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Grounds publishedDecided 18 Sep 2026

General Division of the High Court

The trust deed made the trustee distribute all assets on the wife's death

Fereydoon Mossanen and others v Julius Baer Trust Co (Singapore) Ltd

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[2026] SGHC 190Case no. Originating Claim No 848 of 2025 (Summons No 932 of 2026)

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The trust deed made the trustee distribute all assets on the wife's death

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [261], [266]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] HC/SUM 932/2026 (“SUM 932”) is an application by the claimants in HC/OC 848/2025 (“OC 848”) for summary determination of nine issues listed in Annex A to SUM 932, pursuant to O 9 r 19 and/or O 9 r 25(3) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). The issues (reproduced at [61] below) revolve around the terms of various deeds relating to a family trust established by the first claimant. Certain questions of law engaged by these issues do not appear, so far as I am aware, to have been addressed hitherto in Singapore case law.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [2] The first claimant, Dr Fereydoon Mossanen (“Settlor”), is the settlor of a trust known as The Moss Trust (Singapore) (“Moss Trust”). The Settlor was married to Mrs Madlen Mossanen (“Wife”), who passed away on 10 November 2024.

  6. [3] The second and third claimants, Mr Amir Mansour Mossanen (“Mr Amir Mossanen”) and Ms Natasha Rahban, are the Settlor and the Wife’s children (together, “Children”).

  7. [4] On the claimants’ case, the fourth claimant, Mr Linus Georg Ernst Jaeggi (“Mr Jaeggi”), is one of two current protectors of the Moss Trust and the current Chairman of the Committee of Trust Protectors of the Moss Trust comprising himself and the other protector, Mr Maurice Benezra (“Mr Benezra”).

  8. [5] The defendant, Julius Baer Trust Company (Singapore) Limited (“JBTC”), is the current trustee of the Moss Trust.

  9. The Original Trust Deed

  10. [6] The Moss Trust was established under the laws of Singapore by way of a trust deed dated 20 March 2015 (“Original Trust Deed”) executed by the Settlor and the original trustee of the Moss Trust, EFG Wealth Solutions (Singapore) Limited (“EFG Wealth”). The Original Trust Deed was governed by Singapore law (cl 3.1).

  11. [7] The Original Trust Deed stipulated that the beneficiaries of the Moss Trust were the Settlor, the Wife, the Children and any lawful issue of the Settlor (cl 1.1 and the Second Schedule). There is no contention that the Settlor has any lawful issue apart from the Children.

  12. [8] The Original Trust Deed provided for (a) the trust fund to be applied in the manner stipulated for the benefit of the Settlor and the Wife during the Settlor’s lifetime (cl 4.1(i)); (b) the trust fund to be applied in the manner stipulated for the Wife’s benefit upon the Settlor’s death (cl 4.3); and (c) the trust fund to be distributed in the manner stipulated to the Children and their issue after both the deaths of the Settlor and the Wife (cll 4.3 and 4.4).

  13. [9] The Original Trust Deed also provided that the Moss Trust was revocable and amendable by the Settlor within specified parameters, and that upon the Settlor’s death, no one would hold any power of revocation or amendment (cl 3.2).

  14. [10] The Original Trust Deed further provided for the constitution of a Committee of Trust Protectors (“Committee”) to provide advice to the trustee, and for the appointment of the Settlor as the first Chairman of the Committee (cll 1.9 and 9). Aside from the Settlor, no other protector/Committee member was appointed at the time.

  15. The 2016 Trust Deed

  16. [11] JBTC replaced EFG Wealth as the trustee of the Moss Trust with effect from 10 November 2016.

  17. [12] On or around 10 November 2016, the Settlor and JBTC executed an “Amended and Restated Deed of Trust” bearing that date (“2016 Trust Deed”).

  18. [13] The provisions in the Original Trust Deed for distributions to the Settlor, the Wife and the Children (see [8] above) were materially retained in the 2016 Trust Deed (cll 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4). The list of beneficiaries also remained the same (cl 1.1 and the Second Schedule).

  19. [14] Clause 3.2 of the 2016 Trust Deed also continued to vest in the Settlor the power to revoke the Moss Trust and to amend its terms.

  20. [15] The provisions relating to the Committee also remained broadly similar. Clauses 9.2 and 9.3 of the 2016 Trust Deed provided for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Committee in the following terms:

  21. The 2016 Appointment

  22. [16] On or around 10 November 2016, the Settlor executed an instrument titled “Appointment of Additional Initial Members of the Committe[e] of Trust Protectors and Appointment of Successor Members and Chairmen of the Committee of Trust Protectors of the Moss Trust (Singapore)” and bearing that date (“2016 Appointment”). Under the 2016 Appointment, the Settlor “appoint[ed] [the Wife] as the successor Chairman of the Committee of Trust Protectors, but she shall serve only after the death, resignation, or incapacity of [the Settlor]” [emphasis added].

  23. The 2017 Amendment

  24. [17] On 4 April 2017, the Settlor and JBTC executed a “Deed of Renunciation and Amendment” (“2017 Amendment”). I highlight the following amendments to the 2016 Trust Deed made by the 2017 Amendment.

  25. [18] Clause 3.2 of the 2016 Trust Deed was amended to provide, inter alia, that (a) the Moss Trust was irrevocable; (b) the Moss Trust was amendable by the Wife (instead of the Settlor) within specified parameters; and (c) after both the deaths of the Settlor and the Wife, the Moss Trust was amendable by the trustee with the prior or simultaneous consent of the protector within specified parameters (cl 3.3).

  26. [19] The Second Schedule to the 2016 Trust Deed was amended to remove the Settlor as a beneficiary of the Moss Trust (cl 3.6). In a similar vein, cl 4.1 of the 2016 Trust Deed was amended to provide that, during the Settlor’s lifetime, the trust fund would be applied in the manner stipulated for the benefit of the Wife only (cl 3.4).

  27. The 2019 Declination

  28. [20] On 3 January 2019, the Settlor forwarded to JBTC a communication from the Wife addressed to the “Trustees and Protector” expressing her objections to receiving any powers under the Moss Trust and her view that it was “better to have [JBTC] acting”.

  29. [21] On 14 August 2019, the Wife executed an instrument titled “Declination to Accept Power to Amend or to Serve” (“2019 Declination”). Under the 2019 Declination, the Wife declared that (a) she declined and confirmed her prior declination to accept any and all power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust; (b) she had never exercised or purported to exercise any power to amend the Moss Trust; and (c) she declined to serve in any capacity on the Committee. It was common ground between the parties that the 2019 Declination was effective as a refusal by the Wife to accept the power of amendment of the Moss Trust.

  30. The 2019 Modification

  31. [22] After the Wife executed the 2019 Declination, the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC executed a deed titled “Modification of Deed of Renunciation and Amendment and Amended and Restated Deed of Trust” dated 14 August 2019 (“2019 Modification”).

  32. [23] Recital (G) in the 2019 Modification stated:

  33. [24] Clause 3 of the 2019 Modification stated that the 2017 Amendment would be modified such that, inter alia, the amended cl 3.2(ii) of the 2016 Trust Deed would provide for the Moss Trust to be amendable by the trustee with the prior or simultaneous written consent of the protector(s):

  34. In other words, the 2019 Modification sought to confer the power of amendment of the terms of the Moss Trust on JBTC (instead of the Wife) with effect from 14 August 2019 (ie, the date of execution of the 2019 Modification).

  35. [25] The 2019 Modification (cl 3) also stated that the 2016 Trust Deed would be modified, inter alia, as follows.

  36. [26] In respect of distributions from the trust fund:

  37. (a) A new cl 4.3(iii) of the 2016 Trust Deed was added to address the treatment of “trophy residence[s]” that were part of the trust fund.

  38. (b) A new cl 4.3(v) of the 2016 Trust Deed was added, which provided for a stipulated distribution in two equal shares to the trustee of the Moss Trust Amir (“Amir Trust”) and the trustee of the Moss Trust Nat (“Nat Trust”) (these being trusts set up for the benefit of the respective Children ) after the Wife’s death and whether or not the Settlor was then living.

  39. These clauses appeared in similar terms in the 2024 Trust Deed (defined at [36] below) (see [37] below).

  40. [27] In respect of the appointment of Committee members, cl 9.2 of the 2016 Trust Deed was amended to read:

  41. [28] Clause 4 of the 2019 Modification stated: “[JBTC] hereby acknowledges the modifications set forth herein”.

  42. The 2019 Appointment

  43. [29] On 13 November 2019, the Settlor, JBTC, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra executed a “Deed of Appointment and Retirement of Protectors” (“2019 Appointment”).

  44. [30] Recital (A) in the 2019 Appointment stated that the 2019 Appointment was supplemental to the Original Trust Deed, the “Deed of Acceptance of Resignation or Removal, and Appointment of New Trustee” dated 10 November 2016 by which JBTC was appointed as the trustee of the Moss Trust, the 2016 Trust Deed, the 2016 Appointment, the 2017 Amendment, the 2019 Declination and the 2019 Modification, all of which were collectively referred to as the “Trust”.

  45. [31] Recital (C) in the 2019 Appointment referred to “Clause 9.2 of the Trust” and described that provision in the terms of the amended cl 9.2 of the 2016 Trust Deed as set out in the 2019 Modification (see [27] above).

  46. [32] Recital (F) in the 2019 Appointment stated that “[p]ursuant to Clause 9.2”, the Settlor wished to appoint Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra as Committee members and that they wished to accept the appointment.

  47. [33] Clause 3 of the 2019 Appointment stated the Settlor’s appointment of Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra in the following terms:

  48. The 2019 Amendment

  49. [34] On 13 November 2019, the Settlor, JBTC, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra executed a “Second Deed of Amendment to The Moss Trust (Singapore)” (“2019 Amendment”).

  50. The 2020 Trust Deed

  51. [35] On 22 January 2020, JBTC, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra executed a “Deed of Amendment and Restatement” (“2020 Trust Deed”), which consolidated all the amendments effected by the 2017 Amendment, 2019 Modification and 2019 Amendment.

  52. The 2024 Trust Deed

  53. [36] On 5 March 2024, JBTC, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra executed a “Second Deed of Amendment and Restatement”, which amended the Moss Trust by restating it in its entirety as set out in the Appendix thereto (“2024 Appendix”). On 15 August 2024, JBTC, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra executed a “Deed of Amendment to Second Deed of Amendment and Restatement” (“2024 Amendment”), which amended a term of the Moss Trust relating to tax provisions. I will refer to the terms in the 2024 Appendix as amended by the 2024 Amendment as comprising the “2024 Trust Deed”.

  54. [37] Clause 4.3 of the 2024 Trust Deed provided for distributions to the Wife after the Settlor’s death (cll 4.3(i) to 4.3(iv)) and for distributions upon the Wife’s death (cll 4.3(iii) and 4.3(v)):

  55. [38] The “Trust Fund” comprised (a) the property listed in the First Schedule (viz, US$1,000) and Fifth Schedule (viz, the shares set out at [40] below) to the 2024 Trust Deed; (b) all further or additional property added by way of further trust, testamentary bequest, accumulation of income, capital accretion or otherwise; and (c) all property from time to time representing the same respectively (cl 1.16).

  56. [39] Clause 3.2(ii) of the 2024 Trust Deed contained a provision authorising the protectors to “resolve” in their “sole and absolute discretion” “any and all conflicts and ambiguities that might arise in the administration and interpretation” of the terms of the Moss Trust (“Protector Resolution Clause”):

  57. Assets of the Moss Trust

  58. [40] At the time of the Wife’s death, the assets of the Moss Trust comprised US$1,000 in cash and shares in the following companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands (“Investment Companies”):

  59. [41] In turn, the Investment Companies held the following assets:

  60. Background to the dispute

  61. [42] I briefly sketch the origins of the parties’ dispute. The claimants and JBTC have levied numerous allegations against each other which, at this stage of the proceedings, are unnecessary to elaborate on and unsuitable to delve into.

  62. [43] After the Wife’s death on 10 November 2024, the parties engaged in discussions to transfer all the trust assets held by the Moss Trust to Fiduciary Trust International of Delaware (“FTID”), which is the trustee of the Amir Trust and the Nat Trust (together, “Delaware Trusts”).

  63. [44] In a letter dated 22 November 2024 from JBTC addressed to Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra “as the Protector Committee of the Moss Trust (Singapore)” and copied to the Settlor and the Children, JBTC informed the claimants of its view that, because of certain transactions which JBTC undertook and/or caused to be undertaken in 2020 (“2020 transactions”), the transfer of the shares of the UK Property Investment Companies to FTID would incur UK tax liability of £4,483,138.44 for the Moss Trust. JBTC added that it would take advice on “whether there may be alternative ways to distribute the trust’s assets to the Delaware Trusts other than a transfer of the shares in Albert Property, Chameleon and Novacore, for example a transfer of the UK properties”.

  64. [45] According to the Settlor, JBTC’s letter of 22 November 2024 gave him the impression that JBTC knew that it had made a serious mistake in effecting the 2020 transactions and was trying to find ways to avoid the tax consequences of that mistake. On its part, JBTC averred that the 2020 transactions had been entered into on the directions of the Settlor, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra.

  65. [46] In the event, by an e-mail sent to, inter alia, the Settlor, Mr Amir Mossanen, Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra on 17 December 2024, JBTC’s external legal counsel, one Ms Beatrice Puoti (“Ms Puoti”) of Stephenson Harwood LLP, suggested that the real estate properties held by the UK Property Investment Companies be transferred in specie to the Delaware Trusts.

  66. [47] On 6 January 2025, one Mr Martyn Carré (“Mr Carré”), holding the post of “Director” at JBTC, sent an e-mail to Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra (with, inter alia, the Settlor, Mr Amir Mossanen and Ms Puoti in copy), stating, inter alia:

  67. [48] On 9 January 2025, Mr Carré followed up with another e-mail to Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra (with, inter alia, the Settlor, Mr Amir Mossanen and Ms Puoti in copy), stating, inter alia:

  68. [49] By a letter dated 28 January 2025 from JBTC to FTID, JBTC then asserted that only “trophy residences” referred to in cl 4.3(iii) of the 2024 Trust Deed were to be transferred (ie, in specie) to FTID under cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed after the Wife’s death but during the Settlor’s lifetime.

  69. [50] On 28 January 2025, having seen JBTC’s letter to FTID of the same date, Mr Jaeggi sent an e-mail to JBTC objecting to JBTC’s proposal to transfer the real estate properties in specie to FTID. Mr Jaeggi stated that his understanding was that cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed provided for “all funds of the trust, which include[d] all companies” to be “transferred in total”, and that there was no provision for “the properties … to be separated from the companies”.

  70. [51] JBTC then obtained a legal opinion from an English barrister dated 8 May 2025 (“Opinion”). The Opinion was rendered according to English law. Among other things, the Opinion conveyed, in gist, that:

  71. (a) It was uncertain whether anyone had the power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust after the 2017 Amendment, with the result that it was uncertain whether the present terms of the Moss Trust were those set out in the 2024 Trust Deed or in the 2016 Trust Deed as amended by the 2017 Amendment.

  72. (b) It was uncertain whether cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed required JBTC to transfer the real estate properties held by the UK Property Investment Companies and the US Property Investment Companies (together, “Property Investment Companies”) in specie to the trustee of the Delaware Trusts (as opposed to transferring the shares in the Property Investment Companies to the trustee of the Delaware Trusts).

  73. (c) It was uncertain whether the Protector Resolution Clause in cl 3.2(ii) of the 2024 Trust Deed was valid and/or enforceable.

  74. [52] According to the Settlor, he was surprised that the Opinion focused on the validity of the trust deeds of the Moss Trust as “[a]t that point in time, there was simply nothing to suggest that there was anything impinging on the validity of the Trust Deeds, the terms of which had been acted on and abided by all parties concerned”. He believed that JBTC had procured the Opinion to “cast doubt on the operative terms of the trust in order to avoid having to transfer the shares of the [Property] Investment Companies to the [Delaware Trusts]”, and that JBTC’s “motivation” for doing so was “probably to mitigate the mistake [JBTC] had earlier made” in respect of the 2020 transactions, which would result in the Moss Trust having to pay significant tax liabilities if the shares of the UK Property Investment Companies were transferred to the Delaware Trusts (see [44] above).

  75. [53] On 28 August 2025, Mr Jaeggi sent a letter to JBTC (“28 Aug 2025 Letter”), in which he “formally state[d]” on behalf of Mr Benezra and himself that:

  76. Mr Jaeggi further explained his disagreement with the arguments in the Opinion that cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed referred only to the distribution of “trophy properties” and not all funds. He concluded with an “appeal” to JBTC to “solve this issue in an amicable, cooperative and constructive way”.

  77. [54] On or around 11 September 2025, JBTC provided a document titled “Moss Trust – Note of advice on Moss Trust position”, dated 11 September 2025 and authored by Ms Puoti (“Note”) to the claimants. It was opined in the Note that:

  78. [55] The claimants disagreed with the contents of the Note.

  79. Commencement of OC 848: pleaded claims and defences

  80. [56] On 15 October 2025, the claimants commenced OC 848 against JBTC.

  81. [57] The claimants claimed that JBTC had committed breaches of trust and breaches of duties “amount[ing] to dishonesty, bad faith, wilful and individual misconduct / wrongdoing, and/or gross negligence” by allegedly: (a) attempting to invalidate the 2024 Trust Deed; (b) refusing to account to the Committee; (c) refusing to abide by the Committee’s directions set out in the 28 Aug 2025 Letter; (d) continuing to disavow the 2024 Trust Deed; (e) unlawfully interfering with the Settlor’s tax returns; (f) refusing to meet the claimants’ demands to, inter alia, comply with the terms of the 2024 Trust Deed; (g) commencing, without authorisation, legal proceedings against, inter alia, the Singapore law firm which had advised JBTC on the 2019 Modification before JBTC’s execution of the same; (h) continuing to retain and seek advice from Ms Puoti; and (i) mismanaging the Moss Trust in connection with a potential sale of a UK real estate property held by Albert Property.

  82. [58] In advancing these claims, the claimants pleaded, inter alia, that:

  83. (a) The 2017 Amendment contained an implied term that if the Wife declined to accept the power of amendment conferred by the 2017 Amendment, then the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC may, by mutual consent, assign the power of amendment to another party who was not the Settlor or the Wife (including JBTC itself) (“Claimants’ Implied Term”). The Settlor, the Wife and JBTC were entitled to enter into and effect the 2019 Modification pursuant to the Claimants’ Implied Term. The 2024 Trust Deed represented the latest version of the terms of the Moss Trust.

  84. (b) Further and/or alternatively, the 2017 Amendment should be rectified to include the Claimants’ Implied Term, with the result that the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed) were valid.

  85. (c) Further and/or alternatively, JBTC was estopped by convention from denying the validity of the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed).

  86. (d) Further and/or alternatively, the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to sanction the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed).

  87. (e) Clause 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed required JBTC to transfer the shares of the UK Property Investment Companies (and not the underlying real estate properties in specie) to the Delaware Trusts.

  88. (f) The Committee’s directions set out in the 28 Aug 2025 Letter were made “in the exercise of their power and/or discretion under [the Protector Resolution Clause]”, and JBTC’s refusal to comply with those directions was a breach of trust and a breach of its duties.

  89. [59] The reliefs sought by the claimants included:

  90. (a) a declaration that the 2024 Trust Deed was valid, effective and enforceable;

  91. (b) a declaration that Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra were validly appointed as the protectors of the Moss Trust;

  92. (c) if it was found that the Claimants’ Implied Term did not exist and that JBTC was not estopped from denying the validity of the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed), an order rectifying the 2017 Amendment to include the Claimants’ Implied Term;

  93. (d) if it was found that the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed) were invalid, an order sanctioning the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed);

  94. (e) a declaration that JBTC had and continued to have the power of amendment as provided for in the 2019 Modification, the 2019 Amendment, the 2020 Trust Deed and the 2024 Trust Deed;

  95. (f) a declaration that cl 3.2(ii) of the 2024 Trust Deed (containing the Protector Resolution Clause) was valid and enforceable;

  96. (g) an order that JBTC specifically perform its obligation under cl 3.2(ii) of the 2024 Trust Deed to comply with the protectors’ decision(s) in relation to any and all conflicts and ambiguities that might arise in the administration and interpretation of provisions of the Moss Trust and any and all amendments and modifications thereto; and

  97. (h) an order that JBTC specifically perform its obligation to distribute the assets of the Moss Trust pursuant to cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed, viz, to divide the balance of the Trust Fund into two equal shares, with one share distributed to the Amir Trust and one share distributed to the Nat Trust.

  98. [60] In its Defence, JBTC denied any breach of trust or duty. JBTC pleaded, inter alia, that:

  99. (a) The claimants’ averments set out at [58(a)]–[58(d)] above were “not admitted”.

  100. (b) That said, JBTC had not denied the validity of the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust and had not taken a position on the validity of the 2024 Trust Deed.

  101. (c) JBTC had not refused to administer the Moss Trust pursuant to the terms of the 2024 Trust Deed per se, but instead “require[d] clarification” as to the terms of the Moss Trust.

  102. (d) JBTC had been advised to apply to court to determine “the proper meaning and effect of clause 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed”. JBTC was “ready, able and willing” to distribute the assets of the Moss Trust if required to do so by its terms.

  103. (e) JBTC “ma[de] no admission” as to the claimants’ entitlement to the reliefs set out at [59] above, and was “ready, able and willing” to comply with the court’s determination on the claimants’ prayers for those reliefs.

  104. The application in SUM 932

  105. [61] On 25 March 2026, the claimants filed SUM 932 (amended on 7 September 2026) for summary determination of the following nine issues pursuant to O 9 r 19 and/or O 9 r 25(3) of the ROC 2021:

  106. (a) Issue 1: Did the 2017 Amendment contain the Claimants’ Implied Term?

  107. (b) Issue 2: If the 2017 Amendment did not contain the Claimants’ Implied Term, should the 2017 Amendment be rectified to include a term with the content of the Claimants’ Implied Term?

  108. (c) Issue 3: Did the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC validly agree by way of the 2019 Modification to assign the power of amendment to JBTC acting with the prior or simultaneous consent of the protector(s) of the Moss Trust?

  109. (d) Issue 4: Is JBTC estopped by convention from denying the validity of the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust, including the 2024 Trust Deed?

  110. (e) Issue 5: Should the court exercise its alleged inherent jurisdiction to sanction the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust, including the 2024 Trust Deed?

  111. (f) Issue 6: Are the current terms of the Moss Trust set out in the 2024 Trust Deed?

  112. (g) Issue 7: Was JBTC obliged, following the death of the Wife, to distribute the assets of the Moss Trust, being shares in the Investment Companies, in equal shares to the trustee of the Amir Trust and the trustee of the Nat Trust pursuant to cl 4.3(v) of the 2024 Trust Deed?

  113. (h) Issue 8: Were Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra validly appointed as members of the Committee pursuant to the 2019 Appointment?

  114. (i) Issue 9: Is the Protector Resolution Clause valid and enforceable for the purpose of Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra resolving any and all conflicts and ambiguities that might arise in the administration and interpretation of provisions within the Moss Trust concerning the distribution of trust assets?

  115. [62] By way of overview, the parties were in agreement that Issues 1 to 8 should be summarily determined by the court. JBTC’s position on whether Issue 9 should be summarily determined appeared somewhat more equivocal (as I explain at [172]–[173] below). Notwithstanding that, and in any event, JBTC repeatedly emphasised that it maintained a neutral stance on the merits of the issues, and was “ready, willing and able” to abide by the court’s determination of all the issues.

  116. The law in respect of O 9 r 19(1) and O 9 r 25(3) of the ROC 2021

  117. Order 9 r 19(1)

  118. [63] Order 9 r 19(1) of the ROC 2021 provides that:

  119. [64] Order 9 r 19 of the ROC 2021 replaced O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”), and case law on O 14 r 12 of the ROC 2014 continues to guide the application of O 9 r 19 of the ROC 2021 (Singapore Court Practice (Jeffrey Pinsler SC, gen ed) (LexisNexis (online version), 2026) at paras 9.19.1 and 9.19.2). Order 14 r 12(1) of the ROC 2014 provided that:

  120. [65] Four key principles apply to O 9 r 19(1) of the ROC 2021.

  121. [66] First, the question for determination must involve a question of law or construction of any document. This is expressly stated in the provision.

  122. [67] Second, the question must be suitable for determination without a trial. This requirement (which was expressly stated in O 14 r 12(1) of the ROC 2014) is implicit in O 9 r 19(1) of the ROC 2021: by providing that the court may decide the question “without a trial or hearing on the facts”, the anterior requirement is that the question must be suitable for determination in such manner.

  123. [68] It follows that a question that raises disputed factual issues is unsuitable for summary determination (TMT Asia Ltd v BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) [2015] 2 SLR 540 (“TMT”) at [34]). That said, in an application where (a) one party simply makes no admission of the facts pleaded by the other party (such that there is effectively no contest over those facts) and (b) the court is satisfied that the evidence adduced establishes those facts without the need for a trial, I see no reason the court cannot summarily determine the question of law or construction on the basis of those facts.

  124. [69] A complex question of law is not itself unsuitable for summary determination, unless it is a novel question of considerable public importance (TMT at [33] and [35]).

  125. [72] For completeness, I add that even where the parties have agreed for a question to be summarily determined, it remains for the court to be satisfied that it is an appropriate case to do so pursuant to O 9 r 19(1) of the ROC 2021.

  126. Order 9 r 25(3)

  127. [73] The claimants also purported that their application in SUM 932 was made, “in the alternative”, pursuant to O 9 r 25(3) of the ROC 2021.

  128. [74] Order 9 r 25(3) of the ROC 2021 should be considered in the context of the preceding O 9 rr 25(1) and 25(2):

  129. [75] As is evident from the provisions, O 9 r 25 of the ROC 2021 deals with the court’s powers to give directions for the trial or hearing of an action (Singapore Rules of Court: A Practice Guide (Chua Lee Ming editor-in-chief & Paul Quan gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2026) at para 09.089). O 9 r 25(2) empowers the court to order separate trials of the issues of liability and damages, while O 9 r 25(3) empowers the court “to decide whether one or more questions of fact may be tried before the others” [emphasis added] (Singapore Civil Procedure 2026 vol I (Cavinder Bull SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2026) at para 9/25/1). In my view, O 9 r 25(3) envisages the determination of the factual issue in question by trial or a hearing where witnesses will be examined. That coheres with the nature of how disputed issues of fact are determined as well as the context of the rest of O 9 r 25.

  130. [76] The claimants’ purported reliance on O 9 r 25(3) of the ROC 2021 is thus inapposite as what the claimants seek is “summary” determination of the issues listed in SUM 932 “on the basis of affidavit and documentary evidence” that has been placed before the court. The claimants have not asked for any issue of fact to be heard and/or decided. And, apart from a bare invocation of O 9 r 25(3) “in the alternative”, the claimants made no submissions on the legal principles applicable to the provision or how it applied in the present case. I will therefore proceed on the basis that whether the issues listed in SUM 932 should be summarily determined falls to be decided solely under O 9 r 19(1).

  131. Issues to be determined

  132. [77] Two main questions arise in respect of each of the nine issues listed in SUM 932:

  133. [78] I will address the nine issues listed in SUM 932 in the following sequence. I will begin with Issues 1 to 6, as these are directed towards a foundational ascertainment of what the current terms of the Moss Trust are. I will then address Issues 8, 9 and 7 in that order. Issue 8 seeks to determine the validity of Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra’s status as protectors of the Moss Trust, and its determination logically precedes the determination of Issue 9 concerning their power as protectors. In turn, because Issue 9 essentially asks if the Protector Resolution Clause validly empowered Mr Jaeggi and Mr Benezra to determine Issue 7, it is logical to consider Issue 9 in precedence to Issue 7.

  134. Issue 1

  135. [79] Issue 1 asks: Did the 2017 Amendment contain the Claimants’ Implied Term?

  136. The claimants’ case

  137. [80] The claimants submitted that Issue 1 should be summarily determined. A determination on Issue 1 would go towards resolving whether the 2019 Modification and all subsequent amendments to the terms of the Moss Trust (including the 2024 Trust Deed) were valid, and that in turn would “go a long way towards resolving the parties’ disputes in OC 848” which were “almost entirely due to their differences on the applicable trust deed”. Issue 1 did not raise any dispute of fact that would bar summary determination.

  138. [81] The claimants submitted that the legal principles governing the implication of contractual terms in fact, as set out in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”), should apply in determining Issue 1. Applying those principles, the Claimants’ Implied Term should be implied into the 2017 Amendment.

  139. [82] First, it was undisputed that the 2017 Amendment contained a gap in that although it purported to vest the power of amendment in the Wife, it did not provide for what should happen if the Wife declined the power of amendment. The Settlor and JBTC had assumed that the Wife would agree to accept the power of amendment and had not considered this gap when executing the 2017 Amendment.

  140. [83] Second, the Claimants’ Implied Term was necessary to give the 2017 Amendment business efficacy: the Settlor’s uncontradicted evidence was that the power of amendment was critical to safeguard the best interests of the beneficiaries, as such a power would provide the Moss Trust with the necessary flexibility for tax planning purposes.

  141. [84] Third, had it been put to the parties at the time the 2017 Amendment was prepared that the Claimants’ Implied Term existed, the parties would surely have responded “Oh, of course!”: (a) Mr Amir Mossanen’s uncontradicted evidence was that, during discussions concerning the 2019 Modification, “everyone” believed that the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC had the power to, by mutual consent, assign the power of amendment to someone else besides the Wife; (b) JBTC’s Singapore counsel had confirmed in January 2019 that the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC could jointly execute the 2019 Modification by mutual consent to vest the power of amendment in JBTC; and (c) after the Wife refused to accept the power of amendment by way of the 2019 Declination, the parties proceeded to act as if the Claimants’ Implied Term existed, in that the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC jointly executed the 2019 Modification to vest the power of amendment in JBTC instead.

  142. [85] In oral submissions, the claimants’ counsel accepted that instead of the formulation per the Claimants’ Implied Term, it was “possible” on an “intellectual level” for the implied term to be construed as being that, in the event the Wife declined to accept the power of amendment, the Settlor would have the power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust to confer the power of amendment on someone other than the Wife (including JBTC).

  143. JBTC’s case

  144. [87] JBTC submitted that it was well-established under English law that the doctrine of implication of terms (by law or in fact) applied to trust deeds. While this point “[did] not appear to have been resolved [in] Singapore jurisprudence”, Singapore law “[did] not prohibit” the application of contractual principles on the implication of terms (set out in Sembcorp Marine) in respect of trust deeds and instruments.

  145. [88] On whether there was a gap in the 2017 Amendment, if the court accepted that it was always the Settlor’s intention that the terms of the Moss Trust could be amended and that he did not consider the possibility that the Wife would decline the power of amendment, it “may be argued” that the 2017 Amendment had an unintended gap in that there was no provision for what would happen if the Wife declined to accept the power of amendment. This “must be considered in the context that many trusts do not contain powers of amendment, and this does not make them unworkable”. It “may also be noted” that the 2017 Amendment conferred a power of amendment on the Wife during her lifetime and a subsequent power of amendment on JBTC after the lifetime of the Settlor and the Wife, which meant that there was a potential period in which the Moss Trust could not be amended (viz, for the remainder of the Settlor’s lifetime if the Wife died before the Settlor).

  146. [89] On whether it was necessary to imply a term in order to give the Moss Trust efficacy, the Moss Trust would be much less flexible without a power of amendment, and it was a matter for the court if this sufficed to render implication of a term necessary.

  147. [90] On the specific term to be implied, there was “uncertainty”. It could be argued that if the Wife declined the power of amendment, the power of amendment would revert to the Settlor. Or, that if the Wife declined the power of amendment, she would be empowered to nominate someone else to exercise the power of amendment. That said, the test for implication of terms was an objective one for the court to apply, and JBTC would abide by the court’s decision in this respect.

  148. Decision

  149. Issue 1 should be summarily determined

  150. The relevant law: implication of terms into a trust deed

  151. [92] I turn then to the determination of Issue 1.

  152. [93] The implication of contractual terms in fact is the process by which the court fills a gap in a contract to give effect to the parties’ presumed intentions (Sembcorp Marine at [29]). The court takes a three-step approach to determine whether a term should be implied:

  153. (a) First, the court ascertains how the gap in the contract arose (Sembcorp Marine at [101(a)]). Implication will be considered only if the gap is a “true” gap in the sense that the parties did not contemplate the issue at all and so left a gap (Sembcorp Marine at [94]–[96] and [101(a)]).

  154. (b) Second, the court considers whether it is necessary in the business or commercial sense to imply a term in order to give the contract efficacy (Sembcorp Marine at [101(b)]).

  155. (c) Third, the court considers the specific term to be implied. This must be one which the parties, having regard to the need for business efficacy, would have responded “Oh, of course!” had the proposed term been put to them at the time of the contract (Sembcorp Marine at [101(c)]).

  156. [94] In respect of the second step, the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine explained that the business efficacy test is used in the context of commercial transactions to identify gaps in the contract that need to be filled for it to be workable, as it is assumed that commercial parties are rational, and as such, seek business efficacy in their transaction (at [84], [85] and [99]). As Bowen LJ (as he then was) put it in The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 (“The Moorcock”) at 68, “the law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have” (cited in Sembcorp Marine at [84]). However, depending on the nature of and the parties to the contract, for instance one between family members, there could be other external normative standards which may be more appropriate than business efficacy in distilling the parties’ presumed intentions (Sembcorp Marine at [85] and [99]).

  157. [95] It has been held that the interpretation of a contract and the interpretation of a trust deed share “the same ideological premise” of giving effect to the objectively ascertained intentions of the parties to the instrument; the legal principles governing the interpretation of contracts would thus generally apply to the interpretation of trust deeds (Eller, Urs v Cheong Kiat Wah [2020] SGHC 106 at [45], affirmed in ESR Group Ltd v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd [2024] 1 SLR 1164 at [53]). On principle, this position would extend to applying the legal principles governing the implication of contractual terms in fact to the implication of terms in fact into a trust deed. There is also, as JBTC pointed out, precedent in English case law for doing so (see, eg, A v C [2026] AC 846 (“A v C”) at [3] and [65]–[81]).

  158. [96] I will therefore apply the three-step approach in Sembcorp Marine (at [101]) in determining Issue 1.

  159. [97] At the first step, I accept the Settlor’s uncontested evidence that:

  160. (a) When he settled the Moss Trust and for several years thereafter, he firmly believed that the Wife would outlive him.

  161. (b) When he and JBTC executed the 2017 Amendment, he did not (and he believed that JBTC also did not) consult the Wife on whether she would agree to accept the power of amendment. He also did not (and believed that JBTC also did not) consider the possibility that the Wife would refuse to accept the power of amendment. He simply assumed that the Wife would not have any concerns with having the power of amendment.

  162. [98] I therefore find that there was a “true” gap in the 2017 Amendment in that, because the Settlor (and, for that matter, JBTC) did not contemplate that the Wife might refuse to accept the power of amendment, there was no provision for what should happen to the power of amendment if the Wife declined to accept it. I disagree with JBTC’s point that the existence of the gap “must be considered in the context that many trusts do not contain powers of amendment, and this does not make them unworkable” (see [88] above). This “context” is not relevant to the Moss Trust, which was, from inception, designed to be amendable (see [9] and [14] above). JBTC’s point also does not change the fact that neither the Settlor nor JBTC contemplated, when executing the 2017 Amendment, that the Wife might refuse to accept the power of amendment. As for JBTC’s other point that the 2017 Amendment did not cater for anyone to have the power of amendment during the period after the Wife’s death and while the Settlor was still alive (see [88] above), that might well constitute a separate gap in the 2017 Amendment in that the Settlor did not contemplate dying after the Wife, and as such, the 2017 Amendment did not provide for what should happen to the power of amendment in that scenario; it does not contradict the existence of the relevant gap under discussion.

  163. [99] At the second step, I accept JBTC’s submission that the relevant intention behind the 2017 Amendment is that of the Settlor and not JBTC (see [86] above) as it was the Settlor who had, and was exercising, the power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust to confer the power of amendment on the Wife.

  164. [100] I further accept the uncontested evidence of the Settlor that it was always his intention that the terms of the Moss Trust could be amended and that he regarded the power of amendment as critical to the interests of the beneficiaries (ie, the Wife and the Children) in providing the Moss Trust with the necessary flexibility for tax planning purposes. This evidence is corroborated by (a) the fact that the Original Trust Deed and the 2016 Trust Deed vested a power of amendment in the Settlor (see [9] and [14] above); and (b) the Settlor’s e-mail to JBTC’s external counsel (who were preparing the 2017 Amendment) dated 29 March 2017 communicating that the Moss Trust must be amendable “in view of the fact that we live in a changing world and [an] inflexible trust may be damaging to the interest of beneficiaries in future”.

  165. [101] As alluded to at [94] above, outside the context of commercial transactions, there is scope for the application of other normative standards (apart from the “business” efficacy of a contract) to gauge if it is necessary to imply a term to fill the gap. The present case does not concern a conventional commercial transaction. It concerns a family trust (the Moss Trust) settled by a patriarch (the Settlor) with the overarching objective of providing for his family in the long-term. The specific instrument into which the implication of a term is being considered is the 2017 Amendment, which is a deed by which the Settlor amended the terms of the said family trust. In these circumstances, the “efficacy as [the relevant] parties must have intended that at all events [the transaction] should have” (Sembcorp Marine at [84], citing The Moorcock at 68) ought not to be measured in terms of the commercial workability of the transaction, ie, 2017 Amendment. Instead, efficacy ought to be measured in terms of the capacity for fulfilment of the purpose of the transaction, ie, what the Settlor objectively sought to achieve by the 2017 Amendment, bearing in mind its nature as a deed to amend a trust intended for the transmission and continued enjoyment of family wealth.

  166. [102] In my judgment, based on the evidence at [100] above, the purpose of the 2017 Amendment was to ensure the continued amendability of the Moss Trust so as to preserve flexibility in its structure, accommodate future changes in circumstances and safeguard the beneficiaries’ interests, all in keeping with the Settlor’s overarching objective in establishing the Moss Trust (viz, providing for his family in the long-term). The relevant inquiry is thus whether it is necessary, in order to achieve this purpose, to imply into the 2017 Amendment a provision for the continued existence and exercise of the power of amendment if the Wife refused to accept it. I answer this question in the affirmative. The inherent purpose of the Moss Trust, viz, its continued amendability, simply could not be achieved if the Wife refused to accept the power of amendment and there was no fallback provision in that situation. The implication of a term is thus necessary to give effect to the Settlor’s presumed intention that there should be provision for the continued existence and exercise of the power of amendment if the Wife refused to accept it, so as to achieve the Settlor’s purpose for the Moss Trust to always be amendable.

  167. [103] Turning to the third step, I find that the specific term to be implied in the 2017 Amendment is as follows: if the Wife refused to accept the power of amendment, the Settlor would have a limited power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust for the sole purpose of vesting the power of amendment in another person (“Implied Term (2017 Amendment)”). I reach this view because it was the Settlor who had the power of amendment from the time the Moss Trust was established up to when he conferred (by the 2017 Amendment) the power of amendment on the Wife instead. At the time the 2017 Amendment was being prepared, if the Wife had made known that she did not wish to accept the power of amendment, the Settlor would have been the one to choose another person in whom to vest the power of amendment. It is only logical that, if the Settlor had thought that the Wife might subsequently refuse to accept the power of amendment, he would likewise have expected to be the one to choose another person in whom to vest the power of amendment in that event. By parity of reasoning, JBTC would have shared this same expectation. In other words, had the Implied Term (2017 Amendment) been put to the Settlor and JBTC at the time of the 2017 Amendment, they would have responded “Oh, of course!”.

  168. [104] I disagree with the claimants’ submission that the term to be implied should be formulated per the Claimants’ Implied Term, ie, that if the Wife declined to accept the power of amendment, then the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC may, by mutual consent, assign the power of amendment to another party who was not the Settlor or the Wife (see [58(a)] above). First, where the Wife refused to accept the power of amendment, I see no reason the Settlor would have expected her to (still) have any control over whom the power of amendment should be conferred on instead. Second, Mr Amir Mossanen’s evidence about what “everyone” purportedly believed in 2019 (see [84(a)] above) is irrelevant because the officious bystander test is applied with reference to how the Settlor would have responded to the proposed implied term at the time of the 2017 Amendment. Third, the claimants’ reliance on what JBTC’s Singapore counsel said (see [84(b)] above) is of no assistance because the disclosed communications show only that the counsel made a conclusory statement that there were no issues with the 2019 Modification, without elaboration. Fourth, I disagree with the claimants’ characterisation that the 2019 Modification showed that the parties acted as if the Claimants’ Implied Term existed (see [84(c)] above). To the contrary, the mechanism by which the power of amendment was vested in JBTC via the 2019 Modification was through further amendment of the term in the 2016 Trust Deed conferring the power of amendment (see [24] above). As framed, the Claimants’ Implied Term did not confer any power on the Wife or JBTC to amend the relevant term of the Moss Trust to vest the power of amendment in JBTC. Further and in any event, the Wife could have had no power to make this specific amendment via the 2019 Modification (even assuming, arguendo, that the Claimants’ Implied Term purported to confer such power on her) because she had already refused to accept “any and all power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust” via the prior 2019 Declination.

  169. [105] I therefore conclude that it is an implied term of the 2017 Amendment that if the Wife refused to accept the power of amendment, the Settlor would have a limited power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust for the sole purpose of vesting the power of amendment in another person.

  170. Issue 2

  171. [106] Issue 2 asks: If the 2017 Amendment did not contain the Claimants’ Implied Term, should the 2017 Amendment be rectified to include a term with the content of the Claimants’ Implied Term?

  172. [107] The claimants submitted that Issue 2 arose only if the Claimants’ Implied Term did not exist. This is correct and remains so where I have found that a differently formulated implied term, viz, the Implied Term (2017 Amendment), exists. This is because the implication of terms and the rectification of terms are based on fundamentally incompatible factual foundations. A term may be implied to fill a gap which was not contemplated by the parties (see [93(a)] above). In contrast, equitable rectification involves correcting a written instrument where the words used inaccurately or inadequately convey the parties’ objectively ascertained intentions (Yap Son On v Ding Pei Zhen [2017] 1 SLR 219 at [62]); this presupposes that there was no gap and that the parties had contemplated how to address the issue in question but ended up expressing their agreement on the same inaccurately or inadequately in the written instrument (see also Sembcorp Marine at [96]). Since I have found that there was a gap in the 2017 Amendment arising from the fact that the Settlor (and JBTC) did not contemplate that the Wife might refuse to accept the power of amendment (see [98] above), it is not possible to proceed on an inconsistent premise that the Settlor had applied his mind to how to address this situation at the time of the 2017 Amendment and that the 2017 Amendment should be rectified to reflect such a purported intention. Issue 2 thus does not arise for consideration, and I say no more about it.

  173. Issue 3

  174. [108] Issue 3 asks: Did the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC validly agree by way of the 2019 Modification to assign the power of amendment to JBTC acting with the prior or simultaneous consent of the protector(s) of the Moss Trust?

  175. The claimants’ case

  176. [109] The claimants submitted that Issue 3 should be summarily determined for reasons similar to those set out at [80] above.

  177. [110] The claimants submitted that if the answer to either Issue 1 or Issue 2 was in the affirmative, the 2019 Modification would be valid, ie, Issue 3 would be answered in the affirmative.

  178. JBTC’s case

  179. [111] JBTC submitted that Issue 3 was suitable for summary determination since Issues 1 and 2 were “likely to be dispositive of [Issue 3]”.

  180. [112] If Issues 1 and 2 were answered in the negative, Issue 3 should be answered in the negative.

  181. [113] If either Issue 1 or Issue 2 was answered in the affirmative, the next question was whether the implied or rectified term (as the case may be) was validly exercised by way of the 2019 Modification. If it was, Issue 3 should also be answered in the affirmative. In this connection, JBTC pointed out that:

  182. (a) The 2019 Modification was not expressed to be made in exercise of the Claimants’ Implied Term.

  183. (b) Recital (G) in the 2019 Modification stated that “acting together”, the Settlor, the Wife and JBTC “mutually consent[ed]” to the modification of, inter alia, the relevant term in the Moss Trust to confer the power of amendment on JBTC.

  184. (c) Clause 4 of the 2019 Modification provided that: “[JBTC] hereby acknowledges the modifications set forth herein”.

  185. [114] JBTC stated that it would abide by the court’s determination on Issue 3 “in light of the Court’s determination of [Issues 1 and 2]”.

  186. Decision

  187. Preliminary issue concerning the effectiveness of the 2019 Declination

  188. [115] It was common ground between the parties that the 2019 Declination was effective as a refusal by the Wife to accept the power of amendment. I agree.

  189. [116] As the learned authors of Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin QC & James Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts vol II (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2020) (“Lewin on Trusts vol II”) state at para 28-052: “The settlor is free to choose any third party as the donee of a power. The third party may, of course, decline to act and is free to do so” [emphasis added]. An effective refusal to accept a power means that the intended donee never had the power to begin with. In my view, such a refusal would not be effective if the intended donee had already accepted or exercised the power prior to expressing his/her purported refusal to accept the power. In the present case, the Wife declared in the 2019 Declination that she had never exercised or purported to exercise any power to amend the Moss Trust (see [21] above), and this was not disputed by the parties. The Wife was thus entitled to refuse to accept the power of amendment which the 2017 Amendment had sought to confer on her. The parties did not contend that the Wife’s refusal had to be expressed in any particular form or was subject to any formalities. The Wife’s declaration in the 2019 Declination that she declined to accept any and all power to amend the terms of the Moss Trust (see [21] above) thus constituted an effective refusal by her of the power of amendment.

  190. The relevant question: whether the Settlor made the 2019 Modification in exercise of his power under the Implied Term (2017 Amendment)

  191. [117] I have found that the Settlor had a limited power under the Implied Term (2017 Amendment) to amend the terms of the Moss Trust in this situation for the sole purpose of vesting the power of amendment in another person (see [103] and [105] above). The question which arises for determination is thus whether the Settlor had exercised his power under the Implied Term (2017 Amendment) in making the 2019 Modification such that the 2019 Modification validly vested the power of amendment in JBTC.

  192. [118] I am mindful that I have framed the question for determination differently from that posed by Issue 3. The difference is due to my finding (under Issue 1) that the term to be implied in the 2017 Amendment is the Implied Term (2017 Amendment) and not the Claimants’ Implied Term. I do not think my approach poses any difficulty. First, O 9 r 19(1) of the ROC 2021 provides that the court may decide any question of law or the construction of any document “on the Court’s own accord” (see [63] above), which means that the court may act on its own initiative to make such a ruling even if neither party had requested it (Aquilo Shipping at [41]). Second, the essence of the inquiry under both questions is the same. As the claimants themselves put it in their written submissions, what they wanted to know by Issue 3 was: “is the 2019 Modification valid?”. The question I have framed entails this inquiry.

  193. Issue 3 (as reformulated) should be summarily determined

  194. [119] While the question is strictly one of mixed fact and law, it involves no contested facts. I therefore find, for reasons similar to those set out at [91] above, that the question should be summarily determined.

  195. The relevant law: imputed exercise of powers doctrine

  196. [120] I turn then to the determination of whether the Settlor had exercised the power conferred by the Implied Term (2017 Amendment) in making the 2019 Modification such that the 2019 Modification validly vested the power of amendment in JBTC.

  197. [121] A power is the ability to do lawfully something which, absent the power, would be unlawful (Snell’s Equity (Steven Elliott KC gen ed & John McGhee KC consulting editor) (Sweet & Maxwell, 35th Ed, 2025) (“Snell’s Equity”) at para 10-001). Powers may be public or private, legal or equitable (Snell’s Equity at para 10-001). Powers in private law include the powers of trustees and others concerned in the administration of a trust (Snell’s Equity at para 10-001).

  198. [122] In the context of powers in private law, to determine whether a particular administrative or distributive or dispositive power has been exercised, the court will look at all the relevant documentation to see whether there was (a) an express or implied reference to the power or to the property subject to the power or (b) an intention to bring about a particular result that could only have been achieved by an exercise of the power (Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 98 (David Hay ed & Clare Stanley consultant editor) (LexisNexis, 5th Ed, 2024) at para 553). The latter principle is part of what is known as the imputed or implied exercise of powers doctrine (see, eg, BIC UK Ltd v Burgess [2019] EWCA Civ 806 (“BIC”) at [63]), although, as will be seen (at [135(a)] below), I think it is more accurate to describe the doctrine as involving the imputed (as opposed to implied) exercise of powers. The imputed exercise of powers doctrine is well-recognised in English law, but does not appear, so far as I am aware, to have been considered in Singapore case law.

  199. [123] One of the earlier English cases in which the doctrine was articulated and applied is Mogridge v Clapp [1892] 3 Ch 382 (“Mogridge”). In that case, a lessor, believing himself to be the absolute owner of certain land, granted a lease of the land purportedly as the absolute owner. The lessor was, however, actually only a tenant for life. Nevertheless, in that capacity, he had the power to grant the lease under the Settled Land Act 1882 (c 38) (UK) (“Act”). The question before the court was whether the lease had been validly granted in the exercise of the lessor’s power to do so under the Act, notwithstanding that “the lessor did not know that he was exercising the power given by the Act; he probably did not know that there was such a power, and also did not intend such a power to be exercised, even if he knew it existed” (at 387). Kekewich J (whose decision was affirmed on appeal) held that the lease was valid, stating (at 388):

  200. [124] In Davis v Richards & Wallington Industries Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1511 (“Davis”), Scott J (as he then was) applied the doctrine to impute the exercise of a power to remove a trustee. The case concerned a pension scheme for the employees of a group of companies established by an interim trust deed in 1975 (“1975 Deed”). In 1982, a deed prescribing the rules of the pension scheme was executed by the parent company of the group (“Industries”) and two trustees of the pension scheme (“1982 Deed”). One Mr Parsons had previously been appointed as the third trustee of the pension scheme but had tendered a signed letter of resignation from his trusteeship in 1981, after which he played no further part as a trustee and was treated by the remaining two trustees as if he had resigned. Mr Parsons was not a party to the 1982 Deed. A question arose as to whether Mr Parsons remained one of the trustees, such that the 1982 Deed was invalid by reason of not having been executed by him. Scott J answered this question in the negative, finding that the 1975 Deed contained an implied term enabling a trustee to resign and that Mr Parsons’ letter of resignation in 1981 was effective to relieve him of his trusteeship (at 1528G–1529H).

  201. [125] Scott J nevertheless went on to consider whether, assuming Mr Parsons had remained a trustee, the execution by Industries of the 1982 Deed represented Industries’ exercise of its power under the 1975 Deed to remove Mr Parsons as a trustee (Davis at 1530A–B).

  202. [126] In this connection, Scott J first articulated the imputed exercise of powers doctrine as it had been applied in cases dealing with dispositions of property (Davis at 1530G–H):

  203. [127] Scott J then reasoned that there was no basis for confining the application of the doctrine to dispositions of property, and opined that it applied to the case at hand (Davis at 1530H–1531A):

  204. [128] Scott J stressed that, under the doctrine, it was unnecessary to infer a positive intention on the part of the donee of the power to exercise the power; the intention to exercise the power would be imputed to the donee unless it could be inferred that the donee had the positive intention not to exercise the power (Davis at 1531C–D).

  205. [129] On the facts of the case, Industries had intended to bring the rules of the pension scheme into effect by way of the 1982 Deed. If Mr Parsons was still a trustee, he would have had to be removed from that position for the 1982 Deed (to which Mr Parsons was not a party) to be valid. Industries had the power to remove Mr Parsons as a trustee. Applying the doctrine, Scott J found that while the removal of Mr Parsons as a trustee was simply not on anyone’s mind, equity would impute to Industries an intention to exercise its power to remove Mr Parsons as a trustee and treat that power as exercised by Industries’ execution of the 1982 Deed, with the effect that the 1982 Deed was valid because Mr Parsons was not a necessary party to it (Davis at 1531F).

  206. [130] In LRT Pension Fund Trustee Co Ltd v Hatt [1993] OPLR 225 (“LRT Pension Fund”), a company (“LRT”) and three trustees (“original trustees”) executed an interim trust deed in 1986 (“interim deed”) to establish a pension scheme for LRT’s employees. The interim deed contained a clause which reserved to the original trustees and LRT the power of amendment. In 1989, the original trustees, LRT and another company (“LRT Trustee Co”) executed a deed of appointment discharging the original trustees and appointing LRT Trustee Co as the trustee under the interim deed. Applying Davis, Knox J held that the deed of appointment evinced a clear intention of the original trustees and LRT to substitute LRT Trustee Co for the original trustees as the trustee of the interim deed; the original trustees and LRT could exercise the power of amendment in the interim deed to effect that substitution; it was not shown that the original trustees and LRT had an intention not to exercise the said power of amendment; and the execution of the deed of appointment could thus be treated as a direct exercise by the original trustees and LRT of the said power of amendment even though they had no such exercise of the power of amendment in mind (at 260).

  207. [131] In BIC, the English Court of Appeal recognised that the imputed exercise of powers doctrine, exemplified by cases such as Davis, had “a valuable function to perform in cases where trustees intend[ed] to bring about a particular result in the administration of a pension scheme which would depend for its validity on the exercise of a power vested in them” (at [63]). The relevant enabling power had, however, to be in existence at the time when the relevant transaction took place (at [63]).

  208. [132] In Briggs v Gleeds (Head Office) [2014] 3 WLR 1469 (“Briggs”), Newey J (as he then was) cautioned that the courts must beware of deeming trustees to have exercised a power that they did not in fact have in mind, if the exercise of that power required the examination of materially different considerations from those relevant to the power that the trustees saw themselves as exercising. This was because trustees could be guilty of breach of duty if they failed to take account of material considerations when making a decision. If trustees were treated as having unknowingly exercised a power which they might not have exercised had they had regard to considerations relevant to its exercise, they could be deemed to have failed in their duties in connection with something that they had never actually intended to do in the first place, which could hardly be right (at [95]).

  209. [133] Newey J also made a separate point that the doctrine could not normally be invoked unless it allowed the whole of what the decision-maker was trying to do to be achieved (Briggs at [96]):

  210. [134] In my respectful view, the crux of Newey J’s point is contained in his statement that “the Davis and LRT approach cannot normally… be used unless it allows the whole of what the relevant decision-maker was trying to do to be achieved”. It was to illustrate this point that Newey J gave the example of how, “[w]here a decision-maker seeks to do more than one thing in a single document”, the application of the imputed exercise of powers doctrine vis-à-vis that decision-maker should result in the validation of the whole document. This example assumes, however, that the single document does not seek to give effect to separate transactions made by different decision-makers. Where the document does so, my view is that the principle articulated by Newey J calls for the whole of the relevant transaction (and not necessarily the whole of the document) to be capable of being validly effected through the application of the imputed exercise of powers doctrine vis-à-vis the relevant decision-maker. I will demonstrate, at [139(f)] below and with reference to the 2019 Modification, how the distinction I have drawn applies in practice.

  211. [135] From the above authorities, the following principles under the imputed exercise of powers doctrine can be distilled:

  212. (a) Where a party (X) intends to effect a given transaction and the exercise of a power vested in X is necessary for that transaction to be validly effected, X will be taken to have exercised that power even if (i) there was no reference to the power and/or (ii) an actual intention by X to exercise the power cannot be discerned, unless a positive intention by X not to exercise the power can be inferred (Mogridge at 388; Davis at 1530G–1531D; LRT Pension Fund at 260; BIC at [63]; see also Lewin on Trusts vol II at para 29-078). It is clear that the doctrine entails imputing to X an intention to exercise the power (see also Davis at 1530G–H, cited at [126] above), as opposed to finding an implied actual intention on X’s part to exercise the power. For this reason, I consider it more apt to refer to the doctrine as the imputed exercise of powers doctrine (as opposed to the implied exercise of powers doctrine).

  213. (b) The relevant enabling power must be in existence at the time the relevant transaction was effected (BIC at [63]).

  214. (c) The application of the doctrine must lead to the validation of the whole of the relevant transaction (Briggs at [96]; see also [133]–[134] above).

  215. (d) Particularly where fiduciary powers are concerned, the trustee (or other donee) should not be treated as having exercised the power if its exercise required the examination of materially different considerations from those which the trustee/donee did consider, or there was otherwise doubt whether the trustee/donee would have exercised the power after a proper examination of the considerations relevant to its exercise (Briggs at [95]; see also Lewin on Trusts vol II at para 29-079).

  216. [136] At [160]–[165] below, I expand on the application of the principles set out at [135(a)] and [135(d)] above in the situation where (a) the donee has purported to exercise a particular power, (b) which it turns out the donee could not have validly exercised, and (c) the court is asked to impute an intention by the donee to exercise a different power.

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