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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Jun 2026

General Division of the High Court

A landlord could not keep a whole security deposit, only the sums actually lost

Equation Recycling Pte Ltd v Leading Bio-Energy (S) Pte Ltd

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[2026] SGHC 126Case no. District Court Appeal No 23 of 2025

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A landlord could not keep a whole security deposit, only the sums actually lost

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The law of penalties and the law of deposits have long been recognised as having separate historical origins. The former originated from the Chancellor’s jurisdiction at equity to grant relief against the strict enforcement of penal bonds at common law. The latter, being an import from the civil law, is older than the common law itself. The courts have therefore long strived to treat the two as “entirely distinct and separate” (Linggi Plantations Ltd v Jagatheesan [1972] 1 MLJ 89 (“Linggi Plantations”) at 91B–E; see Li Jialin v Wingcrown Investment Pte Ltd [2024] 2 SLR 372 (“Li Jialin”) at [35]–[36]).

  3. [2] The locus classicus on the law of penalties in Singapore is the House of Lords decision of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage and Motor Company Limited [1915] AC 79 (“Dunlop Pneumatic”). Under Lord Dunedin’s classic formulation of the penalty rule, a clause imposing secondary obligations will be struck down as an unenforceable penalty if it does not, at the time of contracting, provide for a genuine pre-estimate of the likely losses that the innocent party will suffer on breach (Dunlop Pneumatic at 86, cited with approval in Denka Advantech Pte Ltd v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 631 (“Denka v Seraya”) at [151] and [185(b)]). The parties’ freedom to agree on their remedial obligations is limited by the broad policy that “an award of contractual remedies must always be to compensate, and not to punish” (Denka v Seraya at [93]).

  4. [3] The locus classicus on the law of deposits in Singapore is the English and Wales Court of Appeal (“EWCA”) decision of Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89 (“Howe v Smith”) (see Li Jialin at [37]). Indeed, that decision has been described as “the source of all modern learning as to the nature of deposits [which] has been followed again and again ever since” (Linggi Plantations at 91F). In what is almost a canonical statement of the law, Fry LJ recognised that a deposit functions as “an earnest to bind the bargain so entered into” (Howe v Smith at 101; Li Jialin at [37]). They are not intended to be compensatory; instead, they are meant to deter and disincentivise the payor of the deposit from falling into breach of the contract (Li Jialin at [43] and [49]).

  5. [4] In Li Jialin, the Court of Appeal (“CA”), following a detailed and instructive review of the relationship between the law of penalties and the law of deposits, held that the former had no application to the latter (at [43]–[52]). The law of penalties cannot be applied to what was never intended by the parties to be a substitute for damages (Li Jialin at [49]). However, Li Jialin, as well as virtually all of the authorities cited in its discussion on the law of deposits, concerned the forfeiture of purchase deposits paid under or pursuant to a sale agreement. It did not concern a security deposit paid by a tenant under a lease for the purpose of securing the due performance and observance of its obligations to the landlord.

  6. [5] A question that arises in this appeal is whether the law of penalties can apply to such a deposit, and if so, whether the clause providing for its forfeiture in fact amounts to an unenforceable penalty. The learned District Judge Chiah Kok Khun (“DJ”) answered both questions in the affirmative in his judgment in Leading Bio-Energy (S) Pte Ltd v Equation Recycling Pte Ltd [2025] SGDC 250 (“Judgment”). The DJ also permitted the respondent to advance the argument that the clause providing for the forfeiture of security deposit constituted an unenforceable penalty, despite the fact that the respondent had failed to plead such a point in its statement of claim (“SOC”).

  7. [6] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I disagree with the DJ that the respondent should be permitted to advance this unpleaded argument. The appellant’s victory on this point, however, is a pyrrhic one. That is because I find that the DJ erred in his interpretation of the appellant’s right to forfeit the security deposit. In any case, while I agree with the DJ that the law of penalties may apply to a clause providing for the forfeiture of a security deposit paid under a lease, I find that the clause in this specific case does not amount to an unenforceable penalty. Given the relative novelty and importance of the legal issues raised in this appeal, I set out the reasons for my decision in full.

  8. Background facts

  9. [7] The appellant, Equation Recycling Pte Ltd, is a company incorporated in Singapore that carries on the business of recycling metal waste and scrap. The respondent, Leading Bio-Energy (S) Pte Ltd (“LBE”), is a company incorporated in Singapore that carries on the business of waste collection.

  10. [8] The appellant is the tenant of two lots of State land at 6A Jalan Papan Singapore 619402 and 6B Jalan Papan Singapore 610000 (“Premises”) respectively, pursuant to a tenancy agreement with the Singapore Land Authority under the State Lands Act 1920 (2020 Rev Ed).

  11. The Handling Service Agreement

  12. [9] On 12 April 2021, the appellant and the respondent entered into a “Handling Service Agreement” (“Agreement”) for the respondent to use an open area of the Premises (“Service Area”) for a period of 30 months from 1 June 2021 to 31 December 2023 (“Term”). The respondent was to use the Service Area for its warehouse activities and storage of recyclable materials.

  13. [10] The terms of the Agreement, which the parties agreed is in the nature of a lease, are preceded by five recitals. Two of them are relevant for the purposes of the appeal:

  14. (a) First, under recital three (“Recital 3”), the respondent agreed to pay the appellant a monthly “Handling Service Fee” of $40,000 (excluding GST) in consideration for its use of the Service Area.

  15. (b) Second, under recital four (“Recital 4”), the respondent agreed to pay the appellant a refundable security deposit of $120,000, which would be held by the appellant for the respondent’s due performance and observance of the terms of the Handling Service Agreement (“Security Deposit”). Given the centrality of Recital 4 to the issues arising in this appeal, I set it out in its entirety:

  16. [11] Turning to the terms of the Agreement proper, the respondent undertook, amongst others, the following obligations:

  17. [12] Further, the Agreement made provisions for the contingency that the respondent defaulted on its obligations. These provisions, amongst others, are:

  18. The events giving rise to DC/OC 1343/2024

  19. DC/OC 640/2022 and DC/OC 752/2023

  20. [13] Fissures began to form in the relationship between the parties in August 2022, when the respondent began defaulting on its obligation to pay the Handling Service Fee to the appellant. On 9 September 2022, the appellant commenced HC/OC 640/2022 (“OC 640”) against the respondent to recover the sum of $87,031.15 – the aggregate sum owed by the respondent under four outstanding invoices that had been issued by the appellant.

  21. [15] The respondent began defaulting on its obligations under the Agreement again from April 2023. It failed to pay the Handling Service Fee, as well as the accompanying utilities charges, for the month of April 2023 on the first day of that month as required under Recital 3 read with clause 1(c) of the Agreement. The appellant did not receive payment from the respondents despite the respondent having received a letter of demand from the appellant’s solicitors for the same.

  22. [16] Accordingly, on 28 April 2023, the appellant invoked its right under clause 3(b) of the Agreement and served on the respondent a written notice stating that the respondent would be given 14 days from the date of the notice (ie, 12 May 2023) to make payment of the Handling Service Fee, the utilities charges for April 2023 and the Late Interest payable thereon (“Notice”). In the Notice, the appellant stated that it would be entitled to terminate the Agreement should the respondent fail to remedy its breaches.

  23. [17] The appellant was of the view that the respondent had failed to comply with the terms of the Notice by the stipulated deadline of 12 May 2023. It also took the position that the respondent had failed to pay the Handling Service Fee and utilities charges for the month of May 2023 on the first day of that month. Accordingly, on 18 May 2023, the appellant notified the respondent that it would be exercising its right to terminate the Agreement under clause 3(b) of the same. At the same time, the appellant demanded that the respondent remove its stock and property at the Service Area by 25 May 2023. The respondent did not do so, though it paid the Handling Service Fees and the accompanying utilities charges for the months of April and May 2023 (which came up to a total sum of $85,988.24) by way of a cheque.

  24. [18] On 1 June 2023, the appellant commenced DC/OC 752/2023 (“OC 752”) against the respondent for breaches of the Agreement. On 20 June 2023, the appellant obtained judgment in default for failing to file a notice of intention to contest or not contest against the respondent (vide DC/JUD 978/2023 (“JUD 978”)), which required the respondent to:

  25. [19] The respondent was served with JUD 978 on 21 June 2023 by the appellant’s solicitors, but failed to comply with its terms. As such, on 6 July 2023, the appellant applied for: (1) an enforcement order (DC/EO 86/2023) (“EO 86”); and (2) examination of enforcement respondent (DC/SUM 1652/2023) to enforce JUD 978 against the respondent. In response, the respondent filed: (1) a summons for an order to release debts attached pursuant to EO 86 (DC/SUM 1965/2023) (“SUM 1965”) on 2 August 2023; and (2) a summons to set aside JUD 978 (DC/SUM 1898/2023) (“SUM 1898”) on 11 August 2023. For reasons that are unclear, SUM 1965 was subsequently withdrawn on 6 September 2023.

  26. The settlement agreement

  27. [20] On 4 October 2023, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in relation to JUD 978 (“Settlement”). This Settlement was entered into by way of telephone conversations and WhatsApp correspondence between the parties’ solicitors. No formal written agreement appears to have existed. Its terms are set out in an email sent by the appellant’s solicitors to the respondent’s solicitors dated 4 October 2023. These terms are that:

  28. [22] The respondent was also unable to vacate the Service Area by 10 November 2023 as required under the Settlement. Instead, in breach of the settlement, the respondent only vacated by the Service Area on 11 December 2023 and informed the appellant of the same on 12 December 2023. Further, the appellant asserted that the respondent had not, prior to vacating the Service Area, restored or reinstated the Service Area to a lettable and tenantable condition in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

  29. [23] On 14 December 2023, the appellant’s solicitor sent a letter of demand to the respondent’s solicitor, stating that:

  30. (a) the respondent had failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement, and that the appellant was at liberty to enforce JUD 978;

  31. (b) the respondent owed the appellant $266,250.52 under JUD 978 as at 14 December 2023;

  32. (c) the respondent owed the appellant further sums of: (i) $3,006.71 for the utilities charges for October 2023 (“Oct 2023 Utility Charges”); and (ii) $3,000 for the costs of SUM 1898; and

  33. (d) the respondent was to make payment of a sum of $272,257.23 (ie, the total of the three sums above) by 21 December 2023.

  34. The forfeiture of the Security Deposit

  35. [25] By way of letters dated 14 March, 20 March, 1 April and 5 April 2024, the respondent requested that the appellant refund the Security Deposit which the former had paid over to the latter at the beginning of the Term. In a reply dated 5 April 2024, the appellant refused to do so, citing various breaches of the Agreement on the part of the respondent, which had allegedly caused it loss and damage. In the same reply, the appellant also asserted its right to forfeit the Security Deposit under Recital 3 of the Agreement.

  36. [26] On 15 August 2024, the respondent commenced DC/OC 1343/2024 (“OC 1343”) with a view towards recovering the Security Deposit from the appellant. The essence of the respondent’s claim was that the appellant had wrongly refused to repay the Security Deposit, even though: (a) the respondent had vacated the Service Area; (b) the appellant had been paid on JUD 978 pursuant to EO 176; and (c) there was no outstanding unremedied breaches of the Agreement. The respondent, however, admitted that it had not paid $3,006.71 Oct 2023 Utility Charges, and agreed that it should be deducted from the Security Deposit of $120,000 which the appellant owed the respondent. Thus, the respondent’s claim against the appellant for the recovery of the Security Deposit was in the sum of $116,993.29.

  37. [27] In its defence filed on 5 September 2024, the appellant asserted that it was, pursuant to Recital 4, entitled to forfeit and deduct from the Security Deposit should there be a breach of the Agreement. The appellant argued that there had been multiple breaches of the Agreement and the Settlement, causing it various heads of loss and damage. Specifically, the appellant stated that it had suffered the following seven heads of loss and damage:

  38. Decision below

  39. [29] Following a day-long trial on 14 July 2025, the DJ issued the Judgment on 19 September 2025. He began by considering whether, on a proper construction of Recital 4, the appellant was entitled to forfeit the Security Deposit for any breaches of the terms of the Agreement on the respondent’s part (Judgment at [7(a)] and [19]–[20]). The DJ answered this question in the affirmative based on a plain reading of Recital 4 (Judgment at [28]). There was no ambiguity on this point, and such an interpretation was consistent with the objective intentions of the parties (Judgment at [29]–[30]).

  40. [30] The next issue that the DJ was faced with was the argument that Recital 4 constituted an unenforceable penalty clause (“Penalty Argument”). The respondent, however, had not pleaded the Penalty Argument in its SOC. Instead, it had been “raised for the first time at trial” (Judgment at [32], [33] and [36]). Notwithstanding that, the DJ permitted the respondent to advance it for two main reasons.

  41. (a) First, the DJ found that “the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 [was] a legal issue arising from the [appellant’s] reliance on Recital 4”. As such, there was no need for the respondent to have pleaded the Penalty Argument in its SOC (Judgment at [36]).

  42. (b) Second, the DJ found that no prejudice had been occasioned to the appellant by the respondent’s failure to plead the Penalty Argument. The appellant was relying on Recital 4 to justify the forfeiture of the Security Deposit which the respondent was demanding it to return. Hence, the appellant would have been aware that the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 was in issue since the commencement of OC 1343. It would therefore not have been taken by surprise by the Penalty Argument (Judgment at [36]).

  43. [31] The DJ then turned to the respondent’s argument that Recital 4 of the Agreement amounted to an unenforceable penalty clause proper. For the law of penalties to even apply, however, Recital 4 had to be a clause that imposed secondary obligations. In undertaking this analysis, the DJ relied on the guidance provided by the CA in Leiman, Ricardo v Noble Resources Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 386 (“Leiman Ricardo”), which at [101] distinguished between clauses imposing primary and secondary obligations (Judgment at [38]–[42]; see [139] below). Moving to the analysis proper, the DJ began by noting that the “commercial purpose” of the Agreement was to “generate income” for the appellant. The respondent would “fulfil this commercial purpose” by making “payment of the Handling Service Fee on time”. However, Recital 4 imposed “a requirement on the [respondent] to pay compensatory damages to remedy […] any breach of the Agreement” [emphasis in original]. As such breaches would not be limited to the respondent’s obligation to pay the Handling Service Fee on time, the obligations imposed by Recital 4 went “beyond the essential purpose of the Agreement”. This meant that Recital 4 imposed obligations which were “incident to the primary commercial interest of the [appellant] under the Agreement of being paid for letting out the Service Area”. Consequently, the DJ held that “the obligations imposed on the [respondent] under Recital 4 would be defined as secondary obligations” (Judgment at [45]–[46]).

  44. [32] The question that followed was the application of the rule against penalties proper, viz, whether Recital 4 provided for a genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss that would be suffered by the appellant in the event of a breach of the Agreement by the respondent (Judgment at [47]). The DJ answered this in the negative. First, although the quantum of the Security Deposit represented three months of the Handling Service Fee, it could be forfeited “on the occasion of one or more of any breach of the Agreement”, some of which might cause serious loss whilst others might not. Second, the appellant would be entitled under Recital 4 to forfeit the entire Security Deposit for the respondent’s breaches of the Agreement which consisted solely of a failure to pay a sum that was smaller than the quantum of the Security Deposit (eg, Utility Charges and Late Interest). The DJ therefore found that Recital 4 offended the rule against penalties, and that the Security Deposit was not forfeitable (Judgment at [50]).

  45. [33] In reaching the conclusion that Recital 4 was an unenforceable penalty clause, the DJ rejected the appellant’s reliance on the CA’s decision in Li Jialin and Ramesh J’s (as he then was) decision in Hon Chin Kong v Yip Fook Mun [2018] 3 SLR 534 (“Hon Chin Kong”), holding that those cases had no application to the present case (Judgment at [51]). The appellant had relied on these two cases to argue, amongst others, that the law of penalties has no application to the forfeiture of the Security Deposit.

  46. [34] The DJ then moved to consider the appellant’s alternative contention that it was entitled to set off monies against the Security Deposit by reason of the respondent’s repeated breaches of the Agreement (Judgment at [52]). Before doing so, the DJ examined the effect of the Settlement in respect of the respondent’s breaches. The DJ found that the Settlement had compromised all of the respondent’s breaches up to the time of the Settlement (“pre-Settlement breaches”) (Judgment at [55]). The appellant having exercised its rights under the Settlement and recovered from the respondent what was due to it under the Agreement, the DJ held that it was not permitted to claim any set-off of the Security Deposit in respect of the pre-Settlement breaches (Judgment at [56]).

  47. [35] However, the DJ noted that the Settlement did not compromise the parties’ rights post-settlement, given “the absence of the usual clause in the Settlement that one tends to see in settlement agreements that extinguishes all claims of the parties relating to the subject-matter of the dispute” (Judgment at [56]). In this regard, the appellant had pleaded seven heads of loss and damage which it had allegedly suffered owing to the respondent’s breaches of the Agreement (see [27] above). The DJ, however, held that there was no legal and/or factual basis for it to claim a set-off of these alleged losses or damages against the Security Deposit. Accordingly, the DJ dismissed the appellant’s alternative defence of set-off (Judgment at [65]). The DJ’s reasons in relation to each specific head of loss are summarised as follows:

  48. (a) In relation to the Legal Costs, the DJ found that these had been “subsumed” in JUD 978 and the Settlement. In any case, in so far as the appellant was attempting to set off solicitor and client costs against the Security Deposit, the DJ held that “short of an express agreement between parties, solicitor and client costs cannot be the subject matter of a claim for damages” (Judgment at [58]).

  49. (b) In relation to the Commission, the DJ found that there was “no evidence” indicating that it had in fact been paid (Judgment at [59]).

  50. (c) In relation to the Oct 2023 Utility Charges, the respondent had admitted its failure to pay the appellant the same (see [26] above).

  51. (d) In relation to Late Interest on the Oct 2023 Utility Charges, the DJ found that such a head of loss would not have been incurred by the appellant at all if it had returned the Security Deposit to the respondent at the first instance (ie, when first requested by the respondent to do so). This was because the Oct 2023 Utility Charges would have been offset against the Security Deposit, resulting in there being no principal sum on which the Late Interest could have been charged (Judgment at [60]).

  52. (e) In relation to the costs of the cement cubes (including the incidentals) deployed at the Service Area from May to July 2023, the DJ found that this had been “subsumed” in the Settlement. This was because the costs for the cement cubes had been incurred before the Settlement. However, it had not been included therein (Judgment at [61]).

  53. (f) In relation to the Handover Costs, the DJ found that the appellant had incurred them despite having been informed by the respondent that it would not be able to vacate the Service Area by 10 November 2023. Accordingly, the DJ held that the respondent should not be held liable for such costs (Judgment at [62]).

  54. (g) In relation to the Reputation Loss, the DJ found that the appellant had not produced any evidence to substantiate its assertion that it had suffered such a loss (Judgment at [63]).

  55. [36] Having succeeded in substantially all of its arguments, the DJ entered judgment in the respondent’s favour. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent the sum of $116,993.29 (the quantum of the Security Deposit, minus the Oct 23 Utility Charges ($3,006.71)) with interest (Judgment at [67]).

  56. The parties’ cases

  57. The appellant’s case

  58. [37] The appellant advances four main challenges against the DJ’s decision. First, the appellant submits that the DJ was wrong to have permitted the respondent to advance the Penalty Argument when it had not been specifically pleaded by the respondent. Specifically, the appellant argues that the DJ erred in finding that: (a) the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 was a legal issue arising from the appellant’s reliance on Recital 4; and (b) the respondent had pleaded the material facts necessary to advance the Penalty Argument. The respondent’s SOC was devoid of particulars as to why Recital 4 amounted to a penalty clause, and so was its opening statement and the affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) of its sole witness.

  59. [38] Additionally, the appellant argues that the DJ erred in finding that it would not be taken by surprise by the Penalty Argument and that there would be no prejudice occasioned to it. As the respondent had not pleaded the material facts for the Penalty Argument, the appellant “never truly knew the case they had to meet to defend it properly and adequately”. Owing to the belated nature in which the respondent raised the Penalty Argument, the parties were unable to lead evidence to determine “whether the Security Deposit constituted a genuine pre-estimate of loss or otherwise”. Accordingly, the appellant argues that the DJ erred in permitting the respondent to advance the Penalty Argument when it had not been specifically pleaded in its SOC.

  60. [39] Second, the appellant submits that the DJ erred in finding that Recital 4 of the Agreement was an unenforceable penalty clause. This argument has two broad limbs, the first of which is that the law of penalties is not applicable to the forfeiture of the Security Deposit. In this regard, the appellant argues that the DJ erred in finding that the CA’s decision in Li Jialin did not apply to the present case. Pointing to Smart Glove International Pte Ltd v Full Support Healthcare Ltd [2025] SGHC 168 (“Smart Glove”), where the principles in Li Jialin had been applied in “a factual matrix other than the conveyancing context”, the appellant alleges that the DJ had placed “undue emphasis” on the conveyancing context in Li Jialin. The appellant also argues that Hon Chin Kong, a case that was substantially endorsed by the CA in Li Jialin, did not concern a deposit paid in the course of a conveyancing transaction. Therefore, it argues that the principles enunciated in Li Jialin (which will be set out in greater depth below) are not restricted to conveyancing transactions.

  61. [40] The appellant additionally argues that the DJ had “failed to consider” whether the principles set out by the CA in Li Jialin could also apply to security deposits paid under a lease. The appellant referred to Kwek Mean Luck J’s decision in Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 248 (“Royal & Sons”), where the learned judge found that the landlord in that case was entitled to forfeit a security deposit for breaches of the relevant tenancy agreement (Royal & Sons at [56]).

  62. [41] The appellant also argues that the DJ erred in finding that the Security Deposit had not been paid to the appellant “in the form of an earnest”. The appellant argues that, contrary to the DJ’s reasoning, a deposit that takes the form of an earnest payment “need not be made pending the execution of the [relevant] agreement”. Instead, it suggests that so long as the relevant sum has been paid over as “a guarantee that the [relevant] contract be performed”, the deposit takes on an “earnest” character such that the law of penalties is no longer applicable. As the Security Deposit had been paid to secure the respondent’s performance of its obligations, the appellant asserts that it has an earnest function and that the law of penalties has no application to it.

  63. [42] The second limb of the appellant’s argument that the DJ erred in finding that Recital 4 is an unenforceable penalty clause is an alternative to the first. The appellant argues that, even if the law of penalties is applicable to the forfeiture of the Security Deposit, the DJ erred in his application of the penalty doctrine to the Security Deposit. Specifically, the DJ is said to have erred in finding that Recital 4 imposed a secondary obligation on the respondent. Instead, Recital 4 imposed a primary obligation on the respondent to make payment of the Security Deposit, which would be forfeitable upon the breach of the Agreement. This would be consistent with the CA’s statement in Li Jialin that deposits “do not operate in the sphere of secondary obligations” (at [49]).

  64. [43] Next, the appellant also argues that the DJ erred in finding that the Security Deposit was not “a genuine pre-estimate of the loss a landlord would suffer”. It contends that the quantum of the Security Deposit was reasonable since it amounted to 10% of the total rent for the term of the tenancy. Industry practice, as shown by the Singapore Business Federation’s Code of Conduct for the Leasing of Retail Premises dated 15 March 2022, is that the quantum of security deposits for commercial premises with a floor area of up to 5,000 square feet and with a lease term of up to three years shall not exceed an amount equal to three months’ gross equal rent. Given that the Security Deposit was equivalent to three months of the Handling Service Fee for a floor area of approximately 16,159.50 square meters and a Term of 30 months, the appellant submits that the quantum of the Security Deposit was eminently reasonable. Further, the appellant argued that there was “a probability” that the greatest loss that could conceivably have followed from a breach of the Agreement would exceed the quantum of the Security Deposit – a possibility that turned into reality in the present case, as the damages that the appellant had claimed by way of EO 176 far exceeded the quantum of the Security Deposit.

  65. [44] Lastly, the appellant argues that the DJ erred in finding that the appellant was not entitled to the Late Interest on the Oct 2023 Utility Charges, on the ground that it would not have been incurred if the Security Deposit had been returned to the respondent. The appellant asserts that it is entitled to charge such a sum based on clause 3(a) of the Agreement (see [12(a)] above). The DJ’s conclusion on this point was premised on his earlier finding that the Security Deposit was not forfeitable. Given the appellant’s position that the DJ erred in finding that the Security Deposit was an unenforceable penalty clause, it submits that, were the court to be with it on that point, the DJ’s basis for deciding this issue in favour of the respondent would disappear. Accordingly, the appellant submits that it is entitled to the Late Interest of 12% per annum on the Oct 2023 Utility Charges from 7 November 2023 to the date of actual payment.

  66. The respondent’s case

  67. [45] The respondent rejects all four grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant. First, respondent submits that the DJ was correct in permitting it to advance the Penalty Argument notwithstanding its failure to specifically plead it. It argues that it is unnecessary for “the precise legal label (“penalty”) to be pleaded, provided that the material facts are known and contested at trial”. Given that the DJ’s findings that the material facts had been sufficiently pleaded by the respondent and that there was no prejudice occasioned to the appellant are consistent with the authorities and the evidence, the respondent argues that the appeal on this point should be dismissed.

  68. [46] Second, the respondent submits that the DJ was correct in declining to apply the CA’s decision in Li Jialin. It rejects the appellant’s reliance on Smart Glove, on the basis that that case concerned “refundable advance payments” made under a supply agreement, as opposed to security deposits paid “to secure compliance under a tenancy”. It also argues that the appellant’s reliance on Royal & Sons is misplaced, given that the question as to whether the forfeiture clause in that case was unenforceable as a penalty had not been argued before Kwek J. In any case, the DJ’s decision was based on a reasoned distinction between purchase deposits and security deposits. Unlike the former, which is paid as an “earnest pending contract execution”, the latter is paid to “secure ongoing compliance with the Agreement”. As such, the respondent argues that the DJ was right to distinguish Li Jialin on the facts, and that the appellant’s appeal on this ground should be rejected.

  69. [47] Third, the respondent submits that the DJ was correct in finding that Recital 4 amounted to an unenforceable penalty clause. The respondent’s submissions on this front mostly rehash the DJ’s reasoning in his Judgment. Hence, it suffices to say that the respondent asserts that the DJ was correct in finding that Recital 4 imposes secondary obligations on the respondent and that the Security Deposit was not a genuine pre-estimate of loss.

  70. [48] Fourth, the respondent asserts that the DJ was correct in holding that the appellant is not entitled to Late Interest on the Oct 2023 Utility Charges. If the Security Deposit had been returned to the respondent at first instance (as the DJ found the appellant ought to have), the Oct 2023 Utility Charges would have been offset against the Security Deposit, resulting in there being no outstanding sum on which Late Interest could be chargeable under clause 3(a).

  71. Issues to be determined

  72. [49] Three main issues arise for my determination:

  73. (a) First, whether the DJ erred in permitting the respondent to advance the Penalty Argument when it had not been pleaded in its SOC.

  74. (b) Second, whether the DJ erred in his interpretation of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4. The relevance and significance of this issue will be explained below.

  75. (c) Third, if the DJ had not erred in permitting the respondent to advance the unpleaded Penalty Argument, whether the DJ erred in finding that Recital 4 is in the nature of an unenforceable penalty. This requires the resolution of two separate issues, which I will approach sequentially:

  76. [50] Before I set out my decision on the issues that arise in this appeal, I will, for completeness’ sake, set out a preliminary issue that appears to have been missed by the DJ and the parties. That issue stems from the fact that the “clause” which purportedly gave the appellant the right to forfeit the Security Deposit was in the nature of a recital.

  77. [51] Ordinarily, recitals set out the background to a transaction and the purpose for which the parties are entering into the transaction (Richard Christou, Boilerplate: Practical Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2020) (“Practical Clauses”) at para 1–010; Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 264 ALR 15 (“Metcash Trading”) at [379]). Broadly speaking, recitals do form part of the contract in which they are found and may be used to assist in its construction. However, the common law, since at least 1693, has drawn a distinction between the operative terms of a contract and its recitals. Save for those situations where there are express words to the contrary, the general position at law is that recitals are usually not regarded as operative terms of a contract (Bath & Mountague’s Case (1693) 3 Cas in Ch 55 at 101; OMG Holdings Pte Ltd v Pos Ad Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 SLR 201 at [68]; The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Raphael [1935] AC 96 at 143–144; Metcash Trading at [380(2)]; see also Practical Clauses at para 1–010).

  78. [52] The Agreement draws a clear distinction between its recitals and its terms. Its recitals, found at the second page of the Agreement, is preceded by the header “WHEREAS”. Its terms, found at pages three to six of the Agreement, is preceded by the header “WHEREBY IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS”. In light of this, during the hearing of this appeal, I queried the appellant on the legal significance of the fact that Recital 4 was in the nature of a recital, as opposed to a term of the contract. In response, the appellant confirmed that both parties have proceeded, and will be proceeding, “on the basis that [Recital 4] is a term of the [Agreement]”. The respondent did not argue otherwise. Accordingly, notwithstanding my reservations on this point, I will proceed – as the parties and the DJ have – on the basis that Recital 4 is an operative term of the Agreement.

  79. Issue 1: Whether the DJ erred in permitting the respondent to raise the unpleaded Penalty Argument

  80. The law on pleadings

  81. [53] Antecedent to the substantive question of whether the DJ erred in finding that Recital 4 amounted to an unenforceable penalty is the procedural question of whether the respondent ought to be permitted to advance the Penalty Argument, when such an argument had not in fact been pleaded in its SOC. That requires me to set out the law on pleadings, a subject on which the CA has provided authoritative guidance in various cases.

  82. [54] In an adversarial system of justice like ours, pleadings serve at least two functions: they define the issues to be decided by the court and inform the parties of the case they have to meet (V Nithia v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [36]; Sheagar s/o T M Veloo v Belfield International (Hong Kong) Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 524 (“Belfield International”) at [94]). But more than that, pleadings furnish the entire factual substratum on which the parties’ cases, as well as their subsequent conduct of the litigation, rest. They feature in all stages of the trial process; their role in the civil litigation process is pervasive (see generally PT Prima International Development v Kempinski Hotels SA [2012] 4 SLR 98 at [35]).

  83. [55] An important purpose of pleadings is to “enable the opposing party to know what case is being made in sufficient detail to enable that party properly to prepare to answer it” (British Airways Pension Trustees Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd (1994) 45 ConLR 1 at 4–5 (per Saville LJ), cited with approval in Sharikat Logistics Pte Ltd v Ong Boon Chuan [2011] SGHC 196 at [7]). As a matter of natural justice, every litigant has a right to be given fair and proper notice of their opponent’s case in advance, so that they will not be left in the dark as to the case they will have to meet at trial. That right is vindicated by the correlative duty of every litigant to plead the material facts in support of their claims or defences, which is the means by which parties are informed of their opponent’s case (V Nithia at [37]–[43]; Belfield International at [94]). Indeed, it has been said that the principal consideration underlying the law of pleadings is “to prevent surprises arising at trial” (SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah [2016] 2 SLR 118 at [46]; Liberty Sky Investments Ltd v Aesthetic Medical Partners Pte Ltd [2020] 1 SLR 606 at [16]). As procedural fairness is a sine qua non for the achievement of substantive justice, the law does not countenance trials “by ambush” (V Nithia at [37], citing United Overseas Bank Ltd v Ng Huat Foundations Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 425 at [8]).

  84. [56] The general rule is therefore that parties are bound by their pleadings and the court is precluded from deciding on a matter that the parties themselves have decided not to put into issue (Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital [2022] 1 SLR 689 (“Noor Azlin”) at [272], citing V Nithia at [38]). Consistent with the very purpose of pleadings themselves, the rationale underpinning a court’s refusal to permit an unpleaded claim or defence is to “prevent injustice from being occasioned to the party who, because of the failure of the opposing party to plead, did not have a chance to respond to the claim or defence in question” (How Weng Fan v Sengkang Town Council [2023] 2 SLR 235 (“How Weng Fan”) at [18], citing Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 304 at [34]–[35]).

  85. [58] Second, it is only the material facts – the facts which are necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action or defence – that must be pleaded (Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712, cited with approval in Multi-Pak Singapore Pte Ltd v Intraco Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 382 at [29]). Put another way, the facts supporting each element of a cause of action or defence which a litigant seeks to rely upon must be specifically pleaded, so that the opponent is given “fair notice of the substance of such a case” [emphasis in original] (V Nithia at [43]–[44]). A corollary of the principle that only material facts should be pleaded is that matters of law should not be stated as facts or pleaded at all (Sir Jack Jacob and Ian Goldrein, Pleadings: Principles and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) at 51). Hence, the particular legal consequence or result that is alleged to flow from the material facts need not be pleaded (How Weng Fan at [19]; Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936 at 941).

  86. [59] The question of whether a clause in a contract is in the nature of a penalty or liquidated damages is one that does not fit neatly within the categories of material facts or points of law. Instead, in Banner Investments Pte Ltd v Hoe Seng Metal Fabrication & Engineers (S) Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR(R) 244 (“Banner Investments”), S Rajendran J took the position that such a question is one of mixed fact and law, which must be pleaded by the party that is seeking to rely on it (Banner Investments at [14]–[18]). In that case, the appellants had entered into a factoring agreement with the respondent, where the latter undertook not to assign or otherwise dispose of any debts owed to it to anyone but the appellant. The respondent entered into another factoring agreement with a third party in breach of this obligation. In proceedings that subsequently arose between the parties, the appellant counterclaimed for a sum of $56,759.36 against the respondent as “agreed liquidated damages”. A defence that the respondent had relied on in response to this counterclaim was that the clauses on which the claim for liquidated damages was based were in fact penalties. Such a defence, however, had not been pleaded (Banner Investments at [1]–[5]).

  87. [60] At first instance, the trial judge found that the sums claimed by the appellant against the respondent were penalties and not genuine pre-estimates of damages. She therefore dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s contention that the respondent should not be permitted to raise a defence that “the sums claimed were penalties” when such an argument had not been pleaded by the respondent. The appellant, dissatisfied with the trial judge’s finding on this point, appealed against her decision on the basis that she had misdirected herself in law by permitting the respondent to raise the unpleaded point (Banner Investments at [6]–[7]).

  88. [61] Rajendran J allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial judge in respect of the counterclaim. The learned judge began by noting what is now the well-established proposition that where a party asserts that a clause is in the nature of a penalty, the legal burden is on that party to prove that claim (Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428 (“Robophone Facilities”) at 1447E; Ethoz Capital Ltd v Im8ex Pte Ltd [2023] 1 SLR 922 (“Ethoz Capital”) at [68]–[69]; see also Denka v Seraya at [287]). To decide on such a claim, Rajendran J reasoned, the court is required to consider “the surrounding facts, the terms of the contract and the intention of the parties”. For example, in Dunlop Pneumatic, which as noted above is the locus classicus on the law of penalties, the defendants had specifically pleaded that the relevant sum was a penalty, and evidence had been led at the trial by the claimants as to why it had required the relevant clause (see Dunlop Pneumatic at 81–82). It was only after “a detailed consideration of the evidence that the court came to a decision on the plea of penalty” (Banner Investments at [9]).

  89. [62] Following that analysis, Rajendran J proceeded to hold that the question of whether the relevant agreed damages clauses in the factoring agreement are in the nature of penalties is “a question of fact and law”. This was because the court would have to “consider the clauses in the factoring agreement in light of the surrounding facts of the factoring business before arriving at a decision on the issue”. To make good its defence, the respondent had to establish that the amounts stipulated as damages in the relevant clauses of the factoring agreement “were in fact not genuine pre-estimates of damages” but amounts fixed “in terrorem”. Those, however, were “matters of fact that clearly ought [to have been] pleaded if [the respondent] wished to raise them” (Banner Investments at [14]–[15]). Given that the respondent had not done so, it was not open for the trial judge to have decided the appellant’s counterclaim on the basis of a defence which had not been pleaded (Banner Investments at [18]).

  90. [63] The premise of Rajendran J’s decision in Banner Investments is that a plea that a contractual clause is an unenforceable penalty is one of mixed fact and law. Such a plea is said to be “a material fact which raises a point of law” (see Singapore Court Practice 2024 (Jeffrey Pinsler gen ed) (LexisNexis, 2024) at para 6.5.25). It raises, as Lord Dunedin put it, “a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of the breach” [emphasis added] (Dunlop Pneumatic at 86–87; Denka v Seraya at [281]). The ultimate aim of that process is to determine whether the relevant clause provides for a payment of money stipulated in terrorem of the offending party, or as a genuine pre-estimate of loss (Dunlop Pneumatic at 86). In so far as this is a question of contractual construction, the relevant facts that each party wishes to rely on in support of their advanced construction must be pleaded “with specificity”, as well as the effect such facts will have on their intended construction (Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) at [73]). Examples of such facts that may be relied on include:

  91. (a) The party seeking to impugn the relevant clause as an unenforceable penalty may wish to adduce evidence on the greatest loss that may be expected to follow from breach, in order to show that the sum stipulated for in the clause is “extravagant and unconscionable” compared to such loss (Dunlop Pneumatic at 87). In this regard, it has been held that, notwithstanding that the question of whether a clause is an unenforceable penalty is determined objectively by reference to the date the contract was made, it is permissible to have regard to subsequent events for the limited purpose of showing “what could reasonably [have been] expected to be the loss at the time the contract was made” (Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1993] 1 LRC 775 (“Philips Hong Kong”) at 786).

  92. (b) The party seeking to argue that the impugned clause is not an unenforceable penalty may seek to provide reasons as to why the parties had chosen to quantify their loss in the manner set out in the contract (Philips Hong Kong at 786). For example, owing to the existence of “special circumstances” known to both parties but not expressly provided for in the contract, it may be shown by the party seeking to rely on the impugned clause that a breach would have caused him greater losses than in the ordinary course of events (Robophone Facilities at 1447). The question of whether a clause is an unenforceable penalty being an objective one rooted in public policy, the parties’ intentions or the language they employ in the relevant clause (eg, as a “penalty” or “liquidated damages”) are not determinative. This is a principle of a very ancient vintage and is based on the principle that the court “must proceed according to what is the real nature of the transaction” (Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 at 9; Kemble v Farren (1829) 130 ER 1234 at 1237). That, however, does not preclude the courts from evaluating, or taking into account, the parties’ reasons for the inclusion of the impugned clause in their agreement (Philips Hong Kong at 786).

  93. [64] As a matter of principle, I would therefore agree with Rajendran J’s decision in Banner Investments that an argument that a clause in a contract is an unenforceable penalty is a point of mixed fact and law that has to be pleaded by the party seeking to rely on such an argument. Additionally, as a matter of precedent, Rajendran J’s decision has been endorsed and applied in various subsequent cases, including those of the CA by which I am bound (Beihai Zingong Property Development Co v Ng Choon Meng [1999] 1 SLR(R) 527 (CA) (“Beihai Zingong”) at [17]; New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v Guobena Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 SLR(R) 368 (HC) at [68]; Development Bank of Singapore Ltd v Bob Chee Seng Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 693 (CA) at [28]).

  94. [65] I also note the CA’s decision in Phoenixfin Pte Ltd v Convexity Ltd [2022] 2 SLR 23 (“Phoenixfin”), which concerned an application to set aside an arbitration award on, amongst others, the ground of a breach of natural justice. The relevant arbitration concerned the first appellant’s alleged breach of a consulting agreement which it had entered into with the respondent. During the course of the arbitration, the first appellant had applied to amend its pleadings to aver that the certain provisions of the agreement on which the respondent had based its claims for damages were unenforceable penalties (“Penalty Issue”). The tribunal disallowed the proposed amendment. Despite that, the tribunal proceeded to find in its award that the relevant clauses were unenforceable penalties. The CA affirmed the decision below to set aside the award on the ground that a breach of natural justice had been occasioned to the respondent. What is notable about that case was the fact that the CA had repeated, at least four separate times in its judgment, that “whether a particular provision is or is not a proscribed penalty… is an issue of mixed law and fact” (Phoenixfin at [46], [54], [64] and [68]). The approach that a supervisory court should take vis-à-vis such issues in the context of a setting aside application was said by the CA to be as such (Phoenixfin at [52]):

  95. [66] Given that the first appellant had not pleaded the Penalty Issue in its defence and counterclaim, and the tribunal had dismissed its amendment application, the Penalty Issue was “not in play” in the arbitration. Specifically, the tribunal was not entitled to raise and determine such an issue when its inclusion had been specifically contemplated and rejected. The parties had in fact proceeded on such a basis, as evidenced by the fact that the first appellant had not led any evidence on the Penalty Issue. By unilaterally reintroducing it in the proceedings, the respondent was not only taken by surprise but was also faced with the unenviable task of responding to a case which had never been established by its proponent. It followed that the respondent had not been given a proper opportunity to present its case on the Penalty Issue. The CA accordingly set aside the sections of the award dealing with the Penalty Issue (Phoenixfin at [53]–[70]).

  96. [67] I am aware that Rajendran J’s decision in Banner Investments should be read in light of the CA’s authoritative guidance in How Weng Fan and V Nithia on when it is permissible to allow a party to advance a point that has not been pleaded. I am also cognisant that, in arbitration proceedings generally, pleadings are not determinative in the same way as they might be in court litigation (Phoenixfin at [50], noting TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972 at [52]). I am, nevertheless, of the view that the CA’s decision in Phoenixfin is consistent with the tenor of Rajendran J’s decision in Banner Investments, which is that the question of whether a contractual provision is an unenforceable penalty is a question of mixed fact and law that must be pleaded.

  97. The respondent ought not to be permitted to advance the unpleaded Penalty Argument

  98. (1) The DJ erred in finding that the Penalty Argument is a point of law

  99. [68] With those principles in mind, I turn to the present facts. In my judgment, the DJ erred in permitting the respondent to advance the Penalty Argument. It is not disputed that such a point had not been pleaded in the respondent’s SOC, nor raised in its opening statement, or even alluded to it in the AEIC of the respondent’s sole witness, Mr Zhang Xiaofen (“Zhang”), who is its director. The Penalty Argument had in fact been raised by the respondent’s counsel (Mr Sankar) in passing for the first time at trial (see [30] above), in response to the DJ’s questions to the parties as to the issues that fell for his determination in OC 1343. The appellant’s counsel (Mr Wang) objected to the respondent raising the Penalty Argument on the ground that it had not been pleaded in its SOC. The DJ noted Mr Wang’s objections, and informed the parties that the issue of Recital 4 being a penalty clause is “a matter of law” which should be dealt with in the parties’ closing submissions (see also Judgment at [36]).

  100. [69] As noted above at [30], there were two principal limbs to the DJ’s decision to permit the respondent to advance the Penalty Argument. First, the question of whether Recital 4 constitutes a penalty clause is “a legal question that arises from the facts pleaded” (Judgment at [36]). In my judgment, the DJ misdirected himself as a matter of law in holding so. The authorities speak with one voice in stating that the question of whether a clause is an unenforceable penalty is one of mixed fact and law that must, as a starting point, be pleaded by the party seeking to rely on such an argument (see Banner Investments at [18] and the authorities discussed above at [59]–[66]).

  101. (2) The DJ erred in finding that the appellant had not been irreparably prejudiced

  102. [70] The second limb of the DJ’s reasoning was that no prejudice had been occasioned to the appellant by the respondent’s failure to plead the Penalty Argument. To recapitulate, the DJ explained that the respondent’s demand for the return for the return of the Security Deposit and the appellant’s reliance on Recital 4 to justify its forfeiture had placed the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in issue. Thus, the appellant would have been aware that the enforceability of the forfeiture clause had been in issue since the commencement of OC 1343. It would therefore not have been taken by surprise by the unpleaded argument. In any case, no new facts or evidence had been adduced at trial to support the respondent’s argument that Recital 4 was unenforceable as a penalty clause (Judgment at [36]).

  103. [71] With respect, I am unable to agree. First, the fact that the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 was placed in issue did not mean that the respondent was at liberty to raise any argument to impugn its enforceability untethered from the averments made in its pleadings. In any case, I disagree that the respondent’s claim for the return of the Security Deposit (less the Oct 2023 Utility Charges) necessarily placed the enforceability of Recital 4 of the Agreement (or lack thereof) in issue. The respondent’s claim was based on the appellant having refused to refund the Security Deposit even though: (a) the respondent had vacated the Service Area; (b) the respondent had paid the appellant the sums due under JUD 978 pursuant to EO 176; and (c) there were no outstanding unremedied breaches of the Agreement.

  104. [72] Under Recital 4, the appellant had the obligation to refund the Security Deposit once the respondent had carried out the requisite “reinstatement works” to the satisfaction of the appellant (see [10(b)] above). It is in this context that the respondent’s claim in OC 1343 must be understood. By asserting that it had vacated the Service Area “with all reinstatement work completed”, none of which had allegedly been disputed by the appellant, it was essentially arguing that it had an accrued contractual right to be refunded the Security Deposit, and that the appellant’s repeated refusal to refund the Security Deposit amounted to a continuing breach of the contract. In asserting that there had allegedly been no outstanding breaches of the Agreement and that the appellant had been paid the sums due under JUD 978, the respondent was also arguing that the appellant had no entitlement to retain the Security Deposit. All this is consistent with the position that Mr Sankar took before me during the hearing of this appeal. But more importantly, it is also consistent with the evidence that was given by Mr Zhang in his AEIC, and what the appellant had understood the respondent’s case to be.

  105. [73] It was in response to the contention of the respondent that it had an accrued contractual right to be refunded the Security Deposit that the appellant asserted its contractual entitlement to forfeit the sum for outstanding breaches of the Agreement under Recital 4. It was with a view towards making good such an assertion that the appellant had produced Mr Yap Wui Han (“Mr Yap”) as its sole witness for the purposes of its defence. Mr Yap is the sole director and a shareholder of MAPLE87 Pte Ltd (known at the material time as Ruo C & E Pte Ltd (“RC&E”)), a company engaged by the appellant to provide monthly maintenance services for the Service Area. Mr Yap would receive instructions from Mr Chng Weng Huat (“Mr Chng”), the former director of the appellant, to provide ad hoc services in relation to the Service Area. Mr Yap’s evidence in his AEIC was principally directed towards how the respondent had been in breach of various terms of the Agreement since 2023 (and how the appellant had suffered loss and/or damage therefrom), based on his personal visits to the Service Area on an almost monthly basis which were for the purposes of providing maintenance services.

  106. [74] Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the DJ that the appellant had been aware that the enforceability of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 had been placed in issue since the start of the trial. In holding so, the DJ attributed to the appellant knowledge of an erroneous picture of the parties’ cases that was not supported by any of their pleadings, AEICs or opening statements. The respondent’s case was that it had an accrued contractual entitlement to be refunded the Security Deposit, since it had discharged its obligation to complete reinstatement works and had remedied its breaches of the Agreement. The appellant’s case was that the respondent did not have such an entitlement because the respondent remained in breach of the Agreement, and that it had suffered loss and/or damage therefrom, for which it was entitled to forfeit the Security Deposit. The parties’ cases, especially the respondent’s, as reflected in their pleadings, contained not even a scintilla of an indication that the Security Deposit ought to be refunded on the basis that the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 was unenforceable. Therefore, I accept the appellant’s argument that it had truly been taken by surprise when the Penalty Argument was raised by the respondent for the first time at trial.

  107. [75] In my judgment, the appellant was irreparably prejudiced by the DJ’s decision to permit the respondent to raise the unpleaded Penalty Argument. First, the legal burden of showing that the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 constituted an unenforceable penalty was on the respondent as the party asserting such a claim (see [61] above). Being a question of mixed fact and law, the evidential burden was on the respondent to adduce sufficient evidence to show that the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 constituted an unenforceable penalty (Ethoz Capital at [74]–[77]). However, no evidence whatsoever had been adduced in Mr Zhang’s AEIC (and for that matter, Mr Yap’s AEIC) to show even a prima facie case that the clause in question is an unenforceable penalty. As the DJ himself noted, “[n]o new facts or evidence” had been adduced at trial to support the respondent’s contention on the enforceability of Recital 4 (Judgment at [36]). By resolving the issue of penalties in favour of the respondent in spite of the dearth of evidence adduced on the same, the DJ effectively discharged the respondent’s legal and evidential burden of showing that Recital 4 is an unenforceable penalty on its behalf.

  108. [76] Second, the respondent having adduced no evidence on showing that Recital 4 constitutes an unenforceable penalty, the appellant was faced with the Sisyphean task of having to respond to a case that had never been established by the respondent. In this narrow sense, the appellant’s position in OC 1343 was similar to that which the respondent in Phoenixfin found itself in before the tribunal (see [66] above). In any case, Mr Yap, the sole witness produced by the appellant, was never in any position to testify as to whether the forfeiture clause is an unenforceable penalty. As the director of RC&E, which the appellant had outsourced the maintenance of the Service Area to, Mr Yap would simply have been in no position to testify to the parties’ (or at the very least, the appellant’s) intentions for the inclusion of Recital 4 in the Agreement. More crucially, being an outsider of the appellant, Mr Yap would have been in no position to testify to the likely losses that the appellant would have suffered in the event the respondent breached the terms of the Agreement – which is the comparator against the stipulated sum for the purposes of determining whether the clause is an unenforceable penalty or not. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellant could have produced a different, or perhaps an additional, witness in the form of Mr Chng – who had signed the Agreement on the appellant’s behalf – to testify as to the parties’ reasons for agreeing to Recital 4 of the Agreement (see [63(b)] above). The appellant had conceivably not called Mr Chng as a witness in light of what it had (reasonably) understood the respondent’s pleaded case to be. That, however, left the appellant in the invidious position of being unable to adduce any evidence to rebut any prima facie case that Recital 4 constituted an unenforceable penalty – a case that was, in any event, non-existent.

  109. [77] In the premises, I permit the appellant’s appeal on this issue and set aside the DJ’s decision to permit the respondent to advance the unpleaded Penalty Argument.

  110. Issue 2: Whether the DJ erred in his interpretation of the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 of the Agreement

  111. [78] The next ground of appeal raised by the appellant is that the DJ erred in finding that the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 is an unenforceable penalty clause. A preliminary issue that I believe is necessary to consider, however, is whether the DJ had been correct in his interpretation of the appellant’s right of forfeiture under Recital 4 of the Agreement. To recall, the DJ held that Recital 4 unambiguously gave rise to a right on the part of the appellant to forfeit the Security Deposit “for breaches of the terms of the Agreement on the [respondent’s] part” (Judgment at [29]). Specifically, the DJ appears to have taken the view that, questions of validity aside, this right of forfeiture held by the appellant permitted it to forfeit the entire Security Deposit for any breach of the terms of the Agreement (Judgment at [28]–[29], [45]–[46] and [50]). Having reached such an interpretation, the DJ’s conclusion that the forfeiture clause in Recital 4 is an unenforceable penalty was perhaps inevitable. Having considered the matter afresh, I hold that the DJ erred in arriving at such an interpretation.

  112. It would not be procedurally improper to make a determination on this issue

  113. [79] In my judgment, in so far as the DJ came to the position that Recital 4 allowed the appellant to forfeit the entirety of the Security Deposit upon establishing that a breach of the Agreement had occurred, I am unable to agree. Properly interpreted, Recital 4 only permits the appellant to forfeit and deduct from the Security Deposit the actual losses it suffered by virtue of the respondent’s breaches. Before I set out my reasons for arriving at such a conclusion, I note a preliminary point on procedure, which is that the DJ’s interpretation of Recital 4 does not appear to have been specifically challenged by the parties on appeal. Both parties are ad idem on the view that Recital 4 contains a “forfeiture clause” that entitles the appellant to forfeit the Security Deposit for breaches of the Agreement by the respondent, and they have confirmed that they are not challenging the DJ’s decision on this point.

  114. [80] I do not, however, think that this precludes this court from taking a different view on the proper interpretation of the forfeiture clause on Recital 4. First, an appellate court is not bound to decide a controversy upon an erroneous concession of law made by the disputants before it. The court retains the residual power to raise the issue on its own accord and rule otherwise in the interests of justice – the critical question is whether the parties (or a party) would be prejudiced if such a point is to be raised at this stage of the proceedings (see Yong Kheng Leong v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd [2013] 1 SLR 173 at [32], citing NV Multi Corp Bhd v Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia [2010] 5 MLJ 573 at [16]).

  115. [81] Second, under O 19 r 7(4) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”), an appellate court “may make any order relating to any part of the decision of the lower Court and for any reason although that part is not the subject of any appeal and that reason is not stated by anyone in the appeal”. This rule clearly applies in the present case, being an appeal against a judgment of the District Court given in a trial of an originating claim (O 19 r 1(a)(i) of the ROC). Hence, this court, in exercising its appellate civil jurisdiction, is not restricted by the parties’ appeal submissions and may make orders in respect of parts of the lower court’s decision not subject to any appeal (Singapore Civil Procedure 2024 vol 1 (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2023) (“White Book”) at para 19/7/4). A fortiori, this court may apply a reason that is not stated in the parties’ appeal submissions in coming to a decision on “an issue which is in fact the subject of an appeal” (Ong Han Nam v Borneo Ventures Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 30 (“Borneo Ventures”) at [34]).

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