Mr Speaker, Sir, since 1967, we have been in the process of building a credible defence force for Singapore. In the initial stages, the task of building such a force was left in the hands of those who were prepared to take soldiering seriously when others would not, and make it their life career. They were a hardworking lot, dedicated and were prepared for any eventuality, and indeed they were, during the Confrontation. Sir, I am referring to the regulars in the SAF whose dedication and hard work laid the foundation on which the first National Service army was raised. These regulars dedicated whatever limited experiences, skills and military know-how they had to the task of building a credible National Service army. Some of these regulars and permanent staff are still around, though their brand of man-management, discipline and training methods are no longer considered conducive to the present-day SAF. Mr Speaker, Sir, today we talk about people-oriented management, high technology in modern weaponry and training techniques, computerized war games and productivity, to inculcate into our young National Service army the importance of being prepared militarily in the defence of our country. Today, we have a very sophisticated army, a well-equipped navy and a highly skilled air force. However, Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding the tremendous progress and significant achievements of the SAF, I wish to place on record the important contributions made by the regulars and the permanent staff. They are still a contributory factor in the management and training of the SAF and must be given the opportunity to keep abreast with the latest developments in defence technology and war strategies, They must be given the opportunity to upgrade themselves so that they can better serve the SAF in their respective roles. Their man-management philosophies and techniques must be upgraded if they are to be compatible with their soldiers who come from diverse backgrounds with varied experiences and educational levels. I wish, therefore, to draw attention to the need for constant upgrading and development of military skills for this group of men and women. I would be grateful, Sir, if I could be given an insight to the Defence Ministry's plans for the regulars in the direction that I have elaborated. What are the latest professional courses made available to them? How many of these regulars have since been given opportunities to upgrade themselves, and how many have succeeded? Now I turn to the reservists. We have a new breed of people in the SAF today whose dedication to the build-up of a defence capability for Singapore is second to none. Today, we have reservists as our mainstay in national defence. They are our front-line troops - a responsibility that they have just been made aware of and which they need to realize seriously, There are serious implications all round for them to consider and to be prepared for at all times. It is not only their military knowledge and skills that are at stake but what can happen to them, their families and, for that matter, the economy and survival of Singapore in times of emergency, For these reservists, Sir, are also the mainstay of our economic sector, contributing to the productivity and prosperity of Singapore. It is therefore vitally important that the attitude of our young reservists be motivated to take on their dual roles seriously, especially that which concerns national defence. They must be totally committed to their training and perform well so that they can be a credible force to be reckoned with. Sir, I would like to enquire on the steps taken by Mindef to cultivate and inculcate the right ideals and moral values in our young reservists so that when the big test comes, although we certainly hope not, our young front-line troops will not be found wanting in ideals, motivation, courage, skills and fitness to give a good account of themselves. Finally, Sir, I would like to touch a bit on sportsmen in the SAF. Mr Speaker, Sir, every year during national service intakes, a number of top sportsmen from the schools are among those enlisted. They have great potential to become Singapore's representatives in their respective sports at national or international levels. A few years ago, the cream of these athletes and sportsmen were given special consideration under the Supernumerary Scheme to continue with their practice and training to develop into reputable sportsmen. After their basic military training, the Ministry of Defence and SAFSA became the first beneficiary of their prowess under this scheme. Later, of course, the various sports clubs and finally the national body benefited. Today, the Supernumerary Scheme is no longer in existence in the SAF. The potential young athletes and sportsmen do not get the same opportunities to develop and improve their sporting abilities. Sir, I must record my appreciation to Mindef and SAFSA for their cooperation all these years in helping the national sports associations, especially, of course, to the FAS, for the various competitions that they are competing. However, I would like Mindef to consider re-introducing the Supernumerary Scheme on selected individual games. The Minister of State for Defence and Trade and Industry (BG Lee Hsien Loong): Mr Speaker, Sir, if I may reply to the points raised so far, so that we keep track of the discussion. I deal first with the points raised by the Member for Whampoa. He talked about productivity, procurement, $600 toilet seats, $1,000 hammers, and asked whether we buy such things. Let me assure him that we do not. But let me explain productivity in the context of the SAF, of an armed force. We are not in the business of buying raw materials to make into radios, where we buy the cheapest raw materials, so that we may sell the cheapest radios. What does productivity mean to us? Productivity means, to us, that we are able to deliver an effective fighting force with a minimum cost in blood and danger and death and to win in war. That is our payoff. That is a very difficult objective to achieve, one which we struggle to achieve all the time with varying degrees of success. It is very eye-catching to buy a $600 toilet seat. It is much worse to buy a $30 million aeroplane which you do not need, or to buy the wrong aeroplane, or to buy a frigate when you actually need small boats to sail around, or to buy a tank which costs $2 million, instead of one which costs $1 million and does the same job twice as well. That is what productivity means, and that is where the focus of my Ministry's efforts are, when we try to make sure that money is well spent. We try our best to make sure that our money is well spent. We scrutinize purchases very carefully, both in the Defence Ministry and also in the Defence Committee, comprising critical Cabinet Ministers. I can assure the Member that we do not throw money away. I should also say that despite the eye-catching news from the US Congress about gold-plated items - I think what Senator William Proxmire calls "gold-plated mouse-traps" - the US Congress is totally ineffective at controlling the US defence budget and, in their haste not to catch mice but to catch mouse-traps, the aircraft carriers sail by without anybody realizing what has happened. So let us concentrate on the critical, big, items. Efficiency and productivity in the more ordinary sense, talking about whether our people generate ideas, whether we have WITS teams, whether we have BEST programmes to help soldiers upgrade themselves so that they get some basic education, yes, we do that. Not only because it is in line with the national effort, but also because it is good for us. 12.00 pm We want soldiers who can think for themselves. We want soldiers who can take the initiative and act on their own. We want soldiers who can behave with common sense when their Commanders are absent, or when their Commanders are killed. This is why we put a lot of effort into people-oriented management, into encouraging active participation from our national servicemen and regulars, into encouraging people to think. "What will I be doing? I am the person who is doing it. Could I do this better?" Because who knows better than the rifleman whether the rifle he is carrying meets his every need? We have experts, we have management, but if only the man who does it will know well enough to say, "Well, you put the knob, not quite at the right place, so that when I stretch out my left forefinger, I cannot reach it because it is a quarter centimetre too far away." We encourage all our people to bring these ideas up. We have literally thousands of suggestions every year in the Suggestion Scheme. Some are good ones, and we hope that this atmosphere will continue. Cooked food, which the Member raised, is in fact one example of what we are trying to do to raise productivity. When looking for a solution to a problem like this, you really must ask: What is the most cost-effective solution, from the national point of view? We had many national servicemen available during the baby boom years of the mid-70s. We had 30,000 people coming in a year. We could afford to be generous. We could afford to give every unit its own cook sergeants, its own facilities, and expect it to prepare its own food. We no longer have 30,000 national servicemen a year, because fewer babies were born 18 years ago in 1967. Even fewer babies are being born today than in 1967. Today, we have about 20,000 national servicemen a year. It will go down further, to 18,000, 17,000. You can read the Population statistics. So, every national serviceman that we have is a valuable digit to us. He must learn to fight. And he must learn to be a frontline soldier. Wherever possible, if he is a supporting soldier, we must be sure that it is a critical supporting function which can only be done by a soldier in wartime, and that a civilian will not do. Cooks, in this scale of things, are not very high. If we can have civilians cook for us, if we can have food mass-prepared for us, palatable, nutritious, and efficiently served out, then we should do that. National servicemen are not cheap labour. We must use our resources wisely. I assure the Member for Whampoa that we take great care to make sure that food is palatable. I do not know when he last had chicken in the SAF, but I extend him and all other Members a standing invitation: any time, let me know and I will bring you to taste SAF food, without notice. And I think he will find that it is not what he expects it to be. I hope he will take up this offer. All offers made from this side of the House are serious ones. Thirdly, Welfare. I shall deal with not only the Member for Whampoa's points but also the Member for Pasir Panjang's. We had only a token sum of $10 in the line item last year. This year it is being removed. The question is why. The amount allocated under Welfare has been $10 ever since 1977. It is only $10 because, in fact, the SAF Welfare Fund has got miscellaneous sources of funds. It gets a rebate from selling duty-free beer to the troops. It gets some income from operating coinafons in Units, which soldiers use to telephone friends and families. And it gets miscellaneous other donations to finance its activities. Each year we spend altogether about $2.4 million. Of that, loans and grants to servicemen come to about $100,000. Loans for SBS shares come to $0.5 million, because we make easy loans for soldiers to buy SBS shares, so that they are able to get concession rates to go to and from work. Funeral grants - money given out when a relative of a serviceman passes away, or when a serviceman himself passes away and the family has to cope with funeral expenses - come to $0.5 million. And various Unit recreational activities and welfare amenities come to $1.3 million. That adds to $2.4 million. So I think we spend quite a lot money on welfare, and our Commanders are indoctrinated into this. We ask them to think of ways in which they can improve the welfare of their servicemen. Because a serviceman who is well looked after is a serviceman who will fight well in war. That incidentally answers the other question on what we do for poor national servicemen. We give loans to them, grants to them, and we make sure that the family does not suffer undue hardship as a result of his national service. The Member for Thomson raised a number of points. Passports - why do reservists have passports for only one year? Well, I should say, before I answer this question, that, like him, I am a reservist also. So if he declares his interest, I share it with him. Why do we have passports for reservists for one year? Actually, reservists can leave the country for up to six months at a time, without requiring an exit permit. So we give you a one-year passport. When you consider that, if you go to a country like the United States, they want six months life at the end of your passport before they let you in, then it is reasonable, because we give you enough life on your passport for you to make a journey without an exit permit. Longer than that, you need an exit permit. You have to come to us, and we will give you the exit permit; we will give you the passport. And if you have a specific purpose, for example, you are studying overseas, or you are working overseas, then we give you a passport for that duration plus six months at the end, so that you can stay the whole length of time there and will not have to come back or go to great inconvenience to have your passport renewed, Passports are really also a means for us to keep contact with our reservists. We would like to know where you are. We would like to know if you are going away, and, if you are going to be away for a long time, we must know, because your Unit must plan for somebody to replace you. Otherwise, if ever we go to war when you are in the United States or Europe, and we cannot reach you, then your Unit will not know what to do - is it because you are still at home and have not got the message, or because you are away, and have to be replaced? There is an operational requirement. Weekly break from in-camp training, yes, one full-day per week. I think there is the term "subject to exigencies of service". If you are in Singapore, and you are doing in-camp training, yes, you get a day off. I think it is done. If you are on exercise, the exercise takes precedence. I you are overseas, it is very hard to fly you back. So, "wherever possible." What have we done to upgrade reservists? We have talked about this a lot because it is important to us. Let me just give you a few indicative numbers. About half of our key officer appointments in reserve units are filled by reservists - Battalion Commanders, Brigade Principal Staff, Brigade Second-in-Command - 96 out of 205. The number will go up. We hope in four or five years' time to fill them all with reservists. For the time being, these are the people we have available. We are trying our best to find some more, to train some more. Last year, we upgraded from lower appointments, 538 Other Ranks and 303 Officers. That means, moving a Platoon Commander up to be a Company Commander, or moving a Platoon Sergeant up to be a Company Sergeant Major. To make bigger steps from NCO to become an Officer, or from a Private to become a Warrant Officer, that is harder. That is harder not because we are unwilling to do it. We are prepared to do it, but the amount of time necessary to be invested to make you a competent officer or a competent Senior Warrant Officer is large. We cannot just put you through a ten-day programme, put some brass on your shoulder, declare you an Officer, and have everybody salute you. You would be ashamed of yourself, and everybody would be ashamed of you. So if you want to be an Officer, you must go through the proper process - SAFTI, Officer Cadet School, spend some time command a platoon, get some experience, self-confidence, leadership, and then you will be a lieutenant or captain. If any reservist is willing to spend this time, we are happy to put in the investment because having proven himself in outside life, he would be a good investment. But I do not know whether many reservists would be able to do this, because they have other demands on their time also. Our long-term objective is to match civil advancement with military advancement. In other words, if you are in charge of a big company, if you are in charge of a department, or, if you are a Minister, then you should also be a senior reservist. Because if you can do that, you should be able to perform in the army. And, conversely, if you cannot perform in the army, it is unlikely that you will be able to excel outside. This is a long-term objective which we are working towards. Feedback. My first comment on feedback is that feedback is two-way. It is sometimes forgotten, but it is important. You must hear me, I must hear you. Because if you do not hear me, I can listen to you, but I will be unable to communicate with you, to meet your objections, to make you understand what is good, and how to meet your own aspirations. So the first thing is for us to make sure that everybody understands the Mindef line. When we talk about Total Defence, what do we want? When you talk about the 13-year cycle, what do we expect out of the reservists? That has to go on. At the same time, we collect feedback on the overall- policy. Do people believe in national defence? Do people believe that national service is important? We collect feedback also on individuals. Are particular individuals badly affected by our policy, which overall is correct, but may not have coped with this particular exception? Perhaps something has to be done to alleviate that case. How do we do this? We have a variety of means. In fact, we have been doing this for some time already, long before the current heightened interest on feedback came about. We have, first of all, a chain of command. If you are unhappy, you tell our Commanding Officer. And that is very important because your Commanding Officer, most often, has the greatest ability to put things right as quickly as possible. That is one way. The second way, if this does not work, is the Meet-the-Reservist sessions. The Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Mindef regularly meets reservists in SAFRA. The reservists come with their problems. We look at them - deferment cases, cases of in-camp training, cases where people want some adjustment to their national service terms, these are dealt with by the Senior Parliamentary Secretary, and he has had a good response. Thirdly, servicemen can, in extremis, call direct. They can call our Personnel Affairs Department, our Personnel Services Centre, our Counselling Centre. These agencies deal with individual serviceman. They will be the friendly front to the whole of the Mindef bureaucracy. You do not have to go round looking for individual Mindef departments, who may send you on a wild goose chase. But see him, and he will give you a one-stop answer. He will go round, he will find the answer. He will deal with you, and try to satisfy you. Feedback is critical to us not only because of peacetime considerations, but also because of wartime considerations. When you go to war, before you commit a battalion to battle, you must know whether it is going to stand, or it is going to disintegrate. So in war, it is critical. We depend on the chain of command, but we also want other ways to find out what the state of morale is. Under those circumstances, we are not talking about individual soldier anymore, but about the group. Psychologists can help. We are looking for ways to do this, to give a psychological test to some of the soldiers in the battalion, and quickly tell from the results whether morale is high or low, whether they have a sense of what is going on around them, whether they have a sense of control over what is going on, and whether there is going to be a crisis of morale. That sort of feedback is also important in peacetime, of course, because we must know whether to have confidence in our troops. We are working on this now. Now, I come to the Member for Pasir Panjang. He asked about the career development of old officers and NCOs, regular officers (NCOs) who have been with us for a long time, people who have given dedicated, yeoman service. Do we have schemes, plans to upgrade them? Yes, we have. They attend military courses, they get career postings, they get developed in their jobs, .and they also attend courses outside of the SAF - management courses. There are many. 12.15 pm But I would say to the Member for Pasir Panjang that We should not send such regulars, who have proven their worth, and demonstrated their ability, on a wild goose paper chase. It is not necessary because we know them, and they know us. They are mature, they are formed. They know what they can do, we know what they can do, If you have a degree, if you have a certificate, if you have a diploma, it will not make the slightest difference to the way we look at you and to your prospects in the organization. There is sometimes the belief that, if only you had a piece of paper, you would move faster. I assure you, Sir, that in Mindef, we look at what a person is worth, not what a person brings with him by way of paper. And that must be the way we manage an efficient armed force. Reservists. How do we encourage reservists, indoctrinate them, give them the right ideas, make them understand what Total Defence is all about? We try very hard in active national service. We try very hard by advertising. It is a continuous process. But there are two points which I would especially wish to raise here. One, whether the reservist feels that he is making a valuable contribution depends on acceptance by society of his role in national defence. That means people accept that if you are a civilian running a bank, and if you have to do in-camp training, you must suspend any contract negotiations you may be involved in for a week or two while you do in-camp training, then come back and continue. Which is what senior management in Switzerland do, as a matter of routine. You deal with them. You are negotiating with them, but when they have to do their in-camp training, they go back, to do it. They come back, you resume. The second point is, when we talk of acceptance by society, we are especially concerned about employers, because employers are the ones most directly affected. If you leave the job for 40 days, your employer has to try to find somebody to stand in for you. It is not easy, it can be irritating, and very inconvenient. But I think it is critical. We have no other way. To pretend that we can keep a reserve force alive, vibrant, and operationally ready, without spending time every year to train them, to bring them together, to test out their skills, is to bluff ourselves. We have to bring them back. We have to spend the time. And the senior management of the Unit, the senior commanders and staff of the Unit, must spend more time. It has to be so. In the long-run, more and more the senior civilian echelon will coincide with the senior military echelon. And if you are not anything in the SAF, you are unlikely to be going very, very far up the ladder in your civilian career either. I say "in the long-run", because it takes time to develop this position. And if that is the position, then when employers look at a man who is a senior reservist and hesitate, because senior reservists spend more time training with the SAF, they should ask themselves, "Would you prefer this man, senior reservist that he is?"