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Grounds publishedDecided 1 Dec 2009
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Court of Appeal

ADF v Public Prosecutor

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[2009] SGCA 57Case no. Cr App 6/2008, 12/2008

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  1. V K Rajah JA:

  2. Introduction

  3. [1] This appeal arises from a decision of the High Court convicting ADF, of physically abusing a domestic maid on several occasions. At the trial below, ADF, faced a total of 13 charges for voluntarily causing hurt, committing rape, carnal intercourse and outraging the modesty of his maid (“the victim”). The victim had been employed as a domestic maid by ADF’s wife. ADF was convicted on five charges for voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”). However, he was acquitted on all the charges pertaining to sexual offending as the Prosecution was unable to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that those offences had been committed.

  4. [2] ADF was convicted on the first, ninth, tenth, 12th and 13th charges. In these grounds of decision, I will address only these five charges as they are the ones immediately relevant to this appeal. The said charges are reproduced below.

  5. First Charge:

  6. Ninth Charge:

  7. Tenth Charge:

  8. 12th charge:

  9. 13th charge:

  10. [3] ADF made a qualified admission of guilt to the first charge. The first charge was for an incident that occurred on the night of 29 January 2006. ADF claimed that the incident happened in the morning of 29 January 2006 and not at night. The trial judge (the “Judge”) subsequently amended the first charge to the morning of 29 January 2006. ADF also pleaded guilty to the ninth charge. ADF pleaded not guilty to the tenth, 12th and 13th charges. The Judge sentenced ADF to three weeks’ imprisonment on the first charge, and to six months’ imprisonment for each of the ninth, tenth, 12th and 13th charges. The sentences for the ninth and 13th charges were ordered to run consecutively. The sentences in the first, 10th and 12th charges were ordered to run concurrently. As a result, the cumulative sentence imposed on ADF was a term of 12 months’ imprisonment. The Judge delivered separate grounds of decision for the convictions ([2008] SGHC 171 (“GD 1”)) and sentences ([2009] SGHC 27 (“GD 2”)).

  11. [4] ADF has appealed against the convictions on the tenth, 12th and 13th charges, as well as the sentences imposed on all five charges. The Prosecution has not appealed against the acquittals but has instead appealed against the length of the sentences for all five charges on the ground that they are manifestly inadequate.

  12. Background facts

  13. [5] ADF is a 37-year-old police officer holding the rank of staff sergeant. He joined the Singapore Police Force in April 1993. His last posting was at the Intellectual Property Rights Branch, Criminal Investigation Division, as an Investigation Officer.

  14. [6] The victim is a 26-year-old Indonesian maid. She started work with ADF and his wife in December 2004. This was her first job in Singapore. She had previously worked as a domestic maid in Indonesia and Malaysia. Her duties were to look after her employers’ infant daughter and to perform household duties. As she was conversant in Mandarin, communications with ADF and his wife were in Mandarin. The victim spoke little English. According to the victim, she did not receive any monthly salary while working for ADF and his wife. The arrangement was that she would be paid only when she returned home.

  15. [7] At the onset of the victim’s employment, ADF instructed her to record all the duties she performed and their timing in a notebook. She was required to hang the notebook around her neck using a rubber band. The victim claimed that ADF had also given her another notebook in which she had to record all her mistakes. The entries paint a disturbing picture of an oppressive period of employment experienced by the victim. It will be necessary only to refer to a sampling of entries to get a flavour of the contents. For example, the fifth entry in this book read:

  16. The sixth entry read:

  17. ADF apparently had instructed the victim that any food she consumed without their permission was tantamount to stealing. As I mentioned earlier, the victim was not paid regularly. She was therefore wholly dependent upon ADF and his wife for her dietary needs. In addition to controlling her meals, ADF, his counsel acknowledged, had affixed three padlocks on the gate to the flat “to control [her] movement”.

  18. [8] Over time, ADF and his wife became increasingly unhappy with the victim’s work lapses. Counsel for ADF, in his written submissions, acknowledged “that [ADF] had indeed wanted to make the [victim’s] life miserable, but that was mainly through psychological warfare with her”. He, however, maintained that this was provoked and brought about by “numerous unhappy incidents”. The Judge found that the victim was afraid of ADF as he often mistreated her. She testified that on some occasions, when he was unhappy with her, he would threaten “to send her to Batam to be a prostitute” or to send her to prison if she disobeyed him (GD 1 at [13]). While ADF denied making the prostitution threats, he admitted making the imprisonment threats. I need only say, before I narrate the material facts, that these details offering a brief glimpse into her-day-to day life outline a disquieting narrative of an abusive relationship.

  19. [9] The offences unexpectedly came to light only on the morning of 5 May 2006. Jeanie Cacanando (“Jeanie”), a Filipino maid working for the occupiers of the flat next to ADF, noticed the victim crying. While conversing with the victim, Jeannie learnt of the abuse that the victim had been enduring. They were, however, unable to communicate effectively because the victim spoke little English, and Jeanie did not speak Bahasa Indonesia or Mandarin. Later, Jeanie persuaded Mdm Lau Eng Teng (“Mdm Lau”), an elderly lady residing in a neighbouring flat, to speak to the victim in Mandarin. As Mdm Lau spoke to the victim, she noticed that her right eye was blue black and the pupil had reddish specks. Upon being prompted, the victim showed her further injuries on her hips. According to Mdm Lau, the victim’s hips had a number of plainly visible blue-black marks. The victim tearfully informed Mdm Lau that she had been both physically and sexually abused by her employer and that her chest and abdomen hurt. Mdm Lau advised the victim to make a police report but the victim declined to do this as she was apprehensive about the consequences. She was fearful that if she did so “her male employer [who] was working in CID … would put her in jail”. Disturbed by what she had learnt, Mdm Lau, without consulting the victim, thereafter notified the police about the victim’s predicament, informing that, “the maid was hit by the owner and locked in the house”.

  20. [10] The police officers who responded to Mdm Lau’s complaint found the victim hysterical, trembling, crying and unable to communicate with them. The police were unable to unlock the gate and entered the premises only after ADF arrived. Later, on being interviewed by the police, the victim alleged that during the period 29 January 2006 to 5 May 2006, ADF had both physically and sexually assaulted her. Upon completion of investigations, ADF was charged with 13 offences; see above at [1].

  21. [11] On 5 May 2006, the victim was examined and treated at the Emergency Department at National University Hospital. Dr Chan Kim Poh (“Dr Chan”) attended to her. When queried in the course of cross-examination, Dr Chan confirmed that there was no translator present when he attended to her. He spoke to the victim in English and not in Mandarin. Nevertheless, he was certain that she understood him because she nodded and answered his questions. According to Dr Chan’s report, the victim had told him that she was assaulted by her employer on 4 May 2006 and raped by him on 13 April 2006. She had also been kicked by him over her left lower chest and pinched over her left breast. She complained of pain in her left lower ribs.

  22. [12] On clinical examination, Dr Chan noted the following injuries:

  23. Dr Chan eventually administered to the victim a dose of intramuscular doclofenac for pain relief. In his report, Dr Chan stated that “[a]n estimate of the age of the injuries is between 1 to 14 days”.

  24. [13] The victim was also examined by Dr Cheah Wei Keat (“Dr Cheah”) on 18 May 2006. According to Dr Cheah, the victim complained of discomfort in the lower left chest. On examination, he found mild tenderness over the chest wall but there was no bruising. In Dr Cheah’s opinion, the bruising was likely due to soft tissue injury and no specific treatment was required.

  25. The appeal against the convictions

  26. The relevant provisions

  27. [14] All the convictions were in relation to s 323 of the Penal Code read with s 73(2) of the Penal Code. The relevant provisions are reproduced below:

  28. [15] When the Penal Code was amended in 2008, the penalties for s 323 were increased to imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine which may extend to $5,000, or both. However, these amendments are not applicable to this case as the subject offences were committed prior to the amendments coming into force. Therefore, the maximum sentence for each of the offences on which the accused has been convicted remained one and a half years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,500, or both.

  29. Appellate intervention

  30. [16] Before I deal with the appeal on the convictions, I ought to perhaps reiterate that an appellate court has a limited role when it is asked to assess findings of fact made by the trial court. In summary, the role is circumscribed as follows:

  31. (a) Where the finding of fact hinges on the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility and veracity of witnesses based on the demeanour of the witness, the appellate court will interfere only if the finding of fact can be shown to be plainly wrong or against the weight of evidence: see PP v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR 601 at [32] and Yap Giau Beng Terence v PP [1998] 3 SLR 656 (“Yap Giau Beng Terrence”) at [24]. An appellate court may also intervene, if, after taking into account all the advantages available to the trial judge, it concludes that the verdict is wrong in law and therefore unreasonable: Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP [2006] 4 SLR 45 (“Jagatheesan”)at [43].

  32. (b) Where the finding of fact by the trial judge is based on the inferences drawn from the internal consistency (or lack thereof) in the content of witnesses’ testimony or the external consistency between the content of their testimony and the extrinsic evidence, an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to assess the veracity of the witness’s evidence. The real tests are how consistent the story is within itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination, and how it fits in with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case: see Jagatheesan at [40]. If a decision is inconsistent with the material objective evidence on record, appellate intervention will usually be warranted.

  33. (c) An appellate court is as competent as any trial judge to draw any necessary inferences of fact from the circumstances of the case: see Yap Giau Beng Terence at [24].

  34. [17] In PP v UI [2008] 4 SLR 500, this Court summarised the legal principles relating to appellate review of sentences. The Court stated at [12] that an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb the sentence imposed by the trial court except where it is satisfied that:

  35. [18] In relation to the question of what is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate, this Court accepted that the threshold would only be met if there was a need for a substantial alteration to the sentence rather than an insignificant correction to remedy the injustice.

  36. Significance of acquittal on some of the charges

  37. [19] The Judge acquitted ADF of seven charges of sexual abuse and one charge of physical abuse. In addition, the Judge amended the first charge of physical abuse after accepting ADF’s version of events which was that the incident happened in the morning (as opposed to at night). The Defence argued that the inference to be drawn from the acquittals and amendment of charge was that the victim’s evidence was in all likelihood not unusually convincing for those charges. As such, the acquittals and amendment should seriously affect the victim’s credibility and the Prosecution’s overall case. In support of this proposition, the Defence cited my decision in XP v PP [2008] 4 SLR 686.

  38. [20] Additionally, the Defence cited Jagatheesan to say that while there was no absolute prohibition or legal impediment in convicting an accused on the evidence of a single witness, the court had to be mindful of the inherent dangers of such a conviction, and ought to subject the evidence at hand to close scrutiny regardless of whether the witness was an accomplice or an interested witness. The witness’s testimony also had to be so compelling that the Prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt solely on the basis of that witness’s testimony. While acknowledging that minor discrepancies in a witness’s testimony should not be held against the witness in assessing his or her credibility, ADF’s counsel argued that a “systematic and widespread pattern of many inconsistencies coming together” can destroy the credibility of that witness. According to his counsel, the fact that ADF was acquitted of several charges meant that there was a “systematic and widespread pattern of many inconsistencies coming together” which ought to destroy the victim’s credibility altogether. The Judge should not have accepted any part of her evidence unless there was corroboration from independent and extrinsic sources.

  39. [21] I do not see any force in these arguments. In XP v PP, nineteen charges were initially brought against the accused by seven different complainants, concerning outrage of modesty offences under s 354 of the Penal Code. Of these, ten charges were stood down. Out of the remaining charges, the appellant was acquitted of six and convicted of three charges. On appeal, the convictions were set aside. On the trial judge’s decision to only give grounds of decision for the three charges on which she convicted the accused, I had observed, at [65]:

  40. [22] The facts in XP v PP were entirely different. It was a case where several similar charges emanated from a few complainants who also gave evidence to corroborate each other. The Defence alleged collusion amongst the complainants. The district judge dismissed the allegation of collusion and convicted the accused on the allegations made by two of the complainants. She found that the evidence of these complainants was corroborated by the evidence of the other complainants. However, she had, nevertheless, apparently found the testimony of these complainants not credible in relation to the charges involving them and acquitted the accused of those charges. On appeal, I held that if the district judge did not find the testimony of the other complainants credible, she could have erred in holding that there was no collusion amongst the complainants. The district judge thus left a legal void by not stating her reasons for acquitting the appellant on the other charges especially since she had dismissed the allegation of collusion.

  41. [23] The present case concerns allegations from only one complainant. If the Judge found that a particular offence was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not mean that the Judge must have found the witness to be one who lacked credibility. By way of illustration, I refer to Farida Begam d/o Mohd Artham v PP [2001] 4 SLR 610 (“Farida Begam”), where the employer was acquitted of some charges and convicted on only one, the trial judge clearly stated that the appellant’s acquittal on three other charges was not due to the complainant’s unreliability but because of the lack of specific details in her evidence. Yong Pung How CJ unhesitatingly affirmed the convictions on appeal.

  42. [24] In the present case, the Judge has lucidly stated, at [5]-[8] of GD 1:

  43. Here, while the Judge noted that there were inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence, he did not say that her evidence was unbelievable or concocted. Instead, he expressly stated that the inconsistencies “were not critical, and they did not detract from the basis on which I have found [ADF] to be guilty on the charges”: at [8] of GD 1. In my opinion, it is plain that even though ADF was acquitted of some charges this does not mean that the victim was not a credible witness. Rather, it appears to me that the Judge was guided by caution and not the victim’s credibility, or lack thereof, in acquitting ADF of those charges.

  44. [25] In any event, the fact that inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence surfaced does not mean that there was a “systematic and widespread pattern of many inconsistencies coming together” which ought to destroy her credibility altogether. The following observations made by Yong CJ in Govindaraj Perumalsamy v PP [2004] SGHC 16 are instructive, at [30]–[31]:

  45. [26] That ADF did in fact, abuse the victim on several occasions is clear beyond peradventure because of the objective evidence available, viz, photographs and medical evidence. The photographs were taken and the medical examination was completed some time after the injuries were actually inflicted. Yet, the extent of the visible injuries, as can be seen from the photographs, were substantial and obviously inflicted over a period of time. What remained to be proved were the particulars alleged in the various charges preferred against ADF. This required the Judge to assess, in relation to each charge, how the victim’s testimony measured up to ADF’s testimony against the backdrop of the established objective evidence. This matter is no different from the typical domestic maid abuse case in that the only direct evidence available is that from the victim. Nevertheless, it bears reiteration here, that the objective medical evidence partially affirms that the abuse clearly took place over a period of time. This is not a case of a one-off offender and or a single incident that was reported immediately after it occurred. Furthermore, given the trauma experienced by the victim, it is perfectly understandable that inconsistencies surfaced in her testimony in relation to some aspects of the incidents. As observed in Jagatheesan at [82]:

  46. [27] The trial below spanned over a period of 28 hearing days. The Judge had ample opportunity to observe both ADF and the victim and to assess their credibility. He convicted ADF on the first and ninth charge on the basis of his admissions. In relation to each of the three other charges under appeal, there was medical evidence of injuries inflicted on the victim. This medical evidence, together with the testimony from ADF and the victim, was sufficient to convince the Judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the offences did take place. In contrast, it is to be noted that there was no irrefutable medical evidence, besides the victim’s testimony, to support the allegations of the sexual offending and the Judge gave ADF the benefit of the doubt in holding that the aforesaid allegations were not made out.

  47. [28] I am satisfied that the Judge had painstakingly and correctly considered the evidence for each charge that was preferred against ADF and where a reasonable doubt remained unresolved, the Judge acquitted ADF. His reasoning and determinations in relation to the various convictions cannot be faulted. These are my detailed reasons for upholding the Judge’s findings of fact in relation to the convictions.

  48. Tenth charge

  49. The evidence

  50. [29] In court, the victim testified that, on the morning of 29 April 2006, she could not find the baby’s toys. ADF then repeatedly kicked the victim on both sides of her hips. She noticed that there were blue-black marks on both sides of her hips. The victim had not referred to this incident when a statement was recorded from her by the police on 5 May 2006. However, she mentioned the incident in her statement to the police on 9 May 2006.

  51. [30] The Prosecution highlighted the ecchymoses on both sides of the victim’s hips recorded by Dr Chan as having been caused by the assault on this date. The photographs of the victim taken on 5 May 2006 also show a number of serious bruises on the victim’s hips. The Prosecution claims that the bruises were a result of the assault on this day.

  52. [31] In his police interviews, ADF denied kicking her. In a statement that was recorded from him on 26 May 2006 the following exchange took place:

  53. In court, ADF denied having kicked the hips of the victim on 29 April 2006. He said:

  54. The above response was referred to at [20] of GD 1, where the Judge observed that they “[overlooked] the events of 29 January 2006 referred to in [14]”. The 29 January 2006 incident relates to the first charge (see [2] above). According to the victim, ADF knocked her with his knuckles repeatedly as she forgot to pack the baby’s hat and napkins when they went out that day. ADF could not recall the reason for that earlier beating.

  55. The Judge’s decision

  56. [32] The Judge accepted the victim’s testimony and convicted ADF on this charge. The victim’s evidence was that she was kicked on the hips on only one occasion, 29 April 2006. Dr Chan found that the age of all the injuries he recorded was somewhere between one to 14 days. The Judge determined that Dr Chan’s report, therefore, supported the victim’s version of events since the ecchymoses on the victim’s hips could correspond to injuries inflicted on 29 April 2006.

  57. [33] The Judge was also of the view that the victim’s failure to mention the 29 April incident in her first statement to the police given on 5 May 2006 did not mean that her evidence was inconsistent. That statement was taken on the very day of her abrupt removal from the flat, and was recorded from 10.15pm to 2.00am the next morning. The Judge concluded that this must have been a traumatic and exhausting period for her and she may not have recalled the incident. He noted she had referred to this incident in her next statement recorded on 9 May 2006. It was also apparent from the Judge’s observation at [20] of GD 1 (referred to above) that he did not find ADF’s explanation that he would hit the victim only when the latter caused his daughter to “cry or [be] injured”, to be credible, given that the victim had earlier been assaulted on 29 January 2006 for simply forgetting to pack the baby’s hat and napkins.

  58. My decision

  59. [34] ADF contended that the Judge erred in concluding that the medical evidence corroborated the victim’s evidence that she was kicked on 29 April 2006. Dr Chan had not specifically stated that the hip injuries were between one to 14 days. His opinion obviously extended to all the injuries found on the victim. ADF argued that the medical evidence could equally corroborate ADF’s version which was that he kicked her on her hips on 4 May 2006, not on 29 April 2006.

  60. [35] I accept that the medical evidence does not firmly establish the precise date when the injuries were inflicted. Nevertheless, the Judge had not mistakenly evaluated the medical evidence. At [17] of GD 1, he noted:

  61. Dr Chan’s report confirmed that there were injuries on both her left and right hips. This was consistent with the testimony of the victim. Additionally, the Judge noted that an injury on 29 April 2006 would fall within the one to fourteen-day period. In this way, Dr Chan’s report affirmed the victim’s testimony. The Judge had not concluded that the medical evidence was contrary to ADF’s version. He only determined that the medical evidence supported the victim’s testimony.

  62. [36] ADF additionally argued that the Judge erred in relying on the 9 May 2006 statement. During the victim’s cross-examination, the Defence had successfully applied to adduce the victim’s 5 May 2006 statement on the ground that the statement was inconsistent with her evidence in court in relation to the charge of rape. While the 5 May 2006 statement was tendered only for the purpose of impeachment of the victim with regard to her evidence on the charge of rape, the Judge permitted the Defence to cross-examine the witness on all the other contents of the statement. The Prosecution in turn tendered the 9 May 2006 statement during the victim’s re-examination solely for the purpose of refuting any suggestion of consent in relation to the charge of rape. For this statement, the Judge only allowed the Defence to cross-examine the victim on the issue of consent for the charge of rape. The Defence therefore vigorously insisted that it was wrong for the Judge to rely on the victim’s narration of the incident on 29 April 2006 in the 9 May 2006 statement.

  63. [37] I agree with ADF’s counsel that the Judge should not have referred to the victim’s narration of events of the 29 April 2006 incident in her 9 May 2006 statement. However, the Judge had merely referred to that statement to explain that the victim’s failure to mention the 29 April 2006 incident in her earlier statement was not fatal. As observed by the Judge at [23]-[24] of GD 1:

  64. [38] It is plain to me that the Judge had, at the end of the day, properly relied on her testimony and Dr Chan’s report in convicting ADF on the tenth charge. In my opinion, the Judge’s determination that the Prosecution had proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be said to be either against the weight of evidence or incorrectly arrived at. After all, ADF himself was far from consistent in narrating his version of events in relation to this charge. Having reviewed the evidence, there were ample grounds not to accept ADF’s version of events.

  65. 12th charge

  66. The evidence

  67. [39] The victim claimed that on the night of 4 May 2006, ADF and his wife became angry with her for allowing their child to play with a ballpoint pen. ADF then asked the victim to go to the computer room where he kicked her several times on her stomach. He also ordered her to place her hands on her head while he kicked her. The victim found the kicks painful and she attempted to shield her stomach with her hands. A hand came into contact with ADF’s leg and this further infuriated him. He reprimanded her for hurting his leg and complained to his wife about this. His wife then kicked the victim’s stomach and scratched her chest. ADF returned after his wife left and continued kicking her stomach. After this, he raised one of his legs and pressed a foot against the victim’s chest, causing her breathing difficulties. He followed up by slapping her on the left and right sides of her face. The Prosecution submits that the tenderness over the left lower chest wall of the victim and the eczematous patches over her anterior abdominal wall that were recorded by Dr Chan were caused by the assault on this date and 5 May 2006.

  68. [40] In his statements to the police, ADF denied having committed the offence. However, during examination in chief, he admitted that he physically assaulted her on the night of 4 May 2006. According to ADF, his wife informed him that they were about to dress the baby after her bath when the baby hit her head on the floor as the victim had forgotten to put a cushion behind the baby. ADF acknowledged having used his legs to kick the victim and his hands to hit her. The following exchange between ADF and his counsel is pertinent:

  69. While ADF admitted to assaulting her, he did not plead guilty because he claimed that he kicked her on the hips and not in the abdomen because he did not want to cause internal injury to her.

  70. The Judge’s decision

  71. [41] The Judge found the victim’s recollection of the events more reliable than ADF’s stumbling account. He therefore found ADF guilty of the charge. In coming to this conclusion, the Judge noted that ADF had admitted to kicking and slapping the victim, though he had qualified this by saying that he kicked her hips and not her abdomen. ADF’s state of mind during that incident may have obscured his recollection. On the other hand, the victim was clear that she was kicked in the abdomen. She had complained to Dr Chan that her employer kicked her on 4 May 2006 on her lower left chest and that she had pain in the left lower ribs. The Judge felt that there was no reason for her to say that ADF kicked her in the abdomen if he had kicked her hips.

  72. My decision

  73. [42] ADF’s counsel argued that the Judge failed to consider adequately the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. The victim testified that she was kicked on her abdomen and that ADF pressed his leg hard against her chest. However, she had informed Dr Chan that she was kicked on her left lower chest. This, counsel submitted, was a material discrepancy. Kicking was different from pressing and there is a clear distinction between the chest area and the abdomen area. Moreover, the Judge did not give sufficient weight to the fact that the victim did not mention to Dr Su Lin Lin (“Dr Su”) that she was kicked in her abdomen or that she felt pain at her abdomen. Dr Su was an Associate Consultant at the Department of General Obstetrics & Gynaecology at the National University Hospital and she examined the victim on 9 May 2006.

  74. [43] I note that Dr Chan testified that during the medical examination, no interpreter was present. The victim communicated in simple English, a smattering of Mandarin and some simple gestures. With regard to the injury to the chest, she did not use the word “chest”. Instead, she indicated the area of pain. The following questions addressed to Dr Chan by the Prosecution are relevant:

  75. [44] In assessing the victim’s testimony, consideration must be given to the fact that she was unable to effectively communicate in English. One should, therefore, be slow to split hairs over whether Dr Chan had accurately recorded the area of injury as the chest or abdomen. The victim had indicated to Dr Chan, by way of gestures, the general area where her employer had kicked her. It bears mention that Dr Chan stated that he could not remember if the victim informed him that she was kicked in the chest or he had used the term himself. As for the examination by Dr Su, I note that her focus were the alleged sexual assaults. In cross-examination, Dr Su confirmed that she did not focus on the bruises on the abdomen area because the victim had already seen the doctor at the Accident & Emergency Department. As such, the significance of the victim’s omission to mention the pain in her abdomen to Dr Su should not be overstated.

  76. [45] Mdm Lau and Jeanie were the first, of the witnesses who testified, to learn of the assaults. They confirmed that the victim clearly gestured that her employer had kicked her stomach. Both these witnesses are independent witnesses. As the Judge correctly noted, the significance of their evidence is that while the victim had informed them of the assault by ADF, she had not intended nor did she prompt them to act on her complaints. I agree that the real cogency of what she told them lies in the fact that she neither sought them out to complain nor did she request or expect Mdm Lau to notify the police.

  77. [46] Indeed, ADF himself admitted that the assault on 4 May 2006 was a bad assault as he had lost control of himself. It is pertinent to note that ADF’s counsel had as a result no alternative but to acknowledge the following in his closing trial submissions:

  78. Like the Judge, I find it difficult to accept that after he had lost his self-control and assaulted the victim “badly”, he was still able to ensure that he only measuredly kicked her hips and not other parts of her body to prevent the infliction of internal injuries. ADF had also admitted that the victim had not kept still and was squirming when he assaulted her. The Judge rightly found the victim’s recollection more reliable and I see no basis to interfere with this finding of fact, especially when ADF’s counsel concedes that “he could not recall exactly what he did”.

  79. [47] In the circumstances, I see no basis to interfere with the conviction on the 12th charge.

  80. 13th charge

  81. The evidence

  82. [48] In court, the victim testified that early in the morning of 5 May 2006 (the day the incidents were reported to the police), ADF’s wife had asked the victim to prepare milk for the baby. The victim inadvertently placed the wrong teat on the milk bottle. ADF and his wife were enraged with the victim over this. ADF then kicked her stomach a few times. The Prosecution contends that the tenderness over the victim’s left lower chest wall and the eczematous patches over her anterior abdominal wall that were recorded by Dr Chan were caused by the assault on this date.

  83. [49] According to the victim, after ADF kicked her in the stomach, he told her that even if she worked for two years, he would not send her to the airport but instead to prison. The victim was also told that she would not be paid her salary.

  84. [50] ADF denied having committed this offence. He claimed that this incident was a fabrication. The baby did not cry and he did not kick the victim.

  85. The Judge’s decision

  86. [51] The Judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was truthful when she alleged that ADF had kicked her abdomen that morning. The Judge felt that the evidence of Jeanie and Mdm Lau was crucial. They were independent and neutral witnesses who had no reason to lie or to help the victim by falsely incriminating ADF. When the victim informed them of the assault by ADF, she had not expected them to act on her complaints. She did not want to report the matter, and she had not expected Mdm Lau to unilaterally call the police.

  87. My decision

  88. [52] ADF’s defence was a bare denial. He also repeated the tired refrain that the victim had failed to mention the pain in the abdomen to Dr Su. I have already rejected this argument in relation to the 12th charge and do so here again.

  89. [53] ADF’s counsel also suggested that while both Mdm Lau and Jeanie were independent witnesses, the Judge had failed to appreciate that both of them were not eye-witnesses to the alleged assault. The Judge, I observe, was well aware that there were no eye-witnesses to the incident. He accepted that since the victim had been kicked in the abdomen on 4 May 2006, the injury reported in the medical report could have been due to the earlier incident. However, in the opinion of the Judge, this did not create a reasonable doubt as regards ADF’s guilt. He also took into account that Jeannie had found the victim crying that same morning and the victim had related this incident to both Jeanie and Mdm Lau. Since this conviction is certainly not against the weight of evidence, and was also arrived at after a careful assessment of the evidence, I see no basis to disturb the conviction on this charge as well.

  90. The appeal against the sentences

  91. Sentencing principles

  92. [54] The classical principles of sentencing may be generally summed up in four words: retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. A court has to keep these four principles in mind when sentencing an accused. Not all the principles apply in every case, and not infrequently, there is tension in relation to which of these considerations (or combination thereof) ought to take precedence. In every sentencing decision, a court has to judiciously assess which of the four principles apply, the interplay which these principles have with the factual matrix and how much weight they should be given before being applied to the matter at hand.

  93. [55] In a case of domestic maid abuse, ordinarily, the principles of deterrence and retribution take precedence. A deterrent sentence signifies that there is a public interest to protect over and above the ordinary punishment of criminal behaviour. The protection of domestic maids from abuse by their employers is always a matter of public interest, given their vulnerable status and the prevalence of such relationships in Singapore. No employer or household member has the right to engage in abusive behaviour against a domestic maid. All maids should be treated fairly, with dignity and respect. Indeed, domestic maid abuse not only causes harm to the victim and calls for deep public indignation; it could also harm Singapore’s bilateral relations with other countries. Domestic maids from several neighbouring countries come to Singapore to work. Maid abuse by errant employers, if left unchecked, could therefore also result in wider repercussions which could include soured diplomatic relations, quotas on domestic maids working here and so on: see Farida Begam at [28]. Indeed, in a recent Time Magazine article, it was stated that:

  94. I now turn to broadly explicate the relevant sentencing considerations in relation to domestic maid abuse cases before addressing more specifically the appeals on sentence.

  95. Deterrence

  96. [56] In PP v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR 814 (“Law Aik Meng”), the High Court pointed out, at [18]:

  97. [57] In Tan Kay Beng v PP [2006] 4 SLR 10 at [31], it was explained that the deterrence principle is:

  98. [58] Domestic maids must be treated with respect. It is always disturbing to learn of instances of employers imposing unusual requirements on domestic maids, causing them distress or, even worse, abusing them. Abuse can be either psychological or physical or a combination of such conduct. In Lim Chuan Huat Francis v PP [2002] 1 SLR 105 (“Lim Chuan Huat”), the employer hit the maid on her palms with a rattan cane and pinched her cheek. The employer also required the maid to keep a diary in which she recorded all the chores she had done and any mistakes which she had made. The domestic maid would occasionally be required to read the diary aloud to the employer. The employer claimed that this would enable the maid to learn from her mistakes and not repeat the same mistakes in future. The court emphatically denounced the infliction of any manner of humiliating conduct on a maid employed in her professional capacity to assist in domestic chores, at [38].

  99. [59] In enacting s 73 of the Penal Code in 1998, Parliament has unmistakeably singled out domestic maid abuse as a genre of offending that merits special deterrence. The courts on their part have consistently emphasised that domestic maid abuse cannot be tolerated and maid abusers who indulge in inappropriate behaviour will not just be severely chastised but, in addition, receive deterrent sentences. There are two aspects to deterrence: specific and general deterrence. These two aspects correspond to the deterrence of the offender and the deterrence of likely or potential offenders respectively. The distinction has been explained in Law Aik Meng as follows, at [21] and [24]:

  100. General deterrence

  101. [60] In Law Aik Meng, the court listed out various types of offences which warrant a general deterrence sentence. One of these was offences against vulnerable victims. The Court observed, at [24]:

  102. The Court held that prevalence of the offence and difficulties in detection were two examples of particular circumstances which may attract general deterrence, at [25]:

  103. [61] The courts have unwaveringly recognised domestic maids as vulnerable victims and a category of persons in need of constant protection: see Farida Begam and PP v Chong Siew Chin [2002] 1 SLR 117 (“Chong Siew Chin”). Many domestic maids work within the confines of the employer’s home and have little contact with the rest of the society. Often, they are not well educated and cannot speak English or effectively communicate with the wider public. Further, not all cases of abuse come to light as some maids may be apprehensive about the consequences of seeking help in a foreign environment. Less educated maids may also not be aware of their rights and the severe view taken by the authorities here in relation to substantiated complaints. Lee Han Shih, “Silence on maid abuse must end” Business Times (27 July 2002), observed:

  104. In the present case, the victim was subjected to months of intolerable abuse before her predicament came to light; and even then, because of a purely fortuitous meeting with a public spirited neighbour, see above at [9]. Despite the introduction of enhanced penalties for causing hurt to maids, the number of substantiated domestic maid abuse cases, in which employers inflicted bodily hurt, on the maid has not meaningfully decreased over the years. While there were eight such cases dealt with in 2001, there were 26 in 2004 and 19 in 2008. It must be acknowledged that these figures only represent matters that have been prosecuted. While surveys show that most maids are fairly treated, there are still a not insignificant number of instances of abuse that may not come to light. Indeed, as perceptively noted by Yong CJ in Chong Siew Chin at [43], “[m]aid abuse usually takes place in the privacy of the home where offences are hard to detect”. In my view, it is important for this court, in its role as the final appellate court, to send an unequivocal message to all employers that any abuse of their authority and any harm caused to their domestic maids, if revealed, will inevitably be met with stiff penal consequences and denunciation.

  105. Specific deterrence

  106. [62] Specific deterrence operates through the discouraging effects felt when an offender experiences and endures the punishment of a particular offence and is usually appropriate in instances where the crime is premeditated: see Law Aik Meng at [22]. Specific deterrence is more relevant where the accused commits the offence deliberately as opposed to a case where the accused commits the offence on the basis of some irrational and uncontrollable impulse. It has particular significance to cases where an accused shows a propensity to repeat the offending. On specific deterrence, the High Court clarified in PP v Loqmanul Hakim bin Buang [2007] 4 SLR 753 (“Loqmanul”), at [26]:

  107. [63] The Judge has found that ADF deliberately assaulted the victim, not once, but repeatedly. The assaults were not spontaneous lapses of self-control. Rather, they were the “vengeful reaction to [the victim’s] continued presence in his house”: see GD 2 at [23]. ADF needs to be deterred from engaging in similar conduct.

  108. [64] Therefore, both general and specific deterrence are important considerations in the sentencing of ADF. This is a disturbing case of systemic and sustained abuse of a domestic maid over a notable period. The sentence imposed on ADF should be substantial enough to both punish him fairly as well as to deter other members of the public from indulging in similar behaviour. An adequate sentence will be one that also encapsulates the wider community’s abhorrence that is evident whenever a case of domestic maid abuse (and particularly serious cases of systemic abuse) comes to light. In this regard, I reiterate the following observations made in Law Aik Meng at [29]:

  109. Retribution

  110. [65] The essence of the retributive principle is that the offender must pay for what he has done. In PP v Tan Fook Sum [1999] 2 SLR 523 at [16], Yong CJ quoted Lawton LJ in R v Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 at p 77:

  111. [66] Wrongdoing must be adequately censured as well as deterred. If appropriate punishment is not imposed, or if it is generally perceived as being proportionally inadequate, the victim, as well as the wider community, will be left with the sour taste of injustice and grievance.

  112. [67] The victim came to Singapore to work and earn an honest living. She has, however, been subjected to months of unrelenting serious psychological and physical abuse. The sentence imposed on the accused must reflect the condemnation of the wider community for such abuse.

  113. Proportionality in sentencing

  114. [68] A punitive sanction imposed in the name of deterrence and or retribution ought not to contravene the principles of proportionality. While local case law adopts in many offences a deterrent sentencing philosophy, such an approach must nevertheless be circumscribed by the notion of proportionality in relation to the severity of the offence committed as well as by the moral and legal culpability of the offender: see for instance Law Aik Meng at [30].

  115. [69] In the present case, ADF’s conduct can be considered to be very serious. Domestic maid abuse not only causes harm to the victim, but could also, if let unchecked, cause harm to the wider community. By way of illustration, I need go no further than to point out to the possibility of the damage heinous cases might do to harm bilateral relations, see above at [55].

  116. [70] ADF must take full responsibility for his reprehensible conduct even if all the consequences of his conduct had not been contemplated by him. In addition, the fact that the seriousness of the abuse escalated over time cannot be lightly dismissed, see below at [91(d)].

  117. Precedent cases on sentencing of domestic maid abusers

  118. [71] This is the first occasion that a case on maid abuse has reached this court. In the light of this, it would be helpful to the lower courts if I examine the more notable sentencing decisions on domestic maid abuse and consider if the current sentencing framework for this genre of cases needs to be re-assessed or fine-tuned.

  119. [72] In Farida Begam, Yong CJ noted that a fine has only been imposed by the courts where no injuries or minor injuries have been caused. The trial court had imposed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment on the accused for a charge of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid by hitting her head, face and chest with a wooden scrub and slipper. The victim suffered bruises on her temple, left ear pinna and shoulder and over her lower right eyelid and nasal bridge and some swelling. On appeal, Yong CJ enhanced the sentence to a term of nine months’ imprisonment.

  120. [73] Yong CJ listed out the aggravating factors that enhanced the sentence given to the accused (at [24]):

  121. He held that the accused’s lack of antecedents did not carry much weight.

  122. [74] In Chong Siew Chin, the accused was convicted of three charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid by slapping her on three occasions. The victim suffered bruises on the left cheek and a cut to her lip. The magistrate imposed a fine of $1,500 on each charge and in default, two weeks’ imprisonment. On appeal, Yong CJ enhanced the sentence to six weeks’ imprisonment on each charge. Two of the three sentences were to run concurrently making a total of 12 weeks’ imprisonment.

  123. [75] The court emphatically declared that where mental abuse was calculatedly applied in conjunction with physical abuse to a domestic maid, this should be viewed as a serious aggravating factor (at [42]). The accused subjected the maid to a regime of threats and coached her to lie if she was ever questioned. This created in the maid, an ‘overwhelming fear’ of the accused.

  124. [76] In sentencing the accused, Yong CJ also took into account the lack of remorse on the part of the accused, the fact that the offences were committed habitually and in response to dissatisfaction over very trivial matters and that the injuries were not superficial wounds, and a great deal of force had been used which caused extensive bleeding.

  125. [77] In PP v Ong Chin Chin [2005] SGMC 16, the accused pleaded guilty on the first day of trial to two charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid. The first was for punching the chest of the maid. The second was for slapping both her cheeks once. The victim suffered sustained a 2-cm bruise over the sternum and a 1-cm abrasion over the right side of the victim’s lower lip respectively. The accused was sentenced to three weeks’ imprisonment on each charge. Both sentences were ordered to run consecutively so that the aggregate sentence was six weeks’ imprisonment. Three other charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the victim were taken into account for the purposes of sentencing. The magistrate felt that the plea of guilt carried little mitigating value. The magistrate considered a compensation of $8,500 which was made to the victim and the accused’s medical condition (she was under medication for stress, was suffering from anxiety, depression and mood instability associated with pre-menopausal symptoms) as mitigating factors.

  126. [78] However, the magistrate then rightly highlighted the following as aggravating factors:

  127. (a) The incidents of abuse were committed within a short span of nine days and they occurred shortly after the maid started work.

  128. (b) The injuries, although relatively minor, were sustained on vulnerable parts of the body, namely, the head, face and chest areas and tremendous force had been used.

  129. [79] In Ng Chai Imm Evelyn v PP [2001] SGMC 37, the accused pleaded guilty to two charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid. The first was for kicking her buttocks and the second was for grabbing her neck and pushing her. The accused was sentenced to one week’s imprisonment and three weeks’ imprisonment on each charge respectively. Both sentences were ordered to run consecutively so that the aggregate sentence was 4 weeks’ imprisonment. Yong CJ referred to this case in Ong Ting Ting v PP [2004] 4 SLR 53. In the latter case, the district judge sentenced the accused to one week’s imprisonment each on four charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the victim. The first charge was for pushing her and causing her to hit her head against the wall, the second was for kicking her in her thigh, the third was for pushing her and causing her to fall and injure her elbow and the last charge was for pushing her and causing her to fall on a pail. On appeal, Yong CJ noted that the sentence was at the lowest end of the sentencing range but he declined to disturb the sentence because the district judge had failed to give sufficient weight to the accused’s lack of antecedents as a mitigating factor.

  130. [80] In Lim Chuan Huat, the district judge sentenced both the husband and wife to three months’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,500 (in default two months’ imprisonment). The husband had been convicted for voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid by hitting the latter’s back, shoulders and hands with his hands and a rattan cane. The wife was convicted for voluntarily causing hurt to the maid by pinching her cheek and pulling her ears, and by hitting her hands with a rattan cane. The victim suffered bruises over her cheek, shoulder, thigh and hands. She suffered abrasions on both forearms and earlobes. There was reddening of skin on both breasts. The husband and wife appealed on both conviction and sentence but the appeals were dismissed.

  131. [81] In PP v Foo Chee Ring [2008] SGDC 298 (“Foo Chee Ring”), the district judge sentenced the accused to four weeks’ imprisonment for voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid by slapping her three times across both her cheeks and for kicking her lower limbs. She sentenced the accused to five weeks’ imprisonment for voluntarily causing hurt to the maid by grabbing the maid’s hair and banging her head against the wall thrice. The accused received a sentence of four weeks’ imprisonment for another charge of voluntarily causing hurt to the maid by slapping her four to five times on both her cheeks on another occasion. The sentences of imprisonment for the first and second charges were ordered to run consecutively, while those for the first and third charges were to run concurrently, making a total sentence of nine weeks’ imprisonment. The sentences were upheld on appeal. There was no evidence of any injury on the victim and the doctors said that any injury of the type allegedly inflicted was not likely to be visible by the date of medical examination.

  132. [82] In PP v Heng Kwee Huang [2002] SGDC 122 (“Heng Kwee Huang”), the accused was convicted of three charges of voluntarily causing hurt to the domestic maid. The district judge sentenced the accused to seven months’ imprisonment for punching the maid’s eye and imposed a fine of $1,500 each (one week’s imprisonment in default) for firstly pulling the maid’s hair and banging her head against the table and secondly, for slapping the maid’s face. In mitigation, it was pleaded that the accused, a teacher with young triplets, was unable to cope with her job and the responsibility of looking after the triplets. She suffered from severe depression and had attempted suicide on several occasions. The District Court held that while the court sympathised with the accused’s mental condition, it could not be an excuse for domestic maid abuse. For completeness, it should also be pointed out that she was in addition sentenced to a term of ten month’s imprisonment for scalding the maid on her right thigh with hot water pursuant to s 324 of the Penal Code read with s 73.

  133. [83] In Sentencing Practice in the Subordinate Courts (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2003) (“Sentencing Practice”) at p 142), the unreported case of Normi binte Darus v PP (MA 217/2007/01) (“Normi”) was discussed. In Normi, the accused claimed trial to five charges of causing hurt to her domestic maid on five occasions over a period of three months. On the first charge, she was sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment for kicking the maid twice in the left thigh with her bare foot. On the second charge, she was given three weeks’ imprisonment for an incident a month later where she pinched the victim twice on her cheek. On the third charge, she received a two-week imprisonment sentence for punching the victim’s forearm twice a month later. For the fourth charge, she was sentenced to a one-month imprisonment term for using the earpiece end of the handset to hit the victim twice on her forehead. On the fifth charge, she received a three-month imprisonment for hitting the top of the victim’s head with a scoop for about three times until she bled. The sentences of the second, fourth and fifth charges were to run consecutively so that the aggregate sentence was four months and three weeks. The district judge held that the persistent course of physical abuse with violence that escalated with time was an aggravating factor in the case. Additionally, it was noted that the injuries indicated the degree of violence used by the accused and the consequent pain caused to the maid. Twice, the attack had been on the maid’s head – her forehead and vertex respectively. The human head, the district judge observed, was potentially vulnerable to substantial force. Such force could lead to life-threatening situations.

  134. [84] Very recently, in PP v Tong Chew Wei [2009] SGDC 202 (“Tong Chew Wei”), the accused was convicted in a District Court on seven charges of voluntarily causing hurt to his domestic maid. On the first charge, the accused was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for using a broom stick to haphazardly hit the maid. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on the second charge for pulling her right hand and using a broken broom stick to hit both her legs repeatedly causing abrasions on her chest, forearm, thigh and ankle. On the third charge, he received eight months’ imprisonment for throwing a mug filled with hot water towards the maid thereby causing her to suffer a 10cm scald burn behind the knees. The accused was given a four-month imprisonment term for using his feet to stamp both the feet of the maid on the fourth charge. For the fifth and sixth charges, he received three months’ imprisonment each for wearing a pair of slippers and stamping it on the feet of the victim and using a broomstick to poke on the body of the victim respectively. On the last charge, he received a six month imprisonment term for using his right hand to punch on her left face area, grabbing and pulling her hair and using his elbow to hit her upper centre back. The sentences on the first, third and the seventh charges were ordered to run consecutively, making it a total of 20 months’ imprisonment.

  135. [85] In sentencing the accused, I note that Hamidah bte Ibrahim DJ rightly considered the following to be aggravating factors:

  136. (a) that there was a definite pattern of abuse over a few months;

  137. (b) while the injuries were minor and the domestic maid did not suffer any permanent disability, she suffered emotionally and was in a traumatised state when she ran away;

  138. (c) after being subjected to constant physical abuse, the maid had developed an overwhelming fear of the accused;

  139. (d) on the last day of abuse, the maid had been deprived of food.

  140. I am mindful that this decision was given after ADF had already been sentenced by the Judge here. However, it remains relevant for the purposes of this appeal because the sentences imposed in Tong Chew Wei were arrived at within the context of the existing sentencing framework for domestic maid abuse cases.

  141. [86] All the abovementioned cases involved convictions for voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 read with s 73 of the Penal Code. Perhaps I should also mention that offences committed against domestic maids captured by ss 324-326 of the Penal Code are outside the immediate scope of my present discussion, though many of my general observations on sentencing considerations will have relevance to such cases in future. In addition, I should also underscore the point that s 73 of the Penal Code only permits the enhancement of sentences for convictions of an employer of the domestic maid or a member of the employer’s household. Therefore, in Ho Yean Theng Jill v PP [2004] 1 SLR 254 (“Ho Yean Theng”), where the victim’s work permit was registered under the name of the accused’s ex-husband but the accused had moved out of the matrimonial flat together with the domestic maid before the material incidents took place, s 73 of the Penal Code was held not to be directly applicable.

  142. [87] In Ho Yean Theng, the accused was convicted by the Magistrates Court on five charges of voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 of the Penal Code and sentenced to a total of four months’ imprisonment. The magistrate sentenced the accused to four weeks’ imprisonment for using a bamboo pole to hit the maid’s hand twice, two months’ imprisonment for scratching the maid’s face with keys, four weeks’ imprisonment for hitting the maid on top of her head with a high heeled shoe five times, four weeks’ imprisonment for hitting the victim on the head with a plastic bucket and two months’ imprisonment for using her right hand to scratch the maid’s face. The second and fifth sentences were to run consecutively, bringing the total term of imprisonment to four months. Yong CJ upheld the sentences on appeal. Yong CJ noted that the two most pertinent facts were that the accused was in a position of authority while the victim was a vulnerable victim.

  143. [88] In sentencing the accused, Yong CJ referred to cases where the domestic maid abuser had been charged under s 323 read with s 73 of the Penal Code. He found that the sentences meted out in those cases were relevant because the aggravating factors were similar, bearing in mind the authority the accused person wielded over the maid and the vulnerability of the maid in each case. He was of the view that the need for general deterrence is just as strong even though s 73 did not apply.

  144. [89] I agree that the need for general deterrence is just as strong in cases where the domestic maid abuser is not the employer or a member of the employer’s household. However, when sentencing an accused pursuant to s 323 of the Penal Code, reliance ought not to be placed on sentences meted out in cases where s 73 of the Penal Code is applicable. This is because, Parliament has expressly rejected the suggestion to extend s 73 to maid abusers who are not the employer or a member of the employer’s household. In Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report (1998) vol 68 at col 1950, (Mr Wong Kan Seng, the Minister for Home Affairs), the Minister rejected a suggestion to have a deeming provision for the purposes of s 73:

  145. [90] Currently, when a judge sentences an accused for an offence under s 323 read with s 73 of the Penal Code, he may impose a greater sentence (though still within the maximum sentence allowed under s 323 alone) than he would have given for the same offence under s 323 alone, because he has been conferred a greater sentencing leeway. Therefore, while a court may broadly consider precedents where the domestic maid abuser has been charged under s 323 read with s 73 for the sentencing principles such as aggravating factors, it would not be correct, in sentencing an offender who is not an employer or a member of the employer’s household, to directly rely on the “sentences” as appropriate precedents.

  146. Sentencing framework applicable to cases of domestic maid abuse

  147. [91] I see no reason to depart from the existing sentencing framework though it appears to me that it will be helpful to spell out more clearly what might be considered as aggravating considerations. From the abovementioned cases, it is clear that a custodial sentence is almost invariably warranted in cases of domestic maid abuse where there has been any manner of physical abuse. Even cases where real psychological harm alone has been caused could also merit prosecution and punishment, see [148]-[149] below. Every such offence involves an abuse of authority and results in harm being caused to a vulnerable victim. An employer’s unhappiness with a domestic maid’s work or conduct should never justify any form of abuse. All such offences are, in the eyes of the law, unprovoked. Where harm to a maid has been caused, a fine will only be imposed in a really exceptional case where, for example, there are strong mitigating considerations. Even the least serious offences (where there are no aggravating factors, but with some injuries caused) ought to attract a custodial sentence. A slap, which leaves no mark or injury, may not always merit a custodial sentence but again this, in the final analysis, would depend on all the relevant facts. The sentence must also be enhanced if there are aggravating factors present. Without attempting to exhaustively itemise all relevant aggravating factors, I suggest that a court in sentencing domestic maid abusers ought to consider these aspects of an offence:

  148. (a) The more serious the injury and or the trauma, the greater the sentence imposed. The amount of force used is a relevant factor. Injuries inflicted to vulnerable parts of the body such as the head, eye, chest, stomach region and the private parts attract enhanced sentencing. This is not to say, however, that a linear sentencing approach is to be rigidly applied.

  149. (b) The use of weapons or objects in causing hurt to the victim is an aggravating consideration. The type of weapon or object used is relevant. The use of a dangerous weapon such as a knife should result in a greater sentence than the use of a less dangerous weapon. That said, serious harm or pain caused by hands or by kicking would be viewed with similar severity as it would be covered by (a) above. A fist or a forceful kick can also cause fatal injuries, see the observations of this court in PP v Leong Soon Kheong [2009] SGCA 28 at [31(c)]: “A fist can also be a lethal instrument of harm”.

  150. (c) The degree of abuse of position or authority over the domestic maid.

  151. (d) The prolonged abuse over a period of time is an aggravating factor, especially if the severity of the abuse escalates over time. Ordinarily, subsequent similar offending ought to merit more severe sentences as they usually show not just deliberateness and maliciousness but also a profound lack of basic respect for the domestic maid’s welfare and dignity.

  152. (e) Where mental abuse takes place in conjunction with physical abuse, this inevitably ought to be also reflected in the severity of the sentence. The humiliation inflicted and the psychological trauma caused is relevant. Where mental abuse was calculatedly applied in conjunction with physical abuse to a domestic maid that would constitute a serious aggravating factor: per Yong CJ in Chong Siew Chin at [42]. The conditions of employment and the day-to-day relationship of the accused with the maid are also relevant. For example, if the domestic maid has not received sufficient rest and or nourishment, this ought not to be ignored.

  153. (f) The absence of genuine remorse by the domestic maid abuser is relevant.

  154. [92] Here, I should pause and highlight the sometimes overlooked distinction between sentence specific aggravating factors and cumulative aggravating features. Where multiple distinct offences have been committed, sentencing is a two-stage process. First, the sentence for each individual offence had to be determined. Second, the court has to determine whether the sentences for these multiple offences ought to run concurrently or consecutively and if consecutively, which combination of sentences ought to be made and whether the overall sentence properly comprehends the criminality of the multiple offender, see below at [141]-[146]. If sentence-specific aggravating factors are present, the sentence for each particular offence should be appropriately enhanced. Cumulative aggravating features, on the other hand, are features that ordinarily have primary relevance at the second stage of sentencing, particularly as regards to the issue of whether the global sentence should be enhanced by consecutive sentencing, when multiple distinct offences have been committed. As the possibility of an overlap may occur in some cases, care must be taken not to re-input an aggravating consideration at the second stage, if it has already been fully factored into the sentencing equation during the first stage.

  155. The Judge’s decision on the aggravating factors applicable to this case

  156. [93] After considering some sentencing precedents on domestic maid abuse at [13]-[19] of GD 2, the Judge mentioned the following factors as pertinent in the sentencing of ADF (at [21]):

  157. [94] The Judge also considered the seriousness of the victim’s injuries. He was of the view that although there were no permanent or disabling injuries, the assaults caused the victim real pain and left marks which could be seen in the photographs.

  158. Subsequently, he observed at [27]-[28] of GD 2:

  159. I should add that while the Judge quite appropriately listed the various aggravating factors, he did not explain (nor is it obvious) how he applied them, ie, whether he took them into account at stage 1 of the sentencing process (when determining the sentence for each charge) or at stage 2 (when determining the cumulative sentence).

  160. My view on the sentence specific aggravating factors in the present case

  161. Seriousness of injuries

  162. [95] In written submissions, the Defence argued that the victim only required outpatient treatment. The injuries were not life threatening and she did not suffer any form of permanent disability or scarring from the assaults. Therefore, the injuries should not be treated as serious.

  163. [96] I find it impossible to accept such an implausible argument. This does not even begin to acknowledge that the victim had been through a harrowing experience that is difficult to accurately describe. The judge certainly cannot be faulted for concluding that an injury does not have to cause a permanent disability or scarring in order for it to be considered as serious. The photographs and medical report of the victim unmistakeably show that ADF had inflicted numerous severe injuries on the victim. There were aging as well as recent bruises all over her face, left hand and hips. The victim sustained as well, subconjunctival haemorrhage in her right eye. On my part, I have found the visible injuries on the photographs, and in particular those on her face, to be nothing short of appalling. They must have been plain to see to all who came into contact with her. Despite this, ADF did not provide her with any proper medical treatment and continued to escalate his abusive behaviour towards her as part of his campaign of psychological warfare. It should be noted that by the time the victim was rescued by the police and the photographs taken, some of her earlier injuries were either already in the process of healing or had healed. Plainly, many of these injuries when inflicted would have caused severe distress. Further, ADF has caused injuries to vulnerable parts of her body such as the abdomen and head. Such injuries to soft tissue are not always apparent to the eye. The severity of the injuries is unquestionably an aggravating factor that should be taken into account in the first stage while the escalation in this matter is relevant at the second stage of the sentencing equation here, see above at [92] and below at [105] and [147(b)].

  164. Abuse of position or authority

  165. [97] As a member of the employer’s household, ADF was (together with wife) in a position of authority over the victim. He needlessly and relentlessly underscored his status as “boss” by imposing strict and cruel requirements on the victim. According to the victim, ADF had instructed her to record all the duties she performed and the time at which she performed these duties in a notebook. She was supposed to hang the notebook around her neck using a rubber band everyday, see above at [7]. The victim claimed that ADF had also given her another notebook in which she had to record all her mistakes. The victim had to seek permission from ADF or his wife before she had her daily meals.

  166. [98] In my opinion, such disciplinary measures are not just improper but plainly cruel. The domestic maid was given the impression that eating basic food items without ADF or his wife’s permission was tantamount to stealing. This was clearly inappropriate behaviour. All employers have an obligation to ensure that their maids receive reasonable nutrition according to their needs. It must also have been extremely humiliating and distressing for the maid to continuously carry the notebook around her neck as if she were a domestic pet. I note that she testified that she felt “sad” about such a requirement being imposed on her. In my opinion, ADF has undoubtedly wantonly abused his authority over the victim and this should be considered an aggravating factor.

  167. [99] This case also involves another peculiar form of abuse of authority. The Judge held that ADF had abused his position as a police officer and played on her fear and respect for authority. This was an aggravating factor that he took into account in the sentencing decision.

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