Hansard, Tuesday, 5 January 2021

1 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Social and Family Development arising from the Study on the Inter-generational Effects of Divorce on Children in Singapore (a) whether there were significant differences in the outcomes of the children based on the age of the child when the parents got divorced; and (b) what are the Ministry’s next steps in further examining the issue of a "divorce penalty" on our children and studying the efficacy of our interventions to reduce the effect of this penalty.

Mr Speaker, Sir, divorce is never easy but some couples have had to make such a decision. Raising children poses its own challenges, and divorced parents, just like any other parent, want the best for their children and try their best to raise their children well.

The MSF study on the inter-generational effects of divorce covered more than 100,000 children and of these, about 8,800 of them were children whose parents divorced when they were below 21 years old. The study did not attempt to determine causality, that is, it did not seek to determine if the divorce itself caused certain outcomes in children.

Rather, the study examined the children’s outcomes in the following five areas and its co-occurrence with parental divorce: one, whether they obtained a university degree; two, their annual income, three, their balances in CPF MediSave and Special Accounts; four, whether they got married; and five, whether they divorced among those who got married.

There was no clear finding suggesting a relationship between the child’s age when the parents divorced and the child’s outcomes at age 35. MSF will continue to look deeper into various aspects of divorce so as to understand the factors that are associated with positive or negative child outcomes post-divorce.

The study findings show a significant negative association between parental divorce and children outcomes based on the five factors analysed. In other words, in general, children whose parents were divorced were more likely to not fare as well as those whose parents remained married based on the five factors analysed. But it is not a deterministic cause and effect relationship. In fact, the findings also indicated that amongst children whose parents were divorced, there were some who did as well and even better than many children whose parents remained married.

Hence, in cases of parental divorce, it is important to focus more efforts on early intervention for the children, not only to mitigate the potential negative effects but also to enhance their positive development. This intervention effort should be based on rigorous evidence from the social and behavioural sciences, and for it to work we will need good policies and the help from experts but also the support from families, communities and indeed a whole-of-society approach.

Today, couples who are undergoing divorce go through parenting programmes. Under the Women’s Charter, those who cannot agree on the divorce or its ancillary matters must attend a mandatory parenting programme before they can file for divorce. For those who agree on the divorce and its ancillary matters, they can go for the Parenting PACT programme after the divorce is concluded. Muslim couples considering divorce attend the Syariah Court’s mandatory Marriage Counselling Programme, as well as parenting programmes as part of the divorce process. All these initiatives for civil as well as Muslim divorces aim to raise parents’ awareness of their children’s needs and the importance of co-parenting in a respectful and collaborative manner. We will continually review both the process and the content of these initiatives to enhance their efficacy.

For couples experiencing marital stress or contemplating divorce, we have started a new online counselling pilot with the Community Psychology Hub in April 2020. Couples or their children can also alternatively approach any of our six Divorce Support Specialist Agencies (DSSAs) if they require counselling support. We will also be introducing a new pre-divorce online portal in late 2021. In this regard, MSF has just completed an engagement session with more than 120 citizens, many of whom were divorcees. I thank them for stepping forward as it is not easy for them. They have given us valuable inputs on how we can better provide information that parents need to consider when contemplating divorce, ranging from the emotional well-being of their children to bread and butter issues that impact their children, particularly housing and financial stability. MCCY will also be conducting a similar engagement with a focus on Muslim divorce issues.

MSF provides an evidence-based programme for parents and children between six and 15 years of age. This programme is called “Children in Between” and is run by counsellors from the DSSAs. It equips children with skills to manage their feelings and develop resilience. Although there are about 6,500 children a year whose parents get divorced, only about 100 children attend “Children in Between”. We are looking into how we can encourage more divorced parents to enrol themselves and their children for this important programme.

Our schools and Institutes of Higher Learning (IHLs) provide support to all students who are facing personal challenges. I encourage parents who would like such support for their children to approach the network of teachers, counsellors and Education and Career Guidance counsellors. I also encourage the older students, especially those who are teenagers, to seek help from this extensive network. If you are facing issues arising from your parents’ divorce, you need not handle it on your own. Please turn to this network of care and support.

Earlier, I mentioned that we had engaged more than 120 citizens on the pre-divorce support portal, and that many of them were divorcees. While they appreciated what we were trying to do, many strongly urged us to also try to save marriages. Indeed, it is as important, if not more, that we increase our upstream efforts to strengthen marriages.

We will also step up our efforts to encourage couples to undergo marriage preparation programmes such as the evidence-based Prevention and Relationship Education Programme (PREP) workshops run by our Social Service Agencies, which equips them with the skills to build a strong foundation for marriage. MSF offers a rebate of $140 for the PREP workshop, or $70 for other approved programmes conducted by Social Service Agencies. For Muslim couples, we provide Cinta Abadi marriage preparation programme which is now offered online to make it even more accessible.

Solemnisers can also play an important role to support newlyweds. A group of Kadis/Naib Kadis from the Registry of Muslim Marriages initiated the ground-up effort, Bersamamu or “With You”, to inspire strong and stable marriages. The Bersamamu has two components namely, face-to-face (F2F) interaction with soon to-wed couples and the Kadis/Naib Kadis remain connected with the newlyweds for up to two years after their solemnisation. Since Bersamamu started in July 2019, about 6,000 couples have attended the F2F Bersamamu with their Kadis/Naib Kadis. We will be engaging solemnisers from ROM and hope that we can find champions among them who would develop similar initiatives.

Since March 2019, we have trained 215 community leaders, religious and lay leaders as well as marriage solemnisers as Marital First Responders (MFRs). They will provide basic marriage support to couples facing marital issues, especially in its early stages before matters turn for the worse. We will continue to train more MFRs to support more couples in need. We are also working with social service agencies, community and religious organisations to offer more marriage enrichment programmes so that couples can nurture and deepen their relationships through life’s ups and downs, and find fulfilment in their marriage.

We will continually review and examine the efficacy of our interventions to mitigate post-divorce issues as well as to strengthen marriages, in order to improve children’s outcomes for all families.

Mr Melvin Yong.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister of State for her reply. Divorce can be messy affairs and the children in these cases often suffer the consequences. Just last night, I had two divorce-related conflict cases at my Meet-the-People Session (MPS).

Our children need stability and security to grow into healthy adults and experts have said that it is important for divorced parents to remain amicable and be able to effectively co-parent, in order to mitigate what the experts term as "divorce penalty".

I would like to ask the Minister of State, on average, how many percent of divorce cases are high-conflict cases, where the parents are unable to co-parent well; and whether MSF's social workers are able to step in earlier to help the children in such divorce cases, rather than having to wait until the Court orders a supervised exchange and visitation programme?

I thank the Member for his question. As a rough gauge, there were 249 Court Orders for supervised exchange or supervised visitation in 2019 – I guess you could consider that these are high-conflict situations – out of 7,620 divorces. This translates to about 3% of all divorces. I take the point that, indeed, we need to intervene earlier. I recognise the point that children may suffer the consequences of divorces if they are not handled properly and amicably. And that is why in my earlier reply, I had gone to some extent to talk about the marriage counselling programmes that we have.

Just to give an example. The marriage parenting programme I mentioned earlier for civil divorces is a consultation session for parents with minor children before they file for divorce and it is compulsory. It is designed to encourage divorcing couples to make improved decisions that prioritises the well-being of their children. For instance, the areas that they look at are to discuss the financial challenges they may face post-divorce, their living arrangements, child custody and access, as well as the co-parenting and parenting plan.

We have various counselling sessions before the finalisation of a divorce to exactly achieve what the Member had shared with us: that we want to achieve the best available outcomes for children to mitigate the impact of divorces on them.

I thank the Minister of State for her response and for sharing with us the programmes related to support, post-divorce, and also, pre-marital counselling. I would like to highlight that when couples go through divorce, unfortunately, despite all the efforts in pre-marital counselling and support that has already happened, it is a very difficult journey.

I would like to ask what exactly was the Ministry's intention and motivation for this study? And what was the motivation for publishing the results of this study in a manner that, unfortunately, I think, creates the unintended further stigmatising of divorcees, achieving the effect of maybe potentially guilt-tripping them, and also the unfortunate labelling of children from divorced families. Are there any measures within the Ministry to look into better planning such communications in future, where it can be accompanied by further and deeper insights into the factors that account for the outcomes that were shared? I understand the spirit of data sharing and observations, but the timing of this publication and the limited scope or insights that it provided, unfortunately, created a certain effect amongst divorcees.

I went through a broken marriage before. I was quite saddened when I saw this and I questioned myself. Does this make it harder for couples who are already considering divorce due to very difficult circumstances in their marriage? Because then, they would worry about these outcomes, which they already do worry about. It does not help them in their consideration process.

I thank the Member for her observation and her sharing. We fully recognise that divorce is a difficult process and also, a deeply personal one. That is why when I started my response, I had said that it is never easy. The intent of MSF to publish this research study is not to guilt trip anyone. But we have data, administrative data, and we think that there are important observations that can be made from this data. And we wanted to share it with practitioners and families, so that they understand what the data presents.

MSF undertook the study to understand the potential impact of divorce. Like I have said, we looked at divorce and its co-occurrence with the five factors that I have shared earlier. But it is not about cause and effect. We are not talking about causation. We are talking about co-occurrence. That was how the study was conducted. Now that we have this information, the next step we want to look at is how we can further strengthen marriages, how we can help to prevent divorce where it is possible. But we fully recognise that, in some instances, for certain family dynamics, divorce may jolly well be the best way out for everyone. And if that is the case, and if there are young minor children involved, how best do we mitigate the impact of divorces on these children? That is the intent and the spirit of this study. But I fully acknowledge and take the Member's point about the importance of communications and that is why I really appreciate the opportunity to share about MSF's motivations at this occasion today.

Mr Louis Ng.

Thank you, Sir. I think the "Children in Between" programme is an important one. But as the Minister of State has just shared, the problem really is that the take-up rate is so low. So, I am just wondering whether MSF will consider making this programme mandatory, just like how we make the parenting programme mandatory as well.

I thank the Member for the suggestion. We will look into it. I guess, in any situation, we also have to consider the family dynamics. But I think it is a worthy suggestion the Member has made and MSF will study it. Thank you.

Ms Carrie Tan.

Thank you, Minister of State. I would like to find out whether there are current plans and timelines for further studies around the various factors contributing to these outcomes that children from divorced families present. I think that will contribute to certain mitigation measures and specific programmes to address those factors. Are there any plans right now for this kind of research to further pursue the factors contributing to these outcomes?

I thank the Member for her supplementary question. I think with the data we have on hand, the next step we will look at is to explore what causes divorces and how we can better protect and strengthen marriages and also to mitigate the impact of divorce. If we were to attempt to try to explain causality, the way we would approach the study would be very different from how we have done so for this particular study because we would have to track the experience of the child from when the divorce takes place and we have to be able to isolate specific factors and, over time, see how the child has grown and developed and what eventually the outcome of the child is. It is different from how we have conducted the survey as it is now, which is based on administrative data and looks at where the child is, how they have performed at specific points in time.

So, for us to undertake that kind of longitudinal study to determine causation will require a lot of resources. I think, for the time being, we will focus efforts on how we can better strengthen marriages, help the process when couples are contemplating divorce. I had talked about the pre-divorce support portal. So, those would be the immediate next steps that we will be taking.

2 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Trade and Industry in hosting the World Economic Forum's Special Annual Meeting in May 2021 (a) how will the health requirements be implemented for participants attending the forum; (b) to what extent will Singaporean talents be involved in the executive component of organising the event; and (c) what will be the contingency plans should the situation worsen requiring the closure of borders.

Mr Speaker, the health and safety of the attendees of the World Economic Forum’s Special Annual Meeting in Singapore this coming May, as well as the local community, are of utmost importance. Attendees will adhere to prevailing public health requirements and safe management measures. These include a rigorous testing regime, including pre-departure and on-arrival testing, as well as strict safe management measures during the Meeting itself. To minimise the risk of seeding local transmissions, we will also put in place measures to manage the interactions between the local community and the event attendees. The specific public health requirements and contingency plans are currently being worked out and will take into consideration the latest COVID-19 situations here in Singapore and also globally. The health requirements developed for this event could also serve as an important reference for subsequent events that are going to be held in Singapore.

The WEF’s intent is for the Special Annual Meeting to have a greater focus on Asia, given Asia’s growing importance and economic weight in the global economy. So, we are looking forward to the opportunity for Singapore to contribute to the programme and discussions at the Meeting. In addition, we have also been introducing interested local companies and local service providers to the WEF and their contracted event organiser, PublicisLive, to explore potential partnerships between our local companies and service providers as well as PublicistLive and the event organiser. It will be also be a good chance for us to showcase how Singapore has made it possible through our efforts to maintain robust health protocols while sustaining important economic and business activity amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

In order for us to host the WEF's Special Annual Meeting successfully in Singapore, we will not let our guard down but instead continue to do our best to minimise the number of COVID-19 infections in Singapore.

Mr Yip.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister of State for his reply. I note that the healthcare requirement plans are currently being worked out. But are there plans to require the majority of the Singapore public to be vaccinated before the event?

I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. We all know that the availability and the roll-out of vaccines globally and, in fact, in Singapore are still being worked out, as the Co-Chairs of MTF had described yesterday. So, we will continue to evaluate the situation with these roll-out programmes locally as well as globally and apply the prevailing conditions to all incoming travellers to Singapore. And I have said earlier that we will make special plans also to ensure that event attendees as well as the local population are also being segregated as well for the safe conduct of the event.

3 Miss Cheryl Chan Wei Ling asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what percentage of electricity in Singapore today is from renewables; and (b) how does the investments by local utility companies in overseas renewable projects help Singapore to offset our carbon footprint.

4 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what domestic energy generation options the Ministry had considered prior to proposing the import of electricity from regional countries; (b) whether the Ministry plans to (i) set a cap on the proportion of imported energy as part of our overall energy supply and (ii) set a cap on the amount that individual countries can export energy to Singapore, in order to limit the risk to Singapore's energy security; and (c) what other steps the Ministry will be taking to ensure Singapore's energy security when the trial is expanded.

5 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether Singapore will be participating in the Sun Cable project; (b) if so, how much of Singapore's energy supply will come from the Sun Cable project; (c) what efforts are in place to diversify our energy sources; and (d) what are the associated risks and cost fluctuations of energy diversification.

6 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how have post-COVID-19 needs impacted Singapore's energy market outlook; (b) whether Singapore's plan to import electricity from Malaysia is limited to renewable energy; (c) what is the process for the energy to be sold to Singapore; and (d) how can energy supply reliability be assured as more clean electricity from other countries are imported into Singapore.

7 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what is the current fuel mix for electricity generation derived from renewable energy sources; (b) how has this changed over the last 10 years; and (c) what is the target mix for the amount of electricity generated from renewable energy sources in 2030 and 2050.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 3 to 7 all in one go?

Yes, please.

Thank you. Mr Speaker, electricity demand is expected to have declined by around 2% to 4% last year in 2020. This was amidst the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. However, electricity demand will rebound as the economy recovers and grows. This is also driven by new users, such as data centres, 5G telecommunication networks, agri-tech facilities as well as electric vehicles.

We will harness the four switches to transform and diversify our energy supply. This is to help us achieve our vision of a clean and efficient energy future. These four switches comprise natural gas, solar energy, regional power grids and emerging low-carbon alternatives like hydrogen.

Singapore has progressively transitioned from oil-powered power plants since the early 2000s to adopt natural gas. Currently, this is the cleanest burning fuel. Natural gas currently accounts for 95% of the electricity produced in Singapore and I think all Members here in this House would appreciate the fact that we lack alternative energy sources. We do not have the natural resources, land area as well as climatic conditions necessary for the large-scale deployment of renewable energy sources, such as hydro and wind. Natural gas will continue to be the mainstay and main source of energy for power generation to serve our households and industry reliably in the medium term, and this is as we continue to develop the other three switches.

Our second switch, which is solar energy, is currently the most viable source of renewable energy within Singapore. Over the last 10 years, installed solar capacity has increased more than a hundred fold, from 3.8 megawatt-peak in 2010, to around 400 megawatt-peak last year, in mid-2020. We are accelerating our efforts and will almost quadruple our solar capacity to 1.5 gigawatt-peak by 2025 – five years from now – and, by the end of 2030, we hope to achieve 2 gigawatt-peak. So, by 2030, we expect our second switch to supply around 3% of our total electricity consumption. And, of course, depending on the state of technology at that point in time and cost, we hope to be able to do more.

Our local companies partner the Government in the deployment of solar photovoltaic systems. For example, the Sunseap Group is a major participant in the SolarNova programme, which deploys solar panels in public sector buildings and spaces. When these companies invest in overseas renewable companies and projects, they can bring valuable insights and capabilities back home here in Singapore. These projects may, some day, also export electricity to Singapore as well. This brings me, therefore, to the third switch, and that is on regional power grids.

Regional power grids, or electricity imports, is our third switch. Today, some Southeast Asian countries have an abundance of hydroelectric power and other renewable energies. If we can connect the regional grid well, it will provide greater resilience and sustainability for the entire system. For a start, we are trialling imports of up to 100 megawatts from Peninsular Malaysia. One hundred megawatts would be about 1.5% of our peak electricity demand. So, there will be minimal impact on the reliability as well as cost of our electricity supply. Our preference, of course, is to import electricity from renewable energy sources. Hence, the “cleanliness” of the generation source will be a consideration in selecting the importer. The Energy Market Authority (EMA) will select the importer through an open and competitive selection process, and it is expected to sell electricity via the Singapore Wholesale Electricity Market (SWEM) to interested buyers.

Other companies, like Sun Cable, have also approached EMA to import electricity to Singapore. We welcome these interests, but we have to also be mindful to pace these imports to ensure that they complement and do not undermine the reliability of our electricity supply as well as the stability of our electricity market. Sir, discussions on Sun Cable's proposal to supply solar power from Australia’s Northern Territory to Singapore are on-going. At this particular point in time, EMA is unable to share details, given the commercial sensitivities – a point that I believe everyone in the House would appreciate.

Last but not least, for our fourth switch, we are also working intensively with the industry and research community to study emerging low-carbon technologies, such as hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage. We will facilitate the development of these technologies through various research, development and demonstration funding initiatives, including a Low-Carbon Energy Research Funding Initiative. This initiative will see around $50 million being used to explore areas such as the supply, storage and downstream uses of hydrogen, as well as carbon capture and storage for use in building materials or fuels.

By tapping on all four switches, Singapore will be able to diversify our energy sources. This will enhance our access to secure and competitively priced energy supplies and this will reduce our energy security risks. The future energy mix will depend on technological advances in the four switches. This will need to be complemented by efforts to enhance energy efficiency across all sectors and consumers. The Government will work hand-in-hand with our workforce, researchers, industries and consumers, to achieve our vision of a cleaner, a more efficient and a more secure energy future.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

I thank the Minister for the answers. I have two supplementary questions. The first question is in relation to energy resilience, and I would like to point out that the Minister had shared and answered some of the questions that I had in mind for my supplementary question. But the question I have now is, the Minister mentioned that the energy mix would be dependent on the technology improvements over time, but can you roughly share the percentages target for some of these switches at this point in time. Because if you look at the electricity reliance now, we are relying a lot on natural gas. I think more than 95% of the electricity generated in Singapore is via imported natural gas and it is largely from Malaysia and Indonesia. So, there is a concentration effect, by country, on Malaysia and Indonesia. The mix by country, for one, if you can share, going forward over the medium to long term, and also in terms of the switches, if you can share.

My second question is, as we proceed to these four switches, going forward – over the next five, 10, 20, 30 and 50 years – for example, in Malaysia's case where we are trying to get the electricity imports from Malaysia into 2021, we have the electricity connector infrastructure with Malaysia. Going forward if the Sun Cable project does materialise, how do we get some of this direct electricity connectivity to Singapore, when we have these switches exposing us to various countries as far afield as Australia, if the Sun Cable project does happen and as far afield as Indochina, going forward?

I thank Mr Saktiandi for his questions. With regard to the percentage breakdown of the four switches, at this particular point in time, it is 95% natural gas. The natural fossil fuels which we, as I have alluded to earlier is the cleanest fossil fuel today.

It is difficult to give a percentage breakdown but suffice to say that by 2030, we expect to peak in terms of carbon emission at about 65 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emission. Our target is to halve that by 2050. So, from 65 million tonnes, we will halve it to 33 million tonnes by 2050. By the latter half of this century, we will achieve a net zero carbon emission. That is the target that we have set for ourselves.

Depending on the technology development over the next 10,15 to 20 years, we should see an increased migration towards renewable energy, of which solar is one of them, and a higher degree, depending on the trial import of this 100 megawatt from Peninsular Malaysia, a higher reliance on drawing from the regional power grid as well. In fact, just last year, declared our intent to procure another 100 megawatt from the Lao PDR via the Lao, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore grid network.

We hope that in time, we can also, through this, reach out to more ASEAN countries to tap on this regional grid. That is another one of our diversification strategies.

To the extent that we are able to draw from the regional power grid, we certainly would. The Sun Cable project, as I have alluded to, is also something which we are in active negotiations. Obviously, we are not at liberty at this particular point in time to communicate the details of it because of the commercial sensitivities.

To the Member's last point about the concentration risk, today, a significant amount of the natural gas that we are using to burn comes from Malaysia and Indonesia through the PNG. But we have also now diversified the sources of the procurement via LNG, the liquefied natural gas, from other countries further afield and that includes the Middle East, UAE and so on. The exact breakdown of that, at this particular point in time, I cannot provide to the hon Member.

I thank the Minister for the detailed explanation. I have got two supplementary questions. The first is in relation to the setting off targets. I note the Minister's speech that we are expected to employ two gigawatt peaks of solar energy by 2030 which we expect to contribute to 3% of our electricity generation needs, and also, that we are going to have an emissions target for 2030 and 2050. And in relation to these, if I may ask, if the Ministry would consider setting a target mix for the amount of electricity that is going to be generated from renewable energy sources as a target that we can strive for together as a nation?

If we look at the IEA estimates, at present, globally, about 30% of the electricity generation is really from renewable sources. I recognise that we have geographical constraints but is that perhaps a goal that we can strive towards, especially when we are already considering new green energy sources such as hydrogen, which I recognise that the EMA is already studying.

The second is in relation to the calculation of electrical tariffs. Right now, given that 95% of the energy mix is derived from natural gas, I think the fuel cost component is pretty much based on average natural gas prices, especially if future transmission from regional grids are involved. How then would the fuel costs as well as network costs component be calculated, and how would that be passed on to consumers at the end of the day?

I thank the hon Member of Parliament for his questions. To the first point, in terms of working on the target, indeed, we are and we have been looking at the different technologies that are available at this particular point in time. Also, through working with the research institutions, the universities and so on, to see how we can also take on some of these initiatives with regard to carbon capture utilisation to see how we can set that target. In due time we would be able to share that, once a more definitive landing on some of these technologies are available.

With regard to the renewable energy targets, the two gigawatt peak in terms of solar power, the renewable solar power, will come in by 2030. We are on track by 2025 to achieve 1.5 gigawatt. To reach that target by 2030 should not be a major problem. In fact, we hope that we can do even better than that.

With regard to the electricity tariffs, it is, at this particular point in time, still a fairly commercial venture. As I have alluded to earlier on, the pricing will be competitive. There will be an open transparent bidding process and this electricity will then be sold into the Singapore Wholesale Electricity Market.

When we work out the arithmetic behind it, from the import of the 100 megawatt from the regional power grid, the pricing should not be significantly higher than what we are already getting today in terms of the electricity tariffs. So, I hope that that reassures the hon Member of Parliament.

Miss Cheryl Chan.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Before I begin, let me declare that I am a senior executive for a gas and engineering company that deals with energy sources. I want to thank Minister for his response on the diversification to ensure our energy needs over the years. But with respect to the fourth switch, I have this question for Minister. When it comes to dealing with low carbon energy sources or alternatives, the very key aspects are around policies and the other one around subsidies and fundings.

Our current carbon tax programme is actually very low compared to many countries in the world and we have a very low target that we want to achieve by 2030 and beyond. So, I want to know how this lever is going to impact the kind of low-carbon alternatives we will have in future.

And for the other aspect around subsidies – will the Government look at more options apart from just funding the technology programmes, but directly subsidising some of the very attractive alternatives in order for us to achieve this target of decarbonisation, earlier than later.

Mr Speaker, I thank the hon Member Miss Cheryl Chan for her very insightful questions and her points. For the carbon tax, even if we raise the carbon tax significantly, it is not going to move the needle that much in terms of the overall pricing. Where we are now looking at is also, as I have said, the fourth switch. It is not just about carbon capture, utilisation and storage; it is also looking at hydrogen utilisation and leveraging on this hydrogen technology.

To that end, EMA and the Ministry are actively pursuing significant projects to see how we can, not just extract the hydrogen, but also in terms of the transportation of that hydrogen. If we are able to tap on it, it is going to be the cleanest fuel, the byproduct of which is water.

These are the few big initiatives that we are currently embarking on today.

Other than carbon capture, we are also exploring employing carbon credits and contemplating some form of a carbon trading platform so that we can leverage on the multiple initiatives that are available to help us reduce our carbon footprint.

8 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) since the start of the COVID-19 Support Grant, how many applicants have been rejected because they are unable to produce retrenchment letters from their employers; and (b) whether the Ministry will be open to consider applicants favourably as long as they are able to produce correspondence to show that they have been under pressure to resign by their employers.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the COVID-19 Support Grant (CSG) supports lower to middle income resident employees who, as a result of the economic impact of COVID-19, are: (a) involuntarily unemployed due to retrenchment or contract termination; (b) placed on involuntary no-pay leave for at least three consecutive months; or (c) experiencing reduced monthly salary of at least 30% for at least three consecutive months.

As of 20 December 2020, MSF had approved the CSG for around 95,000 applicants, including around 15,000 applicants who received the CSG upon appeal. There were about 4,000 applicants who were rejected from the CSG as their employment details could not be verified by MSF. When the applicants do not have supporting documents or CPF records, we would try to contact their employers.

However, MSF does not track the number of applicants whose applications were rejected for the specific reason of not being able to produce retrenchment letters from their employers. We recognise that some applicants might have been unable to do so due to reasons beyond their control. For example, the companies they were working for might have closed down without issuing them any termination letters. In such instances, MSF would verify their employment status by checking their CPF records or contacting their former employers.

Applicants who claim to have resigned involuntarily due to pressure from their employers could appeal to the Social Service Office. As part of the assessment process, we would consider supporting evidence from the appellants, such as their correspondence with their former employers. We would also consider if appellants had extenuating circumstances, or link them up to other assistance schemes, if necessary.

Application for the CSG has closed on 31 December 2020. MSF will launch the COVID-19 Recovery Grant (CRG) on 18 January 2021 to support lower to middle income employees and self-employed persons who are financially impacted by COVID-19 in 2021. Similar to CSG, those who genuinely are unable to produce documents for CRG and need help, can approach our Social Service Office for assistance.

Ms Carrie Tan.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for providing the numbers. I am not sure whether I heard correctly, that 95,000 applications have been approved, out of which 50,000 have been approved upon appeal.

Fifteen thousand.

Fifteen thousand, okay. The question I wanted to ask was motivated by the fact that many residents come to Meet-the-People Session or MPS. These are low-wage workers who were not able to produce either termination or retrenchment letters, and their involuntary loss of jobs was deemed or seen as voluntary because there was this concern that they wanted to preserve the goodwill with their employers in order to safeguard their future job prospects within the same industry.

So, if the policy here is to cater for involuntary job loss, we do need to have some empathy for circumstances where it is not so clear-cut.

Based on that, would the Ministry be open to give the SSOs discretion to process these cases at the frontline, without necessarily having the applicants go through an appeal process, given their bandwidth tax and also the fact many low-wage workers depend on these payouts for some of their basic needs. So, the question is, can the SSOs at the frontline have the discretion to approve this kind of suspected involuntary but appears voluntary applications, so that we can reduce the bandwidth tax on applicants for the COVID-19 Recovery Grant in the new year?

I thank the Member for her question and I fully appreciate the example she has provided of low-wage workers who may find themselves in a situation that she has shared.

In my earlier reply, I had shared that as part of the assessment process, that we would consider supporting evidence from the appellants, such as whatever correspondence, whatever nature it is – WhatsApp, a letter, an email or it could even be something handwritten, documents of correspondence that they have between themselves and their employers. The SSO would verify those documents. The intention of the SSO, at the end of the day, is to help those who are applying for the CSG. It is with the intent of trying to provide help, rather than trying to withhold help.

But, regardless, the point stands that, at the end of the day, the grant is from taxpayers' money and we have to be accountable for it. That is why the SSO has to verify: correspondence that the resident provides, any document that they provide, it would be thoroughly investigated, looked into. The SSOs would also go to the extent of contacting the former employer, which is what I have shared.

I would like to assure the Member that the SSO does want to help the resident. Another number that I would provide is that 97% of appeals have been successful for the CSG. I think that gives you some assurance that the intent is to help residents who face difficulty in these trying times.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to ask some supplementary questions on the earlier question because I was one of the original filers of the question.

No, we have passed that. Sorry.

9 Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked the Minister for Manpower (a) whether there have been any suspected cases of fraudulent applications under the Self-Employed Person Income Relief Scheme (SIRS) and, if so, what follow-up actions have been taken; and (b) whether there are plans to audit the SIRS to ensure proper administration and governance.

10 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Manpower (a) in the past three months, what is the proportion of payouts under the Self-Employed Person Income Relief Scheme (SIRS) that has been subjected to clawback; and (b) what are the major reasons for the clawback.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 9 and 10 together?

Yes, please.

Sir, MOM and NTUC take public feedback seriously, including those from whistle-blowers. We are aware that there were scams inviting individuals who were not the intended recipients of the Self-Employed Person Income Relief Scheme or SIRS to apply for payouts. These cases have been surfaced to the Police for investigation.

Government grants such as SIRS aim to provide assistance to Singaporeans who need help. For prudent stewardship of public monies and as with all other Government schemes, SIRS is subject to financial audit. This will be done by an external auditor appointed by NTUC, the scheme administrator.

In addition, MOM also conducts our own audit before and after the final payout tranche was disbursed. The audit of applications is still on-going. For timely assistance to self-employed individuals, eligibility was assessed based on applicants’ declarations of their employment income and number of properties owned. Those whose declarations met the eligibility criteria received payouts. Subsequent audit affirmed the eligibility of most successful applicants. But we also uncovered some cases of erroneous declarations, constituting about 0.5% of all successful SIRS applications.

To be fair and consistent to all applicants, those with erroneous declarations have been approached to refund their SIRS payouts. Some have already done so, and we will reach out to the rest individually to give them time to do so.

I thank the Minister for the clarification. I have two quick follow-up supplementary questions.

The first has to do with the fact that given the SIRS criteria were so stringent, at least, based on the number of rejected SIRS applications among my residents, why is it that we did turn out to have this number of false positive? Was it essentially due false reporting on the part of residents? If that is the case, then was it because that they were misled in the kind of criteria they needed to submit for the applications?

And then, relatedly, my second question is whether there are actions to ameliorate this kind of false positives. So, for instance, if someone faced clawback, would they be able to then pay back the amount in instalments, for example?

Mr Speaker, the Member has described some cases as false positives. I take that to mean that they were actually the intended recipients of SIRS but they are not going to get it. Actually, what we are discussing in this Parliamentary Question that has been filed is that they are not the intended recipients of SIRS but because of the way in which they had declared their incomes, they appeared to be eligible and the payout was given to them. So, steps are being taken now to ask these individuals to refund the amount.

It is perhaps useful to describe the whole situation here. SIRS had a very large group of recipients that were auto-included. We had used past data to ascertain their eligibility based on the criteria that was set out. And without asking these individuals to submit further information, the payout was processed, it was disbursed to them. This was one group.

But we also know that basing our disbursement on past information would potentially exclude a group of intended recipients whose data, whose information, have been updated but which we were not in possession of. That is why a category was opened up for applications.

In this period where the Government was actually processing and disbursing a very large number of grant and support schemes to households, to businesses, each of these had very tight timelines to follow. As a result, in order to meet the timelines, there were many occasions where we decided that we should take the individuals' declarations in good faith and process the payments.

However, as stewards of public funds, we do have the duty to audit. In this situation, one good outcome is that the audit showed that most of the successful applicants had actually valid reasons to have applied and they met the eligibility criteria. But there was a very small number, for whatever reasons, they may have been mistaken in their own understanding of their circumstances, it is sometimes possible that a person did not quite know what he was earning and he made a declaration based on a mistaken understanding. So, we will reach out to them and try to sort these things out.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Thank you, Speaker. I am following up on the answer by the Minister for Manpower. Minister for Manpower alluded earlier in her reply to cases that have been referred to the Police. Can the Minister share how many cases, in absolute number, have been referred to the Police?

Secondly, the Minister spoke of erroneous declarations – 0.5% were erroneous. Again, the absolute number would be appreciated.

To that end, I had a resident who approached me at my MPS who declared openly that he earned $10,000 a month but he had certain circumstances which he reported accordingly, and he was given the SIRS payout. Now, it is being clawed back.

My point is not so much about this case but how many cases were there where it was NTUC or MOM which actually approved a SIRS payout, even though it was well outside the qualifying criteria, and now, it is calling for a clawback? How many cases involved, I would not call it a mistake but actions that were taken by NTUC or SIRS, resulting in a clawback?

Mr Speaker, I think Mr Singh's second and third questions are basically asking for the same information. What is the number of cases where we have approached the individuals for refunds of the SIRS payouts? I mentioned in my reply that it was about 0.5% of the successful applicants. The number of successful applicants is something in the order of 200,000. There are still some that are pending processing, but 0.5% would come to about 1,000. I think that is the number that applies it to both his second and his third questions.

To the first question, how many cases have been referred to the Police? I do not have the number offhand, perhaps if the Member were to file a Parliamentary Question, we could address it appropriately. However, I should add that the investigations are still on-going and it would be inappropriate for me to comment too much on it right now.

Mr Pritam Singh.

I thank the Minister. Let me just parse my second and third supplementary questions a bit more finely. I apologise if I did not make it clear. In her reply, Minister spoke of erroneous declarations, the suggestion being that it was the applicant who made the erroneous declaration. And the third supplementary question really was looking at the number of cases where NTUC or MOM acknowledged that a person fell outside the qualifying criteria and then decided actually, no, this should not have been approved in the first place and hence is now clawing the SIRS payout back. How many cases are we referring to in that regard?

Mr Speaker, Mr Singh mentioned one case. I myself have not come across another but I believe that there may have been a few. I do not have the number that I can share with him right now.

11 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Manpower with regard to the Jobs Growth Incentive scheme (a) how does the Ministry derive the support threshold of 50% for mature local hires aged 40 and above; and (b) whether the Ministry will consider increasing this support threshold to 75% to incentivise more employers to hire mature local workers instead of foreign workers.

Mr Speaker, Members have filed a number of questions on employment support for different groups of jobseekers. I will respond to these related questions together for a fuller treatment.

The SGUnited Jobs and Skills Package was launched in April 2020 with the goal of curating 100,000 jobs and skills opportunities for Singaporean workers. From April to October, the National Jobs Council or NJC, working in partnership with employers and unions, placed nearly 60,000 jobseekers into various opportunities. As at end-October, there are more than 123,000 jobs and skills opportunities still available.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim was interested to know about the nature of these opportunities. For the purposes of statistical comparison across countries, the International Labour Organization or ILO defines "standard employment" as work that is full-time, continuous, with a direct relationship between employer and employee. This would exclude employment on fixed term contracts, temporary employment, part-time employment, multi-party employment and gig work; all of which are commonly found in modern job markets. This is why the ILO recognises that non-standard employment can provide meaningful opportunities for workers to enter the labour market or to switch sectors. For the same reason, the NJC does not narrowly focus on opportunities that meet the definition of "standard employment". Instead, the NJC's aim is to open up pathways for jobseekers to make inroads into the workforce despite global weakness in labour demand.

Company-hosted traineeships and attachments as well as curated training courses will help jobseekers who are unable to secure a job acquire industry-relevant skills and exposure. This will improve their employability and position them better for eventual economic recovery.

It is encouraging that amongst the SGUnited Jobs and Skills placements, about half were into long-term jobs. One in three were into short-term jobs of less than 12-month duration. The remaining were for company-hosted traineeships and attachments or course-based training. Of the available SGUnited Jobs and Skills opportunities, nearly six in 10 were for long-term jobs, two in 10 were for short-term jobs, and the remainder for company-hosted traineeships and attachments, or course-based training.

Mr Christopher de Souza and Mr Gerald Giam asked about support for mature workers to find jobs and make career transitions. Jobseekers aged 40 and above are well-represented among those placed into opportunities under the SGUnited Jobs and Skills Package, comprising around 50% of job placements and 35% of traineeships and attachments, and training opportunities.

We have consistently provided more support to help mature workers make career transitions. In the Unity Budget, we introduced the SkillsFuture Mid-Career Support Package for locals in their 40s and 50s, to help them stay employable and enter new jobs or new industries. This provides enhanced support of up to 90% of the cost for employers to reskill mature new employees, as compared to generally up to 70% for other new employees.

The Government provided an additional $500 SkillsFuture Credit for those aged 40 to 60 in 2020 to empower them to refresh their skills and enhance their employability. We also built up a pool of volunteer Career Advisors to provide sector and occupation-specific career advice and outline career options.

Mature individuals have valuable skills and bring with them a wealth of work experience. However, some mature jobseekers may still face difficulties in finding permanent jobs in the current job market.

In September 2020, the Jobs Growth Incentive or JGI was launched to support firms in accelerating the hiring of their local workforce. To encourage employers to consider hiring more mature jobseekers, the Government will underwrite 50% of their salaries, up to the first $5,000, for 12 months. This is double the wage support for younger new local hires.

The Jobs Growth Incentive should be seen in conjunction with other measures in the overall package. For example, an employer that meets the eligibility criteria for the Jobs Growth Incentive and hires a mature local worker via a Professional Conversion Programme will not only receive the 50% JGI, but also additional salary support and course fee subsidies, as well as further salary support under the Jobs Support Scheme if they are eligible. This approach has the advantage of tilting more support towards jobseekers that are harder to be matched to available openings.

Having said that, the JGI scheme is still very new, having only started in September 2020. We are constantly monitoring the situation and will continue to make adjustments as and when necessary. For example, in October last year, we extended the higher tier of JGI support to persons with disabilities as well as ex-offenders. This was in response to points raised by Mayor Denise Phua and Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr de Souza asked about the Jobs Support Scheme for the aviation and tourism-related industries. The Government has put in substantial effort and committed close to $100 billion in support measures to help companies and workers deal with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our economic measures are estimated to have offset some of the rise in resident unemployment rate by about 1.7 percentage points this year. MOF extended the Jobs Support Scheme to cover wages up to March 2021 for sectors that continue to be impacted by COVID-19, such as the aviation and tourism sectors, and are reviewing if a further extension is needed.

MOT and MTI have also provided targeted support to prepare our businesses and workers to emerge stronger. For the aviation sector, MOT introduced the Enhanced Aviation Support Package to preserve core capabilities and to support our local carriers to regain air connectivity to the world. For the tourism sector, MTI worked with industry stakeholders to pilot MICE events and formulate an Event Industry Resilience Roadmap to provide guidance on safe and gradual resumption of business events. STB also launched a domestic tourism campaign and the SingapoRediscovers Vouchers to drive local tourism and stimulate sectoral activity.

While the aviation and tourism sectors have been adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, its medium to long-term prospects remain positive.

However, unlike in a cyclical downturn, some jobs may not return in their previous forms. Therefore, in addition to the Jobs Support Scheme, we are supporting employers to make use of the downtime to redesign jobs and reskill their employees to take on new job roles. For example, WSG has rolled out the Job Redesign Reskilling Programme and the Digital Marketing Reskilling Programme to retrain and redeploy workers in hotel and tourism companies.

For affected workers who are looking to switch to new careers, we will help them to access jobs and skills opportunities. WSG has set up the SGUnited Jobs and Skills Centres in all HDB towns and deployed Careers Connect On-the-Go to bring career matching and coaching services closer to jobseekers. This is in addition to physical touchpoints such as WSG Careers Connect, NTUC-e2i's career centres and WSG-appointed Career Matching Providers, Ingeus and MAXIMUS. Jobseekers can also use WSG's MyCareersFuture.gov.sg, to search for job opportunities that suit their skills and competencies.

The Jobs Growth Incentive will enable firms that continue to do well in the current climate to bring forward their hiring plans. The Government will press on with our efforts to provide employment facilitation support to different groups of jobseekers in different industries, to help them emerge stronger for eventual economic recovery.

Mr Gerald Giam.

I thank the Minister for her reply. According to MOM's Third Quarter Labour Market Report, unemployment rate among residents aged between 40 and 59 was higher and rose more steeply compared to all other age groups except those below 30, so I am hopeful that the JGI will help this group.

My questions are: how many individuals aged 40 and above have secured jobs as a result of the JGI since the scheme was introduced in August; what is the Ministry's target figure for the number of secure jobs for mature workers under the JGI; and what will they count as a success for this scheme?

Mr Speaker, the Member has asked for an update of the JGI which I am also keen to provide to Members as soon as the data is available.

Let me explain why it takes a bit of time for us to understand how well the JGI has been taken up by companies.

The objective of the JGI is to encourage firms to bring forward their hiring and to expand the number of locals in their workforce. In order to reduce the administrative burden to these companies, we will look at their CPF data and compute the incentive that they are eligible for so that we can automatically disburse it to them.

For every person that is eligible for JGI support, the administrator will have to look at the CPF submissions of the employer in order to compute the incentive that is being paid out to the company. For every employer that has a local employee, for which he has CPF employer obligations, the employer is actually given two months in order to make the CPF payments. So, for someone who was employed, brought onboard at the start of the programme in September 2020, the employer actually has up till the end of November in order to make those payments. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister for Manpower", Official Report, 1 February 2021, Vol 95, Issue No 16.]

So, the data is still very new, we have to wait for it to come in, in order to make a proper analysis for it. But I assure the Member that we ourselves are very keen to have a sense of it. And like him, we are particularly interested in who has been on the receiving end of this support as far as the jobseekers are concerned.

I would also want to add one more point. The Member has pointed to the unemployment rate of different age groups. Here, I think I wanted to make a general point to all Members and not to Mr Giam, specifically.

We always have to look at data, especially on labour statistics, in a holistic manner. Looking at unemployment is one important indicator but it is also important to look at employment. In the case of Singapore, what we have found is that by the end of the third quarter, the employment levels have returned almost to pre-COVID-19 levels. The employment levels in September 2020, if we compared it to a year ago, was off by just about 0.4%.

That does not mean that we are not concerned about the unemployment numbers and, of course, of the groups that still face more serious issues when it comes to unemployment.

But we look at it in totality, it does paint a different picture. It does tell us that notwithstanding the difficulties, the jobseekers are still invested in the search. They have not exited from the workforce. And if they had exited from the workforce, we would have a very different problem because over the medium to longer term, we still have to address the challenges of a contracting workforce and we also do want to be able to enable people to stay in the workforce, especially those that are older.

Mr Giam has asked about what would constitute a good target. I would say that at this point in time, we would have to look at the entire pool of jobseekers in totality. Every single one of them is important. Every single one of them that we can get back into our workforce is a family that is more able to make progress. So, whilst being concerned about specific segments of jobseekers, I would say that everyone benefiting from the JGI is still a good thing for us.

The Government has set aside a budget of $1 billion for the JGI and we will look at the take-up rate and make adjustments if it is necessary to do so, as we have done for all schemes in the past.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister for explaining the details of the JGI as well as the importance of looking at not just one category of workers but all the workers. Having said that, I really want to understand whether the JGI has a target that it wants to achieve.

This is related to my Parliamentary Question in which I asked about whether the 75% threshold would be considered because if there is no target that is set, how would the Ministry know whether or not it has achieved what it needs to achieve, and how would it know whether it needs to make adjustments, for example, increasing the salary support threshold?

Mr Speaker, I would be cautious about expecting any one single scheme to deliver on our objectives when it comes to employment. Overall, as a Government, our aim must be to try and expand employment and bring down unemployment.

To do so, many factors will have to be aligned. For example, the overall economic conditions and business confidence must be there. If the overall economic conditions are not favourable and businesses do not have the confidence, then no matter how much we set aside for the JGI, no matter how lofty the goals we set out as targets, it will not produce the intended results.

I should also say that in terms of our ability to create the right economic conditions and to boost business confidence, a lot of it has to do with how we are going to continue managing the public health risk.

So, yesterday, we had a very extensive exchange in Parliament following the Ministerial Statements by my colleagues, Ministers Gan Kim Yong and Lawrence Wong. Everything that we are doing in the Multi-Ministry Task Force to manage the public health risk is to enable the economy to get back to some normalcy, at the same time recognising that things will not be identical to what they were before and the adjustments that businesses are going to have to make.

It is also with that context in mind that when we examine the range of schemes and tools that we have at our disposal, it has to be, in terms of how they complement one another. So, the JGI tries to encourage the employers to expand hiring. But we know that for the positions that require higher skills demands from the jobseekers, we know that JGI alone will not do the trick. Because you can put the incentive in front of the employer, but from the employer's perspective, there is no point in whether it is bearing 25%, 50% or 75% of the wage cost if this person that is brought on board is not able to perform as part of the team and deliver and help the business advance, which is why the JGI has to work in concert with other schemes.

So, it is not a good idea for us to overly depend on any single scheme. It is a more holistic approach that we have to employ in order to ensure that we are able to boost employment and bring down unemployment.

But the commitment is certainly there and we are putting all the effort that can be conceived of, and if there are other interventions that are needed, we will certainly also consider the need and the timeliness to do so.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

With your respect, Mr Speaker, the Minister does not appear to have directly answered the question that I had posed, which was about non-standard jobs. Instead, she has answered about the proportion of longer term or permanent jobs versus short-term jobs.

And the reason why I draw this distinction is because while I appreciate that non-standard jobs are still jobs, but for workers, these are quite different things if they were to lose their jobs. Standard jobs provide not just security, they provide pecuniary benefits, such as CPF matches from the employers, as well as non-pecuniary benefits, such as employers-supported healthcare.

So, I am wondering if we can get some additional clarity on the proportion of non-standard jobs that have been generated by the jobs programme.

Mr Speaker, there is no question about it. We certainly would like the jobseekers to be able to get into more permanent positions. We would like them to have acquired new skills. And we would like them to be able to get on to a better career path. But in the current context, I think we have to be quite realistic.

At this point in time, what we have to worry about is skills atrophy. If people, for some reason, are not able to get into a meaningful position, whether it is company hosted traineeships or attachments or whether it is training programmes that are course based, I think the risk to them is not so much that they do not have standard employment now; the risk to them is that they will never have standard employment in future.

So, whilst I appreciate the Member wanting to seek a number for me to respond to, I really question the value of this number. It is not how the NJC looks at it. The NJC looks at all these opportunities as being valuable. Otherwise, we would not be pursuing them at all. So, I hope that the Member can understand that.

12 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Transport (a) what public education efforts has the Ministry undertaken to educate pedestrians and other users of public paths on the pedestrian code of conduct which enforcement has started in August 2020; (b) whether footpath ambassadors will be deployed to increase public knowledge of the code of conduct in order to prevent rider-pedestrian accidents; and (c) whether there is a team that specialises in commuter behavioural change research and education to enhance plans towards the active mobility vision.

Mr Speaker, the Active Mobility Code of Conduct, which was expanded in August 2020, is a set of guidelines for cyclists and riders. It also set out some safety tips and reminders for pedestrians. To be clear, it serves an educational purpose. "Enforcement" really entails officers going on the ground to exhort good behaviour and correct bad ones; non-compliance with code of conduct guidelines will not incur penalties.

LTA will be rolling out a new public education campaign this year on these good commuting habits, such as keeping left on paths to allow others to pass safely. This complements other existing efforts, such as awareness campaigns, community and school engagements. Since 2016, volunteers have carried out community patrols under the Active Mobility Patrol scheme to educate pedestrians and device users on safe and gracious path behaviour. As of December 2020, more than 1,000 volunteers from 72 teams have joined the scheme to serve as path ambassadors. They will continue their efforts and we certainly welcome more volunteers to create a stronger presence on the ground.

LTA has in-house transport researchers who conduct research and study ways to design infrastructure and programmes to encourage positive commuter behavioural changes, including those related to active mobility. LTA also collects feedback from perception surveys and trials, which are used to inform LTA's outreach plans and public education messages.

13 Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin asked the Minister for Home Affairs what support do parents, spouses and children of incarcerated members of society have to access on a consistent basis (i) the inmate during his time in prison and (ii) as part of his reintegration upon release from prison.

Mr Speaker, the period of incarceration is a difficult time, not only for the offenders, but also their families. Families may encounter financial difficulties and challenges in care-giving. These issues may affect the offenders' focus on rehabilitation. To address these issues, the Singapore Prison Service (SPS) collaborates with community partners through various programmes to assist the families.

Newly admitted offenders are encouraged to participate in the Yellow Ribbon Community Project or YRCP in short. This is a grassroots-led programme where trained grassroots volunteers visit the offenders' families, befriend them and link them up with existing community resources, such as Social Service Offices and Family Service Centres, if required. Booster packs containing grocery vouchers are distributed annually to help the families with day-to-day expenses. School-going children receive vouchers that they can use to purchase school items. To maintain family ties, YRCP arranges for the children to receive handwritten letters from their incarcerated parent.

The YRCP has grown from eight participating grassroots divisions in 2010 to 89 divisions in 2020. The number of trained YRCP grassroots volunteers has likewise multiplied, from 74 in 2010 to more than 1,200 in 2020. These volunteers have, to date, reached out to more than 15,000 families.

Throughout incarceration, offenders are encouraged to share their concerns on family issues with SPS officers. Where necessary, referrals will be made to SPS's Family Resource Centres or FRCs in short, which will follow up on the needs of the offenders and their families. As the FRCs are conveniently located at the Changi Prison Link Centre, families can also walk in to these FRCs during visits to their incarcerated relative. If an offender's family is assessed to have complex needs, a referral will be made by the FRC to the Family Service Centre (FSC) within the vicinity of the offender's home for further assistance.

As part of their rehabilitation, offenders participate in programmes which help to increase their knowledge, skills and confidence in maintaining ties and building stronger relationships with their family members. Offenders and their children can also attend facilitated bonding sessions organised by SPS and its community partners. In addition, offenders can sign up for programmes and services targeted at assisting their families and/or children. These are offered by SPS' community partners, which include the Singapore Aftercare Association (SACA), Industrial & Services Co-Operative Society Ltd (ISCOS) and Yellow Ribbon Fund.

Towards the tail end of an offender's incarceration, he may be assigned with an aftercare case manager. The case manager will provide support after the offender is released based on his assessed reintegration needs, which includes linking up the offender and his family with relevant agencies, such as FSCs and partners from the Community Action for the Rehabilitation of Ex-offenders Network, in short, CARE Network. This includes organisations like SACA, ISCOS and Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association (SANA). Examples of assistance rendered include interim financial assistance for ex-offenders and their families, access to support group and befriending services, as well as education support for ex-offenders and their children.

Order. End of Question Time. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Orders of the day.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), Written Answers to Question Nos 17, 20-27, 29, 32, 34-37, 39-43 and 46 on the Order Paper are reproduced in the Appendix. Question Nos 14-16, 18, 28, 30-31, 33, 38, 44-45, and 47-48 have been postponed to the next available sitting of Parliament.]

[(proc text) Resumption of Debate on Question [4 January 2021], "That the Bill be now read a second time." – [Minister for Home Affairs]. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Question again proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Melvin Yong.

Mr Speaker, I stand in support of the Guns, Explosives, and Weapons Control Bill, which seeks to review and strengthen our existing regulatory regime governing weapons and firearms, to keep pace with the security risks posed by new technologies.

Mr Speaker, one of the key provisions of this Bill is to outlaw the unauthorised possession of any digital blueprint for the manufacture of a gun or a major part of a gun, to mitigate the threat posed by illegal manufacturing of guns with 3D-printing technology. This is a timely move given the increasing rate of technological advancement of additive manufacturing.

In addition to criminalising the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for guns, we would also need to proactively cut off the source where such blueprints get downloaded. I would like to ask how the Ministry plans to tackle the issue of criminals downloading digital gun blueprints from the Internet, in particular the Dark Web?

I would also like to ask if there would be any circumstances that a person or an organisation would be authorised to possess a 3D blueprint of a gun, and what would be the obligations placed on such a person or organisation to ensure that there are proper safeguards to prevent misuse of such blueprints.

Mr Speaker, much like trying to stem the influx of pornographic and terrorist-related propaganda on the Internet, I foresee that it will be nearly impossible for us to fully cut off access to digital blueprints of guns online. I would, therefore, urge that we start to think about how we should regulate specific types of 3D printers that are able to manufacture these guns.

As the Executive Secretary of the United Workers of Electronics & Electrical Industries, I have seen first-hand how 3D printers have become more versatile today, and are now able to print different materials, alloys and even carbon fibre.

There are several types of 3D printers currently available on the market, catering to a wide range of customers – from action figure enthusiasts, to start-ups doing rapid prototyping, to aeroplane manufacturers. These 3D printers can use a wide variety of “raw ingredients”, from plastics, to metal, to carbon fibre. Perhaps, the Ministry could consider imposing a licensing requirement on those who import industrial-grade 3D printers, as such devices have the potential to 3D-print a fully functioning gun. Examples would include the Stereolithography printer, the Direct Metal Laser Sintering printer, and the Electron Beam Melting printer.

Mr Speaker, the Bill’s proposal to criminalise the act of loading drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles with weapons and explosives is both timely and crucial. As the Minister of State mentioned in his speech yesterday, drones loaded with weapons can pose a serious threat to safety and security. As early as 2015, there were news reports of a teenager in the United States who had already figured out a way to mount a handgun onto a drone and fire it remotely. To make things more worrying, instructional videos on how to do this, which is to replicate this remote firing process, can easily be found online. As technology progresses and the effective range for drones increases exponentially, it is likely that drones can be controlled beyond an operator’s visual line of sight, and foreign sources can use their drones to enter our airspace with malicious intent.

I would like to ask the Minister of State what will be our defences and countermeasures against such drone attacks, in particular, if the drone is operated remotely by an operator based outside of Singapore? Are there plans to develop our own anti-drone radar and jamming systems? Many Members of this House would recall the drone disruptions that happened at Changi Airport in June 2019, which shows that malicious actors need not necessarily load a drone with a weapon to cause damage in Singapore. The drone itself can be the weapon.

Mr Speaker, another key provision of the Bill is to allow for the outsourcing of compliance checks for low-risk guns, explosives and weapons (GEWs). According to the Minister of State, this is to allow our Licensing Officers to focus their attention on high-risk GEWs. While I can understand the intent and need to optimise our resources, we must ensure that the third parties that are contracted are able to maintain the high standards of the MHA and SPF. I would, therefore, like to ask what will be the training, if any, that will be provided to these third-party licensing officers, what are the standards that will be imposed on them, and how does the Ministry intend to ensure that they adhere to these standards.

Mr Speaker, as we review our existing regulatory regime governing weapons and firearms, we need to also bear in mind that there exists a small but sizable number of replica gun hobbyists in Singapore, who have an interest in collecting gun replicas.

While gun replicas are harmless on its own, the high resemblance to real guns can cause a lot of undue fear and alarm, especially to vulnerable people such as the elderly and children. Many replica gun hobbyists are deeply private and most pursue their passion quietly. However, just as 3D printing technology gives criminals the ability to produce their own guns, it would also allow these hobbyists to 3D-print their own gun replicas.

I would like to ask if the Bill would criminalise the possession of digital blueprints for gun replicas, such as BB guns and Water BB guns. Are there any plans to engage gun replica hobbyists, so that we can allow them some flexibility in pursuing their passion within a safeguarded space, perhaps, through a proper licensing framework?

To conclude, Mr Speaker, the introduction of the Bill is timely as it will allow our enforcement agencies to keep pace with criminals seeking to use new technologies to commit crime and perform acts of terror in Singapore.

While it is important to ban the unauthorised possession of 3D gun blueprints, we need to also prevent the downloading of these blueprints on the Dark Web and regulate specific 3D printers that can use these blueprints to produce a functional gun. As we move into the new decade, drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles will increasingly become a security threat, and we will need to step up on our anti-drone capabilities. I also hope that the Ministry could do more to engage hobbyists, who often keep their hobbies in the dark, for fear of running afoul of the law, as they, too, can use the same additive manufacturing technology to 3D-print replica guns, and even functional ones. With that, I support the Bill.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Mr Speaker, it is sensible to consolidate the Arms and the Explosives Act, Dangerous Fireworks Act and the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act into a single piece of legislation. I also agree that there is a need to update the legislation to keep up with new technology and threats. The Workers' Party endorses the strict stance of weapons control and I am in general support of the Bill.

Nevertheless, I would like to seek some clarifications on the provisions relating to security clearances and licensing and on the appointment of Compliance Officers.

First, on the issuing of licences. Clause 43 of the Bill provides that licences may be issued to individuals as well as non-individuals, such as corporate entities. For individuals' licence to possess firearms, I believe there was a historical practice where wealthy individuals and/or their security personnel were permitted to carry firearms for protection. This was because they were considered to be at risk of being kidnapped for ransom. Could the Ministry clarify whether such considerations still apply today and, if so, how many licences have been issued to individuals for this purpose of private defence?

As for licences issued to organisations, clause 43 states that security clearances must first be obtained for all individuals who are responsible executives as well as at least one close associate of the entity. While it is quite logical that responsible executives, such as the CEO, president or general manager, would need security clearances, the additional requirement for the close associates to also have security clearance needs further explanation. A close associate of an entity is defined as a person who either holds 5% of equity or voting rights or is a person who will be managing the business. Why is it necessary to have security clearance for a 5% shareholder who may not be participating in managing the business? And, if it deemed relevant to clear shareholders, why is the bar set at only 5%, meaning that the remaining 95% of shareholders do not need security clearance? Is this meant to cater for companies whose shareholders are mainly corporations?

Next, I move on to the factors considered by the Licensing Officer in deciding on security clearances. It is stated in clause 45 that the Licensing Officer must consider various factors, including whether the applicant has participated in any criminal activity, has a history of violence or threat of violence and whether clearing the applicant is contrary to the public interest or national security. The explicit listing of the factors is welcome for transparency.

At this juncture, it would be useful for the Ministry to clarify whether the Licensing Officer still has discretion to grant the security clearance to an applicant who fails on one or some criteria, say, the applicant has an old conviction in the Youth Court when he was a teenager.

Another question on security clearances is how the Licensing Officer would access information submitted to him in such applications. Clause 45(2) provides that to assist the Licensing Officer, the Commissioner of Police or a law enforcement agency may provide a report to him to help assess applications for security clearances. Thus, the Licensing Officer can verify whether the applicant is known to have participated in criminal or violent acts and so on.

In this regard, I believe the Ministry expects to receive applications from foreigners, such as those who need short-term licences for trade fairs. How will be Licensing Officer verify the background information of foreign applicants? I hope there will be no compromise in ensuring that foreign persons are subject to the same standard of checks as resident applicants.

Finally, I have one clarification on the appointment of Compliance Officers. Clause 80 of the Bill provides that the Licensing Officer can appoint an individual who is not a public officer to be a compliance officer. According to the Ministry’s press release of 3 November, the investigation and enforcement of breaches will still be handled by Police officers.

I also note some restrictions on the powers of a Compliance Officer under clause 80(7). Nevertheless, under Part 6 of the Bill, compliance officers will be empowered to check licensees for compliance including inspection of premises, asking for information and explanations, stopping vehicles in transit and so on. These are potentially confrontational situations at locations where guns and weapons are kept. Failure to comply with a Compliance Officer’s directions is also an offence punishable with a fine of up to $10,000.

As the powers and responsibilities of Compliance Officers are thus not trivial, could the Ministry explain why it decided to set the minimum age for Compliance Officers at only 18 years?

Mr Speaker, Sir, when I learnt about this Bill, I wondered at first if it was necessary to regulate guns, explosives and weapons through a new piece of legislation. Upon further reading and consideration, I am convinced that we need to do so.

Our environment has changed and technology has evolved tremendously. The threat of terrorism is still high. Information on weapons and explosives can be more easily retrieved these days from the Internet, particularly from the dark web; new technology, such as 3D-printing, enables customised creation and manufacture of guns and other weapons.

Updating our legislation to take into account the advent of technology is timely, and a constant reminder to ourselves to keep up with changes. While we welcome and embrace the benefits of new technology such as 3D printing, we need to guard against the pitfalls it can bring.

With today's technology, manufacturers could produce toy guns almost as good and functional as the real guns, which can pose a genuine threat to our lives too. Hence, there is also a need to protect our people against such threats. I would like to ask the Minister how many cases of armed crimes involved the use of fake and toy guns in the last 10 years.

Security and safety must remain top priorities for our nation. We are fortunate to be able to provide a fairly secure environment for Singaporeans and residents so far. Even so, there are still cases of violence and unauthorised use of fireworks. Our tight control over guns and weapons has helped minimised the destructive impact of such events. However, we must not take things for granted.

It is of the utmost importance that we continue to remain vigilant and stringent on security measures. There have been many incidents and tragedies in countries that had legalised arms possession. We must continue to have zero tolerance towards guns and weapons, just as we do not tolerate drugs in our jurisdiction. We must continue to educate Singaporeans that such a stand has been key to our secure and safe living environment.

Therefore, the deterrence penalties, in line with other relevant legislation, including capital punishment, must be upheld. We must continue to send a strong signal to all in Singapore and to others beyond our shores that we have zero tolerance for any action that could threaten our peace and security.

In addition, we need to tighten the surveillance of potential influence and threats in social media. We will need the support and technical expertise of social media service providers to help us defend against perpetrators who use social media to advance their interests and promote the use of violence and weapons of mass disruption in Singapore.

In this challenging digital environment, how would the Ministry use artificial intelligence or AI to take pre-emptive measures and strengthen our defence against terrorism and the use of guns, explosives and weapons?

Last but not least, it is important that we continue to promote tolerance and acceptance among our multiracial, multilingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious community members. Singapore is and will be a fair and equal society for all Singaporeans with zero tolerance of extremism. Religious and racial harmony must always be our core value. I would like to conclude with my support for the Bill.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Mr Speaker, the Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Bill of 2021 comes at an appropriate time, as advances in additive manufacturing technology mean that the accessibility of firearms is now simpler than ever before. While the key objective of the Act is to consolidate a number of older pieces of legislation, it also introduces a number of updates that are designed to accommodate the reality of weapons in the modern world.

Historically, our ability to successfully control the distribution of weapons was premised on the combination of managing supply and demand. On the supply side, we have been able to tightly control the inflow of goods and people due to our small, island geography and sophisticated policing of porous points along our borders. In terms of demand, we have instituted some of the world's most severe gun control laws – with punishments for unlawful possession, trafficking and use stipulated in the Arms Offences Act of 1973 and 2008, and Arms and Explosives Act of 1913 and 2013. We have supported these sticks with the carrot of an efficient, uncorrupt Police force.

This largely airtight control is now being undermined by the advancement of technology. Worldwide, there are currently an excess of 1.4 million 3D printers, and the figure is estimated to rise to more than eight million units by 2027. The ease of obtaining, securing and subsequently deleting electronic blueprints for weapons means that for a digitally-sophisticated population such as ours, the ability to independently print guns, if one chooses to do so, will increasingly be trivial. Moreover, if printed with non-standard materials, such 3D- printed guns will become increasingly undetectable with our usual screening devices.

While the printing of ammunition remains rudimentary and generally impotent at the moment, clause 4 of the bill will appropriately ensure that, if the technology to do so does emerge in the future, these will thereafter fall under tight legislation. Still, it appears only to be a matter of when, not if, technology catches up.

The basic principles of deterrence are straightforward and, I am certain, well understood by Members of this House. An individual with the proclivity to exercise violence may choose not to do so, if he or she believes that there will be a credible threat of a possibly disproportionately large retaliatory response.

Termed "mutually assured destruction", this threat of a response was what characterised the Cold War and what kept the United States and Soviet Union from pursuing outright war, with most conflicts pursued by proxy.

Same arguments are often made in the context of defenders of the right of individuals to carry weapons in self-defence. Now, the problem with this simple logic of deterrence, and the reason why strict weapons control is generally preferable, is that the deterrent effect is no longer applicable when we relax some of these basic assumptions. In particular, brandishing a gun on an unsuspecting victim confers first-mover advantage to the aggressor, which nullifies the threat of a retaliatory response. A gun in one's backpack is of no use if an erstwhile robber has one pointed at your face.

And the simple rationality that undergirds deterrence theory also breaks down when one agent is viewed as particularly susceptible to emotional response. This is, for example, why some observers have argued that dealing with North Korea may require actions beyond simple deterrence.

Nevertheless, it is our responsibility to at least consider how, compared to the past when tight monitoring and policing was often sufficient, future attempts to control the spread of firearms will be that much more challenging. Thus, even when we widen the scope of controlled goods, as clauses 12 and 13 seek to do, by designating the manufacture and possession of unauthorised digital gun blueprints as illegal, we need to recognise that the act of simply banning such items will be more limited than before. Yet, the majority of the subsequent clauses, such as clauses 17 or 20 or 27, prescribe penalties for violations; relying, as it were, on the stick rather than the carrot. My argument is that we need to be more creative about our use of deterrence.

The crux of the matter is this: We should be willing to consider the efficacy of a blunt reliance on strict weapons control as our central tool for containing violent crime and take efforts to address the underlying motivations for crime more seriously.

Of course, crime is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Criminologists point to factors as varied as the thermal climate, urban density, inhabitant characteristics and psycho-social risk. But two important drivers have emerged recently and stressed the effects of poverty and income inequality. Of course, I am not suggesting that the Government has not made any efforts at addressing these more fundamental drivers.

What we should not forget though is that an important spillover of our policies to diminish inequality and eliminate poverty is that we yield the payoff of reduced crime too. If we believe this to be true, then we should be prepared to resource our agencies accordingly, to examine whether there is room to increase our expenditure for welfare and social services, and if budget considerations preclude otherwise, to re-examine our existing expenditure on publicly-funded domestic security services. On that note of general caution, I assert my support for the Bill.

Mr Sharael Taha.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. I applaud the effort to keep legislation concerning guns, explosives and weapons – referred to as GEW by Minister of State Desmond Tan – updated especially given the fact that advancements in technology and open borders have made it significantly easier to procure and manufacture GEWs.

We in Singapore are fortunate that our law enforcement agencies and supportive citizenry has kept our nation safe and free from the proliferation of GEWs. However, we must not rest upon our laurels in the face of recent developments.

3D printing is certainly an exciting and revolutionary technology as the designs you can manufacture now are effectively limited only by your imagination. As someone who is exposed to 3D printing at the workplace, I can assure that whatever that you can think of, it is highly likely that the 3D printer can print it out for you.

3D printing is also relatively cheap compared to traditional manufacturing with lathes and milling machines. Printers are readily available under $1,000. For the more serious hobbyist, a sophisticated 3D printer can be purchased under $5,000 for all your DIY needs from online portals such as Lazada and Amazon – and you can even have it delivered to your doorstep within a week. These 3D printers can print many different kinds of materials – from plastics to carbon fibre reinforced thermoplastics, to even different metals for the more complex and sophisticated machines.

In the industry, the use of 3D printing – or what is known as additive manufacturing or AM – is becoming more prevalent. AM has revolutionised how we design and manufacture components where there is little or even zero waste, unlike traditional subtractive manufacturing. AM is forcing us to rethink supply chain and manufacturing strategies because now, anyone in any part of the world can manufacture a 3D component if he has the design and a 3D printer capable of doing it.

In addition, there is also a lot of online resources available for free. GrabCAD, an open source forum for 3D models has more than 4.5 million computer aided design models – more commonly known as CAD models – and a number of these designs are for guns or weapons as defined by the Bill, which includes knuckledusters, daggers, swords and nunchakus.

3D printing brings exciting opportunities in manufacturing. However, there is an increasingly worrying global trend on the irresponsible use of 3D printing guns and offensive weapons. These designs are also increasingly downloaded. One of my residents even showed me the design of a "Gutbuster" – a knuckleduster integrated with a dagger and a revolver. This is indeed a worrying trend given our objective of becoming a digitally connected nation.

There is also a strong online community of advocates pushing for the digital design of guns to be made available to all for free as an extension of the United States' second amendment on the freedom to bear arms. As an example, Cody Wilson, described as a crypto-anarchist, had designed and successfully tested his first 3D-printed gun, which he named "The Liberator". He proceeded to upload it online for others to access for free. When the US authorities got wind of it, they managed to shut the site down but not before the gun design had been downloaded a total of 100,000 times.

A quick Google search also shows many examples of organisations distributing blueprints for guns and weapons with the intent of arming civilians to protect themselves and rise up against authorities.

To further complicate these worrying trends, 3D printed guns are unserialised and therefore untraceable. They can also be made using plastics, making them undetectable by metal detectors at security points such as in our airports and other sensitive installations.

All these lead to the simple fact that there are low barriers of entry for anyone who has the interest to 3D print a gun or weapon. Low printer cost, free downloadable software and blueprints open the gates to the proliferation of these 3D printed guns and other offensive weapons. Just some examples of the designs of guns that are available online: flying swallow revolver, zig-zag gun, AR15, FGC-9. Some are revolvers and some are semi-auto weapons.

Any person with very modest means and a broadband connection can effectively print his own gun in the comfort and privacy of his own homes. In fact, there are many YouTube videos that show just this. The situation becomes increasingly dangerous when we take into consideration the instances of self-radicalised individuals on our shores. Easy access to such technology seems like the perfect opportunity for a lone-wolf operative aiming to commit acts of terrorism.

It is therefore imperative that we pass this Bill. We need to keep up with the advancements in 3D printing technology and deal with the low barriers to access blueprints, especially in the current global and societal context. Like it or not, 3D printing of guns and other weapons is here with us and when it is misused, presents a clear and present danger to the safety and security of the general public.

Given its importance, I would like to suggest the following considerations.

In clause 13, I support the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for guns and major parts of a gun. In addition, I suggest that it should also consider gun modifications and attachments that can be used with malicious intent such as silencers, scopes and so on.

I also note that digital blueprints for offensive weapons such as knuckledusters and daggers are not covered. As someone who is excited about the benefits of 3D printing, I do understand that we do not want to stifle creativity and innovation and we also do not want to over-criminalise 3D printing. However, how do we keep to the spirit of the law and prevent such offensive weapons from being used in our country?

One of our Pasir Ris residents came to see me to appeal against the fine he received – including the confiscation of the item – from Singapore Customs for buying a knuckleduster online from an overseas source. Of the hundreds of thousands of parcels crossing our borders, I am glad and I am thankful that our Singapore Customs have the capability to detect, intercept and prevent such offensive weapons from crossing our borders. How do we continue with this intent in this new world where we are unable to rely solely on the control at our physical borders to prevent these offensive weapons from appearing on our shores?

How do we get people to practice responsible 3D printing without over-criminalising it?

As a deterrent and to ensure responsible 3D printing, I would like to propose that if 3D printed items are found to be used as weapons in Singapore, we should consider options to charge the person or company for supplying the weapons together with the individual that uses it.

Since it is impractical to prevent people from having the blueprint of non gun-based weapons, at least, this will force those that are responsible for 3D printing to think twice on the use of 3D printed items, especially if it is used to cause harm in our society.

On enforcement, I would like to understand how MHA intends to enforce the unauthorised possession of the digital blueprints of guns.

Can we explore the banning of websites that advocate gun blueprint sharing?

How can MHA make non-intrusive checks on residents to ensure that they do not have gun designs stored on their hard drives? Do we have the right resource, skillset and organisational capability in MHA to tackle this threat?

I believe the community also has a wider role to play too. How do we co-opt the community to understand the urgency of this issue and the threat that it poses to public security and safety? Can we educate the public to be vigilant and be on the lookout? Is there a role family members should play, especially in our objective to identify early radicalised individuals who may turn out to be lone-wolf operatives? Do we provide safe, anonymous whistle-blowing channels for the public or family members?

How do we also ensure that the ease of access to 3D printers in schools and other agencies are not abused?

It is great that many of our kids are exposed to 3D printers in schools nowadays. However, anyone with computer aided design skills – which is now taught in schools – is able to design a simple, sharp-ended knuckleduster and have it printed in hours. They do not even need to wait for weeks for shipment from overseas.

Given the changing circumstances on making GEWs using 3D printers, I would like to propose a holistic approach of not only enforcement but also education to instill responsible 3D printing practices to the users and institutions that acquire these devices.

Another consideration is on the declaration and serialisation of some highly sophisticated 3D printers.

Some five-axis computer numerical control (CNC) machine centres are classified under export control, are serialised and also have yearly declarations as they are capable of manufacturing components for the centrifuge in building nuclear devices or ballistic missiles.

I would like to propose that we extend the same need for serialisation and yearly declarations to certain types of 3D printers. This would help to monitor its use and ensure it is not in the hands of individuals with ill intent and forces the 3D printing contract manufacturers to be aware of the downstream usage of their manufactured products.

Lastly, while we protect ourselves internally from the possession and manufacture of 3D printed guns, how do we protect our borders from the importation of 3D printed guns or weapons, especially those made from thermoplastics that can escape metal detection at our borders? The dangers of not detecting such guns and weapons cannot be underestimated. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The advancements in 3D printing technology present us with exciting and promising new opportunities. 3D printing technology is transforming the manufacturing world and forcing us to rethink supply chain strategies.

3D printing is capable of creating any product that can be made anywhere in the world. The usage of 3D printing is now growing. It augments and sometimes replaces traditional manufacturing processes such as "lathe" and "milling machines". Therefore, it is important for our people to explore, understand and possess the competence in this technology that is increasingly becoming the norm in the new economy.

Last month, the M3@Pasir-Ris Punggol organized a 3D printing course. The course was held for people of all ages; young and old. The course participants were able to learn about 3D printing, and they were excited about the potential of this technology.

Although 3D printing brings a lot of benefits, we also need to be aware of the threats posed by this technology. As 3D printing technology and weapon blueprints are readily available online, coupled with the negative online elements that promote terrorism, there are individuals who have started to produce weapons using 3D printing in their own homes. Therefore, we need to be vigilant towards those who may be using them with dangerous intentions.

As concerned members of the community and family members, we need to know the tell-tale signs of such individuals and contact the authorities so that Singapore continues to be safe and secure.

(In English): In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, our zero tolerance for gun and weapon possession has been instrumental in keeping Singapore safe and keeping gun and weapon crimes to as low as possible. However, our safety and security is now threatened by the unscrupulous use of the latest 3D printing technology. We need to move quick and catch up with the technological threat that 3D printing poses without over-criminalising it and stifling 3D printing activities while continuing to maintain zero tolerance for gun or weapon possession in our country.

Not withstanding the considerations I have proposed, I stand in support of the Bill.

Ms Joan Pereira.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I welcome this Bill, which has introduced important amendments to cover new areas of risks and to enhance the enforcement powers of our Police force.

Twenty-twenty had been a particularly difficult year for all. In addition to the COVID-19 health crisis, many parts of the world also experienced political turmoil and upheavals in their streets. Situations escalate quickly in territories where guns, explosives and weapons are accessible.

Hence, I strongly support measures to tighten control over guns, explosives and weapons which pose higher risks as well as increasing the maximum fines for unlicensed activities fivefold to $50,000 for persons and $100,000 for entities.

What has stood out for me in this Bill is the criminalisation of the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints for the manufacture of guns or major gun parts. This is necessary with the rapid advancement of 3D printing technology, which has been improving by leaps and bounds. It is frightening and sobering to see how the Internet has enabled the world to connect and share all good and bad. Information and videos on how to make and assemble many items are shared freely or for a fee on the web.

We have to be especially wary of digital printers being used to make guns, weapons and explosives that could be assembled in installments and shipped here without anyone knowing their purpose.

A concern I have is how the Singapore Police Force is going to spot and identify gun or weapon parts which can imported into Singapore in hard-to-detect bits and pieces, deceptively mislabeled as something else. These could be shipped in different batches and assembled here.

Would the Minister share how we can counter this threat? Is there a guide being drawn up to help enforcement officers identify and keep a lookout for items that could be suspicious as they would be used to assemble illegal items? Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] We have to be especially wary of digital printers being used to make guns, weapons and explosives that could be assembled in installments and shipped here, without anyone knowing their purpose.

A concern I have is how the Singapore Police Force is going to spot and identify gun or weapon parts which can be imported into Singapore in hard-to-detect bits and pieces, deceptively mis-labelled as something else. These could be shipped in different batches and assembled here. Will the Minister share how we can counter this threat?

Is there a guide being drawn up to help enforcement officers identify and keep a look-out for items that could be suspicious as they would be used to assemble illegal items?

(In English): Lastly, I would like to ask for more details and updates about how the Ministry intends to control and regulate 3D printers to prevent their misuse, while keeping a balanced approach so as not to stifle innovation for other engineering purposes. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Louis Ng.

Sir, this Bill seeks to consolidate and update our laws relating to guns, explosives and weapons. The regulation of guns, explosives and weapons is important to the safety and security of Singaporeans, and our regulatory framework should be updated to account for changing technologies and threats. I have four clarifications to raise on this Bill.

My first clarification is on the proposed definition of “store” and the four limbs of the definition. The definition first sets out the first and second limbs, followed by the phrase “and includes”, then the third and fourth limbs. Can the Minister clarify if this should be interpreted to mean that the first and second limbs are broad definitions, and the third and fourth limbs are specific examples of the first and second limbs? Can the Minister also clarify if the third and fourth limbs are examples and do not exhaustively set out situations where a gun or major part of a gun is deemed to be stored?

I seek this clarification because the third limb refers very specifically to being in possession of any explosive or explosive precursor for more than 24 hours. The fourth limb refers specifically to controlling or managing 12 guns or major parts of a gun. These very specific numbers seem to provide an opening for someone to circumvent the law by possessing an explosive for only 23 hours or controlling only 11 guns.

My second point is on the definition of "weapon". The Bill defines weapon in the First Schedule, which comprises a detailed list, such as arrows, knives and swords. The First Schedule does not provide any exceptions for imitation, replica or ornamental weapons. By contrast, the definition of gun or explosives in the Bill does provide exceptions for imitation guns and explosives. The result appears to be an expansion of the law, with the proposed Act requiring licences for imitation, replica and ornamental weapons, while existing laws do not. For instance, under section 13(6) of the existing Arms and Explosives Act, a licence is not required to possess a sword or dagger kept in a dwelling for ornamental purposes.

While clause 94 of the Bill deems ornamental or theatrical weapons as lawful purpose for possessing an offensive weapon under the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, it is not clear how imitation, replica or ornamental weapons are treated under the new Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Act.

Can the Minister clarify if the term “weapon” is intended to cover imitation, replica or ornamental weapons? If so, can the Minister share how it intends to address the enforcement issues that may arise because of the over-inclusiveness? Would the Ministry consider, for instance, issuing class licences for activities involving objects that fall within the definition of weapons but would not ordinarily be used to cause harm, such as imitation, replica or ornamental weapons?

My third point is about variation orders for class licences. Section 57(1) of the Bill allows the Minister to vary a class licence by order in the Gazette. However, the Gazette is not necessarily accessible to the layperson. To propose to vary a class licence, the Minister is required to publish a notice on a website or in other forms readily accessible to the public. While the proposal to vary a class licence must be published, the order to vary itself is not subject to these requirements. For consistency and transparency, will MHA ensure that the variation order itself be published in forms readily accessible to the public?

My fourth and final point is about the enforcement powers of compliance officers. The Bill empowers the Licensing Officer to appoint compliance officers to assist the Licensing Officer in the exercise of its enforcement powers. These compliance officers are private contractors, not public agents. Despite not being public agents, compliance officers may exercise a range of enforcement powers under the Bill.

Can the Minister clarify how compliance officers will be supervised in the exercise of these powers? Will compliance officers be held to the same standards of accountability as public servants? Sir, notwithstanding my clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Derrick Goh.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Guns, Explosives and Weapons or GEW (Control) Bill is a good step forward. This effectively harmonises and updates the laws against new trends and threats and will strengthen the existing enforcement framework which will, in turn, minimise risks posed by GEW going forward.

Having had the experience of being a former National Service Police Commander, I can see that this Bill has taken a holistic approach. Not only has it appropriately increased the deterrence for offences with the intent to cause harm, it has also included proactive features in two key areas, namely: one, upstream preventive measures; and, two, the use of class licensing regime. These steps allow for better risk management without increased regulatory burden, of which, I have a request and one clarification for the Minister.

Relating to the first point, a few years back, I previously practised at the National Shooting Centre at Choa Chu Kang under the oversight of a coach. At that time, I noticed that the procedures of the range were not as tight as now. It did cross my mind then that a range user could leave the range with arms and live ammunition – in this scenario, the severity would be high, and the probability is low, although not zero.

This Bill will now address this gap and require, for example, the National Shooting Centre, which is now not a licensable activity, to operate more securely under licence, such as tighter control of ammunition storage and issuance, for example, armed security at the range’s control points and better security measures in place to prevent firearms and ammunition leaving the shooting range.

This measure is more reassuring for all range users as well as the public. However, in view of the tightened level of security and licensing requirements, I hope that the Ministry will keep the inconvenience to impacted stakeholders to a reasonable level in terms of, for example, wait time for licence registration and approvals, lead time for range and arms booking, as well as keeping the associated costs manageable.

On the second point, the Bill’s calibration is evident by the inclusion of the new class licensing regime. This class of licensing will facilitate the development of Shooting sports which is an area where Singapore has done well, with world-class athletes. Examples include in the international arena, such as the SEA Games, ASEAN Games and at the International Shooting Sports Federation World Cup. I am heartened that the Minister has highlighted that this Bill will mean that student members of a school’s Air Gun Club would now not be required to apply for individual licences, as this has always been a good source for scouting of young talent. In this way, class licensing will facilitate legitimate users and stakeholders. However, as we have noted, the risk of GEW is low but not zero. I hope the Minister can give us the continued assurance that the Class Licensing regime will not apply to the higher risk GEW categories or situations.

In concluding, Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill is holistic in its approach and balanced. I support this Bill.

Ms Yeo Wan Ling.

Mr Speaker, Sir, given my background at the Singapore Economic Development Board and as a start-up founder, I am always excited by the proliferation of innovative technologies in Singapore. It is this appetite for and dedication to innovation that has put us on the map for seven consecutive years as the Asia Pacific’s most innovative nation, according to the Global Innovation Index.

Imagine, Mr Speaker, Sir, being able to speak into existence virtually any object the mind can conceive. This is the enormous potential of the innovative technology we know as 3D printing. It has birthed communities fascinated by 3D printing’s ability to unleash their creativity with endless practical applications.

Other than formal settings, such as professional manufacturers and designers or even academic institutions, 3D printing has found a place at the heart of several interest groups that tap on its versatility. Those passionate about drones, e-scooters, Nerf, Warhammers, even baking, and so many more, have found 3D printing to add incredible value to their hobbies and passions. Beyond its obvious economic benefits and industrial uses, 3D printing has also been an added catalyst for hobbyists resourceful enough to tap on it.

For example, the Nerf community in Singapore, they have been around for many years, and this, traditionally, has been a competitive game involving the use of foam-based weaponry fired from primarily foam-based blasters. Hobbyists seek out and improvise their own arenas of play in parks or other spaces, where games are hosted and played by those within the Nerf community. Those who participate find this an exciting way to keep active and creative.

In the past couple of years, 3D printing has made itself a staple in the Nerf community, where about half of those in the estimated 5,000-strong community own a 3D printer. The technology allows hobbyists to forge more powerful blasters that greatly enhance their game. While store-bought blasters typically fire at about 80-100 feet per second, our resourceful hobbyists are known to modify blasters that propel their foam darts up to 150-200 feet per second. Also, modifications to the aesthetics and performance of blasters are shared among the community to encourage innovation and celebrate each other’s achievements.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am not sure about you, but as I learnt about this, I was delighted! The Government spends years and pours loads of resources for Singaporeans to pick up new technologies. But here we have a community that has eagerly adopted the exciting technology of 3D printing as an integral part of their interest.

More than that, I am heartened by the community spirit they display in wanting to be responsible citizens as well. For example, modifications to blasters’ aesthetics that paint them black are frowned upon, as such realism might cause panic to the public. Hobbyists actively and responsibly refrain from such realism so as not to put the wider Nerf community’s interests at risk. And that is, indeed, thoughtful of the community.

The 3D printing community has also come under the spotlight for good reason during the pandemic. I would like to raise the example of one Gerald Yeo from my constituency. Gerald’s interest in 3D printing began when he had to print parts for a robotics competition in school and, since then, during the pandemic, he has put his 3D printing skills to good use as he printed face shields in bulk that were donated to our constituency to help reduce the spread of the virus.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to make the case for the 3D printing community and, indeed, the passions of researchers, inventors and adventurers, that even as we ramp up regulations on this versatile technology, we are careful not to set a precedent for further restrictions that might stifle the creative winds taking their community by storm.

It is easy to be afraid of the unknown, as with exciting new technologies such as 3D printing. So often, in the face of uncertainty and "what if's", our first foot out the door is to come down hard with regulation.

When I consulted those in the 3D printing scene, from researchers, inventors to hobbyists, I found that many felt that the idea that one with malicious intent would resort to using home-based 3D printing to produce dangerous weapons such as guns would be a pretty distant one. Many pointed to lower hanging fruit such as pipe guns, given the impracticality of using a household-appropriate 3D printer to print functional weapons.

Not only would important aspects of a functional weapon, such as ammunition, be impossible to forge using such 3D printers, 3D printed weapons themselves – according to the experts – would be unable to withstand the pressure of firing a bullet due to the way the plastic is layered in the 3D printing process. One researcher from the 3D printing community even remarked, "they had better chance making a bow and arrow", when asked about those with malicious intent.

At this juncture, I would like to assure everyone that I am not playing down the possibility that on an off-chance, someone might indeed 3D print a weapon and use it for harm. However, while such fears are warranted and everything should be done to curb any instances of such behaviour, it must be asked, are there better ways to do so?

As hon Members, Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Melvin Yong had mentioned, not only would it be extremely challenging to monitor the Internet traffic of those with 3D printers, an implausible response time of mere hours, if not minutes, would be required to intervene between the download of a 3D weapon's blueprint to its production.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I reiterate that it is with great caution that we must proceed with the regulation of 3D printing lest we produce an unwanted chilling effect on the use of such innovative technologies. Proposed controls on 3D printing activities reminded me of the controls we placed on colour copiers from 1979 to the late 1990s. Yes, colour copiers. This is too familiar a tune. These same controls on colour copiers were lifted also because of their onerous restrictions, making way for innovation in counterfeit-resistant currency notes in Singapore. With the imminent difficulty of enforcement, potential futility of regulation and stifling of a vibrant community with controls on 3D printing, we must consider alternatives.

In this vein, I must inquire, even as we move to enact heavier regulations from above, have we been conscientious to fly low to the ground and explore community alternatives?

With an already active community eager to facilitate the free flow of ideas and pool resources for the furthering of their hobbies, initiatives toward visibility sharing of designs and builds would not be too far-fetched. We have already seen several maker spaces, which are public workshops with 3D printing capabilities, where people can come and realise their designs in community, tapping on one another's experiences and resources. These spaces are also good opportunities for the education of budding 3D printing enthusiasts to uphold community guidelines such as the Nerf community's compromise on the realism of their blasters to prevent panic.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to end off my speech with fair warning that regulation, without education and awareness, puts us on a slippery slope. Should this Bill fail to provide an answer for the actual threat it is seeking to defuse, we set a precedent for shackling any novel community at the slightest hint of danger. This Bill must live up to the responsibility it seeks to hold over the 3D printing community, lest we end up fighting a battle that simply did not exist in the first place. This concern notwithstanding, I support the Bill.

Mr Zhulkarnain.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this Guns, Explosives and Weapons (Control) Bill will strengthen our existing regulatory regime and minimise the safety and security risks posed by GEWs. It will harmonise the application of various legislations like the Arms and Explosives Act (AEA), amongst others. Given that the last review of the Arms and Explosives Act occurred in 2007, this review and introduction of this Bill is timely and welcomed.

Singapore is known for its zero tolerance for the misuse or mishandling of GEWs. Singapore also has one of the most effective gun control legislation in the world; with the number of privately owned firearms remaining relatively constant from 2007 to 2017 and no homicides committed with a gun in recent memory.

However, now we are faced with newer challenges and different threats to our security and public safety. Hence, I welcome the changes to tighten the control on high risk GEWs and improve the overall compliance and Police's operational effectiveness. In this regard, I would like to highlight the refinements which show that the law is also sensitive to the circumstances of each case that an individual may face.

Firstly, on the Arms Offences Act (AOA) which will be consequentially amended through this Bill. Previously, section 3 of the AOA makes no distinction between possession of arms or ammunition whether with or without criminal intent. The AOA will now recognise the offence of an unlawful possession of gun with criminal intent and impose aggravating circumstances for scheduled offences such as rioting, kidnapping and robbery. I welcome such clear distinctions and refinements to the law.

Secondly, in relation to the offence of unauthorised possession of blueprints of 3D printouts of GEWs, it is a defence if the person came into possession of such blueprints without any solicitation or malice and/or that he or she reasonably would not have known of such blueprints. This may go some way to assuage the concerns of some parents, who are worried of the kind of information that our children may be exposed to on the Internet. In this regard, I would humbly suggest, that perhaps MHA could work together with MOE to increase the awareness in schools and our IHLs so that our youth will understand and appreciate the dangers or consequences of having access to such dangerous information.

I have some clarifications to seek though. Section 64(2) of the Bill curtails the powers of the Minister to issue a security direction for regulated activity and limits it to cases where it is impracticable in the circumstances of the particular case for the Minister to make or amend any regulations to effectively address any issue or perceived issue of public safety.

My first question, can the Minister clarify the circumstances in which such impracticality will arise?

My second clarification, I understand that the security direction is given to the person – would this also cover "close associate" of such persons as defined under section 41 or otherwise?

My third clarification, given that the security direction is non-appealable and that there is no automatic right to be heard under section 64(4). Would it nevertheless be possible for any aggrieved party to seek judicial review of the process or perhaps, allow a party to seek interim relief for preservation of any asset which may fall under the said security direction. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Malay please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Our world faces various terrorist threats and extremist ideologies that threaten our security. We saw how, in 2019, the world was rocked by a shooting case that killed 51 worshippers at a mosque in New Zealand.

Even though our situation in Singapore is very different due to our already very tough laws, we must continue to monitor emerging new threats. Our world, which is plagued by the COVID-19 outbreaks and economic slowdown, will make more people feel pressured and this may lead to disputes or even domestic violence.

For example, in my earlier parliamentary speech, I have shared that police reports relating to domestic violence in Singapore had increased by 22% since last April during the circuit breaker period in Singapore. On average, trends around the world show that social pressure and social isolation will result in more cases of domestic violence.

In domestic violence cases in countries such as the United States, Britain and South Africa, nearly 70% of the deaths involve women and the perpetrators are usually their spouses or ex-spouses. Within these, about one in three murder cases is committed using firearms.

Therefore, we need to continue providing protection to those who are more in need and should not allow any dangerous weapons that can be used to create violence in our society.

A research paper published by the RAND Corporation in 2018 stated that 3D printing technology will accelerate the proliferation of dangerous weapons and could result in more crimes and violence. The situation becomes more high-risk because of the unemployment rate and the alienation of workers who face more pressure due to the declining global economy.

Therefore, I agree with the Bill, which will further tighten surveillance and ownership of any details or plans that can be used to produce dangerous weapons through 3D printing technology.

I welcome the amendments to the Bill that will safeguard our plural society in Singapore and eradicate violence in any form.

(In English): With that, Mr Speaker, Sir, suggestions and clarifications notwithstanding, I support this Bill.

Mr Vikram Nair.

Mr Speaker, I speak in support of this Bill. Singapore is well known for its no nonsense approach to weapons possession. The possession of guns and firearms by members of the public is prohibited, and the usage of firearms is heavily restricted and generally limited to the armed forces, police and a few private gun clubs. The possession of other weapons, including items that might be used as weapons such as knives, is also controlled and people are not permitted to be in possession of such items in public without good reason.

Strict laws like this have played an important part in keeping Singapore safe and we do not have horror stories of shootings and gun violence. While we do have other weapons being used in incidents like gang fights, the strict laws against improper possession have also permitted police to move pre-emptively in such cases, arresting individuals in possession of weapons without good reason even if they have not used it for violence yet. As such, violent fights with weapons are also few and far between.

Against this backdrop, these latest changes to legislation and harmonisation of several different Bills tighten and expand the laws to cover developing areas of potential threats. One example of such a potential threat is the 3D printing of gun parts. While smuggling guns or gun parts into and around Singapore is not easy and subject to the strictest of penalties, it has now become possible to manufacture gun parts with 3D printers, which are becoming more widely available. The blueprints for such weapons may be found on the Internet, or more commonly, the Dark Net. With such blueprints and a 3D printer, individuals could 3D print usable gun parts.

The new rules will make it an offence for people to possess the blueprints required to 3D print gun parts. Now, this is a tough measure, but one which I welcome as the more easily something dangerous is readily available, the tougher the rules must be to discourage its possession and use. This sends a clear, no nonsense signal that we are remaining tough on the possession of weapons, even if all that one possesses is a blueprint to 3D print such parts.

While the use of guns by military and the Police are heavily controlled, one area where members of the public may access weapons is at private shooting ranges. A few years ago, in 2017, the Police already had imposed measures to better control activities at these premises, including measures to make such premises more secure and to better control the type of weapons being used. This Bill allows the Police to issue licences for ranges, which allows Police more flexibility to regulate how they will operate through the imposition of licence conditions and they would be able to ensure the most stringent conditions for the use of firearms in Singapore and to ensure that such firearms are not easily available outside.

The introduction of a class licensing regime for lower risk activities balances the generally tough approach with practicality. There are some people who participate in lower risk activities such as the use of air rifles for sport. The introduction of a class licensing regime to deal with these is a clever method and saves each person the hassle of getting an individual licence.

Class licences have been used in other areas too, for example, in legislation by MCI in relation to the media, although in this case, given many of the class licensees will be individuals, it will be important for them to know the relevant rules that will apply. I will be interested to know what steps the Government will take to keep the class licensees informed of such rules. While the mechanism being used is that of a licence, in substance, what needs to be done is for the individuals in possession of such weapons to know exactly what is permitted and what is not to stay out of trouble.

The other changes largely involve the rationalisation and harmonisation of offences that existed across many different pieces of legislation. There were some inconsistencies in these previously, as different offences were covered by different rules and developed at different times, but the overall changes in this new legislation rationalises the penalties based on degree of culpability, which means that there will be higher penalties for intentional offences and less for unintentional ones, as well as seriousness of the harm, which means higher penalties for more dangerous weapons and where weapons are used to cause harm. These are, of course, very sensible and the general principles on which all criminal legislation is based. I therefore support this Bill.

Minister of State Desmond Tan.

Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their views and for their strong support for this Bill.

There are many questions that have been asked. I shall address them in turn, first, on the 3D printing of guns, given the strong interest among Members on this topic. Following which, I shall address issues raised by Members thematically.

Many Members raised questions about clause 13 which is on the new offence of unauthorised possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of guns or major gun parts. The divergence of views among Members shows that there is no straightforward answer to achieving an appropriate regulatory balance on this matter.

On the one hand, Mr Sharael Taha asked if the offence should be widened beyond guns and major gun parts to also cover gun modifications and attachments and offensive weapons. Mr Melvin Yong also took the view that clause 13 should cover possession of digital blueprints for gun replicas. On the other hand, Ms Yeo Wan Ling was of the view that 3D printed guns are unlikely to work in practice and that clause 13 could have a chilling effect on innovative applications of 3D printing.

To be clear, under present law, if you produce a gun using a 3D printer without a licence, you are committing at least two offences: unlicensed manufacturing a gun and possession of an illegal gun. The Bill does not change this basic position. What the Bill does is to address the new phenomenon where it is increasingly easy for anyone to seek out and acquire online designs and directions on how to make a gun, and using a technology that is increasingly accessible.

But we are also careful to ensure the law is not over-reaching. We have limited clause 13 to guns and major gun parts as we have assessed these to pose the highest risk, necessitating such strong controls.

Major parts of guns are essential to the operation of a gun, such as the barrel or the trigger mechanism and which can be assembled to create a functioning gun.

On the other hand, gun accessories are designed to be fitted to or attached to a gun for various purposes, such as to conceal its fire, like a silencer or flash suppressor, or it cannot work except in connection with an operative and functioning gun. They therefore pose a lower risk.

As for weapons like swords and knuckledusters, they are less lethal and dangerous than guns, and therefore, we think there is no necessity at this juncture to also control the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of these weapons.

On replica guns, while we agree that they can potentially be used to cause alarm, they cannot be used to cause physical harm per se and therefore similarly pose lower risks. But if such guns are used while committing certain offences, such as robbery and extortion, an offence would be made out under the Arms Offences Act, along with the Penal Code offences for the main criminal act.

To address Ms Yeo Wan Ling's point that 3D-printed guns are unlikely to function and her concern on inhibiting innovation, as I mentioned in my Second Reading speech yesterday, the threat posed by the 3D printed guns and gun parts is real. This point was echoed by other Members as well. There have been genuine cases and online videos demonstrating the use of 3D printed guns or gun parts, especially the metallic ones.

In this regard, we are not alone in addressing this new phenomenon. Other jurisdictions have also passed legislation that deal with the threat of 3D printing of guns. For example, New South Wales also passed laws in 2015 to criminalise the unauthorised possession of 3D blueprint for the manufacturing of firearms.

Licensing the possession of such blueprints will enable the authorities to know who are involved in 3D manufacturing of guns, to ensure that proper security and practices are in place for handling dangerous articles that may potentially be produced as a result.

But I also want to emphasise that items which do not fit the description of a gun under clause 3 of the Bill will not require a licence to possess or 3D print. Clause 3(4)(c) also makes clear that imitation guns are not considered guns for the purpose of the Bill. Therefore, the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of such items will not require a specific licence under clause 13.

On the impact on the NERF gun community, off-the-shelf NERF guns are clearly meant for recreational purposes and present little risk, given that the projectiles are foam-based, and are unlikely to cause injury if used properly. MHA does not regulate NERF guns today, and does not plan to do so at this juncture. Correspondingly, the possession of any blueprint of NERF gun parts will not be regulated.

We will continue to assess how best to apply the right regulatory tools for the various items, in a way that is calibrated to the risks involved, so as not to hamper innovation unnecessarily.

Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Melvin Yong raised questions pertaining to the enforcement of this offence.

Police will enforce in a practical and reasonable manner, based on information that is received, for example, from members of the public.

In this regard, we agree with Mr Sharael Taha that the community and family members and friends play an important role, such as flagging out potential lone wolves 3D printing guns illegally with intent to cause harm. Information can be provided to the authorities and will be treated with strict confidence.

I also acknowledge at this point Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's point about addressing the underlying motivations behind criminal activity. The Government never loses sight of the need to do so and I thank the Member for his views.

Members also raised questions on the import of guns: how we deal with 3D-printed guns that can escape metal detectors, and the threat of guns and weapon parts imported into Singapore via parcels which are deceptively mislabelled as something else.

First, to clarify, the import of a 3D-printed gun, whether metallic or not, still requires a licence. Our postal regulations also make it unlawful for a person to send by post or to deliver by post any gun or weapon.

There are robust checks at our checkpoints to detect threat objects, including gun or weapon parts and 3D-printed guns, and Mr Sharael Taha shared an example earlier on.

Incoming parcels are inspected, with the help of technologies other than metal detectors, such as X-ray machines. Certain persons of interest, such as those flagged up by intelligence agencies to be of security threat, may also be subject to further checks. Enforcement officers at the checkpoints may also conduct random checks, to deter and detect any security threats.

Notwithstanding, we recognise that there is no fool-proof system to fully prevent the import of gun and weapon parts. To complement the already robust measures at the checkpoints, we have a stringent enforcement and regulatory regime inland, as well as severe penalties under the Bill for unlicensed supply, storage and possession of GEW. This will be a strong deterrence against potential offenders.

Mr Melvin Yong asked for the circumstances under which a person or an organisation would be authorised to possess a 3D blueprint of a gun.

We recognise that there are legitimate reasons to possess digital blueprints of guns in Singapore, such as conducting scientific or law enforcement research. And the Bill is not intended to impede such activities.

Parties that wish to undertake such activities can apply for the appropriate licence or seek special approval from the Minister for Home Affairs under clause 13(2)(c). They will then have to adhere to licensing or approving conditions, such as, requiring that the blueprints are securely handled and not be left easily accessible by uninvolved persons.

On the questions raised by Mr Sharael Taha on the need to impose export controls on certain types of 3D printers, and by Ms Joan Pereira and Mr Melvin Yong on whether MHA intends to regulate 3D printers, these issues fall beyond the scope of this Bill, which does not deal with 3D printing in itself or 3D printers per se. I seek the Members' understanding that this will have to be studied in detail, wider, with the relevant agencies and dealt with separately.

Having addressed Members' queries on 3D printing, I will now move on to Members' comments on other clauses. Mr Louis Ng asked about the definition of "store" in clause 2, which is one of the regulated activities covered by the Bill.

Paragraphs (c) and (d) in the definition are extensions beyond what would be the exhaustive paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of "store". They are meant to clarify the situations under which the possession of a certain number of articles or for a certain period for purposes outside of what is in paragraphs (a) and (b) will constitute storage, and not possession, for the purposes of the Bill.

The thresholds of 12 for guns and major gun parts, and 24 continuous hours for explosives and explosive precursors, were determined based on MHA's operational assessment of the increased risks associated with these higher quantities or longer time of GEW being held in one's possession.

The thresholds are necessary for regulatory certainty. Otherwise, there is no difference between storing and possession of these items, which has to be regulated differently because of the appreciable risk difference of these activities.

To elaborate, if the thresholds are exceeded, the licensee may be required to implement more extensive storage-specific safety and security measures, such as CCTV requirements and hardened walls. These are over and above the requirements typically placed on licensees who possess a single gun, or handle explosives or explosive precursors for a very short period of time.

We acknowledge that with any defined threshold, persons may seek to operate at the margins to avoid taking on additional regulatory burden. But this is a necessary trade-off between meeting our security objectives and providing stakeholders with clarity on the rules. To assure this House, regardless of the quantity or duration of possession of such items, a licence will already be required for the possession of these items, setting out basic safety and security conditions that must be adhered to.

If these quantity or time thresholds need to be revised subsequently due to changes in threat assessment, clause 2(2) of the Bill allows downward adjustments to be made through Regulations.

Next, on the definition of "weapons", Mr Louis Ng also asked if the term is intended to cover imitation, replica or ornamental weapons.

Imitation or replica weapons are not regulated under the Bill, as these are unlikely to be effective in causing injuries or death, and therefore pose too little risk to warrant tight regulation. The way the Bill has been drafted places only an exhaustive list of actual weapons to be regulated in the First Schedule.

Conversely, "gun" has a broad, descriptive definition in the Bill, and therefore to avoid doubt, the Bill makes clear that imitation and replica guns are excluded.

Notwithstanding, the use of an imitation weapon to threaten or cause fear of injury or death to others would likely be an offence under other Acts, such as the Penal Code.

Ornamental weapons, however, are covered under the Bill. These include ornamental swords and daggers. These items have potential to be misused to cause harm due to their sharp tips or blades. But we also recognise that the overall safety and security posed by these items is low, as long as they are kept safely and securely within dwelling places for the purpose of display.

Therefore, possession and storage of these items will be considered for class licensing. This would be a light-touch approach that mitigates the risk of misuse of such items, without being overly onerous.

Moving on, I will touch on licensing of shooting range operations and costs to stakeholders. We note Mr Derrick Goh’s suggestion to manage the inconvenience and costs to stakeholders.

I must reiterate that, when designing the regulations and processes, safety and security will remain our topmost priority. But within this objective, we are also mindful to minimise regulatory burden as far as possible.

Specifically, prior to granting or renewing a shooting range operation licence, there are certain procedures which are fundamental to ensuring the safe conduct of activities that need to be carried out. These include inspecting the range premises to ensure the robustness of safety and security measures, and security vetting of key persons. These inevitably take some time.

Where possible, Police have streamlined procedures and processes to make things easier on licensees and applicants. For example, Police have digitalised the entire licensing application and renewal process, reducing administrative burden and unnecessary waiting time. However, activities such as range time slot booking are managed by the range operators, and are not within the control of the regulator.

On the issue of compliance cost, range operators have generally implemented most required measures on their own accord, even today, such as the installation of CCTV systems and setting up access controls into and out of the range premises. We therefore do not expect the introduction of shooting range licences to impose significant additional costs in the immediate term on these operators.

In addition, to help manage costs for operators, we will introduce a new licensing model, where if an applicant seeks to conduct related activities, he will only need to make one application to the regulator, to obtain the set of different licences for these activities. The cost of this one application will be lower than the total of having to apply individual licences for each regulated activity.

Next, on class licensing, Mr Derrick Goh asked for assurance that class licensing will not apply to higher risk categories or situations. Mr Vikram also asked about the steps that Government will take to keep class licensees informed of requirements under a class licence. Relatedly, Mr Louis Ng also asked if variations to class licences will be published in forms more readily accessible to the public, than the Gazette.

To Mr Derrick Goh's question, as class licensing is less stringent than individual licensing from a security standpoint, MHA’s intent is to apply class licensing only to lower-risk activities, such as air gun shooting in school settings.

To Mr Vikram's question, under clause 56, class licensing conditions will be published in the Gazette, which is publicly accessible. Police will also reach out to groups that will be class licensed to make them aware of their regulatory obligations.

To Mr Louis Ng's question, the short answer is yes.

Variation of class licences will also be published on Police's website; and Police will reach out to affected class licensees, where feasible, to inform them of the changes.

On the issue of appointment of Compliance Officers raised by Mr Melvin Yong, Mr Louis Ng and Ms Sylvia Lim, to assure this House, Compliance Officers will be required to undergo training and assessment by the Police Licensing Officer. Only qualified Compliance Officers will be authorised to conduct site inspections on behalf of the Licensing Officer.

In addition, they will not be allowed to exercise more intrusive enforcement powers such as seizure, search and issuance of composition.

The Police Licensing Officer will also conduct audit checks on Compliance Officers to ensure that they are proficient in carrying out their duties.

Given these safeguards, and in line with the minimum age for other security-related work such as security officers, MHA has assessed that the minimum age of 18 is appropriate, and there is no need to set a higher minimum age at this juncture.

Ms Sylvia Lim raised several questions regarding the security clearance regime, under clauses 43 and 45 of the Bill.

First, on the need to security clear close associates. While close associates may not handle GEW directly, they need to be security cleared because of the security risk associated with the indirect influence they can exert over the operation of the entity and on the regulated activities the entity conducts.

The threshold of 5% equity interest or voting rights to qualify as a close associate is similar to that for determining a "substantial shareholder" under the Companies Act, and is currently used by the Police for the purpose of evaluating the fit and proper criteria. As setting a lower threshold would make it more onerous for businesses, MHA assesses that the 5% threshold is sufficient and balanced, based on the current circumstances. The threshold can be reviewed from time to time, depending on the threat environment. So, shareholders who hold 5% and above will have to be security cleared.

Second, on whether the Licensing Officer (or LO) has discretion to still grant security clearance if a person fails one or more criteria under clause 45(1).

The answer is yes. The clause does allow the LO to give such weight to the factors, as he considers appropriate, when assessing the security clearance of a person.

Third, on the security clearance for foreigners, such as arms dealers for short-term trade fairs. The Police Licensing Officer performs security vetting on all licence applicants, whether foreign or local. Specifically for foreigners, the Police Licensing Officer will request for relevant documents to show proof that they have been duly licensed or authorised by the source countries to handle the GEW.

To further mitigate the security risks associated with imported guns and explosives, all movement of such high-risk items in Singapore must be escorted and guarded by armed auxiliary police officers, thereby minimising the chances of the items being misused or mishandled.

Mr Zhulkarnian asked about security directions under clause 64. First, on the circumstances for which security direction may be issued. As mentioned in my earlier speech, security directions issued by Minister can be used where there is imminent threat to life or property.

A possible scenario is where there is an on-going suspected terrorist incident, such that for public safety reasons, licensees and even those who are exempted from holding GEW licences must immediately enhance their security posture or completely shut their premises for a specified period to prevent the terrorists from getting their hands on guns and explosives.

In such a scenario, issuing a security direction would be critical to mitigate the threat first, given that the matter is of such urgency and magnitude that there is not enough time for regulations to be amended or new regulations to be made, and for the due process under clause 63 or licence conditions to be modified.

Secondly, Mr Zhulkarnain also asked if a security direction would apply to a "close associate" of a licensee. The answer is no. A security direction can only apply to a licensee, class licensee or person exempted from the Act.

They are ultimately responsible for the regulated activity and are best placed to take necessary action to comply with the security direction. It would be ineffective and disproportionate for a security direction to apply also to a close associate.

To Mr Zhulkarnain's question on whether it is possible to seek judicial review against a security direction, given that a security direction is non-appealable under the Act, the Bill does not contain a privative or ouster clause, and so yes, a person who is aggrieved by exercise of power can seek judicial review.

On the need for asset preservation, the Member need not be concerned because the security direction is aimed at dealing with a particular situation and is valid only for a period of up to six months. Asset disposal or destruction will not be an appropriate response in a security direction.

I will now progress to other issues raised. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked for the statistics on crimes involving imitation guns.

There are only a handful of such cases – nine cases were reported in the last 10 years, of which seven resulted in conviction for offences under the Arms Offences Act or the Penal Code.

Using imitation guns to commit certain scheduled offences such as robbery and extortion continues to be a serious offence under the Arms Offences Act. The offender can be jailed for up to 10 years and be liable for caning of no fewer than three strokes.

Ms Sylvia Lim also asked the question for the number of gun possession licences issued for self-defence that are still in force.

There are currently 19 gun possession licences in force, issued to personal security officers of certain embassies, for security reasons and protection. In the past, the Police used to issue gun possession licence to private individuals, such as arms dealers, for self-protection; but this is no longer practised today.

Mr Melvin Yong asked on the defences and counter measures against drone attacks. SPF will work closely with CAAS to deal with the threat of weapon-mounted drones. This is because section 7B of Air Navigation Act today makes it an offence to operate a drone with prohibited items carried on it. Weapons, guns and explosives are prohibited items. Clause 97 updates the reference in the Air Navigation Act to refer to this new Bill.

We have developed some capabilities, and are testing more methods to counter drones used for illicit purposes. However, I will not be able to share more due to the sensitivity of the operations.

Lastly, Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Gan Thiam Poh raised the concern of access to harmful online content relating to GEW, terrorism and other materials.

I agree these are important issues raised.

However, preventing terrorism use of GEW is but one aspect of the Bill. There are more specific and focused laws like the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and the United Nations (Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations to address the threat of terrorism.

This Bill works alongside other laws to keep the threat of online harms at bay. That said, the threat of online influence lies outside of this scope and Members may consider filing specific parliamentary questions for this to be addressed holistically.

Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members’ concerns. The Bill is a crucial piece of legislation that will go a long way to continue to ensure safe, secure and responsible GEW handling in Singapore. Once again, I thank Members for their strong support for this Bill. Sir, I beg to move.

Clarifications?

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]

[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan)]. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]

Clarification by Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I wanted to make some clarifications with respect to TraceTogether.

You will recall that the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza had raised the question yesterday. I want to make three points.

First, on the purpose of the programme. Second, the built-in protection for privacy. And third, the legal provisions governing the use of TraceTogether data.

First point: contact tracing is absolutely essential for the control of COVID-19. We need to quickly identify everyone who has been exposed or potentially exposed to a patient who is infected in order to provide the necessary care to this close contact and to reduce the probability of them passing on the virus. In other words, to be able to truncate chains of transmission quickly, effectively and early.

We have today in Singapore perhaps the most successful contact tracing programme in the world, with a TraceTogether participation rate of around 78%. This is one of the key reasons for our current good control of the COVID-19 situation in Singapore today.

Second point: we have always been conscious of the need to protect personal privacy. To this end, we took great effort in the design of the system, the coding of the application. We even open-sourced the code for public scrutiny and to share with overseas jurisdictions.

TraceTogether only collects Bluetooth proximity data on a temporary basis. It does not collect – and I want to emphasise – it does not collect GPS location data nor movement data.

Let me reiterate this. The TraceTogether app and token were not designed to allow any Government agency to track the user. The app or token only keeps a temporary record of who you have come into close contact with for a prolonged basis. Neither the app nor the token tracks a user's location. The data is then stored in encrypted form locally on your device – either your phone or your token. And that encrypted data is automatically purged after 25 days.

So, you can see that we have taken maximum efforts to protect privacy while enabling contact tracing to be facilitated through digital means.

Third point: on legal provisions. Under section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police have the power to order anyone to produce data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. And the key word here is criminal investigation.

We have gone to great lengths to protect the privacy of all TraceTogether users in all normal use cases, but TraceTogether data is not exempt from section 22 of the CPC. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs (Correction by Written Statement)", Official Report, 5 January 2021, Vol 95, Issue No 15, Correction by Written Statement section.]

The Police can only do so – meaning can only ask for access – by requiring a person involved in or assisting a criminal investigation to produce either his smartphone or his token. Frankly, and I think Members know me well and I am always very frank. Frankly, I had not thought of the CPC when I spoke earlier.

This application of the CPC is not unique to TraceTogether data. Other forms of sensitive data, for example, phone or banking records, which may be protected by specific privacy laws are also, nevertheless, subject to the provision of the CPC. And from time to time, the Police have done so, with proper safeguards and with the good outcomes that Singaporeans have come to expect from our Police investigations.

I think Singaporeans can understand why section 20 of the CPC confers such broad powers. There may be serious crimes, like murders or terrorist incidents where the use of TraceTogether data in Police investigations may be necessary in the public interest. The Police must be given the tools to bring criminals to justice and protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. And especially in very serious cases and where lives are at stake, it is not reasonable for us to say that certain classes of data should be out of reach of the Police. But this power – on the part of the Police to access data – must be exercised judiciously and with utmost restraint.

Mr Speaker, we do not take the trust of Singaporeans lightly. We cannot prevail in the battle against COVID-19 if Singaporeans did not trust the public health authorities and the Government of Singapore.

We are grateful that more than three-quarters of our residents have chosen to participate in the TraceTogether programme. It reflects not only their willingness to play a part in our collective fight against COVID-19, but also their confidence in the Government's commitment to protect the data so collected.

I want to again assure Singaporeans that your confidence is not misplaced. We will protect your privacy. I would add that, once the COVID-19 pandemic is over and there is no longer a need for contact tracing, we will most happily and cheerfully stand the TraceTogether programme down.

Mr Speaker, Members of this House, every society has to find the right balance, the right balance between protecting public health on one hand and personal privacy on the other hand. I believe it is possible to find that optimal point by being transparent, by being open, by being diligent, disciplined and doing our best all the time collectively.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will be happy to take questions with your permission.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I did not expect Minister to issue this statement at this current point in time, but I think it behoves me to ask some questions.

I thank Minister for acknowledging that the CPC was not really in his contemplation when that statement was made. I think Minister has made that remark in good faith and we will take it as it is.

But Minister made another comment about the Police judiciously using the information that is collected by TraceTogether. Can the Minister further explain under what circumstances the Police would be calling on that information because Police investigations would, by nature of our legislation, comprise of a wide spectrum of offences. So, the expectation cannot be that this information could be used at first instance whenever a Police investigation commences.

I am also mindful as to whether this question should be put to the Minister for Home Affairs or the Minister-in-charge of Smart Nation. So, I think some clarification of this would be quite important for members of the public because everybody wants TraceTogether to succeed, in view of the public health considerations. But this particular point has done has caused consternation and that also probably explains why the Minister has decided to make this clarification.

I thank the Member. I think Mr Singh will know under section 20 of the CPC, the Police are authorised to seek any information within the possession of a person. There are various provisions. As long as the seeking of such information is not excluded by some other written law. There are some provisions and some written laws which circumscribe the exercise of Police powers. Subject to that, the CPC gives the power to the Police and when such a power is given, the Police are obviously under a duty as well.

To give you an example. Let us say there is a murder and the victim, the victim's family and information is available on the TraceTogether token. If Police chose not to seek that information, you can imagine how the victim's family and indeed the rest of Singapore might react to that situation. You could even argue that there can be a judicial review application in such a situation.

However, given that this TraceTogether token is necessary for dealing with the pandemic and it is of national importance and its purposes are to help us deal with the pandemic, the Police approach has been and will be that it is pretty much restricted to very serious offences. And while that requirement is not in the legislation, it will be carefully considered within the Police and discretion will be exercised in seeking this information.

Mr Christopher de Souza.

I had wanted to ask if there was a protocol for officers to use the data reasonably. I think that has been answered by Minister, and whether the data can be collected for all crimes or just serious crimes and that is already been answered.

My remaining clarification is, will the data be deleted at the end of the investigations, if it does not yield anything or at the end of the case?

Can you come again with your question?

The third clarification is, will the data be deleted at the end of the investigations?

If the data is of no particular use, yes, it will be deleted. Otherwise, it will have to be produced in Court.

And in trial.

And in trial or use for trial purposes, even if not produced in Court.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Thank you, Sir. Two clarifications.

Minister Balakrishnan just now said that once the pandemic is passed, the TraceTogether programme will be stood down. My question is, will the data that collected by TraceTogether including data that is beyond 21 days, will that be stored on a server and will that still be accessible by the Police if they invoke the CPC?

And secondly, has the Government considered the impact that yesterday's clarification would have on the adoption and the usage of the TraceTogether app as well as the token? Because as I mentioned yesterday, although we might have 78% adoption, there is no real way of finding out whether people actually using the system because you may have it downloaded on your phone, but you can switch off your Bluetooth when you enter the building or you could use what is called a Faraday bag to keep the token. So, there are many different ways which people can prevent themselves from being tracked if they could well be criminals or engaging criminal activities.

Which is more important then? Is it the fight against this pandemic or the exceptional circumstances where the Police, with all their other powers on hand, are not able to trace where the person is and track the person down?

I thank Mr Giam for that very useful set of supplementary questions. His first point was – what happens post-pandemic? We all look forward to that day.

First, let me deal with the data in your phones and in your tokens. As I said, all that data, first of all, is encrypted and is auto-purged after 25 days. You do not need to wait for the end of the pandemic before your longer term historical data beyond 25 days is auto-deleted.

I will volunteer an extra supplementary question for you – what about the data on patients and close contacts?

Which with the patient's consent or with the close contact's consent and, in fact, active participation – you will know if you look at the app, you actually have to receive a PIN from MOH and you will have to authorise that upload – that data would reside, when you upload it, in a database that MOH's contact tracers have.

I would imagine that so long as the pandemic is alive and posing a clear and present threat, MOH will want to have that data available because it may be the start of a larger transmission chain.

But I believe that once the pandemic has passed, that data – certainly, the specific, personalised data – those fields should be eliminated. For research purposes, I believe MOH may want to still have epidemiologic data but it should be anonymised. It should not be personalised, it should not be individualised.

This is a very important point that you have raised and I think you should continue to ask this point as the pandemic and our response to it evolves.

Your second question is a very important point as well, which is what impact does all this open discussion have on participation and on the way we handle the pandemic itself?

The Member will recall – in fact, I know he had paid attention to this issue even before coming into Parliament this time. There were people who said, "Well, you have got a tool. Make it compulsory. Just enforce it. This is a clear and present emergency."

Members will recall that on numerous occasions in this House and outside this House, I have asked that to the maximum extent, I am going to try to make this voluntary. A much harder target, an approach which requires constant explanation – sometimes, I will get it wrong and when I get it wrong, I will just come clean and say so – and persuasion.

You should be asking me, "Why do you take such a 'ley chey', labourious approach?"

That is because I believe that our victory over this pandemic is not by us sitting up here and issuing rules and edicts, but that our people must understand not only the measures that we are implementing but why we are implementing it, the spirit behind it, so that with their understanding and voluntary and full cooperation, we can achieve success.

The reason we are now in this happy situation – and I tell you, in stark contrast to virtually anywhere else in the world – is not just because we have two wonderful co-chairmen, Minister Gan and Minister Lawrence Wong. It is not because we have such technological wizardry. It is trust, it is understanding, it is cooperation and it is collective responsibility.

The answer to the question yesterday – when Minister of State Desmond Tan answered it – is that we want to be completely above board and transparent. The reason I asked the Speaker's permission to make this clarification is precisely because of this.

If there is disquiet, if there is uncertainty, we must answer it. I must answer it openly, transparently.

Mr Giam, I might be right, I might be wrong. You might agree with me, you might disagree with me. But regardless, at all times, in this House and outside, we must be forthright, honest, open, transparent and do the best that we can.

It is in that spirit, therefore, that we have these open discussions and why I remain confident that the participation rate in contact tracing, using the latest tools that we have available, will remain high and why I hope we will continue to one of the bright spots in the world.

This is a new year but I can tell you at a worldwide level, this is not going to be the year that COVID-19 lifts its impact on the world.

Let us wait and see, but I appeal to you – by all means, continue to push us, ask us, question us, disagree with us. This is the attitude by which we will make progress and overcome.

Your final point was on the pandemic. You tried to juxtapose between what we need to do in the immediate short term as an emergency response to the pandemic and the longer term interest of how the Police needs to be able to safeguard public security and safety.

I am not the Minister for Home Affairs but let me give you some insight from looking at the situation across the world.

In different jurisdictions, the thermostat for how much investigative power you give the Police versus the individual's right to privacy is different. If you go to the United States, for instance, you will recall the case where there was a terrorist – I think it was at San Bernardino – and his phone was locked. The terrorist was obviously dead but the FBI needed access to that data and could not legally get access to the data.

This is their system and they are entitled to make their own regime and their own thermostat. But what happened at the end of that? We know now that in fact, they paid millions of dollars to get a hacking firm to hack that phone in order to gain access to the contents.

Now, I am not making this as a criticism or offering it as a model for us. I am just making the point that every society has to get that balance right.

In Singapore, I submit to you that we have a Police force that is not only excellent in its investigative methods but a Police force that enjoys the trust and the cooperation of all of us. It is this relationship, this trust, that enables us at any point in time, regardless of the crisis confronting us, to set the balance right and to be effective.

I will tell you very frankly. After I realised that the CPC applied to this, I did think, I did have sleepless nights wondering, "Should I try to persuade my colleagues to change the law?"

But, having thought about it, discussed, consulted people both within and outside this House, I have come to the conclusion that right now we are doing well. We are able to keep Singapore safe, we are able to keep and deal with the current crisis. And so long as this Government is able to maintain our reputation for openness, transparency, reliability, I think we are still on the right track.

But if you have specific suggestions on legislative or policy changes, we would be happy to hear from you and from the Leader of the Opposition. Thank you again, Mr Giam.

Ms Tin Pei Ling

Thank you, Minister, for the clarification. I have a couple of questions to ask.

First of all, I understand that the TT token itself does not have the GPS function and that the data will be deleted after 25 days. For the handphone app, I would just like to clarify because the handphone itself has GPS function. Would this also apply to the TT application on the phone? I understand that the data will be deleted or purged after 25 days. I just want to seek clarification and confirmation on this.

The next question that I have is that prior to COVID-19, the Police has a range of ways of collecting data or information that they need for criminal investigation. Therefore, in this case, given it is only exchanges of Bluetooth information, how is the data from this TT useful to Police investigation into crimes? I hope to get a better understanding on this.

Lastly, I really appreciate the effort to make such a statement in Parliament, in this Chamber, because this is a matter of public access. Everything will be on public record. Therefore, I would like to ask the Minister for his reaffirmation that the vast majority of the ordinary Singaporeans out there will not be affected by this question that we are now exploring. That the data that is being taken and collected by TT is really only for a very selected purpose and that is only for serious criminal investigation.

I thank Ms Tin for those three questions, some technical, some operational.

First, on the technical point. The token has no GPS chip and we have opened it up, we have allowed external parties to dissemble it. I can guarantee you there is no GPS chip. There is no way that the token can keep track of your location.

Ms Tin makes the point that most smartphones nowadays do have a GPS chip. But we have been very careful in our coding for the TraceTogether app – that it does not keep a record of GPS locations. The only thing that the TraceTogether app keeps track of is proximity on the basis of Bluetooth data.

On your second question – whether this is useful? I mean that is an operational question, which I will leave to the Police – whether proximity data is useful or not and how they would use it. But, again, I will stand by what the Minister for Home Affairs has said – that this is not something to be accessed lightly or trivially, only for serious crimes and to be used very judiciously, and with utmost discretion applied.

The final question was to give an assurance that the majority will not be affected. Ms Tin, I will put it to you this way. The vast majority of Singaporeans are not involved in or assisting in criminal investigations. In that sense, they are not affected. But TraceTogether and its success affect the welfare and the public health of all of us. In that sense, confidence in this programme makes a difference to all of us.

Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Thank you, Speaker. I have two questions for Minister Vivian Balakrishnan. Firstly, how many instances are there where the Police has tapped the data from the TraceTogether app? Secondly, I would like to thank the Minister for making his statement, because since yesterday, there has been a lot of responses from the public. However, I would also like the Minister to clarify further. One, when did he discover that his statement that he made before, is going to be affected by the CPC? Two, his message today, is it that he wants to apologise that the Government or the Minister had made an oversight? Or is his message telling us that in Singapore, we should just take it that the CPC will be able to access all the information that they have on us in Singapore?

I thank Mr Leong. How many instances? That is an operational question. As far as I am aware, so far, I think there has been only one in which involved a murder case. But I am not privy to operational details and I should not be and, therefore, I am not in a position to comment further on the investigations.

I told you just now that I made the comments and statements earlier. The CPC was not in my mind. Subsequently, we have been having discussions, especially over the last few weeks as to whether, and I alluded to it earlier, we should in fact change the law or whether we continue as we are now. In any case, we decided it is better to be upfront and that is why we were very glad that Mr de Souza asked the question and Minister of State Mr Desmond Tan answered it yesterday.

I have been in the House now for almost 20 years. All the staff who have worked with me over the years will know that I am obsessively concerned with accuracy, needless to say, absolute adherence to honesty. And that means over the years, from time to time, when I have misspoken, I have said so. I have never shied away from saying so because, as I said, it is far more important to maintain trust. And that I might be right or I might be wrong or I might have mistaken some thing or overlook something but, rest assured, when I discover it, I will say so. And to the best extent possible we will find a solution together. That is my approach and I do not see any need to change from that. And I hope you understand.

Mr Murali Pillai.

With your indulgence, Sir, I would like to raise a point of information. I recall the hon Member Mr Giam in a debate on the Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Bill raised the possibility of linking the standards under the Personal Data Protection Act and the Government's standards in relation to data protection, with the General Data Protection Regulations of the EU.

As far as the General Data Protection Regulations of the EU is concerned, there is a carve-out in relation to police investigation. In fact, police may access personal data in relation to detection, prevention, investigation as well as prosecution of criminal offences. So, in a sense, there is parity in relation to the Singapore situation with that of the situation in the EU. That is all, Sir.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Yes, Mr Speaker. I want to thank Minister Vivian for his candour and explaining the circumstances and the thought that went behind the considerations whether or not to have a carve-out for the CPC for the TraceTogether data.

I just wanted to clarify that my purpose for raising that intervention yesterday was mainly in the interest of maximising the adoption of TraceTogether. It was not exactly from a civil liberty perspective although there is a time for discussion about that in the future. But my intervention was mainly for the purpose of ensuring that there is a maximum adoption of the TraceTogether system because I have been a strong advocate of it on the ground with my residents in the face of quite a bit of scepticism actually, about the system. I have exactly tried to convince people to not only use the token but also use the app and use the app instead of using the token if they have a mobile phone.

So, I think I just want to put on record that I do support the TraceTogether system and I do encourage Singaporeans to use the token or the app as much as they can.

In response to Member Mr Murali's point about the GDPA and the PDPA, I do not intend to open up a whole debate about this. But just to clarify that, if I recall right, what I said during the debate was that the GDPA does have carve-outs for security purposes. So, it is possible to have a PDPA that has carve-outs that allow the Police do certain things and access certain data. It is not incongruous to what I said earlier on.

Mr Vikram Nair.

Thank you. I have listened to the discussion and explanation. One point that I would like to make is that I would actually support the use of TraceTogether for Police investigations. Because not only is it necessarily helpful in finding out who may have been in the vicinity of a crime, for example, but it can also help exonerate people who are wrongly accused.

So, for example, if you accused and TraceTogether will tell you who was around you, it may help you establish an alibi. So, I would suggest that people who are accused or assisting in investigations, should be able to request that the Police do check their TraceTogether to see if they may have alibis at the time of the offence.

Okay, let us move on. Minister for Transport. We will move on to the Multimodel Transport Bill.

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Transport, I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a second time”.

The Multimodal Transport Bill 2020 will set up a new Act to give effect to the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport. This provides for the standardisation of provisions relating to the international multimodal transport of goods to and from any ASEAN member country, under a multimodal transport contract.

A harmonised transport system will enhance regional connectivity in ASEAN and facilitate the free movement of goods, services and investment.

To support this goal, ASEAN member states have signed three framework agreements. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit was signed in 1998, followed by the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport in 2005. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport was signed in 2009.

ASEAN member states have been ratifying these agreements. In 2019, Singapore completed the ratification of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport.

We are now introducing the Multimodal Transport Bill, to facilitate Singapore ratifying the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport later this year.

After all ASEAN member states have ratified the agreement, it will provide a single, unified framework for the multimodal transport of goods within ASEAN. This will include market access for Singapore logistics operators to operate in other ASEAN member states under a set of regionally aligned standards.

Sir, the Multimodal Transport Bill applies to the carriage of goods via more than one transport mode, whether through air, land or sea. These goods are carried by a multimodal transport operator registered with the Competent National Body established in the ASEAN member states, under a single multimodal transport contract where the origin or destination of the goods delivery is in an ASEAN member state.

The Bill covers four key areas, which are: (a) Registration with the Singapore Competent National Body; (b) Issuance of Multimodal Transport Document; (c) Liabilities of Multimodal Transport Operators; and (d) Duties and Liabilities of Consignors.

I will go through each of these areas.

First, the Bill will put in place the legislative framework for Singapore to recognise the Competent National Body, established by each ASEAN member state to maintain a registry of multimodal transport operators, or MTOs for short. For Singapore, the Land Transport Authority will be the Competent National Body.

MTOs have the option to join the registry. For these MTOs, LTA will issue them with registration certificates, after assessing that they have met requirements such as having insurance to cover any payment of claims, and maintaining a minimum level of assets.

Once issued, the registration certificate is valid for one year and can be renewed. The Competent National Body can also cancel the registration of MTOs if they have falsified material or contravened conditions of the certificate.

The second area of the Bill relates to the Multimodal Transport Document.

It will serve as a common documentational framework to be issued by MTOs registered with a Competent National Body. MTOs will be able to issue this document to consignors, which are the parties engaging the MTOs for the conveyance of the goods.

This document will be recognised by all ASEAN member states to certify that the MTO has taken charge of the goods and will deliver them in accordance with the multimodal transport contract.