Court of Appeal · Decided 15 January 2016
ATE v ATD and another appeal
Feedback & support[2016] SGCA 2 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 64 of 2015 · 28 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] These were appeals by both the defendant (“the Husband”) and the plaintiff (“the Wife”) against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in ATD v ATE [2015] SGHC 131 (“the GD”). The Husband appealed in Civil Appeal No 64 of 2015 (“CA 64/2015”) against the decision of the Judge that he pay the Wife a sum of $36,000 (as a matter of division of assets) and that he pay the Wife nominal maintenance of $1 per month. The Wife appealed in Civil Appeal No 65 of 2015 (“CA 65/2015”) against the decision of the Judge that the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home in the sum of $186,097.51 were to be divided equally between the parties and that the Husband should pay her a sum of $36,000.
The facts and decision in the court below
Background
- [3]
[3] The parties were married on 28 March 2008. Their only child, a daughter (“the Child”), was born on 5 April 2011. The Wife had applied for divorce on 5 April 2013, on the Child’s second birthday, and Interim Judgment was granted on 18 September 2013. The parties agreed to have joint custody of the Child with care and control to the Wife and reasonable access to the Husband. The Husband is presently paying monthly maintenance of $1,300 for the Child.
- [4]
[4] Both the Husband and the Wife are well educated and in well paid employment. Based on the Notice of Assessment for 2013, the Wife’s gross monthly income was $10,185.08 while the Husband’s income was $8,012.50.
- [5]
[5] The matrimonial home was purchased by the Wife, the Husband and the Husband’s mother. $560,000, which amounted to half of the purchase price, was contributed by the Husband’s mother. The remaining $560,000 was contributed by the Husband and the Wife through repayments to a mortgage loan.
- [6]
[6] The sale of the matrimonial home was completed on 3 April 2013. The Husband’s mother’s share is no longer in the picture as the parties have settled her claim out of court. This left a sum of $186,097.51 as the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home less the monies paid out to the Husband’s mother.
The Judge’s decision
- [7]
[7] The Judge considered that the pool of matrimonial assets included the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home valued at $186,097.51 and the sums in the parties’ respective CPF accounts as well as their various bank accounts. These other assets – the sums in the parties’ CPF and bank accounts – amounted to $1,147,351.85 (at [38] of the GD). A number of assets were excluded from the pool by the Judge. Amongst the assets excluded (by their mutual agreement) were the parties’ present residences. The total size of the matrimonial pool, including the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home, was therefore $1,333,449.36.
- [8]
[8] The Judge first dealt with the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home as a separate class from the other assets in the pool. The Judge found that – leaving aside the Husband’s mother’s payment of half the purchase price – the parties contributed equally both to the repayments to the matrimonial home as well as the outgoings of the home. The Judge therefore awarded each party half of the net sale proceeds of $186,097.51.
- [9]
[9] In so far as the other assets were concerned, the Judge found that neither party had at the outset given full disclosure, though the Wife did subsequently give better discovery than the Husband. The Husband had not produced updated documents relating to his emoluments and his latest tax assessments at the ancillaries hearing, which took place more than 15 months after parties had filed their initial affidavits of assets and means. In particular, the Husband had failed to produce his income tax assessment for the year of assessment 2014, during which time he had been promoted to his current position of Associate Director. Both parties also had a tendency to inflate their expenses. The Judge also noted that the Husband was calculating and that generosity was not part of his nature. She therefore found it unlikely that he had contributed more than his share of expenses.
- [12]
[12] To recapitulate, the Judge’s orders were as follows:
(a) The net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home in the sum of $186,097.51 were to be divided equally between the parties.
(b) The Husband was to pay the Wife a sum of $36,000.
(c) The parties were to retain all other assets in their respective names and possession.
(d) The Husband was to pay the Wife maintenance of $1 per month.
(e) The parties were to bear their own costs of the proceedings.
- [13]
[13] As we have mentioned at the outset, the Husband appealed against the orders listed at (b) and (d) above, whilst the Wife appealed against the orders listed at (a) and (b) above.
Our decision
The order for division of matrimonial assets
- [14]
[14] We turn first to the manner in which the Judge divided the matrimonial assets. In effect, the Judge had divided the matrimonial assets largely along the lines of the direct contributions of the parties (as she had found), except that the Husband was to pay the Wife an additional $36,000. This award of $36,000 was largely premised on the fact that the Husband had failed to disclose all his assets (see the GD at [36]–[40]). Although we increased the amount payable by the Husband to the Wife from $36,000 to $63,000, our reasons for varying the amount payable were premised on a wholly different legal basis than that adopted by the Judge in the court below. Put simply, we increased the amount payable by the Husband to the Wife to reflect more accurately the Wife’s indirect contributions. In our view, the award made in the court below suggested, in fact, the opposite: that the Husband’s indirect contributions were weightier. This is not surprising as the Judge had – as we have just pointed out – arrived at the award payable by the Husband to the Wife by way of a completely different legal basis altogether, although in fairness to the Judge, she did recognise that the Wife did make indirect contributions as a wife and mother (see the GD at [39]).
- [15]
[15] To begin, we considered the arguments of the parties in relation to the size of the matrimonial pool. As already noted, the parties’ present residences were excluded by agreement from division. On appeal, the Husband argued that the numbers were unfair because he had purchased his new flat on 3 April 2014. As his relevant documents were disclosed at an earlier date, this meant that the numbers relied upon by the Judge did not reflect the pending cash and CPF payments for the new flat that he had purchased. On the other hand, the Wife’s new property was purchased in early 2013 which meant that the expenses would have been accounted for. This argument was unmeritorious. The purchase of the Husband’s new flat was completed well before the hearing before the Judge but he chose not to update his numbers; neither did he try to adduce new evidence before this court. He only invited this court to take this into account in a general sense. We could not see how we could do so. Similarly, the Wife argued that the surrender value of the Husband’s insurance policies, amounting to $56,743.32, should be added to the pool, but we saw no reason to make any adjustments to the Judge’s determination of the pool of matrimonial assets. We therefore proceeded on the basis that the total pool of the matrimonial assets, including the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home, were as found by the Judge.
- [16]
[16] Further, we were satisfied that the Judge was correct to consider that the direct contributions of the parties to the matrimonial home were equal, and we similarly proceeded on that basis.
- [17]
[17] In arriving at the figure of $63,000, we bore in mind the structured approach set out by this court in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”), whilst simultaneously being cognisant of the caveat in that same case that that approach should not detract from the overall purpose and spirit underlying the division of matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Women’s Charter”), as embodied in the following observations (at [30]):
- [18]
[18] In so far as the structured approach set out in ANJ is concerned, this court observed as follows (at [22]−[29]):
- [19]
[19] Turning to the facts of the present case, both parties worked full-time, with the Wife having the more financially rewarding career. The marriage lasted about five years, and the parties were childless for the first three years of the marriage, during which they had part-time help. The Husband moved out of the matrimonial bedroom shortly after the Child was born; he moved out of the matrimonial home altogether in January 2013. In looking after the Child, the parties had the assistance of both a full-time maid and the Wife’s mother (who had moved in with them).
- [20]
[20] Even when they lived together, they had kept their finances apart. The Wife never depended on the Husband financially during the marriage. The Judge had found that the Husband was a calculating man and, indeed, the Wife also said that he was “extremely stingy with his finances”. In a rather business-like way, he made sure that she paid her share of the household expenses and even when they went shopping together, he would keep track of the expenses and then seek reimbursement from her afterwards if he had made the upfront payment.
- [21]
[21] Given that the marriage was a short one, that both Husband and Wife were working, the manner in which both Husband and Wife conducted their lives during the marriage itself, and that there was a not inconsiderable amount of assistance on the domestic scene, the appropriate ratio between direct and indirect contributions ought to be 75% and 25%, respectively.
- [22]
[22] In so far as the ratio of indirect contributions by the Husband and the Wife, respectively, was concerned, counsel for both parties were in agreement (correctly, in our view) that the proportions ought to be 40% and 60%. In so far as the ratio of the direct contributions by the Husband and the Wife was concerned, given the manner in which the parties conducted their finances, we were of the opinion that their contributions were reflected by the matrimonial assets in their respective names.
- [23]
[23] When we apply those numbers to the whole of the matrimonial pool (including the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home), the average ratio is derived as follows:
The order for nominal maintenance
The applicable principles
- [26]
[26] The entire topic of maintenance of a former wife has been comprehensively dealt with by a leading scholar in Singapore family law (see Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2013) at ch 18 (“Leong”)). Indeed, our local case law on this specific topic owes much to, and embodies many of the views of, Prof Leong in both this work as well as her other works in the field.
- [30]
[30] Quite apart from the two general (and related) principles just referred to, it would be inadvisable for this court to lay down more specific principles simply because the factual permutations are enormous (from a human standpoint, possibly infinite). As already mentioned, the precise facts and circumstances of each case are of the first importance, and this is itself a (further, and third) general principle that is so obvious, yet vital. That having been said, we have also mentioned that the law in this particular sphere will undoubtedly evolve over time. Although it is not the case that specific factual matrices will necessarily lead to general principles being formulated, the entire process of legal development is far more nuanced and interactional in nature and, in this regard, it is entirely possible that embedded within specific fact situations are general rules and principles which could be developed over time. Indeed, the facts of the present case illustrate this.
- [31]
[31] Before we consider the facts of the present case, there is another general principle that can, in our view, guide the courts. It is, arguably at least, as important as, if not more important than, the three general principles already set out above. And it is this: The court ought always to bear in mind the underlying rationale and purpose for the award of maintenance generally to former wives. As this court stated in Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 (“Foo Ah Yan”), the overarching principle embodied in s 114(2) is that of financial preservation, which requires the wife to be maintained at a standard that is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage – but we also cautioned that s 114(2) had to be applied in a “commonsense holistic manner that takes into account the new realities that flow from the breakdown of marriage” (at [13] and [16]; emphasis in original). In this regard, some elaboration may be apposite. As this court (adopting the views of Prof Leong) has emphasised in Foo Ah Yan at [22] and [26]:
- [34]
[34] The following observations by Prof Leong might also be usefully noted (see Leong at p 666):
- [39]
[39] Before we turn to the next point, the Singapore High Court decision of ADB v ADC [2014] SGHC 76 also merits some discussion. It was a brief marriage of persons who were each capable of earning a comfortable income. Between the parties, the wife owned significantly more assets than the husband. The wife had a child, aged 16 and from a previous marriage, whom the husband adopted and loved. The parties were financially independent. In deciding not to award the wife any maintenance, Choo Han Teck J stated (at [10]) that “[t]he idea that maintenance is an unalloyed right of a divorced woman is an idea borne from the time when women were housewives living on the maintenance of the men”.
- [41]
[41] We have cited a few cases to give a flavour of the multifarious considerations that could weigh on the court’s exercise of discretion. However, it is of the first importance to emphasise that the ultimate decision arrived at by a court in any given case will depend, in the final analysis, upon the precise facts and circumstances concerned (which is, in fact, the third general principle referred to above (at [30])).
The principles applied
- [43]
[43] We would respectfully disagree with the Judge’s reasons for ordering nominal maintenance in the present case as set out in the preceding paragraph. What, in effect, the Wife was requesting – and which the Judge agreed with – was that the Husband be a general insurer for the wife for an indefinite period of time. The preservation of the Wife’s right to claim maintenance in the event any misfortune should befall her appeared to be the sole basis for her request and indeed, the Judge’s decision to award nominal maintenance to the Wife. As we have already emphasised above, this cannot – and ought not to – be the case. The future is impossible to predict and that something untoward could happen is always possible. However, that is – in and of itself – an insufficient reason for granting nominal maintenance, bearing in mind that this is an obligation that might be visited on the husband concerned at any time in the future even though the marriage has already been terminated. Hence, something more must be shown on the facts and circumstances of the particular case to justify the court awarding the wife concerned nominal maintenance.
- [45]
[45] Based on all the relevant facts, it was clear that the Wife was more than capable of taking care of herself, and had in fact been doing so. In the circumstances, we could not see any justification for imposing on the Husband the continuing (albeit contingent) obligation to provide the Wife with maintenance at some indeterminate time in the future. We also note that a substantial portion of the Husband’s take-home pay is being directed towards the Child’s maintenance and this correspondingly relieves the Wife of her financial burden in this particular regard.
Conclusion