I am sorry that the Member for Telok Ayer is not happy with my enlarging on his metaphor, but I would like to complete it. In comparing the Chief Minister to a bee, I felt it was most appropriate because the bee is such an energetic fellow. With incessant energy he continues to accumulate honey, not for himself but for the service of others. Moreover, the bee is, when attacked, armed with a sting with which he can do damage! Now, on Friday, the Chief Minister argued - and I felt with very great force and cogency - that in the relevant section of the constitutional document the word "may" is directive and not permissive. This point seems to present some difficulty, perhaps, to some Members of this House, and certainly elsewhere, and if people are unconvinced, I would suggest that, for the purposes of argument, I shall pass by the Chief Minister's array of legal authorities, his picul or so of calf-bound tomes which he brought with him in case they were needed, and I will grant, purely for purposes of argument, that in this matter His Excellency has certain discretionary powers. I will proceed to examine what is then the position if those powers, in fact, are rightly in His Excellency's control. I will quote as my first authority Professor Barriedale Keith. His textbook - the British Cabinet System - is, I believe, a reasonable work of reference which is accepted as an authority. He points out that when a British Colony adopts the British Cabinet system - as we are doing here - it necessarily adopts also the fundamental principles and practice of the British Cabinet system. And so, if we can accept Professor Keith as being right - and obviously he must be because you cannot adopt a model of democracy without adopting the principles which have produced that model - if he is right, we have to examine the principles on which we are hoping to proceed. Our attention has been very much fixed on one major principle, which is that the Sovereign, or in this territory the Sovereign's representative, should act on the advice of his Ministers when it is formally and officially tendered to him through the Chief Minister. That principle, I think, is clear to everybody, and nobody has any difficulty or doubt about the statement of the principle. Where the difficulty and doubt has come, at least in His Excellency's mind, is whether that principle should be applied here and now. My object is to show that it can and should be applied, without hesitation and without delay. I will quote, in support of that, another principle which is equally fundamental and perhaps more far-reaching: a principle which can best be stated by saying that the constitution must be flexible. It must have flexibility and the possibility of adaptation to things as they change. In Britain, there is no written constitution. You have various fixed constitutional points such as Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights, or the Parliament Act of 1911, or the Habeas Corpus Act, which can be called constitutional documents, but they do not amount to a written constitution. In so far as they have any effect, their effect is to give more freedom and more liberty of action. They do not restrict people in any way, except to restrict the power of the Executive to some extent. The Commonwealth of Nations also has no written constitution. The whole British system is based on the fact that you deal with situations as they arise, and you do not tie yourself down in writing to an intention which you cannot, in fact, carry out because the situation has changed. You do have in the United States of America a written constitution, and they get into quite a mess with it sometimes. My little reading in American history has indicated that they get conflicting interpretations according to the political colour of the country at different times. There is a fairly long time lag between changes, and certainly in Singapore we have already got into some difficulty with our written constitution. It is precisely because we have a written constitution that we need this principle of flexibility. It was inevitable that we should have a constitution written, because whilst elsewhere constitutions have grown up slowly over a long period of time, here no opportunity for constitutional progress was made. If progress had started 50 years ago, we should now no doubt have conventions instead of a written constitution, but we have not. We have to cram into a few years the progress that might well have been spread over half a century. And so I pass to my next authority. This is no massive tome, but I received it some two or three months ago from our worthy friend the Public Relations Officer. It is published by the Central Office of Information. The title is The Monarchy and The Commonwealth, and it says on the inside cover that this document is intended as reference material and is derived from authoritative sources and may be freely used in preparing articles, speeches, broadcasts, etc. I take it that it is authoritative, because it comes from an authoritative source, and I take it as being a reasonable and fair statement of what the British position is. "Constitutional conventions differ from strict law in that they are not recognised and applied by the Courts" - I know that some Members of this House wish them to be brought to the Courts, but they did not appreciate the British approach to constitutional problems. They are not recognised and applied by the Courts - "but nevertheless they are indispensable and lend themselves to adaptation to changing conditions without serious disturbance to existing legislative forms. It was largely by means of the firm establishment of such conventions that in the course of centuries restrictions were imposed on the use of the Royal prerogative and that the powers of the Crown, ceasing to be at the personal disposal of the Sovereign" - or in Singapore the Sovereign's representative - "came to be the means of giving effect to the wishes of the people". I will repeat the two key portions of that quotation - "adaptation to changing conditions without serious disturbance to existing legislative forms". We have changing conditions. They have changed rapidly. We do need to be able to adapt to them. The Progressive Party has now made it necessary, through their amendment, that we should disturb the existing legislative forms. The point is not of any vital importance, it seems to me in this case, but, as far as it goes, they have gone somewhat against the general spirit of democracy; but it does not matter very much. The other portion which I wish to remind Members of is - "powers of the Crown came to be the means of giving effect to the wishes of the people". His Excellency is the representative of the Crown, and it is not unreasonable to hope that the powers which he exercises now can, by a simple constitutional transference, without serious disturbance of any sort, either legislative or any other kind, become the means of giving effect to the wishes of the people. I do not know whether it is necessary to argue this point any further, but I think perhaps it will be useful to cover briefly the interpretation of this, as it is quoted in this booklet, in the history of Canada, which is called the senior Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Hon. Members will recollect, no doubt, the American Revolution where the Imperial power stood on its strict constitutional rights and, as a consequence, lost its American colonies which now become the great and dollar - powerful United States of America, with whom we have, happily, friendly relations. That gave the British Government furiously to think, and at the end of about 70 years they had thought it all out and Lord Durham went to Canada and produced in 1839 a Report from which the future development of the Commonwealth has grown. The effect of this Report was that although there were powers retained and reserved - powers of disallowance, surveillance and so on, which were retained by the Imperial Government - they were not, in fact, used and they were obsolete long before they were removed. In other words, it was perfectly feasible under the British practice to have powers, but not to use them. The situation did not call for them. Canada was perfectly competent to act responsibly, achieving economic and political independence. The principle of flexibility was applied, and although the powers were there they were not used. I have no doubt that the Rendel Constitutional Commission, as they surveyed the field of Singapore with conscientious thoroughness, brought to their study the full knowledge of this principle of flexibility, and they also knew, I am sure, that in the wrong hands flexibility could degenerate into flabbiness. They might wish that the Governor should be strong, because on surveying the Singapore scene at that time they felt that there was a danger of flabbiness. They felt that democracy was a difficult thing to transplant into this tropical climate. They might have had in their minds the old quotation from Rudyard Kipling that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet": and they might have wondered whether, in fact, democracy could be transplanted into Singapore in the course of a few years - that fragile flower might wilt and droop, become flabby and might need a strong gardener in the person of the Governor to drive in a stake and tie the plant to it so that it might stand up, until it had gathered enough strength to stand by itself. I am only assuming what might have been in the minds of the Rendel Constitutional Commission, but I would suggest that we might take note of the whole of what Kipling said, because it is rather relevant. "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat; But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!" That is our situation today. We have two strong men - His Excellency and cur Chief Minister. They have come into conflict. They are grappling today in a constitutional struggle, and in that struggle the great gap between East and West is abolished. It is brought together into a single democratic process, which, as democratic processes do, is producing difficulties, making the sparks fly; but out of it we see this. The struggle between His Excellency and the Chief Minister is a clear and obvious proof that democracy has taken strong root here and is already a real and vital political principle at the very heart of our political life. This struggle would not have been possible, as I pointed out before, if there was not substantial unanimity, and if the Chief Minister was not representing effectively the wishes of the people and of the representatives of the people. There can be no question about it. When this struggle resolves itself, I think it will be plain that Singapore has taken a great step forward. We shall be grateful not only to the Chief Minister for fighting this battle, but we may well feel grateful to His Excellency for having provided the occasion for the battle. Because this struggle has given to us the opportunity of demonstrating to the whole world that Singapore no longer needs to receive democracy as a gift, but has taken democracy and made it her own; is able to use it and live it, and fight for it, and to succeed in its practice and in the interpretation of its principles. This constitutional struggle is nothing new. It was foreshadowed in the very heavy poll at the time of the elections. In spite of some ingenious simple arithmetic, the fact remains that the poll was extremely heavy. The electoral register contained numerous errors, and although there may have been in theory some 300,000 potential electors, the actual figure was much nearer 200,000 and the poll was an exceptionally high poll for any democratic country, and an astonishing poll in a place like Singapore with a small and weak democratic tradition. If further proof of the strength of democracy here is needed, it has been given in the energy and vigour of the Chief Minister's Government. His Excellency's powers to prop and shelter the flower of democracy are no longer needed. Where they should have been a support, they are now an encumbrance, a hindrance, and an obstruction to the free development, growth and movement of the democratic process. We need flexibility and not rigidity, and I would like to close by quoting to the House what, to my astonishment, nobody has quoted so far - Sir John Nicoll's words to this House on the 22nd of April in his Opening Address: "We have already had a most striking demonstration of the realisation by the people of Singapore of their responsibilities in this matter" (that is in the matter of the new constitution). "The General Election held earlier this month showed that the people of Singapore understand the importance of the vote and the need for casting their votes in accordance with their convictions. It is now for the Council of Ministers and this Assembly as a whole to see to it that the popular will thus democratically expressed is carried out. Let no man suppose that he knows better than the Election results." On that note I would like to end with these last words: That out of this struggle, and out of our ultimate victory in it, there can grow a new unity of the people of Singapore. We can look forward to a period of useful and prosperous relationships between His Excellency and all that he stands for, and the Chief Minister and all that he stands for.