Mr Speaker, Sir, Prof. Chin suggested that the use of the word such as "serious" in the definition of "terrorist act" in the Bill may be too restrictive. The reasons for this restrictive definition are as follows: Firstly, this is a Bill which gives effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. As such, the Bill's definition of "terrorist act" therefore adopts the wording of the Convention, and they are totally consistent with what is being used in other countries as well. The Convention's definition of "terrorist act" includes an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian when the purpose of such act is to intimidate the population or to compel a government to do or refrain from doing any act. Secondly, Singapore is not alone in adopting such a definition. Our definition is also consistent with the definition used in other countries' similar legislation on terrorism in the Commonwealth countries, such as the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000, Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act and the Australia's Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Bill. Since this Bill is to give effect to an International Convention, there is no reason for us to deviate from the international standards adopted. Finally, this is also to maintain consistency with the definition of "terrorist acts" used in our own law, and that law is the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations. So, all those words we find in this particular Bill are exactly the same as what we already have in our United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations. We are not doing anything different. Prof. Chin has suggested that anyone planning a criminal act which amounts to a seizable offence should be caught by the definition of "terrorist act". In my view, to define "terrorist act" to include any seizable criminal offence may be too wide and over-inclusive. We should target our laws against offences which clearly have a nexus with terrorism. Seizable offences, with reference to non-Penal Code offences, are offences which are punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years or more. Prof. Chin has also raised the example of a gunman who had robbed a goldsmith shop, and asked if his property can be seized or forfeited. Let me reiterate that the main focus of this Bill is not about criminalising terrorist acts, but about criminalising the financing of terrorist acts. As such, whether the robber's property will be forfeited will depend on whether a person who has committed any of those provisions relating to the financing of terrorist acts. A mere commission of a robbery will not make his property liable to seizure or forfeiture under the law even if he had, in carrying out robbery, intimidated a section of the people around the shops. Let me give a real life example of this. On 18th May 2001, members of the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), staged a robbery of the Southern Bank in Peninsular Malaysia. They were initially regarded as robbers. But investigations subsequently revealed that their actions were in support of the KMM, which aimed to wage a holy war against the Malaysian government to establish a purist Islamic state. Obviously, then they were more than just ordinary robbers. So, by our definition, they will be regarded as terrorists. And this is not the only example that happened last year. In the mid-1970s, three gunmen robbed a bank of RM122,000 in Petaling Jaya. Later, it was found that they were also responsible for two murders. If these were all, then, of course, those who were found and convicted subsequently will be convicted as robbers and murderers. But when it was established that they were actually members of the CPM Marxist-Leninist Faction and had robbed to augment the CPM's funds, then, obviously, they were more than just ordinary robbers and murderers. The two persons they murdered under the CPM's instruction were the Inspector General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman in 1974, and the Chief Police Officer of Perak, Tan Sri Koo Chong Kong in 1975. So, again, by definition under our Bill, we will consider them as terrorists. Prof. Chin is correct in asserting that the key difference between a purely criminal act and one that amounts to a terrorist act lies much in the intent or the motive established. But this is not unique to the current Bill. Intent is the key ingredient in determining culpability, even in purely criminal actions and offences. Often, in criminal cases, there may potentially be more than one offence in the laws which can apply to the same action and the same set of circumstances. Which one to proceed with requires not only interpretation, but commonsense and judgment. Let me assure Prof. Chin that there is no lapse in the handling of such situations in criminal cases. In determining offences under this particular Bill, the law will always be applied with care and due diligence. We will always be very careful, and not simply abuse the powers provided for in the Act. On the question of burden, there is indeed a high burden on the prosecution, because the offences created by the Convention and the Bill are very serious in nature. For example, any person convicted of providing or collecting property for terrorist acts can be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 10 years, or to a fine of up to $100,000. Since the offences are serious in nature, then we have deliberately only targeted the provisions against persons who have knowingly or intentionally committed such acts. This will ensure that the innocent persons are not prosecuted for such offences. But if there is evidence to show that the person has turned a blind eye to the commission of such acts, then the same provisions will allow us to prosecute him, as these provisions also contain a lower threshold of "having reasonable grounds to believe" in cases where it is not possible to prove that the person has wilfully or knowingly committed such acts. So I think there is enough flexibility built into the legislation to enable us to deal effectively with the various types of offenders. Prof. Chin and Mdm Ho, I believe, also expressed concern on the order of forfeiture and the Judge has to be satisfied on the balance of probability, and also the question about ex parte. Let me first clarify Prof. Chin's point on ex parte. The application for the issue of warrant of seizure or restraint order under clause 11 is made ex parte because there is a need to ensure that the offenders do not have a chance to dispose of their properties. But once the property is seized or restrained under clause 11, the forfeiture application, which is made under clause 24, is not made ex parte. The owner of the property will have a right to be heard before the Judge orders forfeiture of the property. As for the use of balance of probability as a standard of proof for forfeiture, this is not something new that we are doing. The same standard is also found under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act in respect of forfeiture of proceeds derived from drug trafficking and other serious crimes. The Bill therefore maintains the same standard of proof for the purpose of forfeiture. Further, this standard on the balance of probability is also used in the Canada Anti-Terrorism Act. So, let me assure the House that, in conducting investigations into these offences, the enforcement agencies will strive to obtain the best evidence to support the allegations. Regarding the onus imposed on corporate bodies, which is also a question raised by Mr Andy Gan, to make sure that we do not unnecessarily restrict the businesses of our companies, clause 35, as we have put it there, is a standard provision commonly found in the existing Acts as well. It is not something that we just created out of nowhere. A body corporate can only act through its officers. It is not unreasonable therefore to expect officers of a body corporate to be responsible for the acts of a company, such that the officers must give an account of themselves if the company commits an offence. Let me give Members examples of similar provisions in other legislation. They are the Electricity Act 2001, the Gas Act 2001, the Planning Act, the Civil Defence Act, the Building Control Act, the Control of Vectors and Pesticides Act and, finally, the Fire Safety Act. So, this question of duty of the corporate officers is also clearly defined in other similar legislation that I have just cited. Prof. Chin is concerned about people who make malicious complaints, leading to unnecessary investigations and the accused party suffering anxiety and stress. Although the Bill does not provide for the offence of malicious accusation, this is not different from, say, defaming a person. The person so defamed or accused can always sue the person making the defamatory statement or accusation. If the accusation is made to a police officer, then the accuser can also be charged under the Penal Code. For example, section 182 of the Penal Code makes an offence for any person to give any public servant any information to cause such public servant to use the lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of any person. A person who is convicted under section 182 can be sentenced to imprisonment, as well as to a fine. So, if a person falsely or maliciously reported his neighbour for committing a terrorist act or activity to a police officer, he can be dealt with under the Penal Code, and there is no need to put this provision in the Bill. The Penal Code is adequate to deal with such offenders. Let me now turn to some of the points raised by Mdm Ho. Mdm Ho's view is that we are placing too much onus on the family members, like the spouse, children, parents or siblings, because, she says, they are more likely than not to have knowledge of the terrorist affairs. But I think this is debatable. Let me give an example of the Jemaah Islamiyah group. Many of their family members actually claimed that they did not know. So I do not think it is fair to say that their spouse or immediate family members will definitely know, and therefore if they report the matter, it may lead to a break-up of families, like in the case during the Cultural Revolution. I think the problem of the Cultural Revolution is a totally different one. I do not think we should just simply leave things be and leave it to the conscience and the sense of responsibility of individuals to report a terrorist act or financing of such act, and not put this into the law. If everybody does behave responsibly and acts with conscience, I think we do not need any laws. We will then be living in utopia. But we know that we are living on the earth. So it cannot be done. Therefore, it is better that we provide for this in the legislation to ensure that if family members do know, and it can be seen and shown that they do know, then it is their duty to make such a report to the Police. But, of course, in the investigation, we shall be thorough about this. Mdm Ho's suggestion to exempt information received because of privileged information, eg, in the case of lawyers, I do not think this is necessary because clause 8(4) of the Bill provides that it shall be a defence for a person charged for failure to prove that he has reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure and it shall be left to the court to decide on the merits of each case. Mdm Ho also asked what extent the Attorney-General rely on information and belief to apply to a Judge to issue seizure and search warrants, and she asked if the burden of proof should be higher than the balance of probability, and whether a conviction of terrorism should be made first before forfeiture should take place. Her view is that no one should have the power to destroy property of little or no value unless it is ordered by the Judge to do so. She also proposes that seized property which may bear interest be held in an interest-bearing account. Let me address her questions in sequence. Clause 12 of the Bill provides that an affidavit in support of the application for a warrant of search and seizure of terrorist property may be made by an investigation officer based on his information and belief, and such information and belief are the result of investigations conducted by the investigation officer, who would most likely be the police officer or a Commercial Affairs officer. He would not act just because he had a dream the night before and said, "I believe and, therefore, I act." They do not act like that. I do not think we can allow him to act like that too. So he must conduct an investigation and show that there are indeed reasonable grounds for his belief. The Attorney-General, therefore, does not rely on hearsay or mere information received. He will ask the investigation officer, "What have you found in the investigation?" and satisfy him before he applies to the court for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant. The House may wish to note that clause 11 of the Bill provides that the court may require undertakings to be given in respect of application for warrants or restraint order, and the undertaking is a form of check to prevent any abuse of powers. The indemnity is to ensure that the law enforcement agencies investigating a case must have sufficient grounds before applying for a warrant for seizure or a restraint order. So he does not just act on impulse. Proof based on the balance of probability is the standard employed under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act for the forfeiture of properties or proceeds derived from drug trafficking and other serious crimes. The Bill, therefore, maintains the same standard of proof for the purpose of forfeiture. Clause 21 of the Bill allows a Judge to order forfeiture of property owned or controlled by or on behalf of any terrorist or terrorist entity. The order of forfeiture may also be made if the property has been or will be used to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act. There is no requirement to have a conviction first of the offences of providing or collecting property for terrorist acts, providing property and services for terrorist purposes, use or possession of property for terrorist purposes and dealing with property of terrorists. This is because the intention is to ensure that terrorist properties can be confiscated by the Government. But let me assure Members that strong evidence will be adduced before the Attorney-General applies to a Judge for such a forfeiture order. Clause 16 of the Bill also allows a person appointed to destroy seized properties that have little or no value. But the person must first apply to the Judge for the destruction order. In other words, he cannot say that, "I do not like this thing lying on my desk", and then he starts to destroy it. He will have to apply to the court for such an order. Mdm Ho's suggestion that property which may bear interest should be held in an interest-bearing account may not reap practical gains. We may not seize large assets or properties which may bear interest. If a legal requirement is then imposed to subject all properties which bear interest to be held in interest-bearing accounts, this may result in generating more administrative work. Sir, I believe I have dealt with all the points raised by the Members.