YIJ v YIK [2026] SGHCF 29

Division of matrimonial assets

Identification and valuation of matrimonial assets

I take the matrimonial pool as identified at the IJ date (ie, 4 September 2024), with assets valued as at the date of the ancillary matters hearing (ie, 14 May 2026), save for bank and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts which are taken as at the IJ date. This was the parties’ common position and it accords with settled practice (see, eg, CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55]).

Joint asset

The only joint asset is their matrimonial home (“Matrimonial Home”). Its inclusion in the matrimonial pool is not disputed. It is also common ground that the Matrimonial Home was fully paid for upon purchase in 1998. Based on a valuation of a jointly appointed valuer, the Matrimonial Home is valued at S$5,800,000. I note that the Wife had paid the valuer’s fee of S$981. The Husband is to return half of that sum (S$490.50) to the Wife.

Assets in the Husband’s sole name

The parties agree that all of the assets held in the Husband’s sole name fall within the matrimonial pool. They differ slightly only on the value of the 180 Singtel shares. The Husband values them at S$570.60, relying on his Singapore Exchange portfolio generated on 9 October 2024. The Wife values them at S$550, relying on a screenshot of the Singtel share price on the SGX as at 12 November 2024. As 12 November 2024 is closer to the ancillary matters hearing date of 14 May 2026 than 9 October 2024, I accept the Wife’s value of S$550. In any event, the difference between the parties’ valuations is negligible in the grand scheme of things.

The following assets in the Husband’s sole name are to be added to the matrimonial pool:

Assets in the Wife’s sole name

Three matters are disputed in relation to the Wife’s assets: (a) the bank accounts held in her name and the allegations of dissipation arising from them; (b) the legal fees she expended; and (c) her jewellery and an antique cupboard. I deal with each in turn.

(1) Legal fees

At the hearing, counsel for the Wife, Ms Kulvinder Kaur (“Ms Kulvinder”), accepted that the Wife’s legal fees ought to be added back to the pool, save for a payment of S$10,000 made to the Wife’s previous solicitors on 11 September 2023. The Wife’s evidence in her further affidavit is that she received a letter from the Husband’s solicitors on 6 September 2023 concerning his severance of the joint tenancy of the Matrimonial Home, and that this S$10,000 was the consultation fee she then paid for advice on that issue. She produced a screenshot of her payment to the solicitors, and points to the Husband’s own affidavit acknowledging that he sent that letter on that date. In the absence of any contrary evidence or argument from the Husband, I accept the Wife’s evidence that this sum was incurred to obtain advice on the severance rather than on the matrimonial proceedings. I decline to add it back to the pool.

Adding up the Wife’s remaining legal fees as stated in the Joint Summary, which are not disputed to be added back, I arrive at a total of S$32,710.45 to be added back to the pool.

(2) Bank accounts and dissipation allegations

Three of the Wife’s bank accounts are in dispute: the HSBC Everyday Global Account No -4-492 (“492 Account”), the HSBC Savings Account -1-221 (“221 Account”) and the Standard Chartered Bank Account No -0416 (“416 Account”).

The 492 Account was a joint account between the Wife and the parties’ son, closed on 12 January 2023 with a closing balance of S$232,751.43. In his written submissions, the Husband points to a withdrawal of S$152,000 from the 492 Account on 9 November 2022. His position is that this sum possibly went into the 221 Account. It is unclear to me the point the Husband wishes to make. He advances no argument, whether by way of claw-back or adverse inference or on some other footing, that this sum should be added back into the matrimonial pool. In any case, on his own position that the sum went into the 221 Account, there would be no dissipation of the S$152,000, hence the real question before me is the reduction in the balance of the 221 Account.

Before turning to the 221 Account, I address the Wife’s allegations that there were unauthorised withdrawals by their son from the 492 Account and the 416 Account (which was closed on 21 September 2021), made without her knowledge or consent and in which the Husband was complicit. She asks that these sums be added back as the Husband’s dissipation under the TNL dicta in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”) at [24], or that she receives a 5% uplift. As I indicated at the hearing, there is no evidence before me that the Husband colluded in the son’s withdrawals from either account. The Wife alleges the Husband’s involvement in the dissipation of these funds only on the basis that he lived in the same household, benefited from the son’s spending, and drank with him. That is speculative and I decline to add these sums back.

As for the reduction in the funds in the 221 Account, I accept the Wife’s documentary evidence that the closing balance of S$232,751.43 from the 492 Account was deposited into the 221 Account in January 2023. But the amount left in the 221 Account, as of 2 October 2024, is S$27,341.07, according to the Wife. The Husband also pointed out in his written submissions that fixed term deposits totalling S$378,404.15 had been placed as of June 2023, but they remain unaccounted for. Given the significant reduction in the value of the 221 Account, I granted the Wife leave to file a further affidavit explaining it.

First, regarding the fixed term deposits, the Wife explained that each of them matured and was returned to the 221 Account. Only one of the transactions is not documented in the bank statements, as it matured in July 2023 and that month’s statement fell outside the quarterly statements ordered in discovery. I accept that explanation.

Second, on the depletion of the 221 Account to S$27,341.07, the Wife explains that the 221 Account is held jointly between her and the parties’ eldest daughter. Their daughter made withdrawals over the years for the Wife’s expenses and may have made others of which the Wife is unaware. The Wife also points to the Husband’s own Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief, in which he acknowledged that the eldest daughter had taken control of the Wife’s bank accounts, stating that he “verily believe[d] the [Wife] exercises no control over our funds in her bank account and had allowed [the eldest daughter] free rein over our matrimonial monies in the said banks”.

On the limited evidence before me, and in light of the Husband’s own statement, I accept the Wife’s explanation that the funds were used by their eldest daughter. To add these sums back into the pool and divide them as though they remained available would reduce the Wife’s share by reference to moneys she cannot recover. That would be neither just nor equitable. In any event, the Husband advanced no proper basis for adding the sums back. He did not request the court to draw an adverse inference, which requires a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case of concealment against the party concerned (BPC v BPB [2019] 1 SLR 608 at [60]). Nor did he invoke the TNL dicta for a claw-back, which requires the expenditure to have occurred without consent and when divorce was imminent (TNL v TNK at [24]). I therefore decline to add back any sum and only the value of the 221 Account, being S$27,341.07, falls into the matrimonial pool. For avoidance of doubt, this analysis does not affect the Wife’s legal fees paid out of the 221 Account, which fall to be added back into the matrimonial pool as analysed above at [7]–[9].

(3) Jewellery

The Husband argues that the gold and diamond jewellery and an antique cupboard in the Wife’s possession ought to be added back to the pool. The Wife’s position is that the jewellery pieces are everyday items she still wears, purchased long ago and no longer supported by receipts, and are in any event of de minimis value. The antique cupboard, she says, is an heirloom passed down from her grandmother to her mother and then to her.

Gifts and inherited assets of de minimis value may be excluded from the pool, and whether an item is de minimis must be assessed against the overall pool of matrimonial assets (Tan Hwee Lee v Tan Cheng Guan [2012] 4 SLR 785 at [48]–[49]). Neither party placed before me any evidence of the present value of these items. No proper valuation was carried out for either the jewellery or the antique cupboard. From the photographs appended to the Husband’s will, the jewellery consists of a few chains, bracelets and rings. Even if the jewellery pieces were not gifts, they were purchased long ago and are personal items that the Wife, on her evidence, wears daily (see, eg, WJG v WJH [2022] SGHCF 28 at [14]–[17]). Set against a pool exceeding S$5,800,000, being the value of the Matrimonial Home alone, I consider these items to be de minimis and exercise my discretion to exclude them from the pool.

(4) The Wife’s assets to be added to the matrimonial pool

Taking into account the above, the following assets in the Wife’s sole name are to be added to the matrimonial pool:

Total matrimonial pool

The total matrimonial pool comprises:

(a) Joint asset: S$5,800,000

(b) Assets in the Husband’s name: S$14,489.03

(c) Assets in the Wife’s name: S$80,436.94

The total value of the matrimonial pool is accordingly S$5,894,925.97.

Division and apportionment of matrimonial assets

The “structured approach” set out in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”) is more appropriate for dual-income marriages, while the “broad-brush approach” is better suited for long, single-income marriages (TNL v TNK at [42] and [46]). This is a dual-income marriage. Both parties worked throughout its first half and retired at roughly the same time (the Wife in 1992 and the Husband in 1993), the Husband as a supervisor at [Company B] and the Wife as a teacher. The structured approach therefore applies.

Direct contributions

The Wife argues that she contributed to 100% of the Matrimonial Home, all the assets in her sole name and the Husband’s POSB Account. For the Matrimonial Home, the Wife says that she alone financed it. She claims that she bought their previous property (“Previous Property”) under the Teacher’s Estate housing scheme, and that its sale proceeds were applied in full to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, to which the Husband contributed nothing. On the other hand, the Husband seeks a 50:50 division of all the matrimonial assets. He claims to have contributed to the Previous Property through the retirement fund benefit he received from [Company B] (relying on the affidavits of his witnesses), and further claims that a lump sum gratuity from [Company B] went towards the Matrimonial Home.

The difficulty is that neither party’s account is supported by documentary evidence. That much was accepted by Ms Kulvinder and counsel for the Husband, Ms Gurmeet Kaur (“Ms Gurmeet”), at the hearing. Where the documents fall short of establishing who contributed what, the court must make a “rough and ready approximation” (ANJ v ANK at [23]). Additionally, this was an exceptionally long marriage of some 64 years, and a dual-income one. Courts recognise that in long dual-income marriages, there is little reason not to incline towards equality “in the light of the philosophy of marriage as an equal partnership” as well as trends in past cases (UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921 at [66]). Since neither party can establish that he or she contributed more, and given the exceptional length of this dual-income marriage, I assess direct financial contributions at 50:50.

Indirect contributions

The Wife seeks a ratio of 80:20 in her favour, arguing that she bore virtually all the financial and non-financial burdens of the family throughout the marriage. On indirect financial contributions, she says that even during the first 32 years, when both parties worked, she was the main provider. She paid for a helper to care for the children when she was at work, the children’s tuition and courses, the children’s weddings and the family’s vacations, and gave their son S$50,000 to start a business that failed. For the second half of the marriage, after she retired in 1992, her evidence is that the Husband had no income and contributed nothing, while she funded the household from her pension of S$2,402.84 a month, of which she gave the Husband S$1,200 each month. On indirect non-financial contributions, the Wife says that she was the children’s primary caregiver. Even with a helper (who remained until the eldest child was 11), she cooked for the family, engaged and supervised the helpers, managed the household including its repairs and maintenance, paid the son’s medical bills, and planned outings and meals for the children and the Husband’s extended family.

There is an absence of documentary evidence supporting both parties’ claims. In a marriage of this length, however, that is to be expected, and the courts have recognised the evidentiary difficulty when it comes to indirect contributions, and the value to be given to them is “necessarily a matter of impression and judgment of the court” (ANJ v ANK at [24]; USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 at [45]).

As for indirect non-financial contributions, I am convinced that the Wife contributed the greater share as well. Her evidence of her caregiving and homemaking is detailed and specific in her affidavits. She was the children’s primary caregiver from birth, and did so while working. She helped their three children with their homework in the evenings and managed matters relating to their schooling and activities. She ran the household, cooked for the family and organised family gatherings, and when helpers were later engaged, she trained and supervised them. After the Husband’s retirement, she also attended to his personal needs by guiding and supervising the helper to care for the Husband as his mobility declined. The Husband, on the other hand, does no more than assert in general terms that he did his fair share. He descends to no particulars of caring for the children, their schooling, their health or their emotional needs. I also consider it significant that the Husband neither disputed most of what the Wife says she did for the family nor offered any competing account of his own.

Considering the evidence in the round, I assess indirect contributions at 70:30 in favour of the Wife.

Whether the Husband’s rent-free occupation of the Matrimonial Home warrants a 2% uplift

In her written submissions, the Wife seeks a 2% uplift to her share of the pool on account of the Husband’s sole and rent-free occupation of the Matrimonial Home, relying on s 112(2)(f) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”). Her case is that the Husband unlawfully excluded her from the Matrimonial Home from March 2025, including by putting a padlock on the gate to prevent her from entering. The Husband’s position, in his affidavits and submissions, is that the Wife and the parties' eldest daughter moved out of their own accord.

As the Husband pointed out in the Joint Summary, the Wife’s complaint of unlawful exclusion surfaced for the first time in her written submissions. Her affidavits do not set out her evidence that she was unlawfully excluded from the Matrimonial Home (see Rule 89 and Rule 90 of Part 5 of the Family Justice Rules 2014). This is a complaint the Husband ought fairly to have had the opportunity to answer on affidavit, and he has not been afforded that opportunity. Both parties will also, in any event, obtain a substantial sum from the division of the matrimonial pool. I therefore decline to consider this submission by the Wife, and I make no uplift to her share of the matrimonial pool.

Conclusion on the division of matrimonial assets

I ascribe equal weight to the parties’ collective direct financial contributions and their collective indirect contributions, seeing no reason to accord greater weight to either in deriving the average ratio (see, eg, ANJ v ANK at [26]). The average ratio of the parties’ direct and indirect contributions is therefore:

Applying the average ratio to the pool of S$5,894,925.97, the Wife’s share is S$3,536,955.58 and the Husband’s share is S$2,357,970.39.

Spousal maintenance for the Husband

The Husband seeks maintenance as an incapacitated former husband under s 113(1) of the Women’s Charter, relying on factors such as his medical and mobility issues, his inability to earn a livelihood, his minimal income and the Wife’s departure from the Matrimonial Home which left him to meet the home’s expenses alone. Alternatively, he seeks a 5% to 10% uplift on his share as a lump sum in lieu of spousal maintenance.

I decline to order spousal maintenance or any lump sum payment. Section 114(1) of the Women’s Charter requires me to have regard to, among other things, the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of each party, their respective needs and obligations, their ages, and the duration of the marriage. Here, both parties are in the twilight of their lives, the Husband being 90 and the Wife 89 years of age. Neither has any earning capacity and neither can be expected to improve their respective financial positions through work. Both parties rely on monthly pensions or payouts as their financial source. Most significantly, each party will emerge from the division of the matrimonial pool with a very substantial sum. The Husband alone will take more than S$2,000,000 from the matrimonial pool. That is a sum more than sufficient to meet the needs of a 90-year-old retiree for the remainder of his life. Once the division takes effect, he will be amply provided for. In these circumstances, I do not think an order for maintenance against the Wife, herself an elderly retiree living on a pension, would be just or necessary.

Property tax

In his further written submissions, the Husband seeks to recover from the Wife’s share of the net sale proceeds of the Matrimonial Home the property tax he paid on the Matrimonial Home for the Years of Assessment 2025 and 2026, on the basis that the Wife has paid nothing towards it since moving out in March 2025.

I am guided by TIC v TID [2019] 1 SLR 180 (“TIC v TID”), where the Court of Appeal held that property tax payments are tariffs levied on the ownership of the property, independent of its occupation or beneficial use (TIC v TID at [21]). The prima facie position is therefore that such payments should be borne by the party who should be taken to be the owner of the property, subject to the court’s power to make a contrary order if the circumstances require (TIC v TID at [21]). That case concerned a buy-over of the matrimonial property, where one spouse had chosen to take over the other’s share, and that spouse (who was going to be the eventual owner) was held to be the notional owner and bore the property tax in the interim period between the order and completion of the transfer (TIC v TID at [23]).

Presently, the factual matrix differs in that the property tax fell due before any division of the Matrimonial Home was ordered, and the Husband paid it in full because the Wife had moved out. But I draw from TIC v TID the proposition that property tax is levied on ownership, not occupation or beneficial use. Hence, it cannot be said that the Husband must bear the whole of the tax simply because he lives in the property. Equally, the Husband’s argument that the Wife should bear it because she moved out is untenable. Even after the Wife moved out in March 2025 and stopped paying the property tax, the parties continued to hold the Matrimonial Home as tenants-in-common in equal shares. Therefore, I am of the view that the property tax for the Years of Assessment 2025 and 2026 ought to be borne by the parties equally.

Costs

Consequential orders

Both counsel informed me at the hearing that the parties wish to sell the Matrimonial Home.

In light of the above, I order as follows:

(e) There shall be no maintenance for the Husband.

(f) The parties shall bear their own costs.

(g) The parties shall have liberty to apply.