I have not the slightest intention, Mr Speaker, Sir, to dwell on the subject of the Member for Hong Lim. As I have indicated earlier in my opening, what we are interested in is not the Member for Hong Lim but the tactics of certain Left-wing adventurers. We have nothing to do with the Member for Hong Lim. All I was doing was to recount their practice. All those who have followed the newspapers in the last few weeks, including you, Mr Speaker, will bear me out, I think, when I say that I am only recounting what they said and the issues upon which they wished to take up the cudgels with the Government. What they said, quite simply, is that they dismissed the Member for Hong Lim, but they supported the so-called 16 resolutions. Now, this is important. What they are admitting is that it is true that the man who proposed these resolutions was in their opinion unworthy, but they wanted to support the worthiness of the 16 resolutions which they said contained progressive material. In other words, they were all in favour of trying to fish in P.A.P. troubled waters - what we have often demonstrated in the past to be an extremely unprofitable profession. This man, whom they detested and despised to the point of conspiring to oust him in August 1957, they now find a useful lever for pushing the P.A.P. into what they hope would be a more malleable and plastic position. They hold up their hands in horror, and say that the P.A.P. is going Right. They must stiffen it and make it go more Left. They must make it resist the forces of reaction, i.e. the colonialists, imperialists and feudalists, and respond `to the forces of progress, that is, pro-C.P. forces. In a time of relatively minor difficulties in the Party, they hoped to trip up the Party into submission in the name of unity of the progressive forces. Let me restate the P.A.P.'s position. We stand for what we believe in. And if we have not got the strength, ability or skill to carry the mass of the people with us on our principles and policies, then we deserve to fail. There is no need to be "rescued" by self-appointed mass leaders. Whatever our weaknesses, lack of courage of our convictions is not one, nor do we lack understanding of the techniques of these Left-wing adventurers. Were they really interested in the 16 resolutions? Were they interested in 5 of those resolutions turning upon the internal cadre organisation of the P.A.P., designed to prevent the party from being controlled other than by those who are loyal to the long-term aims and objectives of the party? Did they want to be cadre members of the P.A.P. when they supported 5 out of those 16 resolutions? And since when did they decide that tobacco and petrol taxes were unsocialist moves? And the Betting Bill. Nobody passed any resolution or sent any memorandum from the First to the Third Reading of the Bill and then not until after the P.A.P. conference. Let them be honest. They were only interested in a few of these resolutions-resolutions designed to appeal for support of these Left-wing adventurers. Reopen talks with the British. For what? Independence? Nobody in his senses believes that Singapore alone, in isolation, can be independent. In the same breath, another resolution, talks of re-opening talks with the Federation for merger and independence. What is it to be? Independence through talks with the Federation for merger, or independence for Singapore alone through talks with the British? This issue was fought out with similar Left-wing adventurers in 1957 when the P.A.P. went to the Tanjong Pagar by-elections. The issue then was, and still it seems now is, independence for Singapore by itself as a practical, feasible political objective, or independence for Singapore only through merger with a larger entity - the Federation of Malaya - from whom its water supply comes and on whose hinterland Singapore's trade, commerce and industry depend. One of the problems for these pro-C.P. forces during the past year has been the absence of issues which would agitate and excite their followers. They could not, when they supported the so-called 16 resolutions, have put much faith on the practicability of independence for Singapore alone. All they were concerned with was to find some slogans to keep their supporters excited, something on which to get tensions to mount, to create an atmosphere of uncertainty in which no industrial expansion will take place, so that economic and social conditions will deteriorate and therefore their forces of recklessness will increase and strengthen. And for good measure, there were two other issues - release all political detainees arrested before the P.A.P. came into power. The P.A.P. had already decided on this principle and has made its stand clear, both in public and in the Internal Security Council. But of course they claim that the P.A.P. bourgeois revolutionary party was weak and vacillating, yielding to the forces of reaction in the Internal Security Council! And the cancellation of the registration of the federation which the Government had registered but had de-registered, again because the Government, so they claimed, was either weak in the face of reactionary strength, or leaning to the Right. There were contradictions between the Left-wing government of Singapore, and the British and what the' Federation Government itself calls a Right-wing government of the Federation, contradictions which we must normally expect Communists to exploit, but many of these contradictions they did not exploit because it would have redounded to the credit of the P.A.P. Let me give a small illustration but a vivid one. Everybody knows that the P.A.P. Government is going to stand or fall on its policy of industrial peace with justice, to secure industrial expansion to resolve the economic problems. And it is the business of a non-Communist government to explore all avenues and all channels conceivable, for assistance and economic aid to resolve our economic problems. And do they not know, these Left-wing adventurers from reading the newspapers, that even the presence of a Russian delegation to an E.C.A.F.E. Conference in Singapore on small-scale industries was viewed with suspicion and disfavour? Are they unaware from Press reports that even the giving of a residence visa for more than a transitory visit to a Russian representative had caused excitement and brought opposition? The British interests in Singapore are obvious. The Federation has to ensure that Communist activity in the Federation is not aided from bases in Singapore. One would have thought that intelligent Communists would have found this a good united front issue. But on the contrary the Left-wing adventurers kept silent. They only chose to exploit the issues which are of no benefit to the P.A.P. but of benefit only to their pro-C.P. forces. Let me pose the contradictions between the P.A.P. and the pro-C.P. forces. I say pro-C.P. advisedly because the M.C.P. is underground and is unable to evince its collective will itself, and there is no way of preventing several different lines of various pro-C.P. groups, all being issued in the name of the C.P. The P.A.P. is a progressive force and will remain one - a force for change towards a more equal and just society. There are three possible situations in which we can find ourselves as a Party. First, where what is good for the people and for the P.A.P. may be bad for the Communists. Secondly, what is good for the people and the P.A.P. may also be good for the Communists. And third, what is bad for the people and the P.A.P. may be good for the Communists. In all these cases, we are prepared to proceed according to the dictates of our interests, our conscience and our judgment. Whether it is bad for the C.P. or good for the C.P. is irrelevant. The P.A.P. Government is prepared to carry out all policies which are for the benefit of the aims and objectives which the P.A.P. stands for, and which the people voted for. But it is not prepared to fight for, nor is it going to carry out policies, which are bad for the P.A.P. but are good for the Communists. To try and coerce the P.A.P. into a united front on the third of these premises is a futile and fruitless business which will aggravate, exacerbate and stiffen the attitude of the P.A.P. We are not going to promise independence for Singapore for the immediate future, first because we believe it is a fraud on the people to claim that Singapore can be independent alone, not only because it is not viable, but because it can be so easily captured and destroyed. Have they forgotten that some 80,000 British troops had to surrender in Singapore 10 days after the Japanese captured Singapore's water supply situated in Johore? Do they believe that an island with 1� million souls but with no natural resources, can be independent? We credit them with intelligence and therefore we believe that they can see these facts as well as we can. And the conclusion we can come to is that they are deliberately arousing false expectations and hopes in the people and in their supporters for the selfish purpose of creating excitement and tension, and an atmosphere of what they hope would be uncertainty upon which the growth of their strength depends. I would like to restate in simple language for the benefit of the Opposition, both in this House and, equally important, outside this House, that the policies of the P.A.P. were evolved out of its own experience of struggle under local conditions, not out of doctrinaire principles. And it has been successful up to date and will continue to be successful so long as it adheres not to doctrinaire principles, in complete disregard of local facts and conditions, but to the principles evolved in the context of the Malayan revolutionary situation. We believe in an independent, democratic, non-communist, socialist Malaya. What is the alternative for all Left-wing forces in Malaya? To this affirmation of our faith, does anybody seriously stand up to say that they believe in the establishment of an independent Communist Soviet Republic of Malaya? In the context of the present situation, do they hope to carry with them the mass of the Muslim Malays, the English-educated, the Indian-educated? Surely all have conceded that there can be no Communist Singapore until there is a Communist Malaya and there can be no Communist Malays unless the Malays are sufficiently softened from neighbouring countries. I must ask the House to forgive me for having taken so much of its time on what would appear to be a theoretical dissertation of the inter-play of political forces in Singapore. But it is because what I have discussed are the factors that will decide whether Singapore ticks for better or for worse that I have spent time discussing these factors. I am sorry that after 14 months of P.A.P. Government the English language newspapers are still allowed to confuse and delude the public. The irony of it is that basically anti-Communist local journalists, through European imperialist, colonialist newspapers - they are long-winded hyphened words, but they are terms of art and have certain marks with circles, and I have sought .to use these terms advisedly - these journalists have helped to build up confusion in the minds of the people. All this talk of absolute democratic rights, laissez-faire liberalism, freedom and human rights, in the face of the stark realities of an underground struggle for power, can only confuse the English-educated world. The problem that we are confronted with is not a simple one of allowing absolute liberalism and democratic rights to prevail, but of exerting that amount of restriction on absolute rights so that a reasonably tolerant democratic society can endure without turning or yielding to a totalitarian state. In other words, the government can, and where necessary must, restrict the rights of individuals, but if it does so to a point where it, in fact, makes the whole system a totalitarian society, then the purpose of the restriction would have been negated. These restrictions are only bearable because without them a more intolerant system would triumph. In his speech to this Assembly the Yang di-Pertuan Negara has listed out in detail the things that will be done for the people in the coming year. They include mundane things as roads, footpaths, drains, sanitation and stand-pipes. Since the integration of the organs of local government with those of the Ministries of the central Government, all these things have become the concern of this Assembly. These are the things which intimately concern the people and their daily lives. It is right that a government that seeks to improve the lives of the vast majority of its people - the workers and the farmers - should spend so much time and effort and money to make the administration respond to these social problems. After 14 months we can say that the organs of the State of Singapore are well maintained and functioning with a reasonable degree of sensitivity to the problems of the people. But we have to admit that a lot of ground has still to be covered in making the administration more alert, and equal to the political challenge we are confronted with - a challenge of rapid change, rapid progress, rapid improvement which the political ferment and revolution in Asia has aroused in the hearts and minds of its peoples. What are the chances of success in our struggle to achieve these objectives - changes of the economic basis of our livelihood and the social structure of our population through the democratic process? What kind of political weather are we in for? Running the risk of all weather forecasters to be proved wrong in the event, I would still go on to say that the indications are that we will have reasonably decent weather with fair periods, wet patches and sudden squalls. It is the sudden squalls that we must be careful of. For the worst that can happen - and it is important that we remember this - is the failure of this little experiment in the democratic process of one man one vote to bring some improvement in the lot of the people. If we are unable to face these sudden squalls, then we shall go under and the experiment will have to be restarted all over again on some other occasion. But it is useful if we can put these things in perspective, in terms of the ultimate, of the worst and the best, that is possible. What is the worst that can happen in the immediate future for us as a Government? It is that the Government may find itself out-manoeuvred and out-propagandaed by these Left-wing adventurers, in which case the P.A.P. will have to take the count in this fight, and the Communists will be counted out for many years to come. We are not unaware that with the Communists on one side of us and the British colonialists on the other, each side will want to pull us to its side. We are also aware that failing this, each of these two contending extremes are quite prepared to use us as buffers in their machinations against each other. The British want to preserve their economic and military interests in Singapore and in this whole region for as long as possible. The Communists want to set up a Soviet Republic of Malaya. To them let me say this: we are fully alive to the realities of this political situation. It is the business of a government to govern, and whilst we are the Government we must ensure that this Government's authority prevails within the limits of its jurisdiction. But it is also the business of the Government to ensure that if a collision has to take place between these Left-wing adventurers and the colonialist imperialists, the P.A.P. should let them break their heads on each other. For we are confident that whatever the temporary maneuverings and ups and downs, we as a non-C. P. socialist force have a historic role' to play in the political struggle of Malaya in this crucial stage of our history. Our duty is to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of our non-Communist socialist movement, not to be used in other peoples' plots. The best that we must strive for is to succeed in settling the economic and political problems of the people and succeed in maintaining industrial peace with justice to the workers, whilst industrial expansion takes place to alleviate the unemployment problem and create optimistic prospects for the years beyond 1964. The economic and social conditions of poverty and distress must be removed by the efforts of the people and the Government. There must be enough success to ensure a reasonable equilibrium for peace and prosperity in this phase of our struggle. Question proposed. 4.21 p.m.