(Paper Cmd. No. 2 of 2000)
Sir, yesterday on Foreign Affairs, many Members raised issues on a wide variety of subjects, our relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, the position in ASEAN, East Timor, United Nations, technical assistance, amongst others. My colleague, Mr Zainul Abidin has touched on Singapore-Philippines relations, and this morning, we will address the other issues which were raised. 12.45 pm First of all, Malaysia-Singapore relations, a matter which several MPs touched on. They asked me about the state of relations as well as some specific aspects, such as updating on the package negotiations. As far as the overall relations are concerned, I last touched on this at our sitting on 17th January this year when I updated the House on the status of the package negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues. Sir, I would describe our relations with Malaysia to be in a "holding pattern". Following three rapid rounds of discussions on outstanding issues in March, April and May last year, the momentum of negotiations except on CLOB has grounded to a halt. We all know that for the better part of last year, Dr Mahathir and his Government had been preoccupied with domestic issues such as the general elections in November and there has not been a focus on relations with Singapore. Now that the elections are over, it is our hope of course that efforts can be resumed to renew and enhance the cooperation between our two countries. But having said that, let me emphasise that Malaysia and Singapore are indeed bound by a multiplicity of different ties. Any such close relationship inevitably must go through different phases. I think it is natural that there will be ups and downs during our relations. But Singapore's relations will be marked by both competition and cooperation to advance our respective national interests. Singapore's position remains unchanged, that is, we are committed to forging a mutually beneficial long-term relationship with Malaysia based on mutual respect, trust, reciprocity and mutual benefit. We believe in the principle of prosper-thy-neighbour and we would continue to take a constructive approach towards realising the full potential in our bilateral relationship. Members also asked for an update on the package negotiations. As I said, the senior officials met in March, April and May last year on the package of outstanding bilateral issues. Singapore tried to be helpful and took the approach of offering "maximum benefits for both sides" by trying to accommodate new Malaysian requests on issues such as the POA and the CPF withdrawal by West Malaysians. However, Malaysia has not given any indication yet that it is prepared to accommodate Singapore's request on the various issues, especially the supply of raw water to Singapore after the expiry of our water agreements. I have informed this House previously that it is Malaysia's turn to host the next round of talks. The Malaysians have on several occasions indicated that they are aware that the ball is in their court. But they have not yet responded with specific dates. We want to resolve these issues as soon as possible. When Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid visited Singapore last year, we agreed that officials from both sides should try to narrow the gaps on the issues, so as to arrive at a win-win package deal. That continues to be our expectation and our approach. However, it would seem that the immediate priority of the Malaysians is on the UMNO General Assembly elections in May. As such, it remains to be seen whether there will be significant movement on the discussions of the bilateral package before that date. But it is clearly in the best interest of both countries to resolve the issues as soon as possible. I will not touch on the CLOB issue where the Singapore Exchange and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange have reached a comprehensive and legally binding solution, because the Deputy Prime Minister had dealt with this in this House comprehensively yesterday. On the railway land, which is also part of the package deal, all I need to do is to reiterate what I said in this House before. The fact that there is a package discussion going on and that it has taken some time to resolve this matter does not, in any way, affect the legal position of these agreements and undertakings under the law. Some of these issues involve questions of principles and questions of law. And these positions of principles, whether it is sovereignty or on legal interpretations of existing agreements, such as the railway land, have to be maintained by Singapore. For example, under the Points of Agreement, Members will recall that there are clear legal undertakings and responsibilities and a time schedule which has to be adhered to. There are certain obligations to be performed and undertaken under the agreements and that continues to be our position. As I pointed out in Parliament on 5th June 1997, the POA provides for a "maximum period for the railway station to be moved from Keppel, that is, within five years from the time the MRT reaches Woodlands New Town, which it did on 10th February 1996." Some Members also referred to Pedra Branca, but I wish to point out to the Members and they will recall that I informed this House last year in January that officials from Malaysia and Singapore did reach an agreement in 1998 on the text of a special agreement to refer Malaysia's claim to Pedra Branca to the International Court of Justice. Hence, this matter is no longer a pressing issue which explains why it was not included in the package of outstanding issues for bilateral negotiations. Mr Chiam See Tong had reiterated his suggestion for an economic union between Singapore and Malaysia. I would refer to what Prime Minister Goh said in reply in this House on 5th June 1997, and I quote: "He (Mr Chiam) got his economic history of our Malaysia days wrong, and he has ignored important non-economic factors, but the economic logic of his proposal is correct. However, cooperation takes two willing parties. I do not think this is the right time to talk about an economic union when bilateral relations are strained and we are still having difficulties implementing specific items of cooperation." And he said: "Singapore and Malaysia share a symbiotic relationship. I fully subscribe to Dr Mahathir's philosophy of 'prosper-thy-neighbour'. It is an important way to strengthen our two countries' symbiotic relationship and help each other to become developed." That was what Prime Minister said. What Mr Chiam was saying yesterday is whether an economic union of the Suzhou type of project or other economic projects, there are many opportunities for the two sides to undertake to strengthen economic cooperation. I agree. I would say that there are endless opportunities for both countries to cooperate for mutual benefit. But there must be political will from the other side to respond to Singapore's efforts. If there is any perceived lack of progress on economic cooperation, let me say that it is not due to any lack of effort on our part. Members of the House will recall that Prime Minister Goh had proposed a framework of wider cooperation with Malaysia in line with the 'prosper-thy-neighbour' philosophy which Dr Mahathir has espoused. Under this framework for wider cooperation, Prime Minister Goh had proposed concrete cooperation projects such as the development of water resources in Malaysia for sale to Singapore and the joint development of Malayan Railway land in Singapore. Members may also be aware that Prime Minister Goh spent a lot of time and effort and, in fact, he met with Dr Mahathir eight times in the past two years. More recently, Prime Minister had indicated that he is prepared to meet Dr Mahathir. We will continue to press on and persevere with our efforts to promote bilateral cooperation. Mr Zulkifli Baharudin's suggestion was for more resources to be made available to the civil societies, and in particular, the Singapore International Foundation and Singapore Institute of International Affairs for the promotion of people-to-people cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia. I would agree that the fostering of good relations is not the sole prerogative of governments. The private sector, civic organisations, cultural organisations, sporting organisations, to name a few, all play a role in promoting good relations between our neighbours. As to his specific suggestion that more finances and resources be made available to civic bodies, if there are specific and worthwhile projects and a request made to MFA, we will of course be prepared to consider them on a case-by-case basis. Of course, Members have to bear in mind that many civic organisations are autonomous organisations and might want to retain their autonomy. Mr Charles Chong, Mr Hawazi Daipi and a few other Members spoke about the letter by Mr Malik Tahir which was published recently in our local press. They asked whether Mr Malik Tahir's views typify the general feelings of Malay Malaysians. I of course cannot speculate if his perspective respresents the views of the majority of Malay Malaysians. But let me say that we should make a distinction between the views expressed by such individuals and private parties on the one hand, and the official views of a Government. Sir, as I mentioned before in this House on several occasions, after separation, Singapore and Malaysia have, in fact, evolved and developed into two distinct societies. It would not be possible for Singapore to give up its system which is based on meritocracy and multi-racialism. But our approach would be, notwithstanding the differences between our two systems, both countries stand to benefit greatly from bilateral cooperation. Such cooperation must be on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual benefits. It cannot be on the basis of unequal or differential relationship prescribed by Mr Tahir. Connected with this matter, Mr Sin Boon Ann asked whether we are doing enough to put our position across to the Malaysians so that our views, stand and positions can be disseminated better or more effectively in Malaysia. Let me say that when issues arise, we do, in fact, take considerable measures to put our views across, not only here, but also in Malaysia. And where there are reports in the Malaysian media which are erroneous or false, we rebut them. We also publish our speeches, press releases and rebuttals on our MFA website as well as in the website of our Mission in Kuala Lumpur. Therefore, I wish to assure Members that MFA and our Missions abroad have been proactive in putting Singapore's views across when necessary. This has even been noted by the Malaysian media. For example, on the CLOB issue, the New Straits Times reported on 29th February this year, and I quote: "One of the lessons of the CLOB affair is perhaps the value of effective public relations. The Singaporeans had their whole Government involved, including their overseas missions, telling their side of the CLOB story. In Kuala Lumpur, for example, the Singapore High Commission was sending copies of CLOB-related documents to the media. The same intensity was absent from the Malaysian side." So I think this speaks for itself. Mr Charles Chong asked about the latest developments, if any, on the Singapore-Johor bridge which Malaysia was reported to have proposed to construct to replace the Causeway. The answer to that is that we have not received any official proposal from the Malaysian Government. As this is an important issue involving two sovereign countries, naturally, we can only consider this matter when a formal proposal is received from the Malaysian Government and not through any other party. 1.00 pm I think Mr Charles Chong also referred to newspaper reports in Malaysia to the effect that Malaysians have briefed Prime Minister Goh during his recent visit to Johor. Indeed, during the Hari Raya party which the Johor Mentri Besar hosted for the Prime Minister on 30th January, the Mentri Besar, Dato Abdul Ghani, showed Prime Minister some models and pictures of a possible new bridge over the Causeway, but there was no discussion of the issue. The Prime Minister made it clear to the Johor Mentri Besar that it should be regarded as a non-briefing. In other words, it was not an official briefing. As I have said before, Singapore has, to date, not received any official proposal from Malaysia. If and when an official proposal is received, I think there are obviously some key questions which will have to be considered. First and foremost, what is the justification for wanting to replace the Causeway with a bridge? If there is a proposal, we need to consider carefully whether it is feasible. And to consider and conclude whether it is feasible, one would have to make a careful cost benefit analysis. If the study shows that the proposal is not feasible, then we will not be able to support it. Anyway, as I said, no proposal has been put to the Government and therefore, at the moment, there is nothing to study. Members then turned to the situation in Indonesia. They asked me about the state of our relations with Indonesia and also certain specific questions. If I may make some broad observations about the situation in Indonesia, I would say that Indonesia is actually in transition. There have been political, economic and social changes there, and there have also been greater demands for regional autonomy, as well as regions requesting a greater share of local resources. The election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President represents a legitimate leadership. Notwithstanding its legitimacy, I would say that it has a difficult job in dealing with post-Soeharto changes. With this new leadership, other power centres have also emerged. They are seeking a greater say in government as well as acting as a check and balance. The role of the armed forces is also being reshaped. President Wahid has begun a process of political consolidation, national reconciliation and restoring international confidence. This is important for the return of economic stability and foreign investment. President Wahid also sought to deal with the regional pressures for greater autonomy and, in some cases, even calls for independence. But he has received the endorsement of the international community on Indonesia's unity. President Wahid continues to face considerable challenges. Singapore supports the Indonesian government, and wishes President Wahid well in his efforts to deal with the political, economic and social changes. As regards our relations with Indonesia, I said in last year's Committee of Supply debate that relations then, one year ago, were going through a difficult period. At that time, various Indonesian leaders and officials had made all sorts of allegations and negative comments against Singapore. Members will recall that, subsequently, later in the year, in November, responding to a question on bilateral ties, I said that Indonesia was one of our closest neighbours and a major trading partner, and we would like to see a prosperous and stable Indonesia. That is our position. We are ready to work with Indonesia to assist in its economic recovery. We are a small country and our contribution can only be modest. But we can play a catalytic role to help restore investor confidence through practical measures. Singapore and Indonesia now enjoy warm and friendly ties. The foundations of our relationship are strong and have withstood many storms. We have cooperated for mutual benefit for many years, and Singapore is one of Indonesia's largest foreign investors and our bilateral trade remains strong, notwithstanding the economic crisis. We have a vested interest in Indonesia's stability, growth and prosperity. Furthermore, Indonesia is strategically important for both Singapore, for the region and for ASEAN. It is therefore in everyone's interest to see a prosperous and stable Indonesia. Even during the difficult times, Singapore did not lose confidence in Indonesia. Members will recall the West Natuna Gas project and the Pertamina-Singapore Power agreement reflected Singapore's faith and long-term confidence in Indonesia. I would add that President Wahid's decision to make Singapore his first stop in his ASEAN tour also underscores the importance he places on relations with Singapore. And the return visit by Prime Minister in January continued the process of further strengthening bilateral relations. As regards the questions by Mr Sin Boon Ann and Mr Hawazi Daipi about the recent troubles in Bintan and whether it has affected Singapore's investments there, this matter has been addressed by the Minister for Trade and Industry. But let me say that the demonstrations in Bintan were over the issue of land compensation. It was unfortunate that the issue resurfaced. When development works by the Indonesia-Singapore joint venture company on the Bintan Industrial Estate began more than five years ago, compensation for the land had been fully settled and the land was free of encumbrance. The demonstrations which occurred recently caused losses for companies operating there as work had to be stopped. It also affected tourist arrivals and, consequently, the livelihood of the people was also affected. Therefore, if such disturbances are unchecked, it would affect investors in the Bintan Industrial Estate and, in turn, dampen foreign investors' confidence in Indonesia. And it will affect our role to act as a catalyst to enhance investor confidence. Sir, we have conveyed to the Indonesian authorities at all levels the importance for Indonesia to resolve this matter. But let me add that the disturbances in Bintan should be seen in the context of other incidents of social unrest in various other parts of Indonesia. President Wahid himself has said that the outbreaks of unrest in Indonesia were the product of a conspiracy against his government. The Indonesian authorities have indicated that the disruptive elements from other parts of Indonesia had been involved in Bintan. They recognise the nature and potential impact of the problem, and they have taken swift action to end the disturbances. Since then, the situation in Bintan has been stabilised, and it is our hope that investor confidence will not be affected by the demonstrations. Such incidents should not deter Singapore from pursuing bilateral cooperation projects with the Indonesian government in the Riaus. Finally, Mr Chiam asked whether the Government could consider leasing from the Indonesian government one of the Riau islands to develop it into an economic area with Singapore having full control on, such as security, immigration and allowing entry by Indonesian nationals and so on. I think Mr Chiam must know that this is not a practical proposal, because he himself pointed out that this is a very sensitive issue. I think he knows that it will be open to all sorts of misunderstandings and interpretation, particularly when what he proposed may be seen as impinging on Indonesia's rights of sovereignty. This is especially so when Mr Chiam's proposal envisaged that the Singapore Government will exercise what may amount to sovereign functions like immigration and security control in another territory. At a time when there is so much sensitivity in Indonesia over calls for separatism, autonomy, independence, I think Mr Chiam will agree when I say that it is unlikely that this proposal would be considered, in his words, as a purely "business" or commercial deal. Related to Indonesia, some Members also asked about East Timor. Three questions were posed. One is to ask about the assistance which we have already given; second, about the technical assistance or training which we may give to East Timor; and, thirdly, prospects of East Timor becoming independent and they applying for ASEAN membership. On the assistance we have given to East Timor up to now, as a member of the UN support group for East Timor, we have contributed US$230,000 to the UN Trust Fund for East Timor. The Trust Fund was set up to fund UN activities in East Timor. Then, as Members will know, there was the International Force for East Timor (InterFET) and our contribution comprised a medical detachment, military observers, logistics support and two landing ship tanks. Altogether, a total of 250 personnel were involved. The cost of maintaining our contributions in East Timor was not small. We incurred some $22.2 million for maintaining our contributions to InterFET and the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor. InterFET then was replaced by United Nation Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and our contributions to UNTAET are 40 civilian police, 8 military observers and staff officers, a level one medical team comprising up to 26 members. The 40-man civilian contingent will be deployed to East Timor on 6th March and I assume they are already there. An SAF officer has also been appointed as a deputy chief of staff for military and civil affairs in UNTAET. If the UN accepts all our contributions, the total contribution to UNTAET is estimated to cost about $9.1 million for one year. As to the kind of technical assistance and training which we can give to East Timor, the leaders, Mr Xanana Gusmao and Jose-Ramos Horta, visited Singapore in January, as part of their regional tour to establish the groundwork for future relations with friendly regional countries, and they were also wanting to gain support for East Timor's construction efforts. They expressed an interest in Singapore's development experiences since independence. At their request, briefings were arranged with EDB, HDB, MPA and PSA. They also visited a HDB new town and met our businessmen. Mr Gusmao thanked us for our contributions to InterFET and UNTAET, and he also requested our help in providing technical assistance to East Timor. They were particularly interested in the area of human resource development such as port and airport management. We have assured him that within the limits of our resources, we would do what we can to help out. We have extended an invitation to a team of Timorese officials to visit Singapore to discuss how we can dovetail some of our technical assistance to East Timor's requirements. I expect the team will come in due course. 1.15 pm As regards East Timor's independence and thereafter applying for membership, we had informed Mr Gusmao and Mr Jose-Ramos Horta during their visit that while Singapore would be open to the question of East Timor's membership in ASEAN, it was really premature to consider this issue now. Our message to them was that in the next few years the priority should be to achieve independence, reconstruction and nation building. East Timor's reconstruction needs are enormous and will require massive assistance and strong political backing for some time. The UN and the international community will be the people with the resources and experience to best facilitate East Timor's transition to independence. It is important that the international community and the UN remain engaged in East Timor. ASEAN countries themselves do not possess all the necessary capabilities to undertake this task of reconstruction for East Timor. Many ASEAN countries themselves are recovering from the financial crisis. But this is not to say that ASEAN should take a hands-off approach. ASEAN will be involved, as we have been with INTERFET and the UN support group for East Timor, and individual ASEAN countries, I am sure, including Singapore, will continue to support the international effort for East Timor. As for membership of ASEAN, when they eventually apply for membership, I am sure ASEAN will have to give it serious consideration. East Timor, like any other aspiring member, will have to meet certain criteria and we will have to take this one step at a time. In any case, ASEAN membership has to be decided by consensus. They have to follow a procedure. There has to be an application first. Usually the country becomes an observer, after that they apply for membership and membership comes after undertakings to adhere to certain basic ASEAN agreements, including the Bangkok Declaration, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and various other agreements. There are some six agreements which aspiring members will have to undertake to be bound. Members then asked about ASEAN. A common question was: has ASEAN outgrown itself? I think Dr Ong Chit Chung asked that. Mr Ravindran asked: have we expanded too fast? Because of the expansion, has ASEAN slowed down? These are valid questions which even members in ASEAN are asking themselves. I would say that ASEAN is going through an important testing period. It is going through a difficult period because, firstly, many of the countries are recovering from the financial crisis. Secondly, ASEAN has been touted for many years as the most successful regional grouping. If it was considered as the most successful regional grouping, it was because many of the members were doing well economically, and there was political stability. That is not so now: Economically, some of the countries are having problems. Politically, some of the countries like Indonesia are going through very difficult challenging times in their political transition. The perception is that ASEAN's reputation has been dented. It has lost its shine or lustre. So the challenge for ASEAN is how it can reorganise itself, re-invent itself, so to speak, to recover its relevance as a vibrant regional grouping. This is an important challenge and ASEAN will have to demonstrate that it is relevant to the region, and relevant to the external players. As I have mentioned in my answer to Dr Ong Chit Chung on the strategic situation, ASEAN has been relevant in the past because of its ability to engage key powers in discussions on security in the region. If ASEAN does not live up to this challenge, then it will be marginalised and it will be just another one of those many organisations that we have seen in the world today. But I am confident that ASEAN will face this challenge squarely. Questions were asked about Singapore's chairmanship of ASEAN for the previous year, which culminated in our hosting the ASEAN meeting and the ARF meeting. As Chairman of ASEAN, we initiated an honest reappraisal of ASEAN at the meeting which Singapore chaired. It is precisely because of these difficulties that ASEAN is going through that I introduced, with the agreement of the other Ministers, for the first time ever, an ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat, in other words, just the Foreign Ministers without officials at all. We had a frank exchange of where we are going. The consensus was that this was a very candid exchange of views. To indicate the candour, we took note of the danger of ASEAN becoming a two-tier organisation, in other words, some of the new entrants like the Indochinese countries on the one hand, and on the other hand, the original ASEAN member states. It was important that we should prevent ASEAN from becoming a two-tier organisation. To prevent that, it was important to concentrate on efforts to integrate and assist the newer members of the organisation. As regards Singapore's role during our chairmanship and after our chairmanship, I would say that we have tried to play a constructive role by coming out with practical ideas to advance ASEAN's role. For example, Members will recall that the Prime Minister proposed, and the leaders accepted, the idea of sending missions or road shows abroad to demonstrate to Europe, America and elsewhere that ASEAN is determined to get back on its feet. These missions were agreed upon, and one mission already took place to Japan led by Malaysia with other members of ASEAN. BG George Yeo, the Minister for Trade and Industry, will lead this ASEAN mission to the United States in May. Thailand will also lead the third mission to Europe in May. Singapore will be represented in all these missions. Other Singapore's initiatives and efforts which were agreed upon were the Prime Minister's e-ASEAN initiative, which is intended to transform ASEAN into a borderless and seamless market instead of 10 fragmented markets. They also endorsed Prime Minister's proposal to accelerate AFTA. So Singapore continues to play a constructive role in ASEAN by coming out with ideas which have been agreed upon. Also to indicate how ASEAN is trying to adjust, the leaders agreed that we should have an ASEAN Troika. Because once you have 10 members and if you meet once a year at Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and leaders meet once a year, how do you deal and respond to fast changing events? So it was proposed at the Leaders' Meeting that we should have a troika of three members to have a faster mechanism for ASEAN's response. This was agreed to. What was Singapore's major task ahead this year for ASEAN? I wish to inform Members that we will be hosting the Fourth ASEAN Informal Meeting in November this year. We intend to build what has been achieved in Manila. I doubt if we want to have some grand visions or themes. Rather, we hope to focus on the message that ASEAN has to renew itself. On the ARF, responding to Mr Simon Tay, I agree with him when he says that moving into preventive diplomacy is very important. Singapore is very mindful of that and Singapore supports the practice of preventive diplomacy. For the other Members who might not be very au fait with ARF, the ASEAN Regional Forum had three phases of evolution. First was confidence building measures. The second phase is preventive diplomacy, and the ultimate objective is to make the ASEAN Regional Forum into a body which can be engaged in conflict resolution. For the past few years we really have been focusing on confidence building measures. Some of us, like Singapore, feel that we should now nudge ourselves into the preventive diplomacy phase. So I agree with Mr Simon Tay when he says that Singapore should support preventive diplomacy. I want to assure him that we are ready to do our part in terms of preventive diplomacy. But in terms of Singapore itself engaging in preventive diplomacy, that is a slightly different matter because he knows that in international practice and international law, preventive diplomacy, if you offer yourself as good offices, depends on the consent of whichever parties are disputing. You just cannot impose yourself on disputing parties. We will work with the other ARF countries to see how we can accelerate slowly the process of ARF moving towards preventive diplomacy. Mr Ravindran asked about Myanmar. I can say that the situation there is generally calm and the State Peace and Development Council remains firmly in control. I understand that they are concerned over Myanmar's economic slowdown as a result of a combination of various factors including the Asian financial crisis. He asked about ASEAN's role and constructive engagement. I have explained in this House before that being an ASEAN member, Myanmar has greater exposure and opportunities to come into contact with the other countries in ASEAN. We take this opportunity to have a quiet, frank discussion. Many of us, individually and separately, quietly exercised some suasion in trying to persuade Myanmar on the ways of achieving normalcy, as in some of the other ASEAN countries. But we do not take the approach of some other countries like in the East who are inclined to imposing their views and insisting that various measures be taken. We think it is better to have quiet diplomacy. Notwithstanding the help and encouragement Singapore and other ASEAN countries can give Myanmar, in the end the pace of reform measures must still be left to them to decide. Mr Charles Chong asked about ASEAN-EU relations. It is true that there is a difficulty and that difficulty is because the EU has a common policy with regard to Myanmar. Because of the common policy, they maintain that they will not be able to allow the Myanmar Foreign Minister to attend any meetings held in Europe. Therefore, for the first time last year, the ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which has taken place regularly for many years, was cancelled. It was to take place in Berlin. It was cancelled because the European Union insisted that they would not give a visa for the Myanmar Foreign Minister but the rest of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers could come. Naturally, ASEAN could not accept that condition, and the meeting therefore did not take place. 1.30 pm Our position on Myanmar vis-a-vis the European Union is to tell the Europeans that they are free, and should feel free, to take whatever position they want with regard to Myanmar, but to distinguish their relations with ASEAN as an organisation from their relations with Myanmar. Just as when we held meetings here, as I chaired the meetings last year, we had the Myanmar Foreign Minister and the European Union here, and they had no difficulty in sitting down in the same meeting with Myanmar Foreign Minister. So this is a real problem. We have persevered with European Union. There are many countries in the EU who would like to break this impasse and get back to the productive ASEAN-EU relationship. So we will work with them to see how we can revive this ASEAN-EU Ministerial process, and many behind-the-scene discussions are going on. I believe Mr Charles Chong also asked, if we should have a "tit for tat", and will ASEAN take a similar position on the Austrian government. I cannot speak for the rest of ASEAN, but I doubt it. Because if ASEAN wants to be consistent over the position we have taken with EU on Myanmar, then it should follow that ASEAN's relationship with EU, which is a bloc-to-bloc relationship, should not be contingent on whether a particular government or a particular Minister is in that government. Mr Simon Tay and a few others asked about our United Nations Security Council candidature. First, to give an update. Singapore is bidding for a seat, which is in Asian Group seat, for the United Nations Security Council, non-permanent member. The election will be later this year, around October or so. Because it is in Asian Group seat, and there is no rival Asian candidate competing with us, and the Asian Group earlier has endorsed Singapore's candidature as the Asian Group's agreed candidate, I would say that the prospects of us being elected are very good. But we are not being complacent. We are continuing with all our efforts to talk to other countries in other regions to ensure that we have a good result when voting takes place in the United Nations. But I am reasonably confident that we will be elected, and the election is for a two-year term starting in January 2001. But I would like to say this. If we can get elected to the UN Security Council, we should not get carried away by the fact that we will be in the Security Council for two years. And it does not mean that we have suddenly arrived or that for two years we will have some magical power status bestowed on us. That is not the case. During the two years, if we are on the Security Council and thereafter, we will still continue to be a small country and we cannot pretend to be otherwise. I thought I should emphasise this. We should have a sense of proportion and not have any delusion that we are not a small country. And the reason why I make this point is yesterday, as I was listening to some of the comments, questions and observations in the cuts on Foreign Affairs, I thought that there was a little lack of proportion, a little lack of realism. When I listened to some of the comments, say, "look, can we send so many more military missions, peacekeeping operations, can we expand our technical assistance, not just human resources but also try to influence the policies in these countries", and so on, I would say, you better come down to reality and remember that we are a small country with limited resources. We shall do our best to be active in foreign policy - to advance our interests, to be a responsible international citizen and to have constructive ideas on issues, whether in the region or in international organisations. Having said that, let me say that if we are elected to the Security Council, we will do our best to contribute to the work of the Council by bringing to the Council - and I think this is Mr Simon Tay's question - the perspective of a small country, and we will try to demonstrate wherever possible that a small state can also play a useful role in the Council. And we will work with like-minded countries in the Council, including those from the Non-aligned Movement and the G77, on issues of common interest. As the endorsed candidate of the Asian Group, naturally we will also work with the Asian Group to reflect their views and concerns in the Security Council. Mr Simon Tay asked whether on issues we would side with the big powers. I think our record speaks for itself. In all these years, people consider Singapore to have taken positions on the basis of principle and that we would have an independent foreign policy, and we shall continue to do so, whether we are in the Security Council or we are not in the Security Council. I will now ask your permission, Sir, for my colleagues Dr Ow Chin Hock and Mr Zainul Abidin to deal with the remaining issues.