Hansard, Tuesday, 2 February 2021

1 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health (a) how many and what proportion of workers at healthcare institutions are currently outsourced; (b) what proportion of outsourced workers perform roles which in the pre-outsourcing era would have been in frontline or patient care areas or involving handling patient samples; and (c) whether human resource practices for outsourced workers are harmonised with direct hires, including recognition for COVID-19 related work and frontline exposure risk.

Sir, as a doctor and a unionist, I want to thank all our frontline healthcare workers for their sacrifices and hard work during this COVID-19 crisis. About 10,000 staff, or about 13%, working in public healthcare institutions are hired by third party contractors. Some examples of outsourced workers include housekeeping staff, security guards, and staff doing landscaping, pest control and kitchen or food services. Of these outsourced staff, almost 70% of them are in roles which require them to be at the frontline or patient care areas, but less than 5% are involved in handling patient samples.

In general, the third party contractors have been engaged by the public healthcare institutions under a contract for service arrangement for specific projects or services. They are engaged for a fee and take on the responsibility of hiring the staff required to meet the needs of these projects or services. Hence, the compensation and benefits of staff that they hire is determined and paid by these contract companies.

Nevertheless, to ensure that the welfare of outsourced staff is taken care of during the COVID-19 outbreak, the public healthcare institutions have extended various initiatives to them. Outsourced staff who work in high-risk areas are trained in infection control measures and provided with full PPE, or Personal Protective Equipment, when discharging their duties. They are also included in the COVID-19 vaccination exercises for our healthcare workers.

The public healthcare institutions appreciate the contribution of these outsourced workers in our battle against COVID-19 and many of these institutions have extended goodwill donations and care packs to their outsourced staff. The Ministry certainly encourages the public healthcare institutions to continue looking into ways to show appreciation for the hard work of outsourced staff in many different ways.

Dr Ta Wu Meng.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his answer. I have two supplementary questions I would like to put to MOH. As preamble, I just want to make reference to the Budget 2020 Round-up Speech delivered last year by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, and I quote from paragraph B24(a), "The Government will award public officers on the frontline who are directly battling with the COVID-19 disease up to one additional month of special bonus. This will include many healthcare officers in MOH and the restructured hospitals."

Sir, in the context of this, I can share that my Clementi residents tell me, and my brothers and sisters in the Labour Movement tell me, that there are cleaners serving in our hospitals, cleaners who are cleaning COVID-19 patient rooms, cleaners who are cleaning COVID-19 patient room toilets, who unfortunately, at the moment, do not qualify for this bonus because they are outsourced. So, can I ask the Senior Minister of State will the Ministry consider extending this bonus to outsourced cleaners and rank and file workers who are embedded deep in the COVID-19 frontline? I ask this again, Mr Speaker, because in the pre-outsourcing era, these workers would have been in-sourced, would have been direct hires and in the pre-outsourcing era, they would have qualified for similar bonuses and support. And it would also be in harmonisation with the existing measures the Senior Minister of State has mentioned – provisions of vaccination support and PPE support. So, I raise this for the Ministry's consideration, please.

Sir, I agree with the Member that outsourced workers who share the same risks in very high-risk areas, for example, the COVID-19 ICUs or the COVID-19 wards, need to be appropriately recognised. And I am sure the healthcare institutions will look at ways to honour their hard work and sacrifices, and the risks that they take as well. We will give the healthcare institutions the latitude and the time to plan for appreciation in the various ways that they can to show solidarity with these workers who have also taken risks, just like any of our other healthcare workers in the frontline sector.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State. I have one question. Does the Ministry make it a requirement for service providers to extend work injury compensation to outsourced healthcare workers?

Sir, can I just clarify if the Member is asking about compensation by the hospitals or work injury compensation in general?

It would be specific to the service providers, because these are outsourced workers. There are situations – not exactly in the healthcare setting but sometimes, other settings – where the worker is on a contract for service arrangement and no Work Injury Compensation Act or WICA benefits accrue to such workers. So, I am wondering whether healthcare institutions make it a requirement for companies that provide such outsourced services to healthcare institutions, whether it is a requirement by the healthcare institutions themselves for these workers to have WICA coverage.

Sir, I do not have specific details on this pertaining to the institutions but I would imagine that the generic provisions for workplace injuries and compensation would apply in this setting as well.

The following question stood in the name of Ms He Ting Ru –

2 To ask the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether the POFMA Office is taking any measures to deal with misinformation over COVID-19 and COVID-19 vaccines; and (b) if so, what are the measures being taken, bearing in mind the need to ensure that there will not be a chilling effect on legitimate concerns being raised.

Question No 2, please.

Mr Speaker, Sir, misinformation is a serious challenge in our fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. In the past year, we have responded to over 60 instances of speculation, rumours, scams and outright falsehoods pertaining to COVID-19, using a range of responses – from public communications to legislative levers, including the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act or POFMA.

A key focus of the Ministerial Taskforce and our Government agencies has been to provide accurate updates from trusted sources in a timely and transparent manner, to help ensure our citizens are well-informed and to calm anxieties caused by such misinformation. For instance, we regularly convey information and clarifications through the media, on Government websites, social media and the Gov.sg channel on WhatsApp and Telegram.

Public education is key to our vaccination programme. We want to strengthen our resilience against vaccine misinformation by enhancing the understanding of COVID-19 vaccines and debunking falsehoods, so that Singaporeans can make informed decisions for the safety and health of themselves, their loved ones and the community.

We use multiple platforms and languages to communicate essential information about the COVID-19 vaccines to all segments of our society. Over the past few weeks, vaccination information has been conveyed through print and broadcast interviews, as well as social media, direct messaging platforms and Gov.sg. The local media has also published articles and FAQ columns to address concerns and questions about vaccines. We have also worked with major tech companies to ensure that authoritative sources, including MOH’s website, are prominently included on their platforms.

As we commence the vaccination programme for seniors, community volunteers from the People’s Association, as well as Silver Generation Ambassadors, will be conducting house visits to speak to our seniors and address their queries about the COVID-19 vaccine and the vaccination programme.

We are also actively monitoring for vaccine-related misinformation. Where there is cause for action, we will not hesitate to use the full force of the law.

All of us have a role in stemming the spread of misinformation. We should check that the information we receive comes from reliable sources, make the effort to verify before sharing and not share unverified information. It is vital, especially in this time of crisis, that every one of us does the right thing.

I thank the Minister for that response. I am just wondering as a supplementary question if some degree of benefit of doubt may be afforded to those who may unwittingly be sharing disinformation. I have in mind Grandma who may run the risk of falling foul of POFMA because she shares reservations in a WhatsApp message she received about mRNA vaccines. She is exercising just individual skepticism.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. In our response to misinformation as I have described, we have a range of possibilities – from public education, to a targeted effort to clarify a particular point on Government websites and other channels, as well as working with the specific parties concerned. We do not need to always resort to the extreme use of the legislative levers, unless it is warranted by the circumstances. Therefore, in the kind of example that the Member cites, very often, we have found that engagement with the relevant parties has sufficed to clarify the matter and correct the misinformation.

3 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) what is the impact of the SolarWinds breach on Singapore and the cybersecurity of our critical systems; and (b) what steps is the Ministry taking to mitigate the cyber threats to Singapore arising from this and other global cybersecurity incidents.

4 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for Communications and Information in light of the SolarWinds cybersecurity incident (a) how many companies and Government agencies are affected or vulnerable to such attacks; and (b) how can companies providing essential services and Government agencies have better oversight over cybersecurity arrangements with third party providers.

Mr Speaker, the SolarWinds cybersecurity breach compromised a network management software that is widely used by major companies worldwide. The attacker used the software’s regular updates to implant a backdoor and gain a foothold in the networks of organisations that downloaded and installed the malicious update. This is a very sophisticated attack that evaded detection for many months.

As reported by the media, SolarWinds’ clients include US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies – including Microsoft, CISCO Systems and VMWare. It affected about 18,000 customers, although a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on activity on their systems. This breach is especially noteworthy because the SolarWinds software is part of the network control and management infrastructure. Hence, it was trusted and had privileged access to internal networks. The situation is still evolving and the affected firms are continuing with their investigations.

When first alerted of the breach, the Cyber Security Agency, or CSA, immediately raised the National Cyber Threat Alert Level and worked with our Critical Information Infrastructure, or CII, sectors to check and monitor our critical systems. There is no indication thus far that Singapore’s CII and Government systems have been adversely affected by the SolarWinds breach. The Government is nonetheless adopting a cautious approach and CSA has issued public advisories on steps that enterprises and organisations should take to safeguard their systems against this threat. These include having full visibility of their networks and detecting unusual activity in a timely manner.

In the longer term, dealing with these sophisticated cyber threats requires a fundamental shift in mindset towards a "zero-trust" cybersecurity posture. At its core, this "zero-trust" cybersecurity posture has the notion that we should protect our networks by observing two key principles. First, we should not trust any activity without first verifying it; and second, ensure constant monitoring and vigilance for suspicious activities. This includes compartmentalising and restricting access to different segments of the network, validating transactions across segments, reconciling any escalation of user privileges, and actively and regularly hunting for threats. Organisations should also put in place robust plans for cyber incident response in the event they fall victim to a cyber-attack.

CSA will strengthen engagements with CII sectors, enterprises and organisations to adopt and sustain these measures.

Mr Speaker, the SolarWinds incident underscores the global and transborder nature of cyber threats. Given the nature of the digital domain, such cyber incidents will happen from time to time. Malicious actors only need to exploit one vulnerability, while the defenders must ensure that there are no vulnerabilities in all the systems and networks that they are protecting, all the time. Though difficult to completely prevent, we need deliberate, targeted and consistent efforts to strengthen our cyber defences against sophisticated threats like the SolarWinds breach, which exploit the supply chain of trusted software and vendors. Our CIIs, enterprises and citizens must also maintain their vigilance against cyber threats, as we mitigate the risks while leveraging the opportunities of digitalisation.

Mr Speaker, may I also have your permission to say that this is also in response to Question No 4.

Please do. Mr Desmond Choo.

I would like to thank the Minister for his clarification. I have two points of clarifications for the Minister. The first, is before the SolarWinds incident, FireEye was also a victim of hacks. According to media reports, 30% of companies have actually not used SolarWinds nor FireEye software. This means that the vulnerability could be a lot more extensive than we believe. How would the Government go ahead in the future to make sure that we close up our weakest link?

The second point of clarification is on the roles of CSA and GovTech, in helping our companies providing essential services to toughen up their defences. Not all companies are equally well-resourced, some will need more support than others, we are probably only as good as our weakest link. So, I hope the Minister can point us the way forward.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. I think his two questions are in some ways inter-related. Because the first is, how we can ensure that we are not vulnerable and the second is how we can help companies fortify themselves against such threats.

I think underlying this is the key point first, what I stated earlier in my main response, which is that, the nature of cyber threats is such that they are global, they are transborder and they can occur or affect us through a multiplicity of chance; not least, as the SolarWinds incident illustrates, through trusted network systems and vendors.

And therefore, the first and perhaps most important point is the "zero-trust" posture that we must adopt. In other words, always be vigilant, constantly evaluate our systems and conduct regular monitoring and threat hunting exercises. I think this is a fundamental; it is a posture that we need to adopt across not just our critical information infrastructure, but indeed across all organisations, especially as our digital footprint grows as we adopt new digital solutions.

Secondly, on the part of CSA and the Government, CSA works with our CII sectors in particular, to share information regularly on evolving threats and also on solutions that are available for adoption. In particular, CSA is in regular contact with its counterparts around the world and that is an important source of this information and intelligence that is necessary to strengthen our own system.

CSA also has, as I mentioned, an alert system, so that when it is warranted, the alert levels are raised so that our CII owners are aware that the threat landscape has shifted and they need to step up some of their activities in response to that.

Finally, CSA works with several private sector partners and others to ensure various forms of cybersecurity solutions are available for adoption and use by not just the large enterprises and our CIIs but also SMEs.

This is an important part of our work going forward, raising awareness of cybersecurity and also putting in place solutions or making available solutions which businesses can use, and at the same time also working with individuals.

So, there is a range of measures we are undertaking and that we continue to undertake. I think the fact of the matter is, we can never be foolproof in this effort, but we can make sure that we take every effort to strengthen our system and learn from incidents like SolarWinds to further fortify ourselves.

5 Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) how regularly are complaints about smoking in prohibited locations lodged; (b) how many of them turn out to be in areas that are not prohibited; and (c) whether there have been considerations to redefine prohibited smoking areas based on different parameters such as human traffic volume and width of walking area.

Sustainability and the Environment): Feedback on smoking received by NEA is categorised as either smoking in prohibited or non-prohibited areas. NEA does not track the number of feedback received on smoking in prohibited locations that turn out to be in areas that are not prohibited. In 2020, NEA received an average of about 2,900 feedback a month on smoking in prohibited areas and 210 feedback a month on smoking in non-prohibited areas.

To reduce the public's exposure to the harmful effects of second-hand tobacco smoke, NEA has been progressively extending the smoking prohibition to more places where the public are likely to be exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke. Human traffic volume is already one of the considerations when determining smoking prohibited places, alongside other factors such as whether the places are enclosed, and frequency of visits by families and vulnerable groups.

Besides the Government's efforts on smoking prohibition, I urge smokers to exercise social responsibility and refrain from lighting up where the tobacco smoke can affect those around them. Families and friends of smokers, as well as the general public, can help to reinforce positive social norms.

Ms Yeo.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for her response. I have two supplementary questions. The open areas outside of many common public hotspots such as MRT, LRT stations, pathways leading up to shopping malls, which may house polyclinics as well as dialysis centres are often open air and unsheltered. However, these pathways are frequented by families with young children as well as patients with compromised immunities and vulnerables such as seniors.

In such high human traffic thoroughfares, often, the smoking community would also find it convenient to take a break and smoke, especially if there are litter bins around for the disposal of the cigarettes. In such areas as well as in places where there are high incidence of complaints which turn out to be areas which are not prohibited, would the Minister consider to locate such litter bins to areas where there is less human traffic but still convenient and safe for our smokers to take a break?

The second supplementary question is, would the Minister also consider to place advisories or send emissaries to the areas for the community to be considerate of each other's needs?

I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. I assume that for areas where there is high human traffic, litter bins are placed there in order to provide convenience for people to bin their rubbish. But I do understand the Member's questions and concerns. Indeed, we do have such similar feedback on these thoroughfares. NEA has responded to the feedback by working with the relevant agencies and premises owners to relocate these bins – particularly the ones with the ashtrays – to places where there is less footfall, away from the main thoroughfare or high human traffic volume, to prevent the areas near where the thoroughfare is to become smoking congregation areas.

With regard to advisories, indeed, NEA actually worked closely with the Town Councils as well as with various Government agencies and grassroots to distribute advisories or flyers in residential estates as well as to put up visual reminders to remind smokers to be considerate when lighting up and to not smoke in smoking prohibited areas. And of course, we will continue to actively monitor and enforce against smoking in prohibited areas.

6 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether the high-rise anti-littering measures taken so far have been effective; (b) whether the surveillance devices being deployed can be scaled up; and (c) whether the agencies will look to new technologies and devices to enhance enforcement capabilities.

Sustainability and the Environment): NEA adopts a multi-pronged approach comprising enforcement, public education and community partnerships to deter high-rise litterbugs.

In 2020, NEA has stepped up enforcement against high-rise littering by increasing the number of surveillance camera deployments by over 50% as compared to 2019. NEA also partnered closely with Town Councils to enable more timely information-sharing to facilitate the investigation of high-rise littering offences. These measures enabled NEA to take more than 1,000 enforcement actions against high-rise litterbugs in 2020. NEA will continue to enhance its enforcement capabilities by keeping pace with developments in camera technology for high-rise littering surveillance.

Even as NEA steps up enforcement against high-rise littering, we must continue to cultivate social graciousness, good habits and a sense of collective responsibility to keep Singapore clean and safe. For this reason, NEA adopts complementary strategies such as strengthening community partnerships to raise awareness on the negative impacts of high-rise littering. In 2020, NEA trialled informative standees at public areas with persistent littering feedback and enforcement, to deter people from committing high-rise littering offences. NEA is also partnering Town Councils to install posters at HDB blocks, highlighting the environmental and social consequences of high-rise littering.

Through the collective efforts of all, we can uphold high standards of public cleanliness.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Thank you, Sir. While I appreciate the efforts by NEA over the years, there are obviously no visible improvements in the estate that we can see and have been monitoring. Items continue to be thrown out of windows, such as cigarette butts, and it is frequently still happening. Many Members have raised this in this House for many years. So, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether this is a case where the deterrent effect is not working and the litterbugs think they can get away with it. If that is the case, then are surveillance and enforcement working to achieve that?

Secondly, I would like to ask whether NEA is seeing this littering problem as a steady state problem or is NEA committed to improving the situation to move the needle and using and harnessing technologies and a community effort to reduce high-rise littering?

Again, let me thank the Member for his questions and, in fact, comments.

First, with regard to the question about the deterrent effect of our enforcements, let me say that due to the nature of the offence – high-rise littering act – as well as the fact that our estates especially are very heavily built up, very dense, I think you would appreciate that it is not easy to identify and apprehend high-rise litterbugs. Despite this, a high-rise littering offence is a very serious offence. It affects our public health and, in fact, safety, too, and we take this seriously and we take firm enforcement action as far as is possible and practicable.

Over the years, we have stepped up our enforcement and surveillance capabilities. In fact, we leveraged technology and data analytics in order to apprehend high-rise litterbugs. And as I have noted, since last year, 2020, we have actually increased our camera deployments by more than 50%. We have also worked more closely with the Town Councils to enable more timely sharing of information in order to facilitate our investigations. In fact, we have worked to improve our work processes through data analytics so that we can actually shorten the waiting time for camera deployments for surveillance and that is the reason why we are able to increase the number of deployments of the cameras.

We have also worked to streamline our investigation procedures to shorten the investigation period as far as possible. In addition to that, of course, we will continue to look at using better camera technology in terms of better image resolution as well as detection capabilities and so on to be more effective. Let me also say that, in fact, we have, over the years, been increasing the penalties for high-rise litterbugs. So, for high-rise littering, the first offence is already a Court conviction, with a maximum of $2,000 fine and/or CWO. The third and subsequent offences are a maximum of $10,000 fine and/or CWO. What we are doing now is also to deter future high-rise litterbugs. For instance, when we have a camera capture of a high-rise littering act, we are working with Town Councils to put up standees in that affected block to inform residents that high-rise littering offences have been committed and have been captured by camera deployments.

Let me also add that when we look at the statistics, basically, the repeat offenders for high-rise littering acts actually are lower than for the general littering offences. So, although the number of offences per offender may be higher for high-rise littering because the camera will capture multiple acts of high-rise littering, but, for repeat offenders, actually, the percentage is lower. So, it does show that what we are doing does have a deterrent effect if we are able to identify and apprehend them.

So, steady state? No. As I have said earlier, at the end of the day, even as we step up enforcement and continue to actively monitor and try and apprehend with technology and so on, ultimately, what is important is we need the community, we need Singaporeans to cooperate. We need Singaporeans to cultivate social graciousness, good habits and collective responsibility and not to litter, in order to be able to keep Singapore clean and green.

7 Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Government is working with the Malaysian authorities to facilitate Singaporeans entering Malaysia for essential personal matters such as family bereavements.

Mr Speaker, many of us have family or close friends across the Causeway. So, in the last one year, the enforced separation by the border closures has had a profound emotional impact on many families in Singapore, especially when confronted by family bereavement. I have lost count of the number of emails I have received from people who were deprived of that opportunity to be with a family member at the end of life. So, we particularly sympathise and understand the feelings of Singaporeans and, indeed, Malaysians who are caught in such circumstances.

Having said that, we also fully understand the need for public health precautions, of which border closures are part. And we also recognise that it is the responsibility of each government to do whatever it takes in order to protect public health.

Throughout this epidemic, we have been in close contact with the Malaysian authorities and we have worked with them to facilitate travel for Singaporeans with essential or compassionate reasons for travel. Since March 2020, we have helped to facilitate travel for more than 250 appeal cases from Singapore Citizens or PRs who wanted to enter Malaysia. We have also facilitated the repatriation of more than 350 Singaporeans who were stranded in Malaysia, and these were usually the elderly or very young, or people with disability and mobility issues, and we have had to run special services across the Causeway to bring our people back home.

We have reached with the Malaysian authorities an in-principle agreement to have protocols for travel in such circumstances, including family bereavements. The exact details are still being worked out. As Members of the House are aware, the COVID-19 situation keeps evolving very rapidly. Even our previously agreed Reciprocal Green Lanes and travel bubbles have had to be opened and shut, sometimes quite quickly. So, I hope all Members understand that this is a dynamic and difficult situation. We are doing our best but, from time to time, we will sometimes have to take tough decisions.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Thank you, Speaker. I have two supplementary questions for the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

First, in his earlier reply, he mentioned that the Ministry has facilitated successfully about 250 appeals for travel by Singaporeans and PRs across the Causeway. I have some residents who were obviously not successful in their attempts to get across and this was despite MFA Consular officers coming in to try to assist, but there was just no response from the Malaysian side. So, I would like to ask how can the Ministry take this forward to ensure that there is a broader baseline or more objectivity to facilitate such travel, such that it is not just hit-and-miss where some appeals are allowed and some are not, and I do not know the circumstances of the 250 successful appeals.

The second question, perhaps more broadly, is that we are all aware of the dynamic political situation in Malaysia and also the state of emergency currently. So, I wonder if the Minister could share with us his observations about how functional currently are the diplomatic channels to resolve bilateral issues.

I thank Ms Sylvia Lim for the two supplementary questions. I said just now we had facilitated more than 250 cases. The Member is quite right. In fact, the majority of cases did not get through. For each case that MFA is aware of, we would first inform the Singaporean or PR concerned that they need to get approval – specific approval from the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. We always ask them to keep us informed so that we can also reach out informally to the Malaysian High Commission to try our best to persuade. But the legal and diplomatic position is that the ultimate discretion and the final decision rest with the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. So, I am not in a position to say on what basis he agreed to some of our requests and disagreed with many of the other requests.

I would also say that I have also come across many cases, when the Singaporean is made aware of how difficult the hurdles are in place, they have sometimes decided that because of the lack of time, that it would be pointless to try to get across the Causeway and to delay the funeral. So, all in all, it has been a very tough, a very heart-wrenching time for these families. And what I can assure is that MFA takes seriously each and every single case. We will do our best.

On Ms Sylvia Lim's second point about what she described as the dynamic political situation in Malaysia, the state of emergency and the rest of it, what I would say from an MFA perspective is that throughout this entire crisis – and Members must remember, in the case of Malaysia, they have even gone through a change of government in the past one year – nevertheless, throughout this crisis, we have been able to maintain good functional communications and relations between the Prime Ministers, between the Ministers, certainly between myself and the Foreign Minister of Malaysia Dato' Sri Hishammuddin Hussein, and as well as at the public service, civil service level.

So, all those ties, those communications, both formal and informal, including WhatsApp messages, are flowing. I can tell you that there have been occasions where I have even had to call him up personally because a Singaporean got stuck in a particularly delicate situation and he has obliged. So, the point is, on both sides of the Causeway, we are dealing with a very difficult situation. My objective is to keep relations open, keep communications honest, constructive, helpful. Not to make things worse, not to put undue pressure which would actually cause damage to the long-term challenge of both countries having to deal with this pandemic.

So, all in all I would say that our relations remain in a very good state. I am sorry that we have not been able to persuade the authorities in Malaysia to agree to every request that has come from Singaporeans, but we will do our best.

8 Ms Ng Ling Ling asked the Minister for National Development (a) how many Singaporeans are currently eligible for community care apartments; and (b) whether HDB will consider rolling out such apartments earlier to more townships should demand far exceed the pilot supply.

Mr Speaker, jointly developed by MND, MOH and HDB, the Community Care Apartments integrate senior-friendly housing with care services that can be scaled according to individual care needs, with the aim of better supporting our seniors to age in place. The first pilot at Bukit Batok will be launched for sale in February 2021 – which is this month – in our HDB Build-To-Order exercise.

The number of Singaporeans who may be eligible for the Community Care Apartments will depend on their age, the income levels and in the case of this pilot, we give priority to those with need for assistance with their activities of daily living. The demand for the Community Care Apartments will also depend on seniors' budget, preferences and care needs.

We have plans for the Community Care Apartments to be piloted at additional sites if the take-up rate and public response for the first pilot at Bukit Batok is good. As this is a new housing concept, we will evaluate the initial pilots before developing longer term plans.

Ms Ng Ling Ling.

Thank you, Speaker, and I thank the Minister for the reply. I am very encouraged by MND, MOH and HDB for their collaboration to bring about such a meaningful pilot housing model and to expand the housing options for our seniors with a complimentary suite of care services – almost able to be customised to their needs. I have several of my residents' families who have expressed their needs for a smaller, affordable apartments like this, with care support nearer to home.

My two supplementary questions are: one, will MND also consider granting exceptions for eligibility of such flats if one of the applicants is a care-giver below 65 years old, but is looking after a senior. Case in point is a resident of mine who is the only child of an aged parent requiring such care that has been described in the pilot model.

My second question is, will MND consider granting exceptions for eligibility to such flats if one of the applicants is a person with disabilities who can benefit also from such care support, but is below 65 years old? A lot of the criteria spelt out would also be actually very suitable for people with disabilities. So, these are my two supplementary questions.

Mr Speaker, this is the very first pilot. We have scoped it. We want to see what the demand is and how people respond to a care continuum option like this. But nevertheless, if appeals come in, we will consider making exceptions to the two cases that the Member had mentioned. But I think we want to make sure that we can first, evaluate the pilot, at least the first site, for the target group that this was intended for. Nevertheless, in the steady state, we will certainly look at the exceptional cases like this.

In the first case, if one is below 65 years old but a care-giver, I think we can look at the situation and exercise discretion. On the second, I have asked my team, beyond the pilot for Community Care Apartments for seniors, to look at the model for persons with disability and independent living in the community.

I have actually gone to the exhibition at HDB and studied the Community Care Apartment model. I am very impressed and very excited as well. My supplementary question is related to Member Ng Ling Ling's question. I think it is such an excellent model and it should be scaled.

I am asking if the Minister would consider working with the disability organisations to pilot this model. Because the current options for residential living for persons with disability is not a continuum – you either stay at home with your own parents who are also ageing themselves, or you go to a residential home which is a very costly model. There is also merit to develop a continuum of living models so that folks can afford and benefit from different tiers of service packages. I think it just make sense for persons with disability who are younger than 65 years to be given that option; so that the principle of more self reliance and joint responsibility can be manifested in the new options.

I hope that the Minister will not wait until the pilot is over, but to try this model with persons with disability who will be able to live more independently – do a pilot of the pilot.

Yes, we are already studying and actively looking at how and what options may be available for persons with disability who may want to live independently in the community.

For the Community Care Apartments, apart from the age criterion, a person with physical disability may benefit from the Care Apartment model. If a younger person with disability, and it is a physical disability, would like facilities such as these, we are certainly studying that. But, of course, there other forms of disability that we may need to look at, and the availability of community based services in a model such as this. But we are actively looking at it.

Mr Xie Yao Quan.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his reply. I have one supplementary question. The Minister has mentioned that the Community Care Apartment is a novel housing scheme and I think the key differentiator is that this scheme integrates – it is not just about housing but it integrates care, health and social services. And the Minister, in his reply, has also emphasised the importance of evaluating this new housing scheme.

So, my question is apart from public response and market demand, what other factors and outcome measures might the Ministry take into consideration as it reviews its plans for the roll-out and evaluate the pilot scheme.

I think the Member is right. In evaluating this pilot, we look beyond just the market response to a housing option like this because this is not just housing; it is housing plus social support and care options integrated together.

And therefore, in evaluating this pilot, we look at a number of things. For example, getting feedback from the seniors as well as their care-givers and family members on the layout of the Community Care Apartments, on the communal spaces that we are providing, on the programming that we are offering, on the care services, both the basic as well as the optional care services that we are providing to them.

We are also looking at whether the Community Care Apartments and the programming we are providing as well as the support that comes with it, whether it adds and supports and promotes the overall well-being of our seniors in a holistic way – both the physical well-being, emotional well-being and relational well-being.

Thirdly, for a new housing concept like this, we also want to evaluate the new models such as joint balloting. For this particular scheme, we allow seniors who are family members or friends to jointly ballot and if they ballot successfully, then both can select the apartments; and ideally on the same floor next to each other.

So, new models that seek to try to enable the kind of relationships that seniors would like to continue with, despite moving to a new home.

And ultimately, looking at it from macro-perspective as the Community Care Apartments seek to close a gap in the overall continuum of housing options for our seniors in their golden years – whether indeed it plays the part of enabling a senior to right-size to a smaller home that they can manage better in terms of housekeeping, as compared to a larger home that they owned in their earlier days when their children lived with them; as they move to a new environment, there is that social communal kind of relationships that are forged with their neighbours in the apartments; whether they are kept involved and engaged in the community and interested in the community and in active pursuits of activities.

And ultimately, it is the ability to make a more gradual support framework that escalates based on their needs; and as some seniors increasingly become frailer and have more care requirements, having priority access to a nursing home nearby.

9 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for National Development (a) what is HDB’s approach to assist flat dwellers who experience persistent external wall seepages and ceiling leakages; and (b) whether HDB invests in new capabilities and technologies to tackle long-standing and recurring cases where the HDB maintenance contractors are unable or incapable of rectifying.

10 Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for National Development whether HDB will consider rolling out a national programme of facade repair for ageing HDB blocks in view of the recent spates of external wall seepage.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 9 and 10 together.

Yes, please.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa and Mr Muhamad Faisal Abdul Manap have raised questions about external water seepages and ceiling leakages. I will address the Members' questions together. Mr Desmond Choo also had a question about how MND can support Town Councils with water seepages and wear and tear problems at common areas, which my colleague, Senior Minister of State Sim Ann will address separately.

The external walls of HDB blocks are common property under the Town Councils' management and maintenance. As they are subject to wear and tear over time, Town Councils are advised to keep them in good condition by carrying out regular maintenance and repairs where needed. Residents who encounter water seepage through their walls typically report such cases to their Town Council. As such, HDB does not have information on the total number of external wall seepage cases.

There are currently no plans to roll out a programme for façade repairs to address external wall seepage specifically, as such issues can be prevented today through regular maintenance by Town Councils. HDB provides assistance to Town Councils by co-sharing 50% of the costs of façade repairs, under the Façade Repairs Co-payment scheme.

From the second half of this year, BCA will require a Periodic Façade Inspection (PFI) to be carried out for all buildings above 20 years old and above 13 metres in height. The objective is to improve public safety, by facilitating the early detection of potential issues and the timely repair of façades.

Ceiling leaks that occur in HDB flats are generally a result of wear and tear over time. In such cases, the responsibility for repairs is shared jointly between the upper and lower floor flat owners. Both upper and lower floor flat owners would need to jointly investigate and carry out the repairs. In most cases, leakages can be amicably resolved when flat owners exercise mutual understanding and cooperate with one another.

HDB also offers assistance to help upper and lower floor owners resolve ceiling leak issues. In cases where the leak is caused by wear and tear, HDB may offer assistance with repairs and co-share the cost of repairs under the Goodwill Repair Assistance (GRA) scheme. Under this scheme, HDB will pay 50% of the ceiling leak repair cost. The remaining 50% is then shared equally between the upper and lower floor flat owners. However, if the cause of the leak at the lower floor flat is due to renovations carried out at the upper floor flat, the upper floor flat owner would be fully responsible for rectifying the leak and bearing the full repair cost.

HDB has been exploring new technologies to improve on current repair methods for ceiling leaks and has identified two new repair methods. Firstly, nanotechnology waterproofing system and secondly, overlaying waterproofing membrane system. These technologies provide alternative repair options for residents who do not wish to hack their toilet tiles or who prefer to keep the existing finishes in their toilets. For complex and recurring issues which contractors are unable to rectify, HDB will also assist in the investigation and provide advice where possible.

Lastly, ceiling leaks can also occur for units that are on the top floor, as water seeps into the flat through the roof. As the roof is part of common property, the Town Council is responsible for addressing the leak. Where necessary, HDB can provide technical advice to the Town Council on the root cause of the leak and on the appropriate repair methods.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Thank you, Sir. Sir, the Minister of State mentioned about not having data other than from HDB sources. Just to let him know that I have received more than hundred feedback over the last two, three months. And some very serious cases where water flows out like a tap from the wall. So, here is the frustrating situation. The Town Council contractors will always be called upon to do the repair and they will use a trial-and-error method because they cannot really identify where the source of the seepage is. And it may not be fixed in one day, they will come another day; and sometimes, it takes multiple sessions to get it done. It causes a lot of frustrations to residents and also the resources of the contractors as well.

Can I ask and appeal to MND and HDB to intervene in this situation because this is really a basic liveability issue, especially first thing for those that are perennial cases, where HDB should step in? Because some of these are due to certain batches of HDB flats that were built using a particular technique, prefabrication techniques and so on. Therefore, the water seepage has been there for many years.

I hope the HDB can come in for those cases to help identify the root cause of the problem, use technology like the Minister of State mentioned, use the research that HDB has. It does help to assist the contractors to tackle the problem as well. This is actually for the good of construction productivity because the contractors will then know how to tackle this problem as well. I hope that HDB sees some ownership in this problem as well.

Secondly, can I also request when the flats go through the Home Improvement Programme, can HDB also incorporate the repair of the seepages and rectifications as part of the suite of offering? Because these 30-year-old flats are going to be around for another 30 years, the next 30-year life cycle. We need to help fix those problems so that they do not face this problem the next 30 years.

Sir, I thank the Member for the supplementary questions. Certainly, we will look at how we can improve rectifying; and also help other organisations, even the contractors. We are looking at the building industry, how we can use research and technology to repair and to produce materials and products which are long-lasting and able to rectify such seepages and other kind of defects. So, this is something that we will take note of.

As the cases that the Member has raised may be specific to certain types of construction method, I will take it back and see how we can address the situation together.

Faisal Manap.

Thank you, Sir. I thank the Minister of State for his reply. Sir, there are national programmes such as Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) and Home Improvement Programme (HIP) to repair and revitalise ageing HDB neighbourhoods and flats' interior respectively.

Basically, my proposal is to have a similar national programme for facade repair. One, so as to reap the economies of scale benefit; hence, resulting in the saving of public funds. Secondly, I feel that by having a national programme, it will give a more thorough repair work, which will result in better outcome as compared to patchwork, which is what we are doing currently.

As the Minister of State mentioned earlier, it is co-sharing between Town Council and HDB. But I believe that more thorough work to be done for the facade repairs under a national programme would be more beneficial in the long run.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for the suggestion. As I shared earlier, we feel that it is important to make sure the buildings or structures that we have are maintained and, at the same time, we look at it in terms of the long term how we can ensure the maintainability and the use of such facilities including the facade. That is why we have a periodic facade inspection regime which will ensure that there is regular and timely inspection. During the inspection, if we see there are things that need to be rectified, we can do so. At the same time, the Facade Repair Co-Payment Scheme will help to take care of such a situation.

So, essentially, we want to see how, as a whole, in Singapore, we can try to inspect and maintain over time. As such, this is something that we are committed to doing with the Town Council. We hope, as a whole, in the whole building industry and construction industry, we want to see how we can enhance, not only the maintainability of the building but, in particular, also the facade.

11 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for National Development how can the Ministry support Town Councils to help residents with water seepages and wear and tear problems at common areas of HDB estates.

Mr Speaker, the external walls of HDB flats are common property under the Town Councils’ management and maintenance. Town Councils are responsible for keeping common property, including external walls, in good condition by carrying out regular and cyclical maintenance.

Residents who encounter water seepage from external walls in their flat typically report it to the Town Council managing their estate. For difficult cases, HDB will work with the Town Councils to resolve the seepage issue. For example, there may be cases where Town Councils have carried out repairs but the water seepage issue persists despite the Town Councils' efforts. In such cases, HDB can assist the Town Council by carrying out joint inspections and providing technical advice to the Town Council on appropriate repair methods.

In addition, to support Town Councils in carrying out their maintenance work, HDB has been providing training to Town Council maintenance staff on the repairs of water seepage from external walls. There are also regular dialogues between HDB and Town Councils to discuss and resolve issues relating to estate maintenance.

12 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Manpower (a) for each year from 2015 to 2019, how many persons, disaggregated by age and gender, who are outside of the labour force, cite care for their own children as the main reason for being outside of the labour force; and (b) how many months on average these persons remain outside of the labour force.

13 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Manpower (a) for each year from 2015 to 2019, how many persons, disaggregated by age and gender, who are outside of the labour force, cite care for their elderly parents as the main reason for being outside of the labour force; and (b) how many months on average these persons remain outside of the labour force.

Mr Speaker, may I take Parliamentary Question Nos 12 and 13 together?

Yes, please.

Ms Carrie Tan asked about individuals outside the labour force who cite care for their own children or care for elderly parents as the main reason for doing so.

Data from the annual Comprehensive Labour Force Survey shows that in 2018, 144,100 or 4.3% of the resident population cited broader care-giving responsibilities as the main reason. Among these, 55,300 were providing care for own children. There was a slight reduction in 2019, to 133,500 and 52,900 respectively. Around nine in 10 residents who cited care-giving as their main reason were females, and about nine in 10 were in their 30s or over. Data collected prior to 2018 was not directly comparable due to different survey questions being asked.

For those who cited care-giving for own children in 2018 and 2019, the median number of years since their last job was about four to five years. For those who cited care-giving for family members or relatives, the median number of years was eight.

Overall, the resident female employment rate in Singapore is high and is rising. In 2019, the overall resident employment rate for females aged between 25 and 64 was at 73.3%, which is above the OECD average of 66.3%. This has improved from 70.5% in 2014.

Support for care-givers has also been enhanced over the years. For families with young children, we have increased accessibility and affordability of pre-school services. Since 2012, we have doubled full-day pre-school capacity to more than 180,000 places today. We also recently enhanced means-tested pre-school subsidies so that more families pay less for pre-school.

Separately, through the Caregiver Support Action Plan that was announced by MOH in 2019, we have strengthened support for care-givers of seniors. There is also a range of home and community care options to help support the care and social needs of the elderly, to support individuals with care-giving responsibilities while they are at work.

Ms Carrie Tan.

Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for providing the data. Great to know that there are extensive efforts by the relevant Ministries to look into pre-school and also care-givers support, to help women who are disproportionately more impacted by care-giving responsibilities on their employment.

Given that in Singapore, our retirement adequacy is tied almost entirely to employment, and given that we have an ageing population, we can expect that more people, especially women, could be displaced from the workforce due to the rising needs for eldercare. So, would the Minister of State agree that it is important to value the work of care by some measures, so that we can avoid compromising care-givers' retirement adequacy?

My second supplementary question is, perhaps, it is not so fair to just direct this question at MOM, given it already has got a lot under its portfolio. But is there any multi-Ministry attention or cross-Ministry efforts now, in addition to the Caregiver Support Action Plan, to consider identifying long-term care care-givers who are displaced from the workforce to provide them with some form of basic income, either in cash or in the form of CPF top-ups to avoid retirement inadequacy?

I thank Ms Carrie Tan for the two questions. I think they are somewhat related. They are about recognising the sacrifices that care-givers have to make in order to take care of their loved ones at home.

Indeed, we are also very concerned about the retirement preparedness and adequacy of care-givers who out of no choice, are unable to work. Hence, a lot of measures have been put in place to provide support to the care-givers to alleviate their roles at home and with the care-giving duties. At the same time, on the financial side, we have a few schemes to provide financial support.

For example, the Silver Support Scheme has been around since 2016 and has been enhanced recently to provide top-ups, especially for those who do not have enough income through their lifetime, and also, for those who have less means to support themselves.

We have also looked at matching the CPF contributions with the latest scheme so that those who have less CPF balance will be able to have top-ups to make their CPF balance higher than what is the current situation.

CPF members are also able to get additional interest for the first $60,000 of the CPF balances. There is also another one percentage point extra interest for those who are 55 years and above, for the first $30,000 of the combined balances.

I thank the Minister of State. I would really like to reflect some sentiments that residents have surfaced to me. Typically, some of the aunties who have been housewives.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Some housewives stay at home to look after their loved ones for many years. They ask me, "Why is it that my friends who work can receive Workfare? I stay at home, not because I do not want to work; it is because I need to look after my family. Why is it that I can’t receive Workfare?"

(In English): Can we consider a separate scheme that perhaps is some version of Workfare but called "Carefare Income Supplement" in the near future or whatever timeline in the future?

I thank Ms Carrie Tan for an interesting proposal. I think we will keep an open mind to all the various options available to improve support for care-givers. At the same time, I want to emphasise that we also promote strong family ties. For example, my mother is a full-time housewife and I see it as a responsibility for me to take care of her now that she is old and for me to be able to help to make sure she still lives comfortably, given that she has sacrificed so many years for us, the children.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for her reply. I just have one supplementary question. At NTUC, I regularly receive feedback from our PMETs, in particular, mothers and those with ageing parents, that they often feel that they have been disadvantaged in their careers due to their care-giving needs.

With COVID-19 drastically changing the way that we work and permanent telecommuting arrangements have now become a reality, I would like to ask if the Ministry has any plans to encourage or even incentivise employers to adopt prolonged telecommuting arrangements for employees with care-giving needs, so that they can both work and care for their loved ones, at the same time.

I thank the Member for the interesting proposal. Indeed, MOM together with our tripartite partners have been strongly advocating flexible work arrangements, not just for care-givers, but for all adults who may be able to achieve better work-life harmony and balance by having that flexibility of working from home, or having staggered work hours, or working part-time.

Certainly, we want to continue to encourage employers to keep an open mind and seize the opportunity to look at expanding the scope of flexible work arrangements for all their employees, regardless of whether they are care-givers or not.

14 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Law (a) what measures protect sole proprietors of micro SMEs from rogue landlords in the event of landlord-tenant disputes where such disputes are not handled by the Small Claims Tribunal; and (b) what are the avenues by which micro SME sole proprietors of limited means can access legal services at affordable cost especially if they do not qualify for pro bono legal services.

Mr Speaker, the Small Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to disputes involving non-residential tenancies. In such cases, small and micro SME tenants who wish to enforce their contractual rights may bring an action in Court. Where the claim involves sums of no more than $250,000, this tenant may commence an action in the State Courts.

The Courts have put in place simplified processes and procedures, and schemes also, to help parties, including SME tenants, to navigate the Court process, even without legal representation. For example, for claims brought in the Magistrate’s Court, parties may opt for a simplified process under the Rules of Court to obtain early resolution of the dispute.

In addition, parties can also resolve such disputes efficiently through alternative dispute resolution. If the matter is already before the Court, parties may request, or be referred by a judge, for mediation at the State Courts' Centre for Dispute Resolution. Tenants may also consider mediation before commencing a court action. Mediation is available at a relatively low cost, for example, through the Singapore Mediation Centre’s Small Case Commercial Mediation Scheme.

There are avenues available for micro SMEs to access legal services at an affordable cost, if it transpires that the Court process is what the SME wants to go through. Whilst pro bono legal advice and legal aid are not generally intended for commercial matters, micro SME tenants who are sole proprietorships and cannot afford their own lawyers may also approach the Legal Aid Bureau for assistance, and this can be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Last year, against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry also stepped in to introduce various relief measures to alleviate potentially unfair outcomes, whilst ensuring fairness to parties, including landlords and tenants: (a) we introduced the Rental Relief Framework in June 2020, to help affected SMEs with their cash flow by mandating the passing on of up to four months of rental waiver for the months of April through to July 2020; (b) in November 2020, we introduced the Re-Align Framework, which will help eligible small and micro businesses severely impacted by COVID-19 to renegotiate certain contracts on fairer terms. These contracts include leases or licences for non-residential property of a duration of up to five years. The Framework has been in operation since 15 January 2021 and will last for six weeks.

It is in the same spirit that the Fair Tenancy Pro Tem Committee was formed in June 2020 under the auspices of the Singapore Business Federation, or SBF, to establish industry norms on tenancy practices and terms on which the tenancies are entered into. Key industry representatives from the landlord and tenant communities have been discussing issues relating to fair conduct on the part of landlords and tenants, as well as enforcement and dispute resolution, should that be necessary. MTI and ESG are closely involved in the process and are working with SBF to help facilitate discussions. The Committee is expected to issue its preliminary report on these findings to the Government shortly.

I thank the Minister for his comprehensive answer. I have got two supplementary questions. Sir, I want to surface an observation that some residents have broached with me in Clementi. Some of these residents are elderly, sole proprietors of micro SMEs. Some of these elderly residents have had limited formal education. They went to start a small enterprise, a micro SME, got into a situation with a landlord. And because of their background and their lack of knowledge, they are in an unequal bargaining position.

Can I ask the Minister what is the policy rationale for scoping the Small Claims Tribunal, or SCT, jurisdiction in its present form regarding tenancy disputes? I ask this because in some of these cases, had the dispute involved a contract in a private, non-commercial capacity, the same asymmetry of bargaining power would have existed, the same quantum might have been in contention, but it would have qualified for SCT jurisdiction. So, I was wondering if the Minister can share more about the policy rationale there.

And secondly, how we can further enhance awareness of the available measures for recourse among these elderly micro SMEs sole proprietors?

Sir, when a matter goes before the Small Claims Tribunal, the parties represent themselves. And so, those cases are typically scoped to be less complicated, more straightforward, more personal in nature, as opposed to business or commercial, which itself, attracts the potential for disputes being more complicated.

In addition, there is a cap on the quantum of claims that go before the Small Claims Tribunal. It is for that reason that the scoping of the nature of the disputes is as such for Small Claims Tribunal cases. That is, of course, not to say that such entities' elderly persons or proprietors, as Dr Tan has put it, will not be able to avail themselves of other legal services. I have outlined several. There are several pro bono options, Legal Aid can step where appropriate. And in those cases where it is deemed to be of a particular complication and there needs to be more legal advice given, Dr Tan's resident in Clementi can approach the Legal Aid.

As far as awareness is concerned, there are different schemes that I have outlined earlier, including those that were recently introduced in 2020, pertaining to the COVID-19-related relief measures, those have been put on a variety of different platforms, including social media, advertisements, websites. In addition to that, we have also made available to various communities on the ground, including hawkers associations, merchants associations, people in touch with the persons who are likely to need to avail themselves of these measures, material information.

In addition to that, I would say that my Ministry also mans a hotline which has been quite well used in the last few months. We address those queries in a variety of different languages as well.

If none of these avail the particular instance that Dr Tan was speaking about, please feel free to approach me and I will take that offline, and assist the person separately.

15 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) what is the total number of Stay-Home-Notice and Quarantine Order breaches to date; (b) what is the range of enforcement actions taken; (c) what is the protocol for the use of the Homer mobile application; and (d) whether its use is compulsory for all Long-Term Visit Pass holders and visitors to Singapore.

Mr Speaker, as at 25 January 2021, a total of 308,442 Stay-Home Notices (SHNs) and 268,385 Quarantine Orders (QOs) have been issued. Of these, there have been 367 breaches of SHN and 130 breaches of QO.

Those who breach the SHN and QO may be prosecuted under the Infectious Diseases Act and be liable to a fine of up to S$10,000, imprisonment of up to six months, or both. For example, on 17 July 2020, a Singaporean was sentenced to three months of imprisonment for evading the service of a Home Quarantine Order (HQO) on four occasions and for refusing to comply with the HQO. Members may also recall the case of a Singaporean who returned to Singapore from Myanmar in March last year and immediately breached his SHN by eating “bak kut teh” at a hawker centre followed by buying groceries at a supermarket. He was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment.

Agencies may also take administrative actions against those who breach SHN or QO. For example, in November 2020, MOM revoked the work passes of four work-pass holders who breached their SHN requirements. Last year, a Singapore Permanent Resident (PR) lost his PR status and was barred from re-entering Singapore after he breached SHN requirements.

We have adopted a range of technological solutions to monitor individuals on SHN and QO.

Since August 2020, all individuals who are serving SHN at their place of residence are required to don an electronic monitoring device for the duration of SHN. These devices are issued to the travellers after immigration clearance and will need to be activated once they reach their place of residence. The devices use GPS and 4G/Bluetooth signals to determine if persons on SHN are within the range of their place of residence. During the 14-day SHN period, persons wearing these devices may receive notifications on the devices and need to acknowledge them in a timely manner. Any attempt to leave their place of residence or tamper with the electronic device will result in alerts being sent to the authorities, who will then conduct follow-up investigations, and take further enforcement actions if necessary.

Similarly, Persons Under Quarantine, or PUQs in short, are required to don electronic monitoring devices to ensure that they do not breach their QO.

Electronic monitoring devices are compulsory for all individuals who are on SHN or QO. This includes Singaporeans, PRs, Long-Term Pass Holders and short-term visitors.

The Member mentioned the HOMER App. The HOMER App was introduced on 7 April 2020 and is currently used alongside the electronic monitoring devices deployed to monitor the health and location of PUQs. The HOMER App uses facial recognition and location tracking to verify the PUQs’ identity and location respectively, to ensure that they do not breach their QO requirements.

End of Question Time. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Orders of the day.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), Written Answers to Question Nos 16-22, 25-35, 37-42 and 44-57 on the Order Paper are reproduced in the Appendix. Question Nos 23-23, 36 and 43 have been postponed to the next available sitting.]

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move that "The Bill be now read a Second time."

Let me begin with a mea culpa. We acknowledge our error in not stating that data from TraceTogether is not exempt from the Criminal Procedure Code. I take full responsibility for this mistake and I deeply regret the consternation, the anxiety that was caused by my mistake.

In Parliament last month, the Minister for Home Affairs and I stated that the use of TraceTogether data in investigations or criminal proceedings would be restricted to serious offences. This Bill before us gives legal force to these statements. The legislation specifies that personal data collected through digital contact tracing systems can only be used by public agencies for the specific purpose of contact tracing, except where there is a need to use that data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. We have decided that these restrictions will cover personal contact tracing data not only from TraceTogether, but also SafeEntry and a private sector system called BluePass insofar as BluePass is interoperable with TraceTogether.

Mr Speaker, this pandemic is not going to go away for quite a long time more. In fact, I do not know exactly when the pandemic will end.

What I do know is that contact tracing, augmented by digital tools, enables us to quickly break the chains of transmission by identifying and isolating close contacts. This is precisely why we need high participation rates in digital contact tracing.

Contact tracing is traditionally a manual, painstaking and very resource-intensive task. Members of the House may recall that – cast your minds back a year ago – at the start of the pandemic, when the number of cases started to grow. And we had to rapidly expand the pool of contact tracers to keep up with the load. We even had to call in reinforcements from the Singapore Armed Forces. But we all knew that this would not be sustainable if the numbers continued to rise. And the numbers did continue to rise.

So, we realised, very early on, that we needed to make better use of both technology and data, including especially proximity data, generated from Bluetooth technology, in order to help our contact tracers carry out their work more effectively and efficiently.

And I say this with the experience of SARS 17 years ago. SARS had much fewer cases than COVID-19 and it was a manual contact tracing system. We would not have been able to cope with the sheer volume this time if we were still using the methods of 17 years ago.

This was why we conceptualised and introduced TraceTogether – to reduce the time and the resources needed to collect some of these essential data for contact tracing. And, if I may add, these efforts have paid off.

TraceTogether, alongside the other digital contact tracing systems, such as SafeEntry, has shortened the average time required for contact tracing from four days to now less than 1.5 days. This means that people who have been exposed, or potentially exposed, are isolated more swiftly. It reduces the probability of them passing on the virus to their family members, friends and the community at large. And where there is widespread adoption of digital contact tracing, the enhanced effectiveness can be very significant.

Let me cite one recent example. In the recent Royal Caribbean Quantum of the Seas case, the use of TraceTogether data helped MOH to quickly identify more than three-quarters of the close contacts – although thankfully, in this case, it turned out to be a false positive.

TraceTogether has also enabled us to trace contacts more comprehensively and to identify many contacts whom the person may not have recalled meeting or even realised that he had been in close contact with. And this is particularly so, when you are with someone whom you do not already know. The probability of your forgetting that interaction is much higher.

TraceTogether was always designed for contact tracing purposes. And this is obvious, if you consider the safeguards and the features of the system. TraceTogether only collects proximity data, which is necessary in order to identify close contacts. It does not collect GPS data; it does not collect movement data. The token does not even have cellular connectivity. These were conscious design decisions made at conception.

Furthermore, the app and the token only keep a temporary record, in an encrypted form, locally on the device itself. And this data is automatically purged after 25 days. The Government also intends to deactivate TraceTogether, along with the other digital contact tracing programmes, once the pandemic is over.

The GovTech engineers and I took great pains to create an app that was fundamentally privacy protecting at its core – privacy by design. We even open sourced the code. We invited experts to come and tear down the TraceTogether token to prove this. Perhaps, I was so enamoured by what I thought was the ingenuity and brilliance of this that I got blindsided.

Prof Ang Peng Hwa of NTU very elegantly described our ethical dilemma as one in which we are dealing with a choice between "right" versus "right". A choice between "right" and "wrong" is very easy to make. But in this case, it is right to protect public health by protecting the data in TraceTogether. But it is also right, and just as important, to protect public safety, especially when it comes to serious crimes – "right" versus "right".

It would indeed be unconscionable to inhibit the ability of the Police to act, when it comes to a serious offence that affects someone's life or safety. Someone came up to me and said, "Think about the example of a kidnapped child. And all that was left was a dropped phone or a token. And if that mother brought that token or phone to the Police, would it be right for us to say, 'No, we cannot and would not do anything about it.'?" In fact, it would be untenable – to adopt a purist ideological stance and to deliberately refuse to check that data and pursue all leads available.

Singapore is one of the safest countries in the world. Our people walk the streets safely, day or night, alone or in groups, with peace of mind, precisely because there is high trust in an effective Police Force that always acts for the public good, that legally pursues all information and leads available to solve and to prevent crimes. We cannot take this safety and security that we value so much for granted even in the midst of this pandemic.

Let me go through the specific legislative amendments that are being proposed.

This Bill sets out what Minister Shanmugam and I said in Parliament last month. It represents a balance between two imperatives. Singaporeans want the protection of TraceTogether. They know it saves lives. Singaporeans also understand and support the Police's continued access to such data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences, to bring perpetrators of crime to justice and to protect public safety and security.

We are moving this Bill on a Certificate of Urgency, so that it may come into effect as soon as possible.

Let me move on to the four key thrusts of this Bill.

Scope of legislation. First, the legislation will cover "personal contact tracing data" recorded in any "digital contact tracing system". Clause 7 of the Bill introduces section 80 to define "personal contact tracing data" to mean "entry or exit records, proximity information or other data collected using any digital contact tracing tool or combination of digital contact tracing tools, that is part of a digital contact tracing system, and which, by itself or with other information, identifies any individual". I apologise for that mouthful of words. Basically, it means, the key point is, data that is personally identifiable.

The "digital contact tracing systems" covered by the Bill are listed in the Sixth Schedule. This will include TraceTogether, SafeEntry and BluePass insofar as it is interoperable with TraceTogether.

SafeEntry, as Members are aware, is a digital equivalent of the visitor record logs. BluePass is a contact tracing system, developed by the private sector, that is capable of interoperating with TraceTogether in order to support the national programme.

We are concerned with protecting personal contact tracing data in the Government’s national digital contact tracing systems, and we will treat all data in the same way, however it enters the national system. Section 84 specifies that the Minister may add to the list of "digital contact tracing systems" if new systems or additional systems are created. However, any removal from the Sixth Schedule will require Parliamentary approval. We will come back here. This means that the Government cannot unilaterally remove any digital contact tracing system from the restrictions imposed by this Bill.

Second, on authorised use and disclosure. The Government's use of the data will be ring-fenced to contact tracing, with the exception for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(1), which specifies that the data may only be used to "carry out or facilitate contact tracing". Subsection 82(2) states that the Police and other law enforcement agencies "in the exercise of any power under the Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 68) or other written law", may not obtain personal contact tracing data, except for "an investigation or criminal proceeding in respect of a serious offence".

There are seven categories of serious offences, set out, quite coincidentally, in the Seventh Schedule. These are offences of a significant severity and/or pose an immediate threat to life or public safety, such as the use of firearms, dangerous weapons, terrorism, murder, drug offences that attract the death penalty, kidnapping and rape. The Government cannot amend this list of offences in the Seventh Schedule without coming back to Parliament for approval.

Third, the Government may not use the data for any purpose other than those mentioned, regardless of any other written law requiring or allowing the disclosure of the data. Just in case "I don't know what I don't know." This is added assurance. This trumps any other written law. This will give added reassurance that there are no further scenarios where public agencies may use the data apart from the purposes stated explicitly in this Bill.

Fourth, on safeguards and data deletion. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(8) which provides for the Minister to specify a date after which a digital contact tracing system is no longer required to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19. The data administrator must then delete any personal contact tracing data which is no longer required.

We have also built other safeguards into our digital contact tracing systems. Today, TraceTogether devices and SafeEntry servers are purged automatically after 25 days, unless that data has been extracted for contact tracing purposes or for the investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. This 25-day timeline is set based on the advice of our medical professionals, to account for the incubation period of the virus, which we currently estimate to be 14 days, and the time taken from the onset of symptoms and for the patient to visit a doctor and get tested and, if positive, to notify MOH. This data retention period could change on the advice of medical experts, if the virus continues to evolve and we have a better understanding of the disease, the virus and its incubation period. But the point here is that we will stand guided on the basis of science and medicine.

Before I conclude my speech, I need to remind you that there are two other sections related to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Law.

Clause 2 of the Bill extends Part 7 of the current Act, for another year, until April 2022. Part 7 provides the legal basis for the Minister for Health to make regulations to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19. These regulations underpin the safe management measures adopted since the circuit breaker last year. As this pandemic will not go away soon, it is imperative that we remain vigilant and continue with safe management measures in our daily lives.

Clause 4 of the Bill amends Part 2A of the Act to set out the Singapore Land Authority's (SLA's) role in the administration of the Rental Relief Framework. The SLA is working to operationalise the Rental Relief Framework.

Mr Speaker, this Bill will give legal force to the statements made by the Minister for Home Affairs and me in this Chamber. You will notice that it has been tightly scoped. It is a specific amendment made in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic – that the Government will limit its use of personal contact tracing data for the purposes of contact tracing, except where there is a need to do so for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences.

These are extraordinary times, exceptional circumstances. We are introducing this Bill urgently, to remove any doubt among Singaporeans and to assure everyone that data will be properly safeguarded and used only for the appropriate purposes, so that we may continue to focus our attention towards battling this clear and present threat, the COVID-19 global pandemic.

This is crucial because the virus is a clear, present and, in fact, on a global scale, a growing threat. And it will remain so for some time. So, we cannot afford to be distracted from our fight against COVID-19. We need to rally together, look out for one another, protect public health and safety even as we try carefully to re-open our economy. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, Sir, my speech is divided into three topics. First, I will talk about the Government's error in not realising that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to TraceTogether data. Second, I will speak on the carving out of the seven categories of offences in the Bill that permits the use of TraceTogether data and I will thereafter set out the Workers' Party's position on the Bill. Third, I will look to the longer term and reflect on the balance between the privacy rights of citizens and the growing power of the state and private companies in collecting and using data and personal information.

I believe there is scope to learn important lessons from the fall-out that has ensued from the Government's admission that TraceTogether data could be used for investigatory purposes, a departure from earlier assurances that TraceTogether would only be used for contact tracing.

First, the Government's error. Sir, Singaporeans are willing to take the actions necessary to combat COVID-19 when called upon by the Government if they believe these actions will help our country and all of us who live and work here.

A few Singaporeans have told me that if the Government had stated upfront that TraceTogether data would be used for the seven categories of serious crimes only, they would have been prepared to prioritise the use of TraceTogether because of the imperative of fighting an epidemic, even those who could have had residual privacy concerns could have been assuaged had the Government detailed the processes and accountability regime for using TraceTogether information in investigations.

Why was there disquiet, unhappiness and even cynicism in some quarters at the Government's belated acknowledgement that TraceTogether can be used for criminal investigations as originally explained by Minister of State Desmond Tan in Parliament last month?

It comes down to a question of trust, the perceived lack of empathy over the public's privacy concerns and discomfort with sharing mobile phone data with the authorities without sufficient assurances.

In fact, from a very early stage the Government clearly contemplated that there would be privacy concerns with the use of TraceTogether for contact tracing.

In his broadcast of 21 April 2020, the Prime Minister said that Singapore intended to make full use of IT, including TraceTogether, which would require everyone's cooperation. He added and, I quote, "There will be some privacy concerns, but we will have to weigh these against the benefits of being able to exit from the circuit breaker and stay open safely."

In the months that followed, the public were told that the number of sign-ups to TraceTogether was not satisfactory.

As late as November, the multi-Ministerial Taskforce linked transiting to phase 3 in our fight against COVID-19 with requiring at least 70% of the population signing up for TraceTogether. Since then and along with the issuance of TraceTogether tokens, this minimum 70% threshold was reportedly reached on 21 November 2020, even as it had been hovering around the 50% mark around two weeks earlier.

When Minister Vivian Balakrishnan admitted in Parliament that he did not consider section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the next sitting of Parliament on 5 January this year, there are Singaporeans who opined that this was not fathomable or even believable for a largely efficient Government machinery that has consistently approached COVID-19 as a whole-of-Government endeavour. They further contend that if not Ministers, at least the officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Health and GovTech who conceived of TraceTogether would have known of the privacy considerations surrounding TraceTogether.

Some go a step further in suspecting the Government of willful blindness on function creep, or worse, that the information surrounding the use of TraceTogether for criminal investigations may have been suppressed until the threshold of 70% of the population had downloaded the app or collected the TraceTogether token.

A separate group of Singaporeans queried whether there will be consequences for those who made this mistake in promising wrongly that TraceTogether would be used only for contact tracing. They believe the Government did not do its homework. While there was no dishonesty or malice, there was a lack of care or diligence in accurately communicating the potential use of data collected by TraceTogether.

I am sure Members have come across a range of opinions from residents in the course of their house visits or interactions with family and friends over the last few weeks on this matter. Whatever the view, it is apparent that the Government's handling of this matter has eroded trust from some members of the public.

To this end, I would like to ask two questions of the Government and, specifically, the Minister. First, what was the exact date on which Minister-in-charge of Smart Nation knew that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure code would apply to TraceTogether? Secondly and, in connection with this, was Mr Christopher de Souza's Parliamentary Question submitted before or after the Minister became aware of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

These questions are important for the House to understand at what point the Government determined that its original representations on the use of TraceTogether were misleading and whether it could have corrected the position and updated the public on its own initiative.

Let me now move on to my second topic, the carving out of the seven categories of crimes and the Workers' Party's position on the Bill.

The Workers' Party's starting point on this matter is that Singapore is as close to a wartime scenario as most Singaporeans have seen in our lifetimes.

This pandemic has exceeded in the living memory of older Singaporeans only by the far greater oppression of World War II. In terms of its effects on the national consciousness, COVID-19 is perhaps on par with other upheavals such as the 1964 riots and Singapore's ejection from Malaysia in 1965. Its scale and complexity have surpassed the SARS crisis of 2003.

In such a wartime scenario, the core question for this House is whether the change in the Government's position on TraceTogether data to allow for its use for serious crimes could compromise the fight against COVID-19 and jeopardise contact tracing. I will make two points in this regard.

First, while we know that TraceTogether data is critical for contact tracing, we need to ask whether TraceTogether data is vital for solving these seven categories of crimes.

As it stands, the Police have an abundance of investigative tools. They have other technological tools like CCTVs. They can forensically examine mobile phones and laptops that contain massive amounts of data other than TraceTogether. They also have old-fashioned police work such as finding and interviewing witnesses using confidential informants, scrutinising the crime scene and collecting physical evidence for forensic analysis.

There is a legitimate view that these tools should be more than sufficient in detecting crime and securing convictions. To know whether these other tools are enough, I would like to ask the Minister two questions about the use of TraceTogether data for actual cases:

For the one known case where TraceTogether was used, was the case solved, in that a suspect has been identified or charged, and how critical was TraceTogether data to solving the case?

How many other times has TraceTogether been used for the seven categories of serious crimes so far?

There is little or no doubt that TraceTogether would make things convenient for the Police. But it is my view that convenience for the Police may not be a good enough reason to compromise the trust necessary to win the COVID-19 fight.

There is an equally legitimate view that with the existing tools at their disposal, the Police are likely to have little, if any additional benefit from using TraceTogether data.

I look forward to hearing the Minister's answers to my questions so that we can know for sure. The answers will allow members of the public to appreciate the balance that is being struck between privacy and policing.

On to my second point: would allowing these exceptions compromise the use of TraceTogether in fighting the pandemic?

Against the possible benefits of using TraceTogether for fighting crime, we need to compare the likely cost to our fight against COVID-19.

There was a public outcry after Minister of State Desmond Tan's reply on 4 January 2020 when Singaporeans found out that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) applied to TraceTogether and that the Government had backtracked on earlier assurances. Some Singaporeans seemed placated when the Government announced a day later that the use of TraceTogether data would be restricted to the seven categories of crime. Others, less so.

However, this House's knowledge of both support as well as resistance of Singaporeans is only anecdotal. In the middle of last week, it was confirmed that the TraceTogether signups had reached 80% from 78% some weeks earlier. However, these numbers too can give a false sense of security insofar as our contact tracing efforts are concerned.

In an Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) report released on 24 May 2020, out of a broadly representative sample size of the Singaporean population, 87% of respondents were agreeable to imposing strict surveillance on those who needed to be quarantined. But when the questioning moved to the employment of CCTVs and cellphones to prevent the spread of COVID-19, only 49% were agreeable to have their cellphone data tracked without their consent.

Separately, more than a few people have anecdotally shared online that they will use the TraceTogether app to gain entry to a place, only to turn off Bluetooth immediately after entering. This clearly shows that a high level of downloads of the TraceTogether app does not necessarily translate to a high degree of continuous usage.

Those who choose to switch off their Bluetooth function could do so for various reasons, a common one being that people do not want to drain their phone battery and not necessarily because of privacy concerns. We do not know for sure either way, but if the IPS report is indicative, privacy is more than likely to matter.

It is therefore open to question whether the efficacy of TraceTogether for contact tracing could be compromised because of the Government's belated explanation on the use of TraceTogether data for investigative purposes.

To that end, I would like to inquire if the Government is able to track the number of users of the TraceTogether app who turn off their Bluetooth function after downloading the app and, separately, who turn it off after gaining entry to a building or premise. The answer to this question will determine whether TraceTogether is working as intended or whether the Government needs to comprehensively review the public buy-in and effectiveness of the TraceTogether app and token.

I now move on to the Workers' Party's position on the Bill. The Workers' Party is of the view that Singapore's number one priority should be to tackle the pandemic's public health and economic effects. Anything that compromises this priority has to give way, unless there are overwhelming good reasons.

Other jurisdictions have taken a cleaner approach on contact tracing apps in line with the Government's original public statements that TraceTogether would be limited to contact tracing, period.

Personally and subject to the Minister's response on the centrality of TraceTogether data for policing, I, personally, would prefer aligning the use of TraceTogether with the Government's original emphatic assurances that TraceTogether would be used for contact tracing only. This is because of some Singaporeans' residual concerns over privacy and the established discomfort about sharing cellphone data.

I am of the view that such an approach would also engender greater confidence given that a public conversation on privacy has hitherto not been ventilated in a significant way in Singapore. I will return to that subject very shortly.

Even so, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill to allow for the use of TraceTogether data for Police investigations in the exceptional cases identified in the Bill. The main reason is because the exceptions constitute a significant reduction of the wide ambit of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

In other words, a Singaporean's right to privacy is better protected with this Bill than without it. Ms Sylvia Lim will speak further on the seven exceptions.

Sir, let me move on to my last topic, which is about the longer term. The discomfort and distrust in some quarters generated by the belated disclosure on the applicability of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code to TraceTogether is somewhat or to some extent unsurprising. A 2016 KPMG report shared that 32% of Singaporeans were extremely concerned about the handling and use of their personal data and that Singaporean consumers felt the most defenceless among Asian respondents over the way organisations handle and use their personal information.

I would contend that across the population, there is a general lack of awareness about not just the Government's powers of data collection, investigation and privacy, but the rapid advance of predictive technologies for public use. As a society, many are relatively uninformed about legal or constitutional rights and responsibilities, to say nothing about the right to privacy.

If we are already talking about a societal COVID-19 reset when this crisis passes, the Government should also review the lessons learnt from the roll-out of TraceTogether and, specifically, whether Singapore should actively appraise the balance between policing and citizen privacy.

The mobile phone application WhatsApp recently found out the hard way what happens when people suddenly become suspicious about technology and privacy. When the company published new terms of service with a short deadline for acceptance, there was a huge backlash against WhatsApp and its corporate owner, Facebook.

WhatsApp's experience shows that Singapore's experience with the TraceTogether issue is not unique. Confidence in technological tools and the institutions that control them can be lost overnight. This loss of trust engenders cynicism and push back from the public, and in an age where information travels instantaneously and fake news spreads at light speed, cynicism has to be taken very seriously and addressed squarely from a governance standpoint.

In the first major debate of this parliamentary term, the Prime Minister addressed the House on Disease X, a possible outbreak even deadlier than COVID-19. In this regard, a new national research programme for epidemic preparedness and response called Prepare was announced in December 2020. The programme is meant to accelerate the production of diagnostic tools, therapies and vaccines once a major disease strikes.

However, medical preparedness is only part of the fight. The other part is the battle for the trust and cooperation of the people. If Disease X strikes and another TraceTogether-type situation occurs, our fight against Disease X may be rendered ineffective and tragically thwarted.

I call on the Government to initiate an immediate conversation on the balance between the state's collection and use of data against the individual's right of privacy because many of the new technologies with public repercussions have already been rolled out. According to the latest Government Financial Statements, or GFS, MHA has invested in PolCam 3.0 and 4.0 whereas only PolCam 1.0 and 2.0 have entered the mainstream media lexicon.

Intrusive technology has already extended to other areas of governance. The Government Financial Statements confirm that the Ministry of Social and Family Development has implemented video analytics, facial recognition and behavioural analytics technology at a voluntary children's home. Let that sink in for a moment – behavioural analytics technology at a children's home.

What impact could befall a child if such data is hacked in a cybersecurity breach many years later? How is the problem of bias, both from a technology perspective and a human interface angle, dealt with? Who checks whether such information is secure or securely wiped? And who has a right to review this information and for how long?

To counter skepticism and its resultant behaviours and to replace it with trust and cooperation, Singaporeans also need to better understand the necessity and ambit of data collection. This is especially so for a new generation who are more likely to be concerned about privacy and individual rights.

The public must also be assured that the data collected and used for investigative purposes have safeguards that are robust enough with independent and external checks and balances, if necessary. And it would be critical for the public to understand that in Singapore at least, regulation is marching in step with the evolution of newer and more intrusive policing and data collection technologies. This is currently not the case in many parts of the world and there is an opportunity for Singapore to be a leader in this regard.

To this end, I would advance that there are important actions that the Government can undertake to better dispel doubts.

First, the Government should be forthcoming, without prompting, in informing the public about what data it collects and how it ensures the robustness and integrity of its processes.

Second, the Government should ensure that our laws reassure Singaporean citizens and residents that investigatory powers and data collection are used for legitimate purposes and are subject to rigorous checks that protect us from the abuse of our personal data.

Moving forward, a review of our existing laws may be required to achieve this. Let me discuss each of these actions in turn.

The first thing the Government could do to counter cynicism and create trust is to be forthcoming about what data it collects and the safeguards to prevent misuse of information in its possession.

The Government regularly asks information of tech giants like Facebook. For example, the Straits Times reported in 2018 that Facebook's semi-annual transparency report revealed that the Singapore Government had made 244 request for information concerning 310 Facebook accounts in the latter half of 2017.

It would reassure the public, in my view, if the Government could tell us what it has asked the tech companies for and for what purposes. This could be done on a regular basis through the Police's annual report, for example.

If the Government is forthcoming with such information, it will engender confidence that the Government has nothing to hide, is performing its role as a state should, and that its requests are for legitimate purposes in the interest of Singaporeans. Singaporeans will also better appreciate the nature of the behind-the-scenes work that is done to keep Singapore safe and secure. And I will make this point again: this awareness and confidence will aid us in our fight against future threats.

The second thing the Government could do is to conduct a broad review of the state's powers to collect data for the purposes of investigations in light of new technologies and consider how privacy concerns could be better balanced or accommodated within the legislation.

Section 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for example, gives the Police wide leeway when investigating arrestable offences to access computers and computer data, even for computers outside of Singapore. Section 40 of the CPC allows the public prosecutor to authorise the accessing of decryption information. Statutes like the Broadcasting Act and the Telecommunications Act and others give the Police powers akin to those in the Criminal Procedure Code, although specifically scoped for those Acts.

Even so, like the Criminal Procedure Code, the investigative powers of the relevant authorities are drafted broadly and do not include separate laws on how the exercise of these investigatory powers come with safeguards. Such safeguards would reassure the public that the state is acting legitimately and with sufficient regard for the individual's right to privacy.

To build confidence between the citizen and the state in an era where the call for privacy will only get louder, other verification mechanisms can be considered. I would offer three suggestions in this regard.

One possibility for checking against abuse and engendering confidence can be the appointment of a neutral commissioner or an ombudsman to monitor the use of such powers by the Government and, in particular, law enforcement agencies.

Another possibility is an omnibus legislation like the UK's Investigatory Powers Act. This piece of legislation covers the acquisition and retention of data, including bulk personal datasets, and provides for how such material is dealt with, including oversight arrangements, amongst others.

Thirdly, the Government could include a key performance indicator in the Budget Book for each relevant Ministry that measures the public's confidence in the collection and use of data collected on the one hand, and the public's right to privacy on the other.

To conclude, Mr Speaker, it is important for me to restate that privacy concerns are not the domain of a small segment of Singaporeans. The international conversation has moved significantly over the past few years with recent revelations of how security agencies of democratic countries, such as the US, collect vast amounts of information about their citizens. Arising from such revelations, other democratic jurisdictions have sought to update their laws to focus on and better calibrate the balance between the state's investigatory powers and the individual's right to privacy. At the heart of this discussion is a desire for checks and balances that are fit for purpose for today's day and age.

Understandably, the conversation with electorates in these countries has not been easy. Many people perceive the world to be in an Orwellian age, complete with fake news and the prospect of privacy intrusions by even private corporations. However, the absence of such a conversation in Singapore, combined with an erroneous assumption that continuing down tried and tested routes will suffice, would engender a worse outcome, even presaging a disunited population. We will all lose if that happens. COVID-19 is a crisis like no other. But insofar as finding a better balance between policing and privacy, the lessons that have been taught by this TraceTogether episode inform us that they are lessons the Government would be wise not to dismiss.

To recap, Sir, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill even as we look forward to the Minister's answers on the specific queries with regard to the Police's use of TraceTogether data. But, separately, and arising from this episode, I urge the Government to open a national conversation on privacy forthwith, with a view to not just prevent the weakening of trust between citizens and the state today, but to strengthen it for the Singapore of tomorrow. Thank you.

Ms Tin Pei Ling.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Sir, today's debate on the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill is very meaningful. This amendment, essentially, restricts the use of information collected by TraceTogether and SafeEntry to seven serious crimes. In fact, this Bill also aims to enhance public trust and encourage Singaporeans to continue fighting against COVID-19 with peace of mind for the greater good.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, more than 2.2 million people worldwide have died and over 100 million confirmed cases have been diagnosed. In Singapore, the number of confirmed cases exceeded 59,000 and the death toll is 29.

In the face of this global pandemic, the Singapore Government has given top priority to the safety of our people. All this while, our Ministries have worked together, mobilised national resources and capabilities, investing nearly $100 billion last year to support Singapore companies and workers, and established a relatively comprehensive system of testing and treatment. At present, efforts to control the pandemic have also achieved firm results. As such, Singapore is widely praised for its COVID-19 fight.

Despite that COVID-19 has dealt a severe blow to the global economy and livelihoods around the world, local employment in Singapore has finally returned to pre-COVID-19 levels, even attracting $17.2 billion in fixed investments last year, which is 13% higher than in 2019.

Singaporeans' lives as well as their jobs are now protected. How many people have had to give their all to achieve this?

Outside of Singapore, we can see how COVID-19 is developing around the world. What is worrying is that, even in China where the control is watertight, they have also seen a rebound of cases. This is a reminder of how fluid the situation really is. In Singapore, vaccination is now in full swing. But with the start of the Phase 3, more people can gather in public places and hold large-scale gatherings. We cannot rule out the possibility of another wave and must be vigilant. Recently, there were community cases now and then. But, fortunately, they have been controlled. At the same time, there are news that not only has the virus not been exterminated, it has also mutated into more infectious strains.

Fortunately, we are living in an age of technology. Viruses cannot be touched or seen, but we can use the Internet and big data to track them down and isolate those who are infected. This would be unimaginable in the last century. Because of the advent of technology, our generation is able to better and more effectively deal with major infectious diseases globally. Technology has given us a ray of hope so that the disasters that befell human civilisations, such as smallpox, the Plague and cholera, will not recur.

As we laud the advancements of technology, there is anxiety, too, both worldwide and in Singapore. Among some communities, there are worries that big data will threaten privacy. Today's amendment Bill on TraceTogether is one clear example. TraceTogether is critical in contact tracing within the shortest time possible to limit the spread once an infected person is identified. The success of TraceTogether depends on all our cooperation. It was not easy to get everyone on board initially. Apart from helping the less tech-savvy to use it, we have to consider privacy issues. Making the coding open source and, therefore, verifiable by third parties, helped build trust in TraceTogether among the public.

However, when Singaporeans later discovered that the Police could access the data for serious crime investigations, which was different from the original picture painted, it triggered a debate. I, therefore, appreciate the Minister's clarifications. Such being the case, this amendment is perhaps the most decisive move. The Bill defines the seven serious crimes where TraceTogether data can be used outside of contact tracing purposes. This is very clear. I am confident that this will fortify the public's trust in the system. Nevertheless, I have three clarifications to seek from the Ministers.

First, after this Bill is passed, if there were other type of cases outside of the seven categories, such as a missing person case, the Police will be under immense pressure to solve it, will the Police be able to use the data from TraceTogether?

Second, if this data were collected for a major crime investigation, what is the process involved and what are the controls involved during this process?

Third, as we move towards a digital future, more technologies and our lives will be intertwined, we cannot deny that there will be a possibility that there will be another major crisis that will affect all. How will this Bill affect the large-scale deployment of such future technology solutions that will enhance our collective well-being? Will it also be just limited to the investigation of these seven major crimes?

Around the world, the success or failure of the COVID-19 fight depends not so much on medical resources and technology, but on public awareness. In countries like Europe and the US where there are strong calls for human rights, the situation seems to be more severe. In contrast, Asian cultures that emphasise the need to abide by social rules for the sake of collective interests have made the fight against COVID-19 more effective.

As the pandemic continues to worsen in most countries, entering Phase 3 means that we will enter a long-drawn war against the diseases. The Government's introduction of legislation at this stage to improve contact tracing efficiency is after much consideration. We cannot afford to let our guard down. We have to tread on thin ice and not let the efforts of the Government and society as a whole to be wasted just because of one careless moment.

In the fight against COVID-19, a wrong move may mean a lost war. Singapore is still plagued by the epidemic. Think of the number of hospital wards where healthcare workers have worked overtime and the loneliness and anxiety of isolated patients and their families, the pain of being separated from those you miss. How many students have to take part in graduation ceremonies online? Also, how many have to bear uncertainties in their career as a result of economic changes?

With the situation so fluid, some people may feel uneasy. Perhaps, even after this Bill is passed, some people would still hesitate to use TraceTogether. Yet, every life is precious and we have to use technology to fight this disease.

In Chinese mythology, Goddess Nuwa transformed her body into all that physically make up the world after she mended the sky. Shennong died after trying out hundreds of herbs himself. Da Yu passed by his home three times, but did not enter while managing the flood. All these characters in the stories shared the same spirit and that is the spirit of the greater good.

Sun Yat Sen, a great man of modern history also said that the difference between the individual and society is like the difference between the individual good and greater good.

Master Xing Yun once wrote in a Buddhist textbook that we need to elevate our love for the individual to a great compassion for all people. If we interpret this from another angle, it means that mankind can and should strive to achieve the greater good and greater compassion for the world.

Looking back at our own history, Singapore faced great difficulties in the early days of nation building. The prosperity and progress we have today depend to a large extent on the sacrifices and contributions of our early founders and pioneers. Some of them were political leaders, some representatives of Chinese businessmen, some philanthropists, some artists, some education promoters. Their names are still familiar to us today and praised by future generations. These include Sir Stamford Raffles, founder of Singapore; Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the founding Prime Minister who fought hard for Singapore throughout his life; Mr Yusof Ishak, the first President who contributed greatly to Singapore's racial harmony; Mr Tan Kah Kee, a philanthropist; Dr Tan Tock Seng who gave medical aid to the needy; Mr Lee Kong Chian, a great educator; and also many pioneers whose names cannot be listed here. Since the founding of Singapore, they have given their all and devoted their entire lives and wealth to promoting the political, social and economic and educational progress of Singapore. These great men have one thing in common, which is a spirit of placing the greater good over their individual good – be selfless. Bit by bit, through their convictions, they built this dream home called Singapore.

Today, I am convinced that making contributions should not be the prerogative of any segment of society. In the past year, we have seen that not only have Singaporeans not been defeated by the virus, they have also shown courage and kindness. Every frontline healthcare worker who faces the unknown with courage is also someone else's child or parent. There are also food and beverage operators who are willing to give hearting-warming meals to healthcare workers despite their own financial difficulties, and volunteers who visit foreign worker dormitories despite the risk of infection to themselves. They have shown us what the Singapore spirit is. They give us confidence that no matter how severe the storm is, we can overcome it.

Therefore, we must not give up our fight against COVID-19 at this juncture. We must continue to work together. Everyone is necessary in this fight. Every man is like a drop of water. Only when he is integrated into the sea can he see the vast expanse of the ocean. He is like a sand integrated into the desert to form a vast desert.

Given that the Bill has restricted the use of TraceTogether information, sacrificing a bit of privacy in exchange for public safety and health can be seen as a good deed. I hope that everyone will support this Bill.

When this pandemic is finally over, what will remain? Physically tired we may be, but we will leave behind a strong sense of home and nation. In the face of unpredictable challenges in the future, we, as Singaporeans should consciously integrate our individual good into the greater good and uphold the spirit of "Singapore for me, me for Singapore". Together, we will overcome this crisis. I support this Bill.

Mr Christopher de Souza.

Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to join this debate. I think the legislation is timely, speaks of transparency and is needed. Following my question to MHA in January, it was announced that data collected through the TraceTogether app could be used for criminal investigations. That was on a Monday. The day after, which was a Tuesday, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan provided a clarification that he had not considered the CPC when he spoke in June 2020 about the ambit of the usage of TraceTogether. I want to say that I listened to every word that he had said and I believe him; and I want to have that stated on Hansard.

I also remember Mr Pritam Singh saying in that debate that he accepts that the CPC was not in the Minister's contemplation at that time and that the remarks were made in good faith. Again, today, presumably consistent with that position of Mr Pritam Singh in January – the consistent position being the consistent position in January – that there is no imputation of dishonesty or malice on the Minister. I think he had quoted several groups that he had spoken to. But, in his view, there is no imputation of malice or dishonesty. And I think that is something very important to clear up because it is consistent with his initial position in January that he accepts the remark was made in good faith.

As a result of my clarification, which is really clarification, which is really an answer to my question from the day earlier – I am talking about the January sitting – we are in double quick time, debating this Bill under a Certificate of Urgency.

What this Bill does is ensure that only under these seven categories of offences can the Police use the TraceTogether data. I support this because in limiting to these seven categories, it allows the raison d'etre continues to be contact tracing. So, the fact is that we only have seven categories out of a vast number of offences in Singapore. And if you can go through the Penal Code, the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Misuse of Drugs Act, you will realise that there are many other offences outside the scope of these seven categories, including offences such as theft, battery and assault, and possession of a controlled drug which TraceTogether data cannot be used for.

Here we are only carving out seven and I think this indicates that it is most certainly geared towards contact tracing.

It is essentially a balancing exercise. We are in the midst of a pandemic and TraceTogether saves lives but we must also balance that with its ability to trace suspects for serious crimes. I have been the Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC) Chairman for Home Affairs and Law all of last term – and I know the threats we face. They are real, especially terrorism, especially drugs. I know how important it is to have the Police be given the tools to fight serious crime and I do know that the Police Force is a professional and judicious one and therefore notwithstanding the sacrifice of privacy the Bill envisions, I think on the grand scale of things, it should be supported so as to achieve the greater aim of containing a pandemic and the ancillary consequence of fighting crime.

I also listened intently to Mr Pritam Singh's position just now saying that, after speaking about privacy, the Workers' Party, notwithstanding, still supports the carve-out of seven offences. So, supporting seven categories, it must follow that the Workers' Party accepts the sacrifice to privacy is justifiable, at least, insofar as this Bill is concerned. Because the sacrifice to privacy is a basic ingredient to the Bill. To support the ancillary purpose of fighting serious crime, it is an ingredient.

Now, what is the basis of that ingredient? Mr Pritam Singh calls it privacy and I would say an element of sacrifice of privacy is needed. And let me make a case for that.

I do want to say something in favour of Home Affairs and MinLaw and AGC and the Police, when they were looking at the seven categories of offences. I do think that they were judiciously exercising self-restraint in not broadening the categories further, that is, they were trying to make the sacrifice of privacy as least painful as possible.

Let me give you a reason why I say this. If you look under the fourth offence, which is the drug-related offence, the TraceTogether data can only be used if the offence attracts a death sentence. Personally, I think this is overly restrictive. I know I am pushing the envelope here, but because of my strong stance against drug trafficking, the heinous nature of the offence and the multi-generational effects it causes on families, if it were up to me, I would not have restricted it to only crimes which attract a death sentence. I would have extended it to all types of drug trafficking, whether or not the offence attracted the death sentence.

And allow me to explain why. The ability to intervene or apprehend a suspect has, in part, to do with pre-arrest intelligence work. CNB may know that a known drug trafficker is going to do another drug delivery but until he is apprehended, they will not know the exact weight of the drug on him. So, it is really only when he has been apprehended with the drugs and the drugs have been weighed and found to have attracted a potential death sentence, for example, an arrest involving more than 15mg of diamorphine, that the CNB can retrospectively use the TraceTogether data of the suspect. This, in my view, restricts CNB far too much.

What I am getting at is that I would have thought that the more efficient method in which the TraceTogether data could be used by CNB would be before the apprehension so that the source of the drug could be ascertained upstream, that is, further up the chain of trafficking.

In effect, the Bill may have the unintended effect of only allowing retrospective tracing and not real time tracing of known drug trafficking whereas, in my view, real time tracing could create more leads thereby making CNB operations more efficient and productive. That is my own view.

My guess is that CNB was consulted in this along with the stakeholders – AGC, MHA, MCI and SNDGO, and the collective decision was to restrict it to only to death sentence for drug-related offences. If my guess is correct, this signals to me a judicious exercise of self-restraint, that is, the lesser the sacrifice to privacy, the better, out of respect to Singaporeans – and I dare say a sacrifice to privacy, to some extent, that the Workers' Party, is willing to accept.

So, I go back to this theme of balance. The overarching raison d’etre of this app is contact tracing; a lesser, ancillary consequence, is the ability to fight serious crime.

And why not allow for that positive ancillary consequence if indeed it can solve crime and alleviate much distress suffered by the victims of crimes, and their families? On balance, I think it is worth it. Why? Because for the reasons I have presented, the Bill still preserves contact tracing as the greater purpose.

Containing a pandemic through contact tracing and solving serious crimes are both – are both – virtuous exercises. The seven categories listed in the Bill strike the right balance. And for these reasons, I support the Bill.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Mr Speaker, I have some queries and concerns on the Bill as regards Part 3 on personal contact tracing data.

First, it seems to me that the furore about the use of TraceTogether data could have been avoided if the Government had been clear from the start that the Police would be using its powers to access the data. Instead, blanket assurances were given by several Ministers that the TraceTogether (TT) data would only be used for contact tracing in COVID-19 cases. These blanket assurances were given from at least the middle of 2020.

Minister Vivian Balakrishnan told the House last month that he had forgotten about the Criminal Procedure Code when he gave his assurances and had sleepless nights thereafter. But the bigger question is: for all these months, why did no one in the Government step forward to correct the misrepresentation that TraceTogether was fully ringfenced for COVID-19 tracing?

Second, on why Police would need TraceTogether data for criminal investigations, I have some scepticism.

First, the TraceTogether data is likely to be incomplete and patchy. As pointed out by the Leader of the Opposition, people can and do turn off the Bluetooth functions on their phones. Those using TraceTogether tokens may also not carry them around all the time. The TraceTogether system's proximity data may also have some technical limitations as to distance and time which may make records incomplete.

Second, it should be pointed out that some countries, like Australia, have chosen not to allow their law enforcement agencies to access information from COVID-19 contact tracing schemes for other investigations. Even speaking as someone who is generally supportive of law enforcement, I believe it is important for the Government to make a convincing case for TraceTogether data use by elaborating on possible scenarios so that we can understand why TraceTogether may be pivotal to solving certain crimes. Earlier in his speech, Minister Vivian Balakrishnan gave one scenario of a child being kidnapped. I wonder if he has other scenarios to share.

Third, the Bill limits Police's use of TraceTogether data to seven categories of serious crimes. When the seven categories were announced last month, it was clear to me, at least, that the Government was making serious efforts to scope down its powers. On the face of offence categories, most can agree that they are grave offences which the public would want the Police to solve.

The seven categories of offences are now listed in the Seventh Schedule of the Bill. The Bill makes clear that the Seventh Schedule cannot be amended by Subsidiary Legislation but only through amending the main Act in Parliament. This will ensure that Members of Parliament and the public can scrutinise any change before it is law.

However, how water-tight are the seven categories? I was expecting to see in the Seventh Schedule a listing of the exact Penal provisions being contemplated such as precisely which sections of which laws are included. However, the Seventh Schedule describes the offence categories in less precise terms. This may lead to some ambiguity and uncertainty in application.

For instance, Category 7 is listed as, and I quote, "Any offence involving serious sexual assault such as rape or sexual assault by penetration". The use of the phrase "such as" means that rape and sexual assault by penetration are mere examples and not exhaustive of the category of serious sexual assault. Would this category include scenarios where the sexual assault did not involve penetration but involved, say, sexual assault of a mentally disabled victim? Many would regard sexual assault of a mentally disabled victim as serious and, in fact, TraceTogether data might be pivotal in such cases due to the victim's reduced ability to assist in Police investigations.

Another example of potential ambiguity is the offence of rioting. Rioting is defined under the Penal Code as a situation where there is an unlawful assembly of five or more persons and one member uses force or violence to pursue a common object of the assembly. If one looks at Seventh Schedule, Category 3, it seems to me that some cases of rioting may be included but not others, as it all depends on whether the injuries to the victim are of a life-threatening nature or not. Given the importance of proper classification, who will be the gatekeeper to certify whether or not a crime incident falls within the Seventh Schedule? It should not be left to the investigator alone.

My fourth point relates to from whom the Police will extract the TraceTogether data. The Bill makes clear that the Police will order the production of the data, so there is no need to seek consent from the person having the data. Referring to the parliamentary answer given by MHA to Member of Parliament Christopher de Souza on 4 January, Minister of State Desmond Tan had said that TraceTogether data would not be extracted from suspects but only from witnesses. Could the Minister clarify the precise basis for distinguishing the two? As for suspects, Minister of State Tan had said that TraceTogether data would not be extracted from suspects for the purpose of security. What are these security concerns?

Finally, in the light of the revelation that Police will use TraceTogether data, several defence counsel have asked me whether suspects too will be able to access TraceTogether data in any given case as it could be exculpatory, that is, it would delink the suspect from the crime. If the Police will be able to use TraceTogether data to incriminate the suspect, then in all fairness, the TraceTogether data should be available to the defence as well.

To this end, we understand that TraceTogether data on devices is transient as it is encrypted and stored for only 25 days, after which it is automatically deleted. Defence counsel often come onto the case some weeks after the arrest. How does the Government intend to handle this issue of justice and fairness?

Sir, as mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition earlier, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill. However, we need answers to the questions we have posed.

Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr Speaker, Sir, today’s debate is about accountability to Parliament. As leaders, it is important to communicate clearly as well as in a principled manner. If we had stated in this House that TraceTogether data is to be used only for contact tracing, then it should be so. Even if there is great benefit to be gained by using it for other purposes, even if there is fine print that allows us to do so, we should forebear. If we want to take a different approach from what was earlier represented in this House, then we should raise the matter here for debate and convince hon Members in this House that it is necessary to change tack.

This is responsible politics. It is for this reason that I welcome the introduction of this Bill.

The hon Leader of Opposition in his speech mentioned that there are quarters outside this House which ascribe a sinister motive in relation to the point as to whether the hon Minister knew from the outset that the data was to be used for other matters, apart from contact tracing, in particular, in dealing with investigation of offences.

What is noteworthy, as the hon Leader of Opposition mentioned, was that in the hon Prime Minister's speech on the 21 April 2020, he had already stated that in relation to the digital contact tracing efforts, there could be privacy concerns.

I filed a Parliamentary Question for the sitting in June 2020. On 4 June 2020, the Government's answer was that the data from TraceTogether would be used for contact tracing only. So, just looking at two points, April and June, you could already see there is a bit of a disjunct and there was an error that arose arising from the fact that while on one hand, the Prime Minister said there could be some privacy concerns, on the other, the Minister had pointed out that the data would only be used for contact tracing.

I, like the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza, looked at the chronology of the entire saga and I am convinced that this error, just like the hon Leader of Opposition said, is not an error that was intentionally made. It was an error, in the words of Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, a mea culpa that arose because it was not drawn to his attention that the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was applicable.

This Bill asks for permission to make TraceTogether and SafeEntry data, which was meant to be used for contact tracing to be available to the Police when there is a clear and pressing need to use that data for criminal investigations into seven categories of serious offences. In this regard, both the hon Leader of Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, and the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim, asked questions in relation to exactly when this would arise in practice. One point that was made was that the Police has already an abundance of tools.

But, to me, I find it useful that in this Bill, there is the operative words "clear and pressing need", and that, to me, limits the ability to use the data. And in relation to the seven categories – these are serious crimes that we are talking about – anyone looking at it would know that – and I am, in a sense, sharing what I am going to say a bit later – in balancing privacy concerns with really the concern for meting out justice in relation to the commission of serious offences, the Police should be provided access.

The question is a simple one. If these harms fall on your parent, your sibling, your child, and if the data from your TraceTogether token can make a difference between solving the case and leaving it unsolved, or if it means catching the criminal in days rather than in months or even years, would we not say yes?

I do say yes, and this is why I support this Bill. I do so for one main reason – it is in line with the current legislative policy to allow the Police access to any relevant data, no matter how personal, in their investigations.

As it stands, there is no blanket privacy protection that applies across the board. Our private phone logs, our banking records, are all subject to these provisions. The need for privacy must be weighed against the demands of justice, and the need to protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. We are by no means unique in taking this stance. I made mention last month in this House that there is parity between the positions taken in Singapore and the European Union through its General Data Protection Regulations.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

An easy way out of this decision, it would be to say that TraceTogether and SafeEntry, taken together, is an aberration – if it had not existed, what would the Police do? The Police have solved crimes before TraceTogether and SafeEntry, and will do so after the programme has been stood down. So, why do we feel it needs this? Why not do without?

It would indeed be the easier route – just keep to the original promise, forget about the data and pretend we never had it.

But the fact remains that this is not a hypothetical armchair philosophy question. We have real crimes, real lives at stake. It is morally indefensible to shut our eyes to the answer when knowing it would make a difference in cracking a serious crime case and bringing the culprit to face justice and, possibly, save other lives from being victims of serious crime. This is not a crude utilitarian trampling of principles for a greater good. It is, in fact, the principle from which all Police powers come – the demand for justice, the right to be protected from evil and harm.

To those people who are troubled because they received this raft of conspiracy messages, saying that, "Oh, the Police has no system to protect data and they use it for all kinds of issues"; let me just say it for myself as a criminal lawyer for the past 25 years and a former police officer before that, that I know personally how seriously the Police deals with issues of misuse of data. I know of cases, some of them were cases where I represented the ex-officer, where there was misuse of data, and the Police officers concerned were prosecuted.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

So, there is a system and I would want to share my own experience with those who are troubled by these conspiracy messages.

A more difficult question – and that was posed by the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza – is why then limit this access to serious crimes as defined under the Bill, given the state of law at this point? He spoke about the need to extend it to cover other classes of drug offences. With respect, this question ignores the facts and circumstances that have led us to this point. As hon Members are already familiar with the background, I will desist from recounting it again in my speech.

The crucial point to note is that this Bill represents a compromise to ensure that we do not take the risk of losing the ability to conduct contact tracing quickly and aggressively via TraceTogether and SafeEntry when we are in the midst of a pandemic.

It seems to me that there is broad agreement for data to be used to investigate the seven categories of serious crime proposed under the Bill. I do appreciate the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim's point about the fact that they are not defined in terms of cross-reference to provisions but there is already description of the serious crimes. To me, that is sufficient. Using the general principles of interpretation, one would get to know what is parliamentary intention.

Extending the categories will require hon Members of this House to take a gamble on whether or not a group of Singaporeans and residents will still be prepared to adopt TraceTogether and SafeEntry – and that is a point that the hon Leader of Opposition made – or, instead, be put off in light of the extended use of the data. This is not a gamble that we should take, given the state of COVID-19 pandemic today. It is far worse than a year ago – the mutating virus has variants which are more infectious and lethal, more than 2 million dead across the world, a reporter in tears on "live" TV as she visited hospitals where patients are dying from lack of proper healthcare, students in a university ringfenced by metal fences to regulate visitor movements and keep them safe. This quick escalation can happen in Singapore if we were to lose our cohesion resulting in our healthcare resources being overwhelmed.

Even the vaccine is not a magic bullet. There are no magic bullets. All we have is our very human responses – our responsibility to each other, our own recognition of our vulnerabilities, our hopes and our better selves.

TraceTogether and SafeEntry, collectively, is a tool to help us in this pandemic and we need it in this new and present threat. It is also a tool to help us against the old evils of human depravity, greed and lust. There is no reason why it cannot do both. Even if one contact were traced through which one serious crime is solved or one serious crime is prevented, it would be worthwhile. And we just need one reason to support this Bill.

In closing, I would like to refer to the hon Leader of Opposition's point about the future and how we should regulate data in the future.

I would suggest, especially, in the context of the present crisis and the efforts being expended to contain the threat of COVID-19, we should also be looking at the future when we have to contain another crisis.

In that kind of scenario, what would we want to be as Members in this House? Should we just be ambassadors of our people, just conveying what this group of people have expressed, or that group of people have expressed? Would that be sufficient? Or would it be necessary that we bear the responsibility as leaders to move our people, to say, "This is a crisis. Yes, errors will be made. But look at the conduct. Look at the outcome."

We must have the courage to move our people in one direction to overcome the crisis together. And that to me would be a big lesson for the future. I support this Bill. [Applause.]

Mr Gerald Giam. Mr Pritam Singh.

I thank the hon Member Mr Murali for his comments. I would just like to pick up on a point the hon Member made about the easy way out being to just proceed as originally assured by the Government. I would suggest, very respectfully, to the hon Member that we have to take a step back and look at what is this easy way out of. And, in my humble view, the bigger issue is to ensure the safety of the population at hand and to ensure that contact tracing is successful.

So, the Government obviously had to weigh the implications of going ahead, proceeding as assured by the Minister and the Government or introducing the exemptions for serious crimes at this point.

In those circumstances, the critical issue in my mind is to determine which way do you go, where do you fall. And I would suggest that it is not a question of armchair philosophy or trying to defend something that is morally indefensible. Because, as a society, we have rules in very different situations. The hon Member is a criminal lawyer of some repute. Outside this Chamber, I think people like me would be going to him for advice on criminal matters.

But a useful example is attorney-client privilege. I could be representing a criminal who could have admitted to me that he committed an offence but my instructions is to plead not guilty for him in Court. And that puts a lot of pressure on criminal lawyers, as the Member would know. There are two options. You do not take up the case; you drop the brief. Or you make sure you follow those instructions to a hilt because if you do not, you have committed some offences vis-a-vis the Legal Profession Act and you have breached client confidentiality.

I am not suggesting an equivalence to TraceTogether. I am not suggesting that. But, effectively, that lawyer is a walking TraceTogether token. He knows something about the matter.

As far as society is concerned, that is a trade-off. What do we want? In this context, Government has put out a position and I would accept, as I have, that serious crimes are something that we have to look at carefully. Hence, the Workers' Party support.

But it is important, I think, for the Government to explain how critical TraceTogether information actually is. Because the public does not know. And insofar as how a conviction or a decision to prosecute turns on TraceTogether data, it is not exactly hypothetical.

The hon Member Mr Christoper de Souza has talked about expanding actually the scope of Misuse of Drugs Act, for example. But if one thinks about it, we have to bring ourselves back down to the purpose of this Bill which is TraceTogether. And the simple answer to that is I do not think drug lords or criminals will be carrying TraceTogether tokens and TraceTogether applications around.

But that is my position. I just wanted to verbalise my views on the points that hon Member Mr Murali made about, suggesting that this is an easy way out. I do not think that is the nub of the issue. I think it is far deeper than that.

Mr Gerald Giam. Ms Sylvia Lim.

I think, Sir, I just have one clarification for Member Mr Murali. If I heard him correctly, during his speech, he said he is comforted by the fact that the Bill states that the TraceTogether data would only be accessed when there is clear and pressing need. I would like to ask him whether he means that it is stated explicitly in the provisions or that it is implied by the provisions.

Mr Speaker, Sir, so as not to hold up the proceedings, I am checking my notes and I will come back to my learned friend, Ms Sylvia Lim, shortly.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Speaker, when I first read the 4 January Parliamentary Question by the Member for Holland-Bukit Timah Mr Christopher de Souza, I anticipated that the Government would answer it in one of two ways.

One, that TraceTogether or TT data is not and will never be used for anything other than contact tracing, as per their earlier assurances. Or two, that the TT data may be used for criminal investigations in some circumstances.

I thought the second scenario would be less likely. I shared with a colleague ahead of that day's Sitting that I did not think the Government would use TT data for non-contact tracing purposes. It will cause a public outcry as it would inviolate TT's privacy policy and what the Government had been saying about TT's privacy protection so far. More damagingly, it could lead to a lower adoption rate of TT, which would in turn hinder our battle against the COVID-19 pandemic.

As it turned out, option two was closer to reality. Minister of State Desmond Tan said that, "The Singapore Police Force is empowered under the Criminal Procedure Code or CPC to obtain any data, including TraceTogether or TT data for criminal investigations", and went on to assure the House that the data was secure and only authorised officers are allowed to access it.

In response to my supplementary question that day, the Minister of State clarified that other than for the purpose of criminal investigations and protecting public safety and security, TT data is to be used only for contact tracing.

The next day, on 5 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a clarification, following a lot of unease expressed by Singaporeans about the previous day's revelations, where he stated that the use of TT data would be restricted to serious crimes.

Three days later, on 8 January, the Smart Nation Digital Government Office announced upcoming legislative provisions for the usage of data from TT and SafeEntry, which are in the Bill we are debating today.

Why did the Government choose the make this revelation only on 4 January, more than nine months after TT was launched? All that time the TT's privacy statement contained a more absolute assurance and, I quote, "Any data shared with MOH will only be used solely for contact tracing of persons possibly exposed to COVID-19."

This privacy statement changed only sometime after 12.25 pm on 4 January, the afternoon that the PQ was answered, with the new clarification that it can also be used for criminal investigations.

On 8 June 2020, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in a press conference that TT data is "only used for contact tracing".

While the Minister has since admitted that he had not thought of the CPC at that time – and I appreciate his explanation – why did anyone in Government not come out sooner to correct this statement?

Many Singaporeans downloaded the TT app and collected the TT token in large numbers, in part, because they trusted the Government's assurances of privacy and limitation of use.

This unfortunate sequence of events may make many Singaporeans more wary of taking Government's statements at face value. Some may now adopt Ronald Reagan's adage, "Trust, but verify".

We may now have an 80% adoption rate for TT but we should not rest on our laurels and become complacent.

First, the more people use TT, the more effective contact tracing will be. We should always aim for maximum adoption and usage and minimise any obstacles to adoption. For example, privacy fears or poor app performance.

Secondly, just because 80% of residents have downloaded the app or collected the token, does not mean that they are actually using it, a point that the Leader of the Opposition also made earlier.

There are many ways that TT can be disabled. There is even a pause function within the TT app itself. Suffice to say, one does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out how to legally disable the TT app or token.

With the 4 January revelation, many people who anticipate engaging and even minor misdemeanours may choose to disable TT just to avoid detection. Some might even do so to avoid being called as a witness in a Court case. Others may do so as matter of principle or because of their lack of trust in the Government.

All these might add up to a not-so-insignificant proportion of our population.

We may think that these people are holding out on TT for unjustifiable reasons, especially since the seven serious crimes have already been scoped in. However, we cannot control every action that individuals make with their electronic devices.

Ultimately, TT relies on user consent. Perceptions will drive behaviour. The net result may be a lower than desired usage of TT which will hamper our contact tracing efforts.

The Government does not want to constrain itself by committing to "never use TT data for crime fighting". However, is the potential cost of slower containment of the community's spread of COVID-19 worth it? Put another way, if the COVID-19 situation were to take a turn for the worse, overwhelming our healthcare system, will the Police still use TraceTogether data if it inevitably suppresses the adoption rate and hinders contact tracing efforts?

Mr Murali has said that it is worth using contact tracing data even if one serious crime is solved. On the flip side, is it worth it if even one COVID-19 cluster goes undetected because a few people deactivated the TT app out of privacy concerns?

Sir, I will, with some reluctance, be prepared to support this Bill. However, I hope the Government and the Police will now consider this question carefully in deciding how often and to what extent it uses the broad powers conferred on it by section 20 of the CPC and this Bill.

Mr Speaker, I have some further clarifications for the Minister on this Bill.

First, we now know that SafeEntry data is also accessible to the Police. Since its launch, how many times have the Police used SafeEntry data for investigations and how many of these investigations were outside the scope of the seven serious crimes in the Seventh Schedule?

Second, the sunset clause proposed under section 82(8) gives a lot of power to the Minister to determine if we still need digital contact tracing and when the contact tracing data will be deleted.

The pandemic may last another four to five years, as Minister Lawrence Wong has recently alluded to. In an even more pessimistic scenario, COVID-19 may never be fully eradicated but will become endemic in our population.

If this happens, will these digital contact tracing systems ever be stood down? What are the criteria that will be used to determine this?

Third, do the safeguards in section 82 of the Bill cover data that has been uploaded to MOH databases for the purposes of contact tracing? If so, will the Police still be allowed to access this data even after the pandemic is over?

I asked a similar question on 5 January and the Minister answered then, "I believe that once the pandemic has passed, that data – certainly the specific personalised data – those fields should be eliminated." Can I confirm that this remains the intent of this Bill?

Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am grateful for your indulgence. I would like to thank the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim for her clarification question. In relation to how I got the impression that the powers would only be used when there is a clear and pressing need, I would like to direct her attention to the Government statement issued on 8 January 2021, entitled "Upcoming Legislative Provisions for Usage of Data from Digital Contact Tracing Solutions", where in paragraph three, it is stated that the legislation will specify the personal data collected through digital contact tracing solutions which comprise the TraceTogether programme and SafeEntry programme can only be used for the specific purpose of contact tracing except where there is a clear and pressing need to use that data for criminal investigations of serious offences.

So, that is how I formed the impression and I would invite the hon Minister to confirm if my impression is correct, in his response to us.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Thank you, Speaker. I would like to thank Mr Murali also for clarifying in effect that it is not the Bill itself that states so. He said that he obtained the information from a Government statement.

Ms Jessica Tan.

Mr Speaker, thank you for allowing me to speak on this Bill.

Many Singaporeans recognise the importance of contact tracing in our quest to keep Singaporeans and Singapore safe during this COVID-19 pandemic. With the clarification that TraceTogether data can be accessed by the Police under the Criminal Procedure Code, I, like many, have received feedback from residents expressing disappointment and concerns. This change from the earlier assurances given that TraceTogether data would only be used for COVID-19 contact tracing purposes is something that has caused some disquiet. I can understand that many are upset because many had collected the token or downloaded the app on this assurance.

But I do want to make this point about looking at the TraceTogether solution and what the Minister has shared earlier with regards to the design decisions on TraceTogether.

I think that it is clear that TraceTogether is purpose-built with the singular purpose for COVID-19 contact tracing to prevent a situation of the spread of COVID-19 and with privacy protection central to that design. Why do I say that?

First, TraceTogether utilises, as many have said, Bluetooth exchanges to capture proximity of who has been close to you. This token or app does not use GPS capabilities and hence does not capture location information. This data is also captured and stored on the token or the app and not on the server.

The Minister had also shared that there are safeguards and what these safeguards include – that the data is kept on the token and is also deleted after 25 days. The scope of the TraceTogether solution has been very singular in that purpose of design. The fact is that data is deleted after 25 days – based on what the Minister had shared – based on medical advice of the time required for contact tracing data, if required, and that it is deleted after that time.

The Minister in his speech also shared that when the pandemic is over, the TraceTogether solution will be stood down and all personal digital contact tracing data used for COVID-19 contact tracing will be deleted from the systems as soon as practicable.

If you think about it from a design purpose, it is clear. But I think the important question now for all of us, in front of us now, is: do we restrict the use of that contact tracing data?

This Bill seeks to limit the use of personal data collected for COVID-19 through digital contact tracing solutions. If this Bill is passed, it will mean that personal contact data from TraceTogether and SafeEntry as set out in the Sixth Schedule of the Bill can only be used for COVID-19 contact tracing purpose when there is an infection and the only exception will be when the data is needed for criminal investigation proceedings for the serious offences as specified in the Seventh Schedule of the Bill.

Despite the intent of the Bill to limit the use of personal contact tracing data for the specified seven categories of serious crimes, some have asked if we should even allow access – and this discussion has been happening outside of this Chamber as well – and use of data for any other purpose as there was assurance given earlier that the information was for the sole purpose of COVID-19 contact tracing in the event that there is an infection.

Many have also pointed out that there is no need for the data from TraceTogether to be used as there are other sources of more intelligent data and information available from other smarter devices. These include close-circuit TVs installed in buildings, elevators, along our streets, in-vehicle cameras, and GPS devices including smartphones, just to name a few. With data from these devices, is there really a need for the data from TraceTogether?

Given the earlier assurance and the mistake made – I think the Leader of the Opposition and Mr Murali have also pointed this out, and I think we have had a discussion – I actually ask this question of myself: would be be an easier decision not to allow the use of the TraceTogether data for any other purpose? Easier in the sense that because of what people are feeling and the angst that some are feeling.

But then I ask myself again: is it the right decision?

If we take the position not to allow access to TraceTogether data for the purpose of police investigation when a serious crime is committed, what it would mean is that even if the data from the TraceTogether token or app could help in the investigation, even if there is a remote possibility, the Police cannot access the data.

The Minister gave the example of someone being kidnapped. I actually wrote that down for my speech too. In the event that someone was kidnapped – I had this discussion with a resident – if that happened, and if TraceTogether data, in the remotest possibility, was the only available data that could provide a lead in expediting investigations in that situation, what it would mean is that the data cannot be accessed if we did not have this discussion and we did not agree on this Bill.

In situations involving serious crimes – and the list, I think, we have all talked about that, in terms of the seriousness of those crimes – like murder, terrorism or kidnapping, timely access to data could make the difference between life and death. Knowing the implications of this, I ask myself again: would it be the right decision for us to agree that the data cannot be used even if it could save a life?

I come to this point that – I think there is some talk about whether it is convenient or easy for the Police. Are we making it easier for the Police to investigate rather than using other data? I think we all agree this is not about convenience. It is really about aiding and helping in investigations of serious crimes – matters that involve, in some cases, life and death.

As the Bill seeks to allow for personal contact tracing data to be accessed by the Police to assist in the investigation of serious crimes, what will happen if someone loses his/her token and it is used by another person for criminal purposes? I know this is somewhat a practical question but can the Minister share what will be done to prevent such misuse? Now that it could be used for criminal investigations of serious crimes, I think there are some voters who may be worried that their token or their app might be misused by someone else. How do we prevent that?

Mr Speaker, as we continue our fight against COVID-19, contact tracing remains the most important measure in keeping transmissions low together with all the other measures. While we protect data privacy – and I think the reason for this Bill is that we recognise that privacy is important – we must make the right decision to protect and keep Singapore and Singaporeans safe and secure. The measures proposed in this Bill are important as they seek to make clear the use and the limitations of personal contact tracing data for COVID-19 contact tracing purposes and criminal investigations.

The Bill is a compromise. It is a balance between public health and keeping everyone in Singapore safe and secure while respecting personal privacy.

Before I end, I do want to touch on this point because I think there were some discussions about whether this Bill will cause lower take up rates of TraceTogether. I think that is the purpose of why we are having this conversation in Parliament. It is to help Singaporeans understand why this balance needs to be made. I think to some extent I trust that Singaporeans, with the right information and understanding, will move in the right direction and support the use of digital solutions to help with contact tracing.

We have seen that of Singaporeans since COVID-19 started till now. We have seen how Singaporeans have stepped up. There have been so many restrictions made on everybody's lives but everyone has played their part. I think it is important we have this conversation so that Singaporeans can make the right decision to continue to move forward together, to keep everyone safe.

For these reasons, Mr Speaker, and for the implications that I have shared on public safety, I support the Bill.

Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Mr Speaker, Sir, we all know by now that the merit of this Bill rests on tradeoff between public trust and public health on one side and public safety on the other.

Public trust in the Government is the cornerstone of Singapore's political system. Our people's trust in the Government enabled the first-generation leaders to transform Singapore from a third-world country to a first-world country. This very same trust enabled the Government to combat and curtail the SARS crisis in 2003 and the H1N1 crisis in 2009.

Sir, I would like to state that the Progress Singapore Party, or PSP, fully supports the Government's efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and we were among the first to urge the Government to make mask-wearing mandatory in the early stages of the pandemic.

However, it would be remiss of me not to state that our contact tracing programmes intrude extensively upon our people's privacy.

SafeEntry collects an individual's NRIC, contact number, their location, whenever they enter a building and even how long an individual stays in a location, while TraceTogether collects who that individual was in close proximity to and for how long. The two programmes together allow the Government to easily create a map where an individual goes and who he associates with.

Singaporeans have long accepted some erosion over their civil rights and by extension their privacy, in order to ensure public safety. However, when the Government announced the TraceTogether token in June 2020, there was a public backlash against TraceTogether. Over concerns that TraceTogether will invade their privacy and the collected data will be used for non-contact tracing purposes.

But in the end, our people trusted both Minister Balakrishnan's and Senior Minister Teo's promises that the collected data would only be used for contact tracing, which was why TraceTogether adoption finally surpassed 70% in December 2020. This trust was broken during the January parliamentary session, when not only did the Government admitted that TraceTogether data was accessible to the Singapore Police Force for the purposes of criminal investigations, it was already actually assessed by the Police to investigate a murder.

Sir, trust takes years to build, seconds to break and forever to repair. This broken promise has broken the public's trust in the Government. It is because of this broken trust that we are gathered here today debating a Bill that has to be passed under a Certificate of Urgency, which means that all the three Readings of the Bill would have to be done in this Parliament Sitting and there will be little time to consider its implications carefully.

Actually, to start repairing the broken trust, the Government must first answer questions about the follow-up process around this episode. Like when did the Police first access the TT data? When the TT data was accessed, did the Police consider that they will be breaking the promise that the Government gave to not use the TT data for anything other than for the purposes of fighting the pandemic?

Has the TT data been accessed only once as Minister Balakrishnan has stated in the previous sitting, or more than once? If more than once, how many cases exactly has the Police actually accessed? When was Cabinet first informed that TT data was accessed in a direct breach of the promise they gave? Did Cabinet then gave instructions to the Police not to access TT data in light of their repeated and public promises?

These five questions apply with equal force to the data collector under the SafeEntry programme, which has so far attracted less attention. To proceed with this Bill, without answering these questions will leave serious doubts in the public's mind over whether this Bill is truly to rebuild public trust in a Government or to rubber stamp the Police actions after the fact. It is therefore in the spirit of rebuilding public trust that the Progress Singapore Party rises in opposition to this Bill. Allow me to elaborate.

As the PSP Secretary-General, Dr Tan Cheng Bock has stated, backtracking is not good politics and it erodes the confidence and social compact of our citizens in our political institutions. At this point in the pandemic, the last thing we need is for our citizens to lose faith in the Government and start second-guessing the Government's motives whenever in announces new measures to control the COVID-19 virus, especially when other countries around the world are experiencing new outbreaks.

The Government is compromising public health and public trust for some benefit in public safety by passing this Bill. Public trust in TraceTogether has been eroded by this broken promise. What I found when speaking to residents is that they are now leaving their TraceTogether tokens at home when they go out. And some are now refusing to use TraceTogether altogether.

This will compromise the effectiveness of contact tracing efforts, and this is exceptionally dangerous in light of the uptick in community cases since Singapore's move into Phase Three.

The SPF has already broad powers to assess documents, things, data, computers and even decryption data under the Criminal Procedure Code for the purposes of investigating crimes. How much is the incremental benefit, from a set of data that exists only for 25 days? Besides I find it quite unbelievable that such criminals would carry their TraceTogether tokens when committing such crimes, especially now that the Government has announced the TT data is accessible by the Police.

Sir, the challenge of a democratic Government is to use innovative technology for public safety, but at the same time, not intruding into the privacy of its citizens too much, not in using any technology that is available. The Government's biggest priority now should be to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and persuade as many people as possible to use TraceTogether. This must be the call and primary purpose. Any other purpose that compromises on this primary purpose and cause people to reconsider using TraceTogether must be set aside.

Sir, the PSP is not objecting to this Bill for the sake of objecting. We have thought of supporting it with some changes, but to trade off public trust in public health measures, which must be of utmost priority in a pandemic crisis, for public safety, is too much to give for us, after much consideration.

And the complete ring-fencing of contact tracing data, keeping it solely for public health objective, is not unprecedented. The Australian government has publicly committed that the data collected by the contact tracing application cannot be accessed by the Police and is to be used only for contact tracing purposes, and has already passed legislation to that effect.

We must also keep in mind that the COVID-19 pandemic will neither be the first nor the last pandemic that our country will have to deal with. Any action the Government takes to deal with this pandemic be it to prioritise public health and trust or public safety will significantly impact our people's trust and confidence in the Government's action in future pandemics and other unforeseen calamities.

Therefore, when all the various issues are considered, passing this Bill may actually run against the Government's objective of rallying everybody together to fight the pandemic which should be our top priority at this moment in time.

In conclusion, Sir, this Bill does not go far enough to assure our citizens that the Government will keep its promises and is insufficient to restore public trust in the Government during this pandemic. The Progress Singapore Party therefore stands opposed against this Bill and calls upon the Government to keep to his original promise by fully exempting contact tracing data from the CPC.

Leader.

Mr Speaker, I just have a clarification for Mr Leong because I just wanted to understand his position. So, would I be correct then in understanding that, in the example given by Minister Vivian, that if there was a child kidnapped and let us say, there is no other sign of any evidence, the only thing that you have is TraceTogether data, Mr Leong's position would be, "No, let it be, we will not access that data." Is it that the position?

I thank the Minister for the question. Yes. Our position will be that.

But of course, in any of the decisions we make, there is a trade-off. So, when you take the position of the Bill what you are saying public trust plus the needs of public health – both of these benefits would be less than the benefits that you draw or you expect to draw from public safety. So, we have the weigh the trade-off and after weighing the trade-off, we hold the stand that we are going against this Bill.

I thank the Member for his clarification. He is right. There is a trade-off, but we would not trade a child's life for something like that.

Mr Vikram Nair.

Mr Speaker, while I understand the context for this Bill, and the reservations many of the earlier Members have mentioned about privacy, I wish to state that I have a somewhat different view. I, too, have my reservations on this Bill, but it largely has to do with the limits its placing on the powers of the Police to obtain information under the CPC. And I think one of the points that we cannot trivialise, is how difficult Police investigations are and how difficult the process of finding the truth can be as well, even if matters were to go to Court.

In Singapore, we have a low crime rate and most Singaporeans go about their daily lives without fear of crime. An important reason for this is that we have effective law enforcement by the Police. Singapore's Police Force is small, relative to the population. We have just under 9,700 regular police officers in Singapore, which is around 170 per 100,000 people. This is one of the smallest in the developed world and even amongst our neighbours. For example, the US has around 238, Hong Kong has 487 and Malaysia has around 320.

Yet, despite the small Police Force, they have been effective at keeping the crime rates low. This is in part because it has strong support from the population. And people make reports whenever they see anything amiss. For Members of Parliament, you know this, almost every other thing ends up in a Police report; whether it is a neighbour dispute, complaint about noise. People share information freely with the Police, trust the Police and expect them to be able to solve crimes. This expectation is reflected in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code which allows a Police officer above the rank of sergeant to order a person to "produce any document or thing" to assist in investigations.

This power is understandable. When a crime happens, Police have to piece together what happened. The crime scene is not going to the tell the Police the story. If they are lucky, they will have eyewitnesses who can identify the accused, get confessions and close the case. But what if they do not have ready eyewitnesses? What if they have people who were there but who did not see things but who may be able to give information or device? These are all different situations you may find yourself in after a crime has happened.

The Police have a wide variety of investigated methods, that is, old-fashioned style investigations, maybe like Sherlock Holmes – you look for clues, you piece together, you draw inferences. But while those make good stories, they do not help you solve a large number of crimes that take place regularly. So, Police use data, they use technology, they find corroborating evidence from as many sources as possible to try and understand what happened.

Even after Police work is done and the suspect is found, a trial may be necessary if the suspect does not plead guilty and where evidence gathered by the Police and investigators are put to rigorous testing.

As a lawyer, I take part in trials and I can tell you, the truth is not always straightforward. There will be competing versions of narratives and the Judge sitting there has to decide who is telling the truth. The more information and data you have, the better you will be able to piece the story together. And the standard for proving guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. So, it is a very high threshold you have to take before you can establish someone has done something wrong.

The general rules of evidence, certainly in civil proceedings is, you have a duty to disclose all evidence that is not privileged, even if it goes against your client's case. This is because your primary obligation is with the Court, to help the Court find the truth. Even in criminal proceedings, there are obligations on prosecutors to disclose evidence that may go towards showing the person is not guilty. All this is there because we want the Courts to have the best available information to arrive at the truth.

So, generally, the rules and the society that we live in has this presumption that the Court has to have access to all available information. And, of course, for the information to get to the Court, it must first be gathered, in this case, by the Police.

I understand that this limitation is only to the powers of the Police and not to the powers of the Court. But in practical terms, where you only have 25 days to gather this evidence, if the decision is not made upfront to gather this evidence, it is unlikely to be gathered or used in Court.

So, against this backdrop of the manpower crunch, Police have regularly kept up with the latest policing methods, using technology wherever possible. One obvious example is the use of CCTVs, which are now there at the ground floor lift lobbies and staircases to HDB flats. There is obviously a trade-off in privacy, but I think Singaporeans have generally been comfortable with this. They trust the Police; they cooperate with the Police.

I always find more requests for more CCTVs, not less. In fact, with most of my residents, the kinds of things they ask surveillance for usually gets rejected but this includes dealing loanshark harassment, littering, inconsiderate neighbourly behaviours, noise nuisance, speeding, traffic offences and parking offences.

The Police have done a very good job of dealing with serious crime. Minor crime is obviously not prioritised but this is what causes the most nuisance amongst many of our residents. And even in these situations, people are always ready to trade off privacy for a fast resolution to issues.

People understand that Police have limited resources and they are generally supportive unmanned surveillance methods.

Where would TraceTogether and SafeEntry come in? What does TraceTogether do? TraceTogether does not track individual locations. It is not this autonomous pilot scene where everyone goes, what you are doing or is it going to retrace your story. The only information TraceTogether has is who is near you at that point in time. This is obviously very useful in contact tracing because you may not know all the people you are in close contact with over a two-week period.

But for this very reason, it can also be helpful if you are trying to solve "who done it", a mystery of what happened here. Let us say, obviously, in a case of murder, it is very clear cut. The victim is there. The victim cannot speak; the victim is dead. The victim has a device. You may be able to infer from that device who was in close proximity at the time of the event.

How about other cases? What about cases where you cannot see the victim. Maybe you are sitting in a coffeeshop. A fight took place behind you. Your token is here but you did not see what happened but you were at the location. By the time the Police come, the people involved in the fight had disappeared. If that fight is not serious, then, that is going to be one of those potential unsolved crimes – people disappeared, not serious enough to investigate. But if they could use TraceTogether data to find out who did it, then that may be another solved crime. Would you want your TraceTogether data to assist in Police investigations with that situation? I would have no objections to it.

Likewise, if someone was hauled up, being interrogated for a crime. And if he were to say, "Oh, yeah, I was in the coffeeshop and I think the Member of Parliament was there, maybe Member of Parliament so and so". Then, if he was not close proximity, he maybe blindsided, cannot remember, you can check the TraceTogether data as well.

The key point about TraceTogether is that it is useful to place you together with a stranger and placing a person is an important part of the solving the mystery of the crime – who done it? where was he at the time it happened? I do not see any principled reason why this data should not be relied on by Police.

The second point is SafeEntry. Currently, TraceTogether data can be used for serious crime. But I also have reservations on things that are excluded. For example, if sexual assault is not serious, it cannot be used; violence not amounting to grievous bodily harm non-capital drug offences. These acts are not serious under the current legislation but would you want the Police to use all data available to solve these crimes? My answer would be yes.

If you were a victim, if one of your family members was a victim, would you want Police to use all available data? Pretty sure the answer is yes. If you were wrongly accused, would you want the Police to use this data to show you were somewhere else the time it happened? Probably yes. But that cannot be done now, unless it is a serious crime.

Police are also being prevented from using SafeEntry data now for anything apart from serious matters. SafeEntry would show what time you entered a place and maybe what time you left if you had checked out. I know that at many places, they monitor you checking in but they do not monitor you checking out. Admittedly, again, it is not perfect. It is just one more clue to help put the whole picture together.

If used in conjunction with TraceTogether, it may show when you went and it may show when you left, if you can remember where you went to and the Police can find someone else who was there at that point in time. You could be corroborated by a stranger.

To me, what SafeEntry does, is similar to what visitor logs at condominiums and so on, may have done. Generally, we accept that people who maintain properties can keep entrances of visitors when they come and go. And this is often used in, both in civil cases as well as in criminal cases to find out whether a person was at a particular location, at a particular point in time. To me, SafeEntry is a far more sophisticated visitor log far, more accurate, and the fact that its use is being limited is actually a concern because, again what you are saying is, no, no, you cannot see the whole picture, you just have to work with this limit of information.

To me, in identifying how a crime happened, who was there, these are not straightforward processes. And for those who do trials, there is plenty of uncertainty involved in all these things. The more information you have, the better you can test the truth or falsity of a person's story. And I think this is important.

Ultimately, if we want to keep COVID-19 in control, we need to use TraceTogether. Why? Because TraceTogether makes contact tracing significantly easier. A person does not have to remember where they were the last 14 days. They do not have to remember exactly how much time they spent at each place nor do you have to do individual interviews for each and every person. So, to me, it goes without saying that TraceTogether is necessary for this fight.

Is TraceTogether something to be feared? Is it a huge invasion of your privacy? In my view, it is not. In my view, the fact that TraceTogether can be used to solve crimes, it may help exonerate innocent people. To, me, that is one more reason to use it, rather than to be afraid of using it.

Ultimately, it is our duty as Members of this House to be role models as well. So I think it is important for us not just to reiterate or echo fears that are outside but explain to people whether there is a proper basis for their fears or whether these fears may be overblown and the important considerations, the benefits of using this outweigh, whatever fears we may have. Because ultimately, when we use TraceTogether, the more of us that use it, the better we can solve the community spread of COVID-19. I also hope the better we can solve crime.

But I do acknowledge that there are people who have concerns about privacy and therefore its use in crime fighting is going to be limited. So, yes, I do have my reservations on these restrictions, but as this Bill is a compromise, I support it.

Ms Nadia Samdin.

Mr Speaker, Sir, it has been slightly over a year since COVID-19 forced its first city into lockdown. The following months saw governments across the world pushed into doing the same, changing our lives and livelihoods in substantial ways for the safety of our citizens.

In Singapore, the situation is largely under control. Thanks to the sacrifices of our frontline workers, work by our Government and Civil Service, and the civic mindedness of our citizens in complying with regulations. We have put society before self. But the community cases remind us that the COVID-19 curve has only been flattened, and not quashed. With every report of a new case, what swiftly follows are assurances that the close contacts are being identified and quarantined, the capabilities of our contact tracing team on full display.

The positive impact of TraceTogether, or TT for short, in increasing the efficiency of our contact tracing efforts is undeniable but given the developments since we last sat in this House last month, we must also understand the sentiments of some Singaporeans about the expanded use of TT data in connection with the investigation powers under the CPC beyond what was originally promised to be used solely for contact tracing purposes.

This is the first time that a database of Bluetooth data that can tell who we are with, and for approximately how long, is recorded and accessible by the Government under specified conditions. While we note the strict conditions in which the data can be accessed, the very collection and storage of such information does involve an ideological leap in some quarters.

However, many believed in the purpose for which the data would be used and on that basis more than 4.2 million people have enrolled in the programme today. We cannot take their concerns lightly.

My worry is that despite the utility and practicality of TT, the cost of going beyond the initial promise of what the TT data can be used for may drive away those who are skeptical of the assurances which this Bill is actually seeking to provide.

To move forward together, I hope for a focus on building trust and gaining confidence for the programme. And, in this respect I have some clarifications to raise, and assurances I hope to seek. These fall into three broad categories: first, transparency in the technology; second, transparency in the projected life cycle and use; and third, transparency in the process of using TT data in investigations.

When the TT programme first started, the Government gave public access to the technology behind it. The programme's base code, Opentrace, is open source. I received an email from a young resident of mine seeking clarification on the continued commitment in making Opentrace, open source. There were two points in particular.

As of 10 January, the Opentrace Github repository for Android was updated close to 10 months prior. However, the app on Play Store was updated on 7 December. This suggests that the version listed on the Github repository, is not the same version as that which was on the application. There are also no opensource licences listed and the terms of use and distribution should be outlined in the repository itself.

Some suggestions for consideration are: to ensure that the Github repository is updated within a reasonable time when there are application updates that have been rolled out; to update the Opentrace repository with opensource licences; to publish brief transparency reports on perhaps a bi-annual basis that will help the public understand how the data is being used, provided that the release of such data will not disrupt any investigations; and to reaffirm the commitment that TT data will always be stored on the user's device, only shared with the Government when the user takes action to upload the data and can be deleted at the request of the user.

On my second point, there are several stages in the investigation and criminal prosecution process. Generally, when the Police have been informed of a possible offence, an investigation is initiated. Evidence is obtained. The investigation officers or IOs meet with the prosecutors in the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC). The DPPs will decide on the actual charge to proceed with, subject to their own internal procedures and approval structures, as well as whether sufficient evidence has been collected. The person under investigation or arrest will then appear in Court to be formally charged.

But some investigations do not conclude with the person investigated being charged for a variety of reasons. For cases that proceed to prosecution, at the stage of criminal investigations, our IOs would likely have an idea of the range of offences which could apply. But the final charge may not be set out until much later. Even then, during trial, charges may be amended or dropped.

How will we deal with cases where TT data is used in investigations where the actual charge, in the end, does not fall within the categories of these serious offences? Will the use of TT data during investigations put pressure on prosecutors to proceed with a holding charge for a more serious offence in order to legitimise the use of TT data?

While I note section 82(7), I would also like to seek confirmation whether an individual will be able to meaningfully offer both his TT and SafeEntry data as evidence. In the event one is being investigated for a serious offence but claims innocence, can such individual volunteer and access personal contact tracing data, noting the possible privacy concerns of others, as that individual's personal contact tracing data may involve the data of others who were around the individual at a particular time.

And, finally, for example, in a case of sexual assault, it can be a very traumatic experience for victims. Cases do go unreported and some take a very long time before they come to light. Given that TT data is automatically deleted in 25 days and very little actual information is collected and stored, how useful is this data for investigations? I would appreciate if the Government could please share some of its considerations in this regard.

My third point. Mr Speaker, over the course of my engagements regarding the inclusion of TT data, people have also shared their concerns with me over the likelihood of TraceTogether one day becoming compulsory, along with a slew of other privacy concerns. There is speculation circulating, and the only way to combat this speculation is with clarity.

Specifically, I would like to request for clarity on the life cycle of the programme. People want to have an understanding and assurance on how long the programme will last, that it will continue to remain opt-in, under what conditions that may change and when it would be laid to rest. Of course, it is impossible for us to give a fixed date for when the TT programme can be terminated as it is still unclear how long COVID-19 will last and even more uncertain what its impact may be on society at large.

However, it is possible for us to take a condition-based approach in detailing the life cycle of the TT programme, a way of specifying the conditions that will prompt a significant change in our present use of the TT app and device. This is so Singaporeans are prepared in advance for any changes in the TT programme as the conditions and parameters for this would have already been specified. As an example, one of the "conditions" could be, should there be no new infections, both community and imported, for a period of x number of months, the TT programme will then be laid to rest. While we are dealing with unprecedented challenges and we recognise that things change very quickly, such an open approach will help engender trust.

In closing, Mr Speaker, Sir, at the heart of it, I, along with many Singaporeans, believe in the importance of contact tracing and the utility of the TT programme. I have read a number of concerns and confusion over the past month and I do feel bad for the engineers and teams behind the programme because I genuinely believe they were doing the best they can, all the while working in the heat of a crisis under immense pressure. I also appreciate the difficult position that we are debating today and the Minister's candour.

It is evident to me that the various protocols around the TT data, for example, encryption, storage on local device and the automatic destruction after 25 days, were in place solely for contact tracing purposes at the time.

However, as a lawyer, I also understand the potential utility for which the TT data could bring as evidence, in particular, for grave offences, and the potential to charge an accused who committed a wrongdoing, exonerate someone who is innocent, and give peace to victims and their families.

Based on several conversations I have had on the ground, many Singaporeans understand and are willing for TT data to be used in investigations although some do wish that they had been consulted first. I hope that some of the above clarifications can be addressed.

Notwithstanding the above, Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe that the Bill reflects a practical position and compromise, and express my support.

Mr Xie Yao Quan.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore may be doing well now, but COVID-19 could be with us for quite a while more. Indeed, many countries around the world are currently dealing with major outbreaks.

In Singapore, we have a multi-layered strategy to keep ourselves safe, for as long as possible. But, crucially, every single layer in this strategy rests on trust between the Government and its people. Safe distancing, wearing of masks, complying with group size limits, keeping at all the Safe Management Measures and resisting fatigue and complacency – we can only do this if there is trust between the Government and its people.

Getting as much of our population vaccinated as possible, allaying concerns, countering misinformation. These too require trust between the Government and its people. And participating voluntarily in a national contact tracing scheme like TraceTogether certainly requires that same trust.

In short, trust is the lynchpin in every layer of our multi-layered strategy to stay safe in a COVID-19 world. And therefore, the Government must do all it can to continue keeping trust with our people in this fight.

This is why personally, I would much prefer – much prefer – that the Government maintains what it had communicated at the start, at the outset, and completely exempts TraceTogether data from Criminal Procedure Code provisions.

In my view, this is the surest way – not the only way but the surest way – to maintain the trust between Government and people that is so crucial in this fight, and the surest way to help Singaporeans understand what Minister Balakrishnan himself had referred to in his clarifications in this House last month, and I quote "not only the measures that we are implementing, but why we are implementing it, the spirit behind it."

A complete exemption of TraceTogether data from Criminal Procedure Code provisions, in line with the Government's original communications on this matter would, in my view, be the surest way to achieve this.

Some have pointed out that other technological applications that are so prevalent in our lives today have far broader terms of use regarding our personal data. But that is really not the point, and in any case, the trust between Government and its people is a completely different matter. It is sacrosanct. It is strategic.

I was, therefore, very concerned about how Singaporeans would take to the Government's clarifications on this matter last month, and to the proposed amendments before us today.

In this respect, I was relieved to observe that, in general, in fact, the level of participation and the desire to participate in TraceTogether had actually remained high. In fact, many of my residents have been anxious to collect their tokens and were asking me when stock at the Community Club would be replenished – happy to know that stock has arrived. Other residents pointed out to me that the amendments actually limit Police access to a much narrower scope than what the Criminal Procedure Code provides for. So, they understand the Government’s thinking on this matter and recognise the Government’s practical and calibrated approach on this matter.

And I note that TraceTogether data, as it was originally designed, will ultimately continue to be automatically purged after 25 days and cease to exist altogether once this pandemic is behind us, the proposed legislation notwithstanding.

So, ultimately, it was really a dilemma for me. On the one hand, the need to jealously safeguard trust in the interest of public health. On the other, having a calibrated way to also enhance public security and safety. I thought long and hard about this matter and, ultimately, after considering the Minister's clarifications, my personal views and by listening to the whole range of views amongst my residents, I am prepared to support this Bill.

Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.30 pm.