YGN v YGO [2026] SGFC 108

Introduction

It is a well-established principle of Singapore family law that the purpose of dividing the assets owned by the spouses upon their divorce is to split between them the material gains of the marital partnership: see WQP v WQQ [2024] SGHC(A) 34 at [35]. The corollary to this principle is that assets which the parties had prior to their marital partnership (or “pre-marital assets” as they are sometimes referred to) would generally be excluded from division because they do not, on their face, represent material gains of the marriage. The treatment of pre-martial assets is, in fact, expressly addressed in s 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev. Ed.) (“WC”).

Nevertheless, s 112(10) of the WC provides for specific scenarios where pre-marital assets can be said to have attained some connection to the marriage such that such assets become (or is “transformed into”) matrimonial assets liable to be divided. In recent years, a steady corpus of jurisprudence has been developed by the courts to address when and how such transformation takes place.

The present case involves the application of these legal principles to a relatively short marriage between two parties who entered a marital relationship later in life, and who brought into the marriage financial resources which they had accumulated in their earlier years.

When their marriage ends, how then should their pre-marital monies and assets, including the sale proceeds from their former homes and the retirement funds contained in their Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts, be dealt with in the divorce? These are some of the issues which had to be resolved by the Court in the present case.

The present proceedings involve an application for divorce filed by the Plaintiff-Wife (“Wife”) against the Defendant-Husband (“Husband”). The parties married on 17 November 2018 and Interim Judgment for Divorce (“IJ”) was granted on 26 December 2024, bringing to an end the parties’ 6-year long marriage.

The present marriage was both parties’ second marriage. The Defendant-Husband was a divorcee with 2 sons from his previous marriage, and the Plaintiff-Wife was widowed in 2010 after her first husband had passed away, leaving behind the Plaintiff and her 3 daughters. The Wife was 50 years old, and the Husband was 56 years old, when they got married in 2018.

As the parties have no children from their marital union, there are thus no children’s issues in their ancillary matters (“AM”) proceedings. Nevertheless, the parties’ children from their previous marriage remain relevant to the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets for reasons I will come to below.

Issues to be Determined

Both parties’ counsel confirmed to the Court at the AM hearing that the following issues are being contested, ie.:

(a) the division of matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(1) of the WC; and

(b) the maintenance payable for the Wife, post-divorce.

I will address both issues in this Grounds of Decision, starting with the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets.

Division of Assets : Matrimonial Asset Pool

Both parties’ counsel put forward lengthy and detailed submissions on two main disputes over the parties’ matrimonial assets – what forms part of the pool of matrimonial assets (“Matrimonial Pool”), and in what proportions it should be divided between the parties.

I will begin with the parties’ dispute over the contents of the Matrimonial Pool.

It is, by now, trite law that “…[w]hen a marriage is dissolved, in general all the parties’ assets will be treated as matrimonial assets unless a party is able to prove that any particular asset was either not acquired during the marriage or was acquired through gift or inheritance and is therefore not a matrimonial asset…”: see USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”) at [31]. This observation from the Court of Appeal arises from the statutory definition of a “matrimonial asset” found in s 112(10) of the WC.

Accordingly, all of the parties’ assets as at the applicable operative date would be included into the Matrimonial Pool and will be divided by the Court. In general, the “default” operative date would be the date of the grant of IJ (or “IJ Date”): see WOS v WOT [2024] 1 SLR 437 at [25]. Both Husband’s and the Wife’s submissions also referred to the IJ Date as being the applicable operative date.

Given the parties’ agreement on this matter, prima facie all assets which the parties own as at December 2024 would therefore be included into the Matrimonial Pool and will be divided.

Notwithstanding their agreement on the appropriate operative date, there remains several areas of disagreement between the parties over what the Matrimonial Pool should consist of. In gist, both parties sought to:

(a) exclude certain assets they own from the Pool notwithstanding the asset’s existence as at the IJ Date on account that these were pre-marital assets;

(b) include other seemingly pre-marital assets into the Matrimonial Pool on account of their transformation into marital assets; and

(c) include monies which had been transferred / used by either party prior to the IJ Date.

I will address each of these claims in turn.

Whether the parties’ pre-marital monies should be excluded

The parties first disagreed over how their pre-marital Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) and cash savings ought to be treated. In simple terms, the question before the Court is this – should the Court deduct from the current value of the Matrimonial Pool the amounts standing in the parties’ CPF and bank accounts when they got married in November 2018?

While the question may appear simple at first blush, the answer to this question requires the Court to first determine several related sub-issues.

To begin with, it is uncontroversial that pre-marital assets would ordinarily be excluded from the Matrimonial Pool. As I had alluded to above, this is expressly stated in s 112(10)(a) of the WC, and has been applied in numerous cases, including the Court of Appeal’s decision in USB (at [19]).

With respect to the monies standing in the divorcing couples’ CPF accounts, where there is information available on what each spouse had at the time of their marriage, the Court may deduct that sum from the value of existing Matrimonial Pool.

Contrary to what the Wife’s counsel, Mr Malcus Poh (“Mr Poh”), had argued, this approach is neither novel nor inappropriate. The General Division of the High Court (Family Division) (“HCFD”) took such an approach in various precedent cases, including TZQ v TZR [2019] SGHCF 3 (“TZQ”), CLC v CLB [2023] 1 SLR 1260, and DDM v DDL [2023] SGHCF 42 (“DDM”).

The crux of the Wife’s submission is that despite the parties having monies standing in their CPF accounts when they got married, those monies ought to be treated as having been commingled or intermingled with matrimonial assets (ie, assets acquired during marriage) or had been used to acquire a matrimonial asset (such as a matrimonial home) such that these pre-martial monies have become matrimonial assets.

Further, Mr Poh argued that even though a person’s CPF monies may, as a matter of administrative policy, be allocated to “sub-accounts” within the CPF regime (ie, the Ordinary Account (OA), Special Account (SA), Medisave Account (MA), or the Retirement Account (RA)), these sub-accounts ought to be collectively treated as a “single” CPF account during the division exercise. The effect of this treatment, according to counsel, is that so long as any CPF money in any one of the sub-accounts had been utilised or commingled with other matrimonial assets, then all the money contained across all CPF sub-accounts becomes included into the Matrimonial Pool.

In essence, the Wife’s arguments raise 2 inter-related questions:

(a) First, are CPF sub-accounts treated as a single unitary unit during the division exercise?

(b) Second, does the utilisation or commingling of monies all pre-marital CPF monies into a matrimonial asset?

Whether CPF sub-accounts should be treated separately?

As regards how CPF accounts ought to be treated when the court divides the divorcing spouses’ matrimonial assets, I am unable to agree with the Wife’s argument that CPF sub-accounts should be collectively treated as a single unitary asset.

In support of his position, Mr Poh relies heavily on the HCFD’s decisions in TZQ, VPH v VPI [2021] SGHCF 22 (“VPH”) and XPA v XPB [2025] SGHCF 57 (“XPA”). However, I find these cases to be distinguishable and/or should not be read as laying down an immutable principle that CPF sub-accounts are treated as a unitary asset. Let me explain.

At the outset, I do not agree with Mr Poh that his reference to TZQ and VPH necessarily supports the Wife’s argument. In both of these cases, the HCFD had in fact recognised that pre-marital CPF monies could be deducted from a spouse’s current CPF monies so long as it could be shown that the pre-marital monies remained intact from the time the parties got married up till their divorce: see VPH at [32]; TZQ at [9].

Indeed, the HCFD in VPH expressly noted that monies refunded/paid into a spouse’s CPF account emanating from the sale of a spouse’s pre-marital property would also be excluded from division even if it had vested shortly after that spouse’s current marriage, so long as the money in the account was traceable to his or her original pre-marital asset.

The Wife’s counsel argues that in these cases, the HCFD had referred to the parties’ CPF sub-accounts collectively in its judgment and by making deductions to the parties’ CPF accounts as a whole when the court calculated the parties’ overall asset pool, the HCFD’s approach should be understood as having laid down a general rule as to how CPF sub-accounts should be treated as a matter of matrimonial law.

I have placed emphasis on the phrase “matrimonial law” in the foregoing paragraph as, in fairness to the Wife, it was not her case that CPF sub-accounts ought to be considered one and the same as a matter of general or statutory law. Such a position would, of course, be inconsistent with s 13 of the Central Provident Fund Act 1953 which: (i) sets out the statutory framework applicable to the CPF sub-accounts; (ii) clearly delineates them from each other; and (iii) provides for when the money in each account may be used or transferred to another.

Having considered these cases carefully, I am unable to accept counsel’s purported reading of the HCFD’s decisions in TZQ and VPH. I do not agree that they stand for the proposition advanced by the Wife, viz. that whenever monies in one CPF sub-account has been commingled with matrimonial assets, all CPF sub-accounts owned by that party would be treated as having been transformed into matrimonial assets by virtue of s 112(10) of the WC.

In my view, the HCFD in TZQ and VPH had referred to the litigants’ CPF sub-accounts collectively in its judgments simply to facilitate the easy presentation of its analysis, argument and mathematical calculations in the cases before it. The HCFD did not establish a new principle of law, nor did it purport to do so in its written judgments.

I next move on to address the Wife’s reliance on the HCFD’s decision in XPA. In that case, the HCFD had the occasion to deal with a claim by one spouse to exclude her CPF monies from the divisible pool of assets in a long marriage lasting some 37 years.

In XPA, the plaintiff-wife (who was a homemaker) sought to argue that her pre-marital CPF monies ought to be deducted from the asset pool on the basis that they were not matrimonial assets. Citing the earlier decision of TZQ, Mavis Chionh J accepted that where pre-marital CPF savings remained in a spouse’s account post-marriage and had not been merged into other assets, such CPF monies could be excluded from the asset pool.

Nevertheless, Chionh J found that the plaintiff-wife failed to discharge her burden to prove that she did not use her pre-marital CPF monies for the purpose of the parties’ matrimonial home: see XPA at [98]. Having made this finding, and given that the plaintiff-wife’s CPF monies had been commingled with other matrimonial assets, Chionh J decided to include all of the plaintiff-wife’s CPF monies (comprising her OA, MA and SA) into the asset pool for division (see XPA at [99]).

On one reading, the HCFD’s eventual decision (of adding all of the plaintiff’s CPF accounts into the asset pool) appear – at first blush – to support Mr Poh’s submission that so long as some part of a spouse’s CPF monies have been commingled, all CPF sub-accounts are thereby added into the Matrimonial Pool.

However, I am not persuaded that the HCFD in XPA intended to recognise a new overarching principle as to how CPF accounts ought to be treated in the division exercise. Indeed, it was not apparent from the judgment that the specific argument as to whether CPF sub-accounts ought to be treated as a single unitary account had been raised to, and considered by, the learned High Court judge.

Given that XPA involved a long single income marriage of 37 years, it was clear that the HCFD’s concern and focus were with the inability of the plaintiff-wife to prove that any part of her CPF funds remained intact in the past 3 decades and/or that there was no clear proof that she had kept these money separately. That being the case, it would come as no surprise that the HCFD included all CPF accounts into the pool. It does not follow, however, that such a result would apply in every case.

Contrary to the Wife’s argument, there are decisions from the HCFD where the court undertook an independent analysis of how each CPF sub-account owned by a divorcing spouse should be dealt with. Once such example is HCFD’s decision in DDM, a case involving divorce proceedings filed by the plaintiff-wife filed against the defendant-husband to end their 15-year marriage.

In the course of the ancillary matters proceedings, an issue arose as to how the defendant’s pre-marital CPF monies ought to be treated as he had produced evidence of the monies contained in each of his OA, SA and MA prior to the parties’ marriage.

In coming to his decision, Kwek Mean Luck J referred to both s 112(10) of the WC and the Court of Appeal’s decision in USB, and found that the burden was on the plaintiff-wife (being the person who sought to exclude what was prima facie not a matrimonial asset) to show that these assets have been transformed into matrimonial assets.

In this regard, Kwek J found that the defendant had, by his own account, accepted that the monies in his CPF OA were eventually used to acquire property during the marriage: see DDM at [26] and [27]. The defendant thus “transformed” these monies into matrimonial assets (a finding similar to that made in XPA) such that the money in his OA should be excluded from the asset pool.

However, as regards the defendant’s MA and SA, Kwek J found that the plaintiff-wife had failed to discharge her burden to show their transformation into matrimonial assets. That being the case, Kwek J expressly excluded the monies in these two sub-accounts from the pool liable to be divided. DDM thus makes amply clear that the court does not treat all of a party’s CPF accounts as a singular entity; the court can (and will) exclude specific accounts, such as the SA, MA, etc. from the Matrimonial Pool where it is appropriate to do so.

In my view, the HCFD’s approach in DDM is logical and comports with how CPF monies work in practice. It is common knowledge that there are specific limitations and/or restrictions on how a Singapore worker can contribute to, or use the money in, each CPF sub-account and that the CPF Board treats them separately. I had alluded to the statutory schema at [30] above. It would thus not be correct for the Court to artificially treat CPF sub-accounts as a unitary account for the purpose of the ancillary matters proceedings when statutory law treats them otherwise. I should emphasise that DDM – being a HCFD decision – is similarly binding on this Court.

Moreover, if the Wife’s counsel’s argument is accepted, there would also be no principled reason to distinguish between a party’s bank accounts within the same financial institution. After all, as the argument goes, a bank account balance (being a chose in action against the bank) should similarly not be further sub-divided since the bank theoretically owes the same account holder the aggregate amount in all bank accounts maintained with the bank. Yet, the Wife has not advanced such an argument which, in any event, would neither be logical nor realistic.

Accordingly, I will treat each of the Husband’s and Wife’s OA, MA, SA and RA separately, and assess whether they have discharged the relevant burden to exclude the monies in each of these CPF sub-accounts.

Part of the parties’ pre-marital monies should be excluded

Insofar as the applicable legal principles are concerned, the relevant precedents from the HCFD (including TZQ, XPA and DDM discussed above) have made clear that where the pre-marital monies in the relevant CPF account had been utilised, or commingled with post-marriage assets, in such a way that it has merged with other matrimonial assets, then exclusion from the Matrimonial Pool would no longer be possible.

One clear example would be where pre-marital CPF monies had been utilised to purchase a matrimonial property or asset. Such assets, even if sold subsequently and some part of the proceeds returned to the spouse’s CPF account, can no longer be treated as pre-marital property and should be included into the Matrimonial Pool.

However, it does not follow that simply because a CPF account (or a bank account for that matter) contains both pre-marital and post-marriage monies, there would automatically be a “commingling” of funds rendering all money in that specific account a matrimonial asset. The commingling must be such that it is no longer possible evidentially to distinguish between the two types of money: see WTS v WTR [2024] SGHCF 33 at [7].

In the present case, I find it appropriate to deduct the value of the monies standing in both parties’ SA and MA in 2018, as well as the Husband’s RA account monies from what they have as at the IJ Date. This is to be contrasted with the parties’ OA account monies which were commingled with matrimonial assets over the marriage.

I am satisfied that the Husband has shown that the monies in these CPF sub-account (which were already in existence in November 2018) stood separate and apart from the other contributions made to these accounts during the marriage. These pre-marital funds ought to be excluded. This was the same outcome reached by the HCFD in DDM.

As a matter of parity, I apply the same treatment to the Wife’s pre-marital CPF monies since there is no evidence that these have been transformed into matrimonial assets. Pursuant to the Court’s directions at the end of the AM hearing, the Wife has provided, via her counsel’s letter, her CPF accounts balance for 2018 (which reflected her pre-marital CPF account positions) which would be used to derive her pre-marital CPF accounts balance.

Accordingly, after deducting the pre-marital CPF monies, the parties’ CPF account monies which form part of the Matrimonial Pool would be:

Unlike the parties’ CPF monies, I will not deduct what was standing in their bank account back in November 2018. I am not persuaded that the Husband has shown that the monies in his POSB Bank Account had been kept separate and apart from his other monies such that the monies he had remained identifiable. It is in this context that I agree with the Wife that with respect to the parties’ bank account, the commingling of funds was such that it is not evidentially feasible to distinguish and segregate their pre-marital and matrimonial assets.

In any case, given the Husband’s case that he had spent a significant amount of money on the family, any pre-marital cash he had in November 2018 would have more likely than not been spent already, and that those pre-marital monies can no longer be traced to any of the funds he has as at the IJ Date.

The Husband’s Manulife Retireready Plus policy (“Manulife Policy”)

Initially, the parties disputed over whether one of the Husband’s insurance policies, ie, the Manulife Policy, ought to be included in the Matrimonial Pool as he had initially sought to exclude this asset, claiming that it was acquired pre-marriage in his written submissions.

However, in the course of oral submissions, the Husband’s counsel, Ms Goh Hui Nee (“Ms Goh”), acknowledged that this Policy was in fact acquired after marriage and that the Husband now accepts that it should be included into the Matrimonial Pool.

Accordingly, the remaining issue is over the value which ought to be included and accounted for – the Husband argues that it should be the Policy’s surrender value (approx. $30,687.09) whereas the Wife submits that the total premiums paid by the Husband (ie, $63,818.20) should be returned to the Matrimonial Pool.

I agree with the Husband that the asset’s current surrender value should be included into the Matrimonial Pool. In my view, there is no good reason to use the value of the insurance premiums paid.

The gist of the Wife’s case is that she had no knowledge that this asset had been purchased by the Husband, and thus she should not be penalised for his decision to unilaterally “divert” $63,818.20 from the parties’ matrimonial assets to pay of the Manulife Policy, only to receive a lower surrender value at divorce. I do not agree with the Wife’s submission.

It is clear that the Wife’s legal basis for seeking the return of the monies paid towards the purchase of this asset is the principle commonly referred to as the “TNL Dicta” first discussed in the eponymous decision of TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) (at [24]), and further explained by the Court of Appeal in UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN”) (at [62]).

Under the TNL Dicta principle, the value of certain assets which had been expended by one spouse without the other party’s consent, during the relevant period, would be “added-back” into the Matrimonial Pool: see UZN at [65]. The Court of Appeal in TNL noted that the relevant period which the court would be concerned with is: (a) when divorce proceedings are imminent; or (b) after IJ but before the ancillaries are concluded: see TNL at [24].

The Wife’s reply submissions, in fact, specifically referred to the TNL Dicta, and her counsel, Mr Poh, had couched the Wife’s case by reference to there being an alleged lack of “consent” of “knowledge” by the Wife for the Husband’s purchase of the Manulife Policy.

In my view, the principle of the TNL Dicta does not apply in the present case. As the Wife rightly noted in her reply submissions, the Manulife Policy was purchased “10 months and 13 days” after the parties’ marriage. This was years before the marriage broke down. At that time, the Wife could not plausibly state that divorce had been imminent – a pre-requisite attracting the application of the TNL Dicta.

I need to emphasise that during marriage, the law does not mandate a husband or wife to account to the other spouse each and every payment made, especially when there was no evidence of any attempt by the allegedly disagreeing spouse (here, the Wife) to challenge or question the manner in which the Husband conducted his personal financial affair, or an active concealment on the Husband’s part to put the asset out of reach.

Indeed, one can analogise the current situation to a bad investment made by one spouse during a marriage. There is generally no reason to hold the spouse responsible for such actions or investments which is part and parcel of daily life. The situation may change when the parties are headed for divorce (given that the other spouse may have a putative claim to the asset during the divorce proceedings), but the TNL Dicta does not extend to the happier times of the marriage.

The Sale Proceeds from the sale of the Husband’s property

I now turn to the treatment of the sale proceeds from the Husband’s pre-marital property. For context, the Husband owned a Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat located at Choa Chu Kang Ave 5 (“Husband’s Flat”) prior to his marriage to the Wife.

While the parties disagree on what the Husband did with the sale proceeds from his previous Flat, the following broad factual matrix was not disputed:

(a) the Wife sold her previous HDB property in or around November/December 2018 around the time of the parties’ marriage;

(b) prior to their cohabitation in their current jointly owned HDB flat in the west of Singapore at (“Matrimonial Flat”), she and her youngest daughter resided in the Husband’s Flat for a period of approx. 7 months. Her elder daughters resided elsewhere;

(c) the Husband’s Flat was sold in or around June 2019 and he received approx. $284,000 in net sale proceeds (including refunds into his CPF account); and

(d) thereafter, the parties moved into the Matrimonial Flat in the same month.

The Wife’s case is that the Husband has therefore not accounted for the remaining approx. $144,000 of the said sale proceeds (being the sum of $284,000 less $140,000). She thus asks that this amount should be “added back” to the Matrimonial Pool. The Husband, on the other hand, explained that this remaining $144,000 had slowly whittled away during the parties’ 6-year marriage as he had used these monies for the household’s and family’s expenses.

Resolving the parties’ dispute on this issue requires, once again, an understanding of what is a pre-marital asset and how such an asset may become (or be transformed into) a matrimonial asset. Put another way, if the Husband’s Flat was not a matrimonial asset to begin with, then there would be nothing to account for as the sale proceeds from the Husband’s Flat would not be an asset divisible in the present AM proceedings.

In this regard, the Court of Appeal in USB (at [19] of the judgment) helpfully identified 4 broad categories of assets in a divorce, ie,:

(a) “Quintessential matrimonial assets”: these are assets which either spouse derived from income earned during the marriage or to which either spouse or both spouses obtained legal title during the marriage by applying their own money.

(b) “Transformed matrimonial assets”: assets which were acquired before the marriage by one spouse but which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other spouse or by both spouses, or which were ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or their children while residing together for purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, etc.

(c) “Pre-marriage assets”: these are assets that either spouse acquired before the marriage and which the other spouse does not thereafter improve substantially, or which are not used for family purposes. These stay out of the Pool generally.

(d) “Gifts and inherited assets” these assets whenever acquired by either spouse are not part of the pool unless transformed by substantial improvement or use as the matrimonial home.

As regards the Husband’s HDB Flat, the question in the present case is whether this pre-marital asset has turned into a “transformed matrimonial asset”. There are several ways where this may be achieved.

The summary at [72] above mentioned two ways – (i) substantial improvement of the pre-marital asset by the other spouse or both spouses; or (ii) ordinary usage for family purposes. These two transformation “pathways” are statutorily provided for in s 112(10)(a)(i) and (ii) of the WC.

In addition to these two “pathways”, the Court of Appeal in CLB v CLC [2023] 1 SLR 1260 (“CLC”) (at [64]) recognised a third pathway – ie, pre-marriage assets, gifts or inheritance belonging to one spouse (which are ordinarily excluded) may become matrimonial assets where that spouse’s conduct during the marriage evinces a “clear and unambiguous intention” to treat these assets as part of the matrimonial pool.

Having set out the applicable framework, the next step is to apply that to the present case. In this regard, the Wife chose to frame her case as one where the Husband’s Flat had been ordinarily used by the parties for family purposes for the several months prior to the parties acquiring the current Matrimonial Flat, citing specifically s 112(10)(a)(i) as the statutory basis.

In USB (at [24]), the Court of Appeal made clear that to transform a pre-marital asset to a matrimonial asset through ordinary usage, such use must be “usual and relatively prolonged rather than casual”. This assessment, in my view, incorporates a multi-factorial analysis where the length of stay is a relevant but not decisive factor: see XCR v XCS [2025] SGFC 64 at [17]. That must be so because the focus of the exercise of dividing a divorce couple’s matrimonial assets is to divide their marital gains. A pre-marital asset by its nature would not usually have any nexus to the parties’ marriage.

Contrary to the Wife’s submissions, the parties’ intention and the context as to how the asset was use cannot be ignored completely and remain relevant. This is because the relevant assessment requires the Court to consider all factors.

The clearest example of this is the Court of Appeal’s decision in TQU v TQT [2020] SGCA 8 (“TQT”) where the Court of Appeal excluded a property from the matrimonial pool which the divorcing parties had lived in for one and a half years because the Court found that the said property:

In the present case, I find that the Wife has failed to show that the Husband’s Flat had been ordinarily used by the family in a manner which transforms the same into a matrimonial asset.

The evidence supports this finding:

(a) The Husband has shown that the parties placed the necessary option money with the former owners of the Matrimonial Flat to secure an option to purchase the said property on or around 29 November 2018 (“Option to Purchase”), less than 2 weeks after they got married.

(b) They then exercised the option 2 weeks later on 14 December 2018 with the completion of the sale taking place on or about 25 February 2019. Both parties (as the intended buyers) agreed to give the previous owners of the Matrimonial Flat a 2-month temporary extension of stay after completion of the sale. That would bring the timeframe to around end-April 2019.

(c) Renovations then began on the Matrimonial Flat. The HDB renovation permit was applied for on 28 April 2019, with an initial deadline for renovation works to be completed in May 2019.

(d) The Husband’s CPF records show that he had received part of the CPF refunds from the sale of his previous Flat sometime in June 2019. I accept his position that it could be reasonably surmised that he had contracted to sell his previous Flat sometime in the months prior.

(e) While the documents were not entirely clear, there appeared to be some delay which led to renovations being completed in or around June 2019, and that the parties moved in thereafter.

The above timeline is broadly consistent with the Husband’s case that the parties had simply used his previous Flat as a temporary housing arrangement while the parties were waiting to move into the Matrimonial Flat. In many respects, this is akin to the situation before the Court of Appeal in TQT.

The arrangement for the Wife to stay at the Husband’s Flat for the few months was borne out of convenience rather than any desire to treat it as a “matrimonial home”. This was a case where both parties had HDB properties in their names pre-marriage and needed to dispose of these assets before they could build their home together after marriage, as is required by the relevant regulations on the ownership of HDB properties.

Since the Wife managed to sell her previous flat first, the parties immediately jumped on the opportunity to secure the Option to Purchase for a new home right after marriage, exercising the same shortly thereafter. As they needed time to renovate their new home, and having given a 2-month extension to the former owners, they decided to stay temporarily at the Husband’s Flat while he was in the course of selling it. He had to do so in order to become a co-owner of the Matrimonial Flat).

The temporary nature of the parties’ stay is also consistent with the fact that the Wife’s two older daughters could not stay at the Husband’s Flat due to space constraints – the decision to reside at the Husband’s Flat was clearly not a well-thought plan to establish the Husband’s Flat as the “cradle of the marriage” because it was never the parties’ intention that it would be such. The Matrimonial Flat, not the Husband’s Flat, was what the parties were looking forward to as their matrimonial home and cradle of their new marriage.

Accordingly, the Husband’s Flat was not transformed into a matrimonial asset. It remained a pre-marital asset and did not have fall within the Matrimonial Pool to be divided in these proceedings.

What about the Husband’s claim that he had “used” of the remaining sale proceeds for the family? Did that transform the same into a matrimonial asset (as recognised by Court of Appeal in CLC)?

In my view, that argument does not arise in the present case. As I had noted above, the Wife’s case was solely that the Husband’s Flat had been transformed into a matrimonial asset through s 112(10)(a)(i). She did not allege that the Husband had shown a clear and unambiguous intention to divest his personal ownership of the sale proceeds and to treat it as part of the family’s estate or as a matrimonial asset. No evidence was adduced by either party to establish that.

Indeed, such an argument would contradict the Wife’s own case where she disputes the Husband’s claim that he had used the remaining $144,000 for the family. That being the case, there is no basis for the Wife to assert that there should be an account for what was clearly the Husband’s pre-marital asset.

For completeness, even if the sale proceeds from the Husband’s Flat (or some part thereof) should be considered as a matrimonial asset, I am not persuaded that there should be any “account” taken for how the remaining $144,000 has been spent, for the following reasons:

(a) For these monies to be added back into the Matrimonial Pool, the Wife must either satisfy: (i) the requirements of the TNL Dicta principle (discussed above); or (ii) that there has been a wrongful dissipation of assets by the Husband.

(b) The Wife did not make clear which basis she is relying on. Be that as it may, the Wife would not have succeeded on either ground as such allegations would not have been substantiated by credible evidence.

(c) Without any tangible evidence of improper transactions or transfers, the use of a sum of $144,000 over a period of 6 years (or approx. $2,000 per month for 72 months), in the present case, is not especially suspicious such that it calls any specific transaction into question. While the parties may disagree on how it was spent (which would be dealt with separately), there is nothing inherently questionable about spending/using the said amount of money to support a case of wrongful dissipation. I am mindful that the Husband is entitled to spend the money on himself and his 2 sons from his previous marriage.

(d) The TNL Dicta is also not applicable as there were no specific transaction or expenditure which the Wife has pointed to which she says ought not to be incurred when divorce was imminent.

As such, I decline to add back any money arising from the sale of the Husband’s Flat in 2019.

The Wife’s children’s bank account monies

The parties’ dispute on the issue of the Wife’s children’s monies relate to 2 categories of assets which she says ought to be excluded from the Matrimonial Pool:

(a) monies contained in the Wife’s joint account with her 2 younger daughters (“Daughters’ Joint Accounts”); and

(b) the sum of $21,991.83 contained in her bank account with POSB Bank ending 256-0, the source of which she claims were from her youngest (minor) daughter’s “red-packet” monies.

As regards the Daughters’ Joint Accounts, the Wife’s case appears to be that the Husband has not proved that she owns the sole beneficial title to these joint accounts and that it would therefore be “unsafe” to include them into the Matrimonial Pool.

I do not agree with the Wife that it is the Husband’s sole burden to prove that these are assets belonging to the Wife and that he has failed to do so. The ownership of joint account monies is not always a binary issue, and where the burden of proof lies depends on what is being sought: see XJK v XJL [2025] SGFC 25 (“XJK”) at [28].

(a) If the Wife seeks to exclude the entire asset, that the burden is on her to prove that all of the monies in the bank account belong to a third party.

(b) If the Husband seeks to include the whole asset, then he has to prove that the Wife is the full beneficial owner of the monies.

(c) But, if neither has been proved, it does not mean that the joint account monies would be ignored or excluded from the Matrimonial Pool. Instead, by default, it is deemed that each joint account owner owns half of the monies therein. This was the view expressed by the HCFD in XYK v XYL [2026] SGHCF 5 (at [12]) and WWM v WWN [2024] SGHCF 27 (at [14]).

In the present case, neither the Wife nor the Husband has shown that the monies in the Daughters’ joint account wholly belonged to the Wife, or to her daughters. I am also not persuaded by the Husband’s case that because the Wife had transacted using these accounts that it follows necessarily that she is the accounts’ true beneficial owner. How she used the money does not necessarily reflect what the source of the monies were.

Moreover, neither Wife nor the Husband opted to bring third party civil proceedings against the Wife’s daughters to seek a declaration as to the ownership of the Joint Accounts. This meant that there was no evidence supporting either party’s argument. Accordingly, and in the absence of evidence, I find that the Wife is deemed to own half of the monies in the accounts.

For completeness, I do not agree with the Wife’s submission that the Family Court making an assessment of what value should be notionally ascribed to the Wife’s share of the joint account is tantamount to “adjudicating away” her daughter’s joint interests. The Family Court is not adjudicating or making binding orders over the rights of the third parties. It is merely making a factual finding as to what the Court deems to be matrimonial assets belonging to the Wife: see XJK at [27]. This approach does not infringe upon the Court of Appeal’s observations in UDA v UDB [2018] 1 SLR 1015.

With respect to the sum of $21,991.83, the Wife’s case was that she had transferred these monies from a previous joint account she shared with her youngest daughter, [Y], which contained “red-packet” or gift monies meant for [Y].

I am not inclined to exclude these monies from the Matrimonial Pool as I agree with the Husband that the Wife has not proven the source and provenance of these so-called “red-packet” money. There is no dispute that the money in question resides in the Wife’s personal POSB Bank account ending 256-0, as at January 2025 (around the IJ date).

Thus, the burden is on the Wife (being the party seeking to exclude an asset which is prima facie a matrimonial asset) to prove that she has no title to, or ownership of, these monies. Despite being granted the right to file further reply affidavits on this issue, the Wife has not produced any documentary records or independent witness statements as to where the money came from and/or that they were from “red-packet” gifts to [Y].

Putting aside the legal question as to whether [Y], being a minor, is able to hold title or own assets in her own name, all the Wife had placed on affidavit is that it would be reasonable to treat the sum of $21,991.83 as the red-packet monies [Y] had received over the years. However, this claim is a bare one and entirely unsupported by any objective evidence.

Overall, Wife has failed to discharge her burden to disprove her ownership of the money contained in her own bank account. The full amount in the POSB Bank account ending 256-0 would thus be included in the Pool.

Monies spent prior to IJ

I now address various financial transactions carried out by the Husband in the period leading up to the IJ which has been identified by the Wife and which she claimed ought to be added back into the Matrimonial Pool. There are:

(a) a sum of $7,000 which the Husband had transferred to his son on 28 August 2024 purportedly for payment of the Husband’s legal fees;

(b) another sum of $6,402.16 which the Husband had transferred to his son on 17 October 2024.

Having considered the evidence, I agree with the Wife that these transactions ought to be added back to the Matrimonial Pool pursuant to the TNL Dicta principle.

The Writ for Divorce in the present divorce proceedings was filed on 20 August 2024 making both transactions to his son well within the scope of the TNL Dicta which covers the period starting from when divorce is imminent. No evidence was provided by the Husband to show that this transaction was carried out with the Wife’s consent, or that they could be considered run-of-the-mill or day-to-day transactions. The Husband’s position is that these were payment for legal fees to defend against the legal proceedings against him. Such expenditures are clearly not run-of-the-mill expenses.

I will therefore add back a total sum of $13,402.16 to the Matrimonial Pool.

Lastly, I deal briefly with the Husband’s claim that he gave maintenance to the Wife throughout the marriage. On this issue, I make the following observations:

(a) As part of his case that he had been providing for the family, the Husband claims that he had been paying maintenance of $1,000 per month to the Wife for a period of 72 months. To buttress his case, the Husband listed, in his written submissions, the cash withdrawals he had made from his bank account over the years totalling approx. $180,000. He says part of these monies included the $72,000 maintenance he had given to his Wife.

(b) The Wife, on her part, denies this and takes the position that these payments have not been proved by the Husband.

(c) Ordinarily, such a dispute would be determined by reference to the evidence. Here, I agree with the Wife that the mere fact that the Husband had withdrawn money from his own bank account is not proof that he provided her with maintenance. That should be sufficient to dispose of this issue.

(d) However, in a rather opportunistic manoeuvre, the Wife’s counsel then argued that since the Husband could not prove the payment of the $72,000 to the Wife, then this sum should be considered as unaccounted funds that has to be “added-back” into the Matrimonial Pool.

(e) With respect, I do not agree with the said approach. A disagreement over how to characterise the Husband’s use of monies does not necessarily mean that the money used has been dissipated with the purpose of hiding the asset from the other spouse or the Court. As I had noted at [90(a)] above, the Wife needs to prove that there has been either wrongful dissipation of assets, or that the money falls within the TNL Dicta principle, in order for the Court to “add-back” the value of the alleged unaccounted assets.

(f) I am satisfied that while the Husband had undoubtedly withdrawn various amounts of cash from his bank accounts over their 6-year marriage, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest he had hidden the cash somewhere to avoid detection in anticipation of the divorce proceedings. There is also no evidence to suggest that these withdrawals were made when divorce was imminent.

(g) As such, there is no good basis for the Court to notionally enlarge the Matrimonial Pool by adding a notional sum of $72,000.

Summary

In light of the findings set out above, the parties’ Matrimonial Pool would be as follows:

To avoid doubt, I have not included: (i) the Wife’s alleged collectibles (comprising gold and old bank notes worth $7,800); and (ii) the various arguments raised by the Husband to exclude the proceeds from his AIA policy which matured in 2023 (and deposited into his CPF OA). In this regard:

(a) I am not persuaded that the Husband has proved that the Wife’s “collectibles” (which appears to be pre-marital in nature) to have been transformed into matrimonial assets.

(b) As for the monies relating to the Husband’s AIA policy, it is not clear from the evidence adduced where the alleged proceeds are now (other than a heavily redacted CPF statement showing a sum of $48,693.30 being transferred into the Husband’s CPF OA in May 2023).

(c) Given that a detailed account of how the policy was paid for during marriage and/or how its proceeds were utilised was not provided, it would not be appropriate to simply deduct the sum of $48,693.30 from the Husband’s CPF accounts as it is not clear from the evidence that the entire sum should be considered a pre-marital asset. I therefore decline to deduct any further amounts from the Husband’s CPF account for this reason.

Division of Assets : Assessing contributions / Ratio of Division

In this section, I will set out my determination of the appropriate ratio of division of the parties’ Matrimonial Pool.

During the AM hearing (and in their written submission), both parties’ counsel agreed that the structured approach recognised in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“Structured Approach”) should be applied in the present case, given that this was a dual-income marriage. Given their agreement, I will accordingly apply the Structured Approach.

It is trite that the Structured Approach requires the Court to assess: (i) the parties’ direct contributions towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets; (ii) ascribe a second ratio to represent each party’s indirect contributions towards the family and marriage; (iii) the average ratio using the earlier two ratios; and (iv) whether further adjustments need to be made, or whether different weightage needs to be placed on either ratios: see XKU v XKT [2026] 1 SLR 187 at [42], per the Appellate Division of the High Court.

Structured Approach : Direct Contributions

When considering the parties’ respective direct financial contributions (“DFC”), different treatment is given to their sole-named assets, and those assets in their joint names.

For their sole-named assets, the general approach is to take their current value (as at the IJ Date or AM hearing date, as the case may be) as representing that party’s contributions to the marriage. This is the consistent position taken in the precedent cases: see UTJ v UTK [2019] SGHCF at [56]; AZZ v BAA [2016] SGHC 44 at [151]; WTL v WTM [2024] SGHCF 40 at [34] and [35]; WFE v WFF [2023] 1 SLR 1524 at [37]; YFC v YFD [2026] SGFC 86 at [52].

However, in cases where there is a dispute as to whether an asset held by one spouse was, in fact, paid for (or belonged to the other), the Court will have to assess the evidence presented and determine this dispute – for eg, a wife may be holding on to shares purchased using her husband’s money, or a husband’s motor vehicle was actually paid for using his wife’s monthly income.

If the paying spouse successfully shows that he or she had paid for the acquisition of the asset (which may be held in the non-paying spouse’s name), then that asset’s value will be treated as if it was the payor spouse’s DFC.

In the present case, the main dispute between the parties relate to their joint asset – the Matrimonial Flat. The Matrimonial Flat was purchased with monies emanating from both spouses, including monies from their respective CPF accounts and subsequent cash payments towards the outstanding mortgage. They both also claim to have contributed to the Matrimonial Flat’s renovations.

Insofar as the monies paid from the parties’ CPF accounts are concerned, I accept the Wife’s submission that she utilised $57,921.69 of her CPF monies, and the Husband utilised $39,671.44. These figures are reflected in the CPF statements provided by the parties.

It is also not disputed that the Wife paid $217,000 as part of the initial outlay for the flat, and the Husband paid a total of $104,936 via cash subsequently.

One minor disagreement on the cash payments for the Matrimonial Flat is who paid the $5,000 initial deposit for the Flat. The Wife claims that she paid the deposit, but the Husband disagrees. It is not disputed that $5,000 was in fact paid as this payment was reflected in the Matrimonial Flat’s completion accounts and cannot be ignored.

In my view, neither party has made out his or her case that they alone paid the $5,000. The Wife’s assertion was based on her recollection, without any clear evidence that she withdrew $5,000 (which would comprise $1,000 to purchase the initial option to purchase, and another $4,000 to exercise the option) to make the relevant payment. The Husband’s case, on the other hand, was based on his attempt to string together disparate cash withdrawals from his account during that period (which did not even properly coincide with the relevant dates) to argue that he must have been the person who paid for it.

In my view, given the passage of time, and the lack of clear evidence, the Court can only adopt a broad-brush approach. This is permissible as recognised by the Court of Appeal in ANJ (at [23] of its judgment). Accordingly, I will apportion this $5,000 equally between the parties.

(a) Neither party could provide clear documentary evidence to completely support their asserted position. The Wife claims to have paid some $90,000 towards renovations but could not provide a complete set of documents to substantiate this.

(b) The Husband’s position is somewhat bizarre. He disputes that the Wife had paid $80,000 – $90,000 for renovations and puts her to “strict proof” in his affidavit. Yet, he voluntarily transferred to the Wife $40,000 on 23 August 2024 (3 days after the Wife filed her Writ of Divorce) and labelled this payment as being for “House Renovation”. He claims, in his Affidavit of Assets and Means filed in February 2025, that he did so as his share of the renovation costs. This payment was, of course, made more than 5 years after the renovations had been completed.

(c) The Husband claims this payment was made “without admission” and “without prejudice” in his Affidavit of Assets and Means filed in February 2025. However, there is nothing in the bank transaction printout exhibited which suggested that these legal concepts should be grafted on to the money transferred. One is generally not allowed to retrospectively and unilaterally deem a certain payment as being made “without prejudice” when there was no such indication at the material time.

(d) Moreover, in the Husband’s initial Defence and Counterclaim filed in September 2024 (“Original Defence”) against the Wife’s divorce application, there was no reservation of rights regarding the $40,000 payment, or that it was paid under protest, or without admission. In fact, all that was pleaded in the Husband’s Original Defence was that he had “unilaterally transferred a further sum of S$40,000 to the [Wife] being part payment of the renovation expenses for the [Matrimonial Flat]…[Emphasis added]”. The Original Defence was eventually amended in November 2024 with the relevant paragraphs deleted but there remained no reference to the nature of the $40,000 transfer.

Ultimately, the Court must determine this dispute based on the evidence presented, and the positions taken by the parties (including their conduct).

However, as a matter of principle and logic, I am unable to accept an ex post facto attempt by the Husband to claim an increased share of a matrimonial asset through a unilateral transfer of money after divorce proceedings has commenced.

The Husband has not cited to the Court any caselaw or precedent which established such a legal principle. Indeed, such a principle would likely introduce significant uncertainty into matrimonial law and would create a perverse incentive for divorcing spouses to cherry pick how their monies should be treated with a view of advancing their personal agenda or litigation strategy.

It is also illogical to treat the transfer as a retrospective payment because the Husband’s actions seek to rewrite history. As a matter of fact, he did not pay for the renovations back in 2019, and it was the Wife who had paid actual cash. There is no evidence to show that the Wife had consented to treat this payment as such.

In other words, while I find that the Wife had paid $80,000 for the renovations to the Matrimonial Flat, I will not attribute $40,000 of these renovations to the Husband on account of his transfer in August 2024. Instead, I will only attribute the sum of $8,564 to the Husband as this is based on the receipts he had provided to substantiate what he had paid in or around June – July 2019.

How then should the Court account for the $40,000 now held by the Wife because of the Husband’s unilateral transfer? Mr Poh submits, on the Wife’s behalf, that the Court should consider this money as belonging to the Wife beneficially since the Husband voluntarily gave her this money. I do not agree as such an outcome is neither just nor equitable.

In my view, this issue should be resolved in the manner I had outlined at [115] and [116] above. The Wife is currently holding on to $40,000 which came from the Husband which he had unilaterally transferred as being “House Renovations”. Since Wife does not accept this characterisation, and since the Husband never intended to gift the Wife these monies absolutely, I cannot conclude that this was an inter-spousal gift or that the Husband had wanted to divest ownership of the money for that purpose.

Accordingly, this $40,000 (despite being in the Wife’s possession and in her sole-named account) should be treated as the Husband’s DFC when ascertaining the parties’ overall DFC ratio.

Structured Approach: Direct Contributions (Summary)

In light of the discussion above, the parties’ contribution towards their matrimonial home, and the overall DFC ratio should be as follows:

Structured Approach: Indirect Contributions

The difference between the parties’ position on the appropriate indirect contributions (“IDC”) ratio is stark.

The Wife submits that the IDC ratio should be 80:20, in her favour, whereas the Husband uses a ratio of 16.5 : 83.5 in his favour.

It is important at the outset to correct a significant issue in the Husband’s approach in deriving his IDC ratio of 83.5 (Husband) : 16.5 (Wife). It is immediately apparent from the numerical figures used by the Husband that they are the product of arithmetical calculations; otherwise, it would be highly anomalous for a party to use a ratio which contains decimal points and places.

As it turned out, the Husband’s counsel, Ms Goh, had obtained this figure by taking the average of two separate ratios – what was referred to as the Husband’s “indirect cash contribution” and “indirect non-cash contribution”. However, this approach is wrong in law, and it is unfortunate that such arguments continue to be advanced today, despite numerous family court cases and precedents highlighting this issue.

To put this matter to rest, one needs to go no further than the seminal decision of the Court of Appeal in TNL decided almost a decade ago. At [47] of its judgment, the Court of Appeal held, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

It is therefore clear that the Husband cannot use separate ratios. Rather, the parties’ indirect contributions (consisting both financial and non-financial contributions) should be expressed as composite ratio derived through the judicious use of the broad-brush approach, a bedrock principle of matrimonial law.

It is also for this reason that numerous cases have repeatedly held that the assessment of the parties’ IDC should not become “a rigid, mechanistic and overly-arithmetical” exercise (see for eg, UYQ v UYP [2020] 1 SLR 551 at [3]; WVS v WVT [2024] SGHC(A) 35 at [1]; XIS v XIT [2025] SGHCF 21 at [56]).

In fact, the present case is a clear example of what not to do. In putting forward his case, the Husband prepared detailed tables of his payments for household expenses, insurance payments (including for his own insurance policies), utility bills, transport payments in an attempt to illustrate the significant funds he had poured into the family over the years. He also added into the mix the cash withdrawals he had made in the 6 years of marriage, and claimed that these withdrawals were all meant for the family.

Ms Goh further claimed that the Husband’s tabulation was computed via “real time” evidence. The use of the phrase “real time” is, of course, inaccurate not least because that phrasing suggests that the computation of the data in the table bore temporal proximity to when the expenses were actually incurred or the money spent. That is plainly not the case.

On the contrary, the Husband’s tabulation was an ex post facto reconstruction based on bank statements he had procured in the course of the divorce proceedings long after the monies were used. The creation of this table sought to provide a veneer of reliability and veracity to the Husband’s case when, in fact, there is no actual evidence to support the Husband’s claim that he spent all of the money he withdrew on the Wife or her daughters. There is also no evidence to prove that he had derived no personal benefit from insurance, transport, medical, or retail purchases he had listed as having been paid by him.

In my view, the Husband’s approach should be eschewed as it goes against the purpose of ascribing an IDC ratio under the Structured Approach, viz. to give credit to the parties’ efforts and contributions (whether financial or non-financial) to the well-being of the family relative to one another.

The IDC ratio recognises contributions which do not necessarily get reflected in the accumulation of marital wealth (ie, the function of the DFC ratio) and is undertaken in a broad brushed manner. As the Court of Appeal had noted in ANJ (at [24]): “[w]hat values to give to the indirect contributions of the parties is necessarily a matter of impression and judgment of the court.”

Taking a broader perspective in the present case, the parties’ marriage was a relatively short one of about 6 years with no children of the marriage. While both parties came into the marriage with children from their respective previous marriages, most of their children have reached adulthood by the time of the parties’ marriage. Only the Wife’s youngest daughter, [Y], remained a minor at the time of the divorce.

As such, when the Court considers each party’s contributions towards the family, one must consider such efforts in the appropriate context.

In this regard, I accept that the Husband had made some measure of indirect financial contribution towards the family, but not to the extent that he has made it out to be. Both the Wife and her elder daughters were working during the marriage, and I accept the Wife’s evidence that she and her daughters also contributed to the household. As the Court has to assess how much each party contributed relative to the other, I am of the view that the parties’ indirect financial contributions are broadly aligned.

With respect to the parties’ indirect non-financial contributions, I do not find the Husband’s contributions to be as significant as he had claimed. In fact, the Husband’s own case was that the parties’ non-financial contributions were limited given that this was the parties’ second marriage which did not last long. In that sense, the performance of household chores, cooking and home-making would not have been significant by either party.

That said, I do accept the Wife’s submissions that she made greater indirect non-financial contributions overall. I also agree with the Wife’s submissions that although not all of her indirect contributions have been supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence, she did provide proof of the various gestures she had made, and the care she had given, to the Husband and his sons from the previous marriage, including Garrick. The Husband, on the other hand, provided little evidence of his non-financial contributions.

Broadly speaking, in childless marriages of short to moderate length, it is not uncommon for the court to apply an IDC ratio of 50:50 especially in cases where the parties had generally made contributions in both the financial and domestic spheres: see for eg., VJR v VJS [2020] SGFC 71; UZM v UZN [2019] SGHCF 26; UWL v UWM [2021] 5 SLR 1012.

However, for the reasons set out above, I find that the Wife had made greater indirect contributions relative to the Husband during the marriage. I therefore find it reasonable to ascribe, as a starting point, an IDC ratio of 55:45, in favour of the Wife.

I next turn to the question of whether the Husband had made negative contributions towards the family. This is an understandably divisive topic between the parties as the recognition of negative contribution by the Husband effectively means a decrease in the assessment of his overall indirect contributions.

The concept of attributing a negative contribution value (that is, to reduce one spouse’s indirect contribution) was first extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in the seminal decision of Chan Tin Sun v Fong Quay Sim [2015] 2 SLR 195 (“Chan Tin Sun”), where the Court applied a 7% discount to a wife’s overall share of the matrimonial assets by reason of her action of systematically poisoning her husband.

The Court of Appeal subsequently, in the cases such as TQT (at [130]), discussed the application of the negative contribution principle within the context of the ANJ structured approach (as Chan Tin Sun was decided before ANJ). In particular, any negative contribution (if applicable) would be applied to the IDC ratio component of the structured approach: see the HCFD’s decision in XFN v XFO [2025] SGHCF 29 (“XFN”).

As highlighted by the Wife’s counsel, Mr Poh, the case of XFN also stands for the important principle that while it is true that the Court of Appeal had noted in Chan Tin Sun that the threshold to ascribe negative contribution is a high one, a party’s misconduct need not rise to the level of a criminal act before the Court ascribes a negative contribution (see XFN at [17]). Much would depend on the facts of the case. The Court is ultimately concerned with whether the behaviour in question that harms the co-operative nature of the marriage and the welfare of the other partner (see XFN at [12]).

In the present case, the main fact relied on by the Wife is that I had granted a personal protection order (or “PPO”) to both the Wife and [Y] against the Husband, in related proceedings earlier this year (in January 2026). The Husband did not appeal those orders, and they continue to remain in place.

For the purpose of her claim for negative contribution, the Wife relies on the findings and orders made in relation to [Y] in the PPO proceedings. This is, of course, a matter of some sensitivity and I do not propose to repeat all the findings made in the PPO proceedings in this Grounds of Decision as those have been covered in the detailed oral judgment I had delivered at the conclusion of the PPO proceedings.

Suffice to say, I had found that the Husband did commit family violence in the form of continual harassment (as was required under the pre-2025 version of the WC) against [Y], including having engaged in physical contact with her body (in sensitive areas) in a manner which made her feel uncomfortable and had caused her emotional distress. I also take into account the fact that the Police had issued a stern warning to the Husband for the relevant incidents.

In my view, I agree with the Wife that the Husband’s actions can be said to have harmed the co-operative nature of the marriage and the welfare of the other partner. It must be recalled that [Y] is the Wife’s only minor daughter at the time when she married the Husband, and they had all lived under the same roof for some time. As the Wife was a widow, [Y] was obviously the Wife’s dependent and an important part of her life. The Husband’s behaviour vis-à-vis [Y], his vulnerable step-child, would have had a significant impact on the Wife’s welfare.

I thus agree that an adjustment should be incorporated on account of the Husband’s conduct. The Wife’s submission of a 10% reduction to the Husband’s IDC percentage is similar to the HCFD’s approach in XFN, and I find that appropriate in the present case.

I should mention, for completeness, that the Husband’s counsel also argued (in her written submissions) that a negative contribution should also be ascribed to the Wife for her actions. These relate to inter alia the Wife’s allegedly exercising “favouritism” for her own children, or to the actions of the Wife’s daughters. I reject this argument as it is entirely without merit. The examples cited – many of which are not even carried out by the Wife – do not justify any negative contribution to be ascribed to her.

Accordingly, after adjustment, the final IDC ratio would be 65 (Wife) : 35 (Husband).

Structured Approach: Average Ratio and Adjustments

Taking into account the findings set out in the preceding paragraphs, the average ratio under the Structured Approach would be as follows:

Apart from the adjustments to the IDC ratio addressed above, I will not make any further changes or adjustments to the Final Ratio as neither party had sought for the same. I have also placed equal weightage on the DFC and IDC ratios as that was the approach taken in both parties’ submissions.

Division of Assets : Implementation

I now move on to how the Final Ratio ought to be applied to divide the parties’ assets.

In my view, the main asset to be divided would be the parties’ Matrimonial Flat and that it should be sold on the open market. Adjustments can be made to the proportion of the sale proceeds which each of them should be entitled to after deducting the value assets they have in their possession.

However, in the Wife’s submissions, she had indicated that she wishes to retain the Matrimonial Flat (although she had sought a ratio of division different from what I have granted). I will therefore give her an option to purchase the Husband’s share of the Flat. Otherwise, the Matrimonial Flat should be sold in an open market sale.

I set out these adjustments in a tabular format below:

Based on the Table above, the Wife should receive 74.8% of the net sale proceed if the Matrimonial Flat is sold and the Husband is to receive 25.2%.

Maintenance

I now move on to the final issue, ie. the Wife’s entitlement to post-divorce maintenance.

In her written submissions, the Wife asks that a lump-sum maintenance order of $96,000 be awarded to her. This is based on the sum of $1,000 for a period of 8 years. According to the Wife, the period of 8 years represents a “reasonable transition period” for her to be financially stable. As I had pointed out to her counsel during the AM hearing, this period is longer than the length of the parties’ marriage.

It is trite law that the power to order maintenance for an ex-wife is: (i) not meant to create life-long dependency; and (ii) is supplementary to the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets: see ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 at [31] and [34]; BG v BF [2007] SGCA 32 at [75]. The Court, in considering the issue of maintenance, must assess whether there are any financial inequalities suffered by the wife during the marriage which need to be addressed or evened-out through the making of a maintenance order. The purpose of a maintenance order is not to provide a form of “general insurance” for a former spouse: see ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 at [29]. These are principles which the Wife’s counsel had recognised in his written submissions.

Based on my division of the Matrimonial Pool set out above, the Wife will receive the lion’s share of the parties’ main matrimonial asset – the Matrimonial Flat – if it was sold in the open market.

Moreover, given that the Wife disavowed the Husband’s claim that he had maintained her during the marriage, it would follow that the Wife (who was gainfully employed throughout the marriage) was able to support herself financially.

In reaching my conclusion, I have considered the Wife’s alleged monthly expenses, which include expenditures relating to [Y], her religious tithe and her pet dog’s expenses. In my view, these expenses include items which were not necessities or do not form obligations which the Husband should be responsible for, post-divorce. I am also mindful that the Wife has adult children who may be in a position to provide for her financially.

Overall, I see no need for an order for ex-spouse’s maintenance for the Wife at all.

Conclusion

In the circumstances, I make the following orders:

Division of Matrimonial Assets

(a) The Plaintiff is at liberty to elect to acquire the Defendant’s share of the parties’ matrimonial property at [Address] (“Matrimonial Flat”) as follows:

(i) the Plaintiff is to give written notice to the Defendant within 2 months from the date of this Order that she intends to take over the Defendant’s share in the Matrimonial Flat;

(ii) the Defendant shall be entitled to receive an amount equivalent to $154,257.22 (“Defendant’s Entitlement”);

(iii) the transfer (other than by way of sale) of the Defendant’s rights, title and/or interests in the Matrimonial Flat to the Plaintiff shall be completed within 4 months after the notice (set out above) has been provided. The Defendant’s Entitlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant upon the completion of the transfer, through the conveyancing process;

(iv) the Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the costs and expenses of the transfer (if any). To avoid doubt, the Plaintiff shall be responsible for securing all necessary refinancing and/or mortgage for the Matrimonial Flat such that she alone would be responsible for any mortgage and/or loan in relation to the Matrimonial Flat after the aforesaid transfer; and

(v) to avoid doubt, the Defendant shall be responsible for making all necessary refunds to his Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) account, as required by the applicable CPF laws, rules and/or regulations.

(b) In the event that the Plaintiff elects not to take over the Defendant’s share of the Matrimonial Flat (as set out in (a) above), the said property shall be sold in the open market within 6 months from the date of Final Judgment.

(c) The parties shall have joint conduct of the sale, and both parties shall facilitate the said sale, including making the property available for viewing by their real estate agent and/or prospective buyers, if applicable.

(d) The Matrimonial Flat shall be sold at or above the sale price of $710,000, or such other price as the parties may agree in writing.

(e) The proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Flat should then be applied as follows:

(i) to discharge the outstanding mortgage and/or housing loan in respect of the property;

(ii) to pay the costs and expenses of the sale (including agent’s fees); and

(iii) the remainder proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Flat shall be divided in the proportion of 74.8 (Plaintiff) : 25.2 (Defendant).

(f) Each party shall be responsible for making the required CPF refunds to their respective CPF accounts from their share of the sale proceeds.

(g) The parties may, by agreement in writing, extend the deadline for the sale or transfer of the Matrimonial Flat, as the case may be, set out above.

Other Matrimonial Assets

(h) Save as set out above, each party shall retain all other assets in their name (whether owned solely, or jointly with third parties).

Maintenance for the Plaintiff

(i) There shall be no maintenance for the Plaintiff.

Miscellaneous

(j) The Registrar and/or Assistant Registrar of the Family Justice Courts under Section 31 of the Family Justice Act 2014 is empowered to execute, sign or indorse all necessary documents relating to the matters contained in this Order on behalf of either party should either party fail to do so within seven (7) days of written request being made to the party.

(k) Liberty to apply.

At the parties’ request, I subsequently clarified some aspects of my orders, the revised version of which have been set out at [181] above.