s Head of Trust Management and Overall Centre Head and Executive Director from 2011 until 2015, who gave evidence on 9, 12 and 13 September 2022; Ms Josephine Novoa Sampaoli (“Ms Sampaoli”), an employee of the Trust and Agency Team in the Geneva Office of CS Trust AG who gave evidence on 13, 14 and 15 September 2022; Ms Sim I-May Joni (“Ms Sim”) a Trust Manager with the defendant who gave evidence on 15 and 16 September 2022; Ms Lau Chew Lui (“Ms Lau”), a Trust Manager with the defendant from June 2011 until July 2016, who gave evidence on 16, 19 and 20 September 2022; and Ms Peh Bee Geok (“Ms Peh”), a Trust Accountant and later Trust Manager with the defendant from June 2003 until June 2021, who gave evidence on 20 September 2022.

  35. [29] There were two other witnesses called by the defendant in respect of documentary searches and disclosure. They were Ms Luna Christie (“Ms Christie”) a Senior Trust Manager with the defendant, and Mr Martin Eichmann (“Mr Eichmann”), the CEO of the defendant. They both gave evidence on the voir dire on 14 September 2022 (which subsequently became evidence in the trial).

  36. [30] To deal with the issue of quantification of loss, parties called two expert witnesses each. The expert forensic accounting expert witnesses, Mr William Howell Wyndham Davies (“Mr Davies”) for the plaintiffs and Mr James Nicholson (“Mr Nicholson”) for the defendant, gave evidence concurrently on 21 September 2022. The expert wealth management witnesses, Mr David Morrey (“Mr Morrey”) for the plaintiffs and Ms Esther Mayr (“Ms Mayr”) for the defendant, gave evidence concurrently on 22 September 2022. The experts’ reports were admitted into evidence without objection. The forensic accounting experts filed a joint statement on 16 September 2022 (“the FA Joint Statement”), and the wealth management experts filed a joint statement on 5 September 2022 (“the WM Joint Statement”).

  37. The admission

  38. [31] On the tenth day of the trial, Friday 16 September 2022, the defendant advised that it wished to make a “concession” to the Court and the plaintiffs admitting “that it had acted in breach of its trustee’s duties by 31 December 2008”. That concession was in the following terms:

  39. [32] On Saturday 17 September 2022 the defendant’s solicitors, Allen & Gledhill LLP, wrote to the Court and the plaintiffs’ solicitors in terms that included the following:

  40. [33] On the eleventh day of the trial, Monday 19 September 2022, instructed Senior Counsel for the defendant, Mr Lee Eng Beng (“Mr Lee”) explained:

  41. [34] The defendant made clear that its concession should not be understood as an admission or concession that it had a duty to review or monitor the wisdom of the investments of the Trust assets. Rather, its concession is expressly limited to a breach of its duty to keep the Trust assets safe.

  42. [35] At the time it made the admission, the defendant accepted that it followed from its breach of duty to keep the Trust assets safe that the plaintiffs would be entitled to some damages or compensation. However that position changed by reason of a settlement that was reached between the Bank and the plaintiffs on 1 December 2022 (“the Settlement”). The defendant now contends that any losses suffered by the plaintiffs by reason of the breach of its duties as a trustee have been fully compensated in accordance with the Settlement.

  43. [36] The plaintiffs contend that the defendant’s choice of 31 December 2008 as the date of the admitted breach of its obligation as trustee was “tactical”. They claim that the defendant knew that the Trust assets had been depleted by the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) of October 2008 by that date and that this “tactic”, if accepted, would keep the assessment of damages lower than otherwise if the breach had occurred before the GFC.

  44. [37] The plaintiffs submitted that both as a matter of evidence and logic, the defendant’s selection of 31 December 2008 as the date of breach is unsustainable.

  45. [38] The plaintiffs contend that the defendant was in breach of its obligation as Trustee earlier than 31 December 2008. In support of this contention, the plaintiffs rely upon the defendant’s conduct in failing to deal with unauthorised payments out of the Trust accounts (“unauthorised payments away” or “UPAs”) during 2006 and 2007 when many millions of dollars were transferred out of the Trust accounts by Mr Lescaudron without the identification of the recipient of the funds and/or without the prior approval of the defendant.

  46. A forensic decision

  47. [39] The defendant had served other affidavits which, as late as 15 September 2022, the ninth day of trial, the plaintiffs anticipated would be read at trial. However, the defendant’s solicitors advised the Court in the letter of 17 September 2022 referred to at [32] above that, in the light of its admission on 16 September 2022, it had made the decision not to read those affidavits. This is a forensic decision that might appear uncontroversial. However, one of those proposed witnesses was Mr Patrick Guldimann (“Mr Guldimann”), a trust accountant, who was brought from Switzerland to the defendant’s Singapore office in 2015, following the discovery of Mr Lescaudron’s fraud, to review the financial statements of the Trust. Mr Guldimann produced restated accounts for the whole of the period 2006 to 2014. He had sworn two affidavits, the first on 18 April 2022 and the second on 29 August 2022.

  48. [40] Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit was the subject of a report by Mr Davies of 28 July 2022. Mr Davies was instructed to identify the “differences” between the originally approved financial statements for the Mandalay Trust and the restated financial statements for the same period “as exhibited” to Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit (the “Restated Financial Statements”). Mr Davies’ report refers not only to the restated financial statements exhibited to Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit but he also extracts parts of and refers to other parts of Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit.

  49. [41] Mr Nicholson’s report of 3 June 2022 referred in numerous paragraphs to having been “instructed” in respect of certain matters. The plaintiffs’ lawyers requested details of those instructions. Mr Guldimann’s second affidavit was filed “to address” Mr Davies report of 28 July 2022 and “the instructions” given to Mr Nicholson in respect of his report of 3 June 2022.

  50. [42] Mr Guldimann’s affidavits were relied on by Mr Davies and Mr Nicholson in reaching some of the conclusions in their joint report and were discussed in their evidence. His second affidavit was referred to in the FA Joint Statement.

  51. [43] Ms Lau was cross examined about Mr Guldimann’s role in reviewing the Trust’s accounts including in respect of e-mails written by him at the time of his work for the defendant. Ms Lau was also taken to the exhibits to Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit.

  52. [44] Mr Guldimann’s role was also referred to by the parties in their written closing submissions on the apparent understanding that the Court would have access to the contents of the affidavits. In fact, the defendant referred to a specific paragraph of Mr Guldimann’s first affidavit in support of its contention in respect of the nature of the “restatement exercise”.

  53. [45] In final oral submissions, the parties were asked to address the issue of how the Court should deal with the “status” of Mr Guldimann’s affidavits. The plaintiffs tendered the affidavits not for the purpose of proving the truth of their contents but for the purpose of understanding the unchallenged evidence that has been given in relation to their contents including by the experts and Ms Lau. The defendant objected to the tender on the basis of its lateness and the fact that the affidavits had not been read in Court submitting that such a step is “irregular”. The defendant could not point to any real prejudice other than suggesting that there is “uncertainty” about the scope of reliance on the contents of the affidavits.

  54. [46] There are numerous aspects to the steps that Mr Guldimann took in restating the accounts that are already in evidence without objection. In all the circumstances and having regard to the reference by the parties to the affidavits in their submissions and the evidence of the experts and Ms Lau referred to above, it is appropriate that the affidavits be received into evidence as an exhibit.

  55. Settlement with the Bank – 1 December 2022

  56. [47] On 30 December 2022 the defendant’s solicitors notified the Court that the Bank had reached an agreement with the plaintiff dated 1 December 2022 in respect of the payment of certain amounts that are claimed by the plaintiffs in these proceedings (the “Settlement”). These amounts related to misappropriations from the Meadowsweet accounts that were itemised in the first instance judgment of the Geneva Criminal Court dated 9 February 2018. The Settlement was expressly “confirmed not to impact in any way” the plaintiffs’ “other claims” in these proceedings.

  57. [48] The Settlement expressly preserves the plaintiffs’ claims for “any other consequential losses from the failure” of the Bank and/or the defendant “to identify and/or take action” in respect of the transfers, the payment of which were the subject of the Settlement.

  58. [49] The Settlement also includes an agreement that if the Court finds that damages are to be awarded to the plaintiffs in these proceedings on a particular basis then it is agreed that such basis will, by consent, be adjusted to exclude both the transactions and the amounts paid under the Settlement from such assessment.

  59. [50] The amount the Bank agreed to pay Meadowsweet, the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s company Wellminstone SA in accordance with the Settlement was USD 79,430,773.

  60. Some litigious history

  61. [52] Although this is a matter of history, it is mentioned because the defendant contends that many of the plaintiffs’ claims are more appropriately characterised as claims against the Bank for which it contends the defendant cannot and should not be held liable. The defendant also contends that the consequence of the arrangements reached in the Settlement is that the plaintiffs have been fully compensated for any loss suffered not only by reason of Mr Lescaudron’s fraud but also by reason of the admitted breach of duty by the defendant in failing to keep the Trust assets safe.

  62. [53] This contention is based in part on the nature of the arrangements under the Mandalay Trust. The defendant claims that because the plaintiff was appointed as the “Investment Manager” of the Trust it has no liability for the losses the plaintiffs claim over and above the amounts that were misappropriated by Mr Lescaudron for which it submits the plaintiffs have been fully compensated by the Settlement.

  63. Events after 31 December 2008

  64. [54] The defendant also contends that events after 31 December 2008 are no longer relevant to the issues for determination because it has admitted that it was in breach of its duty as at that date and that this was a continuing breach. However, it has dealt with the events post 31 December 2008 in its submissions on the basis that the Court may take a different view.

  65. [55] The plaintiffs rely on events after that date as they contend they are relevant in reviewing the parties’ relationships and to the determination of the nature, extent and date or dates of the various breaches of duty they allege were committed by the defendant. It was submitted that it is also important to the determination of whether, if the Court finds there are breaches other than or in addition to the breach admitted by the defendant, the defendant is entitled to relief under s 60 of the Trustees Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Trustees Act”).

  66. [56] In the circumstances it will be necessary to consider the matter in far more detail than simply focussing on the parties’ relationship and relevant events up to 31 December 2008.

  67. The Trust

  68. The setup of the Trust

  69. The parties meet – 30 November 2004

  70. [57] It was in 2004 after the plaintiff and Mr Malkin sold Mikhailovsky that the Bank approached him with a proposal that he place his funds with the defendant. The Bank officer who approached the plaintiff with this proposal was Ms Daria Mihaesco Krassiakov (“Ms Mihaesco”), a Senior RM with the Bank.

  71. [58] On 30 November 2004 a meeting took place in Zurich attended by the plaintiff, Mr Malkin, Ms Mihaesco and two representatives of the Singapore private banking arm of the CS Group, Mr Beat Stamm (“Mr Stamm”) and Mr J.M. Toffoletto.

  72. [59] In an internal e-mail dated 3 December 2004 between the defendant and representatives of the Bank purporting to summarise the discussions at this meeting the following was recorded by Mr Stamm:

  73. [60] The reference “BO” was to “beneficial owner” and “B.I.” was a reference to the plaintiff. The summary also referred to discussion about the possible use of corporate vehicles in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”), a Cyprus trust and accounts in Switzerland, with the conclusion that the plaintiff and Mr Malkin “rather prefer to have a full ‘Singapore solution’ in place immediately, not involving Cyprus, nor Switzerland, and therefore requested [the defendant] to prepare two Singapore Trusts (based on the submitted information about the Cyprus Trusts) with two underlying companies (e.g. Bahamas or BVI) in due time”.

  74. [61] The summary also recorded the following:

  75. [62] Based on the above, it was suggested to the plaintiff that he put forward “guidelines” for the investment of his assets at the meeting. The plaintiff claimed that rather than him giving any “advice” to the defendant or Credit Suisse generally, he went to Credit Suisse because he understood it was a “reliable” and “famous bank”. His purpose in going to the meeting was to obtain advice as to how to invest his money so that it was “protected” and if anything were to happen to him, for it to be transferred to his family.

  76. [63] The plaintiff was “quite surprised” to hear mention of Singapore (and the defendant) at this meeting and he claimed he was advised that his capital would be better protected with the laws and diversification in Singapore. The plaintiff was adamant that he did not dictate the structure for the investments and said that all “offers” including the reference to “AAA” came from the Credit Suisse representatives. His evidence included the following:

  77. Paris Meeting – 9 March 2005

  78. [64] Following the execution of the trust documentation (discussed in detail in the next section), on 9 March 2005, the plaintiff met with Ms Mihaesco, Mr Stamm and Mr Massimo Hiber of the Singapore Bank at the Hotel George V in Paris. Mr Malkin also joined the meeting a short while after it commenced.

  79. [65] The Credit Suisse representatives were discussing the plaintiff’s wishes or instructions concurrently with those of Mr Malkin. Mr Stamm “confirmed that all major documentation was in place” and the Singapore trusts with the underlying company had become “operational”. He “summarised the prepared investment proposal based on” the plaintiff’s “input” in November 2004 “consisting of non-discretionary fixed income-, as well as opportunistic-, partly discretionary elements”. A note of this meeting recorded that the plaintiff had been influenced by Mr Malkin in considering the “similar solution” of a special discretionary mandate. The note also recorded that:

  80. The Trust structure

  81. [66] The Trust has three underlying companies, Meadowsweet, Soothsayer and Lynden, that are held by nominees, Seletar Limited and Serangoon Limited, ultimately owned by the defendant.

  82. [67] The structure of the Trust is as follows:

  83. [68] The defendant owns the shares of Meadowsweet and Soothsayer in its capacity as trustee of the Trust. The corporate directors, Bukit Merah Limited and Tanah Merah Limited, and the company secretary of both corporate directors, Clementi Limited (“Clementi”), are wholly owned by the defendant. The individual directors of the corporate directors include persons who are also directors of the defendant.

  84. [69] Soothsayer held accounts with the Singapore Bank and Meadowsweet held accounts with the Bank. Lynden held a substantial collection of artworks.

  85. [70] On about 22 March 2005, the plaintiff arranged for USD 1.1bn to be transferred into the Meadowsweet accounts. On about 23 March 2005, USD 550m was transferred from the Meadowsweet accounts into the Soothsayer accounts.

  86. [71] On or around 29 March 2005, Meadowsweet entered into discretionary portfolio management agreements with the Bank, under which the Bank was given a mandate to manage the assets within two accounts. On or around 1 April 2005, Soothsayer entered into similar discretionary portfolio management agreements with the Singapore Bank for two accounts.

  87. Trust documentation

  88. [72] The various documents establishing and associated with the Trust and setting up the various accounts with the Bank and the Singapore Bank were drafted in Singapore and Geneva. They were sent to Ms Mihaesco to facilitate their execution by the plaintiff.

  89. [73] On 9 December 2004, Mr Michael Low (“Mr Low”), Head of Trust Administration of the defendant, advised Mr Mark Jackman (“Mr Jackman”), the defendant’s Managing Director, and others that it was intended to try and complete the trust documentation and have the account up and running by the close of December 2004. He also advised that he would send the Acceptance Documentation (see [76] below) “filled up with whatever details” that he could glean from the material with which he had been provided. Mr Low also advised Mr Jackman that he would go ahead with account opening in Singapore because the intention was to close down the Geneva accounts (which had been opened in the name of the Cyprus trusts and underlying companies) “once the Singapore solution is up and running, and thus transfer the full USD1.8b into the trust structure”.

  90. [74] On 10 December 2004, Mr Low forwarded the “first tranche of the trust documents” to Mr Stamm for “onward transmission to” the plaintiff. Mr Low advised that he had noticed that Mr Stamm had indicated that the plaintiff and Mr Malkin were to “act as authorised signatories of the companies” which he took “to mean that they are intended to be appointed as investment managers with limited powers of attorney”. Mr Low advised that if this was so, Mr Stamm should have the plaintiff “also sign the attached form for appointment of investment manager” to be accompanied by the standard limited power of attorney (“LPOA”) form.

  91. [75] At this stage, the structure of the Trust was for the two companies, Meadowsweet and Soothsayer, to manage the Trust assets in Geneva and Singapore respectively. Lynden was brought into the structure at a later time to hold the works of art collected by the plaintiff.

  92. Acceptance Documentation – 28 February 2005

  93. [76] On 28 February 2005, the plaintiff signed a document in Geneva that was entitled “Credit Suisse Trust in Singapore. Acceptance Documentation, Trust/Company” (“the Acceptance Documentation”).

  94. [77] On the first page was a joint message from Mr Jackman and Mr Ethan Chue, the Assistant Vice-President of the defendant, in the following terms:

  95. [78] The first section of the Acceptance Documentation, “Section A. Personal Information about the Proposer(s)” recorded the plaintiff as the “Proposer”. It included a question: “In the normal course of events, is correspondence/open contact with the Proposer permitted?” to which the answer “No” was typed. In consequence of that answer, it was necessary to complete the “restricted contact details” of the person with whom the defendant could communicate, with the suggestion that it could be a “professional advisor of the Proposer(s)”. Ms Mihaesco was identified as that person and details of her address and telephone numbers were recorded.

  96. [79] A question as to whether copies of account advices, statements and general banking correspondence should also be retained at the “Credit Suisse branch in accordance with Credit Suisse regulations and remuneration” was answered “Yes” in handwriting. A question as to whether the defendant “could only accept advice/recommendations from the Proposer” was answered “Yes” in handwriting.

  97. [80] In “Section B. Trust and Company Formation/Acceptance” the name of the Trust was recorded as “The Mandalay Trust” with the proper law of the Trust recorded as Singapore and the type of trust instrument as “CST Declaration of Trust”. This section included an instruction that “Each page of the draft deed chosen by the Proposer(s) must be initialled by him/them and be included with this Acceptance Documentation”. It also recorded that “CST will need to review the deed and take appropriate advice prior to accepting the Trust”.

  98. [81] The Acceptance Documentation recorded that Soothsayer would be a “direct subsidiary of the Trust”. The objectives of the Trust/Company were recorded as “Inheritance Planning and Asset Holding”.

  99. [82] In the section entitled “Auditors and Accounts” it was recorded (with typed text) that “short form accounting” rather than “full detailed accounts” was preferred. It was noted that:

  100. [83] “Section C. Banking and Asset Details” included the following:

  101. [84] In the section headed “Portfolio/Account Investment Manager”, next to the heading “Family Name/Company Name”, a handwritten entry recorded “Proposer - as per letter of appointment” with an initial and date which appears to be “3/3/05”.

  102. [85] “Section D. Due Diligence” included a description of the “financial and business background, the overall net worth, and the social position of the Proposer(s)”. It recorded that the plaintiff had a PhD in Economic Science; was a Director of Impex Bank Moscow; had personal income of “USD 2m p.a from investments salary and bonus”; had an overall net worth of “USD 1.3bn bankable assets (+ real estate and business holdings)”; had no “significant association” with any “politically connected person over the last five years”; and had “sale of mining business and salary” as the source/origin of his assets, which had accumulated since 1992 when he “acquired his stake in the business now sold”. The description of the assets and value to be transferred to the Trust/Company was “Bankable assets up to USD 600m”. This section also included the following:

  103. [86] The Acceptance Documentation was signed by the plaintiff in Geneva on 28 February 2005. The signature page contained a request that the defendant proceed with “the formation of the Trust/Company as appropriate”; a confirmation that the plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the assets to be transferred; and a confirmation that “the undertakings and comments given” in the Acceptance Documentation to the defendant “shall be irrevocable and remain valid” until the defendant “terminates its involvement with the Trust/Company”.

  104. The Trust Deed – 7 March 2005

  105. [87] The declaration of trust establishing The Mandalay Trust was made by the defendant on 7 March 2005 (“the Trust Deed”). It was established under the proper law of Singapore which governed the operation of the Trust. The “Initial Settled Property” of USD 100 was vested in the defendant as Trustee. The “Trust Fund” was defined as: (i) the Initial Settled Property; (ii) all money, investments and property paid or transferred to and accepted by the Trustees as additions to the Trust Fund; and (iii) the investments and property from time to time representing such money, investments and additions or any part thereof.

  106. [88] “Trustees” was defined to include the defendant and any other trustees for the time being. The defendant stood possessed of the Trust Fund upon trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs and to accumulate the income of the Trust Fund and add accumulations to the capital of the Trust Fund for the beneficiaries.

  107. [89] The defendant had wide discretionary powers including powers to appoint such new or other trust powers for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It also had wide discretionary powers to delegate to other persons any of its powers and discretions in this regard which expressly survived any rule restricting the delegation of a power or discretion.

  108. [90] The defendant had the power to exclude or add beneficiaries and to make payments for the benefit of minors. It also had the power to vary by deed “all or any of the trust powers and provisions” of the Trust Deed so long as such variations benefited only the beneficiaries.

  109. [91] Clause 10 provided as follows:

  110. [92] The defendant had power to give up, restrict or release any of the powers conferred on it by the Trust Deed so long as it did not conflict with the beneficial provisions of the Trust Deed. It also had the power to appoint new and additional Trustees with provision made for a trustee’s withdrawal. The only other relevant express limitations on the defendant’s exercise of its very broad powers was to prevent such exercise if it were to infringe the rule against perpetuities.

  111. [93] Clause 13 provided as follows:

  112. [94] Clause 16 provided as follows:

  113. [95] Clause 19 of the Trust Deed provided that the defendant or “Trustees” had “absolute and uncontrolled discretion” to vary all or any of the trust powers and provisions “if they considered the same to be in the interests of the beneficiaries or one or more of them”. As the parties are at issue as to whether the Deed of Amendment and Restatement executed in July 2013 and referred to at [121] below is valid, it is convenient to extract the whole of the clause in relation to the defendant’s power in this regard. It was in the following terms:

  114. [96] The Fourth Schedule to the Trust Deed referred to as the “Administrative Powers” in Clause 13 of the Trust Deed included the following:

  115. [97] The Fourth Schedule also provided the power for the trustees to employ agents and to delegate “by deed” the execution or exercise of all or any trust powers and discretions. The power to employ agents included the power to appoint “banks trust companies or any other agent whatsoever whether associated or connected in any way with the Trustees or not”. In circumstances where the defendant appointed an agent “associated or connected with” it, the Fourth Schedule provided that the defendant would not be responsible to account for any default of the agent if employed in good faith to transact any business or to do any act required to be done in the execution of the trusts.

  116. [98] The Fourth Schedule also included the following:

  117. [99] Although the heading to this clause refers to “investment advisor or manager” the only expression used in the body of the clause is “investment advisor”. The expression “investment manager or investment advisor” is used in the body of Clause 10(b) (see [91] above). The Trust Deed does not define “investment manager” nor “investment advisor”.

  118. Memorandum of Wishes – 7 March 2005

  119. [100] The defendant signed a document entitled “Memorandum of Wishes Concerning The Mandalay Trust” declared on 7 March 2005 (the “Memorandum of Wishes”). The Memorandum of Wishes recorded that its “purpose” was to “record information to assist in the administration of the trust and the exercise of any discretion and powers pursuant to the trust deed”. It identified the plaintiff as “the principal beneficiary” and recorded that:

  120. [101] The plaintiff’s signature appears above a line which records “Copy received by the principal beneficiary”.

  121. The “Letter of Appointment” – 7 March 2005

  122. [102] A letter bearing the handwritten date 7 March 2005 addressed to the defendant and signed by the plaintiff (the “2005 Letter of Appointment”) was in the following terms:

  123. [103] This letter appears to be what Mr Low described as the “form for appointment of investment manager” which he had asked Mr Stamm to have the plaintiff sign if he intended that the plaintiff was to act as an authorised signatory of the companies (see [74] above). Notwithstanding Mr Low’s anticipation of Mr Stamm’s intention, the plaintiff was not an authorised signatory of the respective trust companies.

  124. [104] This is the letter, together with letters in later years, on which the defendant relies to contend that the nature of the Trust is a “reserved powers trust” of which the plaintiff was the “investment manager” and that its liability is limited by anti-Bartlett clauses (so named after the decision in Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] Ch 515) in the Trust Deed.

  125. Limited power of attorney for asset manager – 7 March 2005

  126. [105] The plaintiff also signed a document entitled “Limited power of attorney for asset manager” (“the 2005 LPOA”) addressed to the Singapore Bank. Soothsayer, as principal and holder of accounts with the Singapore Bank, appointed the plaintiff with effect from 7 March 2005 as its agent “to do and perform any transaction(s) relating to the management of the assets” in the accounts.

  127. [106] The 2005 LPOA recorded that the plaintiff, as attorney, was the “asset manager” and “investment advisor” of Soothsayer and that Soothsayer acknowledged that the plaintiff had no authority to bind the Singapore Bank in any transaction, give any advice or recommendation, or make any representation on behalf of the Singapore Bank, or receive any payment or collect assets on the Singapore Bank’s behalf. It was also acknowledged that the Singapore Bank would rely on the continuous validity, capacity and authority of the plaintiff to manage the assets until receipt of notice of revocation of the 2005 LPOA.

  128. [107] The 2005 LPOA also provided that the plaintiff was “not empowered to withdraw, either in whole or in part, securities or other assets” in the accounts with the Singapore Bank. It also expressly provided that the Singapore Bank “may (but shall not be required to) act on instructions signed purportedly by [the plaintiff]”.

  129. Trust Committee Minute – 7 March 2005

  130. [108] A minute of the defendant’s Trust Committee chaired by Mr Jackman and dated 7 March 2005 recorded resolutions which included: (a) a resolution accepting the trusteeship of The Mandalay Trust; and (b) a resolution that the plaintiff “be appointed as Investment Manager to The Mandalay Trust pursuant to the terms of the said trust”.

  131. Other letters – 7 March 2005

  132. [109] In addition to the 2005 Letter of Appointment referred to above, the plaintiff signed other letters addressed to the defendant which bear the handwritten date 7 March 2005. These included: a letter requesting the defendant to open an account for “the Mandalay Trust/Soothsayer Limited” ; and a letter advising the defendant that the plaintiff understood that it was the defendant’s usual practice to obtain confirmation that a proposed client had taken legal advice on “legal and tax matters in connection with the declaration” of trust and that he “had not found it necessary” to do so. The latter letter recorded that the plaintiff did not “regard the defendant or its affiliates as responsible for any adverse legal or tax consequences which might arise or affect” the plaintiff or his family “as a consequence of having proposed/settled [the Trust]”.

  133. [110] Although the letters referred to above bear the handwritten date 7 March 2005, it is apparent from communications between Mr Low and Ms Mihaesco that they were not signed by the plaintiff on the dates they bear.

  134. [112] Ms Mihaesco responded on 8 March 2005 advising that the documents for the plaintiff “have to be filled” and that they were signed in Geneva on 28 February, “as it is the day when we received them in Geneva and that he did not fill in anything”.

  135. Soothsayer acquired – 7 March 2005

  136. [113] On 7 March 2005 the defendant’s Trust Committee resolved that “The Mandalay Trust acquires Soothsayer Limited, as an underlying company registered in the Bahamas by subscribing for 2 ordinary shares of USD1.00 each”.

  137. [114] It was also resolved that “all assets that will be received in the account of Soothsayer Limited be accepted as additional settled assets of the Mandalay Trust”. It was also resolved that the defendant “acting as Trustee of the Mandalay Trust” granted “unsecured, interest-free loans” to Soothsayer “based on the value of the additional settled assets that will be received” in Soothsayer’s account, such loans to be repayable “on demand”.

  138. Meadowsweet acquired – 10 March 2005

  139. [115] On 10 March 2005 the defendant’s Trust Committee resolved that “The Mandalay Trust acquires Meadowsweet Assets Limited, as an underlying company registered in the British Virgin Islands by subscribing for 2 ordinary shares of USD1.00 each”.

  140. [116] It was also resolved that “all assets that will be received in the account of Meadowsweet Assets Limited be accepted as additional settled assets of the Mandalay Trust”. It was also resolved that the defendant “acting as Trustee of the Mandalay Trust” granted “unsecured, interest-free loans” to Meadowsweet “based on the value of the additional settled assets that will be received” in Meadowsweet’s account, such loans to be repayable “on demand”.

  141. Limited Power of Attorney – Pierre Grotz 12 April 2005

  142. [117] In a LPOA dated 12 April 2005 (“the Grotz LPOA”), a Mr Pierre Grotz (“Mr Grotz”) is named as “Attorney” to Meadowsweet as principal in respect of account number 75-5 with the Bank (“account 75-5”). Mr Malkin introduced Mr Grotz to the plaintiff, the Bank and the defendant. Mr Grotz’ relationship with Meadowsweet was described in the Grotz LPOA as “Advisor”.

  143. [118] The Grotz LPOA appears to have remained in place until 24 April 2007 when a discretionary portfolio management agreement was put in place in respect of account 75-5. Under this agreement, Meadowsweet appointed the Bank to “manage” the securities in account 75-5 based on the Bank’s “investment policy and in compliance with the investment profile” chosen by Meadowsweet and any investment instructions Meadowsweet may give. This agreement probably would have superseded the Grotz LPOA but there was no formal revocation on or around April 2007. On 31 March 2011, a letter was sent to the defendant, bearing the plaintiff’s signature, requesting the removal of Mr Grotz as attorney and the appointment of the plaintiff as attorney instead.

  144. Limited Power of Attorney – 8 April 2011

  145. [119] Meadowsweet granted an LPOA to the plaintiff on 8 April 2013 in respect of a life policy that was taken out in 2011 (see [328]–[333] below) (“the CS Life LPOA”). The grant was in general terms with restrictions similar to those in the Meadowsweet LPOA referred to below.

  146. Limited Power of Attorney – 27 May 2013

  147. [120] Meadowsweet granted a LPOA to the plaintiff generally relating to “safekeeping account(s) and assets in accounts”, and without limitation to any specified accounts (“the Meadowsweet LPOA”). The plaintiff was precluded from withdrawing, pledging or transferring all or part of the assets held in the Bank’s accounts, or securities or valuables deposited with the Bank. He was also precluded from contracting loans or signing the acknowledgement of any balance form.

  148. Deed of Amendment and Restatement – 5 July 2013

  149. [121] A Deed of Amendment and Restatement for the Trust Deed (“the Deed of Amendment and Restatement”) was executed 5 July 2013. Its genesis as discussed later (see [399]–[414] below) was in the defendant’s desire to limit its liability in respect of the artworks collected by the plaintiff and over which the defendant was concerned it did not have custody or control.

  150. [122] The recitals to the Deed of Amendment and Restatement recorded that it was “supplemental to” the Trust Deed and that the defendant proposed to exercise its powers to vary the Trust Deed pursuant to Clause 19 of the Trust Deed (see [95] above). The recitals also recorded that the defendant was satisfied that the conditions in Clause 19 had been satisfied. The “Appointer” was defined as the plaintiff, or such person named by him. The other amendments to the Trust Deed were the inclusion of clauses 9 “Investment Manager” and 9A “Special Investment Manager”.

  151. [123] Clause 9 “Investment Manager” included the following:

  152. [124] Clause 9A “Special Investment Manager” provided for the Appointor to declare any company in which the trustees held any interest to be a Special Nominated Company. The company that was nominated was Lynden.

  153. [125] Clause 9A also provided that the Special Investment Manager would be “responsible for all investment and asset management functions relating to the works of art and the other assets held by the Special Nominated Company”. This included responsibility for the “management, maintenance and safe custody of the works of art”, and for “maximising returns whether by auction or private sale” when purchasing or selling works of art.

  154. [126] The defendant’s powers set out in the Fourth Schedule of the Trust Deed were only exercisable in respect of assets held by a Special Nominated Company if there was no Special Investment Manager and no Investment Manager “acting”. If there was a Special Investment Manager or Investment Manager, those powers and discretions were exercisable in respect of a Special Nominated Company’s assets only with the written consent of the Special Investment Manager or Investment Manager. The clause also provided that the defendant, the Special Nominated Company, and its officers: did not have any “responsibility, duty or liability in relation to the works of art”; “shall not be liable in any manner for the failure of the Special Investment Manager (or the Investment Manager as the case may be) to fulfil his obligations or in implementing any direction of the Special Investment Manager (or the Investment Manager as the case may be)”; shall not have any duty to “monitor the actions of the Special Investment Manager”; and shall not have any duty to “consider whether any direction given to the [defendant] is appropriate”. The defendant and Special Nominated Company were obliged to “follow any and all Investment Directions and other directions as set out in this clause” other than in exceptional circumstances, such as where it would be contrary to regulations to do so.

  155. Deed of Appointment – 19 December 2013

  156. [127] On 19 December 2013 the plaintiff signed a deed as “Appointer”, witnessed by Mr Bachiashvili, described as supplemental to the “Settlement” (“the Deed of Appointment”). The “Settlement” was defined as the Trust Deed and the Deed of Amendment and Restatement. The Deed of Appointment recited that the plaintiff had the power “pursuant to clause 9(a) of the Settlement” to “appoint an additional Investment Manager”.

  157. [128] The Deed of Appointment recorded that in exercising the power conferred under Clause 9(a) the plaintiff declared Mr Bachiashvili “to be Investment Manager (acting singly)” with effect from 19 December 2013.

  158. Limited Powers of Attorney – 27 February 2014

  159. [129] Meadowsweet granted two LPOAs to Mr Bachiashvili, one in respect of its accounts with the Bank and one in respect of its accounts with CS Life. The LPOAs were generally in the same terms as those LPOAs that were granted to the plaintiff (see [120] above).

  160. The parties at issue in respect of trust

  161. [130] The parties are at issue in respect of the nature of the Trust, the plaintiff’s status in respect of the operation of the Trust and the defendant’s obligations and liabilities under the Trust Deed. There is also a challenge to the validity of the Deed of Amendment and Restatement.

  162. [131] The defendant claims that the Trust is a reserved powers trust, the provisions of which exclude it from liability to the plaintiffs for any of the losses that the Trust may have suffered other than those losses that are the subject of the Settlement with the Bank and for which the defendant claims the plaintiffs have been fully compensated.

  163. [132] The plaintiffs claim that the defendant has misunderstood the effect of the provisions of the Trust Deed and surrounding relevant documents and submitted that the defendant is liable for the losses suffered by the Trust that exceed the scope of the Settlement.

  164. [133] It will be necessary to consider the provisions of the Trust Deed and other documentation and the parties claims in detail later in this judgment.

  165. The Trust bank accounts and portfolios

  166. Bank Account signatories – 10 March 2005

  167. [134] On 10 March 2005, the board of Meadowsweet appointed Clementi as the sole authorised signatory of the Meadowsweet accounts with the Bank, with capacity to use an Authorised Signatories List for the account in the future. Such List included Bukit Merah Limited and Tanah Merah Limited. The plaintiff was not an authorised signatory nor was he on the Authorised Signatories List.

  168. Meadowsweet account and mailing instruction to the Bank – 10 March 2005

  169. [135] On 10 March 2005, Bukit Merah Limited entered into a contract for the opening of an account and/or safekeeping account between Meadowsweet “as depositor” and the Bank. That contract included provisions in respect of correspondence which were cross-referenced to a letter of 10 March 2005 from Meadowsweet to the Bank. Meadowsweet’s address was recorded as “Nerine Chamber” with a PO Box in Tortola in the BVI. That letter required the Bank to send the “Original transaction, advices, month-end investment portfolio statements, current account statements and bank correspondences” by mail to “c/o” of the defendant’s address in Singapore. It also requested duplicate copies of these same documents to be “retained and released, only upon request”.

  170. Meadowsweet discretionary portfolio management agreements with the Bank – 5 April 2005

  171. [137] On 23 March 2005 Ms Mihaesco forwarded two discretionary portfolio management agreements (“the Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreements”) together with two Investment Profiles (“the Meadowsweet Profiles”) to Mr Low. The Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreements were for two safekeeping accounts referred to for convenience as account 75-1 and account 75-4 with the Bank. In her covering e-mail, Ms Mihaesco advised that the term “plus” meant “opportunistic (return oriented)”, and the term “core” referred to a “conventional mixed portfolio”.

  172. [138] Clementi, for Meadowsweet, as “Client”, signed the two Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreements with the Bank on 29 March 2005. The Bank signed the Agreements on 5 April 2005.

  173. [139] Each Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreement defined the “Portfolio” as the “safekeeping account and transaction accounts”. Meadowsweet mandated and authorised the Bank to manage the Portfolio “independently and without special instructions, except the standing special instructions agreed upon, on a fully discretionary basis in accordance with the agreed investment profile”.

  174. [140] Each Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreement provided that Meadowsweet was not to give any instructions to the Bank for the purchase, holding or sale of investments in respect of the Portfolio. However, it also provided that if Meadowsweet did give such instructions, the Bank was “neither obliged to monitor and assess as to whether the resulting composition of the portfolio after execution of such special instruction is still in accordance with the agreed investment profile or to effect transactions for adjustment purposes”. Each Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreement recorded that Meadowsweet especially understood and agreed that “special instructions might not be carried out if the portfolio is invested in direct investment (e.g. investment funds, instruments of collective investments)”.

  175. [141] Each of the Meadowsweet Profiles was for a “Mixed Portfolio” defined to have “an average risk exposure through the acceptance of the fluctuation of assets and value; long-term capital growth aimed at through steady income, capital and currency gain”.

  176. [142] They each recorded that when “managing the portfolio” the Bank would invest the assets in accordance with the “Asset allocation” in minimum, maximum and neutral percentages in four categories: (i) Liquidity; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Equities; and (iv) Alternative Investments. The allocation in respect of Liquidity and Bonds was identical in each Meadowsweet Profile but differed in relation to Equities and Alternative Investments. For account 75-1 the maximum allocation for Equities was 25% with the minimum and neutral allocations at 0%; and for account 75-4 the maximum allocation for Equities was 50%, with minimum at 10% and neutral 30%. The maximum allocation for Alternative Investments for account 75-1 was 50%, with minimum at 10% and neutral at 30%; and for account 75-4 the maximum was 25%, with minimum 0% and neutral 0%.

  177. Meadowsweet discretionary portfolio management agreement – 23 April 2007

  178. [144] As mentioned above at [117], the Grotz LPOA covered account 75-5 and no discretionary portfolio management agreement was entered in respect of this account until one was put in place on 23 April 2007. The terms of this agreement were similar to the other Meadowsweet Discretionary Agreements. The accompanying profile was also described as “Mixed Portfolio”, with an investment objective of “real-term capital preservation and long-term capital growth” and a risk assessment of “asset fluctuation and average level of risk”. The investment parameters of the profile were: liquidity of 0% to 45% with neutral of 0%; bonds of 40% to 90% with neutral of 70%; and equities of 15% to 40% with neutral of 30%.

  179. Soothsayer discretionary portfolio management agreements – 1 April 2005

  180. [145] On 1 April 2005 a meeting of directors of Soothsayer resolved that the company would establish two discretionary portfolio accounts with the Singapore Bank, referred to for convenience as account 80 and account 81, in US dollars in accordance with a relevant investment portfolio. They authorised Clementi to sign and accept the Singapore Bank’s discretionary portfolio management agreements and investment profiles on Soothsayer’s behalf. On 1 April 2005, Clementi signed a discretionary portfolio management agreement (the “Soothsayer Discretionary Agreements”) and a “Portfolio Mandate” (“the Soothsayer Portfolio Mandates”) for each Soothsayer account with the Singapore Bank.

  181. [146] The Soothsayer Discretionary Agreements authorised the Singapore Bank to “manage” Soothsayer’s accounts “from time to time” as agreed between Soothsayer and the Singapore Bank, subject to discretionary management by the Singapore Bank. They provided that the Singapore Bank would manage the accounts “in accordance with investment guidelines stipulated by” Soothsayer. Soothsayer was authorised to make additions to or withdrawals from the accounts “upon request” to the Singapore Bank provided it gave the Singapore Bank timely notice. Subject to those guidelines, the Singapore Bank had “complete discretion with regard to the management of the Discretionary Account”. It was agreed that the Singapore Bank’s “sole responsibility” in relation to the accounts was to “perform its duties and to make investment decisions in good faith”.

  182. [147] Each of the Soothsayer Discretionary Agreements included the following:

  183. [148] Each Soothsayer Portfolio Mandate recorded that the account would be held with the Singapore Bank “with management advice from Credit Suisse, Singapore, Portfolio Management Asia-Pacific (the “Portfolio Managers”)”. The objectives were described as follows:

  184. [149] The Soothsayer Portfolio Mandate for account 80 was entitled “Global Income-Oriented Asian Core Portfolio” in US dollars. As referred to at [137] earlier, Ms Mihaesco had advised in her covering e-mail in relation to the Meadowsweet accounts that “Core” meant a “conventional mixed portfolio”. The “Benchmark Composite” for account 80 was: 15% FTSE World Index; 15% MSCI Far East Ex-Japan Index; and 70% Citigroup Eurodollar Bond AA- or Better 3-5 year Index.

  185. [150] The investment parameters or “bandwidth” for account 80 were mandated as Equities 10%-- to 50% with a neutral of 30%; Fixed income securities 34% to 90% with a neutral of 70%; and Alternative Investments and cash at 0% to 25% with a neutral at 0%. The maximum exposure to Asian Fixed Income and Equities was limited to 50% of the respective portfolio allocation for each asset class. Asian Equities were listed as neutral at 15% and Asian Fixed Income Securities were listed as neutral at 35%.

  186. [151] Soothsayer directed the Singapore Bank to send it “monthly portfolio statements with performance” to its stated mailing address and that the “relationship manager and/or the “portfolio managers” would arrange and conduct periodic meetings with Soothsayer to review past performance as well as to present future investment strategies.

  187. [152] The Soothsayer Portfolio Mandate for account 81 identified the portfolio as “Global Income-Oriented Asian Opportunity/Plus Portfolio” in US dollars. As mentioned at [137] earlier, Ms Mihaesco had advised that “Plus” meant an “opportunistic (return-oriented) portfolio”.

  188. [153] The “Benchmark Composite” for this mandate was: 70% Citigroup Eurodollar Bond AA- or Better 1-3 year Index; and 30% HFR Global Hedge Fund Index.

  189. [154] The investment parameters for the account 81 mandate were: Equities between 0% and 25% with 0% neutral; Fixed Income Securities 35% to 90% with neutral at 70%; Alternative Investments 10% to 50% with neutral at 30%; and cash at 0% to 55% with neutral at 0%. Once again, Soothsayer directed the Singapore Bank to provide it with relevant information in the portfolio via fax, post or e-mail and to send it monthly portfolio statements with performance of the portfolio.

  190. Soothsayer discretionary portfolio mandates – 25 February 2009

  191. [155] On 25 February 2009, two new portfolio mandates (“the New Soothsayer Portfolio Mandates”) were put in place for the Soothsayer accounts pursuant to the Soothsayer Discretionary Agreements. For account 80, the New Soothsayer Portfolio Mandate was described as “Core Asian”. Its investment objective was “long-term capital growth” and its risk assessment was “increased value fluctuation, above average level of risk”. It provided the following framework of asset allocation: liquidity between 0% and 50% with a neutral of 5%; bonds between 0% and 50% with a neutral of 15%; equities between 20% and 80% with a neutral of 50%; and alternative investments between 5% and 50% with a neutral of 30%. It was recorded that:

  192. [156] The second New Soothsayer Portfolio Mandate covered account 82, for which there was no prior discretionary mandate. This portfolio mandate was described as “Plus Global”. Its investment objective was “capital preservation and long-term capital growth” with “moderate value fluctuation, average level of risk”. Its asset allocation framework was: liquidity between 0% and 50% with neutral of 5%; bonds between 0% and 50% with neutral of 25%; equities between 20% and 70% with neutral of 40%; and alternative investments between 5% and 50% with neutral of 30%.

  193. Relevant events

  194. [157] The parties’ relationship prior to the commencement of the proceedings spanned 13 years. There were many aspects and complexities to that relationship, particularly with the overlay of Mr Lescaudron’s fraudulent conduct. In this section of the judgment, it is intended to deal only with those events that the parties have addressed as relevant to the issues for determination, rather than embarking upon a detailed analysis of every aspect of that relationship.

  195. Gazprom investment – February 2006

  196. [158] In February 2006, Ms Mihaesco was dealing directly with the plaintiff in relation to various matters including in respect of the purchase of Gazprom ADRs. Ms Mihaesco’s notes of 2 February 2006 include the following:

  197. [159] Ms Mihaesco’s notes for 6 February 2006 include the following:

  198. [160] The reference to “confirmed in writing” in the first line of this note is probably a reference to a typed document purportedly signed and dated 3 February 2006 by the plaintiff in the following terms:

  199. [161] Although the plaintiff was initially sceptical in his evidence that he would have owned or purchased USD 400m worth of Gazprom shares, and although he did not have a recollection of the communications recorded in Ms Mihaesco’s notes, he said that because so much time had passed he “theoretically … cannot exclude” that this occurred. He could not recall owning such a large holding of Gazprom shares but emphasised that this was during a period, 2006 to 2008, when he was trading Russian shares and co-ordinating the process himself. A large proportion of these trades were Gazprom and Lukoil shares. Ultimately, the plaintiff’s evidence was that he did not exclude the possibility that the value of Russian shares might have even been several hundred millions of dollars in the period from 2005 to 2008.

  200. [162] As the plaintiff admitted, this was during a period in which he was “actively trading in Russian shares and was coordinating the process [himself]”. It is probable that Ms Mihaesco’s notes are an accurate record of her communications with the plaintiff at this time and are instructive of the nature of the plaintiff’s involvement in the management of this part of the Trust assets in February 2006.

  201. Mr Lescaudron becomes RM – June 2006

  202. [163] Ms Mihaesco left her employment with the Bank in June 2006. The plaintiff was disappointed because he had a good working relationship with Ms Mihaesco, particularly because he was able to converse comfortably with her in Russian.

  203. [164] It was at this time that Mr Lescaudron became the RM in respect of the Meadowsweet accounts held with the Bank.

  204. Unauthorised Payments Away

  205. [165] It was not long after Mr Lescaudron took over as the RM that the defendant’s officers became aware that he was making Unauthorised Payments Away from the Trust assets in the Meadowsweet bank accounts with the Bank.

  206. [166] A UPA is “a payment from a structure under CS Trust, for which CS Trust’s prior approval was not obtained”. Credit Suisse’s Best Practice Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) in place during the relevant period which applied to all of CS Group locations worldwide, expressly recognised that UPAs “may present elevated legal, regulatory and reputational risks to CST Group should they not be reduced to a minimum”. The Guidelines defined UPAs as follows:

  207. [167] The Guidelines required the responsible Trust Manager to initiate the “rectification” of the UPAs within five working days of receiving notice and to “possibly” finalise the rectification after another five working days. The Guidelines also required the Trust Manager to retroactively obtain adequate documentation on which the transaction was based and executed. They also set up a monitoring and reporting regime and the steps to be taken to “escalate” the rectification of the UPAs in cases in which RMs created UPAs “in spite of adequate information and training”.

  208. [168] UPAs were to be identified by comparing and/or matching payment instructions by the defendant to “Debit Advices” from the Bank. Debit Advices were documents delivered to the defendant by the RM reflecting a transaction that had been effected. The Debit Advice form included a section in which it was intended that the recipient of any payment or distribution from the trust fund was identified. That section included the words “In favour of” next to which it was intended that the recipient’s name(s) would be inserted. There was also a section for “Payment reason” where it was intended that the reason for and/or nature of the transaction would be recorded.

  209. [169] If there were no payment instructions in respect of a particular Debit Advice, that transaction would be identified as a “possible” UPA and followed up on by the Trust Manager. This “follow-up” involved the Trust Manager contacting the relevant RM to obtain details in relation to the particular transaction and documentation “evidencing the beneficiary’s approval to ratify a distribution or payment that had been made”.

  210. [170] UPAs were recognised as having been “clearly” forbidden by a “Compliance Alert” issued by the Credit Suisse Legal & Compliance Department in 2003.

  211. Immediate action required in relation to UPAs - December 2006

  212. [171] On 5 December 2006, Ms Sim, who was the Trust Manager of the Trust at the time, wrote to Mr Lescaudron’s assistant, Ms Suzanne Raschle (“Ms Raschle”), with a copy to Mr Lescaudron, Mr Low and Ms Lina Teng (“Ms Teng”), a compliance officer working in “Business Risk Management/Compliance” of the defendant, advising that “6 debit advices for Meadowsweet” had been received but that she could not recall “giving authorisation for these payments” or receiving the relevant invoices. Ms Sim requested clarification and receipt of the invoices “duly signed” by the plaintiff.

  213. [172] Ms Raschle responded by e-mail on 6 December 2006 in which she advised Ms Sim that an invoice had been sent on 4 December 2006. After further questioning by Ms Sim on 12 December 2006, Ms Raschle admitted that the invoice had already been paid whilst “waiting” for the defendant’s “signed confirmation”. This prompted Ms Sim to write to Ms Raschle on 12 December 2006, with copies to Mr Lescaudron, Mr Low and Ms Teng, in terms that included the following:

  214. [173] In an e-mail just moments later, Mr Low congratulated Ms Sim writing: “Well done, that’s telling her. I’m not sure that it will make much difference, but we try ….”. In a further e-mail twenty minutes later, Mr Low wrote directly to Mr Lescaudron, with copies to Ms Teng, Ms Sim and Ms Raschle in the following terms:

  215. [174] Also on 12 December 2006, Ms Teng provided her report on “Unauthorised Payments – November 2006 (CST Singapore)” to various recipients including Mr Jackman, Mr Low, Ms Sim, Mr Kevin Clerey of CS Trust AG (“Mr Clerey”) and Mr Thomas Ditrich, the Head of Compliance at CS Trust AG (“Mr Ditrich”).

  216. [175] At about this time Ms Teng also had a telephone conversation with Mr Ditrich about the continuation of UPAs with “many instances … from CS Switzerland branches”. She wrote separately to him on 12 December 2006 referring to that conversation and in terms that included the following:

  217. [176] On the following day, 13 December 2006, Mr Ditrich wrote by e-mail to Mr Clerey with the Subject Line “Your attention is required – Unauthorised Payments – November 2006 (CST Singapore)” with a copy to Ms Teng. Mr Ditrich forwarded Ms Teng’s e-mail of 12 December to him and wrote in terms that included the following:

  218. [177] The Legal & Compliance Alert attached to Mr Ditrich’s e-mail recorded that “often” settlors/founders or beneficiaries were not aware “that, upon establishment of a trust, the power of disposal over the transferred funds is passed to the trustee or the directors respectively” and the Bank was “not entitled to carry out requests submitted by a beneficiary without the prior approval of the trustee”.

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