Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to inform the House of the latest position in regard to the continued presence of a Malaysian infantry battalion in Singapore. The issue was first brought to public attention by a public statement made by the Prime Minister of Malaysia on 17th February, when he described how he was taken aback by what he termed the sudden demand by the Singapore Government that the Malaysian battalion should vacate the camp that they had been occupying. This came, in the words of the Tengku, as a bolt from the blue. In fact, quite some time before the Tengku's public statement, events had already been set in motion. The first step was taken by the Malaysian Ministry of Defence. In a letter dated 4th February, 1966, i.e, nearly two weeks before the Tengku's public statement, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and Minister of Defence wrote to me proposing that a Malaysian infantry battalion remains stationed in the island. This particular battalion had been in occupation of Camp Temasek, following upon the posting of the 2nd Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment, to defence duties in Sabah. In February the battalion had completed its tour of duty and was scheduled to return to its own camp by stages. Advance parties of the battalion had already arrived in Singapore and were in occupation of Camp Temasek to prepare for the arrival of the rest of the battalion. At the same time, the Malaysian battalion in Camp Temasek was scheduled to move to another battalion camp in Tapah and, in like manner, advance parties of this battalion had moved to Tapah. The request of the Malaysian Defence Minister was therefore an unexpected move not in conformity with the schedule of rotation of troops previously laid down. It constituted an obvious departure from policy. I replied on the 9th February stating that the question of the continued presence of a Malaysian infantry battalion in Singapore was something that should be discussed as a separate issue. In the meantime, it was urgent that the Malaysian battalion vacates Camp Temasek to allow units of the Second Battalion of the Singapore Infantry Regiment to return to their camp since they had been living in very difficult conditions in the jungles of Borneo for the past six months. Since the Tengku's statement, there has been public controversy as to the respective rights of the two Governments under the separation of Singapore agreement in respect of stationing of troops. The Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, claimed that "it is obligatory on the part of the Singapore Government to allow Malaysian troops to stay in the present bases or, if they require these bases for their own troops, to provide suitable alternative accommodation." Article V (3) of the Independence of Singapore Agreement, 1965, was invoked in support of this claim. The Singapore Government had made it clear in a statement on 18th February that it does not accept this interpretation of the agreement on two grounds. First, Article V stipulates that the two Governments will enter into a treaty of external defence and mutual assistance to provide for matters set out in four separate sections. The two Governments have not as yet entered into any such treaty. Second, when such a defence treaty is agreed and signed, it will provide, in accordance with paragraph (3) of Article V, that "the Government of Singapore will afford to the Government of Malaysia the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities used by its military forces within Singapore and will permit the Government of Malaysia to make such use of these bases and facilities as the Government of Malaysia may consider necessary for the purpose of external defence". The operative words are "right to continue" bases and facilities "used" by Malaysia's military forces. Camp Temasek was not "used" by Malaysia's military forces on the date of the separation agreement - 7th August, 1965, or the date of separation, 9th August, 1965. By section 9 of the Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965, passed by the Parliament of Malaysia, all property which before Malaysia belonged to Singapore reverted to Singapore once again. We offered to submit the issue to arbitration by an independent Commonwealth or international tribunal as a means of resolving the disagreement as to the interpretation of the Agreement. Up to now, this offer has not been accepted by the Government of Malaysia. In the meantime, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Malaysia, issued a public statement on 21st February, 1966. In one respect, the statement was re-assuring in that the Parliamentary Secretary stated that his Government accepted the fact that Singapore is an independent and sovereign State. He also stated that the Malaysian Government had never maintained the right to station troops in Singapore without regard to the agreement and without the consent of the Singapore Government. So far so good. But he went on to say that the Singapore Government had agreed to the Malaysian Government stationing their troops in Singapore under the separation agreement. He also stated that under the separation agreement Singapore had agreed that Malaysia shall be responsible for the defence of Singapore. Sir, it is important that the two Governments should be in no doubt as to what the separation agreement provides for and what it does not provide for. Nowhere does the separation agreement state that Singapore has agreed that Malaysia shall be responsible for the defence of Singapore. If the Malaysian Parliamentary Secretary had consulted his own Attorney-General, he would never have made a statement like this. The second point is that the agreement in respect of bases and facilities in Singapore, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is limited to those bases and facilities used by the Malaysians on the island at the time of separation. The right of the Government of Malaysia is the right to continue to maintain these bases and to make such use of these bases as they may consider necessary for the purpose of Malaysia's external defence. It does not extend to the right to occupy new bases with new troops. Here again, if the Malaysian Government disagrees with our interpretation, the matter can quite easily be resolved by reference to an independent international tribunal, whose decision should be accepted as binding on both Governments. Sir, let me, for a moment, move away from the constitutional and legal aspects of this matter. There are two points to which attention may be drawn. The first is the obvious one that the Second Battalion of the S.I.R., having served a gruelling campaign in the jungles of Sabah in the defence of Malaysia, surely deserve better treatment on their return to Singapore than to find that their camp has been occupied by Malaysian troops. The second observation is that a disagreement of such a nature could have arisen in the way it did is symptomatic of a deeper malaise in the relations between the two Governments on defence matters. This issue is but one of the many outstanding issues which had arisen between us. I do not wish to overburden the House with the minutiae of the many points of unresolved disputes arising between the Ministries of Defence in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, but an outline of some of the matters may be illuminating. The Second Battalion, S.I.R., has not only been deprived of its camp accommodation, but also of the greater part of its Battalion transport. A search party is now in Batu Gajah to try to collect the Battalion's transport which has found its way there. So far their efforts to locate their trucks, jeeps, landrovers and other vehicles have met with only limited success. Nor is the First Battalion of the S.I.R. in a better position. Much of its transport had been taken over by the Fourth Malaysian Infantry Brigade Headquarters during the time when Singapore was in Malaysia. In spite of repeated requests over the last four or five months for the return of the transport to the First Battalion, S.I.R., both the trucks and the drivers still remain with the Fourth Malaysian Infantry Brigade, who maintain that until they receive instructions from Kuala Lumpur, they are unable to make any move. On Singapore Day, there were large numbers of Singapore army personnel, some three hundred in number, posted in various units of the Malaysian army. Similarly, there are large numbers of Malaysian citizens in the Singapore army. Attempts to have this matter sorted out so that citizens may return to their own armies, have so far made very little headway. However, a message has been received from Kuala Lumpur recently that suggests that there is hope that this vexatious issue will be settled shortly. Not only is the army transport and camp accommodation taken over by Malaysian units, but a large part of our signals equipment and personnel have also been taken over by them. There are 60 officers and men of the Singapore Armed Forces posted to the Fourth Malaysian Infantry Brigade. It was agreed in November last year that these officers and men and their equipment should return to Singapore units in a phased programme. Here again, no progress has been made to carry out this phased programme, with the result that the operational efficiency of our Battalions in carrying out internal security functions is reduced. Again, armoured cars, equipment and personnel belonging to Singapore were attached during Malaysia to the Federation First Independent Reconnaisance Regiment and all our attempts to unscramble this have met with no success. As regards our Navy, the story is even more extraordinary. Before we joined Malaysia, we had a naval ship, the renowned "Panglima". This ship has disappeared under Malaysian Command, and attempts even to find its location have not met with any success. Sir, where do we go from here? It is important that we should never lose grasp of the proper perspective of the fundamentals of our defence policy. Both Malaysia and Singapore do not have adequate defence forces at their command to deter aggression from their larger neighbours, nor are they able successfully to fend off any major assault that may be mounted upon us. So for some time, until our defence forces are substantially increased, we shall have to depend on the military shield provided by our Commonwealth Allies. But our Commonwealth Allies will be willing to provide us with this shield only if they find their international political position a tenable one and the domestic scene stable enough for their defence effort to be effective. If the Governments of Singapore and Malaysia are unable effectively to co-operate in their common defence effort, this must in turn adversely affect the efficacy of the defence arrangements with Britain, Australia and New Zealand who are expending large sums of money and men in retaining their military commitments in this region. So co-operate we must, but this co-operation must be as between two sovereign States and not as between big brother and his satellite. It is therefore necessary that the Malaysian Government should revise its attitude towards the Singapore Government in defence matters. Peremptory requests, stone-walling and obviously dilatory and evasive tactics in dealing with legitimate requests and enquiries from us can only lead to increasing exasperation. If the Malaysian Government is prepared to accept Singapore both in word and in deed as an equal partner in the defence arrangements of the whole region, then I do not see that there is any problem that cannot be resolved to our mutual satisfaction. On the other hand, if the Malaysian Government were to insist on having its own way regardless of the legality of its actions in international law, then the whole issue will acquire wider implications and it may eventually become necessary for us, in order to have our sovereignty in these matters recognised and respected, to have recourse to appropriate international tribunals. I am certain that it is not the desire of the Malaysian Government to bring matters to such a pass, and that they are as prepared as we are to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution of all outstanding issues. On our part, we have acted with the utmost circumspection, and indeed the public revelation of the disagreement over the Malaysian Infantry Battalion in Singapore was not made by the Singapore Government but by the Malaysian Prime Minister. Inche Mahmud Awang (Kampong Kapor) rose -