Public Prosecutor v Darabi Golshaniiran Mohammad [2026] SGMC 34

Introduction

What should have been an ordinary visit to his condominium’s sauna became, for a 14-year-old boy (“the Victim”), a deeply traumatic encounter within his own residential compound. Darabi Golshaniiran Mohammad (“the Accused”), a 45-year-old man residing in another apartment within the same condominium, committed two acts of outraging the Victim’s modesty that evening, exploiting the Victim’s vulnerability in spaces where he ought to have felt secure.

The Accused faced two charges under s 354(1) of Penal Code 1871 (“PC”) for using criminal force to the Victim without the Victim’s consent, intending to outrage the Victim’s modesty. The first charge involved the Accused’s grabbing of the Victim’s exposed penis for a few seconds, while the second charge involved his pulling down of the Victim’s shorts to expose the Victim’s genitalia and licking the Victim’s penis for a few seconds. He pleaded guilty to the second charge and consented to the first charge (“the TIC Charge”) being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing.

For the reasons set out in this judgment, I order an imprisonment term of 18 months and three strokes of the cane.

Facts

The following facts are based on the Statement of Facts, to which the Accused admitted without qualification. There is a gag order against publishing the name, address, photograph, any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of the Victim.

The Accused, an Iranian national, had been residing in Singapore for several months on a dependent pass after his wife relocated to Singapore for work. They rented an apartment in a condominium in Singapore (“the Condominium”).

The Victim was a school-going student who resided with his family in another apartment in the Condominium.

On 3 February 2025 at about 5.15pm, the Victim headed to a sauna in the Condominium, intending to rest as he did not have any other activities planned for the evening. The sauna was located within a toilet, which was a shared facility in the Condominium that could be used by multiple persons simultaneously. Upon arriving outside the sauna, the Victim noticed the Accused (whom he did not know) standing outside the sauna in swimming trunks. Sensing that the Accused intended to use the sauna, the Victim asked the Accused if he could do so at the same time. The Accused agreed.

The Victim proceeded to a changing room to change into a pair of shorts. When the Victim entered the sauna, he noticed the Accused sitting in one corner. He proceeded to sit in a different corner. The Accused initiated conversation, asking the Victim’s name, age, whether he lived in the Condominium, and whether he played sports. The Victim responded to these questions. Shortly thereafter, two other male residents entered the sauna.

Sometime between 5.22pm and 5.36pm, the Victim left the sauna and proceeded to a urinal in the vicinity of the sauna to relieve himself. About 15 seconds later, the Accused left the sauna and followed the Victim. Before the Victim had pulled his shorts back up after relieving himself, the Accused approached the Victim from the back and asked “can I touch?”. Despite the Victim shaking his head to indicate that he did not consent, the Accused proceeded to grab the Victim’s exposed penis for a few seconds, on the area just behind the tip of the Victim’s penis. This is the subject matter of the TIC Charge.

The Victim quickly moved away upon processing what had occurred. He returned to the sauna, as he remembered that there were two other persons there. He resumed his earlier seating position, and the Accused followed shortly thereafter, likewise returning to his previous position in the sauna.

Five to ten minutes later, the Victim left the sauna, collected his belongings, and proceeded to an accessible toilet cubicle to change back into his clothing. He chose this location because it had a door he could close for privacy. However, before the Victim could close the door, the Accused entered the same cubicle and closed the door behind him.

The Accused faced the Victim and asked multiple times “can I?”. The Victim was shocked and asked what the Accused was doing. The Accused then crouched in front of the Victim, quickly pulled down the Victim’s shorts to expose the Victim’s penis and testicles, and used his tongue to lick the Victim’s penis for several seconds. This is the subject matter of the proceeded charge.

The Victim moved backwards as soon as he processed that the Accused was licking his penis. As he was afraid of the Accused, he wished to change back into his clothing in an area where others could come to his aid if needed. He therefore returned to the area just outside the sauna to change, knowing that the two persons in the sauna could see him through the window in the sauna door.

After changing back into his clothing, the Victim was preparing to leave when the Accused approached and asked if the Victim would return to the sauna the following day. The Victim replied that he did not know and then departed.

Following the incident, the Victim discarded the clothing he had worn that day, wanting to eliminate all reminders of the incident. That night, he had difficulty sleeping as he kept thinking about what had happened. The next morning, he informed his father of the incident. His father accompanied him to lodge a police report.

As a result of the Accused’s offences, the Victim reported feeling sad and distressed about what had happened. For months afterwards, he regularly broke down around three to five times a month before sleeping when remembering the incident, with each episode lasting 15 to 20 minutes. He also reported that his behaviour towards strangers had changed, and that he was on high alert whenever he walked past toilets.

The Law and Sentencing Framework

The prescribed punishment for an offence under PC s 354(1) is an imprisonment term which may extend to three years, or fine, or caning, or a combination of the above. PC s 354(1) provides as follows:

The applicable sentencing framework is as set out in Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 580 (“Kunasekaran”), with the sentencing ranges modified upwards following the legislative amendments increasing the maximum imprisonment term from two to three years (with effect from 1 March 2022). The framework comprises two steps which, in gist, comprise:

(a) the first step (“Step One”), where the court considers offence-specific factors to determine an indicative starting point sentence; and

(b) the second step (“Step Two”), where the court considers offender-specific factors to calibrate that starting point and arrive at the eventual sentence.

Step One: Offence-Specific Factors

At Step One, the court analyses the various offence-specific factors in ascertaining the gravity of the offence. The court then determines an indicative range of sentences based on which sentencing band the case falls within, and derives an indicative starting point within that band which reflects the “intrinsic seriousness” of the offending act (Kunasekaran at [46], citing Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) at [39(a)]).

Analysis of offence-specific factors

The three offence-specific factors are (Kunasekaran at [45], citing GBR v Public Prosecutor [2018] 3 SLR 1048 (“GBR”) at [27]–[31]):

(a) first, the degree of sexual exploitation;

(b) second, the circumstances of the offence; and

(c) third, the harm caused to the victim.

Degree of Sexual Exploitation

The first offence-specific factor concerns the degree of sexual exploitation. Relevant considerations include the part of the Victim’s body that the Accused touched, how the Accused had touched the Victim, and the duration of the outrage of modesty (Kunasekaran at [45(a)(i)]).

In the present case, the degree of sexual exploitation was high. There was skin-on-skin contact with the Victim’s private part, involving the Accused using his tongue to lick the Victim’s penis for a few seconds.

Defence Counsel submitted that the touch was only “fleeting” (using the language of typical cases falling within Band 1 – see [34] below). I disagree. There are two conceivable ways that a “fleeting” touch can be understood: first, a momentary touch (ie, temporally fleeting); and second, a light touch (ie, fleeting in terms of intrusiveness or intensity) – see, eg, GCO v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 1402 at [54]. In other outrage of modesty cases, light or relatively brief touches of private body parts have been found not to constitute “fleeting” contact (see, eg, Public Prosecutor v Ong Jun Yong [2024] SGMC 6 at [13(a)] (light squeeze of victim’s breast over her bra); Public Prosecutor v GDX [2021] SGDC 142 at [227] (squeeze of victim’s breast); GCO at [54] (touching vagina area underneath shorts but over underwear). Even if the licking in the present case could be considered temporally fleeting, it was certainly not fleeting in terms of intrusiveness or intensity.

Circumstances of the Offence

The second offence-specific factor concerns the circumstances of the offence. Relevant considerations include the presence of premeditation, the use of force or violence, the abuse of a position of trust, the use of deception, the presence of other aggravating acts accompanying the outrage of modesty, and the exploitation of a vulnerable victim (Kunasekaran at [45(a)(ii)]). In the present case, there are five aggravating factors relating to the circumstances of the offence.

First, the Victim was a vulnerable victim, as he was only aged 14 at the time of the offence. In Kunasekaran at [57], the court similarly noted that a 14-year-old victim was considered vulnerable. It is further aggravating in the present case that the Accused knew the Victim’s age, having asked the Victim about it (see [8] above).

Second, the Victim had expressly indicated that he did not consent to the Accused touching him in relation to the TIC Charge, but the Accused proceeded to do so. Indeed, he escalated the sexual assault by making oral contact with the Victim’s private part.

Third, the Accused demonstrated calculated and opportunistic behaviour by systematically exploiting the Victim’s isolation. He struck each time (under the proceeded charge and the TIC Charge) when the Victim was isolated from the two other male residents in the sauna.

Fourth, the pattern of offending reveals persistence in and escalation of criminal intent. While Defence Counsel submitted that there was no premeditation as it was a “chance meeting” between the Accused and the Victim, the Accused’s repeated targeting of the Victim upon his departure from the sauna, and escalating from grabbing to licking the Victim’s penis, demonstrates persistent and escalating predatory behaviour. Indeed, the Accused even attempted to pursue further engagement with the Victim after the offences, by asking the Victim if he would be returning to the sauna the next day.

Fifth, the location of the offence aggravates its gravity. The offence was committed within the Victim’s residential compound by a fellow resident, thereby violating the sanctity of the Victim’s home environment and transforming what should have been a place of security into one of vulnerability and trauma. To further exacerbate matters, the incident occurred within an accessible toilet cubicle in the residential compound – a private space where the Victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed, it was precisely the Victim’s need for privacy that led him to use the cubicle to change his clothes. In addition, the Accused took the Victim by surprise, entering the cubicle before the Victim could secure the door, and closed the door behind him, thereby cornering the Victim in a confined space with no avenue of escape.

Harm caused to the Victim

The third offence-specific factor concerns the harm caused to the Victim. In the present case, the harm caused was moderate. While there is no victim impact statement, this is not an impediment to a finding that the Victim had suffered psychological or emotional harm (see Thangarajan Elanchezhian v Public Prosecutor [2024] 6 SLR 507 (“Thangarajan Elanchezhian”) at [47]). In the present case, the Accused admitted without qualification, and Defence Counsel did not dispute, that:

(a) First, the Victim suffered distress during and in the immediate aftermath of the incident. He was shocked and afraid when the Accused sexually assaulted him. After leaving the sauna, he discarded his clothing in a bid to eliminate all reminders of the incident. He had difficulty sleeping that night as he kept thinking about the incident.

(b) Second, the psychological trauma extended far beyond the day of the offence. The Victim reported feeling sad and distressed about what had happened to him. For months thereafter, the Victim regularly broke down three to five times a month before sleeping when he remembered what had happened, with each episode lasting about 15 to 20 minutes. The Victim reported changes in his behaviour towards strangers, and being in a heightened state of alert whenever walking past toilets. The Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s acts had resulted in behavioural changes affecting the Victim’s daily life, negatively impacting his emotional wellbeing and normal functioning in daily activities, and causing a persistent state of anxiety and hypervigilance. Defence counsel did not dispute this, and instead expressed the Accused’s sorrow and desire to extend an apology to the Victim and the Victim’s family for the harm caused.

Determining an Indicative Starting Point Sentence

Having analysed the offence-specific factors, I consider which of the three sentencing bands the present case falls within. The sentencing bands and their respective indicative ranges of imprisonment terms and caning are set out in the table below at [34] below. This table is adapted from Public Prosecutor v Lee Kit [2024] SGDC 41 (“Lee Kit”) at [18]. It reflects the framework in Kunasekaran (at [45(b)] read with [49]) as elaborated upon in Thangarajan Elanchezhian at [50], and as modified to account for the increased maximum imprisonment term under PC s 354(1) (see Thangarajan Elanchezhian at [42] and Public Prosecutor v Wong Teck Guan [2023] SGMC 64 at [48]–[55]). The table also includes indicative ranges of strokes of the cane for each of the three bands, although these were not expressly set out in Kunasekaran. I elaborate.

In Kunasekaran, the court held that the “starting point” for imposing caning under PC s 354(1) is where the outrage of modesty involves intruding upon the victim’s private parts or sexual organs (Kunasekaran at [50], citing Public Prosecutor v Chow Yee Sze [2011] 1 SLR 481 (“Chow Yee Sze”) at [9] and GBR at [31]). The court did not set out indicative ranges for the number of strokes of the cane for offences under PC s 354(1). Nonetheless, useful guidance can be gleaned from GBR at [32]–[37], a case concerning offences under PC s 354(2). In GBR, the court held that for offences under PC s 354(2):

PC s 354(2) is an aggravated form of PC s 354(1). It provides for enhanced punishment on the basis that a PC s 354(1) offence was committed against a child under 14 years of age (see Kunasekaran at [48]). The distinction in gravity of the offences is reflected in Parliament’s prescription of maximum imprisonment terms. Specifically, the maximum imprisonment term under PC s 354(1) is 40% lower than that under PC s 354(2). The indicative starting points in terms of the number of strokes of the cane should likewise reflect the distinction in gravity between the two offences. In other words, starting points under PC s 354(1) should be lower than those in GBR. Having regard to the above, and mindful that sentencing should not be approached as a simple mathematical exercise, the indicative starting points for PC s 354(1) offences should be at least two strokes for Band 2 cases and at least four strokes for Band 3 cases.

A tabular summary of the sentencing bands and their respective indicative ranges of imprisonment terms and strokes of the cane is set out in the following table.

There are three points to note in relation to the table above:

(a) First, the indicative ranges in the table are on a claim-trial basis, given that these were established in the context of convictions after trials (see Kunasekaran and GBR).

(b) Second, the table does not address the possibility or indicative quantum of fines, as such determination is not necessary for the disposition of the present case. A fine only suffices if the act of molest was “relatively minor” (Chow Yee Sze at [61]). That certainly is not the case here, and neither the Prosecution nor Defence Counsel suggested that a fine would be appropriate.

(c) Third, the indications on caning remain subject to the sentencing jurisdiction of the court. For instance, for cases (such as the present) that proceed in a Magistrate’s Court, caning shall not exceed six strokes (see Criminal Procedure Code s 303(3)(c)).

I agree with the Prosecution and the Defence that the offence falls at the lower end of Band 3. There are numerous offence-specific aggravating factors in this case, most notably the intrusion of a vulnerable victim’s private part involving skin-to-skin contact – specifically, the licking of the victim’s private part. Indeed, in another case involving the accused licking an intoxicated 17-year-old victim’s private part, the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) likewise found that the case fell within the lower end of Band 3 (see Public Prosecutor v Raj Kumar s/o Bala [2024] SGHC 265 (“Raj Kumar”), which was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal).

Despite acknowledging that this is a case falling within Band 3, Defence Counsel submitted that the indicative sentence should be 15 months’ imprisonment. This submission is untenable as he had relied on the indicative sentencing ranges in Kunasekaran, without accounting for the increased maximum imprisonment term under PC s 354(1). The Prosecution submitted that the indicative imprisonment term should be about 22.5 to 25 months given that the case falls at the lower end of Band 3.

The appropriate sentence in this case must meet the key objective of deterrence. This imperative is particularly acute where a fellow resident abuses his proximity and access to prey upon a young victim within their shared residential compound, violating the safety and security that young persons should expect within their residential environments. I therefore determine that the starting point sentence is 23 months’ imprisonment on a claim-trial basis. Caning also ought to be imposed in this case, based on a starting point of four strokes and not exceeding six strokes (see [33]–[34] above).

Step Two: Offender-Specific Factors

At Step Two, the court analyses offender-specific factors, ie, aggravating and mitigating factors that are personal to the offender, and calibrates the Step One starting point sentence accordingly. The relevant factors are as follows (Kunasekaran at [45(c)] citing GBR at [39]):

These offender-specific factors may result in a sentence outside the indicative ranges for the sentencing band (Kunasekaran at [46], citing Terence Ng at [39(b)]).

In the present case, there are two offender-specific factors that require calibration of the starting point sentence.

First, the presence of the TIC Charge is an aggravating factor. This involved the Accused’s grabbing of the Victim’s penis on the first occasion that the Victim left the sauna (see [9] above). The TIC Charge warrants an uplift of three months’ imprisonment, to 26 months’ imprisonment on a claim-trial basis.

Second, the Accused’s early plea of guilt is a mitigating factor. Beyond demonstrating the Accused’s acceptance of responsibility, the early plea of guilt spared the Victim from the additional trauma of having to relive and recount the distressing events through testimony in court. This consideration is particularly significant given the nature of the offence and its impact on the Victim. The early plea of guilt also saved public resources on the part of law enforcement, prosecution and the judiciary.

The Accused pleaded guilty within Stage 1 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s “Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas”. On this basis, I grant a 30% reduction in imprisonment term, resulting in a term of 18 months’ imprisonment.

On the issue of caning, Defence Counsel implored the court not to impose any caning. However, no substantive justification was given for this position. Prosecution submitted that the appropriate range would be three to six strokes of the cane, given that the present case involved intrusion of the Victim’s private part, and keeping in mind that the present case involved a plead guilty situation. All matters considered, I find that a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane is appropriate.

For completeness, the fact that the Accused is a first-time offender is a neutral point as this is not positive evidence of good character (Kunasekeran at [65]). His lack of antecedents is merely the absence of an aggravating factor, which is not mitigating in nature (Kunasekaran at [65]). In any event, while technically untraced, the Accused had engaged in two instances of offending conduct as reflected in the proceeded charge and the TIC Charge. He even attempted to pursue further engagement with the Victim (see [28] above).

The sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane is proportionate and appropriate when considered against precedent cases under PC s 354(1) that involve contact with the victim’s (or the accused’s) private parts. Such comparisons must be made bearing in mind three points:

(a) First, these precedents concerned offences committed before 1 March 2022. They were therefore subject to a lower maximum imprisonment term of two years’ imprisonment, as opposed to three years’ imprisonment in the present case.

(b) Second, some of the precedents involved sentences imposed following conviction after trial. In such cases, the accused would not have received a sentencing reduction on account of a guilty plea. The summary table at [48] below therefore identifies whether each precedent concerns a plead guilty situation or a claim-trial situation. For plead guilty cases, the notional claim-trial sentence is indicated if this is evident from the decision.

(c) Third, each sentencing decision is “invariably highly fact-sensitive” given that sexual offences occur in a “vast array of circumstances” (BPH v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 764 at [80]). A meaningful comparison requires an understanding of the underlying principles, factual matrices and other considerations in each precedent. It is impractical to set out all these factors comprehensively in the summary table. Rather, the table is intended only to provide a broad overview of the main offending conduct and sentencing outcomes. It should be read together with the detailed reasons provided by the courts in the various decisions.

The precedents are tabulated here, arranged in descending order of severity of the sentence imposed:

Of the precedents in the table above, the present case would most appropriately be compared to Raj Kumar. Both cases fall at the lower end of Band 3. They involve a comparable degree of sexual exploitation, with the accused in each case having licked the victim’s private parts (see [36] above). The key distinguishing factors, which on balance substantially offset one another, are as follows:

(a) The present case involves a younger victim (14 years old) who was violated within the confines of a toilet in the Condominium compound. He suffered psychological or emotional harm as detailed in [30] above. There is also the additional offender-specific aggravating factor of the TIC Charge.

(b) The victim in Raj Kumar was violated within the accused’s apartment unit while intoxicated and unable to extricate herself. She suffered significant psychological harm including self-blame and self-loathing post-assault, as well as adverse effects on her sexual functioning. There were no offender-specific factors that affected the sentence imposed (see Raj Kumar at [194]).

Had the offence in Raj Kumar been committed after 1 March 2022, the claim-trial sentence may have been about 27 months’ imprisonment, which is similar to the claim-trial sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment in the present case (see [42] above). The court in Raj Kumar may also have ordered more than three strokes of the cane on a claim-trial basis, given the increase of the maximum imprisonment term for PC s 354(1) which reflects Parliament’s intention to treat such offences with greater severity. This is comparable to the three strokes ordered in the present plead guilty scenario (see [45] above).

Overall Sentence and Conclusion

Young persons must be able to live and grow within their residential compounds in safety, without fear of predatory conduct from those who share their living environment. The sentence imposed for outraging the Victim’s modesty, in a space where he ought to have felt secure, must reflect the gravity of the offending conduct and serve as a clear deterrent against such behaviour. I accordingly sentence the Accused to 18 months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane.