Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill 1996 contains amendments relating to three issues: (a) Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs); (b) The Elected President's powers; and (c) The Council of Presidential Advisers. GRC Amendments The first set of amendments is set out in clause 14 of the Bill. The amendments increase the maximum number of MPs representing a GRC from four to six. Members may recall that there were two reasons for creating GRCs. The first reason was to guarantee multi-racial representation in Parliament. This was what started us thinking about changing the single member constituency system, and studying schemes like twinning candidates, with one Chinese and another minority candidate in an enlarged two-member constituency. The second reason for GRCs was to fit in with the proposal to set up Town Councils. Our original idea was just to twin two single constituencies. But because of Town Councils, we decided to create GRCs with three members instead. I explained this to Parliament in January 1988, when I moved the amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Constitution to create GRCs. I said that although Town Councils and multi-racial MPs were tWo different ideas, they were compatible with each other, and the GRC proposal was designed to achieve both. I quote from Hansard, Vol. 50, Col. 184, of 11th January 1988: "The town council proposal and the team MP proposal are two different concepts. One is to give residents more authority, more responsibility, to manage their own housing estates; the other is to ensure that Parliament would always be multi-racial. But though the two concepts are different, they are compatible. After an election three MPs, although they are voted in separately, can get together to form a town council. Also, after an election, a group of MPs, three in this case, in a Group Representation Constituency, can also form a town council. Thus, though the two concepts are different, they can be worked together. That was how Group Representation Constituencies, each about the size of three single-member Constituencies and each to be served by a team of three MPs, came to replace twin constituencies." Both the Town Council and the GRC schemes have been successful. As we gained confidence in the schemes, we adapted and extended them in the light of our experience. Thus in 1990, we changed the maximum number of GRC candidates from three to four, to provide flexibility in dealing with a GRC whose population was expanding rapidly. I now propose to take the ideas of Town Councils and GRCs another step further. Town Councils were set up to give more authority and responsibility to residents to manage their own estates. I intend to devolve still more authority to the local communities, by setting up Community Development Councils (CDCs). CDCs will bring government closer to the people and encourage communities to manage their own affairs. They will take over some work hitherto undertaken by Ministries and Government agencies. CDCs will be given more responsibility and resources to carry out self-help projects and dispense help to the needy, for example, through Edusave scholarships and bursaries and Medifund grants. This will strengthen social cohesion and bonding among Singaporeans. For CDCs to be effective, they need to have responsibility for a critical mass of residents. Increasing the maximum number of MPs in a GRC from four to six will give more flexibility to the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee to configure a GRC which is the right size for this purpose. Not all GRCs need to have six members. But where it will be more convenient to create a 6-member GRC, the Committee will be able to do so. Devolving more powers to MPs in Town Councils and CDCs, and enlarging the maximum size of GRCs, is electorally neutral. It gives no unfair advantage either to the PAP or the opposition parties. But it gives voters a bigger stake in the result of their choice, because team MPs will manage more matters, including some duties of the Government now carried out by MCD, Ministry of Education and the hospitals. As a result, their voting will affect them in many more matters within the constituency. So voters are more likely to scrutinise the candidates, their characters and programmes carefully. Bigger GRCs also put a premium on a strong anchor-man for the team of candidates standing there. Then whichever party wins, the GRC is better off with a strong anchor-man heading a strong team, and not just a glib talker supported by a group of straw men. Therefore, the party which wins the largest number of GRCs is more likely to be able to put together a team of competent Ministers to govern the country. In other words, each constituency election in a larger GRC will become more like a national election. Voters will not only be voting for a team of MPs to manage their constituency, but also for part of the core leadership team of the winning party. This will strengthen the political system. Democracy is about exercising the choice of voting for, rather than voting against, something. At the national level, this means voting for a government which will make sound policies and lead the country into the future. At the GRC level, it means voting for a team who will make life better for the residents of the GRC. Democracy can only work when voters support the candidates whom they really have faith in: able and honest people to whom they want to entrust the country and their future. A system which encourages voters to do this is more likely to promote long term political stability in Singapore and the well being of voters themselves. The opposition have been urging voters to do the exact opposite. When they tout their "by-election strategy", what they all mean is that people should vote for opposition candidates, even though they do not trust these candidates to govern Singapore. If this happens in one or two constituencies, the governing Party loses a few seats, but the harm done is not serious, provided the opposition MPs voted in are honest men, who are not out to destroy the system. But if voters do this across the board, they will deprive the party which they in fact support, of the mandate, or the full team of Ministers, that it needs to govern Singapore. This will destabilise the political system, and lead to week governments or even a freak election result. Some people have expressed concern that this change to the GRC rules will compromise minority representation in Parliament. I have said that this will not happen: the PAP will not field fewer minority MPs as a result of this change. If necessary, it will field more than one minority candidate in some GRCs, especially the larger ones, or field minority candidates in single member constituencies. The purpose of the GRC scheme has never been to prescribe a fixed number of MPs from minority communities. It is to guarantee a minimum representation of minority community in Parliament, so that minorities are never excluded from Parliament, by some chance election result in which no minority candidates at all are elected from the single-member constituencies. The Constitution sets out the framework of the GRC scheme, including the maximum number of candidates per GRC, presently four. The Parliamentary Elections Act specifies that at least one quarter of the total number of elected MPs should come from GRCs. With 81 MPs, this means the Parliamentary Elections Act requires a theoretical minimum of six minority candidates. However, we presently have far more than six GRCs. In fact, we have 15 GRCs, as recommended by the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee before the previous general elections. And there are 17 non-Chinese elected MPs in Parliament today, more than the number of GRCs. All are PAP MPs. There are more PAP minority MPs than GRCs, because Bedok and Toa Payoh GRCs have each two minority members. There is therefore no reason to worry that as a result of increasing the maximum size of GRCs to six, minority representation in Parliament will be compromised. Some people have suggested that if we increase the maximum size of GRCs, we could require the larger GRCs to have two candidates belonging to two different minority communities, instead of one as at present. We may also guarantee a higher minimum proportion of minority MPs in other ways, for example, by requiring a larger proportion of MPs to be returned from GRCs. This is worth considering. But I do not think we are ready to implement it now. We should first gain some experience with the system which allows GRCs to have between three to six members. Only then may we consider writing such a provision into the law. The Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill 1996 will make consequential changes to the Parliamentary Elections Act. The detailed changes will be dealt with later when the Bill comes up for Second Reading. Elected President's Powers The second group of amendments in the Constitution (Amendment) Bill is to fine-tune the provisions concerning the President's veto powers. They affect the President's powers in two areas: (1) Bills which circumvent or curtail his discretionary powers; and (2) Key appointments. I will deal with the President's veto powers as regards Bills first. Veto Powers over Bills On 25th August 1994, DPM Lee Hsien Loong explained to this House a problem with the drafting of the mechanism by which the elected President provisions were entrenched in the Constitution, particularly Article 22H. DPM Lee said that the Government intended to amend Article 22H to remedy the problem, but the question had arisen whether the President already had under the existing Article 22H the right to veto such an amendment. The President had stated that in the interest of testing out the system, he would like this question to be referred to the Courts for a ruling, and that he would accept whatever interpretation of Article 22H the Courts ruled to be correct. The Government therefore put this question to a 3-man Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges headed by the Chief Justice. On 20th April 1995, the Tribunal gave its opinion that: "Although Article 5(2A) of the Constitution has not been brought into operation, the President has no power under Article 22H(1) of the Constitution to withhold his assent to any Bill seeking to amend the provisions referred to in Article 5(2A), and specifically to any Bill seeking to amend Article 22H to restrict the powers of the President thereunder to any non-constitutional Bill which provides directly or indirectly for the circumvention or curtailment of the President's discretionary powers conferred upon him by the Constitution." In view of this opinion, the Government is proceeding with the amendments to 22H as it originally intended. These amendments are set out in clauses 2, 3 and 8 of the Bill. Let me explain the problem with Article 22H. When the Elected President amendments were passed in January 1991, the legislative intent was, firstly, that Constitutional amendments which circumvent or curtail the Elected President's discretionary powers should be subject to a referendum and, secondly, that the Elected President's veto over Constitutional changes which affect his powers should not be brought into effect immediately, but only after we have had several years of experience operating and refining the system. This was to have been achieved by placing the master entrenching mechanism clause in one Article - Article 5(2A), and then delaying bringing Article 5(2A) into effect until we were ready. This was done. Unfortunately, we overlooked another Article - Article 22H, which has been brought into effect. Article 22H was intended to cover non-Constitutional legislation. If such legislation circumvents or curtails the President's discretionary powers, the President can refuse assent, and if the Courts uphold the President, the matter is final. Article 22H does not cause any problem when it is applied to non-Constitutional legislation. Such legislation should never circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. These powers are spelt out in the Constitution. If a Constitutional provision is unsatisfactory, the remedy is to amend the Constitution, not to pass other legislation which contradicts it. The question is whether Article 22H also covers Constitutional amendments. The Attorney-General argued before the Tribunal that it did not. But the Tribunal did not rule on this wider issue. It confined itself to answering the precise question posed to it, that is, whether the President could veto an amendment to Article 22H, which is a core provision. Its answer was no, the President could not veto an amendment to Article 22H. There is therefore still a doubt whether Article 22H applies to Constitutional amendments. If it does, this would give rise to two problems. First, the non-core provisions of the Constitution would be protected by an inappropriate criterion. Let me explain. Under Article 5(2A), if the Government wants to amend core provisions of the Constitution, it can either persuade the President to waive the requirement for a national referendum, or put the question to a referendum and win a two-thirds majority. The final test is a political one of policy, whether we should or should not circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. Under Article 22H, on the other hand, if the President refuses to assent to an amendment to a non-core Constitutional provision, the question is put to the Courts. The Courts must answer a narrow question whether the amendment does in fact circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. If the Courts agree with the President that it does, then the President's veto is upheld. The final test of the Constitutional amendment is a judicial one of law: whether it does or does not circumvent or curtail the President's powers. The Courts do not, and correctly cannot, decide the wider political question whether it is desirable to modify the President's powers as proposed. Article 22H, therefore, is inadequate because it provides no mechanism, such as a referendum, to decide this wider question. That is the first problem. The second problem is that Article 22H would prematurely confer upon the President the power to veto non-core Constitutional amendments. The Government has not brought Article 5(2A) into effect in order to preserve full flexibility to amend the Constitution and modify the Elected President provisions in the light of practical experience. This leads to an anomaly: amendments to non-core Constitutional provisions are subject to Presidential veto, if they circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers, whereas the core provisions setting out these powers have, correctly, not yet been entrenched. The solution is to separate Article 22H into two parts, which can be brought into effect separately: One part is an amended Article 22H, confined to legislation other than Constitutional amendments, where the President's veto, once upheld by the Courts, is final. Before or after exercising his veto, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, seek the opinion of the Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges as to whether the legislation has the effect of circumventing or curtailing his discretionary powers. A second part is a separate mechanism to deal with non-core Constitutional Bills. A new Article 5A deals with Constitutional amendments which do not affect the core provisions listed in the master entrenchment provision, Article 5(2A), but nonetheless have the effect of circumventing or curtailing the President's discretionary powers. Again, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, obtain an opinion from the Tribunal. However, unlike Article 22H, the President's veto under the new Article 5A is not final. If the Tribunal upholds the President's view that the Bill does have the effect of circumventing or curtailing its discretionary powers, the Prime Minister may refer the Bill to a national referendum. If two-thirds of the electorate support the Bill, the President's veto will be overruled. The President will be required under both the new Articles 5A and 22H to expressly state whether he intends to withhold his assent to the proposed legislation. If the President has not exercised his veto within 30 days of the proposed legislation being presented to him, he is deemed to have assented to the Bill. This is the same provision as the existing Article 148A(5) of the Constitution, which applies to Supply and Supplementary Bills. The Select Committee adopted this Article from a Malaysian provision. Its purpose was to deal with a difficult President. This was the reason given in the Committee Report: "... the Committee recognizes that a problem can arise if a President deliberately or otherwise delays conveying his decision on assent ... Such delay or failure to decide will prevent Parliament from trying to override the President's veto ...". No such problem has in practice arisen between the incumbent Executive and the incumbent President since the legislation was brought into effect. However, to prevent a problem from arising in future, we are taking the opportunity to insert this provision as a precaution. Consequential upon these changes, the master entrenchment provision in Article 5(2A) and Articles 21(2) and 150(5) have also to be amended. The amended Article 22H will be brought into effect once this Constitutional Bill is passed and assented to. This is to prevent non-Constitutional legislation from circumventing or curtailing the Elected President's discretionary powers. The new Article 5A will be brought into effect together with Article 5(2A) when we are ready to entrench the Elected President provisions. This is unlikely to be the final set of amendments before we can entrench the elected presidency provisions. We will probably need one or more rounds of amendments before bringing the new master entrenchment provision and new Article 5A into force. Veto Powers over Appointments I now turn to the amendments relating to the President's power of veto over appointments. Presently, the President's veto over appointments to key public officers and to the boards of the key statutory boards and Government companies in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution is final. It is final even if the President exercises his veto against the advice of the Council of Presidential Advisers. I explained during the Second Reading of the Elected Presidency amendments on 4th October 1990 the reason why we did not provide an override mechanism for appointments. I quote from Hansard, Vol. 56, columns 465 and 466, dated 4th October 1990: "The overriding mechanism by Parliament is confined only to Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills because these Bills originate from Parliament. It does not apply to the budget of a Government company or statutory board, or to appointments in the public services, because these matters do not come under the direct purview of Parliament. If there is a dispute here, the executive and the President will have to resolve it through fresh submissions of budgets and nominees for appointments." However, there will be occasions when the difference in views between the Executive and the President is one of judgement, rather than a black and white case of an unfit candidate. This will be so when the Council of Presidential Advisers actually supports the Government's nomination, but the President disagrees with the Council's advice. If this happens, the present arrangements unfortunately provide no means for the President and the Executive to resolve the impasse, other than the Executive putting up a fresh nomination. Given our limited talent pool, we may well end up with an inferior candidate. In such circumstances, it is better to have a mechanism to resolve the impasse, rather than force the Executive to nominate another candidate. Articles 22, 22A and 22C of the Constitution will therefore be amended so that where the President vetoes an appointment against the recommendation of the Council of Presidential Advisers, the Executive can take the matter to Parliament, and override the President's veto by a two-thirds majority. This is the same override mechanism provided in Article 148D with regard to the Government's Budget. This mechanism has one disadvantage. Invoking it will mean bringing into Parliament matters which do not come under Parliament's direct purview. We will have to discuss the merits of the candidate publicly. The experience of countries like the United States, which hold public confirmation hearings, shows the risks of this approach. Proceedings become politicised and sensationalised, private lives are publicised, and good men are put off from standing for office. But we do not expect such divergence in views between the President and the Executive over appointments to happen often. Most candidates for key appointments will still be considered and appointed outside the glare of publicity. And when the Executive decides to go to Parliament to override the President's veto, it can consciously weigh the disadvantages of the move against the importance of getting the particular candidate appointed. On balance, a Parliamentary override mechanism, although not perfect, is a workable solution. These amendments are part of the continuing process of fine-tuning the Elected Presidency provisions. There has been no impasse between the incumbent President and the Executive over any key appointment. The President has told me that he agrees with the amendments. Council of Presidential Advisers Let me now deal with the third category of amendments. At present the Council of Presidential Advisers consists of five members. Two are appointed by the President in his own discretion, two are appointed on the Prime Minister's advice, and one on the advice of Chairman PSC. The President, in his discretion, appoints one of the members as Chairman. Although the Presidential Advisers are appointed on the nomination of the President, the Prime Minister or the PSC Chairman, they have their own standing. They serve for fixed terms, and once appointed cannot be removed at will. When the legislation creating the Elected President was first passed, the Government had envisaged that as the institution of the Elected President evolved, the Council of Presidential Advisers would in time come to play a larger role. The experience gained with the Council over the last five years shows that the mechanism is workable. It is timely now to consider expanding the Council to further build up its stature. A larger Council will also enable us to tap a wider spread of expertise, so that the Council can better advise the President on the broad range of issues on which he must exercise his custodial functions. An enlarged Council will complement the new mechanism to override the President's veto of appointments. The override mechanism places a heavier responsibility on the Council. Their recommendation will determine whether the President's veto is final, or whether it can be overridden by Parliament. A larger Council is better placed to make a balanced and objective assessment of the suitability of the nominee. And if the President vetoes the candidate against the Council's advice, and the Executive seeks to override the President's veto, the Executive will have a stronger basis to do so. The Bill therefore amends Articles 37B and 37C to enlarge the Council from five to six members. Article 37J provides that in case the votes are tied, the Chairman of the Council will have the casting vote. The additional member will be nominated by the Chief Justice, and appointed by the President. Having the new member nominated by the Chief Justice, instead of by the Prime Minister or President, will build up the Council as an independent body. Finally, the Bill also makes a minor and technical amendment to Article 113 to reflect the authority of the Education Service Commission and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission with respect to pension rights of officers under their respective jurisdiction. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.