CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE - (AMENDMENT) BILL - (As reported from Select Committee)
Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank all Members of Parliament who have spoken this afternoon. I notice that some MPs still have some reservations over certain changes to the original Bill. The points which they addressed have been debated by Members of the Select Committee and I would try to use the points in the Report to persuade those MPs who still have reservations to come on board. First, on the question of "sunset" clause, Dr Arthur Beng raised the point that if we do not lift the Whip in the next Parliament, it is as good as getting the NMPs accepted not just in this Parliament but also in future Parliaments because MPs who disagree will not have a choice. My approach in this exercise has been to try and persuade as many MPs as possible to come on board. If MPs are prepared to come on board on this issue, I am prepared to let them man the oar on this issue in the next Parliament. In other words, I am prepared to lift the Whip on this particular issue. I think it is fair that MPs should decide at the next Parliament whether they want to have NMPs or not. For this Parliament, I think once we have debated and decided, we should go ahead to appoint the NMPs. On the question of procedure, I believe some MPs are making heavy weather of the issue. For example, they argue that there should be a secret ballot for NMPs. I do not think the procedure of a secret ballot is superior to the one which we have put in the Select Committee's Report, and that is, for the Special Select Committee to consult, wherever possible and practical, each and every MP, either individually or as a group. In the process of consultation with the MPs, if Members so desire, the Chairman of the Special Select Committee can always do a quiet tally as to their views on particular nominees. In this way, the Special Select Committee actually would be able to know the views of MPs in so far as their support for certain nominees is concerned. And I believe in the process of consultation, views can be made known to the Special Select Committee, whereas if you go through a process of voting, the views of MPs may not be known. It is only an "aye" or a "nay" on particular nominees. I believe the procedure which we have outlined is superior to a simple process of voting in Parliament. Again, I believe we are over-arguing the point about NMPs having to retire or resign from political parties. I think the point is taken. If a person wishes to be an NMP, he should by convention resign from a political party. I prefer to leave it to convention because I do not want to load the Bill unnecessarily to legally require a person to resign from a political party. I think it is unnecessary. Anybody who wants to come into this House as an NMP, and who has been a member of a political party, should resign. Anyway, the PAP will make sure that if we have such a person who wishes to be considered, and who is in fact considered and selected by the Special Select Committee, that man should resign from the party, so that he can keep his distance from the party, and have his independence in voting and speaking on issues. I believe this convention should also apply to NMPs who wish to stand for by-election. I do not think there is any purpose served in requiring an NMP who wishes to stand as independent from resigning his position. You can call him opportunistic, wanting the best of both worlds, so be it. But I think a certain convention will evolve over time. If an NMP wishes to stand for elections or a by-election, as a member of a political party, he should resign. But if he wishes to hedge his bet and stand as an independent, I do not think we need to require him to resign. It is entirely up to him. Again, I think convention will evolve over time. I see no real purpose served in requiring him to resign legally. Hence the Select Committee did not make this change to the Bill. On the more important point of appointment of NMPs to office positions, I can sense the unhappiness of Members of Parliament over this change because it does mean that the Government is looking outside this House, not this Government but perhaps a future government, to appoint certain people into office positions. I can understand their reservations and their unhappiness. But my primary concern is for the good of the nation, and I am not referring to the present Parliament, a point which was missed by Dr Lee Siew-Choh. We have 80 out of 81 MPs in this House and we are going to have in the next Parliament perhaps just as many PAP MPs in this House as now. I see no need for the PAP to appoint a nominated MP into Cabinet. But let us look further down the road. What are the possible scenarios - 20 years, 30 years? Can you assume that Parliament will always have 80 MPs from which to choose the Cabinet? I do not believe that 30 years down the road, we can still have the same situation. I hope we can, but I am not sure whether we can because success, I think, breeds certain restiveness in the population, and the population may want to vote in more Opposition Members. Or perhaps down the road, an alternative party can emerge and contest with the ruling Party and split the seats more or less half-half, in which case, whoever forms the Government in the future will have only about 40, 41 MPs to choose the Cabinet from. And you can count the number of positions in Cabinet from which such a ruling Party will have to select its Ministers. There are certain key positions where we should not just have a politician to head the Ministry. We must have the right politician, the man who is capable of doing the job, and the most critical Ministry, in my view, is the Ministry of Finance. I would rather that a government has the flexibility to appoint the right person to be the Minister for Finance than to compel that government to select from whoever is available in the House to be a Minister for Finance, even though he is not the best person. Again, my approach is what is in the interest of the people. If you appoint a rather inadequate person to be the Finance Minister, after four or five years, the economy is mismanaged, your reserves are depleted because of incompetent management, are we better off as a people or are we worse off? I believe we are worse off. And I want to give this flexibility to a future government that may need to have recourse to such an option. This recourse is fair to both parties because we cannot envisage down the road 30 years from now, 40 years from now, who will form the Government and what kind of Parliament we would have. I think it is wise for us to have this flexibility for the future, for the good of Singapore. I hold the view that what we do is not undemocratic because there are precedents for this. In Thailand, General Chavalit resigned yesterday so that he can be appointed a Minister, and he does not have to go through elections to be a Minister. Thailand is not the only example. In Japan, one can also be appointed as a Minister from outside the Diet, the equivalent of Parliament, and this is provided for in the Constitution of Japan. Its Constitution states that "the Prime Minister shall appoint a Minister of State [that is, Minister]. However, a majority of the number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet." In other words, in Japan which is a democracy, they can appoint non-Diet members to be Ministers, provided the majority still come from the elected representatives. Those are the main arguments why the Select Committee decided on allowing NMPs to be considered for appointment as office holders. We can look to other countries, eg, the United States, which has a different system. It is not a parliamentary system. But the President has the right to appoint Secretaries of State to assist him. And NMPs do give a future government that additional flexibility which I think will be very useful for Singapore to have. There were a few other suggestions by other MPs which related to the questions which I have dealt with, eg, by Dr Lau Teik Soon. He suggested that the public should be allowed a say on who should be nominated into Parliament. He asked for the opportunity to be given to members of the public to register their approval or disagreement. I want to remind the House that this is a scheme for nominated MPs. It is not a scheme for elected MPs. So I think we keep the public out. Just leave it to the Special Select Committee and leave it to the MPs who have been elected. Perhaps it is not in the Bill, but I think the Special Select Committee can also consult the Non-Constituency MP in this House. It is entirely up to the Special Select Committee to do so. Dr Wang Kai Yuen suggested that whether we have NMPs or not should depend on the number of Opposition MPs in this House. It was the point which I think he made in the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill. The answer lies in giving Parliament the discretion to decide on NMPs. He made the point that a party should not use the NMP scheme to consolidate its position. I have a different view on this. I think it is all right for the parties to consolidate their position by appointing the right people into Cabinet. If the NMPs can make a contribution to the government, that party does consolidate its position. But it does not help that party to have additional numbers to consolidate its position, because on matters of confidence MPs can move a motion of no-confidence against the government, but NMPs have no votes. So the additional NMPs do not help to consolidate the party in charge by having additional numbers in the party, because NMPs would have no votes on motions of confidence. Dr Lee Siew-Choh again made wild allegations without facts that our mind has been made up on the appointment of somebody into this House. Otherwise why do we provide for this uncertainty in expenditure in the Bill. If he refers to all Bills, he will discover that those are standard wordings, because expenditure cannot be estimated. Yes, we can estimate the allowances that are paid to NMPs precisely, provided we have agreed what the allowance is. But we have not agreed what the allowance is. There will be advertisements, and the procedure itself will incur some costs and those are not at this moment known. But the main point which I want to make is that the NCMP is very fond of making wild suggestions without any basis of facts. I can assure him and this House that we do not have anybody earmarked to be an office holder. Mr Chiam made some points which actually have been debated during the Second Reading and I do not believe we should go over the same grounds in the Third Reading of this Bill, eg, the essence of democracy is that you must have elected representatives and so on. I think this is the wrong forum for that debate. Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe I have covered most of the main reservations or queries of the MPs who have spoken. Again, I urge, take a detached view, approach this from the higher interest of the nation and not on how the NMPs would affect us personally. And despite the reservations, I urge, give this a try and I believe you will see the merits of the scheme and the contributions of the NMPs when they come into this House. And if you are not convinced after trying out this scheme for the remaining period of this Parliament, in the next Parliament you decide. The Whip will be lifted and you can decide how you want the NMP scheme to go in the next Parliament.