High Court · Decided 11 February 2011
CDL Properties Ltd v Chief Assessor and another
Feedback & support[2011] SGHC 31 · Case no. OS No 511 of 2009 · 24 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Kan Ting Chiu J:
- [1]
[1] Two appeals from the Valuation Review Board (“the Board”) came before me. The appellant, CDL Properties Ltd (“CDL” or “the Appellant”), is the owner of the development known as Republic Plaza (“RP”). The appeals are over the annual values and the effective dates on which property tax was charged. The issues were raised before the Board in two sets of appeals, Valuation Review Board Appeal Nos. 54–168 of 2008 (“Appeal Nos. 54–168”) and Valuation Review Board Appeal Nos. 172–173 of 2008 (“Appeal Nos. 172–173”).
Appeal Nos. 54–168
- [2]
[2] These appeals relate to 115 units in RP. Between 6 June and 8 June 2007 the Chief Assessor issued notices under s 20(1) of the Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) (“the Act”), proposing to increase the annual value for the units from about $4.20 psf/mth to $11 psf/mth with effect from 1 January 2007.
Appeal Nos. 172–173
- [3]
[3] These appeals relate to two units in RP which were subdivided from one of the 115 units in Appeal Nos. 54–168 on 16 June 2007. Following the subdivision, the Chief Assessor issued notices under s 20(1) of the Act and proposed to increase the annual value for these units to $11 psf/mth.
Appeals to the Board
- [4]
[4] CDL appealed to the Board against both proposals. In the appeals, CDL argued that the annual value should be $7 psf/mth with effect from 1 January 2007 for the 115 units and $9.80 psf/mth for the two units from 16 June 2007.
The Board’s decision
The other set of appeals, Appeal Nos. 172–173 was dismissed with no order as to costs.
The present appeal
- [6]
[6] CDL appealed against the Board’s decisions in the two sets of appeals on the grounds that the Board had erred in:
(i) ordering that the annual values for the 115 units be amended to $11 psf/mth with effect from the Notice Dates;
(ii) dismissing CDL’s appeal that the annual value for the two units be set at $9.80 psf/mth with effect from 16 June 2007;
(iii) not ordering interest to be paid on the refund of the property tax paid for the 115 units; and
(iv) not ordering costs in favour of CDL in Appeal Nos. 54–168.
and in the appeal before me, CDL put forward a host of arguments which I have taken the liberty to re-organise.
(i) The Board has no power to amend the annual values of the 115 with effect from the Notice Dates
- [7]
[7] This submission was made in the context of the Appellant’s presentation of the “General Scheme of the Act”. It argued that:
- [8]
[8] The Appellant relied on s 6(1) and (2)(a) of the Act that:
but s 6(2)(a) should be read with s 6(2)(b):
- [9]
[9] Giving the provision a proper construction, the Valuation List must refer to a Valuation List in operation. When a Valuation List is amended, the Valuation List is the amended Valuation List.
- [10]
[10] Reverting to the facts of the appeal, the Chief Assessor had amended the Valuation List so that the annual value was to be fixed at $11 psf/mth with effect from 1 January 2007. When the appeal against the amendments went before the Board, the Board ruled that the annual value should be fixed at $7 psf/mth up to the Notice Dates, and that the annual value was to be increased to $11 psf/mth with effect from the Notice Dates.
- [11]
[11] The Board derived its power to amend a Valuation List from s 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Act which state that:
- [12]
[12] There are no restrictions laid down on the amendments that the Board could make to the Valuation List. The Board can amend the Valuation List “as it thinks proper”, and if the Board decides on the facts before it that it thinks proper that a proposed increment of the annual value should take effect from the date of the Chief Assessor’s notice rather than the beginning of the year, the Board has the power to amend the Valuation List accordingly.
- [13]
[13] Section 6(1) and (2) do not limit the breadth of s 33(1). Under s 6(2)(a) the property tax for any year is payable in advance in January. CDL had paid property tax for the 115 units in advance, based on the rate in the Valuation List prevailing at the time of payment. While CDL had fulfilled its property tax obligations when it made payment, that does not mean that the payment will not be adjusted if the Valuation List is amended.
- [14]
[14] After the property tax on a property has been paid, the Chief Assessor or the Board may decide that the annual value of the property has changed upwards or downwards with effect from a specific date, and amend the Valuation List to reflect the change. In the case of the 115 units the Board had a reason for setting the commencement date for the $11 psf/mth annual value to the Notice Dates. In its Grounds of Decisions, it explained:
- [15]
[15] Changes in the annual value are factual matters, which do not necessarily take effect at the beginning of the year. If the annual value is found to have increased, say with effect from the first day of July, there is no reason why additional tax should not be paid for the second half of the year just because the tax for the whole year computed on the original annual value has been paid at the beginning of the year. For the same reason, if the annual value is reduced with effect from 1 July, the excess tax paid at the beginning of the year should be refunded to the taxpayer. Section 6(1) and (2) should not be construed to mean that when property tax has become payable, the tax cannot be adjusted even when the Valuation List is amended. Such a construction would defeat the purpose of the amendment for the first year when there is no reason for not giving immediate effect to the amendment.
(ii) The valuation adopted by the Board was wrong, and the Board should have preferred the rental evidence from longer-term leases
- [16]
[16] The Board referred to the evidence on the rents and leases which were presented before it, and had stated in its Grounds of Decision that:
- [17]
[17] The Appellant made an issue over this part of the Grounds of Decision and argued that:
- [18]
[18] The Appellant supported the argument by pointing out that the definition of “annual value” in s 2 of the Act is the gross amount which “can reasonably be expected from year to year”, and submitted that the phrase “from year to year” implied “a continuous period of rental for an indefinite time and that is more consistent with a longer-term lease”. The Appellant cited Lord Esther MR in R v South Straffordshire Waterworks Co (1885) 16 QBD 359 where he said at 370:
In the same vein, Lord Denning MR had stated that in determining rent from year to year, the lease period to be used should be:
– R v Paddington Valuation Officer ex parte Peachy Property Corporation Limited [1966] 1 QB 380, at 412.
- [19]
[19] In its Grounds of Decision, the Board had observed that rents under three-year leases are generally lower than rents under shorter leases, and the Appellant did not dispute the validity of the observation. But the Board did not hold that short-term rents are to be given more weight than long-term rents. It did not disregard the $10.50 rent for the three-year lease, and it also took into consideration the $12.80 rent for a two-year lease as well as the rents set out in the Table of Average Grade A Office Rentals for 2007 before it arrived at the rent of $11.
- [20]
[20] The Appellant had not shown that the Board had restricted itself to shorter-term lease rents and had ignored longer-term lease rents, or had preferred the former to the latter. It was not suggested that evidence on rents set “simply from year to year” or “for an indefinite time” or for terms beyond three-years had been placed before the Board. My understanding of prevailing rental practice in Singapore is that it is unlikely that any of the 115 units or any comparable property are rented out “from year to year” or “for an indefinite time”. The Appellant had read too much into the observation that rents for two-year leases are generally higher rents for three-year leases.
(iii) The Board had relied on inadmissible and unreliable evidence in setting the annual value at $11 psf/m
- [21]
[21] The Appellant objected to the Board’s reference to the Table of Average Grade A Office Rental for 2007 (“the Table”). The Appellant submitted that:
- [22]
[22] The Chief Assessor had referred to the Table in its submissions to the Board and had noted that:
- [23]
[23] The Appendix referred to was the Table, which reads:
The sources of the data in the Table were disclosed. A diligent valuer can refer to the disclosed sources and verify the accuracy of the Table.
- [24]
[24] The Table was brought into the proceedings before the Board for the first time in the Respondents’ Written Submissions dated 21 November 2008 after both sides had presented its evidence and witnesses before the Board. It was not part of the evidence of Yeo Peng Khoon, a valuer of the Property Tax Division who gave evidence on behalf of the respondents before the Board. The Appellant could have objected the introduction of the Table in the closing submissions. It had the opportunity to do that when it filed its further submissions on 5 December 2008, but it did not object to the Table or seek clarification on it. It raised no questions over the admissibility or reliability of the Table in its submissions, and even during the appeal before me, it did nothing to substantiate the assertion that the Table was unreliable.
(iv) The Board did not award interest to the Appellant
- [25]
[25] In its submissions the Appellant accused the Board of having refused to exercise its discretion to award interest. This was an unjustified criticism against the Board which had explained its decision for not exercising its discretion to award interests (see para 5 hereof). In the light of the explanation, nothing more needs to be said, except that the complaint reflected unfavourably on the Appellant and its solicitors.
(v) The Board did not award costs to the Appellant in Appeal Nos. 54 to 168
Conclusion