Court of Appeal · Decided 29 June 2018
Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters
Feedback & support[2018] SGCA 33 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 86 of 2017
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The present matters arise out of the decisions made in two consolidated actions, Suits Nos 1098 and 122 of 2013 (“Suit 1098” and “Suit 122” respectively; and collectively, either “the two Suits” or “both Suits”), both of which were commenced by Sakae Holdings Ltd (“Sakae”). In Suit 1098, Sakae sought relief under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed), alleging that Ong Siew Kwee (“Andy Ong”), Ong Han Boon and Ho Yew Kong (“Ho”), as well as various companies owned and controlled by Andy Ong, had engaged in acts that were oppressive to it as a minority shareholder of a joint venture company, Griffin Real Estate Investment Holdings Pte Ltd (“the Company”). The alleged oppressive acts consisted of seven transactions by which (among other things) a substantial amount of money was diverted from the Company to entities that were either directly or indirectly related to Andy Ong. A total of 11 defendants were involved in Suit 1098. As for Suit 122, it involved a claim by Sakae against Andy Ong alone for breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed as a director of Sakae and for the tort of inducing a breach of contract by the Company, both in relation to one specific transaction out of the seven impugned transactions. Third party proceedings were subsequently commenced in both Suits by nine of the defendants against Douglas Foo Peow Yong (“Foo”), who was the chairman of Sakae’s board at all material times. In the third party proceedings, these nine defendants sought indemnification against or contribution in respect of any liability that they might incur arising from Sakae’s claims against them.
- [3]
[3] Civil Appeals Nos 86 and 87 of 2017 (“CA 86” and “CA 87” respectively; and collectively, “the Main Appeals”) are appeals by Ho (in CA 86) and seven of the other defendants in Suit 1098 (in CA 87) against the Judge’s findings in the Main Judgment; while Civil Appeals Nos 103 and 104 of 2017 (“CA 103” and “CA 104” respectively; and collectively, “the Third Party Appeals”) are appeals by Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon (in CA 103) and Ho (in CA 104) against the Judge’s findings in the Third Party Judgment. There is also an application by Andy Ong in Court of Appeal Originating Summons No 13 of 2017 (“OS 13”) for a retroactive extension of time to file an appeal against the findings made by the Judge (in both the Main Judgment and the Third Party Judgment) in respect of Suit 122, having filed notices of appeal only in respect of Suit 1098.
- [4]
[4] The present appeals raise (among other issues) two matters of legal significance in relation to oppression actions brought under s 216 of the Companies Act (“s 216”). The first, which lies at the heart of the Main Appeals, is the question concerning the sometimes fine and elusive distinction between personal wrongs against shareholders of a company and corporate wrongs against the company, as well as the related questions of who may seek relief in circumstances where both types of wrongs have been committed and what sort of relief may be sought. One view is that the proper remit of an oppression action under s 216 should be tightly circumscribed such that it is confined to claims for relief which are solely for personal wrongs committed against shareholders. As against this, corporate wrongs, which are wrongs committed in substance against the company rather than against its shareholders, should be remedied by way of a statutory derivative action under s 216A of the Companies Act (“s 216A”). In broad terms, this was the position that we took in Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 723 (“Ng Kek Wee”). Whilst this view is theoretically sound in principle, it can sometimes be challenging to apply in practice, as has proved to be the case in the matters that are now before us. The second issue of legal significance is the question of whether a breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence (as opposed to the fiduciary duties) that a director owes a company would suffice to support a finding of commercial unfairness for the purposes of an oppression action under s 216. In this judgment, we address these issues, among various others.
Background
- [6]
[6] The genesis of the present dispute is the joint venture agreement (“the JVA”) that was entered into between the Company, Sakae and Gryphon Real Estate Investment Corporation Pte Ltd (“GREIC”). Under the JVA, the Company was intended to be the vehicle through which the parties would invest in units at Bugis Cube, a shopping mall located at 470 North Bridge Road, Singapore.
The parties
- [7]
[7] Sakae (the sole respondent in the Main Appeals) is a listed company, and Foo (the sole respondent in the Third Party Appeals) is the chairman of its board. Foo and Andy Ong (the second appellant in CA 87 and the first appellant in CA 103) were friends who had known each other for more than 20 years. In July 2003, Foo suggested that Andy Ong be appointed as an independent director of Sakae. The appointment was duly made and Andy Ong remained an independent director of Sakae until 18 March 2013.
- [8]
[8] GREIC is an investment holding company whose shareholders at all material times included Andy Ong and his two associates, Ong Han Boon (the third appellant in CA 87 and the second appellant in CA 103) and Ho (the sole appellant in CA 86 and CA 104). At the time of the trial, Ho was the sole director of GREIC.
- [9]
[9] ERC Holdings Pte Ltd (“ERC Holdings”) is a company which is 86.85% owned by Andy Ong, who is also its chief executive officer and founder. ERC Holdings is the ultimate holding company of a group of companies, including the following:
(a) Gryphon Capital Management Pte Ltd (“GCM”) (the fourth appellant in CA 87), a company established to manage the Company’s real estate investment. Its directors at all material times were Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon. Sakae acquired 20% of the shares in GCM at the time the JVA was entered into.
(b) ERC Unicampus Pte Ltd (“ERC Unicampus”) (the fifth appellant in CA 87), an investment holding company. Ho was the sole director of ERC Unicampus until 12 July 2013, when he was replaced by Ong Han Boon, who remained the sole director at the time of the trial.
(c) ERC Institute Pte Ltd (“ERC Institute”) (the sixth appellant in CA 87), a professional training and consultancy company. At all material times, its directors were Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon.
(d) ERC Consulting Pte Ltd (“ERC Consulting”) (the seventh appellant in CA 87), a company providing business consulting and education services. Andy Ong was one of its two directors at all material times.
These companies, together with ERC Holdings, are referred to as “the ERC Group”. Andy Ong allegedly controls all the companies in the ERC Group.
The JVA
- [10]
[10] Sometime in late 2009, Andy Ong made a proposal to Foo that they come together to acquire more than 90% of the units in Bugis Cube. By doing so, they stood to be able to redevelop Bugis Cube and then sell the entire project at a profit. Foo agreed and suggested that some of the funding be provided by Sakae. Following this, on 3 September 2010, Sakae entered into the JVA with the Company and GREIC for the purposes proposed by Andy Ong. Sakae was the minority shareholder in the Company, holding 24.69% of the Company’s issued share capital, while GREIC held the remaining 75.31%.
- [11]
[11] The JVA included the following provisions:
(a) The board of the Company would consist of four directors, with GREIC and Sakae each entitled to appoint two directors, regardless of their relative shareholding positions in the Company.
(b) For certain defined matters (“Shareholder Reserved Matters”), the Company could act only if it obtained the prior unanimous approval of all its shareholders in a general meeting, who were required to act reasonably and in the best interests of the Company and the shareholders when exercising their voting rights.
(c) For other defined matters (“Board Reserved Matters”), the Company could act only if it obtained the prior majority approval of its directors, who were required to exercise their voting rights reasonably and in the best interests of the Company and the shareholders.
(d) Any director or shareholder with a direct or indirect interest in any matter that would require either shareholder approval or board discussion, not limited to Shareholder Reserved Matters and Board Reserved Matters, was obliged to declare that interest and was not entitled to participate in any discussion or vote on that matter.
Notwithstanding the provision in the JVA that the Company would have four directors, at the time of the trial, Foo and Ho were the only two appointed directors of the Company.
The impugned transactions
- [12]
[12] Throughout the course of the following years, Sakae and Foo evidently left the management of the Company to Andy Ong and GCM. As a result, Andy Ong was apparently able to and did divert (with the involvement of Ong Han Boon and/or Ho) the Company’s assets to companies in the ERC Group by way of the seven transactions mentioned at [1] above. These transactions consisted of:
(a) the Company’s payment of excessive management fees to GCM (“Transaction 1(a)”) and the assignment of those management fees by GCM pursuant to the “Third Party Assignment of Proceeds” (“TPAP”) (“Transaction 1(b)”);
(b) the Company’s grant of the “First Loan” to ERC Unicampus and its entry into the “First Loan Agreement” (“Transaction 2”);
(c) the wrongful diversion of $16m from the Company to companies in the ERC Group and the execution of the “Lease Agreement” (“Transaction 3”);
(d) the Company’s execution of the “Consultancy Agreement” with ERC Consulting (“Transaction 4”);
(e) the Company’s grant of the “Second Loan” to ERC Unicampus and its execution of the “Second Loan Agreement” (“Transaction 5”);
(f) the Company’s grant of the “Share Option Agreement” in favour of ERC Holdings (“Transaction 6”); and
(g) the Company’s unauthorised payment of $8m to Andy Ong and its execution of the “Project Manager Agreement” (“the PMA”) with him (“Transaction 7”).
We briefly elaborate on each of these transactions below.
Transactions 1(a) and 1(b): The payment of excessive management fees to GCM and the TPAP
- [13]
[13] Transaction 1(a) involved the Company entering into a Management Agreement (“the MA”) with GCM on 23 February 2010, pursuant to which GCM was appointed to manage the Company’s real estate investment. Management fees were payable by the Company to GCM under the MA, and these amounted to $460,000 (plus GST) yearly and such amount of the Company’s profits as was to be determined between the Company and GCM on an annual basis. The defendants in Suit 1098 also produced an addendum to the MA dated 1 May 2010 (“the Addendum”) which purportedly required the payment of management fees of around $2.8m to GCM. This document was signed by Andy Ong purportedly acting for and on behalf of the Company. In 2011 and 2012, Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon, who were then directors of the Company, caused the Company to pay GCM a sum of $2,826,335.17 pursuant to the Addendum.
- [14]
[14] As for Transaction 1(b), in August 2012, Andy Ong represented to DBS Bank Ltd (“DBS”) that GCM was entitled to management fees from the Company calculated in accordance with the terms of the MA and the Addendum. In September 2012, GCM and DBS entered into the TPAP, under which the management fees due to GCM from the Company were assigned to DBS. DBS agreed, on the security of the TPAP, to make credit facilities (“the DBS Loan”) available to one of Andy Ong’s companies, ERC International Pte Ltd (“ERC International”). (ERC International, which is now known as TYN Investment Pte Ltd, is the tenth defendant in Suit 1098; it was previously wholly owned by ERC Holdings.) ERC International drew on the DBS Loan to pay a sum of about $60m to purchase a property at 101 Penang Road. Ultimately, the TPAP caused no loss to the Company because the DBS Loan was fully repaid and the TPAP was discharged.
Transaction 2: The First Loan and the First Loan Agreement
- [15]
[15] Transaction 2 concerned a loan of $10m that the Company extended to ERC Unicampus through the First Loan Agreement. In 2011, Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon, the then directors of the Company, arranged for the First Loan, under which the Company extended a sum of $10m to ERC Unicampus to fund the latter’s purchase of a property that was later named “Big Hotel”. At the trial, whether or not the First Loan had been repaid and, if so, the extent of the repayment made were in dispute.
Transaction 3: The wrongful diversion of $16m to the ERC Group and the Lease Agreement
- [16]
[16] Transaction 3 related to the Company’s payment of $16m to ERC Institute in September 2012 as compensation for the early termination of the Lease Agreement. Under that agreement, which was dated 1 March 2012, the Company agreed to let the third to sixth floors of Bugis Cube to ERC Institute. The term of the lease was three years, with an option to renew it for two additional terms of three years each. The Lease Agreement bore the signatures of Ho and Ong Han Boon for and on behalf of the Company and ERC Institute respectively.
- [17]
[17] Barely three months after the Lease Agreement was signed, the Company purportedly terminated it by way of a letter dated 30 May 2012. This letter was produced only during the trial. An identically worded letter dated 31 July 2012 had earlier been disclosed before the trial began. Supposedly as compensation for the early termination of the Lease Agreement, the Company paid ERC Institute $16m. The bulk of the compensation amount was paid on 13 September 2012, with $14.3m being disbursed to ERC International and $1.5m to ERC Unicampus. The remaining $200,000 was to be paid to ERC Holdings as and when required.
Transaction 4: The Consultancy Agreement
- [18]
[18] Transaction 4 involved the Company’s entry on 4 May 2012 into the Consultancy Agreement with ERC Consulting, under which the latter was to be paid a consultancy fee of $150,000 to conceptualise the sale of Bugis Cube and coordinate promotional activities to effect the sale. The Consultancy Agreement was purportedly signed by Ho on behalf of the Company and by Ong Siew Bok (Andy Ong’s brother) on behalf of ERC Consulting. Ong Siew Bok was at all material times accustomed to act in accordance with Andy Ong’s directions.
- [19]
[19] It turned out that earlier, on 2 May 2012, the Company had already engaged Knight Frank Pte Ltd (“Knight Frank”) as the “Sole Marketing & Sales Agent” to handle the sale of Bugis Cube, and Knight Frank was named as the “Sole Marketing Agent” in the advertisements which were printed to promote the launch event held in June 2012 for the sale. Nonetheless, the Company paid a total of $160,500 to ERC Consulting on 24 December 2012 as “Marketing Consultancy” fees for the sale of Bugis Cube.
Transaction 5: The Second Loan and the Second Loan Agreement
- [20]
[20] Transaction 5 involved the Company’s entry into the Second Loan Agreement on 7 May 2012 to extend a further loan of $10m to ERC Unicampus. This agreement was signed by Ho for and on behalf of the Company, and by Andy Ong for and on behalf of ERC Unicampus. It was common ground that the following events occurred on 4 May 2012: (a) Foo and Ho, as directors of the Company, passed a board resolution approving the Second Loan and another board resolution calling for an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”) to be held on 7 May 2012; (b) Ho issued a notice to inform the Company’s shareholders (namely, Sakae and GREIC) of the EGM; and (c) Foo and Ho, as corporate representatives of the respective shareholders, acknowledged the said notice. At the EGM, the Company’s shareholders passed a resolution approving the Second Loan Agreement. It was also undisputed that the Second Loan was subsequently repaid in full (see the Main Judgment at [151]).
Transaction 6: The Share Option Agreement
- [21]
[21] Transaction 6, which is the sole transaction relied on by Sakae in Suit 122, concerned the Company’s alleged grant of an option to ERC Holdings in September 2010 to subscribe for 8.8 million of the Company’s ordinary shares at a price of $8.8m (“the ERC Option”). It was common ground that on 24 May 2012, ERC Holdings paid the Company $8.8m in the purported exercise of this option. However, Andy Ong only informed Foo two weeks later on 6 June 2012 that ERC Holdings intended to exercise the option.
- [23]
[23] As a result of the issuance of new shares to ERC Holdings and Sakae, at the time of the trial, GREIC held 45.35% of the Company’s issued share capital, ERC Holdings held 29.96%, while Sakae continued to hold 24.69%.
Transaction 7: The payment of $8m to Andy Ong and the PMA
- [24]
[24] Transaction 7 involved the Company’s payment of $8m to Andy Ong on 24 May 2012 and its execution of the PMA with him.
- [25]
[25] According to the appellants in CA 87 (“the CA 87 appellants”), this payment was a valid payment to Andy Ong for work to be done on the Company’s behalf pursuant to the PMA dated 4 May 2012, which was signed by Ho for and on behalf of the Company, and by Andy Ong on his own behalf. The stated purpose of the PMA was to appoint Andy Ong as the project manager (cl 2) to ensure that the works needed to renovate and refurbish the Company’s units at Bugis Cube would be completed to the Company’s satisfaction (cll 4 and 8). Clause 9 of the PMA fixed the “Contract Sum” at $8m.
- [26]
[26] Sakae contends that Andy Ong caused the Company to pay him the $8m without any justification and without its (Sakae’s) knowledge or consent. The PMA, Sakae submits, is a sham agreement which was drawn up much later than 4 May 2012, but backdated to that date so as to provide a fictitious basis for making the $8m payment to Andy Ong, and thereby conceal the fact that that payment had nothing to do with the refurbishment of the Company’s units at Bugis Cube but in fact went towards helping to fund ERC Holdings’ exercise of the ERC Option on 24 May 2012. Sakae found out about the $8m payment only in November 2012 when its Chief Financial Officer discovered, while inspecting the Company’s records, that a payment of $8m to Andy Ong had been recorded as a reimbursement to him for sums which he had paid to a “project manager” appointed to carry out the refurbishment of the Company’s units at Bugis Cube. As for the PMA, it was disclosed only in February 2013 when Andy Ong and Ho filed affidavits to resist Sakae’s application in Originating Summons No 124 of 2013 (“OS 124”) for leave to bring a derivative action in the Company’s name against them pursuant to s 216A (this action was subsequently discontinued by Sakae in May 2013).
The commencement of legal proceedings by Sakae
- [27]
[27] On 25 October 2012, Foo, who by then had serious concerns over various transactions undertaken by the Company, convened a Sakae board meeting to table his concerns. After receiving answers that were unsatisfactory, Foo caused investigations to be carried out into the Company’s financial affairs. The seven transactions enumerated above were then uncovered.
- [28]
[28] This led Sakae to commence the two Suits, which were later consolidated. Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho, along with six of the other defendants in Suit 1098, in turn commenced third party proceedings against Foo in both Suits, claiming either indemnification against or contribution from Foo in respect of any liability that they might incur arising from Sakae’s claims against them.
The parties’ cases below
- [29]
[29] In Suit 1098, Sakae sought relief from oppression pursuant to s 216 as follows:
(a) against Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho, as directors of the Company, for the wrongful diversion of the Company’s assets to the ERC Group by way of the seven impugned transactions, all of which, according to Sakae, were undertaken without its knowledge; and
(b) against the ERC Group, for the repayment of moneys that were diverted from the Company and for declarations that there were constructive trusts on the assets which the ERC Group had purchased using moneys obtained from the Company. These orders were sought in favour of only the Company.
- [30]
[30] In Suit 122 (which, as mentioned at [21] above, concerned Transaction 6 alone), Sakae sued Andy Ong for breaching the fiduciary duties which he owed Sakae as a director of Sakae and for inducing the Company to breach the JVA as a result of its entry into the Share Option Agreement. (The latter head of claim was based on cl 11.1(c) of the JVA, which stated that the Company was not to “create, allot, issue, purchase, redeem, [or] grant … options over any of [its] Shares or otherwise reorganise [its] share capital … in any way” without the prior unanimous approval of all its shareholders.) Sakae pleaded that “[b]ut for” Andy Ong’s conduct in “inducing, causing and/or procuring” the Company to enter into the Share Option Agreement, it would not have paid the sum of $2,641,975 to subscribe for an additional 2,641,975 shares in the Company.
- [31]
[31] At the close of Sakae’s case at the trial, all the defendants other than Ho (referred to collectively as “the AO Defendants” where appropriate to the context; for the purposes of these appeals, the AO Defendants are the appellants in CA 87 and CA 103) made a submission that Sakae had failed to mount a case to answer (a “‘no case to answer’ submission”), and in support of this, they elected not to adduce evidence. As for Ho, he chose to mount a positive defence and, to this end, adduced evidence, including his own testimony. His principal defence at the trial (apart from the general defences raised by the AO Defendants as outlined at [32] below) was that he had at all times acted in accordance with a norm accepted by the shareholders and directors of the Company (“the Established Norm”). In essence, the Established Norm concerned the practice of leaving the management of the Company largely to Andy Ong and his subordinates and staff at GCM.
- [32]
[32] The defendants, in common, relied on the following general defences at the trial:
(a) Sakae’s claims in Suit 1098 were essentially claims in respect of corporate wrongs and could not, as a matter of law, be brought against the defendants because of the proper plaintiff rule and the reflective loss principle. Specifically, the proper plaintiff in this case was the Company. Further, any loss asserted by Sakae was not distinct from the Company’s loss and merely reflected the loss sustained by the Company to the extent of Sakae’s shareholding in the Company.
(b) In any case, Sakae was in a position to resist the alleged oppressive acts. The defendants maintained that they in fact never had or exercised any dominant power over Sakae, and this was fatal to Sakae’s oppression claims.
(c) The JVA provided remedies for any breach of its terms. Sakae had specifically negotiated for those remedies and should be confined to them. Suit 1098, which was for remedies under s 216, was therefore ill-conceived.
(d) Sakae was in a position to remedy the alleged oppression by self-help measures that could have been but were not taken after the impugned transactions occurred.
(e) Sakae knew, ought to have known, or was in a position to find out about the impugned transactions. Its neglect in safeguarding its own interests could not give rise to claims of the sort made against the defendants.
- [33]
[33] In relation to their third party claims against Foo in Suit 1098, Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho sought either indemnification against or contribution from Foo in respect of any liability that they might incur to Sakae in that suit on the basis that Foo was himself in breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed the Company as a director of the Company, and his breach had contributed, either wholly or partially, to the seven transactions upon which Sakae’s claims in that suit were based. A similar claim for either indemnification or contribution was made by Andy Ong against Foo in Suit 122. Subsequently, Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho dropped their claims for indemnification during the closing submissions at the trial and pursued only their claims for contribution.
- [34]
[34] In his defence to the third party claims brought against him, Foo contended that the claims by Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon specifically should be dismissed for want of evidence as they never in fact opened their case against him and did not adduce any evidence to support their respective claims. Alternatively, it was contended that unlike Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho, Foo was not liable to Sakae because he was unaware of and did not authorise the impugned transactions. In any event, Foo submitted, the court should exercise its discretion under s 16(2) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) to exempt him from liability to make contribution because he had not profited from any of those transactions.
The decision below
The Main Judgment
- [35]
[35] In the Main Judgment, the Judge first dealt with the AO Defendants’ “no case to answer” submission, and as a preliminary matter, considered the question of what evidence she could have regard to in arriving at her decision on the two Suits. On this, she held that while the AO Defendants could not adduce their own evidence to rebut Sakae’s case, they could rely on the evidence adduced by Ho (who had not made a “no case to answer” submission). The parties do not challenge this ruling on appeal.
- [36]
[36] The Judge then turned to Andy Ong’s status in the Company and found that he was a de jure director from March 2008 until 9 March 2012, following which he remained a shadow director until March 2015. As for his two associates, she found that Ong Han Boon was exclusively a de jure director of the Company from 29 October 2010 till 9 March 2012, and Ho was exclusively a de jure director from 3 February 2012 till March 2015 (at [37]–[45]). These findings are also not contested on appeal.
- [37]
[37] Turning to the individual transactions complained of, the Judge made the following findings:
(a) In respect of Transaction 1(a), the Addendum was “an ex post facto fabrication designed to cloak unauthorised payments [of excessive management fees] with some semblance of legitimacy”. Neither the Addendum nor the management fees paid thereunder were authorised by the board or the shareholders of the Company (at [61]). This constituted conduct that was oppressive to Sakae as a minority shareholder of the Company (at [68]). Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon acted in breach of their fiduciary duties to the Company by preparing the Addendum and facilitating the payments made thereunder (at [69]). However, there was insufficient evidence to show that Ho committed a similar breach of duty (at [73]).
(b) In respect of Transaction 1(b), although the TPAP caused no loss to the Company, the conduct of Andy Ong and Ho in relation to this transaction was oppressive to Sakae (at [79]). Andy Ong breached his fiduciary duties to the Company by placing himself in a position of conflict of interest, while Ho breached his fiduciary duties to the Company by consenting to the transaction without having exercised due or, for that matter, any diligence (at [79]). However, Ong Han Boon was not in breach of any fiduciary duties to the Company as he was not a director of the Company at the time of that transaction (at [80]).
(e) In respect of Transaction 4, the Consultancy Agreement was a sham that was created and backdated in an attempt to justify paying ERC Consulting a fee that was “far in excess” of anything which it could legitimately have claimed (at [143]). The execution of the agreement was oppressive to Sakae (at [147]). Andy Ong breached his fiduciary duties to the Company by placing himself in a situation of a clear conflict of interest which was not disclosed to the Company’s board (at [145]), while Ho breached his fiduciary duties to the Company by signing the Consultancy Agreement on Andy Ong’s instructions without making any independent inquiry as to whether it was in the Company’s interests to commit itself to the obligations under that agreement (at [145]). However, Ong Han Boon did not breach any fiduciary duties to the Company because he was no longer a director of the Company by the time of Transaction 4, and in any case, there was no evidence of his involvement in this transaction (at [146]).
(f) In respect of Transaction 5, although there was prima facie evidence that the Second Loan was a sham (at [168]), there was on the whole no evidence that the Second Loan Agreement was unauthorised by and oppressive to Sakae (at [169]). Notwithstanding that, the Judge found that Andy Ong acted in breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed as a shadow director of the Company by failing to specifically bring Transaction 5 to Foo’s attention and failing to disclose his conflict of interest (at [169]). Ho too acted in breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed the Company by failing to apply his mind to the nature and import of the transaction that he was asked to endorse (at [171] and [173]). However, Ong Han Boon was not in breach of any fiduciary duties to the Company because he was no longer a director of the Company by the time of Transaction 5 (at [172]). In the light of her finding that there was no oppression arising from this transaction, the Judge did not make any orders in respect of it (at [325]). She explained, however, that the breach of fiduciary duties by Andy Ong and Ho in relation to Transaction 5 lent context to and strengthened her conclusion, in respect of the other impugned transactions, that Andy Ong and his associates had conducted themselves in a way which was oppressive to Sakae (at [173]).
(h) In respect of Transaction 7, the PMA was a sham that was designed to conceal the true nature of the $8m payment by the Company to Andy Ong (at [238] and [245]). The execution of this agreement and the unauthorised $8m payment were oppressive to Sakae in that the Company’s funds were diverted and misapplied to enable ERC Holdings to exercise its purported share option under the Share Option Agreement (at [246]). Andy Ong acted in breach of the fiduciary duties which he owed the Company by taking the said sum of $8m from the Company (at [246]), while Ho was in breach of his fiduciary duties by signing the PMA and backdating it to 4 May 2012 as well as by facilitating the $8m payment to Andy Ong (at [261]).
- [38]
[38] In short, Sakae succeeded in its oppression claims in Suit 1098. The Judge found that apart from Transaction 5, the other six impugned transactions were oppressive to Sakae. Further, Andy Ong was found to be in breach of his fiduciary duties to the Company in relation to all the transactions (and also, for the purposes of Suit 122, in breach of his fiduciary duties to Sakae in relation to Transaction 6); Ong Han Boon was found to be in breach of his fiduciary duties to the Company in relation to Transactions 1(a), 2 and 6; and Ho was found to be in breach of his fiduciary duties to the Company in relation to Transactions 1(b), 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. As will be evident from [41] below, not all of these breaches were met with corresponding orders as where the breaches did not result in any actionable act of oppression, no orders were made by the Judge in Suit 1098 in respect of the defendant in question.
- [39]
[39] The Judge also rejected the general defences raised by the defendants for the following reasons:
(a) Sakae’s oppression action in Suit 1098 was properly constituted even though it was premised primarily on misconduct by Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho, as directors of the Company, in relation to the Company. This was because an action under s 216 could be brought where the plaintiff shareholder was relying on the unlawfulness of an errant director’s conduct as evidence of the manner in which the director had conducted the company’s affairs in disregard of the plaintiff’s interests as a minority shareholder and where the plaintiff’s complaints could not be adequately addressed by the available remedies in favour of the company alone (at [46], [71] and [263]).
(b) Although Sakae had equal representation on the Company’s board, the defendants had dominant power over Sakae because Sakae had no power to remove the directors appointed by the defendants if those directors acted oppressively without regard for its interests (at [268]).
(c) The contractual remedies provided under the JVA did not preclude Sakae from bringing an oppression action because: (i) the JVA did not expressly exclude such an action; (ii) the contractual remedies would not, in any event, adequately address the consequences of the oppression complained of; and (iii) the availability of a contractual remedy in favour of a minority shareholder was not, in principle, an impediment to an oppression action (at [273]–[275]).
(d) There were in fact no self-help remedies that Sakae could avail itself of (at [281]).
(e) Sakae did not know about the impugned transactions at all material times (at [62], [76], [94], [125], [144], [167], [211] and [231]). In any case, Sakae could not be expected to have known about those transactions because it did not, as a shareholder of the Company, have a duty to investigate what was going on in the Company or to scrutinise its accounts (at [285]).
- [40]
[40] As for Ho’s reliance on the Established Norm, the Judge rejected this defence because it was not supported, whether by Ho’s own pleaded case or the evidence adduced or the applicable case law (at [254]–[256]).
- [41]
[41] In respect of the reliefs sought by Sakae in the two Suits, the Judge held that while the court could grant a plaintiff shareholder relief in the form of orders against errant directors to repay the company moneys that they had taken from or caused to be paid out by the company in breach of their fiduciary duties, the court could not make payment orders against third parties who might have received moneys from the company pursuant to the directors’ breaches (at [302]). Thus, payment orders could only be made if they were sought against the errant directors and if the company itself could have obtained those orders (at [303]). Accordingly, the Judge made the following orders:
(b) For Transaction 1(a), Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon were jointly and severally liable to pay the Company the sum of $2,826,335.17 in respect of the excessive management fees that were paid to GCM (at [303]).
(c) For Transaction 2, Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon were jointly and severally liable to pay the Company the sum of $7.9m in respect of the First Loan and the First Loan Agreement (at [315]–[316]).
(d) For Transaction 3, Andy Ong and Ho were jointly and severally liable to pay the Company $16m in respect of the Lease Agreement and the payment that was made to ERC Institute (at [318]–[319]).
(e) For Transaction 4, Andy Ong and Ho were jointly and severally liable to pay the Company the sum of $160,500 in respect of the Consultancy Agreement (at [321]–[322]).
(f) For Transaction 6, Andy Ong was liable to pay Sakae the sum of $2,641,975 and interest thereon from the date of the writ in Suit 122 (at [329]).
(g) For Transaction 7, Andy Ong and Ho were jointly and severally liable to pay the Company the sum of $8m in respect of the PMA (at [332]).
- [42]
[42] For Transaction 1(b), Sakae sought a declaration that the TPAP was void, but the Judge did not accede to this because the TPAP had been granted to DBS, which was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, and the court had no power to grant any remedies affecting third parties in an oppression action (at [309] and [312]). As for Transaction 5, in the light of the Judge’s finding that this transaction was not oppressive to Sakae (see [37(f)] above), no orders were made in respect of it (at [325]).
- [43]
[43] In short, payment orders were made against Andy Ong in respect of the six transactions referred to at [41(b)]–[41(g)] above; payment orders were made against Ong Han Boon in respect of the two transactions referred to at [41(b)] and [41(c)] above; and payment orders were made against Ho in respect of the three transactions referred to at [41(d)], [41(e)] and [41(g)] above.
The Third Party Judgment
- [44]
[44] As a preliminary matter in the Third Party Judgment, the Judge held that the third party claims brought against Foo by Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon could not be dismissed solely on the basis that they had not adduced any evidence themselves, but had instead relied on the evidence adduced by Sakae and Ho in respect of Sakae’s claims in the two Suits, including the evidence of Foo himself (at [21]–[24]).
- [45]
[45] In respect of Suit 1098, the Judge held that the third party claims were not well founded under s 15(1) of the Civil Law Act because the three-step test which this court set out in Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd and others [2012] 2 SLR 549 (“Tan Juay Pah”) at [49] had not been satisfied. This finding rested on the following grounds:
(a) The sums that Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho were to pay pursuant to the Main Judgment would go directly to the Company and not to Sakae; the damage suffered by Sakae by reason of their misconduct (intangible loss of the basis on which it had invested in the Company) was distinct from the damage suffered by the Company (financial loss by reason of the transactions that Sakae complained of) (at [29]).
(b) Even if the sums that Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho were to pay the Company represented the damage that Sakae had suffered, they could not obtain contribution from Foo because there was no liability to Sakae that could be attributed to Foo as a director of the Company even if he were in breach of his fiduciary duties to the Company. The language of s 216 required that there must be “active conduct of the Company’s affairs and active exercise of powers in a manner which oppresse[d] Sakae or unfairly disregard[ed] or prejudice[d] it”, whereas the complaint against Foo was “not that he actively did something but that he did nothing” (at [31]). In any event, the plaintiff shareholder in a s 216 action could not complain that oppression arose from a director’s inaction except, perhaps, in a situation where the inactive director was aware of and acquiesced in the wrongdoing of other directors by not alerting the shareholder to what was going on. This was not the case here (at [30]–[31]).
(c) It could not be established that Foo was liable to Sakae in respect of the very “same damage” as Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho. Foo was not liable to Sakae for oppression, whereas the whole rationale of Sakae’s oppression action in Suit 1098 was to obtain a remedy that would allow it to extricate itself from a situation which was commercially unfair to it. Although Sakae did make various claims in that suit for sums to be repaid by Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho, those claims were for orders that the sums be repaid to the Company, and not to Sakae (at [32]).
- [46]
[46] The Judge further held that even if the requirements under s 15(1) of the Civil Law Act were satisfied, Foo should be exempted under s 16(2) of that Act from liability to make contribution because the wrongs for which Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho were seeking contribution were not mere negligent wrongs but deliberate wrongs; the law should not require Foo to contribute to damage arising out of the deliberately wrongful acts of Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho (at [35]–[36] and [38]). Further, Ho could not rely on the Established Norm defence to claim any contribution from Foo: Ho knew that Foo had left the management of the Company to Andy Ong, and hence, if he was aware that Andy Ong was not acting in the Company’s interests, he had a duty to alert Foo to what was going on (at [40]).
The issues to be determined by this court
- [49]
[49] As mentioned earlier, there are before us the Main Appeals, the Third Party Appeals and OS 13. In OS 13, the sole issue for our determination is whether Andy Ong was correct to file a single notice of appeal even though he was appealing against the findings made by the Judge in respect of both Suits.
- [50]
[50] In relation to the Main Appeals, the issues to be determined are:
(a) whether Sakae’s oppression claims in Suit 1098 concerned personal wrongs against Sakae for which relief under s 216 could be granted;
(b) whether Andy Ong, Ong Han Boon and Ho were liable under s 216 for the commercial unfairness perpetrated against Sakae;
(c) even if the impugned transactions were oppressive to Sakae, whether they were actionable under s 216 having regard to whether:
(i) Sakae could have availed itself of the contractual remedies provided under the JVA;
(ii) Sakae had, but failed to exercise, the ability to resist the oppressive conduct which it complained of;
(iii) Sakae knew, ought to have known or was in a position to find out about each of the impugned transactions at the material time; and
(iv) Sakae was subject to “overbearing conduct” during the discussions on some of the impugned transactions at the board meetings of the Company held on 3 and 11 April 2013; and
(d) in respect of Sakae’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Andy Ong in Suit 122, whether the execution of the Share Option Agreement in Transaction 6 constituted a breach of Andy Ong’s fiduciary duties to Sakae.
In addition, given the evidential importance of the Judge’s ruling that the AO Defendants could rely on the evidence adduced by Ho even though they had elected and undertaken not to adduce evidence pursuant to their “no case to answer” submission, we also address this issue even though, as mentioned at [35] above, the Judge’s ruling in this regard is not contested on appeal.
- [51]
[51] In respect of the Third Party Appeals, the primary issue to be determined is whether the third party claims against Foo should have been allowed having regard to ss 15 and 16 of the Civil Law Act.
- [52]
[52] There were two aspects of CA 87 that were uncontested and hence were resolved immediately at the hearing before us. First, GCM, the fourth appellant in CA 87, applied on the instructions of its liquidators to withdraw its appeal. Second, Sakae applied by way of Court of Appeal Summons No 126 of 2017 (“SUM 126”) for leave to adduce further evidence and file a second supplemental core bundle. As both of these matters were not contested, we granted the applications.
Our decision
Overview
OS 13: Andy Ong’s application for a retroactive extension of time to appeal in respect of Suit 122
- [55]
[55] Before we explain our decision, it would be helpful to briefly set out the relevant procedural history leading to the present appeals. The two Suits were consolidated at the pre-trial stage, with the court documents in both Suits directed to be filed only under Suit 1098. The two Suits were then heard together by the Judge at a single trial. The Main Judgment was issued on 7 April 2017 in respect of the claims brought by Sakae in both Suits; while the Third Party Judgment, which likewise covered both Suits, was issued on 4 May 2017 in respect of the third party claims against Foo. A single judgment (HC/JUD 324/2017) was extracted for both Suits in respect of the orders made in the Main Judgment, and similarly, a single judgment (HC/JUD 321/2017) was extracted for both Suits in respect of the orders made in the Third Party Judgment. The AO Defendants, who include Andy Ong, filed a notice of appeal (CA 87) on 5 May 2017 against the Judge’s findings in the Main Judgment, and Andy Ong and Ong Han Boon filed a notice of appeal (CA 103) on 22 May 2017 against the Judge’s findings in the Third Party Judgment. Both notices of appeal were expressed to be against the findings made in respect of Suit 1098.
- [56]
[56] At a hearing before the Judge on 16 May 2017, Sakae maintained that Andy Ong was required to file a separate notice of appeal in respect of the findings made in Suit 122 insofar as those findings were to be challenged before this court. Andy Ong disagreed and wrote to the Registry of the Supreme Court (“the Registry”) on 17 May 2017 seeking confirmation that CA 87 would take effect as an appeal against the findings made in both Suits. The issue was canvassed at a case management conference on 6 June 2017, but the assistant registrar who heard the matter considered that he was not in a position to make a ruling. After taking other steps which are not relevant for present purposes, Andy Ong filed OS 13 on 30 June 2017.
- [57]
[57] In our judgment, OS 13 is unnecessary because Andy Ong was only required to file a single notice of appeal against each of the two judgments issued by the Judge, and each notice of appeal would cover the findings made in the particular judgment concerned in respect of both Suits.
- [58]
[58] Sakae submits, among other things, that a separate notice of appeal should have been filed for each of the two Suits because the law states that where a party wishes to appeal against orders made in different actions, a notice of appeal is required in respect of the orders made in each action even if the actions were heard together: see Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2006] 2 SLR(R) 565 (“Linda Lai”) at [24], Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 (“Tang Liang Hong”) at [37] and Singapore Civil Procedure 2018 vol II (Foo Chee Hock JC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) (“Singapore Civil Procedure”) at para 57/3/17.
- [61]
[61] Sakae relies on our earlier decisions in Tang Liang Hong and Linda Lai in support of its position that Andy Ong should have filed separate notices of appeal for the two Suits, but we do not find either of these decisions persuasive for two reasons.
- [62]
[62] First, in Linda Lai (at [24]) and Tang Liang Hong (at [37]), the court cited with approval a passage from, respectively, an earlier edition of Singapore Civil Procedure and an earlier edition of Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Singapore Court Practice 2017 vol II (LexisNexis, 2017) (“Singapore Court Practice”). Both of these passages are broadly similar to the following extract from Singapore Civil Procedure (at para 57/3/17):
- [64]
[64] In our judgment, the reservations expressed in Dixon as to the “substance or practice or practicality” of “the last sentence of the editorial comment” (concerning the filing of separate notices of appeal for orders made in respect of one action but at different hearings) apply with even greater force to the filing of separate notices of appeal for orders made in respect of two consolidated actions at the same hearing and in a single judgment.
- [65]
[65] Second, and in any case, both Tang Liang Hong and Linda Lai are factually distinguishable from the present case. In Tang Liang Hong, although the High Court judge made 12 separate interlocutory judgment orders against the appellant in the 12 actions brought against him, the appellant filed only a single notice of appeal against all 12 judgment orders (at [31]–[32]). In those circumstances, we held that “there was clearly an error or defect in the notices of appeal filed” (at [37]). Similarly, in Linda Lai, the appellant attempted to consolidate, in a single notice of appeal, two appeals against two separate orders of the High Court made in relation to two separate actions (at [23]). We held that that was impermissible. Both of these cases are distinguishable from the present case in that they both involved an appellant attempting to file a single notice of appeal to cover multiple appeals against multiple judgment orders. In contrast, what Andy Ong did in the present case was to file two single appeals, each relating to a single judgment – one (CA 87) against the findings made by the Judge in the Main Judgment on Sakae’s claims in the two Suits, and another (CA 103) against the findings made by the Judge in the Third Party Judgment on the third party claims in both Suits. Our decisions in Tang Liang Hong and Linda Lai are therefore not applicable to the factual scenario that is before us in this case.
The Main Appeals
- [66]
[66] We turn now to the Main Appeals. As indicated earlier at [53] above, we allow Ho’s appeal in CA 86, while we allow CA 87 in part only in respect of Transaction 6. Before proceeding to explain our reasons for these decisions, we think it appropriate, given the significance of this issue and even though (as noted at [35] and [50] above) the Judge’s ruling on it is not challenged on appeal, to first address the anterior question of whether the AO Defendants could rely on the evidence led by Ho despite having elected and undertaken not to adduce evidence pursuant to their “no case to answer” submission.
The implications of the AO Defendants’ “no case to answer” submission
- [67]
[67] In our judgment, the Judge was right in holding that the AO Defendants could rely on the evidence adduced by Ho despite their “no case to answer” submission on the grounds that in proceedings where some (but not all) of the defendants make a “no case to answer” submission and, in support of this, elect not to adduce evidence, these defendants may nonetheless rely on the evidence adduced by the other defendants who do not make the submission and who thus proceed to lead evidence.
- [68]
[68] At the trial, Sakae argued that the AO Defendants should not be permitted to rely on the evidence led by Ho because, in undertaking not to call evidence at the close of Sakae’s case, the AO Defendants were in fact submitting that Sakae’s case was in and of itself unsustainable (see the Main Judgment at [26]–[27]). The Judge disagreed and gave three reasons for her decision on this point (see the Main Judgment at [28]–[30]). First, Sakae’s position was not supported by the relevant case authorities, which indicated that the evidence adduced by the defendants who did not make a “no case to answer” submission might well prove to be relevant to the liability of those defendants who made such a submission, and therefore could be considered by the court. Second, the rationale underlying the rule prohibiting a defendant who made a “no case to answer” submission from calling evidence – namely, the inappropriateness of making any ruling on the evidence until it had been completely presented, and to avoid the expense and inconvenience which would result from having to recall defence witnesses if the court’s decision to uphold the submission were reversed on appeal – did not extend the scope of the undertaking from one not to adduce evidence to one not to rely on evidence already or otherwise to be adduced in court. Third, accepting Sakae’s argument would lead to an artificial and inconsistent approach in a case where the plaintiff sought to rely on parts of the evidence adduced by a defendant who did not make a “no case to answer” submission and who therefore did lead evidence. It would not be logical or fair to allow the plaintiff to in effect selectively determine which parts of that defendant’s evidence the court could consider in determining the issues before it. Both common sense and fairness dictated that evidence from a witness which could be used against a party could also be used by that party.
- [69]
[69] We agree with these reasons, and supplement them with the following observations.
- [71]
[71] Where two or more defendants are sued and only one or some (but not all) of them make a “no case to answer” submission at the close of the plaintiff’s case, those defendants who make this submission should be permitted, despite having undertaken not to adduce evidence, to rely on the evidence led by the remaining defendants who do not make the submission.
- [72]
[72] Allowing defendants who make a “no case to answer” submission to rely on the evidence of other defendants who do not make that submission is simply a logical corollary of what has been regarded as the appropriate stage during a trial when the judge should rule on such a submission. The case law is clear that a judge should generally not rule on a “no case to answer” submission immediately upon the close of the plaintiff’s case, but should instead proceed to hear the evidence of the other defendants who do not make this submission (including the evidence of their witnesses) as well as the parties’ full submissions before determining whether the plaintiff has made out a case against any of the defendants, unless it is absolutely clear at the close of the plaintiff’s case that the defendants making the submission are not liable. This is also the position taken by the courts in England, Australia and Malaysia, as we will discuss below.
- [73]
[73] This approach is a sensible one because the evidence which is adduced by the defendants who do not make a “no case to answer” submission might well have a bearing on the determination of whether the submission should be upheld. Hence, by ruling on the submission only at the close of the trial rather than at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court will not be making a decision on the submission until after it has had the opportunity to consider all the evidence that is going to be adduced at the trial.
- [75]
[75] The same position was subsequently taken in a number of Australian cases. In the decision of the High Court of Australia in Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140, Kitto J (as he then was) implicitly affirmed Hummerstone in the following terms (at 141):
- [76]
[76] Similarly, in the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd and others (No 3) (1981) 37 ALR 225, Sheppard J held (at 231):
- [77]
[77] This was also the position taken by the Federal Court of Australia in James and Others v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and Others (1986) 64 ALR 347, and by the Malaysian High Court in Ng Neoh Ha & Ors v Maniam & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 434.
- [78]
[78] Of course, this is not an inflexible position. The question of when the court should rule on a “no case to answer” submission is ultimately a matter of proper case management having regard to the interests of justice, including convenience as well as economy in time and money: see J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (Western Australia Branch) and Others (1992) 111 ALR 377 at 382 per French J (as he then was) and Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Supermix Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Hasrat Usaha Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 6 MLJ 701 at [7]–[8]. However, this does not detract from the general rule, which is as laid down in Hummerstone and affirmed in the other authorities that we have cited above.
Sakae’s oppression claims in Suit 1098
- [79]
[79] We move now to the oppression claims in Suit 1098, which constitute Sakae’s primary cause of action against the appellants. The legal principles governing oppression actions are for the most part well settled in Singapore law. However, one area of potential uncertainty lies in the overlap between personal wrongs and corporate wrongs. This issue arises for our consideration in the Main Appeals because the appellants argue that Sakae is not entitled to relief under s 216 as its oppression claims are based not on wrongs which it has suffered, but rather, on wrongs done to the Company. Before addressing this point, we preface our analysis of Sakae’s oppression claims with the general observation that both in the parties’ written submissions as well as during the oral hearing before this court, the factual findings made by the Judge on these claims were not seriously disputed, and whatever limited arguments which were advanced in that respect did not in any event materially undermine any of the Judge’s findings on these claims.
(1) The established principles on oppression actions
- [80]
[80] Section 216 of the Companies Act provides protection for minority shareholders where:
(a) the company’s affairs are being conducted or the directors’ powers are being exercised: (i) in a manner that is oppressive to one or more shareholders; or (ii) in disregard of the interests of one or more shareholders; or
(b) an act is done or threatened or a member’s resolution is passed or proposed which: (i) unfairly discriminates against one or more shareholders; or (ii) is otherwise prejudicial to one or more shareholders.
- [81]
[81] This section essentially encapsulates four limbs: (a) oppression; (b) disregard of a shareholder’s interests; (c) unfair discrimination; and (d) prejudice. As we held in Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 (“Over & Over”), the common element undergirding these four limbs is commercial unfairness (at [70]–[71] and [81]). A shareholder who brings a s 216 action is not required to identify the specific limb relied on, but needs instead to demonstrate that the conduct complained of amounts to commercially unfair conduct. Such unfairness will generally be found where there has been “a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect” (see Over & Over at [77], citing Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 227 at 229). In ascertaining whether there has been commercial unfairness, the court must assess the unfairness of the alleged wrongdoer’s conduct objectively in the context of the parties’ relationship and in view of the fact that that relationship is a commercial relationship: see Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (“Re Saul”) at 17–20 and Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2017) at paras 4.040–4.042.
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