Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I thank all the Members who have spoken. It is now my pleasant task to summarise the arguments which they have very eloquently made. I do not feel like Darth Vader. I am trying to look like Yoda. The story of how GLCs came about has been well told by all the MPs. So, I do not have to repeat the historical background. But, today, the value-added of Temasek companies accounts for some 13% of Singapore's GDP. If the Government had not got involved in business, most of these companies would not exist today. If you allow for the fact that the Government itself consumes 9% of the GDP, then the non-GLC private sector, which means the local companies and the multi-nationals, makes up 78%, which is more than three-quarters. Our objective is to expand this total pie, of which the larger part is the non-GLCs. And that means expanding the productive part of the economy, namely, the sum of both the GLCs and the non-GLCs, while keeping the Government share as small as possible, because the Government share really is a consumption. It is a necessary burden, but it should be kept small. The question is: do GLCs have a contribution to make in this process? Will growing the GLCs be at the expense of the non-GLCs? More importantly, and a different question, will growing the GLCs be at the expense of the overall economy? I think those are the questions we have to consider. Everyone agrees that in our earlier phase of economic development, the GLCs made a contribution. But now that the GLCs have grown, now that they exist, what should we do with them? Should the Government exit from all the businesses? If so, how? Hence, we have had a long debate in the EISC, chaired by Mr Raymond Lim, and also within the Government on the role of the Government as a shareholder in these companies, and what the Government hopes the GLCs will achieve. The result, after extensive debate, has been the Temasek Charter. The Charter sets out Temasek's role - to nurture the companies with the potential to grow into successful international businesses. It defines the types of businesses which Temasek will hold and those that Temasek will exit and divest. Temasek will have no interest in companies that will only serve the domestic market, unless these are strategic industries, for example, broadcasting, the electricity grid or the port. The GLCs are important players in the Singapore economy. There are very few non-GLCs with the size, organisational strength, or the technological depth of Singapore Telecom, SIA, Singapore Technologies or PSA. The closest would be the banks - UOB and OUB, or now UOB and OCBC, and the property companies, eg, CDL. But these are not technology companies. We can argue whether had the Government not built up these companies, more non-Government private enterprise would have grown, and the Singapore economy would have been more dynamic and entrepreneurial. But the Government decided on a strategy, and it worked. We are convinced it is right. Maybe you are right and we are wrong, but that is Monday-morning quarterbacking. Now that the GLCs have been created, the Singapore Government has a responsibility to make sure that they are well run, grow their business, and contribute to the economy. This may mean tougher competition for the non-GLCs. But so long as the competition is fair, it is good competition, it is good for the economy, it is good for Singaporeans. The policy question is whether GLCs should continue to go into new businesses. Mr Leong Horn Kee wants to curb the proliferation of GLCs. He asked that no new GLC be formed without the explicit consent of MOF. Mr Leong's question has to be addressed at two levels. For the listed companies, which Mr Iswaran has just discussed, the decision to enter into new businesses is for the respective board of directors to take. The board has to act in the interests of all the shareholders, including the minority shareholders. We cannot forbid a listed company from doing certain activities, just because the Government happens to own shares in it. It is wrong both legally, because the directors have a fiduciary responsibility to all the shareholders, and also from a policy point of view. GLCs, especially the listed GLCs, have to operate commercially. It does not mean that DBS will go into manufacturing semi-conductor chips, or PSA should start an airline business, or even a shipping business. The decisions must make business sense, and they must fit the companies' business strategy. But there is no original sin attached to being born a GLC, which taints a GLC from birth and prevents it from doing certain types of business. As for investments by Temasek itself, we are in a different situation from the early days. There is now less need and, I think, fewer opportunities for the Government to go into new businesses on its own. We are not likely to start a new airline, or another bank. But we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the Government may need to invest directly in new businesses. These could be businesses which are exceptionally risky or which have long gestation periods, or where the private sector is not willing to go in. Most of the time, if the private sector is not willing to go in, I would say we should conclude that the business fails the market test, and should not be launched at all. But once in a while the Government may need to impose our judgment and override the verdict of the market. One recent example is the Jurong Island project. The Government felt that it makes sense for us to reclaim seven islands, fill in the land, sell the land, develop a petrochemical complex, not by building the plants ourselves but by encouraging and persuading MNCs to come and build the plants. That is an entrepreneurial business decision, although in that case the decision was made by JTC, and it was done through JTC with the help of EDB, rather than by forming a new Temasek company, which we could have done. Hence, the clause in the Temasek Charter to allow Temasek, from time to time, to invest in new businesses, in order to nurture new industry clusters in Singapore. There will be other occasions when Temasek will need to go in. On the one hand, Mr Leong Horn Kee wants the Government to stop forming new GLCs; on the other hand, he wants GLCs to help the SMEs by co-investing in them. Indeed, as Ms Indranee pointed out, there is a certain tension between these two arguments. Temasek will indeed invest in SMEs, where it makes business sense. But if we did this, please remember and accept that these SMEs, by definition, will become GLCs! Another hot issue which MPs have pressed on is the divestment of GLCs. The Government will divest those which do not have the potential for international growth or serve no strategic purpose, and these are mostly the smaller ones. Michael Fam's Report in 1987 recommended divesting 41 GLCs over 10 years. Mr Leong Horn Kee said only two-thirds of these have been divested, fully or partially. That is true. But, at the same time, we also divested some 30 GLCs which were not listed in Michael Fam's Report. So, overall, since the mid-80s, we have divested some 60 Temasek companies, either completely or partially, more than what Michael Fam's Report recommended. Temasek will continue to consolidate and rationalise its stable of companies. It will divest those that are no longer relevant to its mission, but this must be at the right time, at a fair price, in a way which does not unsettle the market and which ensures that the GLCs continue to be properly managed after divestment. Mr Inderjit Singh and Mdm Ho Geok Choo urged the Government to consider management buy-out (MBO), as a method of divestment. An MBO is certainly one of the methods which the Government will consider and which, indeed, we have used on occasions to divest companies. But, as Mr Sin Boon Ann correctly pointed out, information is not symmetrical in an MBO. Management knows more about their company than the board or the shareholders. Indeed, if they did not know more about the company, something is wrong. But this causes a problem. So it is not so simple to ensure that the shareholders receive full and fair value for their shares in an MBO. The purpose of the MBO is not to sell the company cheap, but to derive full value for the shareholders and act in the best interest of the company. But we do not entirely rule out MBOs either, and each case will be evaluated on its merits. There is no reason for the Government to sell off GLCs below their fair value, regardless of market conditions, by a specific deadline. Why should we do that? We do not need to raise revenue through asset sales. We are not selling off the family silver and the last Canaletto painting that MacMillan said about the British government asset sales. If we sold off the GLCs in a hurry, we will no doubt have a debate in the House and MPs would rightly criticise us for not safeguarding the interests of Singaporeans, and rightly so. Therefore, it would be unwise to publish a list of companies that would be divested within a fixed timeframe. The act itself would depress values, alarm customers, demoralise employees and cause viable businesses to run to seed. Some people have argued that, since the GLCs are not doing well, we should divest them in order to improve their performance. We do not agree. Firstly, most GLCs are performing well. Over the long term, GLCs have amply returned the Government's initial investment. For example, DBS and SIA were transferred to Temasek in 1975. At that time, DBS was valued at $49 million, SIA at $91 million. Today, Temasek's share of DBS' and SIA's market capitalisation is $2.3 billion for DBS and $8.2 billion for SIA. So if we take a longer timeframe, the companies have done very well. In the nature of things, not all GLCs will do well all the time. Where GLCs are not doing well, the management has to sort out the problems. If necessary, the board may need to make management changes, or the shareholders, including Temasek, may need to make board changes. Keeping businesses in good health requires tough decisions and clear mindedness, and Temasek has to have that, and do that. Secondly, I agree with Mdm Ho Geok Choo that most fund managers do not take an active role in building up the companies which they hold shares in. They buy the shares as portfolio investments. They sell the shares when they see the company doing badly, or even when the shares are merely under performing. And if the company is doing well, they may also sell the shares to make a good profit. They are trading, they are not long-term shareholders. Therefore, selling GLCs off to some fund manager, or new shareholder, will not magically solve the problem. The way to upgrade a business is to assemble an experienced board, build a strong and cohesive management team and do the hard work of improving systems, changing management cultures, developing new capabilities, opening new markets. Having the Singapore Government as the shareholder does not stop companies from doing this, provided the Government takes a rigorous commercial approach, and entrusts the task to a capable team. Others have argued that the Government should simply divest all its GLCs regardless, because as a matter of principle, the Government should not own companies. We do not agree. As Mr Raymond Lim highlighted yesterday, despite the recommendation of the World Bank and the IMF to privatise rapidly, the benefits of privatisation are not a given, especially if it is not done under the right conditions. For many of the GLCs, the Government is the major shareholder. If we are to let the companies go, as Prof. Koo Tsai Kee asked, to whom? Which private companies or individuals are in a position to take over SingTel, SIA or PSA? Not just financially, which is difficult enough, but in terms of management oversight. Can we really just distribute the shares to Singaporeans and expect the companies to naturally prosper? Looking at the success stories of companies around the world, great companies are built by committed, long-term shareholders holding major or significant stakes. And this is especially the experience in Asia. But even in the US, after Enron, it is not so clear that having a diversified shareholding and no major shareholder effectively in charge at all is a good formula. Bill Gates still owns a big share of Microsoft. He makes sure it does well. A major shareholder has a substantial amount of his own money at stake. He will take the trouble to find the right people to run the businesses, set the directions, and make sure the business is run properly. Without a major and active shareholder, it is much harder for many small shareholders to get together to do this, as Mr Raymond Lim pointed out. Hence, the Government has the responsibility to promote and ensure good governance in the GLCs. In Singapore, there are very few local individuals or companies with the resources and the capability to buy over and drive the performance of the large GLCs. In Hong Kong, there are tycoons, like Mr Li Ka Shing or Mr Robert Kuok, who own and run major companies. In fact, among the tycoons, they own and run a large part of the Hong Kong economy. Perhaps, over time, such people may merge in Singapore. But remember, a Singapore in which the commanding heights of the economy are controlled by powerful, private shareholders will be quite a different economy and quite a different society from one where the major companies are professionally-run GLCs, and the ownership ultimately comes back to all Singaporeans. Let me reiterate that this does not mean that the status quo is frozen, and that the Government is not going to divest any GLC. We will restructure the GLCs, we will sell off the pieces which do not fit. We will consider mergers and acquisitions which make business and commercial sense. That is the way to make the most of a valuable asset and to realise the full value of the GLCs we have built up. Next, let me address the question of crowding out. Mr Inderjit Singh and also Mr Leong Horn Kee had complained that the GLCs are entering businesses which the private sector is fully capable of doing. Let me assure them that we have no intention of doing that. For example, the famous roast duck company, again recited by Mr Inderjit Singh, had been acquired incidentally as part of a larger acquisition in 1991, and divested in 1994 purely as a business decision. It is an immortal duck! The Temasek Charter is oriented towards companies which have the potential to grow internationally, or are strategic to Singapore. In the EISC, Mr Raymond Lim proposed a 'Yellow Pages' rule. Statutory boards should not set up companies to do things which can be found in the Yellow Pages. I agree in principle with this. If you can look it up in the book, why do you want to start a company to go and compete with the private sector? However, applying the Yellow Pages rule will require judgement. We must expect times when the Ministry or statutory board judges the private sector not to be adequate, but the private sector disagrees. In fact, quite understandably, the more competitive the GLC is, the more unhappy the private sector is going to be. It is in the nature of things. And if the private sector is not up to the job, it is most unlikely that any of them will stand up and say, "Sorry, I am not up to it, please carry on." For example, PSB Corp which runs training programmes and certification for ISO 9000. Private training service providers protest at this. But the former PSB Corp, which is now SPRING Singapore, started the industry when there were no private providers. The industry did not exist then. PSB created the market because of the national reason that we wanted to promote training, upgrading, productivity. And the private service providers then entered the market. Now, the private service providers say, "PSB is competing unfairly." But now that there are private service providers, it is no longer necessary for SPRING Singapore to continue to do this. And so SPRING Singapore has hived off the function to PSB Corp. PSB Corp is a corporatised entity which will subsequently be privatised. I will give you another example. Hdbay, also mentioned in the debate, was set up by a wholly-owned subsidiary of HDB - CESMA International - as a web portal for the renovation industry in January 2001. HDB did this to help raise the standards of the interior design and renovation industry. Because we get complaints, such as contractors making a hole in the ceiling, damaging the structural pillar, so HDB set up Hdbay to try to upgrade standards in the industry. HDB deals with Hdbay at arms length, but still the renovation industry questions whether HDB needed to create Hdbay at all. Well, maybe the renovation industry is right. It is arguable. But far better for us to have civil servants and officials who have the drive and enterprise to start new activities than for civil servants to sit back and do nothing. Of course, now Hdbay is up and running, HDB will consider divesting its interest in the company. But that is a different matter. At least, I have a company and there is something which we can talk about. Mr Leong Horn Kee says bliss to a businessman is a business world in Singapore without GLCs, because there will be less competition and more room for the local businessman to build up his business. Would that be worse? If the local companies were not competing against GLCs, they would still be competing against powerful multinationals, or large local companies in private hands, which is what happens in Hong Kong. Life would not be easier. As Mdm Halimah pointed out yesterday, in many privately developed shopping malls, FairPrice does not get in because the private developers have brought in their own partners, their own private companies, their own friends, which are in the retail business, and not SMEs, nor FairPrice. So without GLCs, you would still have competition. And if we did succeed in reducing competition, which is what Mr Leong really wishes, this would result in a less competitive private sector, and fewer choices for consumers. It is worse for consumers. Far better to have keen competition in Singapore to build strong SMEs which are internationally competitive. And I think Mr Leong acknowledges this because, after his eloquent argument, finally he says he supports FairPrice. Whatever the argument, the conclusion was not wrong. And related to crowding out is the issue of unfair competition. There are different ways in which you can interpret the word "unfair". It could be unfair market practices. It could be an insight track, an unlevel playing field. It could be cheap financing. It could be size. Let me take them one by one. On unfair market practices, which means cartels, predatory pricing, abuse of dominance, the Government does not condone these, whether by GLCs or by private companies. MTI intends to enact a competition law and all companies, including GLCs, will be subject to this law. There will be some sensitive activities which should be exempted from the law, as in all competition regimes around the world. Enterprises which feel that they are facing unfair competition can then take the matter to an independent Competition Commission and it will be adjudicated and there will be a redress. As to whether GLCs enjoy an inside track, our policy is clear. The Government will not tolerate this, we do not do this. We expect GLCs to compete on a level playing field. Ministries and statutory boards will maintain an arms-length relationship with the GLCs, and the GLCs must operate commercially and efficiently, and not receive special subsidies or favours. Of course, the corollary of this is that we must also not expect GLCs to do "national service", whether it is to do a favour to SMEs, lower prices, or provide non-economic services. To favour GLCs at the expense of other companies is to do harm to the economy, and to encourage GLCs to be less competitive and efficient. For example, MAS supervises the banks. One of the banks is DBS. But if you ask DBS, they will tell you that they do not enjoy any special privileges or forbearance. They are treated just like any other local bank. In fact, DBS sometimes feel they are treated more than just like any other local bank. But that is how we have to deal with it. So, Mr Inderjit Singh is mistaken that SMEs will similarly succeed if only the Government would give them the same special treatment it extends to GLCs. The truth is that GLCs enjoy no protectionist measures from the Government. Sometimes, companies which have been spun off or set up by statutory boards still do business with their parent. For example, Ascendas with JTC. In such cases, the perception is harder to dispel, and we have got to make a special effort to be transparent and above-board in the dealings. For example, any asset transferred has to be properly priced, and if a company competes for business with the parent, then it should be through open bidding or tender. Sometimes, we will need to corporatise a Government department or statutory board with a moratorium. For example, CPG Corp, which used to be called PWD Corp, or Jurong Consultants. The moratorium helps the corporatised entity make the transition into a private-sector player and, in cases where the corporatised entity was the sole supplier to the Government, it gives the Ministries time to adjust. I fully agree with Members that moratoriums are not desirable, and they should be avoided wherever possible. They are messy, circumstances change and you wished you had not done it. But a moratorium is no worse than the department or statutory board remaining a Government agency. To help make the transition, sometimes it cannot be avoided, because a cold turkey cut over may be neither practical nor wise to ensure the retention of expertise and the continuance of service to the Government in the transition. In other words, it is not just the company which may not be ready if you cut over cold turkey, but the customers, the clients or the Government departments may not be ready because, all of a sudden, instead of having a regular contractor, architect or engineer, they have got to prepare specifications, call for tenders, evaluate tenders, and supervise. That takes time to learn. Hence, what we did with PWD Corp. Since the corporatisation of PWD in April 1999, CPG Corp has been awarded only about $250 million worth of new Government projects. In contrast, private-sector consultants received 118 Government projects worth $1.3 billion during the same period. Had PWD not been corporatised, these 118 projects would have been undertaken in-house by the Government. So, by corporatising, we have created business for the private sector. The part kept to facilitate this transition is a minority - one-quarter or one-fifth of the business. But because people do not notice this, they say PWD Corp, has a moratorium and an unfair advantage. The facts speak for themselves. Mr Leong Horn Kee says that GLCs enjoy cheap funding because of their perceived links to the Government. The Government does not provide any guarantees to the GLCs. The banks and the markets have to make their own assessment of the credit worthiness of the companies they lend to, and the bigger and stronger companies will generally enjoy better credit ratings and better spreads. However, it is not automatic that GLCs will enjoy loans at lower rates. The lenders and analysts rate the companies, and their credit ratings vary from company to company and from time to time. For example, Moody's put a negative outlook on SingTel in June 2002, fairly or unfairly. SingTel considers it unfairly, but Moodys makes its assessment and it has implications on SingTel's borrowing costs. I do not know why the bankers in Mr Leong Horn Kee's project in China preferred to lend to the three GLCs and not to the one non-GLC which was there. But Mr Leong Horn Kee's explanation that the bankers were favouring the GLCs irrationally is not the only possible one. Mr Inderjit Singh claimed that GLCs succeeded because of the huge investments the Government had made in them, and because they made use of their links to the Government to get ample cheap funding. This is simply not true. The GLCs were started with only seed capital. The rest was internally generated over the years through the GLCs' own efforts. I gave you the example of SIA and DBS just now. Let me cite another example - also recently mentioned in despatches - Singapore Technologies. Mr Inderjit Singh mentioned this as an example of a company with "murky beginnings" - I think it was his phrase. Cloak-and-dagger.