MAIN AND DEVELOPMENT - ESTIMATES OF SINGAPORE FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR - 1ST APRIL, 1991 TO 31ST MARCH, 1992
Mr Speaker, Mr Chandra Das asked about Singapore's role in the Growth Triangle and how many dollars we have spent directly on the projects. The Singapore Government's commitment to the Growth Triangle is through the involvement of agencies like EDB, TDB and JTC. The projects are conducted on a commercial basis. For example, Batam Industrial Park is being undertaken by BatamIndo, which has both Singapore and Indonesian partners. The companies which sign up in the park do so on a commercial basis, and even the developers would not proceed to develop the project unless there is a return on their investment. I think that is the soundest long-term basis for proceeding. But although we do not provide direct grants, we do have an interest in the long-term prosperity of our neighbours. Therefore we provide technical and financial assistance to encourage businessmen to take advantage of the opportunities and the abundant resources in our neighbouring countries. For example, EDB gives incentives to companies which are moving offshore as part of an overall business plan to upgrade the operations in Singapore. EDB's investment allowances and other training allowances are more generously forthcoming if, when the companies submit their plans for upgrading, one component involves moving offshore to Indonesia or to Johor. Secondly, companies which train Indonesian workers in Singapore to work in Batam can receive a training subsidy, which amounts up to half the foreign workers levy, for up to six months. So we are prepared to cover part of the cost of companies setting up in Batam. With Johor, we are discussing the possibility of jointly setting up a Technical Training Institute and a Technology Park. We are in contact with the Johor State government, and have written to them to propose setting up a high level working committee to get these projects going. We are optimistic that particularly the Technical Training Institute will be lounched within the year. That is not all, because as the activities expand, we will need to do more to promote the Growth Triangle. Take, for example, the training subsidy scheme which is presently enjoyed by industries in Batam. We are developing an industrial park on Bintan as well. When Bintan is ready, the training subsidy scheme will be extended to cover Bintan, because that is a joint project, just like Batam. And even with Johor, once we have similar joint projects with Johor, we can extend the same scheme to these Johor projects as well. We will also gradually move towards projects which involve all three of the partners of the Growth Triangle. Last week, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir, visited Batam. You may have seen on television that Prof. Habibie and Mr Mah Bow Tan were on hand to greet him and showed him around. Dr Mahathir then suggested that we should hold discussions among all three partners in the Growth Triangle. Singapore will be happy to take part. We hope there will soon be more activities which involve all three partners. Last year, Singapore and Indonesia did a joint industrial promotion mission, promoting investments in Tokyo and in Osaka. Johor has expressed its keenness to do a similar operation with Singapore. Perhaps for the next mission, we should bring all three together, Singapore, Johor and Indonesia. We should be able to do that within the year. The problems like traffic jams, customs clearance, also mentioned by Mr Das, are being studied by a joint Singapore-Johor Committee on Business Cooperation. They have been brought to the attention of the Malaysian Government. I am confident that the Malaysian Government is as anxious as we are to solve the problems, because these are unnecessary hindrances which will slow down the development of Johor and retard the growth of the Growth Triangle. Secondly, land and labour. Mr Das and Mr Chew Heng Ching have talked about the problems of labour shortage, the inflexibility of the foreign worker policy, some of the problems with revising industrial land prices and rentals from year-to-year, because we always dispute what the correct revision should be. They have suggested a more flexible, market-oriented approach to deal with these scarce resources. I agree with them. We need to allocate these scarce resources efficiently and fairly so that the people who need it, get it, and the people who are best able to make use of it, get the chance to do so. The present arrangements are workable, but they are not perfect. The MPs have pointed out some of the shortcomings. We should make use of market forces as much as possible. The allocation of foreign workers is subject to many non-economic considerations. We have to worry about the social cost, about foreign workers holding back upgrading, the impact on NTUC members and Singapore workers. It is not an entirely free market. But, nevertheless, given that we are going to bring in 200,000, 300,000 or whatever number of foreign workers, it is possible to use the market to distribute this number of workers fairly, to the people who need them most. Presently, we have a foreign worker levy. That is already partially a market test, because if you are not able to pay the levy, then you probably should not be hiring a foreign worker. But the levy is inflexible. We cannot change it every month, otherwise employers would be unable to plan ahead. Besides the levy, we have a 40% cap on the dependency ratio. So if you have 100 workers, then no more than 40 may be foreign workers. That is a further restriction because if there is a sudden burst or spurt in business, you may want to hire more than 40% foreign workers for a short period of time, and then go back down again. One way to do this, as Mr Das suggested, is to have a 2-tier levy system. First-tier can be up to 30% or 35%, lower than the present 40%. It can be arranged as at present. Second-tier can go beyond 40%, to 45% or 50%, but at a higher price. Either we set a higher foreign worker levy or, alternatively, we can have a tender system to tender out entitlements to hire foreign workers. We are studying these possibilities. It is not purely a MTI matter. The Ministry of Labour is principally responsible. We are discussing it with them and I am sure if you ask the Minister, he would have some more to add in due course. Similarly, with industrial land. The Government owns nearly all the land and allocates it direct to JTC. JTC develops it, and leases it to tenants. How do we know what the price should be? There is some comparison. You can look at Hong Kong, you can look at Malaysia. You can tell that land for flatted factories in Ang Mo Kio cannot cost as little as land in Tuas, which is further away and is meant for lower density development. But can we be certain of our price estimates? It is very difficult because despite the best efforts of the valuers, in the absence of actual transactions, it is only a guess, as to what the land ought to be worth. What we should do is instead of giving all the land to JTC, to provide certain chunks for the private sector to develop. For example, if each year we put up 150 hectares, one-third can go to the private sector. We tender those sites, the private sector develops them, markets them, promotes their own industrial estates. You have JTC Industrial Estate, you can have DBS Industrial Estate, or OUB, or Hong Leong, or whoever. And then we will know what is the land worth, what are the differentials, whether we are allocating too much or too little land to industries, whether we are being fair to our tenants when we tell them, "Next year, the rentals must go up by 20% or 25%." There will be a basis to decide. We are studying this. It will take some time to do but I think it is workable. Thirdly, Mr Chew Heng Ching asked about the Singapore dollar. This is the responsibility of MAS and the Minister for Finance. The Singapore dollar has an impact on business cost in Singapore because when it moves up then all your Singaporean factors of production become more expensive - labour, land, rentals. But our position has always been that the Singapore dollar is not an instrument for short-term management of domestic demand. When we go into a recession, we do not depreciate the dollar. When we have a strong economy, neither do we deliberately push it up. It is the market which decides the value of the Singapore dollar in the long term. And in the short term, the fluctuations in the currency values reflect underlying forces which are not really within the control of the Government. The Government can moderate and dampen the movements, but we cannot prevent them. If the market believes that the Singapore dollar should be at an exchange rate of $1.50 with the US dollar, and the Government believes that it should be $1.70, then the Government cannot continue to buy American dollars on the market and sell Singapore dollars. It will accumulate billions of dollars of hot floating reserves, which can move out the moment the market changes its mind, or, perhaps after we have failed in our forex operations, and the exchange rate has shifted against us, so that when the money leaves we have lost out. If the Japanese cannot maintain the Yen value, the Germans cannot maintain the Deutschemark value, against market pressures, neither can the Singapore Government support and defend a Singapore dollar exchange rate which is not justified by the underlying fundamentals, and by the market assessment of what the dollar is worth. 2.45 pm Last year, in 1990, the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar went up, by about 10% against the US dollar. Despite this, we have remained broadly competitive, as I shall show in a moment, although I concede that companies which did not allow sufficiently for currency movements have probably found the adjustment painful. Because when you have a long-term contract valued in Singapore dollars, there might be some variation for exchange rates, but it is unlikely that it would have allowed for as wide a variation. This is unfortunate, but it happens whenever an exchange rate moves. When the Yen went from 230 to the US dollar to 170 and then briefly to 130, the Japanese called it the endaka, high Yen shock. All the Japanese companies which had overseas contracts, which means many of them, were hurt. But they tightened their belts, squeezed themselves, upgraded their productivity and they became competitive again. I am confident that Singapore companies will in due course become competitive again. There is a benefit from a higher Singapore dollar, ie, lower imported inflation. For example, last year, inflation was 3.4%. That was with the Singapore dollar's appreciation. If the Singapore dollar had not appreciated, then inflation would have been around 5%, but that would not have been the end of the story. Because the 5% will feed through higher wage increases, other domestic costs will go up, and eventually exports will become less competitive. In recent months, the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar has stabilised. Inflationary pressures overseas have eased because of lower oil prices. Domestically our growth rate has moderated. Therefore, major shifts in the exchange rate against the exchange rate of major trading partners in the near future are unlikely. Finally, the cost of doing business. Many Members have expressed this concern. I think the statistics will tell a clear story. I have prepared some charts (Cols. 489 - 494) which I would like the Clerk to distribute. [Copies of charts distributed to hon. Members.] charts - GROSS RATE OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING vs REAL GDP GROWTH, NOMINAL GDP GROWTH, PROFIT SHARE AND CHANGES IN PROFIT BEFORE TAX OF COMPANIES, SINGAPORE'S RELATIVE UNIT LABOUR COST AGAINST THE OTHER NIEs AND UNIT BUSINESS COST OF MANUFACTURING (1980=100) (Cols. 489 - 494) While they are being distributed, let me say that this is not a new subject. Every year we discuss this. Every time any costs have to be revised, predictably people say that business costs are going up. Every time the CPF adjustments are made, a chorus is an inevitable concomitant. So after a while we have to work harder to distinguish which are genuine cries of pain and which are standard expressions of regret. The greatest danger for a Trade and Industry Minister is to mistake one for the other, because then he not only makes a wrong decision but the economy will go into a nosedive. But I think that this year we are not badly off. Let me show you the charts. Business costs are important, but the bottom line worry of businessmen is not costs per se but the impact on profitability and competitiveness. Look at Chart 1. Chart 1 shows three lines. First, GDP growth just as a base line from 1980 onwards, healthy, down to zero in 1985, back up to good levels in 1987, 1988 and 1989. Secondly, look at the gross rate of return in manufacturing, in other words, how profitable our companies are. It is a proxy because we do not have figures for banks and the financial sector and so forth. They were very profitable in 1980. The profitability steadily declined, reaching a bottom in 1985, and then went up sharply again in 1988, down slightly in 1989. We do not have the 1990 figures. The 1989 and 1990 profitability figures are not very far from the levels of when the economy was doing very strongly, in 1980, 1981, or for that matter, 1986, 1987 and 1988. Profits were strong. Furthermore, our profitability levels are much higher than those in the US, Japan or West Germany, shown by the dotted line on the chart. When our profitability dived, it went down almost to the level of the developed countries. At that point, Singapore cannot compete. Unless we have an edge, nobody is going to leave America, Japan and West Germany and come to Singapore. But the gap now is 12 percentage points. The American gross rate of return is around 15%. Singapore's figure is around 27%. So whatever the business costs, this is how it impacts the bottom line. May I then take you to Chart 2 which gives you similar data, but this is broader. These are companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. The top chart shows the profit share of GDP, meaning the percentage of GDP which is accounted for by profits. The rest goes to wages and to the Government. The profit share was very high in 1980 - 54%, more than half of GDP. Then it went down steadily. In 1985 where it reached a bottom of 43 1/2%, before it began to come up again. In 1986, 1987 and 1988 it reached a peak. In 1989 and 1990, the profit share was still around 48.4%, quite a lot higher than in the trough of the recession. So profits have not been squeezed. The second chart at the bottom shows the growth of profits of companies over time, how much better they were doing year on year. You can see again that profits before tax have been growing by about 20% per year. In addition, corporate tax has been going down year by year, so profits after tax have been increasing even faster. So companies have been doing well. Finally, costs themselves. Chart 3 shows two lines there. The dotted line shows the unit business cost, ie, comparing Singapore alone, over time. It shows that unit business cost reached a peak around 1985, declined in 1987 and has gone up again. In 1990, they were now near 1985 levels, but that is in absolute terms. What is more important to us is how in relative terms, our business costs compare with the other NICs and our competitors. For that, you look at the solid line, relative unit labour cost. The peak was in 1985 when the index was about 162. It went down steadily year by year to reach about 110 in 1989, and in 1990 it was back up, but still below 120. I concede that the NICs are not our only competitors, we also have to look at Malaysia, which is coming up very rapidly, Indonesia and Thailand. Then the picture becomes more complicated. But as a first approximation, the economy is strong. We forecast 3-6% growth for the year. That was before the Gulf War broke out, and the Gulf War ended. We are quite confident that we will make this. We have some preliminary figures for the first quarter. They have not been published yet, but they are positive. I therefore fully agree with Mr Lim Boon Heng, who said on Monday that the 1% in employers' CPF contribution is the least that we can do, in order to keep faith with the workers whose sacrifices and contributions have brought us thus far. I concede that not all companies will be equally affected. Local companies may be more severely impacted. We may need to give more help to the SMEs, as Mr Philip Tan has pointed out. We will continue to do that, through the Small Industries Financing Scheme, the Business Development Schemes, feedback meetings, discussions and, most of all, through healthy, bracing, strong competition, including fair competition from Government companies. Because it is only through competition that you can make a living abroad. If you cannot compete with a few puny Government companies in Singapore, you have no chance when you go overseas. I am quite confident that many of them will do well. I have met them. We talked to them and they are on their own and prospering.