Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to join in the debate. Sir, today, I would like to talk on three points. First of all, my assessment of the Budget - what it achieved and what it failed to achieve and what more could have been done. Second, I would like to comment on the implementation of the ERC recommendations and, finally, I will touch on the issue of entrepreneurship and what I feel will be the strategies needed to be successful in this area. My assessment of the Budget, as I listened to the Finance Minister delivering it, was that it seemed to be a balanced budget, addressing both the short term and immediate issues as well as the longer term issues needed to address the restructuring of the Singapore economy. As I analysed the Budget further, I actually saw very few new initiatives to make this Budget exciting enough to catch the attention of long-term investors. But before I touch on this point, I would like to square off some very obvious things that, in my opinion, were the disappointments of this Budget. First of all, this Budget did not address the concerns of the middle group of Singaporeans. While we did take care of the lower income Singaporeans through the various rebates, it did nothing to assure the biggest group of Singaporeans who may have more assets than the lower income Singaporeans, but who, in the short term, have the same concerns which worry them and, that is, the loss of jobs and the short-term financial help that they can get from the Government. I feel that the Minister should have done much more to assure Singaporeans that their problems will be addressed in times of difficulties. The Minister should have put in place a temporary scheme to make cash accessible to such Singaporeans, for example, a 1% tax reduction could have helped these people in tough times and these are the people who are paying tax and who may have lost their jobs. Sir, the second issue is the budget deficit, in my opinion, is hardly a deficit. It seems to me that the Minister tried very hard to end up with a deficit budget by making huge special transfers in the three areas of ERS, Lifelong Learning Fund and Medical Endowment Fund. Similarly, I do not see how the year 2003 Budget will end up in a deficit. Again, we are making special transfers, and we are forecasting a lower NII and we did not seem to have fully accounted for the 1% GST increase and the special income coming by way of more COEs expected. So if we had spent a bit more in trying to help companies and individuals in difficulties, perhaps that deficit would have been a welcomed deficit. So what about the long term cost competitiveness of Singapore? Has the Minister missed out looking at this serious recommendation, made not only by the ERC, but also by the many, many committees before the ERC, like the SME21, the T21 and the Cost Competitiveness Committee? I feel that the Minister again lost the golden opportunity to address once and for all this critical issue that is sinking the Singapore economy. I am really disappointed at the seemingly short-term thinking of the Government, especially on this important area of cost competitiveness. And why do I say short term? The measures like temporary rental rebates, temporary property tax rebates and temporary CPF cuts do nothing in instilling confidence among longer term investors that, indeed, Singapore will still remain competitive not only two years from now, but also 10 years or 20 years from now. In fact, the current approach just drives investors harder to move out faster while they can, while the rebates are still in place. As a serious investor, I know that I have to worry that in six months, rentals and property tax will go up again and that the CPF will again go up in two years. The thought process will surely be to encourage companies to prepare to move out before costs once again increase when the regime of temporary rebates and temporary increases run out and go back to a steady state of higher costs. I hope that all the efforts of all the committees I mentioned will not go in vain and I hope that the Government will overcome this inertia and get down to addressing the cost issue seriously. The ideas are all there - differential land pricing, structural changes in the wage system, levies, fees, charges from the Government and utilities, logistics and telecommunication charges. We have enough data to show that Singapore is not competitive in all these areas. Second, the issue of implementation of the ERC. We all know that many Singaporeans were involved in the above process of deriving the ERC recommendations. I must admit that there was some skepticism among some people involved in the process and a comment which summed up the feeling went like this: "I have been asked to give my feedback many, many times before for so many years. What is the point? The Government does not listen and does not believe in us anyway." Sir, this is a true quote coming from a few prominent Singaporeans. To convince them, the argument that all of us who were involved in this process was that, this time round, the Government has realised that there is a need to change for the survival of Singapore and everyone's input was needed. The outcome has been a lot of hard work by many, and the many recommendations to remake the Singapore economy. While on the whole, the recommendations have been bold and will make a big difference, there are certain areas which could have been better dealt with. First, the impression that we have is: are we really re-tuning or refining the economy? We were promised that there were no sacred cows and that no stones will be left unturned in this whole exercise. The outcome in a number of areas, which I felt could have made an even bigger difference, was not changed. The ERC could have exercised greater will power to make bolder changes in certain areas. Unfortunately, the impression many people have is that all we have done is once again to just make tweaks in certain areas when we should have made fundamental changes to turn things around. When the whole exercise started, we talked about the remaking and restructuring of our economy. It now appears more like a refining and re-tuning exercise in certain areas. Yes, we did pick the stones and place them back in the same place or in some other place. We missed the golden opportunity to make much needed changes to the economy. Let me back up my argument with a few examples. First of all, the tax system. We have been touting the tax changes as a major structural change, but as far as I can see, there was no real change in the system. The real big change happened when the Government implemented the GST system, I believe, in 1994. The ERC recommendations merely reaffirmed the 1994 changes. So the ERC's recommendation of a reduction of personal and corporate tax rate was long overdue anyway. It should have come down drastically the day we implemented the GST changes. The tax changes, in my opinion, were not radical enough. The second example is that of the CPF. It is becoming a habit now to tweak the CPF rate in times of crisis. While I am not against this to help us in the short term, this does not give us comfort that we have gotten to the root cause of the problem and that we are just addressing the symptoms. Is it not sufficiently clear that we have a structural problem with the CPF system? We should have worked on a more permanent solution, perhaps a lower contribution from employers and compensated by alternated retirement and medical schemes. Had we made bolder changes, we may never have to fiddle with the CPF contributions now and then. Sir, the final example is one of land prices, and in this topic, I tend to defer from Mr Leong. I believe that the high cost of property, particularly industrial land, is a big issue. To me, this is one of the most serious structural problems, other than the wage which directly affects Singapore's competitiveness, particularly in areas of manufacturing. So while we may talk about moving low value-added activities outside Singapore and trying to bring in more high-tech and high value-added activities in Singapore, the problem is the image that we have created for ourselves is that we are a place where business activity is going to cost companies a lot of money. It is a high-cost country. And I have personally visited a customer about three weeks ago in the US, trying to bring in what I thought was a high-tech activity into Singapore, and the answer I got from them was "We will probably not be coming into Singapore. But if you can promise to do it in China or some other low-cost countries for me, I will move my high-tech activity there." The problem we suffer is that the image that we have created for ourselves is one of a high-cost country. So we really need to fix this problem once and for all. The second issue is on the implementation of the ERC Report's recommendations and roadmap. All of us agreed that the ERC exercise was a key and necessary initiative. But, in my opinion, we reacted a bit too late. There were already a few signals that we could have picked up had we been more attentive. We could have reacted much earlier. The few signals were the bursting of the property bubble in 1996, the Asian financial crisis, the emergence of China and India and the flow of FDIs into China. These are all new things. We could have reacted earlier. But anyway, now that we have identified so many initiatives, including some considered taboo in the past, we should now roll up our sleeves and start implementing them quickly, a point that Mr Leong made earlier. The ERC should not end up as an academic exercise. Too many important people have set aside their valuable time to be involved and we cannot risk disappointing them and again failing to implement the recommendations decisively. More importantly, we cannot risk failing the Singapore economy. The reason I am bringing this up is because, in the past, we have undergone similar exercises with the likes of the S21, SME21, Retail 21 and the many '21' initiatives. For some of these exercises, we were big on plans, but short on actions. We risk losing the confidence of the key stakeholders of Singapore, should we fail in the implementation. The number of recommendations is overwhelming and, if not handled well and not implemented systematically, we could lose the intended impact. So when I read in the papers recently about Singapore climbing up one notch among the most expensive cities in the world compared to the year before, we actually became more expensive and not less expensive by one notch. My heart sank simply because it goes to show that we have not moved fast enough in our restructuring exercise. The second concern I have is that, in our attempt to restructure, are we doing this in isolation? We should, in fact, be aware of the fact that there is a rapidly changing environment around us. Our neighbours are also contemplating the same thing as us. We are working with a moving target. We want to lower the cost of doing business, so do our neighbours. We want to be the Life Sciences Hub in Singapore, so do cities like Xian, Hyderabad, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. I cannot over-emphasise the need for speed. I believe it is not only the ideas which will define our success, but more importantly, our ability to implement these ideas and our ability to implement them swiftly which will determine how successful we will be in transforming our economy. So let us not get too complacent but get moving faster than what we are doing right now. An example of a non-starter and a failed attempt which comes to mind is the NatSteel divestment saga, which dragged on for so long. The inability to make a judgement to take a certain amount of loss, has resulted in the sloppy execution, in my opinion, of the NatSteel divestment. It is clear that Temasek failed to realise this to be a short term loss but a long term gain. Because it has to answer to the people of Singapore, it therefore has to err on the safe side by taking a kiasu approach in ensuring the best possible value because they have to answer to all of us. Therefore, this is the cause of Government getting involved in business in the first place. In the process, we lost a greater opportunity of setting an excellent example of a GLC divestment done successfully for the long-term good of the country. I would therefore like to see an implementation roadmap and an implementation committee, like what Mr Leong suggested, with the responsibility of ensuring that recommendations are implemented the way we intended them to be, and with the speed necessary to achieve the intended impact. It will be good for this implementation committee to share its results regularly by publishing a scorecard for all of us to see. Sir, the final topic I would like to touch upon is entrepreneurship. Having been so used to developing a corporate-based economy in the last 30 years, the real question we have to ask is: are we willing and are we ready to make the transformation to an entrepreneurial economy? And I think this is the most difficult question for us to answer. There are two key elements for us to succeed. Firstly, understanding what it takes to create an entrepreneurial economy and, secondly, the lessons learnt from our successes with the multi-national companies. First of all, understanding what it takes to create an entrepreneurial economy. This is the biggest challenge and the most difficult one to overcome. Unless and until we resolve this issue, we will never be able to transform our economy. The challenge, therefore, for the Government and the Minister for Entrepreneurship is to make a sincere pledge to lead this transformation of our economy and, then, to understand what is needed to make this transformation. The first challenge, therefore, is that of a mindset change. Yes, it is difficult to attract foreign companies to invest and set up shop in Singapore, but it is even more difficult for our economic agencies to visualise how a start-up or a non-entity - someone who is trying to do a start-up - can one day evolve into a world-class company based in Singapore. So, it is therefore compelling to still take the relatively easy way out of continuing to deal with a corporate-based economy - the tried and tested model. The unfortunate fact is that I feel the Government is still unsure or half-hearted about putting in place an entrepreneurial economy. Why is this so? If we ask anyone of the Government economic agencies or the civil servants who are driving this initiative, we cannot help but conclude that they are still programmed to bring in foreign MNCs. The sad thing is that many are sceptical about the ability of our local entrepreneurs to make it big. I say this from my own personal experience and from direct feedback from would-be entrepreneurs. Sir, the second issue on entrepreneurship is lessons learnt from our successes with MNCs. If the mindset change can be achieved, then I feel that the next few steps needed to succeed in transforming our economy and of encouraging more entrepreneurs to set up their bases in Singapore would be much easier. We can learn from our successes in the economic development of Singapore in the first 30 years, which have been in attracting foreign direct investments, multinational companies, and in establishing bigger companies, ie, the Government-linked companies here. We can then apply them as we focus on building an entrepreneurial economy. There are three main lessons to be learned from building a corporate economy. They are, first, creating a conducive environment; second, putting in place incentive schemes; and last, but not least, a hand-holding of multinational companies from cradle to grave. What I am about to say may seem obvious, but I feel that we have not fully understood the root causes and have not addressed and learnt from these lessons, and to address the issues on how we can successfully create our entrepreneurial economy. Sir, firstly, on creating a conducive environment for MNCs to set up base, why were we successful? Because the Government had developed an appropriate infrastructure, offered cheap land, removed other obstacles that may have existed and made it easy for MNCs to decide to start up operations here. Rules and regulations were tailor-made for MNCs and for bigger companies. Many of the MNCs and GLCs had direct access to top civil servants and Ministers, and this allowed them to resolve issues faster. The lesson here is that the rules made for bigger companies will not work for start-ups and for smaller companies. Secondly, on incentives and financing schemes made for bigger companies. To complement the setting up of a conducive environment, the economic development agencies developed a slew of incentive schemes, Government grants and tax breaks, again tailor-made for MNCs and for bigger companies. The lesson here is that while it is easy for big companies to apply and utilise the incentive schemes, the smaller companies find it terribly difficult to do the same. Thirdly, hand-holding of MNCs from cradle to grave. This, in my opinion, is the most significant initiative implemented here that made MNCs most comfortable in setting up bases in Singapore. Kudos to the EDB for this. We created a one-stop agency which hand-held MNCs coming into Singapore, right from the time that we were courting, through the time that they started operations in Singapore, up to the time that we encouraged them to leave for places like Batam and Suzhou. Having dealt with EDB on many occasions - while working in a multi-national company as well as when I went to start up my own local companies - I thought I had a good feel of how they operate. I must confess that I really understood EDB only after reading its book published recently called Heartwork. It is an excellent book. After reading it, I understood why EDB did what it did, and became even more convinced that EDB will never be able to handle and help local start-ups. I would like to say that the EDB has done an excellent job all these years but, having understood the charter and the mode of operation, especially after reading the book, I realised that it is unfair and impossible for them to effectively support local companies. Let me share one example from the book to illustrate the mindset with which it operated in helping bigger companies coming into Singapore. Sir, in the book, what I read was, when Apple computers wanted to set up a factory in Singapore many years ago, EDB went the full mile, did all the work for Apple in fitting up the whole factory. In fact, it went even further than that. An officer was allocated on a full-time basis to become the project manager for setting up of the factory. The American manager who was responsible for setting up the Apple factory in Singapore did not have to be personally here in Singapore while the facilities were being set up. That is what I call service. Can anyone in this House give me an example of a similar service for our local companies? I do not know of any. The reality is that most local companies are left on their own to fight their own battles and to clear the many obstacles themselves. At times, I dare say that the bureaucracy works against them. The lesson here is that had we not had EDB to champion the cause of MNCs, we may not have developed such a vibrant economy. Champion agencies can do wonders because of the influence they have in clearing these obstacles. So, how can we apply these lessons? Firstly, let us create a conducive environment by making a review of rules - which is happening, and I think the rules should not just be reviewed but also revamped - this time round, by putting smaller companies and start-ups centre-stage when we develop these rules. Secondly, of course, is to revisit all the incentive schemes and tailor them to suit start-ups and SMEs. Thirdly, we really need an EDB-style organisation, a one-stop agency for SMEs and start-ups. Today, we see too many agencies claiming to champion the SMEs and entrepreneurs, but my experience with them is such that none is able to provide the comprehensive service that EDB does for MNCs. Many things, in fact, fall into the crack for entrepreneurs and smaller companies. We need a champion. Finally, to build a vibrant financing environment, such as the ones that exist in entrepreneurial economies in the USA, Taiwan and Israel. I will elaborate on these during the Committee of Supply debate. Sir, in conclusion, the budget is just one of the many levers to address the current situation that we are in. The current crisis is different from the previous predicaments, although we may use the same terminology to describe them. We have been using the same old formula to address these new predicaments. The context of the problem has changed. And it will continue to change, because we live in a world where change is a constant. As a result, each crisis will become more complex than the previous one. We have to adopt newer measures, and the speed of implementation is essential for their success. This year's budget is being hailed as a budget in transition. My opinion is that we need to get out of this transition quickly. We have been in the transition mode for quite some time. We need to arrive at an economic model that we want very quickly. We have been planning for quite some time. The planning phase is over. It is now time to execute and implement bold measures. We cannot be half-hearted in our endeavours. We need to be clear in thought and be decisive in action. Sir, on the belief that the Minister will implement swiftly these new measures, I support this motion. 11.52 am