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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Oct 2026
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General Division of the High Court

Chan Yip Tong David (alias Chan Sow Lang) v Chan Yip Tong Franklin (alias Chan Sow Fatt)

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[2026] SGHC 219Case no. Originating Claim No 214 of 2022

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  1. Christopher Tan J:

  2. Introduction

  3. [1] The two parties to this dispute (“Parties”) are the claimant, Chan Yip Tong David @ Chan Sow Lang (“Claimant”) and the defendant, Chan Yip Tong Franklin @ Chan Sow Fatt (“Defendant”). Both of them are brothers. Their mother (“Testatrix”) had three other children:

  4. (a) Chan Yip Tong George (“George”);

  5. (b) Chan Yip Tong Jack (“Jack”); and

  6. (c) Chan Sow Chong @ Oliver Peter Yip Tong (“Peter”), who predeceased the Testatrix.

  7. [2] In the Testatrix’s last will and testament dated 25 October 2012 (“Will”), she named the Parties as the executors of her estate (“Estate”). She passed away on 21 December 2012, with grant of probate being issued on 5 April 2014. The Will named four beneficiaries: (a) the Claimant; (b) the Defendant; (c) Peter’s daughter, Chan Dione Yiptong (“Dione”); and (d) George’s daughter, Chan Joanne Yiptong (“Joanne”). Notably, George and Jack were not named as beneficiaries even though they were still alive at the time the Will was made.

  8. [3] The Will bequeathed the following three immovable properties to the beneficiaries above:

  9. (a) A semi-detached house at Eng Kong Road (“EK Property”) was bequeathed to the Parties in equal shares.

  10. (b) A retail unit in Far East Shopping Centre at Orchard Road (“Far East Property”) was bequeathed to the Claimant, Defendant, and Dione in three equal shares.

  11. (c) A condominium unit at Hindhede Walk (“Springdale Condo”) was bequeathed to Dione and Joanne in equal shares.

  12. The EK Property, Far East Property and Springdale Condo were transferred to the respective beneficiaries in accordance with the bequeathments listed above.

  13. [4] By way of background, the EK Property had been purchased in February 2012, while it was still under construction. Thereafter, its purchase price was settled by way of progress payments. These progress payments were ongoing as at the point the Will was executed and continued to be made even after the Testatrix’s death in December 2012, ending only in April 2014.

  14. [5] Apart from the real estate above, the Testatrix had other financial assets, including monies in bank accounts held either by herself or jointly with one or more of her children. In respect of these monies, the Will directed as follows:

  15. (a) All the Testatrix’s monies – whether in joint or personal bank accounts – were to be applied towards the EK Property’s progress payments, with any balance to be divided equally four ways between the Claimant, the Defendant, Dione, and Joanne.

  16. (b) In the event of the Testatrix’s monies being insufficient to cover the EK Property’s progress payments, any shortfall – which the Parties termed the “EK Shortfall” – was to be met using the net rental proceeds from the Far East Property and the Springdale Condo.

  17. [6] The present dispute arises from a multitude of claims that the Parties have levelled against each other. For a more structured analysis, I have classified these claims under the following broad categories.

  18. [7] Firstly, both sides have advanced a number of claims in relation to the EK Property, as set out below.

  19. (a) The Claimant claims for rent payable by the Defendant for the period when the Defendant’s family was residing at the EK Property.

  20. (b) The Claimant also claims for his share of the rent which the Defendant collected from the tenant who had subsequently rented the EK Property, one Hau Hoang Jason (“Jason”).

  21. (c) The Defendant, on his part seeks various remedies in relation to the rent collected from Jason, including orders that the Claimant:

  22. (i) release the Defendant’s share of rent paid by Jason, which now sits in a bank account jointly held in the names of the Parties;

  23. (ii) pay the “excess rent” which he collected from Jason; and

  24. (iii) furnish an account of the rent collected from Jason.

  25. (d) The Defendant also wants the Claimant to reimburse him for the property tax which the Defendant claims to have paid for the EK Property.

  26. (e) The Defendant also seeks to compel the Claimant to pay half the commission which the Defendant claims to have earned (in his capacity as a property agent) for procuring Jason’s tenancies.

  27. [8] Secondly, the Defendant seeks damages against the Claimant for defamation. This claim pertains to an email which the Claimant had sent to the Defendant’s employer, PropNex Realty Pte Ltd (“PropNex”), concerning Jason’s tenancy.

  28. [9] Thirdly, the Claimant seeks to enforce a handwritten note signed by the Defendant on 11 September 2021 (“Handwritten Note”), under which the Parties agreed that $600,000 of the proceeds from selling the EK Property (which was eventually sold in April 2022 ) would be set aside and distributed equally to George and Jack.

  29. [10] Fourthly, both sides have advanced the following claims in relation to the Far East Property:

  30. (a) The Claimant wants the Defendant to furnish an account of the rent which the latter had collected.

  31. (b) The Defendant wants the Claimant to furnish an account of the maintenance fees and property tax that had been paid.

  32. [11] Fifthly, the Defendant wants the Claimant to furnish an account in respect of the following matters relating to the Estate:

  33. (a) the EK Shortfall (as defined at [5(b)] above);

  34. (b) the Testatrix’s investment in a gold investment company called Genneva Pte Ltd, made sometime between 2011 and 2012 (“Gold Investment”); and

  35. (c) A blue attaché case containing valuables belonging to the Testatrix.

  36. [12] Next, both sides also want the other party to furnish an account of the balances in various bank accounts in which the Testatrix was a joint account holder, as set out below.

  37. (a) The Claimant wants the Defendant to furnish an account of the following two bank accounts:

  38. (i) a joint account with CIMB Bank Bhd ending with the digits “5045” (“CIMB Joint Account”), held in the names of the Testatrix and the Defendant; and

  39. (ii) a joint account with the Development Bank of Singapore Ltd ending with the digits “7643” (“DBS Joint Account”), held in the names of the Testatrix, the Defendant and his son.

  40. (b) The Defendant wants the Claimant to furnish an account of various joint bank accounts, although these have not been fully particularised in the Defendant’s pleadings.

  41. [13] Finally, the Defendant seeks to recover sums which he alleges the Claimant to have withdrawn from a bank account held jointly by the Testatrix and Peter with the Post Office Savings Bank Ltd (“POSB Joint Account”).

  42. [14] I now deal with each of these heads of claim, according to the sequence as set out above.

  43. Parties’ claims relating to the EK Property

  44. [15] As alluded to at [4] above, after the EK Property was purchased in February 2012, its purchase price was settled via progress payments which continued until 2014. The Temporary Occupation Permit (“TOP”) for the EK Property was eventually issued in June 2014, after which there were two periods when it was occupied:

  45. (a) From around October 2014 onwards, the Defendant and his family moved into the EK Property, where they resided for about two years, up until September 2016. Thereafter, the Defendant’s family moved out, with only the Defendant’s son, Chan Zhaohao, Charles Yiptong (“Charles”) continuing to reside at the EK Property. Charles stayed at the EK Property for only two more months – October and November 2016 – after which he also moved out. Thereafter, the EK Property remained vacant for about eight months.

  46. (b) In August 2017, the Parties rented the EK Property to Jason. After successive tenancies that collectively spanned more than four years, Jason vacated the EK Property sometime in January 2022.

  47. In April 2022, the Parties sold the EK Property, after having held it as tenants in common for more than nine years.

  48. [16] The Claimant claims against the Defendant for rent in respect of the EK Property, in relation to both the periods (a) and (b) in the immediately preceding paragraph. Specifically, the Claimant seeks the following:

  49. (a) Rent payable by the Defendant for the duration when his family (including Charles) resided at the EK Property.

  50. (b) Rent which the Defendant collected from Jason. As the Parties each owned half of the EK Property as tenants in common (see [3(a)] above), the Claimant claims for half of the rent collected from Jason.

  51. [17] The Defendant, on his part, has advanced various counterclaims against the Claimant in respect of the EK Property:

  52. (a) Firstly, the Defendant seeks various remedies relating to the rental proceeds from Jason’s tenancies, as set out at [7(c)] above.

  53. (b) The Defendant also wants the Claimant to reimburse him for the property tax which the Defendant claims to have paid for the EK Property.

  54. (c) Finally, the Defendant claims against the Claimant for the commission which the Defendant claims to have earned, in his capacity as the property agent who procured Jason’s tenancies.

  55. [18] I now deal each of these claims in turn.

  56. Claimant’s claim for rent payable by the Defendant for his family’s stay at the EK Property

  57. [19] I begin with the Claimant’s claim for rent which he says the Defendant owes in respect of the duration when the latter’s family resided at the EK Property.

  58. [20] The Parties agree that they had orally entered into an arrangement under which the Defendant would pay the Claimant a monthly rent of $4,000 in exchange for the Defendant’s family residing at the EK Property. While this rent was paid by the Defendant for the months May 2015 to August 2016, the Claimant maintains that the Defendant should also have paid it for:

  59. (a) the prior seven-month period of October 2014 to April 2015; and

  60. (b) the final three months of occupation from September to November 2016.

  61. The Claimant thus alleges that the Defendant owes him a total of ten months’ rent, amounting to $40,000.

  62. [21] The Defendant, on his part, claims that he had made a separate oral agreement with the Claimant, sometime on 25 June 2014, under which the Defendant was excused from having to pay rent while staying at the EK Property until the Defendant could secure rental income from his apartment in The Pinnacle @ Duxton (“Pinnacle”). As it turns out, the Defendant was ultimately unable to rent out Pinnacle but managed to sell it instead, in May 2015. With the sale rendering the notion of renting out Pinnacle moot, the Defendant commenced paying rent for the EK Property from May 2015 onwards. The Defendant thus argues that he was excused from paying rent in respect of the EK Property prior to that, for the months October 2014 to April 2015 (ie, the duration in [20(a)] above), when Pinnacle could not be rented out. In response to this, the Claimant denies that he ever agreed to allow the Defendant to stay on the EK Property rent free.

  63. [22] As for the months of September to November 2016 (at [20(b)] above), the Defendant claims that he and his family had already moved out of the EK Property, with only Charles staying behind in October and November 2016 to oversee post-construction rectification works on the EK Property.

  64. Preliminary observations on the arrangement for the Defendant to pay rent

  65. [23] Before addressing the Claimant’s claim, I make some preliminary observations on the Parties’ arrangement for the Defendant to pay a monthly rent of $4,000 in exchange for his family residing at the EK Property. As alluded to at [20] above, the Parties agree that they did orally enter into such an arrangement. While a co‑owner in occupation of co‑owned property generally has no liability to pay the other co‑owners any occupation fee or rent, such liability can be agreed upon by the co‑owners: Khoo Jee Chek v Lim Beng Tiong [2024] 1 SLR 829 at [62]. As for whether such an agreement creates a landlord‑tenant relationship between the co‑owners, it has been held that a co-owner of a property cannot validly grant a leasehold interest over that property to another co-owner (see the opinion of F A Chua J in Goodland Ltd v Lim Ban Toon [1965–1967] SLR(R) 264 at [17]). The latter proposition has nevertheless been criticised as being commercially impractical and out of line with Commonwealth authorities (Tang Hang Wu & Kelvin F K Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2019) at p 214).

  66. [24] In any event, neither party goes so far as to suggest that their intention was to confer a leasehold interest on the Defendant, in exchange for him paying the monthly rent of $4,000. While their arrangement contemplated that the Defendant’s family would get exclusive possession for the duration that he paid the monthly rent of $4,000, this is not in itself determinative of whether a leasehold interest was intended to be conferred. The court must ascertain parties’ intentions from all the relevant circumstances, looking at their conduct and the substance of the agreement between them: Goh Gin Chye v Peck Teck Kian Realty Pte Ltd [1987] SLR(R) 195 at [14]–[15], citing Street v Mountford [1985] 1 AC 809 (“Street”) at 818. Some insights into what the Parties intended in this case can be gleaned from a WhatsApp message sent by the Defendant to the Claimant on 30 October 2014 at 12.04am, extracted below:

  67. The message above does not suggest any intention by the Parties for the arrangement (by which the Defendant paid a monthly rent of $4,000) to confer any interest in the EK Property on the Defendant, over and above what he already owned (see Street at 824–825, citing Marchant v Charters [1977] 1 WLR 1181 at 1185). In fact, one can tell from the message that the arrangement was a highly fluid one, where the Parties did not even see fit to specify the duration for which this arrangement would subsist.

  68. [25] As such, rather than conferring upon the Defendant any additional interest in the EK Property, the arrangement between the Parties appeared to be more consistent with a contract by which the Claimant merely undertook a personal obligation to stay out of the property, for the duration that the Defendant paid rent. Notwithstanding, the Defendant relies on s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLA”) to contend that the arrangement for him to pay a monthly rent of $4,000, not having been reduced into writing, was unenforceable. This provision states:

  69. Specifically, the Defendant argues that as there was no “memorandum or note” signed by him evincing the arrangement where he would pay a monthly rent of $4,000 in exchange for his family being allowed to reside at the EK Property, s 6(d) CLA dictates that the Claimant “has no action to bring against the Defendant in respect of the alleged rent”.

  70. [26] This defence is clearly a non-starter. As seen from the extract above, s 6(d) CLA is concerned with “any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property” [emphasis added]. As the arrangement for the Defendant to stay on the EK Property was merely a contract embodying a personal obligation by the Claimant that did not entail the disposition of any interest in the EK Property (see [25] above), s 6(d) CLA has no relevance here.

  71. [27] In any case, the Defendant should not be allowed to raise s 6(d) CLA now as the provision was never pleaded by him, despite his Defence and Counterclaim having been amended four times. Section 6(d) CLA was raised by him for the very first time only in closing submissions. Guidance may be taken from the case of Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 258, where the defendant also sought to rely on s 6(d) CLA despite not having pleaded it. V K Rajah JC (as he then was) observed (at [64]):

  72. Indeed, there is even greater cause to bar the Defendant from relying on s 6(d) CLA here, given that this is not just a case of his pleading failing to raise s 6(d) CLA. His pleadings actually admitted that there was an agreement for him to pay $4,000 rent every month.

  73. [28] Notwithstanding his failure to plead s 6(d) CLA, the Defendant submits that the court should take “judicial notice” of this provision. In making this submission, he relies on s 59(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”), which states:

  74. With respect, the Defendant’s submission is misconceived. When the court takes judicial notice of a fact, this simply means that the fact is taken to be uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute, such that it need not be proved: Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v Ceramiche Caesar SpA [2016] 2 SLR 1129 at [38]; see also s 58 EA. That does not relieve the Defendant from his obligation to plead his defence so that the Claimant is not taken by surprise.

  75. My decision on the claim for rent payable by the Defendant for his family’s stay at the EK Property

  76. [29] Having set out my views on the preliminary matters above, I now turn to consider the substantive arguments underlying the Claimant’s claim for rent payable by the Defendant. To recapitulate, the Claimant is claiming for monthly rent of $4,000, in respect of the following months when the Defendant’s family resided at the EK Property (set out at [20] above):

  77. (a) October 2014 to April 2015; and

  78. (b) September to November 2016.

  79. (1) October 2014 to April 2015

  80. [30] Given that the Parties do not dispute that there was an arrangement between them for the Defendant’s family to stay at the EK Property in exchange for a monthly rent of $4,000, the starting position is that the Defendant was liable to pay that rent once his family commenced their stay in October 2014. The Defendant nevertheless contends that he had a separate oral agreement with the Claimant excusing the Defendant from paying rent – despite his family residing at the EK Property – pending the Defendant’s attempts to rent out Pinnacle: see [21] above.

  81. [31] As it is the Defendant asserting the existence of this separate oral agreement absolving him from paying rent, he bears the burden of proving it. The first port of call when faced with claims that an oral agreement had been struck would be the relevant documentary evidence. In OCBC Capital Investment Asia Ltd v Wong Hua Choon [2012] 4 SLR 1206, the Court of Appeal explained (at [41]):

  82. [32] The documentary evidence, including any written correspondence between the parties to the purported oral contract, needs then to be viewed against their contemporaneous conduct at the material time: Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 at [39]. If there is a dearth of documentary evidence, the court will examine the precise factual matrix to ascertain if the alleged oral agreement had indeed been concluded between parties: Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (“Gay Choon Ing”) at [60].

  83. [33] Based on evidence of the WhatsApp messages exchanged between the Parties, I find that they did have an oral agreement to waive the rental payable by the Defendant, at least until he managed to rent out Pinnacle. The most illuminating messages were those exchanged on 23 June 2015, shortly after the Defendant had sold Pinnacle and commenced paying the monthly rent of $4,000 to the Claimant (see [21] above). I extract the salient messages in the table below:

  84. [35] The Parties continued to exchange messages touching on this topic, as late as two years after the Defendant’s family had vacated the EK Property. In a WhatsApp group chat dated 27 September 2018 between the Parties and their uncle, Tam Sook, the latter had voiced his disappointment over how the Parties were still fighting despite his efforts to mediate. In response, the Claimant sent the following message at 10.19pm:

  85. The Claimant thus admitted in this message that he “didn’t argue” with the arrangement of allowing the Defendant to stay at the EK Property rent free (pending Pinnacle being rented out) despite the Claimant feeling that this was unfair, as the Claimant valued their brotherly ties.

  86. [36] Despite the trail of messages corroborating the Defendant’s claim that there was an oral agreement allowing him to stay rent free, the Claimant insisted while under cross-examination that he did not agree to excusing the Defendant from paying rent during the latter’s stay at the EK Property. However, the Claimant was simply unable to explain the WhatsApp messages above, which clearly show that he did agree.

  87. [37] Admittedly, the Defendant’s claim that there was an oral agreement – allowing him and his family to stay at the EK Property rent free (pending Pinnacle being rented out) – was not entirely free of difficulty. In court, the Defendant explained that this oral agreement was concluded at a coffee shop in Toa Payoh, immediately after he and the Claimant had collected the keys to the EK property from the conveyancing lawyer’s Toa Payoh office, on 25 June 2014. However, the WhatsApp messages exchanged between the Parties show that four weeks after that, ie, on 22 July 2014, the Claimant was still inquiring if the Defendant had collected the keys to the EK Property. There would have been little reason for the Claimant to make such an inquiry on 22 July 2014 if the Parties had indeed gone to the lawyer’s Toa Payoh office just four weeks before that (ie, on 25 June 2014) to collect the keys to the EK Property. If the Defendant’s account of how the Parties had collected the keys at the Toa Payoh office on 25 June 2014 is in doubt, this could potentially also cast doubt on his account that they met at the Toa Payoh coffee shop after collecting the keys, where the oral agreement (to let the Defendant stay rent free) was allegedly struck. Under cross-examination, the Defendant was unable to satisfactorily explain the disjoint between his oral evidence and the Claimant’s WhatsApp message on 22 July 2014.

  88. [38] Nevertheless, I find this to be insufficient to cause any material damage to the veracity of the Defendant’s account. The WhatsApp messages at [33] above are sufficiently probative that the oral agreement – to let the Defendant stay rent free at the EK Property – was indeed struck. I am prepared to grant the Defendant some latitude for any difficulties in recalling the exact circumstances under which the oral agreement came into being (eg, whether it was struck at the point when he collected the keys to the EK Property), given that the event took place some 10 years before the trial.

  89. [39] The Claimant also points to the WhatsApp exchange on 30 October 2014 (when the Defendant’s family had just moved into the EK Property), where the Parties recorded their agreement that the Defendant would pay a monthly rent of $4,000 in exchange for his family residing at the EK Property (see [24] above). The Claimant highlights that there was nothing in that WhatsApp exchange suggesting that the Defendant’s obligation to pay that rent would be suspended pending his attempts to rent out Pinnacle. The Claimant questions why the Parties would even be tying down the quantum of the monthly rent if the Defendant had indeed been excused from paying rent at that point in time (Pinnacle having yet to be rented out). In my view, little turns on this. The exchange of WhatsApp messages was consistent with a discussion between the Parties as to the rent that the Defendant would eventually have to pay, once his obligation to pay rent commenced. There was nothing in the WhatsApp exchange to suggest that the $4,000 was going to be immediately payable.

  90. [40] The Claimant also points to the chronology of events annexed to the Defendant’s Opening Statement, which states that the oral agreement was for the Defendant’s family to stay in the EK Property rent free until Pinnacle was sold. This conflicts with the position in the main body of the Defendant’s Opening Statement, which is that the arrangement was for his family to stay rent free until Pinnacle was rented out. The Claimant thus argues that the Defendant is unable to even give a consistent account of the terms of the alleged oral agreement to let him stay rent free. In my view, this inconsistency is quite minor in the greater scheme of things. The position that has consistently been advocated by the Defendant – throughout his pleadings, affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) and oral evidence – is that his family was allowed to stay at the EK Property rent free until Pinnacle was rented out. It was only in the chronology, which was appended as an annex to the Opening Statement, that the term “sold” was used instead of “rented out”. The Defendant has clarified on the stand that the chronology was erroneous in this regard.

  91. [41] I thus find that on balance, the Claimant did agree – albeit resentfully – to let the Defendant stay on the EK Property rent free until Pinnacle was rented out. The Defendant was thus not obliged to pay the monthly rent of $4,000, as from the time his family moved into the EK Property in October 2014 to the point when Pinnacle was sold in May 2015 (when the notion of renting out Pinnacle became moot). I thus dismiss the Claimant’s claim for monthly rent of $4,000 for the months of October 2014 to April 2015, set out at [20(a)] above.

  92. (2) September to November 2016

  93. [42] I now turn to the period spanning September to November 2016, referred to at [20(b)] above, being the last three months before the Defendant and all his family members fully vacated the EK Property.

  94. [43] I begin with the month of September 2016. The Defendant admits that his family did continue to reside at the EK Property until the end of September 2016 and that he was consequently obliged to pay the Claimant rent for that month (Pinnacle having already been sold long before then). Indeed, the Defendant contends that he did pay the rent of $4,000 for the month of September 2016. The Claimant maintains that he did not.

  95. [44] On this, the law is clear. If a party who has an undisputed contractual obligation to make a payment pleads that did make that payment, the burden is on him to prove that the payment was in fact made: SCT Technologies Pte Ltd v Western Copper Co Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1471 at [23]–[31]. On the evidence, the Defendant has plainly failed to discharge that burden. All he needed to do was adduce his financial records to show that the monthly rent of $4,000 for September 2016 was indeed transferred to the Claimant. Rather than doing so, he chose to simply fold his arms and insist that the Claimant proves a negative (ie, that the Claimant did not receive payment). The Claimant’s claim for the rent of $4,000 payable for the month of September 2016 must thus be granted.

  96. [45] As regards the rent for October and November 2016, the Defendant claims that his family was no longer residing at the EK Property, save for his son Charles, who stayed on for these final two months to oversee rectification works (see [22] above). According to Charles, he was the only person residing at the EK Property then – the rest of the family having moved out.

  97. [46] Even if I accept Charles’ explanation that he remained at the EK Property in October and November 2016 to oversee rectification works, this does nothing to alter the Defendant’s obligation to pay rent for those two months. The Defendant claims that there was “a whole myriad of defects from the EK Property that would require further rectification works”. However, in making that assertion, the Defendant relies on a property defects list dated 14 July 2014, ie, about three months before the Defendant and his family had even moved into the EK Property (they moved in only in October 2014). After September 2016, when the Defendant’s family finally vacated and left Charles behind, they would have resided at the EK Property for about two years. Presumably, the bulk of the rectification works would have been completed by the end (if not before commencement) of the family’s stay. Notwithstanding that such works would have been carried out under the watch of the Defendant’s family members during their stay, the Parties evidently did not view this as absolving the Defendant from paying rent (once Pinnacle was sold). That being the case, I fail to see how Charles’ purpose of staying behind in October and November 2016 to supervise rectification works (if any was even left) absolves the Defendant from paying rent for his son’s stay for these two final months.

  98. [47] The Defendant also contends that he had to personally reside at the EK Property, in order for him to be liable for rent. Given that the Defendant was no longer residing at the EK Property in October and November 2016 (when only Charles stayed there), he argues that he had no obligation to pay rent for those two months. In support of this contention, the Defendant highlights a portion of the trial transcripts where the following question was posed to the Claimant in cross-examination:

  99. The Defendant relies on the Claimant’s answer “No” in the extract above to submit that the Claimant himself agrees that so long as the Defendant is no longer personally residing at the EK Property (which was the case in October and November 2016), the obligation to pay rent would cease (notwithstanding that Charles may have remained). However, this submission plainly mischaracterises the evidence. The question posed to the Claimant in the extract above was: “If [the Defendant] was not staying there, would he be liable to rent to you?” and not “would he be liable to pay rent to you?” It is unacceptable for the Defendant to recast the question on record into one that supports his submission. In any case, his submission entirely sidesteps the critical exchange which came immediately after that extracted above, which I set out below:

  100. [48] The Claimant’s response, extracted immediately above, accords with what I understand from the evidence to be the arrangement between the Parties, being that rent was payable for the Defendant’s family (and not just the Defendant personally) residing at the EK Property. As a matter of common sense, that must be correct. Taking the Defendant’s contention to its logical conclusion would mean that his entire family could remain on the EK Property indefinitely and he would still not be liable for rent, so long as he himself was not there. I fail to see how the Parties could have intended such a ludicrous outcome.

  101. [49] Accordingly, I hold that the Defendant is liable to pay the Claimant rent for the months September to November 2016, totalling $12,000.

  102. Parties’ claims relating to rent paid by Jason

  103. [50] I now turn to address the claims concerning the rental proceeds from Jason’s tenancy of the EK Property.

  104. [51] After the Defendant’s family had moved out, the EK Property remained vacant for about eight months before it was tenanted to Jason in August 2017. Jason had rented the EK Property over three consecutive tenancy agreements that collectively spanned a duration of more than four years:

  105. (a) The first tenancy was embodied in an agreement (“1st Tenancy Agreement”) signed in August 2017 by Jason and both the Parties. The 1st Tenancy Agreement was for a term of two years commencing 25 August 2017.

  106. (b) The second tenancy was encapsulated in an addendum to the 1st Tenancy Agreement (“2nd Tenancy Agreement”), signed in August 2019 by Jason and the Defendant but not the Claimant. The 2nd Tenancy Agreement extended the lease under the 1st Tenancy Agreement by a further two-year term, commencing 25 August 2019.

  107. (c) The third tenancy was pursuant to an oral agreement (“3rd Tenancy Agreement”) struck in August 2021 between Jason and the Defendant, where both of them agreed to a short extension of the lease, from September 2021 to March 2022.

  108. All three tenancy agreements above were for a monthly rent of $7,800.

  109. [52] Under the 1st Tenancy Agreement, Jason was required to pay a security deposit of two months’ rent (ie, $15,600), which he duly handed to the Defendant. Thereafter, the rent from Jason under the 1st Tenancy Agreement was paid into an account with Standard Chartered Bank (Singapore) Ltd ending with the digits “3344” (“SCB Joint Account”), held in the joint names of the Parties. The Claimant pleaded, and the Defendant admitted, that the rent paid into the SCB Joint Account amounted to a total of $142,971.04 – comprising rent collected under the 1st Tenancy Agreement for the months of August 2017 to July 2019 (save for August and September 2018, for which Jason paid the rent to the Parties directly ).

  110. [53] When the 1st Tenancy Agreement was about to expire in August 2019, the Defendant sought to extend Jason’s tenancy, as he felt that the rent paid by Jason was above the market rate. The Defendant consequently prepared the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, being an addendum to the 1st Tenancy Agreement that extended the lease for another two years (ie, from 25 August 2019 to 24 August 2021), at the same monthly rent of $7,800. On 7 August 2019, the Defendant and Jason signed the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. The Claimant refused to sign the same but the Defendant still proceeded with the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. Upon signing the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, Jason decided to use the two-month security deposit which he had paid the Defendant under the 1st Tenancy Agreement to offset the rent for the first two months of the lease under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, ie, August and September 2019. In effect, this meant that there was no security deposit covering Jason’s obligations under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. For the rest of the term under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, Jason split the monthly rent into two equal portions of $3,900, which he separately deposited into the personal bank accounts of both the Parties every month. The Claimant did not object to receiving the same, despite his refusal to sign the 2nd Tenancy Agreement.

  111. [54] When the 2nd Tenancy Agreement expired in August 2021, Jason and the Defendant entered into the 3rd Tenancy Agreement, under which they orally agreed to a short extension of the lease for six months, from September 2021 to March 2022. However, Jason moved out of the EK Property sometime in January or February 2022. Under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement, Jason paid the full amount of each month’s rent to the Defendant (instead of separately paying half the monthly rent to the Claimant, as he did under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement). In doing so, Jason had left it to the Defendant to split the rent with the Claimant. However, the Defendant retained the entire amount of rent collected under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement, without handing half of the same to the Claimant.

  112. [55] Arising from Jason’s tenancies, the Parties make the following claims:

  113. (a) The Claimant claims for his half share of the rent paid by Jason, for the first two months of the lease under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement as well as for the entire period spanning September 2021 to January 2022 when Jason was in occupation under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement.

  114. (b) The Defendant counterclaims against the Claimant for:

  115. (i) An order that the Claimant releases to the Defendant the latter’s half share of the $142,971.04 which currently sits in the SCB Joint Account (see [52] above), which comprises the rent paid by Jason under the 1st Tenancy Agreement;

  116. (ii) Payment of “excess rent” of $74,880 which the Claimant collected from Jason; and

  117. (iii) An account to be furnished by the Claimant in respect of the rent collected from Jason’s tenancies.

  118. [56] Each of these claims is considered in turn below.

  119. Claimant’s claim for his half share of rent paid by Jason under the 2nd and 3rd Tenancy Agreements

  120. [57] The Claimant claims for the following amounts of rent which the Defendant had collected from Jason:

  121. (a) $7,800, being the Claimant’s half share of the first two months of rent under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement.

  122. (b) $19,500, being the Claimant’s half share of the rent that Jason paid from September 2021 to January 2022 (totalling $39,000) under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement.

  123. For the reasons below, I allow the Claimant’s claims in both (a) and (b) above.

  124. (1) Claimant’s claim for his half share of the first two months of rent under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement

  125. [58] As explained at [53] above, Jason used his security deposit to settle the first two months of rent payable under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, ie, August and September 2019. As the security deposit now represents the first two months of rent under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, this effectively means that the rent for these two months lies in the Defendant’s coffers. The Claimant claims half of that amount, on the basis that he is entitled to half of all the rent generated by the EK Property.

  126. [59] The Claimant’s claim for his half share of rent is grounded in s 73A of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”), which states that a “tenant in common shall be liable to account to his co-owner for receiving more than his share or proportion of any rents or profits arising from the property.” Given that the Parties were tenants in common of the EK Property in equal shares (see [3(a)] above), the Defendant is liable to account to the Claimant for the rent collected from Jason. The Claimant’s entitlement to an account, which arises by virtue of s 73A CLPA, is not in any way diminished by the fact that he did not actually sign the 2nd Tenancy Agreement (see [53] above). This is because s 73A CLPA imposes a mandatory statutory obligation, providing co‑owners with a remedy against their fellow co‑owners for rental income from co‑owned property where there would otherwise be none: Aw Chee Peng v Aw Chee Loo [2022] 5 SLR 451 at [27]–[31]; Salaya Kalairani v Appangam Govindhasamy [2023] SGHC(A) 40 at [79].

  127. [60] Accordingly, I order the Defendant to pay the Claimant $7,800, being the latter’s half share of the security deposit that was used by Jason to pay the rent for the months of August and September 2019.

  128. (2) Claimant’s claim for his half share of the rent under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement

  129. [61] Unlike in the case of the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, where Jason separately paid half of each month’s rent to the Claimant (see [53] above), the rent under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement – collected for the months of September 2021 to January 2022 and totalling $39,000 – was paid entirely to the Defendant. As the Claimant has not been given his half share of the $39,000, the Defendant is liable under s 73A CLPA to account to him for the same.

  130. [62] Accordingly, I order the Defendant to pay the Claimant $19,500, being his half share of the rent under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement. In doing so, I note that the Defendant himself admits that this sum is due to the Claimant.

  131. [63] This is also an appropriate juncture to highlight the Defendant’s allegation that he had previously offered to pay the Claimant the latter’s half share of the rent under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement but the Claimant refused. According to the Defendant, sometime on or around 3 November 2021 (ie, about two months after the 3rd Tenancy Agreement’s term had commenced), the Claimant turned up at the EK Property to harass Jason. The Defendant, who was present, tried to defuse the situation by offering to pay the Claimant the rental proceeds under the 3rd Tenancy Agreement but the latter refused. In the Claimant’s cross-examination, an extract of which is set out below, the Claimant admitted that the Defendant did make this offer to him:

  132. Defendant’s prayer for an order that his share of the rental proceeds in the SCB Joint Account be released to him

  133. [65] As explained at [52] above, the rent paid by Jason under the 1st Tenancy Agreement (amounting to $142,971.04) now sits in the SCB Joint Account, which is a bank account jointly held in the names of the Parties. Neither of the Parties can withdraw monies from the SCB Joint Account without the consent of the other because the account’s terms dictate that withdrawals may be made only with the signatures of both the Parties.

  134. [66] Given the Defendant’s inability to withdraw his share of the funds in the SCB Joint Account without the Claimant’s consent, the Defendant seeks:

  135. (a) an order compelling the Claimant to release the Defendant’s half share of the $142,971.04 from the SCB Joint Account; and

  136. (b) pre-judgment interest arising from the Claimant’s wrongful refusal to release to the Defendant the latter’s half share of the funds in the SCB Joint Account.

  137. [67] There is no dispute that the Defendant is entitled to half the rental proceeds from the EK Property. The Claimant states plainly in his closing submissions that “it is common ground the monies held in the [SCB Joint] Account consisting of rental collected from [the EK Property] belong equally to the Claimant and [the] Defendant”. The Claimant has also not sought to plead a right of set-off or any other cause of action, against which the Defendant’s entitlement may be extinguished. I thus see no grounds to stop the Defendant from accessing his half share of the rental proceeds from the 1st Tenancy Agreement, which now sits in the SCB Joint Account.

  138. [68] Accordingly, I grant an order that the Parties take the necessary steps to withdraw the $142,971.04 from the SCB Joint Account and divide the same between themselves equally. Apart from the $142,971.04, the SCB Joint Account also contains another $600,000 (see [147] below for the background to this). Any interest earned from the bank in respect of both these amounts and paid by the bank into the SCB Joint Account is similarly to be withdrawn and divided equally between the Parties.

  139. [69] I also decline to award the Defendant any pre-judgment interest, arising from the Claimant’s failure to release the Defendant’s half share of the $142,971.04. The Defendant has not offered any particulars as to the rate of interest which the sums in the SCB Joint Account have been earning from the bank and, more pertinently, justify why he should be awarded further interest over and above those interest earnings. Furthermore, the Defendant has failed to specify exactly when he demanded for the Claimant to release his half share of the $142,971.04. That date is critical, because it is the starting point from which his claim for interest is to be calculated.

  140. Defendant’s claim for “excess rent” of $74,880

  141. [70] The Defendant also claims against the Claimant for “excess rent” of $74,880 which he alleges that the Claimant had collected from Jason. This claim hinges on cl 1 of the 1st Tenancy Agreement, which set out the monthly rent of $7,800. Critically, cl 1 stipulated that the $7,800 was to be apportioned as follows:

  142. (a) $4,680 for “rental”; and

  143. (b) $3,120 for “furniture, fixtures & fittings”.

  144. A fuller extract of cl 1 is set out below:

  145. [71] Building on the manner in which cl 1 had apportioned the monthly rent, the Defendant constructed his case on “excess rent” as follows:

  146. (a) It was the Defendant, and not the Claimant, who bore the expenses of the EK Property’s “furniture, fixtures & fittings”. Accordingly, the Claimant’s half share of the rent should exclude the component of the monthly rent apportioned for “furniture, fixtures & fittings” (ie, $3,120) and be restricted only to the component apportioned for “rental” (ie, $4,680).

  147. (b) This means that the Claimant should only have received $2,340 each month (ie, half of $4,680) and not $3,900 (being half of $7,800). The Claimant had thus improperly reaped “excess rent” of $1,560 (ie, $3,900 minus $2,340) every month.

  148. (c) Having collected such “excess rent” for four years (ie, two years under the 1st Tenancy Agreement and another two years under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement), the total excess rent collected by the Claimant was $74,880 (ie, $1,560 per month multiplied by 48 months).

  149. As seen from the calculations in (c) above, the Defendant’s claim for “excess rent” applies not only to the rent under the 1st Tenancy Agreement but to that under the 2nd Tenancy Agreements as well. This is notwithstanding that the clause apportioning the monthly rent into two components is found only in 1st Tenancy Agreement (ie, cl 1, extracted at [70] above) and not expressly reproduced in the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. While the Defendant has not directly addressed this point, I assume that he is relying on the following clause in the 2nd Tenancy Agreement:

  150. as a means of importing cl 1 from the 1st Tenancy Agreement into the 2nd Tenancy Agreement.

  151. (1) Evidence of the Parties’ intentions

  152. [73] By way of context, the Claimant has explained that it was the Defendant who came up with the idea of apportioning the rent paid by Jason into a “rental” component and a “furniture, fixtures & fittings” component, as a means of reducing the tax payable on the rental proceeds. I accept this, in light of the evidence of WhatsApp messages from the Defendant to that effect. Critically, there is nothing in these messages or in any other evidence of the Parties’ communications to show that they ever agreed to restrict the Claimant’s half share of the rent from the EK Property – which he is statutorily entitled to under s 73 CLPA (see [59] above) – to only the “rental” component of the monthly rent. Certainly, no such intention can be gleaned from a plain reading of the 1st Tenancy Agreement, whose clauses govern the legal relationship between the Parties (as landlords) on the one part and Jason (as tenant) on the other, with no mention whatsoever of how the monthly rent was to be dealt with as between the two landlords.

  153. [74] In any case, the Defendant has admitted under cross-examination that there was no agreement between him and the Claimant for the latter’s share of the rent to be restricted to just the “rental” component of the monthly rent of $7,800 (as opposed to a half share of the full amount of $7,800), conceding that both landlords were entitled to the full rent of $7,800.

  154. (2) Expenses allegedly incurred by the Defendant on the EK Property

  155. [75] Furthermore, the Defendant’s attempt to exclude the Claimant from the “furniture, fixtures & fittings” component of the monthly rent is not adequately supported by the evidence. As the Defendant is the party seeking to deduct $74,880 from the Claimant’s share of the rental proceeds, the burden lies on the Defendant to prove that such a deduction is indeed in order.

  156. (a) Nearly $60,000 on renovation and refurbishment; and

  157. (b) $8,535.50 on various upkeep expenses (eg, installation of swimming pool lights and artificial grass, lift maintenance and curtain dry cleaning).

  158. The Defendant claims that the Claimant – who owns half the EK Property – was liable to bear half of these expenses but failed to do so.

  159. [78] In my view, these purported expenses fail to support the Defendant’s claim for “excess rent”. As regards the $60,000 allegedly spent on renovation and refurbishment, the Defendant has not adduced any documentary proof to show that expenditures amounting to this sum had indeed been incurred. In fact, the Defendant affirmed in the following portion of his AEIC that he could not recall if he received any invoices for the renovation and refurbishment works:

  160. [79] At a broader level, it is trite that where expenses for improvements or repairs to a property have been voluntarily incurred by one of its tenants in common, the other tenants in common who were in no position to reject those improvements or repairs should not be made to contribute towards those expenses: Chia Kok Weng v Chia Kwok Yeo [2017] 2 SLR 964 (“Chia Kok Weng”) at [74] (citing Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60). In the present case, the Claimant affirms that he never agreed to the renovation, refurbishment and upkeep expenses which the Defendant now seeks to get him to share in. The Claimant’s averment is consistent with the evidence, which contains no hint of him ever having agreed to the expenses for renovation, refurbishment and upkeep of the EK Property. Rather, the Claimant suggests that these expenses were unilaterally incurred by the Defendant for the benefit of the latter’s own family as they wanted to move into the EK Property. I note that this suggestion is consistent with the messages exchanged between the Parties on 23 June 2015, ie, about eight months after the Defendant’s family had moved into the EK Property. In that exchange, the Complaint was bemoaning the lopsidedness of the agreement by which the Defendant had been allowed to stay in the EK Property rent free, pending Pinnacle being rented out. To this, the Defendant retorted with the following message (exhibited at [33] above, at 1.05pm):

  161. The emphasised portion of the Defendant’s message strongly suggests that the lion’s share of the costs incurred by him in improving the EK Property was for his own benefit, ie, to facilitate his family’s stay.

  162. [80] The Defendant highlights that the court in Chia Kok Weng contemplated that the remedy of equitable accounting may nevertheless be available if the tenant in common concerned had incurred expenses which enhanced the property’s value (Chia Kok Weng at [76]–[77]). In this respect, the Defendant claims that the $8,535.50 spent on (inter alia) the installation of swimming pool lights and artificial grass (see [77(b)] above) served to improve the EK Property’s value. However, I fail to see the relevance of this submission. The remedy of equitable accounting is not at issue in this case – it was never a remedy sought by the Defendant. In any event, no evidence was led as to the monetary impact that these expenditures had on the EK Property’s sale price.

  163. (3) Conclusion on the Defendant’s claim for “excess rent”

  164. [81] Consequently, the Defendant’s claim that $74,880 of the rental proceeds constituted “excess rent” collected by the Claimant is baseless.

  165. Defendant’s claim for an account of the rent collected from Jason

  166. [82] The Defendant also seeks an account from the Claimant of the rent collected from Jason’s tenancies. In my view, this claim can be summarily dismissed.

  167. [83] As alluded to at [59] above, s 73A CLPA requires a tenant in common to account to his co-owner “for receiving more than his share or proportion of any rents or profits arising from the property” [emphasis added]. The evidence in this case is clear that the Claimant has not received anything more than his rightful share of the rent from the EK Property, meaning that there is nothing collected from Jason which the Claimant needs to account for:

  168. (a) For the 1st Tenancy Agreement, the rent collected from Jason has been paid into the SCB Joint Account (see [52] above).

  169. (b) As for the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, the rent was paid by Jason to the Parties equally (see [53] above), save for the first two months of rent (which were settled using the security deposit – see [58] above), which the Defendant still holds.

  170. (c) As regards the 3rd Tenancy Agreement, all the rent collected from Jason currently lies in the Defendant’s coffers (see [54] above).

  171. [84] The Defendant’s claim for the Claimant to furnish an account of the rent collected from Jason is thus devoid of merit.

  172. Defendant’s claim for reimbursement of the property tax which he purportedly paid in respect of the EK Property

  173. [85] The Defendant also contends that he had paid $13,420.50 in property tax for the EK Property, for the duration commencing from the issue of the TOP in June 2014 to when Jason first moved in at the end 2017. He now claims that the Claimant, as a tenant in common of the EK Property, should be made to pay half of the $13,420.50 or even all of it. In support of the latter position that the Claimant could even be held liable for all of the $13,420.50, the Defendant highlights that the property tax figure was based on a concessionary 6% owner-occupied rate (as opposed to the regular 14%) and this was thanks to the Defendant and his family residing in the EK Property at the material time.

  174. [86] The Claimant, on his part, explains that he was always willing to pay his share of the property tax for the EK Property but the Defendant did not give him copies of the property tax statements.

  175. [87] In my view, the Defendant’s claim for the Claimant to reimburse him for the purported property tax payment of $13,420.50 should be dismissed. I am of course aware that the Claimant conceded that he did not pay the EK Property’s property tax, going so far as to agree with the suggestion that it was the Defendant who paid for it. Still, there is insufficient evidential basis to support the figure of $13,420.50, for which the Defendant now seeks a contribution from the Claimant:

  176. (a) Firstly, it is unclear to me just how the Defendant arrived at this figure. The Defendant has adduced a property tax bill for the year 2015 to demonstrate that at least $9,740.50 in property tax was payable for the EK Property. However, no explanation has been provided as to how the $9,740.50 feeds into the figure of $13,420.50, which the Defendant claims to have paid. Critically, the Defendant admitted while on the stand that he did not know how the $13,420.50 was derived – all he did was to ask his daughter-in-law to calculate the amount of property tax paid, without asking her how she arrived at the final figure.

  177. (b) Secondly, no evidence has been adduced to show that the amount of $13,420.50 was actually paid to the tax authorities. The Defendant adduced a bank statement showing various GIRO deductions but offers no explanation as to what the entries therein mean or how they correlate to the figure of $13,420.50 which he claims to have paid.

  178. [88] In my view, these evidential shortcomings cannot be overlooked, especially since it was within the Defendant’s power to obtain the relevant supporting documents. Since he is unable to prove that $13,420.50 was in indeed assessed as property tax and paid, his claim to be reimbursed for this sum fails.

  179. Defendant’s claim for commission for procuring Jason’s tenancies

  180. [89] I now turn to the Defendant’s claim for the commission which he contends that he is entitled to – in his capacity as a property agent – for having procured Jason’s tenancies.

  181. [90] The Defendant’s pleaded case is that he was entitled to commission of one month’s rent, ie, $7,800, for each of the four years during which the EK Property had been rented to Jason under the 1st and 2nd Tenancy Agreements – meaning that his total commission amounted to $31,200. The Defendant also pleaded that the Claimant was liable to pay him half of this sum, ie, $15,600. The Claimant, on his part, contends that the claim for a commission is without basis as he never agreed to pay any commission to the Defendant.

  182. [91] The Defendant’s claim for commission has a bearing on the security deposit that he collected from Jason under the 1st Tenancy Agreement, which Jason subsequently used to offset the first two months of rent under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement (see [58] above). Specifically, the Defendant contends that he was entitled to retain the security deposit as payment for, inter alia, the commission earned by him in procuring Jason’s tenancies.

  183. [92] For the following reasons, I find that the Defendant has failed to sufficiently substantiate his claim that he was entitled to a commission for procuring Jason’s tenancies. Accordingly, I dismiss his claim that the Claimant pay him $15,600 as commission for procuring Jason’s tenancies.

  184. [93] For a start, the Defendant has failed to coherently frame his entitlement to a commission. As alluded to at [90] above, his pleaded case is that he was entitled to commission of $7,800 for each of the four years that the EK Property was leased to Jason, under the 1st and 2nd Tenancy Agreements – meaning that the total commission due to him was $31,200. He also pleaded that the Claimant was liable to pay half of this sum, ie, $15,600. However, these pleadings ran counter to his AEIC, in which he averred that he was entitled to commission of $7,800 for every two years that the EK Property was rented to Jason – meaning that the total commission due to him for the four years spanning the 1st and 2nd Tenancy Agreements was $15,600 (rather than $31,200). The Defendant’s AEIC then asserted that the Claimant was responsible for the full amount (rather than just half) of the commission of $15,600.

  185. [94] Furthermore, as explained below, the Defendant’s claim for commission was not supported by a plain reading of either the 1st Tenancy Agreement or 2nd Tenancy Agreement.

  186. Commission under the 1st Tenancy Agreement

  187. [95] In so far as the 1st Tenancy Agreement is concerned, cl 5(g) contemplated that a commission would be payable by the landlord(s) upon renewal of the tenancy. Clause 5(g) is extracted below:

  188. This clause thus contemplated payment of a commission upon renewal of the lease in the 1st Tenancy Agreement. In other words, the obligation to pay a commission under the 1st Tenancy Agreement arose when the 2nd Tenancy Agreement was concluded.

  189. [96] The Defendant’s attempt to rely on this clause suffers from several difficulties. For a start, the Defendant has not adduced any evidence to demonstrate what the term “prevailing industrial rate” in cl 5(g) means and – more specifically – why this translates to the commission figure claimed by him.

  190. [97] More importantly, neither cl 5(g) nor any other clause in the 1st Tenancy Agreement suggested that the commission – which was payable by the landlord – was to be paid to the property agent (ie, the Defendant). Rather, cl 5(g) explicitly stated that the commission was payable to the agency (ie, PropNex). That any commission under the 1st Tenancy Agreement was payable to PropNex and not the Defendant is further reinforced by another clause in the 1st Tenancy Agreement, cl 5(l). Clause 5(l), extracted below, stated that the agency PropNex was not liable to refund the landlord any commission in the event of premature termination of the 1st Tenancy Agreement:

  191. [98] Under cross-examination, the Defendant conceded that the operation of the clauses above suggests that any commission under the 1st Tenancy Agreement was payable to PropNex rather than to him personally. Notwithstanding, he tried to explain on the witness stand that he is claiming commission on PropNex’s behalf. This assertion came as a surprise, given that it was not reflected anywhere in the Defendant’s pleadings. Rather, the Defence and Counterclaim, in alluding to the Claimant’s “[f]ailure to pay the Defendant his rightful commission” [emphasis added], clearly reflected that the Defendant is laying claim to the commission in his personal capacity.

  192. [99] Accordingly, the 1st Tenancy Agreement offers no basis for the Defendant’s claim for a commission.

  193. Commission under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement

  194. [100] As for the 2nd Tenancy Agreement, the main clause which the Defendant relies upon in support of his claim for a commission is cl 4. Unlike the 1st Tenancy Agreement, which stipulated that commission was payable to PropNex (rather than to the Defendant), cl 4 of the 2nd Tenancy Agreement explicitly named the Defendant as the person entitled to “renewal rental commission” of $7,800. Clause 4 is extracted below:

  195. [101] I should observe at the outset that the Defendant’s pleaded case, being that he is entitled to a commission of $7,800 for each year of the tenancy (see [90] above), is contradicted by the very terms of clause 4, which stipulated a commission of $7,800 for the entire two-year term under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement.

  196. [102] Furthermore, the Defendant has not explained why cl 4 should be construed as obliging the landlords (ie, the Parties) – as opposed to the tenant (ie, Jason) – to pay the commission stipulated therein. The clause merely stated that commission of $7,800 was to be paid to the Defendant, without specifying who was liable to make the payment. It is not possible to simply resolve this ambiguity in the Defendant’s favour, especially since cl 4 of the 2nd Tenancy Agreement comes immediately after cll 1 and 3, which set out the tenant’s payment obligations – specifically Jason’s obligation to pay rent and his agreement to the continued retention of the security deposit. So long as the Defendant is unable to establish that cl 4 obliges the landlord(s) to pay the commission, the alleged liability of the Claimant (as landlord) to bear half of that commission has not been made out.

  197. [103] More importantly, it has not been established that the Claimant agreed to be bound by cl 4, given that the latter never signed the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. The Defendant argues that as the Claimant had continued to accept half the rent paid by Jason under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement (see [53] above), the Claimant should be regarded as having acquiesced to its terms by his conduct. This submission lacks merit. The Claimant was simply collecting what was legally due to him under s 73A CLPA (see [59] above). That entitlement existed independently of whatever terms the 2nd Tenancy Agreement might have contained.

  198. [104] In fact, the evidence is quite clear that the Claimant refused to sign the 2nd Tenancy Agreement precisely because he objected to the Defendant being conferred a commission under its terms. This is amply corroborated by the WhatsApp messages exchanged between the Parties just a few weeks prior to the commencement of the lease under the 2nd Tenancy Agreement. On the afternoon of 5 August 2019, the Claimant sent messages to the Defendant clarifying that he was prepared to sign the 2nd Tenancy Agreement but was not prepared to pay the commission specified under its terms. For example:

  199. (a) At 2.49pm, the Claimant wrote: “I am not paying commission”.

  200. (b) Shortly after that, at 3.08pm, he followed up with another message stating: “I will sign the addendum: No commission”.

  201. That same day, the Defendant responded by sending a message citing cl 5(g) of the 1st Tenancy Agreement (extracted at [95] above), which contemplated that a commission was payable upon renewal of the lease under the 1st Tenancy Agreement. The Claimant replied one week later, on 12 August 2019, with the exact same message: “I will sign the addendum: No commission”.

  202. [105] The documentary evidence thus debunks any suggestion that the Claimant had acquiesced to the terms of the 2nd Tenancy Agreement conferring upon the Defendant a right to a commission.

  203. Conclusion on Defendant’s claim for commission

  204. [106] The Defendant’s claim for commission which he was purportedly entitled to, in his capacity as the property agent who procured Jason’s tenancies, thus fails. Neither the 1st Tenancy Agreement nor the 2nd Tenancy Agreement substantiate his claim to such a commission.

  205. Summary of my determinations on the claims relating to the EK Property

  206. [107] I summarise my findings in respect of the Parties’ respective claims relating to the EK Property.

  207. (a) In respect of the Claimant’s claim for monthly rent of $4,000, for the period that the Defendant’s family resided at the EK Property:

  208. (c) As regards the Defendant’s claims in relation to the rent collected from Jason, I make the following orders.

  209. (i) I grant the Defendant’s prayer that the Claimant releases to the Defendant the latter’s half share of the rental proceeds collected from Jason under the 1st Tenancy Agreement, ie, half of the $142,971.04 currently in the SCB Joint Account. The Parties are to take collective steps to withdraw this amount from the SCB Joint Account and divide the same between themselves in equal shares. Any interest earned from the bank on the principal sums deposited into the SCB Joint Account is also to be withdrawn and divided equally between the Parties.

  210. (ii) I dismiss the Defendant’s claims for:

  211. (A) “excess rent” of $74,880, which the Claimant was alleged to have collected from Jason; and

  212. (B) the Claimant to furnish an account of the rent collected from Jason.

  213. (d) I also dismiss the Defendant’s claim that the Claimant reimburses him for the property tax of $13,420.50.

  214. Defendant’s claim for defamation

  215. [108] The Defendant’s claim in defamation stems from an email dated 15 December 2021, which the Claimant had sent to PropNex inquiring about the commission payable under the 1st Tenancy Agreement (“PropNex Email”).

  216. [109] To better appreciate the purport of the PropNex Email, it is necessary to lay out the backdrop against which it was sent. As explained at [95] above, cl 5(g) of the 1st Tenancy Agreement contemplated that commission was payable in the event of the lease being renewed. It is also clear that the Defendant did collect what he deemed as commission due to him under the 1st Tenancy Agreement. As explained at [91] above, he appropriated Jason’s security deposit as his commission. The Defendant’s intentions in doing are expressly spelt out in his pleadings, extracted below:

  217. That the Defendant appropriated Jason’s security deposit as a means of satisfying the commission which he regarded as due to himself under the 1st Tenancy Agreement is also reflected in his WhatsApp messages:

  218. (a) On 18 September 2017, in response to a message from the Claimant asking: “Where is the 2 month rental deposit?”, the Defendant replied: “One mth was meant for rental commission”.

  219. (b) Seven months later, on 24 April 2018, the Claimant again pressed the Defendant for the rental deposit, to which the Defendant responded that it had been applied to the Defendant’s commission of $7,800 and various “pre handover expenses”.

  220. (c) Five months later, in late September 2018, the Claimant made various allegations on a WhatsApp group chat to the effect that the Defendant failed to properly account for the security deposit. On 28 September 2018, the Defendant retorted to these allegations on the group chat with the following message:

  221. [110] The Defendant’s act of appropriating the commission payable under the 1st Tenancy Agreement was questionable, given that (as discussed at [97] above) the commission was payable to PropNex and not to the Defendant. The Defendant himself testified that he was obliged to submit the commission to PropNex, so as to allow the latter to process its own cut of the commission. He explained that it would be “totally unacceptable” for him, as an agent, to retain the entire commission without submitting the same to PropNex.

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