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Grounds publishedDecided 25 Sep 2023

District Court

Affluence PR Pte Ltd v Genetech Biotechnology Pte Ltd

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[2023] SGDC 221Case no. [2023] SGDC 22135 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. District Judge Thian Yee Sze:

  2. [1] The Applicant filed this application to seek leave or permission to appeal against the decision of the Tribunal Magistrate (“TM”) for discontinuing its claim for $4,094.13 brought in the Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”) in SCT/14281/2022 pursuant to section 5(5) Of the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984 (“the Act”) as it was beyond the jurisdiction of the SCT. In the alternative, the Applicant sought an order for the matter to be remitted to the same tribunal for its reconsideration pursuant to section 38(3) of the Act.

  3. [2] After hearing counsel’s submissions, I dismissed the application. These are the grounds of my decision.

  4. Facts

  5. The contractual dispute between parties

  6. [3] The Applicant and the Respondent entered into a six-month contract on 7 December 2020 under which the Applicant provided public relations consultancy and related services, including media event and social media marketing consultancy. Pursuant to the payment terms of the contract, the Respondent was to pay the Applicant $40,000 for the provision of its services over six monthly instalments, with the first instalment to be paid upon the acceptance of the Applicant’s quotation and “thereafter payable at the beginning of each month” . The contract also provided for the payment of out-of-pocket expenses such as transport, telephone calls and printing at set rates .

  7. [4] The Respondent made the requisite payment due under the first five instalments. According to the Applicant, the Respondent did not pay the sixth and final amount of $3450.75, as well as $79.16 in out-of-pocket expenses. The tax invoice for the sum of $3,450.75 referred to the nature of the payment as “6th Instalment – Payable at the beginning of each month” . The tax invoice for the out-of-pocket expenses listed charges for transport and telephone calls . Parties did not dispute that they were bound by the terms of the contract as set out in the Applicant’s quotation . What was in dispute was whether the sums due under the two tax invoices claimed by the Applicant in the SCT were for the recovery of a progress payment, in which case the value of the claim would be the value of the contract, and not the value of the progress payment due – see section 2(2)(b) of the Act.

  8. The hearing before the SCT

  9. [5] At the hearing below on 20 September 2022, the TM took the view that the claim was for the recovery of a progress payment. Following from that, he held that section 2(2) of the Act applied to deem the value of the claim to be the value of the contract. As the contract value was $40,000, it exceeded the jurisdiction of the SCT. The TM thus discontinued the proceedings pursuant to section 5(5) of the Act.

  10. Events leading to the filing of the Originating Application

  11. [6] After the hearing, the Applicant filed a General Application on 11 October 2022 to request for an extension of time to “APPEAL AGAINST ORDER OF REGISTRAR” (emphasis added) on the ground that it had “miscalculated the date from the issue of the court order date” . The General Application was rejected for the reason that the claim was discontinued by the TM under section 5(5) of the Act, not by the Registrar. I should add that it will be clear from a perusal of the Order of Tribunal dated 20 September 2022 that the decision was made by a TM, not a registrar.

  12. [7] On 15 November 2022, the Applicant sought legal advice from the current solicitors, and gave instructions to file an appeal against the decision of the TM. This culminated in the filing of the present application on 1 February 2023, through which the following orders were sought:

  13. (a) Leave be granted to the Applicant to appeal against the order of the TM pursuant to section 38(1)(b) of the Act and rule 20F of the Small Claims Tribunals Rules (“SCT Rules”).

  14. (b) Cost of and incidental to the application to be cost in the cause of the appeal proceedings; and

  15. (c) Such further or order orders as the court deems fit and just.

  16. [8] During the course of the hearing before me, in response to the court’s query, the Applicant’s counsel stated that she was no longer seeking an order for permission to be granted to appeal against the TM’s order to the General Division of the High Court. Instead, she was only seeking for the matter to be remitted to the SCT for reconsideration or rehearing under section 38(3)(a) or (b) pursuant to the prayer 3 of the application (see [7(c)] above.

  17. Issues to be considered

  18. [9] In coming to my decision, I considered the following issues:

  19. [10] I shall deal with the issues in turn.

  20. Preliminary point: the proper form of the application for permission to appeal against order of the SCT

  21. [11] Rule 20F(1) of the SCT Rules provides for an application for permission to appeal against any order of the SCT under section 38 of the Act to be made in the “appropriate Form”, which is defined in rule 3 to mean “the current version of the specific form for that purpose set out on the Internet website of the electronic system or in the practice directions”. The “electronic system” is further defined in rule 3 to refer to that established in rule 8A(1), which is the electronic filing and case management system established for the SCT. Paragraph 128(1) of the State Courts Practice Directions 2021 states that for the purposes of rule 8A, the electronic filing and case management system established is the Community Justice and Tribunals System (“CJTS”) and is accessible at www.judiciary.gov.sg/services/CJTS. The appropriate Form to use for applications for permission to appeal is found on the CJTS, and the application is to be filed online on the CJTS, with a filing fee of $100.

  22. [12] When I asked the Applicant’s counsel as to why the Applicant decided to file a new originating process in the form of an Originating Application in the District Court to seek the relevant orders despite the procedure set out in rule 20F(1), she said that she was not aware of the reason as she took over the matter recently and that her colleague who was handling the matter was no longer with the firm.

  23. Whether the SCT’s order to discontinue proceedings under section 5(5) of the Act could be appealed against

  24. [14] The TM ordered that the proceedings be discontinued under section 5(5) of the Act, which reads:

  25. [15] The appellate civil jurisdiction of the General Division of the High Court is contained in section 20 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969. Section 20(c) states that the General Division has jurisdiction over “the hearing of appeals from other tribunals as may from time to time be prescribed by any written law”. Section 40 of the Act specifically states that “(A)n order of a tribunal is final and binding on all parties to the proceedings … and, except as provided in section 38, no appeal lies in respect of the order”. Section 38(1) of the Act goes on to provide for a narrow scope of appeals from decisions of the SCT as follows:

  26. [16] The types of orders listed in section 35(1) include money orders and work orders. Critically, section 35(1) states that a tribunal may make one or more of the orders listed in subsections (a) to (h) “as regards any claim within its jurisdiction” [emphasis added]. It is clear that an order under section 5(5) is not such an order within the meaning of section 35(1) – section 35(1) deals with orders that an SCT can make only if the claim is within its jurisdiction, while an order under section 5(5) can only be made when the SCT is of the opinion that the claim lodged is beyond its jurisdiction.

  27. [17] Since an order made under section 5(5) is not an order made by the SCT under section 35(1), it does not fall within the scope of orders from which an appeal lies to the General Division of the High Court provided for in section 38(1). In short, the order made by the TM to discontinue the proceedings in this case was final and cannot be taken up on an appeal.

  28. [18] The Applicant’s counsel conceded at the hearing when I pointed out the relevant provisions that an order under section 5(5) was not appealable. However, she contended that the fact that the order could not be appealed against under section 38(1) did not mean that the matter could not be remitted to the SCT for reconsideration under section 38(3)(a) of the Act. Counsel explained that this was the reason why it was stated in paragraph 21 of her written submissions that should the court take the view that section 38(1)(a) or (b) was not satisfied, the Applicant would seek a remittal of the matter to the SCT for its reconsideration in the alternative. In this context, and as I mentioned in [8] above, the Applicant’s counsel added that the Applicant was no longer pursuing an order for permission to appeal to the General Division of the High Court.

  29. [19] It was to the question of whether the court could and should order a remittal of the matter under section 38(3)(a) that I turned to next.

  30. When the District Court’s power to order that a matter be remitted to or reheard by the SCT under section 38(3) could be invoked

  31. [20] Sections 38(2) and (3) of the Act provide as follows:

  32. [21] The Applicant’s counsel submitted that to invoke section 38(3), it was not necessary to show that the order of court was appealable in the first place under section 38(1) – this was supported by the words “proposed appeal” in section 38(3). Furthermore, the provision referred to an appeal against “an order made by a tribunal” instead of an order made under section 35(1), cf section 38(1). As such, it was argued that the District Court had the power to remit the matter for reconsideration as section 38(3) should be read to encompass proposed appeals that did not satisfy the requirement in section 38(1) that the order in question was an order made under section 35(1).

  33. [22] On the other hand, the Respondent’s counsel interpreted the ambit of section 38(3) more narrowly, and submitted that if there was no order from which an appeal lay to the General Division of the High Court, section 38(3) did not come into play as there would have been no grounds to bring the appeal in the first place. Counsel argued that section 38(3) contemplated that an appeal was made against a potentially appealable order, but that the District Court ruled that the grounds of appeal in section 38(1)(a) and (b) had not been satisfied.

  34. [23] I agreed with the Respondent’s counsel’s submissions. Section 38 is within Part 3 of the Act, which deals with appeals. The title of section 38 reads “Appeal on point of law”. On a plain reading, all the subsections within section 38 are concerned with orders of the SCT in respect of which an appeal potentially lies to the General Division of the High Court. The section is not concerned with appeals that are bound to fail on the ground that no legislative provision has in in fact made for them.

  35. [24] In my view, having regard to the legislative arrangement of section 38, the words “a proposed appeal” in section 38(3) cannot be equated with all attempted appeals, particularly invalid appeals or appeals filed erroneously when there is no right or avenue of appeal in the first place. Section 38 provides that only specific types of orders, ie, section 35(1) orders, can form the subject matter of an appeal to the General Division of the High Court. Before section 38(3) can be invoked, section 38 must be engaged in the first place. For the reasons in [14] – [17] above, I found that the appeal provision in section 38 was not engaged in this case as the TM’s order to discontinue the proceedings under section 5(5) was not an order in respect of which an appeal lay to the General Division of the High Court.

  36. [25] My interpretation of section 38, and specifically, section 38(3), is supported by the Parliamentary debate during the Second Reading of the Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Bill 2018 (“2018 Amendments”). The SMS explained that section 38(3), which was introduced in the 2018 Amendments, refined the procedure for obtaining permission to appeal from the District Court by “providing that a District Court may, even if it refuses leave to appeal, remit the case back to the tribunal for reconsideration, or order a re-hearing presided by a different tribunal magistrate”. According to the SMS, this amendment would give the District Court “greater flexibility and latitude to ensure that justice is done in each individual case”. It is hence clear that the court’s discretion to order a remittal or re-hearing is contingent on section 38(1) being applicable to the SCT order at hand in the first place. As was explained when the legislative amendment was moved in Parliament, section 38(3) was inserted to refine the existing section 38 procedure by giving the court the discretion to send the matter back to the SCT for reconsideration or rehearing in the event that it refuses to grant permission to appeal to the General Division of the High Court where the proposed appeal does not satisfy section 38(1)(a) or (b).

  37. [26] Further, in response to Mr Murali Pillai, MP’s query as to whether allowing a case to be re-heard on a ground involving issues of fact effectively expanded the scope for an appeal, and hence inconsistent with the previous approach of narrowing the scope of an appeal from the SCT to the High Court, the SMS explained that section 38(3):

  38. [27] As can be seen from the passage in the Parliamentary debate cited above, section 38(3) was enacted as part and parcel of the section 38 procedure. It is not a standalone provision which grants the court the additional power to order a remittal to or a rehearing by the SCT outside the appellate procedure laid down in Part 3 of the Act. If Parliament had intended for the District Court to have such a power outside or independent of the schema in section 38(1), it would not have parked section 38(3) as one of the subsections in section 38 under Part 3, but enacted a separate, standalone provision in another part of the Act, in the same way as the power to set aside an order of the tribunal or the Registrar has been separately and specifically been provided for in section 41 under Part 4 of the Act.

  39. Other arguments raised

  40. [28] The above findings that, first, section 38 was not engaged in this case as the order which the Applicant sought to take up to the General Division of the High Court was not a section 35(1) order and was hence final and not appealable, and second, the court’s power in section 38(3) to remit the case to the same tribunal for reconsideration or to a different tribunal for a rehearing is contingent on it being an order in respect of which an appeal lies, which the TM’s order was not, were sufficient to dispose of this application. However, should I be wrong that the TM’s order to discontinue the proceedings did not fall within the appeal regime in section 38, I proceeded to address the remaining arguments raised by the Applicant which were premised on the fact that section 38 was engaged, ie, that it was an appealable order and hence fell within the ambit of section 38.

  41. Whether an extension of time should be granted for the application for permission to appeal to be filed

  42. [29] Rule 20F(2) of the SCT Rules states that “the appellant must file” an application for permission to appeal under section 38(1) of the Act “within 14 days after the date on which the order being appealed from was made” [emphasis added].

  43. [30] When the court pointed out to the Applicant’s counsel that the Originating Application was filed a few months after the date of the TM’s order and hence out of time, the Applicant’s counsel sought an extension of time to file the application for permission to appeal on the ground that the filing of the earlier application to appeal against the order (at [6] above) was rejected, and that the Applicant approached the current solicitors for legal advice “after exhausting its searches as to why the application was rejected” . To this, the Respondent’s counsel pointed out that the earlier incorrect application to appeal filed on 11 October 2022 was itself filed out of time.

  44. [31] Rule 32 of the SCT Rules sets out when a tribunal or the Registrar may extend or shorten the period of time within which a person is required or authorised by the SCT Rules to do any act in any proceedings before the SCT. Rule 32(4)(b) goes on to state that rule 32 does not apply to “the period under rule 20F for filing or serving an application for permission to appeal to the General Division of the High Court”. It is hence clear that the 14-day period in rule 20F(2) within which the application for permission to appeal is to be filed has to be strictly complied with.

  45. [32] Although it was not necessary for me to determine if this court could invoke its inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time , as suggested by the Respondent’s counsel, no compelling reason had put forth by the Applicant to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction, if any – the fact that the Applicant needed time to seek legal advice did not adequately explain why it took four and a half months for the application for permission to appeal to be filed, and two and a half months after the Applicant first approached the current solicitors for legal advice.

  46. [33] In addition, although this point was not raised by the Applicant’s counsel, I noted that technically speaking, in this case, as the application was filed as an Originating Application in respect of which the Rules of Court 2021 and not the SCT Rules applied, one could argue that the timelines in the SCT Rules did not apply. While there were no full arguments in this regard and that a definitive ruling can be made on another occasion, my preliminary view is that it is not clear that the District Court has the power to override the time period set out in the SCT Rules and the express exclusion imposed by rule 32(4)(b) with regard to the applicability of the power to extend time in respect of permission to appeal applications. Order 3, rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2021, which provides for the extension or shortening of time for compliance, only extends to “the period within which a person is required by these Rules or by any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in any proceedings” [emphasis added] - see Order 3, rule 4(1). In my view, this provision in the Rules of Court 2021 would not assist the Applicant as the period that was sought to be extended was that in the SCT Rules, not the Rules of Court 2021.

  47. Whether there was a question of law involved in this case

  48. [34] As stated in [8] above, the Applicant’s counsel informed the court that she was no longer pursuing an order for permission to appeal in section 38(1). In any event, I agreed with the Respondent’s counsel’s position that whether the nature of the claim was for the “recovery of a progress payment due under the contract” within the definition of section 2(2)(b) of the Act was a question of fact in this case. It hinged on whether the contractual clause setting out the payment terms, specifically the term which stated that “(t)he quotation is accepted at the total Service Fees listed above to be made payable over 6 monthly instalments” [emphasis added] , provided for payment under the contract to be made by way of progress payments. In this regard, the Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that whether an instalment payment under the contract was to be construed as a “progress payment” for the purposes of section 2(2)(b) was an issue of fact. Whether the contractual term in question so provided for progress payments or otherwise was to be determined by the construction of the specific contractual term, which was a factual finding based on the evidence before the SCT, applying the established legal principles relating to the interpretation of contracts. The TM decided on the facts of the case that the claim in question was in the nature of a progress payment, having regard to the terms of the contract. This was a finding of fact, and no question of law was raised to this end. The fact that the factual finding resulted in the claim falling outside the monetary jurisdiction of the SCT did not, in and of itself, convert the issue involved into a question of law.

  49. Whether the requirement in section 38(1)(b) of the Act was met

  50. [35] The Applicant had originally sought permission to appeal pursuant to section 38(1)(b) of the Act (at [7(a)] above), ie, “on the ground that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the SCT” [emphasis added]. Section 38(1)(b) provides for the aggrieved party who contends that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the SCT and hence should not have been taken up by the SCT an avenue to appeal to the General Division of the High Court. It does not provide for an avenue of appeal in the converse situation, ie, where the SCT has ruled that the matter is beyond its jurisdiction – the wording of the provision is clear and unambiguous in this regard. The Applicant’s reliance on section 38(1)(b) to seek permission to appeal on the basis that the SCT had the jurisdiction to hear the claim was hence misconceived.

  51. [36] For completeness, I would add that it was not the case before me that new facts or evidence had come to light since the hearing before the TM. There were also no other exceptional circumstances which would warrant my ordering a remittal to the same SCT for reconsideration or to another SCT for rehearing.

  52. Conclusion

  53. Thian Yee Sze District Judge

  54. Lam Yiting Joelle (KSCGP Juris LLP) for the applicant;

  55. Edward Stanley Tay Wey Kok (Continental Law LLP) for the respondent.