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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Oct 2026
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Court of Appeal

Cheng Tze Tzuen (alias Zhong Zhixuan) v Dang Lan Anh

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[2026] SGCA 42Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 22 of 2025

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  1. Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD (delivering the judgment of the majority consisting of Ang Cheng Hock JCA and herself):

  2. [1] The appeal before us raises a question of public importance: whether a marriage of convenience contracted prior to 1 October 2016 is void under the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”).

  3. [2] The Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC 2020”) makes reference to “marriages of convenience” in its heading to s 11A. Section 11A itself provides that a marriage solemnised on or after 1 October 2016 is void if a party enters into the marriage knowing or having reason to believe that the purpose of the marriage is to assist the party or the other party to the marriage to obtain an immigration advantage and any gratification is offered, given or received as an inducement or reward to any party to the marriage for entering into the marriage. In this judgment, a marriage of convenience is understood to refer to a marriage which satisfies the substantive requirements set out in s 11A of the WC 2020, regardless of when it was solemnised.

  4. [3] Marriages of convenience have also been loosely referred to as “sham” marriages. It is useful to state here, for the purposes of this judgment, what a reference to a “sham” marriage may encompass:

  5. (a) Marriages for other purposes: At the broadest level, a sham marriage refers to a marriage where the parties do not intend to live together as husband and wife or to fulfil the obligations of marriage in s 46 of the Charter. This includes cases of the type considered in Brodie v Brodie [1917] P 271 (“Brodie”) (see [70] below), where the parties marry for purposes other than to establish a genuine matrimonial union, and may not necessarily involve any immigration advantage.

  6. (b) Marriages for immigration advantage: These are marriages entered into for an immigration advantage but without gratification involved. Such marriages would not fall within the scope of s 11A of the WC 2020.

  7. (c) Marriages of convenience: At the narrowest level are marriages of convenience, which are entered into for an immigration advantage and accompanied by gratification.

  8. [4] For reference, as various versions of the Charter are referred to in the course of this judgment, we set out the following for clarity: “WC 2009” refers to the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) as it stood at the time the parties in the present case solemnised their marriage, “WC 2020” refers to the version currently in force, and “Charter” refers to the legislation generally, encompassing both versions.

  9. [5] In the present case, the deceased, Mr Cheng Meng Koon (“Deceased”), married the respondent, Ms Dang Lan Anh (“Respondent”), a Vietnamese national, on 26 January 2011. The Deceased was previously divorced and this was his second marriage. The appellant, Mr Cheng Tze Tzuen (“Appellant”), is the Deceased’s only son.

  10. [6] As the Deceased died intestate, the Respondent, as his wife, presently stands entitled to half of his estate. On 14 October 2024, the Appellant filed HC/OA 1057/2024 (“OA 1057”) in the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that the marriage between the Deceased and the Respondent was void as it was a sham marriage or a marriage of convenience, so as to exclude the Respondent from any share in the Deceased’s estate. However, as s 11A of the WC 2020 only applies to a marriage solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, the question that arises is whether the marriage in issue can nonetheless be declared void on some other ground under the Charter.

  11. Background facts

  12. [8] As the Respondent did not enter an appearance in the proceedings, we set out the facts based on the Appellant’s account in the proceedings below. The Appellant contends that the marriage in question was a marriage of convenience. In support of this, he relies on his own account and those of several members of his extended family, including the Deceased’s siblings and sibling-in-law, who attest to the following facts.

  13. [9] First, the Deceased had never mentioned his marriage to the Respondent to any family member, despite sharing a close relationship with his family.

  14. [10] Second, unlike his first marriage, the solemnisation of his second marriage to the Respondent completely excluded his family and friends. Neither the Appellant nor any family members or friends were invited to the ceremony, and the witnesses named in the marriage certificate are unknown to the Appellant and his family.

  15. [11] Third, the marriage brought about no discernible change in the Deceased’s living arrangements or behaviour. He neither brought the Respondent to live with him in his HDB flat nor moved out to live with her, and throughout the purported marriage until his death, he continued residing with his sister.

  16. [12] Fourth, shortly before the marriage, the Deceased had been experiencing a relapse into drug addiction and financial hardship, accompanied by harassment from loan sharks. Yet, notably, during the year of his marriage to the Respondent, this harassment ceased, though it remained unclear to the family how the Deceased had managed to pay off the debts. The Appellant suggests that as the cessation of harassment coincided with the marriage, the Deceased may have settled his debts through payments received from the Respondent in exchange for entering the marriage.

  17. [13] Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, when the Deceased fell terminally ill with cancer and died less than a year after the marriage, the Respondent provided no support and made no contact with his family. Throughout his hospitalisation and his stay at the hospice, the Respondent remained entirely absent, and the Deceased made no mention of her even on his deathbed.

  18. [14] On 8 January 2012, the Deceased passed away, intestate. His assets primarily comprise his 14% share in a HDB flat and his Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) moneys. He made no nomination of the beneficiary of his CPF moneys. For context, the Deceased and his sister lived together in a HDB flat which they initially owned as joint tenants before converting to a tenancy-in-common, with the Deceased holding a 14% share. According to the Deceased’s siblings, the 14% share was calculated on the basis that the Deceased’s sister would “hold” six shares (ie, around 86% of the flat) for her five siblings and a nephew, while the Deceased would “hold” one share (ie, around 14% of the flat) for the Appellant. This was, however, merely their explanation for how ownership of the HDB flat was apportioned; the Appellant does not contend that the Deceased held his interest in the flat on trust for him.

  19. [15] Shortly after the Deceased’s death, the family learnt of his marriage to the Respondent through a letter dated 2 March 2012 from the Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office (“IPTO”). The letter informed them that the Respondent, as the Deceased’s wife, was entitled to a portion of his CPF moneys. As the family had no information about the Respondent, IPTO placed a notice in the newspaper, The Straits Times, to seek information on the Respondent and her whereabouts. However, no such information could be obtained.

  20. [16] Subsequently, on 16 July 2024, the family was informed by the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (“ICA”) that the Respondent had been deported for immigration offences in 2011. According to the Appellant, his uncle (ie, the Deceased’s brother-in-law) was also informed by the police that the Respondent had been arrested for vice activities prior to her deportation in June 2011.

  21. [17] Finally, on 14 October 2024, the Appellant commenced OA 1057 in the High Court.

  22. The Appellant’s case below

  23. [18] Before the court below, the Appellant advanced two main arguments. First, the Appellant argued that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that this was a marriage of convenience, based on the following: (a) the Deceased did not inform his family about the alleged marriage; (b) the Deceased never lived with the Respondent, either at the time of marriage or thereafter; (c) the Respondent was absent when the Deceased was terminally ill with cancer; (d) there were no joint assets between the parties, nor any trace of communication or other evidence of a relationship between them, as one would expect from a genuine couple; and (e) police investigations suggested that the Respondent was a sex worker who likely made payment to the Deceased in exchange for entering into the marriage and receiving an immigration advantage, particularly given that the Deceased’s serious financial troubles ceased sometime after the marriage.

  24. [19] Second, the Appellant contended that the approach taken in Gian Bee Choo v Meng Xianhui [2019] 5 SLR 812 (“Gian Bee Choo”) and adopted in Kee Cheong Keng v Dinh Thi Thu Hien [2025] 3 SLR 1555 (“Kee Cheong Keng”) should be followed. These cases held that a marriage of convenience, although contracted prior to 1 October 2016, could nonetheless be declared void. The Appellant argued that the conditions for issuing a valid marriage licence under the Charter were expanded from the requirement that there should be “no lawful impediment to the marriage” under s 17(2)(d) of the WC 2009 to the requirement that the parties are not “prevented from marrying by this Act or any other law” under s 18(1)(a) of the WC 2020. Following the reasoning in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, the Appellant submitted that the intention to enter into an immigration-advantage sham marriage was a lawful impediment; had this been declared to the Registrar of Marriages (“Registrar”), a marriage licence would not have been issued. He submitted that a marriage of convenience would contravene several laws, including s 5(b)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”), s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act (Cap 133, 2008 Rev Ed) (“IA 2008”), and s 415 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), thereby preventing the parties from marrying. A failure to declare these breaches would result in an invalid marriage licence and, in turn, a void marriage under s 105 read with s 13 of the WC 2020.

  25. [20] In OA 1057, in addition to seeking a declaration that the marriage between the Deceased and the Respondent was void, the Appellant sought a declaration that the Deceased’s assets be distributed amongst the Deceased’s immediate family members in accordance with the prevailing laws, rules and regulations to the exclusion of the Respondent.

  26. [21] Subsequently, on 14 February 2025, the Appellant sought additional orders through a letter to the court. These included orders that: (a) the Appellant be entitled to apply for a grant of letters of administration over the Deceased’s estate without requiring a renunciation or consent from the Respondent, on the basis that the Respondent is excluded from such administration; and (b) the Appellant be at liberty to distribute, deal with, and/or administer the Deceased’s estate on the same basis.

  27. Decision of the court below

  28. [22] The Judge’s grounds of decision are found in Cheng Tze Tzuen v Dang Lan Anh [2025] SGHC 112 (“GD”). The Judge declined to grant the declaration sought and made no order. Based on the available affidavit evidence and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Judge was satisfied that the marriage was one of convenience (GD at [8]). However, the Judge held that the WC 2020 did not provide any legal basis to declare such a marriage void.

  29. [23] The Judge noted that there were two conflicting lines of authorities in local jurisprudence on the issue of whether, generally, marriages of convenience contracted prior to 1 October 2016 are void – Tan Ah Thee v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957 (“Tan Ah Thee”), Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 (“Toh Seok Kheng”) and Soon Ah See v Diao Yanmei [2016] 5 SLR 693 (“Soon Ah See”) fall on the side which would support the argument that such marriages of convenience remain valid, while Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng fall on the other side which holds such marriages to be void. We note that Tan Ah Thee and Toh Seok Kheng do not deal with marriages of convenience as such, but only with marriages for other purposes; we examine these two cases in greater detail later in this judgment.

  30. [24] The Judge held that the reasoning of Tan Ah Thee remained pertinent. She explained that s 105 of the WC 2020 is an exhaustive provision which does not accommodate grounds beyond those specified as reasons to regard a marriage as void (GD at [30]). Further, s 11A of the WC 2020 does not apply to marriages of convenience solemnised prior to 1 October 2016. Section 11A states:

  31. [25] The Judge remarked that creating new grounds that affect the status of marriage should be approached with caution given the significance of marriage which brings with it changes in a person’s status (GD at [32]). She disagreed with the reasoning in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng that a marriage licence would be invalidated by a failure to declare an intention to enter a marriage of convenience as this would amount to stipulating a new ground in s 105 of the WC 2020 or extending the applicable time period specified in ss 11A and 105(aa) of the WC 2020 (GD at [30]). While the Judge accepted that there has been a policy stance expressed in other statutes against marriages of convenience, she was of the view that the scope of the policy in respect of the validity of marriages and its application in the context of the WC 2020 had been specified by the words of ss 11A and 105(aa) of the WC 2020. She also pointed out that a distinction must be drawn between the legal consequences and the validity of an act – it does not follow that committing a crime or fraud on the Registrar necessarily constitutes a lawful impediment or a circumstance that prevents parties from marrying, the failure of which to declare would nullify the act upon which the crime is based (GD at [31]).

  32. [26] With respect to the reliefs sought, the Judge stated that the appropriate course was to seek relief at the Family Justice Courts (“FJC”) and take up a discussion with IPTO (GD at [36]). The Deceased’s assets comprised (a) estate assets, being the Deceased’s 14% share in the HDB flat; and (b) non-estate assets, being the Deceased’s CPF moneys.

  33. (a) In respect of the estate assets, the Judge held that the appropriate course was for the Appellant to commence proceedings in the FJC. In making the present application, the Appellant sought to circumvent the need for the Respondent’s renunciation given that the Respondent, being the spouse of the Deceased, would have priority to the letters of administration. This was not appropriate (GD at [38]–[40]).

  34. (b) As for the distribution of the estate, the Appellant sought to exclude the Respondent from her entitlement to the estate. Again, this was not appropriate. If the Appellant obtained letters of administration, he would stand as trustee of the estate and be concerned with the distribution of the administered estate amongst the persons entitled, owing a duty to distribute trust property to the persons beneficially and indefeasibly entitled to it, including the Respondent (GD at [41]–[42]).

  35. (c) In respect of the non-estate assets, the Appellant had adduced no evidence as to what view the Public Trustee took on the funds after the advertisement was made, or whether the funds were being held as unclaimed funds (GD at [53]).

  36. The Appellant’s case in this appeal

  37. [27] In the proceedings below, the assistant registrar directed the Appellant to address the issue of whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. On appeal, the Appellant submits that the High Court is the appropriate court to hear the matter and grant the relief sought, namely, a declaration that the marriage between the Respondent and the Deceased is void. The Appellant does not raise on appeal his claims for probate relief.

  38. [28] The Appellant submits that there is a legal basis to declare the marriage between the Deceased and the Respondent void for two reasons:

  39. (a) Section 105 of the Charter only applies to applications in the FJC for annulment by parties to the marriage and hence its exhaustive nature does not limit a third party such as the Appellant. Therefore, the Judge erred in relying on s 105 of the Charter to determine whether the marriage was void; and

  40. (b) Section 11A of the WC 2020 does not prevent the court from declaring void a marriage of convenience solemnised before 1 October 2016, particularly where the marriage was contracted after marriages of convenience had already been criminalised. Public policy considerations require a less restrictive interpretation of the provisions in the Charter to address the real mischief. Accordingly, the approach adopted in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, namely, that a false declaration that there is no lawful impediment to the marriage renders the marriage licence invalid and the marriage thereby void, ought to be followed.

  41. The Court’s invitation for further views

  42. [30] We heard the appeal on 22 January 2026. Following the hearing, we invited the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) to assist the court pursuant to s 49(3) of the Supreme Court Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) and O 9 r 22(3) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) in addressing a list of questions concerning the interpretation and policy intent of the relevant provisions of the Charter. These questions may be broadly summarised as follows:

  43. The AGC’s response

  44. [31] On 26 February 2026, the AGC replied, setting out first a summary of its views on the current legal position regarding marriages of the following character:

  45. (a) Marriages of convenience solemnised on or after 1 October 2016 are clearly void pursuant to s 11A of the WC 2020.

  46. (b) As for marriages of convenience solemnised before 1 October 2016, it is open to interpretation whether the principles in Tan Ah Thee and Toh Seok Kheng should apply (particularly since it is unclear whether gratification was in issue in Toh Seok Kheng) and there is ostensibly a conflict of High Court authorities for this category of marriages.

  47. (c) As for marriages for immigration advantage or marriages for other purposes, whether before or after 1 October 2016, Tan Ah Thee and Toh Seok Kheng, which decided that there is no legal basis to declare such marriages void, appear to remain good law.

  48. [32] The AGC stated that in considering the two conflicting lines of High Court decisions (referred to at [31(b)] above), it was unable to uncover any clear policy intention as to which approach was preferred by the relevant policyholders, nor could it discern any clear legislative intention from the relevant Parliamentary debates. As such, the AGC took the view that the question of which line of decisions to adopt remains a matter for judicial determination.

  49. [33] Given the absence of clear policy or legislative intention, the AGC considered it most appropriate to provide only brief observations on the three questions and indicated that it was unable to provide written submissions or attend any oral hearing to advocate for a particular position:

  50. (a) On the first question, the AGC noted that, apart from s 15(3)(a) of the WC 2020, which provides that a marriage licence is void where the notice of marriage has ceased to have effect, the WC 2020 does not prescribe specific grounds on which a marriage licence may be declared invalid.

  51. (b) On the second question, the AGC noted that it was not aware of any local cases discussing the difference between the phrases “lawful impediment to the marriage” and “prevented from marrying by this Act or any other law”. The change was effected as part of a suite of amendments replacing the statutory declaration previously made before a Commissioner of Oaths with an online declaration in a prescribed form.

  52. (c) On the third question, the AGC noted that the earlier line of authorities, in particular Tan Ah Thee and Toh Seok Kheng, appear to remain good law in respect of marriages entered for an immigration advantage and other purposes, whether before or after 1 October 2016.

  53. [34] The AGC also indicated that it would forward the court’s questions to the relevant policyholders and update the court should they wish to provide any substantive comments.

  54. The MSF’s comments

  55. [35] On 31 March 2026, the AGC conveyed to the court the comments of the Ministry of Social and Family Development (“MSF”):

  56. (a) The MSF responded that the reformulation from “no lawful impediment to the marriage” under s 17(2)(d) of the WC 2009 to “prevented from marrying by this Act or any other law” under s 16(2)(a) of the WC 2020 was not intended to effect any substantive change in the law. The amendment was intended to streamline the provision by subsuming the impediments previously set out in ss 17(2)(b) to 17(2)(e) of the WC 2009 within s 16(2)(a) of the WC 2020.

  57. (b) The MSF also commented that s 11A of the WC 2020 was not intended to have retrospective effect. Sections 11A and 105(aa) were enacted in early 2016 and apply to marriages solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, rendering void marriages that are marriages of convenience. Section 11A does not purport to affect the validity of marriages of convenience solemnised before 1 October 2016.

  58. The Appellant’s response

  59. [36] We invited the Appellant, if he wished, to submit on the points raised by the AGC and the MSF.

  60. [37] The Appellant makes three main points. First, the Appellant agrees with the AGC that Toh Seok Kheng remains good law in two aspects: (a) that a false declaration that there is no lawful impediment to the marriage can render a marriage licence invalid and the marriage void (a proposition first set out in Tan Ah Thee, albeit in obiter, and left undisturbed in Toh Seok Kheng), and (b) that the grounds in s 105 of the Charter are exhaustive. However, whilst urging the court to apply the lawful impediment analysis implicitly adopted in Toh Seok Kheng, the Appellant argues that a different outcome should follow in the present case. The Appellant distinguishes the present case on the basis that, unlike the facts in Toh Seok Kheng where there was no lawful impediment to the marriage given the absence of any criminalisation of or public policy against marriages of convenience at that time, the present case involves a clear and established public policy against such arrangements.

  61. [38] Second, the Appellant argues that in light of the MSF’s clarification that “lawful impediment” in s 17(2)(d) of the WC 2009 bears the same meaning as “prevented from marrying by this Act or any other law” in s 16(2)(a) of the WC 2020, the line of reasoning originating in Tan Ah Thee and applied in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng should be followed.

  62. [39] Finally, the Appellant submits that the MSF’s clarification that s 11A of the WC 2020 does not purport to affect marriages solemnised before 1 October 2016 confirms that the court’s ability to declare such a marriage void remains intact.

  63. Issue to be determined

  64. [40] As alluded to above at [6], the issue before this court is whether a marriage of convenience solemnised prior to 1 October 2016 is void.

  65. [41] We affirm the Judge’s decision that the marriage in issue cannot be declared void. In this regard, we are of the view that this marriage, solemnised in 2011 before the enactment of s 11A, is valid. The formation of marriage is governed by a statutory regime under which a marriage is void only on the grounds expressly provided in the Charter. In the present case, none of those grounds apply to the parties’ marriage which was solemnised in 2011.

  66. [42] Before turning to the main issue, we pause briefly to address the Appellant’s submission on the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the matter and grant a declaration of nullity of marriage sought by a third party. We note that the General Division of the High Court, or High Court (as defined above at [6]), had jurisdiction to hear this matter under s 16(1) of the SCJA, as the Respondent was served with the originating process and did not contest jurisdiction. Although the Appellant relies on provisions in the Charter relating to nullity of marriage, he is not seeking to exercise the court’s matrimonial jurisdiction. Section 93 of the Charter confines matrimonial proceedings to those between “parties to the marriage”, and the Appellant, as a third party, falls outside this. The matter therefore falls within the High Court’s general civil jurisdiction under s 16(1) of the SCJA rather than the matrimonial jurisdiction exercised through the Family Division of the High Court under s 22 of the Family Justice Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) read with s 17(1)(a) of the SCJA. The High Court further has the power to grant declaratory relief pursuant to s 18 read with the First Schedule of the SCJA, and O 4 r 7 of the ROC 2021 (Tan Ah Thee at [16]–[17] referring to Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1995] 3 SLR(R) 233 at [16]–[17]). As the Appellant has demonstrated a “real interest” in bringing the action, a “real controversy” between the parties for the court to resolve, and that the declaration sought concerns a right personal to him which is enforceable against an adverse party (see Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [72]), he has the requisite locus standi to seek such relief.

  67. [43] That said, we make no pronouncement on the Judge’s comments concerning the succession of the Deceased’s estate, as this was not a ground of appeal before us.

  68. [44] We now turn to the main issue before us.

  69. The law on the formation of marriage in the Women’s Charter

  70. [45] The grounds on which a marriage is void are encoded in s 105 of the WC 2020 which provides:

  71. The exhaustive nature of s 105 of the Charter

  72. [46] Section 105 of the WC 2020 expressly states that a marriage which takes place after 1 June 1981 is void “on the following grounds only”. The High Court in Tan Ah Thee had highlighted the exhaustive nature of this provision (at [35]):

  73. [47] The Appellant accepts this as a general proposition but contends that s 105 of the Charter does not apply in the present case for two reasons: (a) first, s 104 of the Charter limits nullity applications to a “husband and wife”; and (b) second, the Court of Appeal in UDA v UDB [2018] 1 SLR 1015 (“UDA”) recognised that a third party may, in very limited circumstances, obtain a declaration that a marriage is void through proceedings that fall outside Part X of the WC 2009 (at [28]). On this basis, the Appellant argues that he is not bound by the “exhaustive” nature of s 105, which falls within Part X, and may instead rely on the wider s 7 of the WC 2020.

  74. [48] We disagree. The statement in UDA at [28] was made in the context of determining whether a third party’s claim to an alleged matrimonial asset constituted a matrimonial proceeding. The Court of Appeal’s observation that a third party may obtain a declaration of nullity through proceedings outside Part X was directed at clarifying that such proceedings do not invoke the court’s matrimonial jurisdiction (as noted above at [42]), and not at suggesting that a third party is free from the substantive constraints of s 105. We are of the view that even where a third party invokes the court’s general civil jurisdiction for declaratory relief (as in the present case), the grounds available for declaring a marriage void or voidable are still those set out in ss 105 and 106 of the Charter.

  75. [49] The Appellant further relies on s 7 of the Charter, which provides as follows:

  76. [50] We accept that s 7 recognises the procedural mechanism by which a marriage may be brought to an end by a declaration. However, s 7 itself does not furnish the substantive grounds for determining whether such a declaration should be granted.

  77. [51] Thus, in our view, s 105 of the Charter sets out the exclusive grounds on which a marriage is void, and a third party, such as the Appellant, seeking a declaration of nullity may only rely on those grounds.

  78. Capacity provisions and essential validity of marriage

  79. [52] Based on a plain reading of s 105 of the WC 2020, it is clear that the grounds on which marriages solemnised after 1 June 1981 are void are those found in ss 3(4), 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the WC 2020, and for marriages solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, the additional ground in s 11A also applies. All the grounds listed in s 105, save for s 13, are capacity provisions that go to the essential validity of a marriage. Section 3(4) requires that at least one party be non-Muslim; s 9 requires that the parties be at least 18 years of age; s 10 requires that they be not related within prohibited degrees; ss 5 and 11 require that they not be in a subsisting marriage; and s 12 requires that they be of different sexes. Together, these requirements determine the parties’ capacity to marry under the WC 2020.

  80. [53] In contrast, s 13 of the WC 2020, which was the former s 22 of the WC 2009 at the time the parties married in 2011, governs the “formal validity” of the marriage. Section 13 of the WC 2020 provides that:

  81. [54] The requirements for a valid marriage licence are set out in s 17 of the WC 2009, which we reproduce below:

  82. [55] The version currently in force is s 16 of the WC 2020, which provides as follows:

  83. [56] Marriage is a public institution and not merely a private agreement between two parties. The law imposes legal obligations on the parties upon the solemnisation of their marriage. The formalities required by s 13 of the WC 2020 reflect this public character. First, a valid marriage licence must be obtained (s 13(a) of the WC 2020). The process of obtaining a marriage licence includes publishing the parties’ notice of marriage (s 14 of the WC 2020); any person may enter a caveat against the issue of a marriage licence, stating the grounds of objection (s 19 of the WC 2020). Second, the marriage must be solemnised by a person holding a valid licence to do so (s 13(b) of the WC 2020). If either of these requirements are not met, the marriage is rendered void under s 13 read with s 105 of the WC 2020, a point which we return to later at [64].

  84. [57] Section 13 also operates to ensure that, as far as practicable, the parties possess the relevant capacities before they are permitted to marry in Singapore. Amongst other things, it operates as a filter that disallows the solemnisation of marriages which would be in breach of any of the capacity provisions in s 105 of the Charter; the Registrar would not issue a marriage licence if he or she is aware of such a contravention.

  85. [58] As s 13 of the WC 2020 requires a marriage to be “solemnised”, it also ensures that, as far as possible, the parties have consented to the marriage by their declaration at solemnisation. Section 23 of the WC 2020 provides that the solemniser must ask the parties whether each is willing to take the other as his wife or her husband, and the solemniser must not solemnise the marriage unless satisfied that both parties freely consent to the marriage. To be clear, we add that if there is no consent, the marriage is valid but voidable by virtue of s 106 of the Charter; it is not void under s 105 of the Charter.

  86. [59] Section 13 also encourages compliance with matters that are not essential requirements for forming a valid marriage, such as attending marriage preparation programmes (see s 16(2)(c) of the WC 2020).

  87. [60] Section 13 plays a vital role in the marriage regime in Singapore. It is a provision regulating the formal validity of marriages celebrated in Singapore. Marriages that are formally valid but fail to comply with capacity provisions will still be void for lack of essential validity. Conversely, marriages that satisfy the capacity provisions but not the requisite formalities will be void for lack of formal validity.

  88. [61] This distinction between formal and essential validity is well entrenched in jurisprudence, both locally (see, for example, Re Maria Huberdina Hertogh; Inche Mansor Adabi v Adrianus Petrus Hertogh & Anor [1951] MLJ 164; Arpinya Rongchotiawattana v Wee Oh Keng [1997] 3 SLR(R) 378; Wong Kai Woon v Wong Kong Hom [2000] SGHC 176 at [46]–[49]) and in other jurisdictions (see Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (14 March 1978), HCCH No 26, (entered into force 1 May 1991); Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (Lord Collins of Mapesbury and Jonathan Harris gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 16th Ed, 2022) (“Conflict of Laws”) at para 17-002).

  89. [62] In this regard, by established conflict of laws rules, a marriage is formally valid if the formalities required by the law of the country of celebration have been complied with but is essentially valid only if the parties have capacity to marry under the law of their domicile. It follows that parties domiciled in Singapore cannot avoid the application of the capacity provisions of the Charter by marrying abroad. That said, if they marry abroad, they are not required to comply with s 13 which is a formality provision for marriages solemnised in Singapore; it suffices that they comply with the formalities of the country of celebration. Section 13 of the WC 2020 expressly provides for its application to a “marriage solemnised in Singapore” [emphasis added]. In contrast, ss 5, 9, 10, 11, 11A and 12 of the WC 2020 expressly apply to marriages “solemnised in Singapore or elsewhere” [emphasis added]. This reinforces the distinction between s 13, which concerns the formal validity of a marriage, and the other provisions in s 105, which govern the parties’ capacity to marry.

  90. [63] The practical significance of this distinction may be illustrated by way of a hypothetical example. Suppose the parties in the present case had chosen to solemnise their marriage overseas. Any challenge to the formal validity of that marriage, such as whether a marriage licence had been properly obtained, would be governed exclusively by the law of the place of celebration, not Singapore law. If the position in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng were correct – that a false declaration of no lawful impediment has the consequence of invalidating the marriage licence and thereby rendering the marriage void – then parties who marry abroad would escape this consequence entirely, since the validity of any licence or other formal requirement would be determined by foreign law instead of s 13 of the WC 2020. The distinction between formal and essential validity therefore serves a coherent and necessary purpose: it recognises parties’ choices in this globalised world on where they wish to celebrate their marriage but also ensures that the substantive capacity provisions of the Charter apply with equal force and consistency, regardless of where the marriage ceremony takes place.

  91. [64] As alluded to above at [56], s 13 also operates as a substantive ground for declaring a marriage void under s 105. That said, its scope is confined to the formal aspects of marriage, such as where parties marry without any licence at all or where the licence ceases to have effect due to expiration or cancellation of the notice of marriage (see s 15 of the WC 2020 and Leong Wai Kum, Marriage, Spouses and Assets (Academy Publishing, 2025) at paras 1.84–1.86). The validity of the marriage licence cannot be called into question only by reason of not declaring one’s true intentions or motivations for marriage, or non-compliance with even minor or inconsequential elements. However, this would be the effect of extending the scope of s 13 of the WC 2020 to render marriages void on the basis of a false declaration, as suggested in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, an approach which the Appellant urges us to adopt. In this regard, we find useful the following passage by Ormrod J which the House of Lords in Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 (“Vervaeke”) cited with approval (at 152):

  92. The law does not inquire into the private motives of the parties

  93. [65] Our position is further reinforced by the principle that, absent a specific statutory provision that permits this, the law generally does not inquire into the private motives of parties entering into a marriage. This principle, first articulated locally in Tan Ah Thee (at [56]), can be traced to the English decision in Vervaeke (at 152) and has since been recognised in several other jurisdictions, including Canada (see, for example, Iantsis v Papatheodorou [1971] 1 OR 245), Australia (see, for example, In the Marriage of B J and G Otway (1986) 11 Fam LR 99 at 102), and New Zealand (see, for example, Skelton v Waisoongnoen [2002] NZFLR 894 (“Skelton”) at [28]), where the courts have generally held that sham marriages, including marriages entered into for an immigration advantage and marriages of convenience, are valid.

  94. [66] We begin with the case of Tan Ah Thee. There, during his first marriage, the deceased had an extra-marital relationship with the defendant, and a son was born out of this affair. After the death of his first wife in 1994, the deceased publicly acknowledged his relationships with the defendant and their son, and in 1996 a marriage was solemnised between the deceased and the defendant. The plaintiffs were children from the deceased’s first marriage who sought a declaration that the deceased’s subsequent marriage to the defendant was void on the ground, amongst others, that it was a sham marriage contrary to public policy. The plaintiffs argued that it was a sham marriage as the defendant’s sole or predominant motive in registering the marriage was to revoke the will made by the deceased prior to his second marriage to the defendant. The defendant applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The application was partially disallowed by an assistant registrar. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed against that decision.

  95. [67] In dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal and allowing the defendants’ appeal, Judith Prakash J (as she then was) held that “the Charter provides a complete code on the law applicable to marriages in Singapore … and there is no room for the court to apply any other standard” (Tan Ah Thee at [19]). Prakash J rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the court could declare a marriage void on a ground other than those provided for in s 105 of the Charter (Tan Ah Thee at [54]). In any case, on the contention that a sham marriage should be void, her view was that (at [56]–[57]):

  96. [68] As referenced in Tan Ah Thee, the case of Kwong Sin Hwa v Lau Lee Yen [1993] 1 SLR(R) 90 (“Kwong Sin Hwa”) also supports the position that the law does not allow the parties’ private motives to undermine the validity of the marriage. The Court of Appeal in Kwong Sin Hwa at [33] approved the following passage from Ng Bee Hoon v Tan Heok Boon [1992] 1 SLR(R) 335 (“Ng Bee Hoon”) at [49], albeit reaching a different conclusion from the High Court in Ng Bee Hoon:

  97. [69] Both Kwong Sin Hwa and Ng Bee Hoon concerned the issue of “wilful refusal” to consummate a marriage. Where parties had a prior agreement to postpone consummation until after a customary or religious ceremony, a question arose as to which party was wilfully refusing consummation if one refused to proceed with the ceremony. The Court of Appeal in Kwong Sin Hwa held, contrary to the High Court’s view in Ng Bee Hoon (at [33]–[34]), that such an agreement was not against public policy as the parties were only postponing consummation. Hence, a spouse who withheld sexual relations before the ceremony was not the one wilfully refusing consummation – rather, it was the other spouse who declined to proceed with the ceremony who was wilfully refusing consummation (Kwong Sin Hwa at [38]).

  98. [70] In the English case of Brodie, a wife petitioned for the restitution of conjugal rights. She had pressed the respondent to marry her whilst she was pregnant with their child; and he agreed to do so if, and only if, she would sign an agreement providing that the parties might live separate and apart after the marriage as if they were unmarried. This she did, and a ceremony took place forthwith at the registry office. It was held that the agreement not to cohabit was void as against public policy; and a decree of restitution of conjugal rights was granted (at 273). Such a decree affirmed the validity of the marriage in question.

  99. [71] In Kwong Sin Hwa, the Court of Appeal distinguished Brodie at [22], reasoning as follows:

  100. [72] These cases illustrate that, once parties have validly consented to enter into the legal status of marriage and complied with the requisite requirements of capacity and formality, their private motives and expectations concerning married life do not ordinarily affect the validity of the marriage, even if those intentions are reflected in agreements which enforceability may be separately considered by the courts.

  101. [73] Indeed, it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the law expects the parties to uphold the obligations of marriage. In Singapore, these obligations are anchored in s 46 of the Charter which provides that parties are mutually bound to cooperate with each other in safeguarding the interests of the union, and caring and providing for the children. An agreement to resile from these obligations may be void as against public policy, but the marriage itself is not void. We illustrate with a hypothetical practical example. Suppose A, who is pregnant with B’s child, agrees with B that after solemnising their marriage, they will live apart and not have to provide financially for each other during the marriage. In reliance on the agreement, they get married in order to confer legitimate status on their child. Suppose during the marriage, A seeks maintenance from B for herself as she has to care for the child and is unable to work to be financially independent. In this scenario, B may not be allowed to resist the maintenance claim by relying on their agreement which contravenes s 46 of the Charter and consequently, maintenance may be ordered against him despite their prior agreement.

  102. [74] As stated above at [65], this premise that the law does not inquire into the motives of parties to a marriage has been endorsed judicially not only in Singapore and the United Kingdom, but in other jurisdictions as well. We find useful the observations of the New Zealand Family Court in Skelton, where the court emphasised that courts should not make value judgements about the motivations for marriage (at [28]):

  103. [75] In our view, this position is reflected in the structure of the Charter as well. We observe that the capacity grounds in ss 3(4), 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the WC 2020 do not concern parties’ intentions or future plans for their marital relationships. The only exception is the recently enacted s 11A, which incorporates the element of knowledge (or “having reason to believe”) that the purpose of the marriage is to assist one party to obtain an immigration advantage. But s 11A is a tightly circumscribed provision targeting marriages entered into for the purpose of obtaining an immigration advantage where gratification is involved. Far from supporting a broader inquiry into matrimonial intent, s 11A’s narrow scope is consistent with the general approach under the Charter that the law does not inquire into the private motives of parties entering into a marriage. Indeed, permitting such an inquiry would introduce considerable uncertainty into the institution of marriage, given that parties enter into marriages for a wide variety of reasons and may have differing expectations of married life. It should not be open to a party to seek to invalidate a marriage merely because those expectations were not met or the marriage subsequently broke down.

  104. Three groups of “sham” marriages: valid or void?

  105. [76] Having set out the law and principles on the formation of marriage in the Charter, we consider whether the three categories of marriages outlined above at [3] are valid or void.

  106. Marriages for other purposes

  107. [77] We have described at [3(a)] above that “marriages for other purposes” are those where, for various reasons, the parties do not intend to live together as husband and wife or to fulfil the obligations of marriage enshrined in s 46 of the Charter.

  108. [78] We consider two alternative positions addressing whether such marriages are valid or void: (a) the first is that a sham marriage is void as parties participated in a marriage ceremony without “truly” consenting to the marriage and such marriages are contrary to public policy; and (b) the second is that, whatever the parties’ motives may be, a marriage is valid so long as the parties consented to marry each other, and that consent was not vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentations or mistake as to the identity of the other party or the nature of the ceremony. On the latter view, there is no room for private motives or intentions to prevent the formation of a valid marriage.

  109. [79] Vervaeke, which was referred to in Tan Ah Thee (see [67] above), offers a striking example of how two jurisdictions may arrive at opposite conclusions on the same issue. In Vervaeke, the Belgian court found such a sham marriage void on the basis that the parties had “delusively indulged in a marriage ceremony without in fact really consenting to a marriage” and had thereby “behaved against public policy”, such that “[t]he disturbancy of public order, the protection of what belongs to the essence of a real marriage and of human dignity, exact that such a sham-marriage be declared invalid” (at 149). On the other hand, the English court recognised that very same marriage to be valid, holding as follows: “… in the English law of marriage there is no room for mental reservations or private arrangements regarding the parties’ personal relationships once it is established that the parties are free to marry one another, have consented to the achievement of the married state and observed the necessary formalities” (at 149). We observe that the English position is such that where two parties use the status of marriage to obtain certain advantages, they will also bear the legal consequences of that act. Thus, in Vervaeke, the wife bore the legal consequences of entering a marriage of convenience, which ultimately prevented her from having the capacity to marry her second husband whose death would have made her a wealthy widow had her purported marriage to him been valid.

  110. [80] The High Court in Toh Seok Kheng applied Tan Ah Thee, which had in turn followed Vervaeke in holding that a sham marriage was invalid (see above at [66]–[67]). In Toh Seok Kheng, the plaintiff was the deceased’s mother, and the defendant was the deceased’s wife. The deceased had married the defendant in 2005 without his family’s knowledge, and the family only learnt of the marriage after his death in 2009. When the plaintiff applied for letters of administration of the deceased’s intestate estate, the defendant lodged a caveat indicating her intention to make a similar application. The plaintiff responded by seeking two declarations: that the marriage was an invalid sham marriage, and that she be appointed sole administrator of the estate. Prakash J reiterated in Toh Seok Kheng that (at [12]–[13]):

  111. [81] We adopt Prakash J’s reasoning, and are similarly of the view that “sham” marriages for other purposes cannot be declared void under any provision in the Charter.

  112. [82] We also observe that, although the marriages in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng were marriages of convenience, neither decision went so far as to hold that the same public policy considerations would apply to sham marriages entered into for other purposes, such that those marriages should be rendered void. Indeed, the judge in Gian Bee Choo stressed at [103]:

  113. [83] Thus, Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng remain consistent with Tan Ah Thee, which did not concern a marriage of convenience. Rather, the allegation in Tan Ah Thee was that the marriage was void because the defendant’s sole or predominant motive in causing it to be registered was to revoke the deceased’s prior will (Tan Ah Thee at [53]).

  114. Marriages for immigration advantage

  115. [84] We next turn to the second category of marriages, namely, marriages entered into for an immigration advantage with no gratification involved (see above at [3(b)]). It bears noting that, even for marriages solemnised on or after 1 October 2016, s 11A of the WC 2020 does not render void marriages entered into for an immigration advantage where no gratification is involved. This was the position in Toh Seok Kheng, where there was no allegation or evidence that gratification was involved in the marriage allegedly entered into for an immigration advantage (Toh Seok Kheng at [4]). For the reasons given by Prakash J in Toh Seok Kheng, reproduced at [80] above, we are similarly of the view that such marriages are not rendered void merely because they were entered into for an immigration advantage, absent gratification, and cannot be declared void on that basis under the Charter.

  116. Marriages of convenience solemnised prior to 1 October 2016

  117. [85] We turn to the third and final category of marriages, namely, marriages of convenience (see above at [3(c)]). We use the term “marriages of convenience” to refer to marriages entered into for an immigration advantage and accompanied by gratification, thereby possessing the substantive characteristics set out in s 11A of the WC 2020, regardless of when they were solemnised.

  118. [86] It is clear that s 11A does not apply to the marriage of convenience in the present case as ss 105(aa) and 11A of the WC 2020 were not in existence in 2011. Following its enactment, s 11A expressly provides that it only applies to marriages solemnised on or after 1 October 2016. The thrust of the Appellant’s contention is that the same policy underlying s 11A of the WC 2020 applies equally to this marriage, notwithstanding that it was entered into prior to 1 October 2016, such that the court should interpret the provisions in the Charter to render the marriage void and address the underlying mischief. Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng are cited in support of this contention. We now address these two cases more fully.

  119. [87] Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng held that the marriages of convenience in question were void for breach of s 22 of the WC 2009 and s 13 of the WC 2020 respectively, read with s 105.

  120. [88] In Gian Bee Choo, the High Court judge found that the marriage in question had been entered into in 2007 for the purpose of assisting the wife to obtain permanent resident status, that gratification had been given, and the parties had not intended for the marriage to result in a “genuine marital relationship” (at [78]). Although the court accepted that s 57C of the Immigration Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“IA 2020”) and s 11A of the WC 2020 were only introduced in 2012 and 2016 respectively, the judge did not think that a public policy against sham marriages only existed when these provisions came into effect. He was of the view that a public policy against such marriages had always existed and that s 57C of the IA 2020 merely created a specific and targeted offence against such sham marriages (Gian Bee Choo at [104]). As pointed out earlier (at [82]), the judge was not referring to sham marriages in the broader sense but to marriages of convenience specifically (albeit contracted prior to 1 October 2016). He observed that, prior to the commencement of s 57C of the IA 2020, such sham marriages were criminalised, albeit indirectly, through two other statutory provisions – s 5(b)(i) of the PCA and s 57(1)(k) of the IA 2008; these provisions were used to prosecute offences arising out of acts associated with marriages of convenience (Gian Bee Choo at [109]–[113]). Further, he opined that such a marriage did not merely contravene public policy but corrupted the very sanctity of marriage as enshrined in s 46 of the Charter, given that the fundamental purpose of such a marriage was to obtain an immigration benefit fraudulently (Gian Bee Choo at [115]).

  121. [89] Whilst accepting that the grounds on which a marriage may be rendered void under s 105 are exhaustive (Gian Bee Choo at [96]), the judge nevertheless held the marriage void on the basis that it had breached s 22 of the WC 2009, which is a ground listed in s 105. The judge held that the reference to a “valid marriage licence” in s 22 of the WC 2009 must be read as meaning a marriage licence issued by the Registrar of Marriages when he was correctly satisfied that all the requirements of s 17(2) have been met. Section 17(2)(d) of the WC 2009 in turn provided that the Registrar shall not issue a marriage licence until he has been satisfied by way of the parties’ statutory declaration that “there is no lawful impediment to the marriage” (Gian Bee Choo at [130]–[131]). The judge thus considered whether an intention to enter into a marriage of convenience constituted a lawful impediment to the proposed marriage (Gian Bee Choo at [132]). He held that such lawful impediments need not be expressly identified in the Charter, and that a lawful impediment arises where the sole purpose of the marriage was to assist one party to obtain an immigration advantage in exchange for gratification and the parties never had any intention to enter into a genuine marital relationship. The judge therefore found that the wrongful declaration that there was no lawful impediment to the proposed marriage had invalidated the marriage licence issued, and that the marriage was void for breach of s 22 read with s 105 of the WC 2009 (Gian Bee Choo at [137] and [146]).

  122. [90] In Kee Cheong Keng, another High Court judge similarly found that the marriage was one of convenience – the marriage was to allow the wife to stay in Singapore and eventually apply for permanent residence or citizenship and the arrangement offered the husband a significant monetary benefit at a time when he was unemployed (Kee Cheong Keng at [8]). The judge held that as the marriage was solemnised before 1 October 2016, it could not be held void under s 105(aa) of the WC 2020 as it did not fall within the scope of s 11A(1). However, he cited Gian Bee Choo and agreed with its holding that it was against public policy to contract marriages of convenience even before the enactment of s 11A of the WC 2020. The judge stated that, according to s 105(a) read with s 13(a) of the WC 2020, a marriage solemnised in Singapore is void unless it was solemnised on the authority of a valid marriage licence. He found that the parties had submitted a false declaration at the time of their marriage by failing to declare that their marriage contravened penal laws such as s 57C(1) of the IA 2008. It appears from this analysis that the judge had held that the marriage was void on the ground that s 13(a) had been breached, as it was not solemnised on the authority of a valid marriage licence (Kee Cheong Keng at [9]).

  123. [91] From the foregoing, it is clear that the High Court in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng did not declare the marriages in question void on the basis of public policy as an independent ground. Instead, they held that the breach of criminal laws and the pre-existing policy against marriages of convenience, which predated the enactment of s 11A of the WC 2020, constituted a lawful impediment. This resulted in breaches of the former ss 17(2) and 22 of the WC 2009 or current ss 16(2) and 13 of the WC 2020 because of the false declarations by the parties that there was no lawful impediment to the marriage, which meant that the marriage licences had been issued on a wrongful basis and were thus invalid. The marriages were thus void under s 105 because the marriage licences were invalid.

  124. [92] We are of the view that the courts’ reading of s 22 of the WC 2009 and s 13 of the WC 2020 in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng respectively is incorrect. We reiterate that s 105 of the Charter sets out exhaustively the grounds on which a marriage may be rendered void. By taking a wide view of “lawful impediment” or “prevented from marrying by [the Charter] or any other law” which goes beyond the impediments imposed by the capacity provisions in s 105, s 22 of the WC 2009 and/or s 13 of the WC 2020 will effectively serve as a side door for admitting new substantive grounds to render a marriage void. This is inconsistent with the statutory regime on the formation of marriages which has been clearly prescribed in s 105 of the Charter. In Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, as there were no lawful impediments in entering into such marriages of convenience prior to 1 October 2016, there was no failure to declare such a lawful impediment under s 17(2) of the WC 2009 and/or s 16(2) of the WC 2020.

  125. [93] It is quite understandable that the courts in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng were troubled by the prospect of a “marriage” which forms a core element of a criminal offence being accorded recognition and validity in law. However, regardless of how compelling the public policy considerations against such marriages, the proper scope of that policy is ultimately a matter for Parliament to determine through the enactment of legislation. In this regard, the Parliamentary debates accompanying the introduction of s 11A of the WC 2020 are illuminating (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 94, Sitting No 7; Page 70; [29 February 2016] (Tan Chuan-Jin, Minister for Social and Family Development)):

  126. [94] This extract from the Parliamentary debates suggests that Parliament intended s 11A of the WC 2020 to render void only marriages that constitute the specific offence under s 57C of the IA 2020 or, where there is no conviction, satisfy the elements in s 11A(1), which reflect those of the offence under s 57C; other marriages entered into for improper motives or “sham” marriages that do not fall within the scope of s 57C of the IA 2020 are not targeted by s 11A of the WC 2020.

  127. [95] Section 11A of the WC 2020 clearly sets out the public policy from 1 October 2016. Nothing suggests that this was also the policy before 1 October 2016. This is further confirmed by the MSF’s response that s 11A of the WC 2020 “was not intended to have retrospective effect” and “does not purport to affect the validity of marriages of convenience which were solemnised before 1 October 2016”. In this regard, we agree with the Judge that “the scope of the policy in respect of the validity of marriages and its application in the context of the WC has been specified by the words of ss 11A and 105(aa) of the WC” (GD at [31]).

  128. [96] We further agree with the Judge that penal provisions and accompanying consequences, without more, would not have any effect on the validity of the marriage (GD at [31]). Indeed, whether the marriage itself is void is a separate policy question to be determined by Parliament. In Gian Bee Choo, the judge appeared to equate the prosecution of parties to marriages of convenience with a broader public policy that such marriages ought to be void. However, while Parliament may have intended to punish the parties under the relevant laws criminalising that conduct, this is distinct from whether, as a matter of public policy, the marriage should be valid or void. The High Court observed in Toh Seok Kheng at [14]:

  129. [97] We would also reject any argument that this approach may incentivise parties to make false declarations to obtain a valid licence. The Charter already provides separate penalties for the making of such false declarations under s 37 of the WC 2020, which serve to deter such conduct notwithstanding that the marriage itself may remain valid.

  130. [98] For the reasons we have explained, we respectfully disagree with the reasoning in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, and do not consider it good law.

  131. Whether public policy constitutes an independent ground to declare the marriage void

  132. [99] Given our view that the grounds on which a marriage may be rendered void are exhaustively stated in s 105 of the Charter, and that s 11A of the WC 2020 does not apply to a marriage of convenience solemnised in 2011, the remaining question is whether public policy can be considered as an independent ground for declaring such a marriage void.

  133. [100] Holding such a marriage void for contravening public policy, rather than on one of the grounds enumerated in s 105, will grate against the guidance in UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM”) at [115], which cautions that where socio-economic issues are governed by statute, courts should be very slow to reach decisions on the basis of public policy alone. Generally, where the courts have had regard to public policy, it has been in the context of statutory interpretation or as one factor in the exercise of statutory discretion, not as an independent basis for action outside the statutory scheme. The scope of public policy as a ground for holding a marriage void is already defined by s 105 of the Charter. Accordingly, to declare void a marriage on grounds beyond those prescribed by Parliament would be to arrogate to the courts a power that Parliament has not conferred.

  134. Conclusion

  135. Ang Cheng Hock Justice of the Court of Appeal

  136. Debbie Ong Siew Ling Judge of the Appellate Division

  137. Sundaresh Menon CJ (dissenting):

  138. Introduction

  139. [103] I have had the advantage of reading the draft judgment of the majority, which I shall refer to as the “majority judgment”. I gratefully adopt the definitions used therein, its account of the background facts, the procedural history, and the Appellant’s arguments, save where I state otherwise. I also agree with the majority that:

  140. (a) the High Court had jurisdiction and power to entertain the Appellant’s application for a declaration that the marriage between the Respondent and the Deceased was void (see [42] of the majority judgment);

  141. (b) the Appellant possesses the standing to seek such declaratory relief (see [42] of the majority judgment); and

  142. (c) there is no need for this court to make any determination relating to the administration or distribution of the Deceased’s estate, given that this was not a ground of appeal before this court (see [43] of the majority judgment).

  143. [104] However, where I respectfully depart from the majority is on a narrow but important point, specifically, its conclusion that the marriage between the Deceased and the Respondent, solemnised in Singapore sometime in 2011 and entered into for an immigration advantage in exchange for gratification, cannot be declared void under the Charter. This marriage has been referred to as a “marriage of convenience” in the majority judgment (at [3(c)]) as it meets the criteria set out in s 11A of the WC 2020, notwithstanding that it was not solemnised on or after 1 October 2016 (which I refer to as “the relevant date”). I agree with the majority that s 11A plainly does not operate to void the marriage in the present case as it does not have retrospective application (see [95] of the majority judgment).

  144. [105] I also agree with the majority that, since s 11A of the WC 2020 is not applicable in the present case, the question is whether a marriage of convenience solemnised in Singapore before the relevant date can be voided on any other ground under the Charter (see [1] of the majority judgment). The majority answers that question in the negative; in my judgment, however, that question must be answered in the affirmative as the parties to such a marriage applied for a marriage licence in order to obtain the status of marriage solely for an illegal purpose, and the facts giving rise to that purpose were such that the Registrar would not and ought not to have issued the licence had he or she been apprised of those facts. In other words, the marriage was not solemnised on the authority of a valid marriage licence (see s 13 of the WC 2020).

  145. [106] My conclusion rests entirely on the proper interpretation of the statutory framework governing the validity and avoidance of marriages under the Charter. I do not rely on public policy as a freestanding ground for concluding that the marriage in this case is void. I accept, as the majority does, that the grounds for voiding a marriage under s 105 of the WC 2020 are exhaustive (see Tan Ah Thee at [35]; and [46] of the majority judgment). However, one of those stated grounds is the absence of a valid marriage licence under s 13 of the WC 2020 (formerly s 22 of the WC 2009, at the time of the marriage in issue). The specific point on which the majority and I differ is over the scope and application of s 13 in rendering a marriage void. This gives rise to a related question as to what Parliament meant when it required, as one of the grounds for voiding a marriage, that a marriage be solemnised on the authority of a “valid marriage licence”.

  146. [107] For the reasons that follow, I would hold that where the parties obtained a marriage licence from the Registrar for a marriage solemnised in Singapore by concealing the fact that they were entering into that marriage solely for an illegal purpose, and where they failed to disclose the facts which would have revealed that they were prevented from entering into such a sham marriage, whether by the provisions of the Charter or of any other law, such a licence would not be a valid marriage licence. On this basis, I would hold that the marriage between the Respondent and the Deceased was void under the former s 105 read with s 22 of the WC 2009, because, in my view, it was not solemnised on the authority of a valid marriage licence. I would accordingly have allowed the appeal and granted a declaration that the marriage was void.

  147. Factual background

  148. [108] The facts on which I proceed are substantially similar to those set out in the majority judgment at [8]–[16], and they may be stated briefly. The Deceased and the Respondent were married on 26 January 2011. The Deceased did not mention the marriage to his family members despite his close relationship with them. His family and friends were excluded from and completely unaware of the solemnisation of the marriage, and those named as witnesses in the marriage certificate were unknown to the Appellant and his family. The marriage brought about no discernible change in his living arrangements or conduct. He did not bring the Respondent home to live with him. Nor did he move out to live with her. When the Deceased became terminally ill and died within a year of the marriage, the Respondent provided no support, made no contact with his family and remained entirely absent. In addition, shortly before the marriage, the Deceased had been in financial difficulty and was harassed by loan sharks, but this ceased during the year of the marriage. The Appellant infers that the Deceased settled his debts using payments he received from the Respondent for entering into the marriage. The Respondent was later found to have been deported from Singapore for immigration offences in 2011.

  149. [109] This factual background is based on the affidavit evidence of the Appellant. The Respondent did not enter an appearance either below or on appeal. The Judge was satisfied, based on the affidavit evidence and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the marriage between the Respondent and the Deceased met the criteria of a marriage of convenience stipulated in s 11A of the WC 2020. Specifically, this was a finding that the purpose of the marriage was to enable one of the parties (in this case, the Respondent) to obtain an immigration advantage, and that gratification was given or received (in this case, received by the Deceased) as an inducement or reward for entering into the marriage. I see no basis for disturbing that factual finding by the Judge. I accordingly proceed on that basis.

  150. [110] There was no conviction in this case of an offence of entering into a marriage of convenience under s 57C(1) of the IA 2020, not least because that provision, like s 11A of the WC 2020, was not yet in force at the material time. While such a conviction in relation to a marriage celebrated after the relevant date would be conclusive of the fact that the marriage was void by virtue of s 11A(3) of the WC 2020, the absence of such a conviction is, in my judgment, not determinative of whether the marriage in issue was solemnised on the authority of a valid marriage licence under the statutory regime that was then in force.

  151. The central issue in this appeal

  152. [111] In my judgment, the answer to the present appeal lies in first recognising that the intending parties to a marriage may seek to obtain a marriage licence for various and sometimes different purposes, and with different expectations as to what this entails. In many instances, those purposes or expectations are of no concern or interest to the court. But in several limited circumstances, I consider it can be relevant, and in this appeal, I consider that it bears directly on the central issue that is presented.

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