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Grounds publishedDecided 29 Jul 2026

Court of Appeal

An appeal against convictions for rape and outrage of modesty failed

CFE v Public Prosecutor

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[2026] SGCA 35Case no. Court of Appeal / Criminal Appeal No 2 of 2025

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An appeal against convictions for rape and outrage of modesty failed

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In HC/CC 37/2024, the appellant (“Appellant”) was convicted on two charges for rape under s 375 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (as at 1 January 2020) (“2008 PC”), and two charges for outrage of modesty under s 354 of the 2008 PC. A Judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) found that all these offences were liable for enhanced punishment under s 73(1) of the 2008 PC (now s 73(1) of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PC”)) as they were committed against a migrant domestic worker (“MDW”) by a member of the MDW’s employer’s household. The Judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 19 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The Judge’s grounds of decision are published as Public Prosecutor v CFE [2025] SGHC 106 (“GD”). CA/CCA 2/2025 is the Appellant’s appeal against his conviction and sentence.

  3. [2] This appeal engages two important issues pertaining to the Appellant’s sentence: first, the appropriate sentencing approach for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty, where these offences are punishable with the enhanced penalties under s 73(1) of the 2008 PC; and second, the scope of the exception to the enhanced penalties under s 73(2) of the 2008 PC (now s 73(2) of the PC). Sections 73(1) and 73(2) of the 2008 PC are identical to ss 73(1) and 73(2) of the PC – our observations therefore apply to the provisions under both the 2008 PC and the current PC.

  4. Background

  5. Facts

  6. [4] We begin by outlining the salient facts. In or about November 2019, the Appellant, then 63 years old, moved in to live with two of his daughters (“D1” and “D2”) in a two-storey apartment owned by D1 (“Flat”). The Appellant describes himself as a “researcher” in the field of health and health supplements. He kept stocks of various health supplements, injections, and Traditional Chinese Medicine products in the Flat.

  7. [5] The complainant (“Complainant”) is a Filipino national. At the time of the alleged offences, she was 35 years old. She came to Singapore to work as an MDW in 2016 and worked for D2 from August 2018. In or about 2019, D2 and her family moved into the Flat. The Complainant moved in with them and had a bedroom on the first floor of the Flat.

  8. [6] On 1 January 2020, D1 and D2 flew to Taiwan to settle the affairs of their deceased mother, leaving the Appellant and the Complainant as the only occupiers of the Flat from 1 to 8 January 2020. The acts which formed the basis of the charges against the Appellant (“Incident”) took place sometime between 11.50pm on the night of Sunday 5 January 2020 and 12.20am on the morning of Monday 6 January 2020.

  9. [7] There were two CCTV cameras installed in the Flat, one in the living room (“Living Room CCTV”) and the other in the Complainant’s bedroom (“Bedroom CCTV”). The video and audio footage from the Living Room CCTV (“Footage”) captured a substantial portion of the events leading up to, during, and after, the Incident. The CCTV cameras were motion-activated, which accounted for some gaps in the Footage. Nonetheless, the integrity of the Footage was not challenged by the Appellant; nor was it his position that the Footage failed to capture material events which supported his case.

  10. Events leading up to the Incident

  11. [8] We first set out the events leading up to the Incident as found by the Judge. Most of these findings were based on, or supported by, the Footage.

  12. [9] The Complainant returned to the Flat at around 7.30pm on 5 January 2020. At approximately 11.14pm, the Appellant invited the Complainant to drink wine with him. The Complainant accepted his offer, and they watched TV as they drank the wine. At around 11.32pm, the Complainant told the Appellant that she was having trouble sleeping and told the Appellant about pain in her stomach and her breast.

  13. [10] Following this exchange, the Appellant agreed to administer injections of health supplements to the Complainant. The Appellant went to retrieve the materials he needed to prepare the injections from the second storey of the Flat. At 11.49pm, the Appellant went to the Complainant’s bedroom and shifted the Bedroom CCTV such that the Complainant’s bed was no longer within the Bedroom CCTV’s field of view. The Appellant returned to the living room, where he chatted with the Complainant before saying, “Ok! We go and give you injection and then you can sleep”. The Complainant got up from the living room floor where she had been sitting and remarked that she felt dizzy.

  14. [11] The Appellant took the injections he had prepared and switched off the lights in the living room, prompting the Complainant to exclaim. The Appellant switched the lights back on. The Appellant suggested administering the injections in the Complainant’s bedroom and switched off the living room lights again. He switched on the living room lights again after the Complainant insisted on receiving the injections in the living room. The Complainant pulled out the sofa bed in the living room. The Appellant switched off the living room lights yet again and switched on the kitchen lights. At about 11.57pm, the Complainant lay down on the sofa bed and unbuttoned her shorts before assuming a prone position, with her arms beside her body. It was not disputed that the Appellant had previously administered injections of health supplements to his family members on their buttocks and that the Complainant was aware of this practice. The Complainant assisted the Appellant in pulling down her shorts, just enough to expose the top half of her buttocks. The Appellant administered an injection into the Complainant’s left buttock. At this point, the Complainant appeared motionless in the Footage.

  15. The Incident

  16. [12] The Judge found that the Footage captured several sexual acts performed by the Appellant on the Complainant between 12.06am and 12.15am, save for the acts relating to the 2nd Charge (see below at [13(a)]) which were not captured. Throughout the Incident, the Complainant was silent and motionless, save for some weak movements discussed below. The acts which form the subject of the charges (see [24]) against the Appellant are set out below.

  17. [13] The sequence of the acts is as follows:

  18. (a) The Appellant inserted at least one finger into the Complainant’s vagina while she was lying face-down on the sofa bed (“2nd Charge”).

  19. (b) The Appellant flipped the Complainant’s body over such that she was lying face-up, licked her breast and touched her vagina (“3rd Charge”).

  20. (c) The Appellant licked the Complainant’s vagina.

  21. (d) The Appellant climbed on top of the Complainant and inserted his penis into her mouth (“4th Charge”). The Appellant then licked her vagina again (together with the act set out at [13(c)] above, these acts of licking the Complainant’s vagina formed the “5th Charge”).

  22. (e) The Appellant climbed off the Complainant, positioned himself between her legs and pulled her body to the edge of the sofa. He then inserted his penis into her vagina (“1st Charge”).

  23. The aftermath of the Incident

  24. [14] After the Incident, the Complainant was partially clothed and lying motionless and silent on the sofa bed. Following a gap in the Footage of about two minutes, the Complainant was seen fully clothed but still lying motionless. It was not disputed that it was the Appellant who had clothed the Complainant in this period.

  25. [15] The Appellant attempted to lift the Complainant from the sofa bed, but she flopped back down without any discernible physical or verbal response. He tried again and succeeded, manoeuvring her from the living room to her bedroom by supporting her from under her armpits and pushing her along from behind. Throughout this period, the Complainant’s body flopped listlessly and the Appellant could be heard panting. The Appellant placed the Complainant on her bed before shifting the Bedroom CCTV back to its original position, such that the Complainant’s bed was once again within the camera’s frame.

  26. [16] The Complainant woke up at about 3.36am on 6 January 2020. She called her sister, “S”, at about 3.43am and could be heard crying. The Complainant continued to confide in S over the next three days regarding the Incident. Between 6 January 2020 and 8 January 2020, she also confided in several other individuals about the Incident, including:

  27. (a) “N”, a Filipino MDW in a neighbouring flat;

  28. (b) “Bing”, a volunteer from the Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (“HOME”); and

  29. (c) “GF”, S’s friend who was a nurse based in the Philippines.

  30. [17] When D1 and D2 returned on 8 January 2020, the Complainant informed them about what had happened. On 9 January 2020, D1 and D2 told the Complainant that they wanted to go to the police. The Complainant made a police report that day, and the Appellant was arrested.

  31. The Appellant’s VRI Statements

  32. [18] The investigation officer, Assistant Superintendent Gan Mei Huey (“IO Gan”), conducted three video recorded interviews (“VRI”) with the Appellant and recorded statements on:

  33. (a) 10 January 2020 at 10.49pm (“10 January 2020 VRI Statement”);

  34. (b) 14 January 2020 at 4.30pm (“14 January 2020 VRI Statement”); and

  35. (c) 15 January 2020 at 4.31pm (“15 January 2020 VRI Statement”).

  36. (collectively, “VRI Statements”)

  37. [19] In the VRI Statements, the Appellant made various admissions pertaining to the Incident. First, the Appellant admitted to penetrating the Complainant’s vagina with his penis. In his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, he stated:

  38. [20] When he was posed follow up questions by Deputy Superintendent Sarah Ann Lee (“DSP Lee”), the Appellant confirmed this account:

  39. [21] Second, the Appellant admitted to kissing the Complainant’s vagina. In his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, after being shown portions of the Footage, the Appellant stated:

  40. [22] The Appellant repeated this admission in his 15 January 2020 VRI Statement. When IO Gan suggested to the Appellant that he had used his mouth to kiss and lick the Complainant’s vagina, he did not refute this. Instead, he explained why he “kissed” the Complainant’s vagina:

  41. [23] Third, in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, the Appellant admitted that the Complainant was unresponsive during the Incident and did not consent to having sex:

  42. The charges against the Appellant

  43. [24] The Prosecution brought the following charges against the Appellant:

  44. Conviction

  45. The parties’ submissions below

  46. The Prosecution’s case

  47. [25] The Prosecution relied principally on the Complainant’s evidence, the Footage, and the abovementioned admissions in the VRI Statements. The Prosecution maintained that the Complainant did not consent to any sexual acts, as she was in a weak and unresponsive state throughout the Incident.

  48. The Appellant’s case

  49. [26] As a preliminary point, the Appellant challenged the voluntariness of the 10 January and 15 January VRI Statements, on the basis that Deputy Superintendent Ryan Yue Rui Sheng (“DSP Yue”) had made threats, inducements, or promises to him prior to their recording. He sought to explain away his admissions in the VRI Statements on the basis that they were made when he was not in the right state of mind.

  50. [27] In respect of the Incident, the Appellant denied committing all the alleged sexual acts save for those in the 3rd Charge. In respect of the 3rd Charge, the Appellant claimed that the Complainant had consented to the relevant acts. In the alternative, the Appellant raised the defence of consent in respect of the remaining charges as well. He claimed that the Complainant had shown interest in engaging in intimacy with him prior to the Incident, demonstrated consent during the Incident, and that her post-Incident conduct reflected the consensual nature of the acts. He further claimed that her limp and unresponsive appearance in the Footage was an act, being part of a plan to frame him out of hatred for D2 and to extract monetary compensation.

  51. [28] The Appellant also adduced medical evidence that he suffered from erectile dysfunction, and pointed to the fact that the Complainant had tested positive for two sexually transmitted diseases (“STDs”) which were not detected on him.

  52. Decision below

  53. Voluntariness of the VRI Statements

  54. [29] The Judge found that the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements were given voluntarily by the Appellant. The Judge found that DSP Yue did not make the statements alleged by the Appellant. In any case, even if the alleged statements had been made, they were too vague to constitute threats, inducements, or promises (GD at [79]–[85]). The Judge also found no evidence that the alleged threats, inducements, or promises, had operated on the Appellant’s mind through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charges (GD at [86]–[90]).

  55. Conviction

  56. [30] The Judge found that the Prosecution had proven the physical elements of the 1st Charge, 3rd Charge, 4th Charge and 5th Charge beyond a reasonable doubt:

  57. (a) On the 1st Charge (ie, penile-vaginal penetration), the Judge found that the Complainant’s testimony was internally consistent (at [101]). Her testimony was also supported by her account of the Incident to other people, including her examining doctor (at [102]). Importantly, her account was corroborated by the Footage (at [105]–[108]). Her testimony was also supported by the Appellant’s admissions in the VRI Statements (at [109]–[113]) which he failed to sufficiently explain away (at [120]–[125]). Finally, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s arguments that the medical and forensic evidence (namely, his erectile dysfunction, the absence of DNA and semen in the Complainant’s vaginal swabs, and the fact that the Complainant tested positive for two STDs not detected in the Appellant) contradicted the Complainant’s account of penile-vaginal penetration having taken place (at [114]–[118]).

  58. (b) On the 3rd Charge (ie, touching of the Complainant’s breast and vagina), the Judge found that the Complainant’s truthful and unembellished conditioned statement and trial testimony were consistent with the Footage which captured the acts in full (at [139]–[144]), and the Appellant’s own admissions at the trial that he performed the acts (at [145]–[146]).

  59. (c) On the 4th Charge (ie, penile-oral penetration), the Judge found that the Complainant’s conditioned statement and testimony in court were corroborated by her account to the examining doctor and the Footage (at [150]–[152]). The Appellant gave multiple inconsistent accounts in the VRI Statements and at trial and could not provide a cogent explanation for the numerous discrepancies in his narrative (at [153]–[156]). The Judge also drew an adverse inference against the Appellant under s 261 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) on the basis that he had failed to raise in his cautioned statement his defence that he had not inserted his penis into the Complainant’s mouth (at [157]–[161]).

  60. (d) On the 5th Charge (ie, licking of the Complainant’s vagina), the Judge found that the Complainant’s account in her conditioned statement and at trial was consistent with her account to the examining doctor and was corroborated by the Footage (at [164]–[168]). The Complainant’s account was further corroborated by the Appellant’s admission in the VRI Statements (at [169]–[173]). As with the 4th Charge, the Judge also drew an adverse inference against the Appellant for his failure to assert in his cautioned statement that he had not licked the Complainant’s vagina (at [175]–[177]).

  61. [31] The Judge found that the Complainant did not consent to any of the sexual acts as she was physically impaired. This was evidenced by her consistent account in her conditioned statement and at trial, her accounts to various persons after the Incident, and the Footage showing her limp, unresponsive and too weak to offer any effective resistance (at [188]–[200]).

  62. [32] The Judge also rejected the following arguments that the Appellant raised in support of his case of a consensual sexual encounter:

  63. (a) First, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim that the Complainant lured him into having sex with her and framed him to exact revenge against D2 and seek monetary compensation. The only objective evidence the Appellant relied upon was a series of messages exchanged between the Complainant and N, but these messages did not suggest that the Complainant harboured so deep a hatred for D2 as to be motivated to plot against her. In any event, accusing D2’s father of rape and sexual assault would have been a “convoluted and potentially self-sabotaging means of exacting such revenge”. The Judge further found that the Complainant had not made any request for money in exchange for not reporting the matter to the police, and that she had given a reasonable explanation for her initial reluctance to make a police report (at [201]–[219]).

  64. (b) Second, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant had attempted to seduce him prior to the Incident. The Appellant relied on a series of incidents in support of his claim that the Complainant had signalled her readiness for sexual intimacy: (i) the Complainant had emerged from the bathroom in revealing clothing on three occasions; (ii) she had shared details of her health issues with him; (iii) she had laughed in response to a suggestive remark he had made about oral sex; and (iv) just prior to the Incident, she agreed to watch television, drink wine with him late into the night, and invited him to touch her stomach when she spoke of her abdominal pain. The Judge found that none of these incidents amounted to attempts by the Complainant to seduce the Appellant. Further, such behaviour was incapable of constituting consent to sexual activity (at [220]–[223]).

  65. (c) Third, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s behaviour during the Incident demonstrated her consent to the sexual acts. The Judge found that the Footage clearly showed the Complainant lying motionless throughout the Incident, and that the audio feed from the CCTV footage did not capture any “moaning sounds” as the Appellant had claimed (at [224]–[225]).

  66. (d) Fourth, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct suggested that she had consented to the sexual acts. The Judge found that the Complainant’s decision to feign normalcy in her interactions with the Appellant until D2’s return was understandable and reasonable. Further, the Complainant’s post-Incident communications with S and N showed that she had expressed worry about a repeat of the sexual assault by the Appellant (at [226]–[230]).

  67. [33] Further, although not explicitly raised by the Appellant, the Judge also considered the defence of mistaken consent and found that it had not been made out (at [234]–[237]).

  68. [34] For the foregoing reasons, the Judge was satisfied that the Prosecution had established all the elements of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges.

  69. [35] In respect of the 2nd Charge, the Judge found that the “unusually convincing” standard applied as it was the only charge where the relevant act was not captured in the Footage (at [133]–[134]). Although the Judge found the Appellant to be a “shifty” witness while the Complainant was “honest”, the Judge did not find it safe to conclude that the Complainant’s testimony alone sufficed to prove the 2nd Charge (at [137]) and accordingly, acquitted the Appellant of the same.

  70. The parties’ submissions on appeal

  71. The Appellant’s case

  72. [36] The Appellant’s arguments are broadly a rehash of his case below:

  73. (a) The VRI Statements were recorded under duress.

  74. (b) The Appellant denies committing the sexual acts in the 1st, 4th and 5th Charges. He also argues that he did not penetrate the Complainant owing to his erectile dysfunction. For completeness, the Appellant maintains his admission that he committed the sexual acts in the 3rd Charge.

  75. (c) The Complainant had consented to the sexual acts. In support of this, the Appellant highlights that the Complainant had willingly consumed the wine he offered her and agreed to the injections administered by him. He claims that the Complainant was not passive during the Incident, pointing to the “gyrating movement of her buttocks and low moaning” as evidence of her consent.

  76. (d) The Complainant had plotted the Incident to exact revenge against the Appellant and his family. In support of this, the Appellant submits that the Complainant had dressed in a revealing manner on prior occasions to “[trap]”, “entice” and “lure” him. The Appellant also argues that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct – including her messages with S, GF, and Bing – was inconsistent with that of a rape victim, and more consistent with her having plotted the Incident.

  77. The Prosecution’s case

  78. [37] The Prosecution largely aligned itself with the Judge’s findings set out at [29]–[34] above.

  79. Our decision on conviction

  80. [38] It is trite that the role of the appellate court is not to re-assess the evidence in the same way a trial court would: Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015 (“Pram Nair”) at [55], citing Haliffie bin Mamat v Public Prosecutor [2016] 5 SLR 636 at [31]–[32]. The appellate court should instead consider:

  81. (a) whether the trial Judge’s assessment of witness credibility is “plainly wrong or against the weight of evidence”;

  82. (b) whether the trial Judge’s “verdict is wrong in law and therefore unreasonable”; and

  83. (c) whether the trial Judge’s “decision is inconsistent with the material objective evidence on record”, bearing in mind that an appellate court is in as good a position to assess the internal and external consistency of the witnesses’ evidence, and to draw the necessary inferences of fact.

  84. (a) the VRI Statements are admissible, and the Appellant’s admissions contained therein were given voluntarily;

  85. (b) the evidence establishes the physical elements for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges; and

  86. (c) the Complainant did not consent to the sexual acts, nor did she engineer any plot to frame the Appellant or extort him or his family.

  87. The Judge did not err in admitting the VRI Statements

  88. [40] We first address the admissibility of the VRI Statements. To recapitulate, the Appellant challenged the voluntariness of the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements. In his written submissions, the Appellant does not specify why the VRI Statements ought to have been excluded, save for a general assertion that they were recorded when he was under duress. We therefore examine the Appellant’s case below.

  89. [41] It was the Appellant’s evidence that while he was alone with DSP Yue at Tampines Neighbourhood Police Centre on 9 January 2020, DSP Yue made the following statements to him:

  90. (a) First, words to the effect of, “What you have done is a very serious offence, and based on your age, you will be in there for the rest of your life” (“First Alleged Statement”).

  91. (b) Shortly thereafter, “If you cooperate…” (“Second Alleged Statement”). The Appellant’s evidence was that he could not remember if DSP Yue had said anything else after uttering these words.

  92. (collectively, the “Alleged Statements”)

  93. [42] When an issue is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement under s 258(3) of the CPC, the burden is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily: Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535 (“Roshdi”) at [45]. The test for voluntariness has both an objective and a subjective limb. The objective limb is concerned with whether there was a threat, inducement, or promise. If there was, the court then considers the subjective limb, which is whether that threat, inducement, or promise had the effect of operating on the mind of the accused person at the material time so as to render his statement involuntary: Roshdi at [44]–[45], citing Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 at [53].

  94. [43] We are of the view that the Judge did not err in admitting the 10 January and 15 January 2020 VRI Statements. This is for three reasons.

  95. [44] First, the Judge’s finding that DSP Yue did not make the Alleged Statements is not against the evidence. We note that the Appellant’s account of who made the Alleged Statements was inconsistent. At trial, the Appellant initially alleged that it was Deputy Superintendent Liao Chengyu (“DSP Liao”) who made the Alleged Statements, but later retracted this allegation and claimed that it was DSP Yue who had done so. The Appellant offered no convincing explanation for this change. The Appellant also said that he could remember the “first few sentences that [DSP Liao] said to [him]” because “it was a shock for [the Appellant]”. However, when cross-examining DSP Yue, the Appellant did not mention the Alleged Statements at all.

  96. [45] Second, even if the Alleged Statements were made by DSP Yue, they were objectively insufficient to amount to a threat, inducement or promise. We agree with the Judge that the Alleged Statements were simply too vague, and it was unclear what the Appellant was being threatened or induced into doing:

  97. (a) As regards the First Alleged Statement, the words, “[w]hat you have done is a very serious offence, and based on your age, you will be in there for the rest of your life” contain no threat, inducement, or promise.

  98. (b) As regards the Second Alleged Statement, the words, “if you cooperate” alone, without more, cannot amount to any threat, inducement, or promise. This is more so given that the Appellant’s admission that any prospect that he could receive a lighter sentence was his own assumption and not a statement made by DSP Yue.

  99. [46] Third, on the Appellant’s own case, the Alleged Statements subjectively had no effect on the voluntariness of the VRI Statements. In the Appellant’s Petition of Appeal, he states that the VRI Statements were given “honestly and truthfully”:

  100. This assertion is difficult to reconcile with his contention that the VRI Statements were not made voluntarily or were made under duress.

  101. [47] At the hearing, the Appellant repeatedly asserted that the VRI Statements were made before he saw the Footage and the text messages from the Complainant. In our view, this does not assist him. Whether the Appellant had or had not seen the Footage or the Complainant’s text messages before the VRI Statements were recorded has no bearing whatsoever on whether the Alleged Statements were made or had operated on his mind. We therefore reject the Appellant’s argument that the VRI Statements were not voluntarily given and affirm the Judge’s finding that they were admissible.

  102. The Judge did not err in finding that the evidence establishes the physical elements for each of the four charges

  103. [48] We turn next to consider the physical elements of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges. In our judgment, the Judge’s findings are not against the weight of the evidence. In particular, the Footage provides clear corroboration of the Complainant’s account. We set out our decision in respect of each of the charges below.

  104. (1) 1st Charge

  105. [49] As regards the 1st Charge, the Judge found that the Complainant’s testimony on the act of penile-vaginal penetration was credible. It was internally consistent and was also supported by her account of the Incident to other people, including her examining doctor (GD at [102]). That account was also corroborated by the Footage captured between 12:13:35am and 12:14:21am on 6 January 2020. The Footage showed the Appellant lying on top of the Complainant, who was lying on her back, such that his groin area was positioned over hers, as he thrust his hips vigorously toward her. At one point, the Appellant moved his body into a more upright position and continued the thrusting motion of his hips and buttocks. The Judge found that although both of their crotches could be seen, the Appellant’s penis could not be seen, which strongly suggested that his penis was inside the Complainant’s vagina. Further, the Judge found that while the Footage did not provide explicit visual confirmation of the Appellant’s penis entering the Complainant’s vagina, what could be seen from the Footage, in particular, the positioning of the Appellant’s body over the Complainant and the thrusting motion of his hips and buttocks toward her, corroborated her testimony that there was penile-vaginal penetration (GD at [105]–[108]). We agree with the Judge that the Footage corroborated the Complainant’s account of penile-vaginal penetration.

  106. [50] The Judge also found that the Complainant’s testimony was corroborated by the Appellant’s own admission in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement that he had penetrated the Complainant (GD at [109]–[113]). This admission is evident from the portions of the VRI Statements set out at [19]–[20] above. The Judge also found the Appellant’s version of events at trial unbelievable and plagued with obvious inconsistencies. As the Judge noted, the Appellant initially claimed that he had merely “rubbed” his “flaccid” penis up and down the outside of the Complainant’s vagina, before changing his account and claiming that his penis had been positioned outside the Complainant’s anus, between her buttocks and the sofa bed, and that he had been rubbing himself hoping to get an erection (GD at [126]–[128]). In our judgment, the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility – both in respect of his attempts to retract the admission in his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement and his account at trial – cannot be said to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence. We therefore see no reason to disturb her findings.

  107. [51] On appeal, the Appellant appears to maintain his case that he could not have penetrated the Complainant because he suffered from erectile dysfunction. He relies on medical reports from Dr Lee Song Liang Joshua (“Dr Lee”) and Dr Wong Kang Min (“Dr Wong”). The Judge rejected this argument below, finding that the Appellant’s erectile dysfunction did not negate the possibility of penetration, as both Dr Lee and Dr Wong had testified that it was still possible for the Appellant to achieve an erection in a non-clinical setting (GD at [115]). While the medical reports did show that the Appellant had a history of erectile dysfunction, they fell short of establishing reasonable doubt that penetration was possible. We note that Dr Lee testified that it was still possible for the Appellant to have an erection that was potentially hard enough for sexual intercourse. The medical reports therefore do not support the Appellant’s case that the Judge’s finding was against the evidence.

  108. [52] For completeness, we also see no reason to disturb the Judge’s findings that the following two pieces of evidence did not assist the Appellant:

  109. (a) First, the Appellant relied on the absence of his DNA or semen on the Complainant’s vaginal swabs. However, Dr Judith Ong (“Dr Ong”), the Complainant’s examining doctor, testified that the examination of the Complainant was conducted more than four days after the Incident. In the circumstances, it was likely that any DNA evidence would no longer be present at the time of the examination (GD at [116]).

  110. (b) Second, the Appellant pointed to the fact that the Complainant had tested positive for two strains of STDs which were not detected in the Appellant. However, there was no evidence that the Appellant tested negative for the STDs. Even if the Appellant did in fact test negative for these infections, the Appellant himself accepted that their transmission via intercourse was not inevitable (GD at [117]).

  111. [53] In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of the 1st Charge.

  112. (2) 3rd Charge

  113. [54] With respect to the 3rd Charge, the Judge accepted the Complainant’s evidence that the Appellant sucked her breast and rubbed her vagina, finding that it was unembellished and internally consistent (GD at [139]–[141]). The Complainant’s testimony was also corroborated by the Footage taken between 12:06:37am and 12:07:19am, which the Judge found provided unassailable corroboration of the Complainant’s testimony (GD at [142]–[144]).

  114. [55] Crucially, the Appellant admitted to the physical elements of the 3rd Charge in his evidence-in-chief. In cross-examination, he sought to walk back from these admissions by claiming that he had only “licked” the Complainant’s nipple instead of sucking it, and that he had not rubbed her vagina but only felt the outer surface of the Complainant’s vagina (ie, the labia). The Judge rejected these qualifications, finding that they did not assist the Appellant’s defence as even on his (new) account in cross-examination, he conceded to skin-to-skin contact with the Complainant’s breast and genitals. The Judge further found that the Appellant’s attempt to walk back his admissions only arose when he belatedly realised the adverse ramifications of having made them (GD at [146]). We agree with the Judge’s assessment. The Appellant’s concession of skin-to-skin contact with the Complainant’s breast and genitals was sufficient to establish the physical elements of the offence of outrage of modesty under s 354(1) of the 2008 PC.

  115. [56] In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of the 3rd Charge.

  116. (3) 4th Charge and 5th Charge

  117. [57] We consider the 4th and 5th Charges together, as the Appellant’s alleged actions giving rise to each charge overlap with one another.

  118. [58] The Judge accepted the Complainant’s account that the Appellant licked her vagina, then climbed on top of her and inserted his penis into her mouth while licking her vagina. That account was corroborated by the Footage taken between 12:09:19am and 12:09:56am on 6 January 2020. In respect of the 4th Charge for penile-oral penetration, the Footage showed the Appellant first moving into a position whereby his crotch was over the Complainant’s head. The Appellant then moved his head toward the Complainant’s crotch. While the Footage did not explicitly show the Appellant’s penis entering the Complainant’s mouth, the Judge found that the actions which were visible in the Footage aligned closely with the Complainant’s account of how the Appellant had inserted his penis into her mouth (GD at [152]).

  119. [59] In respect of the 5th Charge for licking the Complainant’s vagina, the Footage first showed the Appellant crouching with his mouth between the Complainant’s legs at her crotch. The Appellant then got up and moved out of frame; at this point he was wearing boxer shorts, but when he reappeared, they had been removed. The Appellant, with his back to the CCTV, then lifted his right leg and appeared to align his penis with the Complainant’s mouth before laying down over her with his head moving towards her crotch and remaining in that position for around 16 seconds. The Judge found that the Appellant’s movements in this part of the Footage suggested that he was licking the Complainant’s vagina as he lay on top of her (GD at [166]–[168]).

  120. [60] In his submissions, the Appellant does not offer a different interpretation of the Footage, nor does he explain how the Judge had made any error in finding that the physical elements of the 4th and 5th Charges had been established. Having reviewed the evidence, we agree with the Judge that the Footage corroborated the Complainant’s account of the acts constituting the 4th and 5th Charges.

  121. [61] Further, in respect of the 4th Charge of penile-oral penetration, the Judge found the Appellant’s explanation for his actions inconsistent. When IO Gan played and replayed the relevant Footage during the VRI on 10 January 2020, the Appellant insisted that he had no recollection of what was being shown to him. However, during the VRI on 15 January 2020, his position changed. He asserted that he was certain his penis was not in the Complainant’s mouth, reasoning that he would have achieved a full erection had that been the case. Later in the same VRI, when asked whether he had tried to insert his penis into the Complainant’s mouth, the Appellant claimed that he had tried but claimed that he could not do so. He changed his account during cross-examination, this time claiming that he had not even tried to insert his penis into the Complainant’s mouth (GD at [153]–[156]). The Appellant offered no reasonable explanation for these shifting accounts, and we agree with the Judge that they could not be believed.

  122. [62] As regards the 5th Charge of licking the Complainant’s vagina, the Appellant’s case below was that he intended to lick the Complainant’s vagina but decided against doing so when he encountered a strong smell near her vagina. He decided to lick her inguinal region (ie, the region where the lower part of her stomach joined the tops of her thighs) instead. The Judge found that evidence untenable in light of the Appellant’s admissions in the 15 January 2020 VRI Statement as well as the Footage (GD at [171]–[172]). We agree with the Judge. The Appellant’s account was directly contradicted by the Footage and his own admission in the 15 January 2020 VRI Statement reproduced at [22] above that he had “kissed” the Complainant’s vagina.

  123. [63] In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Judge did not err in finding that the evidence established the physical elements of both the 4th and 5th Charges.

  124. The Judge did not err in finding a lack of consent

  125. [64] The Appellant argues that the Complainant had consented to the sexual acts. In support of this, he relies on her conduct prior to, during, and after, the Incident:

  126. (a) As regards her pre-Incident conduct, the Appellant claims that the Complainant had hinted at her interest in engaging in sexual intimacy with him. He alleges that she: had dressed in revealing clothing to “entice and lure” him; had shared with him sensitive health issues relating to her body, including menstrual pain and vaginal discharge; and had been willing to consume the wine offered to her (without telling him that D2 had prohibited her from drinking in the Flat), to have the injections administered by him, and to watch TV late into the night with him.

  127. (b) As regards her conduct during the Incident, whilst acknowledging that the Complainant was in a limp and unresponsive state, he thought she was simply “shy”. In the same vein, he states that she was not passive as there was “gyrating movement of her buttocks and low moaning”, and he took that as an “invitation” to commit the sexual acts on her.

  128. (c) As regards her post-Incident conduct, the Appellant relies on the fact that the Complainant had behaved normally after the Incident, continued to interact with him in a friendly manner, and showed no signs of trauma.

  129. [65] We have no hesitation rejecting the Appellant’s defence of consent, which we find completely baseless. We first address the Appellant’s contention that the Complainant had consented to the sexual acts during the Incident, which we find unbelievable for several reasons.

  130. [66] First, the Appellant himself acknowledged in his 10 January 2020 VRI Statement that the Complainant was “unresponsive” during the Incident and that she did not consent to having sex (see above at [23]).

  131. [67] Second, as the Judge found (see GD at [199]), the Footage showed that the Complainant was limp and weak and did not say anything throughout the Incident:

  132. (a) From 12.06am to 12.07am, the Complainant appeared limp and unresponsive as the Appellant struggled to flip her body over. When the Appellant began sucking her breast, she remained unresponsive for the first eight seconds. After this, she could be seen shaking her head slowly and feebly. She also raised her arm briefly before it dropped back onto the sofa bed.

  133. (b) From 12.09am to 12.10am, the Complainant could be seen making a brief and clearly ineffectual attempt to get up from the sofa bed by lifting her right arm and rolling over to her side. She was unsuccessful as the Appellant swiftly grabbed her right arm and placed it back on the sofa bed, causing her to lie back down in a supine position.

  134. (c) At 12.10am, the Complainant was shown being supported and re-positioned by the Appellant. The Appellant could be heard asking her if she wanted to go back to her bed, but there was no response from her, and she remained motionless.

  135. (d) From 12.13am to 12.15am, apart from a moment when the Complainant was seen attempting to raise her right hand, her body remained limp and unresponsive. The moment the Appellant withdrew his penis from her vagina, her legs could be seen falling limply over the edge of the bed, making a “thud” sound.

  136. (e) In the immediate aftermath of the Incident, the Complainant was shown lying motionless on the sofa bed for approximately four minutes. The Appellant put her clothes back on for her and asked her to “go back to bed”. Receiving no response, he attempted to lift her up; she flopped back down without any discernible physical or verbal response. On his second attempt, he succeeded and manoeuvred her to her bedroom by supporting her from under her armpits and pushing her along from behind. Throughout, the Judge found that the Complainant’s body “flopped listlessly” and that she remained entirely unresponsive (see GD at [38]; see above at [15]).

  137. [68] Importantly, it is not the Appellant’s case, even on appeal, that the Complainant had asked him to do any of the specific sexual acts, to remove her clothing and clothe her back again, or to carry her back to her room. Against this backdrop, we reject the Appellant’s submission that the “gyrating movement of [the Complainant’s] buttocks and low moaning” was evidence of her consent. This was neither observed nor heard on the Footage, which showed that the Complainant was not responsive, reciprocating, or in any way engaging in the sexual acts. It also runs counter to his admission that she was unresponsive, or limp and weak. In our view, it is clear from the evidence, and consistent with the Appellant’s own admission in the 10 January 2020 VRI Statement, that the Appellant performed the sexual acts on the Complainant in the full knowledge that she was incapacitated. In other words, the Appellant knew that the Complainant was unable to give, and had not given, her consent during the Incident.

  138. [69] We also reject the Appellant’s submission that the Complainant’s earlier interactions with him constitute evidence of her consent to the sexual acts. A complainant’s prior sociable, friendly or even flirtatious conduct should not be construed as consent (see Pram Nair at [67] and [72]). The Appellant’s case that the Complainant’s manner of dress (as alleged by him), her acceptance of wine and injections, or her watching television with the Appellant, could amount to consent to the relevant sexual acts was without merit. It is also worth noting that the Appellant made no mention in the VRI Statements of any of the conduct prior to the Incident which he claims led him to believe that the Complainant was interested in engaging in sexual intimacy with him. This omission leads us to conclude that such claims are mere afterthoughts.

  139. [70] We likewise reject the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant’s post-Incident conduct was evidence of her consent to the sexual acts. Preliminarily, it bears repeating that there is no archetypal or standard reaction to sexual assault (Public Prosecutor v BZT [2022] SGHC 91 at [241]) and attempts to conventionalise the behaviour of sexual assault victims have been roundly rejected by this court (Yue Roger Jr v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 829).

  140. [71] In any event, contrary to the Appellant’s case, the evidence suggests that the Complainant was in fact fearful of the Appellant as she had immediately informed her friends and a volunteer from HOME about the Incident, describing it in distressed tones. Her communications with S and N are especially revealing in this regard – they showed that she feared a repeat of the sexual assault, and S and N had advised her on how to protect herself from the Appellant (eg, by keeping a pen as a weapon or placing toys outside her bedroom door as an early warning system if the Appellant tried to enter her room). We also place no weight on the Appellant’s contention that the Complainant’s messages to her friends in the aftermath of the Incident sounded “gleeful” merely because she had used texting conventions such as “hehehe”, and that this was inconsistent with the behaviour of “a real ‘rape victim’ [who would] be ashamed and humiliated”. Such conventions say little about a person’s true emotional state. If anything, the general tenor of the messages suggested fear and anxiety, and her use of such language was consistent with her explanation that she was trying to keep calm. Nothing in the Complainant’s messages suggests that she had engineered the Incident or is inconsistent with her account of having been sexually assaulted by the Appellant.

  141. [72] Further, we agree with the Judge that the Complainant’s post-Incident behaviour is adequately explained by her account that she had tried to act “calm” and to “pretend…as if nothing happened” to manage her fear and unease. Additionally, as an MDW, she had little choice but to continue carrying out her household chores and live in close proximity with the Appellant (GD at [227]–[228]).

  142. [73] For these reasons, we are satisfied that the Judge’s finding on the Complainant’s lack of consent is not against the weight of the evidence. For completeness, and although this was not explicitly raised by the Appellant on appeal, we are also of the view that the defence of mistaken consent under s 375(5) of the 2008 PC is not available to the Appellant. In this regard, we agree with the Judge that based on the objective evidence of the Footage, the Complainant’s limp and unresponsive state throughout the Incident would have been apparent, and would have signalled, to any reasonable person the need to obtain explicit confirmation of her consent to sexual activity. The Appellant’s failure to do so ruled out any possibility that the Appellant could avail himself of the defence of mistaken consent (GD at [236]–[237]).

  143. [74] Before we leave the issue of consent, we pause to make three observations that arise from the arguments canvassed before us. The first concerns the specificity of consent. As mentioned above at [69], this court held in Pram Nair that prior friendly or flirtatious conduct between a victim and an accused does not, in and of itself, constitute consent to sexual activity. In Pram Nair, the court considered the victim’s alleged conduct at a beach club, such as placing her hands on the accused’s arm or waist and being in close physical contact with him, but did not regard these as “particularly suggestive gestures”. The court further held that the more material events for analysis were those that occurred closer to the assault, ie, after the victim left with the accused for the beach where the assault took place, rather than their earlier interactions at the beach club (Pram Nair at [67]–[73]). This is primarily because consent must be given to the specific act in question and it is therefore critical to assess the victim’s words and conduct in relation to that act. Indeed, this is evident from the statutory definitions of sexual offences. Section 375 of the PC, for instance, defines rape as the penetration of a person’s vagina, anus, or mouth with the offender’s penis without that person’s consent. Thus, the consent to be established must be specific to the act of penetration and not to other acts.

  144. [75] The second is as to what constitutes consent. Tay Yong Kwang J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Iryan bin Abdul Karim [2010] 2 SLR 15 (“Iryan”) endorsed the following definition of consent at [123], citing Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian Penal Code 1860 vol 2 (C K Thakker & M C Thakker eds) (Bharat Law House, 26th Ed, 2007) at p 2061:

  145. [76] This definition was affirmed by this court in Pram Nair at [93] and Mustaph bin Abdullah v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGCA 30 at [103]. We would only add that consent may be expressed through words or conduct. In this regard, we gratefully adopt the Canadian Supreme Court’s observations in R v Barton [2019] 2 SCR 579 (“Barton”) at [95]–[100] that an accused cannot rely on the following propositions to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case that a complainant had in fact consented to the act: (a) that silence or passivity, alone and without more, amounts to consent; (b) that prior sexual activity makes consent more likely; (c) that consent can be given broadly and in advance to undefined sexual activity; or (d) that unless a complainant resists or protests, he or she is deemed to have given their consent. While these observations were made in the context of the defence of mistaken consent, they apply with equal force where an accused seeks to rely on them to raise a reasonable doubt that the complainant consented. Beyond this, we say no more, as much will turn on the precise facts of each case. That said, it is the Prosecution’s burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to the relevant act.

  146. [77] However, where an accused relies on the defence of mistaken belief of consent under s 375(5) of the PC, the burden is on him to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he believed “by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith” that the victim had consented to the relevant sexual act. The threshold to demonstrate “good faith” is high – the offender must show that he believed that the victim had consented to the sexual acts, having exercised “due care and attention” (Asep Ardiansyah v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 74 at [45]). In this regard, we endorse the view expressed in Barton at [121] that for the defence to apply, the accused must (a) honestly believe that the complainant had affirmatively communicated to the accused her consent through words or conduct – a mere belief that the complainant inwardly desired the relevant act is plainly insufficient; and (b) take steps to ascertain consent that are objectively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time.

  147. [78] The third observation concerns the continuing validity of consent. For consent to be valid, a person must not only have consented to the sexual act in question but must also retain the ability to withdraw that consent at any time prior to that act. In our view, this flows naturally from the definition of consent articulated in Iryan at [123], which states that consent implies “the exercise of a free and untrammelled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to”. The implication of this is that where a person loses the capacity to withdraw consent – whether by reason of intoxication or otherwise – any prior consent that person may have given must necessarily cease to be operative as it can no longer be freely retracted. To hold otherwise would be to allow an offender to rely on consent that the victim, at the material time, was powerless to revoke.

  148. [79] In this regard, we add that it would be extremely difficult for an accused person to avail himself of the defence of mistaken consent under s 375(5) of the PC where it would be apparent to a reasonable person prior to the sexual act that the victim was incapacitated or otherwise unable to freely retract any prior consent. This is because any mistake an accused person may be labouring under is unlikely to have been made in good faith. That said, as this scenario did not arise on the facts of the present case (given that the Complainant did not at any time consent to the sexual acts in question) and we did not have the benefit of submissions from the parties on this point, we say no more about it and leave it to be decided on a future occasion when it arises for determination.

  149. [80] Finally, we express our profound displeasure at the Appellant’s submissions, which seek to impugn the Complainant’s character by reference to her alleged choice of clothing and purportedly revealing photographs posted on her social media account. As we made clear at the hearing, such arguments are nothing short of victim-blaming and are entirely unacceptable. Any accused person who persists in mounting such attacks on a complainant’s character demonstrates a blatant lack of remorse, and risks having his sentence enhanced (see, eg, Seng Yong Yi Lucas v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 838 at [27]).

  150. The Appellant’s argument that the Complainant masterminded the Incident is unmeritorious

  151. [81] For completeness, we reject the Appellant’s argument that the Complainant had masterminded the Incident. The Appellant’s case is that the Complainant wanted to exact revenge against him and his family, motivated by what he described as her “great hatred” toward her employer, D2, arising from D2’s refusal to advance her $200 of her salary and D2 scolding her for her repeated mistakes. The Appellant further submits that the Complainant had dressed in a revealing manner on prior occasions to “[trap]”, “entice” and “lure” him. He also submits that her “gleeful” messages to her friends suggest that this was part of a plan, and that her friends had “coached her”.

  152. [82] We reject the Appellant’s arguments entirely. Aside from the fact that the Appellant’s submissions are without any basis, a fundamental difficulty with his case is that it was he who offered the Complainant wine prior to the Incident, which meant that, on his case, the Complainant must have formulated and executed an elaborate scheme on the spur of the moment to lure him to commit the sexual acts. In our judgment, such a scenario is wholly fanciful and implausible.

  153. [83] There is likewise no evidential basis for the Appellant’s assertion that the Complainant had been “play-acting” throughout the Incident. This characterisation is directly contradicted by the evidence: the Complainant’s text messages and conduct in the aftermath of the Incident are inconsistent with any suggestion of fabrication or extortion. Notably, the Appellant himself made no mention of this allegation in the VRI Statements – instead, he accepted that the Complainant was “unresponsive” (see above at [23]). He claimed to have become aware of the Complainant’s alleged plan only after viewing the Footage and the Complainant’s text messages to S and N. That explanation, however, is unconvincing – it was not his evidence that the Footage revealed anything he had not personally witnessed at the time, nor could he explain how the Complainant’s text messages lent any support to his assertion.

  154. [84] We also reject the Appellant’s assertion that the Complainant was in any way attempting to extort money or exact “revenge” on him or his family. The evidence showed that the Complainant had a good relationship with her employers. In her conversation with the HOME volunteer, the Complainant described her employers as “kind” and expressed that she did not want their reputation to be destroyed. Even in her conversations with D1 and D2, both expressed concern for the Complainant and encouraged her to report the Incident to the police. There is simply no evidence showing that the Complainant had asked for money or other benefits in exchange for not reporting the matter. Although D1 had initially made that assertion, she eventually conceded in cross-examination that the Complainant had not done so.

  155. Conclusion on the appeal against conviction

  156. Observations on the Judge’s decision on the 2nd Charge

  157. [86] Although the Prosecution is not appealing against the Judge’s decision to acquit the Appellant on the 2nd Charge, we pause to make some observations on that decision. To recapitulate, in respect of the 2nd Charge, the Complainant testified that after the Appellant administered the injections to her buttocks, she felt him touch, before inserting at least one finger into, her vagina. However, there was no video footage corroborating the Complainant’s account (GD at [134]). As explained above (at [7]), there were gaps in the Footage and the Prosecution’s case was that the act of digital-vaginal penetration occurred during one such gap which lasted between 12.01am and 12.06am.

  158. [87] The Appellant also denied inserting his finger into the Complainant’s vagina in his VRI Statements. He claimed that because the Complainant’s vagina was already “so moist”, he saw no need to further stimulate her by inserting his finger into her vagina. The Appellant maintained his denial during cross-examination.

  159. [88] Although the Judge found the Complainant to be an “honest witness who did not seek to exaggerate her account of events”, the Judge noted that “even honest witnesses may make mistakes and/or have imperfect recollections of an event”, and did not find it safe to conclude that the Complainant’s testimony alone sufficed to prove the physical element of the 2nd Charge (GD at [137]). In arriving at this conclusion, the Judge appears to have decided that there was reasonable doubt because, unlike the other four charges, there was no corroboration in the form of CCTV footage or VRI admission in respect of the sexual acts described in the 2nd Charge, and the Complainant’s evidence did not meet the “unusually convincing” threshold.

  160. [89] The “unusually convincing” standard is typically invoked where the uncorroborated evidence of a witness forms the sole basis for conviction (GII v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 578 (“GII”) at [25], citing Public Prosecutor v GCK [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) at [87]). It is a qualitative description of the overall calibre of the testimony of that sole witness, and its use stems from the recognition that while there is no formal legal requirement for corroboration under the law, it may be unsafe to convict an accused person on the basis of the uncorroborated evidence of a witness alone unless such evidence is unusually convincing (GII at [25], citing XP v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 686 (“XP”) at [27]–[28]).

  161. [90] Nonetheless, the abiding inquiry remains whether any reasonable doubt exists as to the accused person’s guilt (GII at [26], citing XP at [30]). Put simply, the “unusually convincing” standard entails that the witness’s testimony alone is sufficient to prove the Prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt (GCK at [90]). The “overwhelming consideration” that triggers the application of the “unusually convincing” standard is the amount and availability of evidence (GCK at [90], citing Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890 at [73] and Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 824 at [29]).

  162. [91] Having reviewed the evidence, we express our reservations about the Judge’s conclusion that there was reasonable doubt as to the Appellant’s guilt in respect of the 2nd Charge. First, the Judge found the Complainant to be a truthful and consistent witness in relation to the other charges, where her evidence was corroborated by the Footage and the Appellant’s admissions. Second, her conduct following the material events was consistent with her account. As the Judge observed (GD at [132]), her testimony about the act of digital-vaginal penetration was consistent with the allegations she had made during her conversation with D1 and D2, and the account she gave Dr Ong during the medical examination on 9 January 2020.

  163. [92] Beyond this, there were several other considerations that supported the Complainant’s account. The facts relating to the 2nd Charge formed part of the same continuous series of events giving rise to the other four charges of which the Judge convicted the Appellant. While the Complainant was feeling dizzy and as though “everything [was] spinning around [her]” with her surroundings appearing “a bit blurry” during the Incident, she was consistent in her evidence that she remained “very conscious” and was able to understand what was happening to her. Indeed, her ability to recall and give an accurate account of what happened was unaffected as demonstrated by her evidence in relation to the other charges being corroborated by the Footage and the Appellant’s admissions. Crucially, the Judge did not identify any aspect of the Complainant’s testimony in relation to the 2nd Charge that she doubted; nor did the Judge identify any aspect of the Complainant’s evidence in relation to the 2nd Charge which suggested a mistaken or imperfect recollection. Instead, she described the Complainant as an “honest witness who did not seek to exaggerate her account of events” (GD at [137]). In fact, the sexual acts constituting the 2nd Charge were, if anything, comparatively less serious than those underlying some of the other charges on which the Complainant’s testimony was found to be truthful and consistent, which made it less likely that it was inaccurate or exaggerated.

  164. [93] In the circumstances, we see no reason for the Judge to have found reasonable doubt in respect of the Complainant’s account of, and the evidence establishing, the 2nd Charge.

  165. [94] The present case illustrates the importance of not applying the “unusually convincing” standard in a way that may unwittingly preclude convictions for sexual offences founded solely on a complainant’s testimony. As the Court of Appeal observed in GCK at [91], the “unusually convincing” standard serves as a cautionary reminder of the high threshold that the Prosecution must meet to secure a conviction, and of the anxious scrutiny required given the severe consequences that follow from a conviction. Where a complainant’s testimony, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, carries that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused (see Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 at [39]), the standard is met. Here, the Complainant’s testimony was consistent across multiple occasions, supported by her conduct in the aftermath of the events, and untainted by any finding of exaggeration or dishonesty on her part. Assessed against this backdrop and bearing in mind the Appellant’s own lack of credibility (GD at [137]), we are satisfied that the Complainant’s testimony carried the requisite ring of truth and that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the Appellant in respect of the 2nd Charge. However, as the Prosecution did not appeal against the acquittal on the 2nd Charge, we leave the Judge’s finding on this point undisturbed.

  166. Sentencing

  167. [95] We turn next to address the Appellant’s appeal against his sentence. This entails a consideration of the appropriate sentencing framework for the offences of rape and outrage of modesty where the offender is liable for enhanced punishment under s 73 of the 2008 PC.

  168. The parties’ submission below

  169. The Prosecution’s case

  170. [96] Before the Judge, the Prosecution sought a global sentence of between 19 years and 2 months’ and 20 years and 3 months’ imprisonment. In respect of the applicable sentencing approach for rape and outrage of modesty offences punishable under s 73(1) of the PC, the Prosecution proposed adding a default multiplier of 1.5 times to reflect the vulnerability of MDWs and the abuse of authority inherent in such offences. This default multiplier could be adjusted depending on the extent of these factors in each case. On the facts, the Prosecution submitted that a multiplier of 1.3 times was appropriate, taking into account the Complainant’s four years of prior working experience in Singapore and her relatively robust support network, tempered by her unfamiliarity with the Singapore justice system and consequent hesitance to report the offences, as well as the relatively lower degree of authority the Appellant held over her as D2’s father rather than D2 herself.

  171. The Appellant’s case

  172. [97] The Appellant sought a global sentence of 8 years and 20 months’ imprisonment, citing his mistaken belief as to consent, his lack of premeditation or predatory intent, his status as a first-time offender, his remorse, and the care he had provided to the Complainant.

  173. Decision below

  174. [98] The Judge sentenced the Appellant to an aggregate term of 19 years and six months’ imprisonment (GD at [240]).

  175. The Judge’s proposed sentencing framework

  176. [99] As there were no reported cases on the interaction between s 73(1) of the PC and the established sentencing frameworks for sexual offences, the Judge developed a sentencing framework (GD at [247]). The Judge found it appropriate to broadly follow the approach adopted in GFX v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 1423 (“GFX”) (GD at [252]), where a three-judge coram of the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) held that in sentencing accused persons who had committed s 325 offences (voluntarily causing grievous hurt) punishable with enhanced penalties under s 74B(2) of the PC, the existing two-stage sentencing framework from Public Prosecutor v BDB [2018] 1 SLR 127 would continue to apply but with an additional multiplier step interposed between the two existing stages (GD at [254]).

  177. [100] Adapting the approach in GFX, the Judge established a three-stage sentencing framework as follows:

  178. (a) At the first stage, the court applies the first step of the sentencing frameworks for rape or outrage of modesty as established in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) and Kunasekaran s/o Kalimuthu Somasundara v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 580 (“Kunasekaran”) respectively, by considering the offence-specific factors, identifying the band within which the case falls, and determining the indicative starting sentence within that band (GD at [257]–[258]).

  179. (b) Next, the court applies a multiplier ranging from 1% to 100% to the indicative starting sentence to derive an indicative enhanced starting sentence (GD at [259]). In determining the appropriate multiplier, the Judge considered the twin factors of: (i) the MDW’s vulnerability; and (ii) the offender’s authority over the MDW, as these were the main considerations leading to the introduction of the enhanced punishment regime in s 73 (GD at [261]).

  180. (i) In assessing the MDW’s vulnerability, the Judge considered the following non-exhaustive factors: the MDW’s age and work experience in Singapore; the MDW’s access to a social network and degree of social isolation; previous incidents of threats, intimidation or abuse by the employer or household members; and external factors such as whether the MDW is the sole breadwinner for her family and/or has taken on significant debt to work in Singapore (GD at [263]).

  181. (ii) In assessing the offender’s authority over the victim, the Judge considered the following non-exhaustive factors: the offender’s relationship to the MDW (employer, employment agent or household member); the extent to which the offender exercised control over the MDW’s day-to-day living conditions, including control over workload and imposition of restrictive rules that circumscribe the MDW’s personal freedoms; and the extent of the offender’s authority over the terms of employment, such as the authority to terminate employment and withhold pay (GD at [265]).

  182. (c) Finally, the court applies the second step of the Terence Ng and Kunasekaran framework and considers the offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors to calibrate the final sentence (GD at [266]).

  183. [101] The Judge found that the exception under s 73(2) of the PC did not apply as there was a clear link between the Complainant’s position as an MDW and her susceptibility to the sexual offences committed against her (GD at [272]).

  184. Application of the Judge’s proposed sentencing framework

  185. [102] Turning to the facts, the Judge first determined the indicative pre-enhanced sentences at the first stage:

  186. (a) For the 1st and 4th Charges (ie, the rape charges), the Judge determined they fell within the low to mid-point of Band 2 of the Terence Ng framework given the presence of three offence-specific aggravating factors: (i) the Complainant’s vulnerability as she was in a physically weakened state (GD at [277]–[280]); (ii) the Appellant’s premeditation (GD at [281]–[283]); and (iii) the Appellant’s failure to wear a condom, thereby exposing the Complainant to various risks including the risk of unwanted pregnancy and disease (GD at [284]). The Judge adopted an indicative starting sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment for each of these charges (GD at [287]).

  187. (b) For the 3rd and 5th Charges (ie, the outrage of modesty charges), the Judge found that the offence-specific aggravating factors of the Complainant’s vulnerability and premeditation applied (GD at [288]). Additionally, there was significant sexual exploitation given the Appellant’s direct skin-on-skin contact with the most intimate parts of the Complainant’s body (GD at [289]). Accordingly, the Judge concluded that the offences fell at the higher end of Band 2 of the Kunasekaran framework and adopted an indicative starting sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for each of these charges (GD at [290]).

  188. [103] The Judge then considered the appropriate multiplier under s 73(1) of the PC:

  189. (a) The Judge found that the Complainant was moderately vulnerable as an MDW. While she had strong social support from her sister and friend, she was unfamiliar with Singapore’s justice system, which had given rise to her fears about lodging a police report. Further, the Incident occurred during the eight days when she was left alone with the Appellant while D2 and the other household members were overseas, meaning that she could not immediately seek help when sexually assaulted (GD at [292]).

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