Court of Appeal · Decided 26 February 2019
Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2019] SGCA 13 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 47 of 2018
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Overview
- [1]
[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Noor Azlin Binte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2018] SGHC 35 (“the Judgment”). At the heart of the Appellant’s case is the allegation that the three doctors who attended to her (over a four-year period) as well as the hospital at which they worked were negligent. The Appellant argues that their negligence had delayed the detection of the malignancy which resulted in the lung cancer she is presently afflicted with, and caused her to suffer the loss of a better medical outcome.
- [2]
[2] Two of the doctors who attended to her were doctors from the Accident and Emergency (“A&E”) department – the Third Respondent, Dr Yap Hsiang (“Dr Yap”) and the Fourth Respondent, Dr Soh Wei Wen Jason (“Dr Soh”), respectively. Dr Yap attended to the Appellant in the A&E department on 29 April 2010 whilst Dr Soh attended to her in the same department about a year later on 31 July 2011.
- [3]
[3] The third doctor was the Second Respondent, Dr Imran bin Mohamed Noor (“Dr Imran”). He is a specialist respiratory physician who attended to the Appellant in the hospital’s specialist outpatient clinic (“SOC”) on 15 November 2007.
- [5]
[5] We pause to note that the fact that Dr Yap and Dr Soh on the one hand and Dr Imran on the other belonged to different medical specialities (and hence different departments of the hospital) is significant in so far as the standard of care they had, respectively, to observe vis-à-vis the Appellant is concerned.
- [6]
[6] The First Respondent is the hospital itself, Changi General Hospital (“CGH”). In this particular regard, we note that the possible liability of CGH may be viewed from two perspectives. The first is by way of primary liability for negligence if the Appellant could demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that CGH was negligent because of the system which it had in place at the material time. The second is by way of secondary liability for the negligence of Dr Yap, Dr Soh and/or Dr Imran, provided of course that such negligence on the part of one or more of the aforementioned doctors could be established (again, on a balance of probabilities).
- [7]
[7] Before we conclude this extremely brief overview, we note that one major issue in the court below that impacted all the defendants (the Respondents in the present appeal) was the issue of causation. Put simply, even assuming that one or more of the Respondents could be demonstrated to have been negligent, could such negligence be considered to have caused the delay in diagnosis and any consequential damage which forms the bedrock or centrepiece of the Appellant’s case? In this regard, the key finding by the Judge in the court below was that, even if negligence were proved, as it was the finding of the court, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant was not afflicted with cancer as at July 2011, such negligence could not have caused the delay in diagnosis.
- [8]
[8] With this briefest of overviews, we turn now to consider the background facts in detail as these are crucial to the findings made by the Judge in the court below.
Facts
- [9]
[9] The Appellant began to visit CGH for various medical conditions from 2007 but was only clinically diagnosed with lung cancer in 2012. Three of these visits form the subject-matter of her claim in medical negligence and we set them out in a chronological fashion below.
31 October 2007 – the first visit to the A&E department
- [11]
[11] Dr Yeo diagnosed the Appellant with a possible case of gastritis and prescribed medication accordingly. He then referred her to CGH’s Respiratory Medicine SOC for good measure to review the opacity, even though the incidental finding of the opacity was unrelated to the symptoms that the Appellant presented with at the A&E department.
November 2007 visit to the specialist clinic
- [12]
[12] The Appellant visited CGH SOC two weeks later on 15 November 2007 and was attended to by Dr Imran, who is, as aforementioned, a respiratory physician and the Second Respondent.
- [13]
[13] At the consultation, Dr Imran reviewed the notes taken by Dr Yeo. Dr Imran noted that:
(a) the Appellant had visited the A&E department for centralised chest discomfort, nausea and mild breathlessness;
(b) upon examination, the Appellant had mild epigastric discomfort and her left lower anterior ribs were mildly tender on palpation, but her heart and lung sounds were normal; and
(c) the Appellant was a non-smoker.
- [15]
[15] The two chest X-rays (“the November 2007 X-rays”) were reviewed by Dr Imran in wet film format using a light box. At that time, the state of technology was such that Dr Imran was unable to digitally manipulate the November 2007 X-rays for size, contrast or brightness. Dr Imran’s assessment was that the opacity noted on the October 2007 X-ray “appeared to be resolving or had resolved on its own”. Dr Imran thus gave the Appellant an open date for follow-up and advised the Appellant to return if she felt unwell.
29 April 2010 – the second visit to the A&E department
- [16]
[16] The Appellant went to the A&E department again on 29 April 2010. This time, she complained of right lower chest pain which started an hour before the consultation. The Appellant said that the pain worsened with deep inhalation which caused shortness of breath. When asked, she denied having respiratory symptoms such as cough, running nose and sore throat.
- [17]
[17] Dr Yap, who was then a locum medical officer at the A&E department, attended to her.
- [19]
[19] Partly given that the pain had only started in the hour prior to the Appellant’s examination and because the Appellant had told Dr Yap that she had consulted a respiratory specialist, Dr Imran and was told she was fine, Dr Yap concluded that the opacity was an incidental finding (ie, unrelated to the patient’s presenting symptoms), and came to the assessment that the pain was musculoskeletal in nature and unrelated to the opacity. We note that Dr Yap did not have Dr Imran’s notes and relied on the Appellant’s account of what Dr Imran had told her. Dr Yap then ran his diagnosis by the senior doctor, Dr Mohan Tiruchittampalam (“Dr Mohan”), who was on duty to supervise junior doctors like Dr Yap. Dr Mohan agreed with Dr Yap’s assessment that the nodule appeared to be stable and that the pain was musculoskeletal in nature. Dr Yap recommended that the Appellant be prescribed painkillers, discharged and told to return if the symptoms persisted or worsened. Dr Yap’s own notes also requested that the patient be recalled if necessary after the X-ray report was out. Dr Mohan agreed. Dr Mohan was not called as a witness for the trial.
- [20]
[20] Dr Yap prescribed painkillers for the Appellant and discharged her. She was also advised to return if the symptoms persisted or worsened. Dr Yap then sent the April 2010 X-ray for reporting. The report was issued in due course but it was never received personally by Dr Yap.
31 July 2011 – the third visit to the A&E department
- [21]
[21] The Appellant returned to the A&E department more than a year later on 31 July 2011 and was attended to by Dr Soh, who was then a medical officer. The Appellant complained of intermittent left lower ribcage pain that had persisted for almost one month. She informed Dr Soh that she had consulted a General Practitioner (“GP”) who advised her that her pain was due to inflammation of her ribcage. She had not obtained any referral and attended at the A&E department because the pain persisted. She was 32 years old then.
- [23]
[23] Dr Soh noted that no rib fractures or other abnormalities showed up on the July 2011 X-rays. Read together with the ECG, Dr Soh concluded that the July 2011 X-rays ruled out life-threatening conditions such as a cardiac event, pneumothorax or pulmonary embolism. According to Dr Soh, because he was focused on the left chest, which was the region the Appellant complained about, he did not notice the opacity in the right chest which appeared on the erect view of the July 2011 X-rays (the opacity cannot be seen in the left oblique view).
- [25]
[25] The July 2011 X-rays were sent for reporting and the report was prepared the next day, on 1 August 2011. Dr Soh did not receive the report and was unaware that the radiologist had detected the opacity in the right mid-zone of the Appellant’s lung, noted that it was stable and had been there since April 2010, and recommended a follow-up of the opacity.
- [26]
[26] The three visits described above form the subject matter of the Appellant’s claim in medical negligence. She was subsequently diagnosed with lung cancer. We set out below the events that led to the diagnosis.
November and December 2011 consultations at Raffles Medical Clinic
- [27]
[27] About four months after she saw Dr Soh, the Appellant attended at Raffles Medical Clinic and was seen by Dr Melvyn Wong (“Dr Wong”) on 28 November 2011. She complained of cough, breathlessness and blood in the sputum. Dr Wong explained that he suspected that the Appellant was suffering from upper respiratory tract infection and prescribed some cough medicine. He told the Appellant to return for a chest X-ray if the bleeding in the sputum did not go away.
- [29]
[29] The Appellant returned on 7 December 2011 to discuss the findings of the report. According to Dr Wong, the Appellant told him that a shadow had been pointed out to her during a previous visit to the A&E department in July 2011. Dr Wong decided to refer the Appellant to a respiratory physician at CGH SOC for further evaluation.
15 December 2011 referral to specialist clinic
- [30]
[30] The Appellant was seen by a respiratory physician, Adjunct Assistant Professor Sridhar Venkateswaran (“Prof Sridhar”) at CGH SOC pursuant to Dr Wong’s referral in relation to a right mid-zone lesion. In his consultation notes, Prof Sridhar recorded that “the serial lesion seen in 2007, 2010 and July [2011] appeared stable in size”. He also noted the symptoms that the Appellant had presented with during the consultations with Dr Wong and recorded that the Appellant was still coughing and with blood in sputum. The Appellant was also identified to be a smoker for the first time.
- [32]
[32] The CT scan was conducted by consultant radiologist, Dr Elizabeth Chan (“Dr Chan”). In her report, Dr Chan noted that the CT scan revealed a nodule that appeared to be a pulmonary hamartoma (ie, benign lesion). Nonetheless, Dr Chan recommended that a biopsy be conducted to establish a “baseline histological correlation” because of the nodule’s interval increase in size, lobulated margins, pleural tagging and the Appellant’s smoking history. The report concluded with the tag “Abnormal – Further action or early intervention required”. Dr Chan also explained that she had looked at and compared the previous X-rays to determine the growth of the nodule over time.
Diagnosis and treatment of lung cancer
- [33]
[33] A biopsy of the nodule was conducted by Dr Andrew Tan on 16 February 2012. The biopsy confirmed that the nodule was malignant and that the Appellant had lung cancer which originated from the lung.
- [34]
[34] The Appellant saw Prof Sridhar again on 1 March 2012. Prof Sridhar explained the results of the biopsy to the Appellant and informed her that there was a good chance she could have a complete cure with a lobectomy. She was clinically staged as having Stage I lung cancer. Prof Sridhar referred the Appellant to surgical oncologist Adjunct Associate Professor Koong Heng Nung (“Prof Koong”), who advised the Appellant to undergo a lobectomy to remove the part of her lung which had the tumour.
- [35]
[35] The Appellant underwent a lobectomy in March 2012 and one-third of her right lung was removed. The tumour measured 3.0 cm and was diagnosed as Stage IIA non-small cell lung cancer. We pause to note that the exact mutation type of the cancer was not identified until much later, in 2014. Prof Koong and Dr Daniel Tan Shao Weng from the National Cancer Centre Singapore (“Dr Daniel Tan”) followed up with medical care and treatment for the Appellant. She underwent chemotherapy for about four months. She also underwent CT scans every four months.
The relapse
- [36]
[36] The Appellant suffered a relapse in August 2014, when a CT scan revealed a new mass-like density in the right middle lobe. A biopsy confirmed that the lung cancer had progressed to Stage IV. In December 2014, Dr Daniel Tan carried out an analysis on the tumour that was resected in 2012 to determine its mutation type. Dr Daniel Tan explained that he was unable to run the necessary tests on the tumour that was present in 2014 because the size of the sample that was extracted in 2014 was too small. He therefore ran a retrospective analysis on the tumour that was removed via lobectomy in March 2012. The resected tumour from 2012 was found to be positive for a rare echinoderm microtubule-associated protein-like 4 (“EML4”)-ALK gene rearrangement. In other words, the Appellant was retrospectively diagnosed only in 2014 to have been suffering from ALK-positive lung cancer in 2012. According to the Respondents’ expert witness, Professor Goh Boon Cher (“Prof Goh”), ALK-positive lung cancer is caused by a rare mutation whereby there is a translocation (relocation or re-arrangement) of a part of a chromosome, which brings together two genes which are usually not together. This results in the expression of a signalling receptor called the ALK. Significantly, Prof Goh stated that it is not known what induces this genetic event or transformation. When the ALK gene is activated, two receptors called the tyrosine kinase will bind to each other and can stimulate cell proliferation (ie, cause an increase in the number of cells). When the ALK gene is expressed on the cell membrane and activated, it is oncogenic (has the potential to cause cancer) and can transform what were initially benign cells into malignant or cancerous cells. Additionally, Prof Goh explained that the ALK gene is usually silenced in a normal human tissue. What this means is that the ALK gene is not expressed except under malignant conditions.
- [37]
[37] In July 2015, the Appellant started on a second-generation ALK-inhibitor, Ceritinib and Nivolumab as part of a clinical trial. She remained on that until October 2016, when the cancer progressed to her brain and mediastinal lymph node. She was then taken off the clinical trial and managed with radio surgery, chemotherapy and Ceritinib. Since March 2017, the Appellant has been treated with a third-generation ALK-inhibitor, Lorlatinib.
The arguments in the court below
- [38]
[38] The Appellant commenced the action for medical negligence against the Respondents in January 2015. Her central complaint appears to be that the Respondents’ negligence caused a delay in the diagnosis and treatment of her lung cancer. As a result, the Appellant claimed that she went untreated and the malignancy grew untreated and progressed from Stage 0 to I to Stage IIA before it was detected. According to the Appellant, had the opacity been investigated and assessed sooner, her medical outcome would have been different.
- [39]
[39] The Appellant also pleaded that there was a contract between herself and the Respondents but this was not pursued below nor on appeal.
- [40]
[40] The Respondents denied liability and contended that:
(a) there was no breach and they had met the standard of care expected of them;
(b) even if there was any breach, there was no causation because:
(i) the Appellant did not have lung cancer/ the nodule was benign between October 2007 and July 2011; and
(ii) in any case, the Appellant received treatment for her ALK-positive lung cancer at the earliest available time because the drugs approved for the treatment of ALK-positive cancer were only available for Singapore clinical trials in 2013 and 2014, and even then only for patients suffering late stage/ Stage IV cancer.
The decision below
- [41]
[41] The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s claim.
- [42]
[42] As alluded to at the beginning of this judgment, the Judge’s decision turned chiefly on the issue of causation. The Judge found that causation had not been made out primarily because the Appellant had not shown, on a balance of probabilities, that she had cancer by July 2011. It was held that there was no evidence to indicate the occurrence of the gene fusion that would cause the nodule to become malignant between October 2007 and July 2011. On the other hand, the Judge accepted the Respondents’ account that the Appellant’s nodule was initially benign and only turned malignant sometime after July 2011. In coming to this finding, the Judge considered the following: (i) the slow rate of growth of the nodule between October 2007 and July 2011 which would be consistent with its benignity; (ii) the Appellant had ALK-positive lung cancer which is generally aggressive and it was in fact aggressive after 2012; (iii) the long doubling time of the nodule which indicated that it was stable and benign at the material time; (iv) there were no notable features of the nodule indicating malignancy between October 2007 and July 2011; (v) when the Appellant was diagnosed with lung cancer in February 2012, she was clinically staged at Stage I, which is a very early stage of the cancer. The Judge therefore accepted the Respondents’ case that the nodule was initially benign in nature and became malignant only after July 2011. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s contention that she had a different form of lung cancer before the gene fusion occurred given the lack of evidence proving this.
- [43]
[43] Relatedly, the Judge also found that the Appellant was diagnosed at the earliest possible stage of her cancer, received the full treatment available to her at the earliest time and did not undergo any treatment that could have been avoided. This was because the Appellant had been clinically staged at Stage I, which was the earliest possible clinical staging given that a Stage 0 cancer would not have been detected on an X-ray. The Judge also accepted that the lobectomy and adjuvant chemotherapy that the Appellant underwent would have been necessary in any case. The Judge took into account the industry knowledge with regard to the ALK fusion gene, namely that testing for the gene only became established in 2014. It was also relevant that treatment for ALK-positive lung cancer was only available for Singapore clinical trials in 2013 or 2014 and even then only for Stage IV cancer. Consequently, the Appellant had received treatment at the earliest available time.
- [44]
[44] The claim would have failed in any case given that causation and loss were not proven. But the Judge went further to determine if the Respondents were in breach of their duty of care. It was first determined that the Appellant’s claims fell within the realm of diagnosis and treatment, as opposed to advice, because the Appellant was in a position of passivity throughout. The Judge therefore applied the test derived from the authorities of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (“Bolam”) and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (“Bolitho”) (collectively “the Bolam-Bolitho test”) to the actions of each of the Respondents to determine if the requisite standard of care had been met.
- [45]
[45] The Judge found that CGH and Dr Imran were in breach of their respective duties of care but that Dr Yap and Dr Soh were not.
- [46]
[46] As just mentioned, Dr Yap and Dr Soh, the two A&E doctors, were found not to be in breach of their respective duties of care. The distinction between an A&E doctor’s responsibility for an incidental finding and that for a patient’s presenting complaint appears to have weighed heavily on the Judge’s mind. The Judge accepted that from the perspective of the two A&E doctors, the opacity was an incidental finding which was unrelated to the Appellant’s presenting symptoms. Thus, it was reasonable for Dr Yap not to have followed up on it, especially since he had determined that it was stable. It was also reasonable for Dr Soh to have missed it given that he was focused on the Appellant’s presenting complaint which related to the left side of her chest. The Judge also considered that both Dr Yap and Dr Soh had consulted their respective senior consultants, both of whom agreed with their diagnosis and treatment plans. In relation to Dr Yap, the Judge also found it reasonable for him not to have run further investigations or to refer the Appellant to a specialist since there was no clinical basis to do so. He was also entitled to rely on CGH’s processes in relation to the radiology reporting, which was meant to flag significant abnormalities, before determining if further action was necessary.
- [47]
[47] With regard to Dr Imran, the Judge found that it was not a breach of his duty of care for Dr Imran to have missed the opacity or seen so little of it. She relied on the evidence of two radiologists, Dr Lynette Teo (“Dr Teo”) and Dr Daniel Tan, both of whom agreed that it was difficult to see the opacity given its location. The Judge also accepted that it may have been more challenging to see the opacity in November 2007 without the benefit of a digital system or radiological report. Second, the Judge held that Dr Imran’s diagnosis that the opacity was due to an infection or inflammation was reasonable given the Appellant’s age and lack of symptoms to suggest otherwise. Third, Dr Imran’s decision not to follow-up the investigations with a CT scan was also found to be reasonable given the Appellant’s presenting symptoms and the risks associated with a CT scan. However, the Judge found that Dr Imran’s failure to schedule a follow-up with the Appellant to ensure that the opacity was completely resolved constituted a breach of his duty of care. Given the circumstances, the Judge found that it was not sufficient for him to have given the Appellant an open date to return.
The appeal
- [49]
[49] We outline briefly the parties’ positions on appeal and will discuss in greater detail the relevant submissions when we discuss the liability of each of the Respondents below.
Standard of care and breach
- [50]
[50] The Appellant maintained that the Respondents were in breach of their duties of care. First and foremost, counsel for the Appellant, Mr Vijay Kumar Rai (“Mr Rai”) suggested that although the Bolam-Bolitho test applies to the realm of diagnosis, treatment and care, a different test should apply when it comes to a “pure diagnosis” that is based purely on the facts. The Appellant relied on two English cases in this regard. Counsel for CGH, Ms Kuah Boon Theng SC (“Ms Kuah”) and counsel for the Respondent-doctors, Ms Vanessa Lim (“Ms Lim”), maintained that there was no reason why the Bolam-Bolitho test should not apply in the present case and submitted that the English decisions were in fact decided within the Bolam-Bolitho framework. The Respondents also took the view that the present case was, in any case, not a “pure diagnosis” case.
- [51]
[51] In relation to Dr Yap and Dr Soh, the Appellant argued that given the limitations of the A&E department, they ought to have referred the Appellant to a respiratory specialist for follow-up assessment of the opacity instead of attempting to assess it themselves under time pressure. The Appellant also contended that it was unreasonable for Dr Yap to have asserted the stability of the nodule based solely on the X-rays because it was a “time-honoured” tradition that the nodule should have been followed up with serial CT scans for two years. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that there was no such tradition and that the articles relied on by the Appellant concerned trials conducted under very different conditions and medical settings. They were therefore neither useful nor relevant. The Respondents contended that there was no medical indication which necessitated a CT scan or immediate referral to a respiratory physician when Dr Yap and Dr Soh saw the Appellant in the A&E department given her lack of symptoms and the doctors’ entitlement to rely on the X-ray reporting system, which acted as a safety net.
- [53]
[53] In relation to CGH, the Appellant alleged that the hospital breached its duty of care by failing to ensure that the A&E team reviewing the radiological reports heeded the recommendations contained therein and carried out the necessary follow-up, such as to refer the Appellant to a specialist. Additionally, Mr Rai submitted that CGH would also be vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr Imran, Dr Yap, Dr Soh and/or the “rest of the A&E team”. For the first time on appeal, the Appellant also suggested that CGH, Dr Yap and Dr Soh had breached their duty of care as joint tortfeasors. In response, Ms Kuah pointed out that the burden of proof was on the Appellant to show that the A&E team failed to recall her for further assessment by a respiratory physician. Ms Kuah submitted that the Appellant’s allegation that the reviewing A&E doctors had ignored the recommendations of the radiologists was a bare one.
Causation and loss
- [54]
[54] Mr Rai argued that the Judge should not have applied the “but for” test to determine causation but should have applied the test of “material contribution to damage” or “material increase in risk”. Ms Kuah submitted that the “but for” test is the correct test but suggested that causation would not have been made out on any test because the Appellant failed to prove that the nodule was malignant when she was attended to by the Respondent-doctors.
- [55]
[55] Mr Rai submitted that the Judge’s finding on causation was based on conjecture since it was impossible to prove that the nodule was benign before July 2011. Ms Kuah submitted that the Judge’s finding that the nodule was not malignant at the material time was supported by expert evidence and well-reasoned, and therefore could not be said to be a conjecture. Ms Lim aligned her submissions with Ms Kuah and highlighted the slow rate of growth of the nodule between October 2007 and July 2011, the absence of malignant features in the opacity in the same period and the clinical staging of the lung cancer at Stage I in February 2012.
- [56]
[56] The Appellant repeated that the Respondents’ negligence prevented an earlier diagnosis of the Appellant’s cancer which caused the cancer to advance to Stage IIA and spread. The delay in diagnosis was said, inter alia, to have reduced the likelihood of cure, reduced the Appellant’s chances of surviving beyond the five-year point and increased the likelihood of a relapse. However, Ms Kuah submitted that there was no basis for any of these contentions by the Appellant. It was argued, first, that it has not been proven on a balance of probabilities that the delay in diagnosis caused the progression of the Appellant’s cancer. Second, Ms Kuah submitted that there was no evidence that a smaller nodule in an earlier stage of cancer progression would have resulted in a higher likelihood of cure, a lower likelihood of nodal metastasis or a lower risk of relapse. Lastly, Ms Kuah maintained that the treatment which would have been performed had the cancer been detected earlier was the same as that which the Appellant had received. Ms Lim also added that the treatments for the specific ALK-positive lung cancer which the Appellant suffers from were only made available in 2013 and 2014 and only for patients with Stage IV lung cancer. The Appellant was thus not deprived of any treatment at the material time and suffered no loss or damage.
- [57]
[57] Finally, Ms Lim submitted that the Appellant’s claim for loss of chance to cure her cancer was not permitted under the law and, in any case, the Appellant had not proven on a balance of probabilities that she had indeed lost her chance of a cure.
The issues on appeal
- [58]
[58] The issues before us are as follows:
(a) first, what the requisite standard of care in relation to “pure diagnosis” cases should be;
(b) second, whether the Respondents were in breach of their respective duties of care owed to the Appellant; and
(c) third, if any of the Respondents was in breach of his duty of care, whether that breach caused any loss and damage to the Appellant.
Our decision
The test for “pure diagnosis” cases
- [59]
[59] Mr Rai urged us to apply a test other than that of Bolam-Bolitho in the present case to determine if there had been a breach by the Respondents. According to Mr Rai, the application of the Bolam-Bolitho test has been questioned in cases where the diagnosis of the doctor was based “purely on the facts”. He relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Penney v East Kent Health Authority [2000] PNLR 323 (“Penney”) and the more recent English High Court decision on the same issue in Muller v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2017] 2 WLR 1595 (“Muller”).
- [61]
[61] In Muller, a consultant histopathologist (someone who studies the manifestations of diseases through microscopic examination of tissue) failed to diagnose a malignant melanoma from a biopsied sample taken from the claimant. The melanoma was subsequently diagnosed and surgically excised but it had spread by then. An expert for the defendant hospital trust testified at trial that the misdiagnosis was not negligent but could have easily been made by a histopathologist acting with reasonable competence. The hospital trust submitted that the correct approach was that set out in Bolam, and that it would be sufficient for the hospital trust to show that the histopathologist had acted in accordance with a practice of competent respected professional opinion that is accepted as proper by histopathologists skilled in the art of reporting on biopsies. The claimant submitted that the correct approach was for the court to determine the objective facts of what the biopsy showed and then to decide for itself whether the misdiagnosis was one which a histopathologist acting with reasonable skill and care could have made.
- [62]
[62] Kerr J, in delivering the judgment, acknowledged that there was some confusion as to whether the Bolam test would apply to a “pure diagnosis” case where what is alleged to be negligent is the doctor’s diagnostic decision itself, with no decision made about treatment or further diagnostic procedures. In such cases, the diagnosis would either be right or wrong and if wrong, either negligently so or not. There was no weighing of risks against benefits and no decision to treat or not to treat (see Muller at [62]). Kerr J opined (at [51]) that such cases were surely not contemplated by McNair J when he set out the test in Bolam, which had no element of wrongful diagnosis and was a pure “treatment” case. Kerr J himself took the view that in “pure diagnosis” cases, the experts expressing opposing views on the issue cannot both be right and the issue is a matter for the decision of the court which should not be delegated to the experts (at [75]). However, he understood himself to be bound by the law as established by the English Court of Appeal in Penney. Although Kerr J interpreted Penney as permitting the court to choose between competing expert opinions on the issue, he concluded that the court was ultimately bound to do this within the boundaries of the Bolitho exception (at [79]). Kerr J went on to find that the hospital trust’s expert’s reasoning and conclusion were not defensible and had to be rejected under the Bolitho exception (at [97]).
- [63]
[63] In our view, neither Penney nor Muller suggests that the Bolam-Bolitho test would not apply in “pure diagnosis” cases. We do not understand Lord Woolf MR to be setting out a different approach for “pure diagnosis” cases. Instead, Lord Woolf MR was simply stating that questions of pure fact can and should be answered by the court without recourse to the Bolam-Bolitho test. But questions which entail interpretation or reviewing of medical opinion, remain subject to the Bolam-Bolitho standards. In other words, a pure finding of fact (such as what could be observed) is a precursor inquiry that the court could undertake without recourse to the Bolam test. However, any subsequent diagnosis that incorporates interpretation and opinion must be measured against a reasonable standard of care as understood by the medical professionals, and hence the Bolam-Bolitho test must apply.
- [64]
[64] In our view, the above approach is correct and continues to be that which we adopt in medical negligence cases; even though questions of pure fact such as whether something was detected or not can be answered without recourse to the Bolam-Bolitho test, when we confront the question of what the doctor should or ought to have done, the Bolam-Bolitho test must necessarily apply.
- [65]
[65] In the present case, the issue of what the Respondents ought to have done is intensely contextual and requires a review of the Respondents’ decisions against established standards within the medical industry. We cannot avoid, at this stage of the inquiry, the consideration of the perspectives of other reasonable doctors and what they would have done given the circumstances and the information available. This is precisely what the Bolam-Bolitho test is designed to allow. As we explained in Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another [2017] 2 SLR 492, the Bolam-Bolitho test gives due recognition to the persisting realities that medical science would always be in a state of discovery and learning, and innovation should not be discouraged (at [100]). Importantly, judges are not in the best position to resolve questions of genuine medical controversy that confront the medical industry and should not be preferring one body of medical opinion over another unless it has been shown to be logically indefensible.
- [66]
[66] We therefore cannot accept Mr Rai’s submission that the Bolam-Bolitho test should not apply in the present case and will therefore apply the said test to determine if there had been a breach of the duty of care owed by each of the Respondents.
The standard of care expected of A&E doctors
- [67]
[67] We begin by addressing the liability of the two A&E doctors, Dr Yap and Dr Soh. However, before we turn to consider if they are liable in medical negligence, we think it useful to first proffer some comments on the responsibility of A&E doctors in general.
- [68]
[68] The standard of care expected of doctors who work in the A&E department must be informed by the reality of the working conditions in the department and calibrated accordingly. The A&E department sees a high volume of patients, many of whom would have major trauma or life-threatening conditions requiring urgent treatment. The doctors who testified at the trial below estimated that that each A&E doctor in CGH attends to 30 to 35 patients during each shift lasting eight hours. Doctors on duty in the A&E department do not have the luxury of long and mature consideration of each case. Instead, they must make decisions at short notice in a highly pressurised environment. In numerical terms, an A&E doctor in CGH is generally expected to spend only about 15 minutes on each patient (excluding acute medical emergencies which would certainly not be subject to such time constraints). Consequently, it would be unreasonable to expect A&E doctors to review cases in as much breadth, depth or specificity as a GP or specialist in an outpatient clinic.
- [69]
[69] Given the intense time constraints, the evidence adduced below (which we find no reason to disagree with) is that an A&E doctor must necessarily adopt a “targeted approach”. What this means is that an A&E doctor can reasonably prioritise the diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s presenting symptoms and the elimination of life-threatening conditions. On the flipside, less attention would be given to incidental findings. That is not to say that incidental findings which are detected can or ought to be ignored. The requisite standard of care in relation to incidental findings would depend among other things, on the characteristics of the incidental finding, whether it has been picked up before, and the clinical history of the patient. An A&E doctor may be required to do no more than to refer the patient to the appropriate department for follow-up in relation to an incidental finding.
- [70]
[70] The evidence also revealed that the A&E doctors work in shifts and rotations. What this means is that patient care and management is undertaken as a team. It is thus not guaranteed, and is, in fact, more often than not the case that the A&E doctor who receives the patient will not follow through and the patient is left to rely on the system and the department as a whole instead of on any particular doctor.
- [71]
[71] We discuss in greater detail the content of such a duty against the facts of the present case below and in relation to Dr Yap and Dr Soh, respectively. It bears emphasising that whether an A&E doctor has discharged his duty of care would ultimately depend on the precise facts as well as circumstances of each case and patient.
Dr Yap
- [72]
[72] We affirm the Judge’s finding that Dr Yap did not fall below the requisite standard of care and agree with all the reasons given in her decision below.
- [73]
[73] Our decision turns on two key considerations: first, that the opacity was an incidental finding because it was unrelated to the Appellant’s presenting symptoms; second, an A&E doctor is entitled to adopt a targeted approach which focuses on treating the presenting symptoms.
- [74]
[74] It was undisputed that the opacity was an incidental finding. As we have discussed above, doctors in the A&E department work under conditions that are starkly different from that of a specialist or GP. As the Judge found, A&E doctors are entitled, and in fact, expected to adopt a targeted approach and make speedy decisions. For this reason, it was reasonable for Dr Yap to have been primarily concerned with diagnosing and treating the Appellant for her chest pains rather than to investigate the opacity which did not seem to be affecting the Appellant.
- [78]
[78] We therefore affirm the Judge’s decision that Dr Yap was not in breach of his duty of care owed to the Appellant.
- [79]
[79] We have one additional observation. The Judge accepted (at [92]) that since Dr Yap was aware that the nodule was a known finding and the Appellant had been seen by a respiratory specialist (Dr Imran) in 2007, it was reasonable for Dr Yap to conclude that an assessment had been made and that the Appellant had been discharged from respiratory follow-up because her condition was not serious, which was confirmed by the Appellant informing that Dr Imran had told her that she was fine. We caution that just because a specialist had attended to a patient is not, in and of itself, prima facie evidence that no further follow-up is necessary. This is especially so if there had been a long passage of time since the last specialist consultation. A patient’s account that the specialist had told her “she was fine” would also not be sufficient reason, in and of itself, not to investigate further.
Dr Soh
- [80]
[80] There was a conflict of evidence at trial as to whether Dr Soh did notice the opacity on the chest X-rays, but the Judge resolved this conflict in his favour, holding that he had not seen the opacity because he had been focusing on the left side of the Appellant’s chest where the pain was said to be emanating from. The Judge went on to find that Dr Soh was not in breach of his duty of care primarily because he was entitled, as an A&E doctor, to adopt a targeted approach and focus on investigating into the Appellant’s presenting symptoms: see the Judgment at [107].
- [81]
[81] We affirm the Judge’s finding that Dr Soh was not in breach of his duty of care for the same reasons given by the Judge. We accept that Dr Soh did not detect the opacity. We see no reason to disagree with the Judge’s finding on this point and the Appellant has not disputed it on appeal either. Dr Lim, the senior consultant who had supervised Dr Soh, also gave evidence that they were focused on the left side of the chest at the material time.
Dr Imran
- [84]
[84] We agree with the Judge that it was a breach of his duty of care for Dr Imran to have discharged the Appellant when he was not certain that the suspected infection had completely resolved (although he is not liable for the reason set out below (at [104])).
- [85]
[85] First, it was clear to us that Dr Imran was (contrary to his evidence) unsure if the opacity had resolved. In his own affidavit of evidence-in-chief, Dr Imran described his assessment as follows: that “the nodule appeared to be resolving or had resolved on its own”. This description indicated that he was unable to determinatively state that the opacity had resolved and that there was at least some degree of uncertainty as to whether it was still in the process of resolving. If he was sure that the opacity had resolved, he would not have employed language such as “appeared to be resolving” or even that the “opacity seems clear”. However, we are not saying that it was unreasonable for Dr Imran to have been unsure if the opacity was resolving. In fact, it was understandable given the following factors:
(a) It has not been seriously disputed that the position of the opacity was such that it was partially blocked by the ribs. According to Dr Teo, a radiologist, the October 2007 X-ray showed that the opacity was partially covered by the anterior aspect of the right fourth rib and it was covered almost entirely by the anterior aspect of the right fourth rib on the erect view of the November 2007 X-ray. Dr Rameysh, a consultant radiologist, also confirmed that the nodule was overlying the rib in the November 2007 X-rays.
(b) Dr Imran had to review the November 2007 X-rays on wet film without the advantage of any technology that would allow him to adjust the brightness of the films or to zoom into a specific area.
(d) According to Dr Teo, that the opacity appeared to be smaller or completely hidden could also be due to a different inspiratory effort by the Appellant. In other words, the size of the breath taken by the Appellant during the X-ray scanning process could also affect the size of the opacity as reflected in the X-ray.
- [86]
[86] Given the above, it was reasonable for Dr Imran to have been unsure if the opacity was resolving or if it had already resolved completely. In fact, Dr Teo herself took the position that she would not have conclusively stated that the opacity had resolved.
- [87]
[87] However, it is precisely because there were numerous factors contributing to the uncertainty of his diagnosis that Dr Imran ought not to have discharged the Appellant without a scheduled follow-up appointment. As a respiratory specialist, Dr Imran would be subject to a duty of care quite different from that of an A&E medical officer in relation to the diagnosis and treatment of an identified lung opacity. One would expect Dr Imran to take care to ensure that the opacity was not of any medical concern. On the evidence, it appears that Dr Imran was well aware of the limitations of reviewing an opacity positioned near or beneath the ribs using wet film X-rays. If there was a possibility that the opacity was still present but merely hidden due to its position, or appeared to be smaller simply because a smaller inspiratory effort was made by the Appellant at the time of the later X-ray, there ought to have been follow-up action. This could have been in the form of repeat X-rays on the same day or by way of a scheduled follow-up appointment. This is especially since as a respiratory specialist, Dr Imran was, in many ways, the “last in line” at the material time to diagnose a lung opacity. Unlike Dr Yeo who could and did refer the Appellant to a specialist, in the absence of a further referral, there would have been no one else who would have been in a better position to conduct the necessary follow-up action. Thus, if Dr Imran did not ensure that the opacity had fully resolved, no one else would.
- [88]
[88] The importance of reaching a certain diagnosis before discharge is underscored by the possibility of the opacity being a malignant growth. In addition, as a specialist, Dr Imran’s assessment would be relied on by generalist doctors. According to Dr Yap, one reason for his decision not to refer the Appellant for further investigations was that the opacity was a known finding that had previously been seen by a specialist, namely Dr Imran. That doctors place great weight on the diagnosis and treatment of “known findings” by specialists is something that we also took into account in determining that Dr Imran ought not to have discharged the Appellant when he was uncertain if the opacity had resolved completely. Again, this is because it was unlikely that any follow-up in this regard would be conducted by another doctor. It was wholly within Dr Imran’s sphere of responsibility to ensure that the opacity was not of concern.
- [89]
[89] We are also concerned with the stark difference in the necessary follow-up action depending on whether the opacity had resolved. In Dr Imran’s own words, if the opacity had been visible on the November 2007 X-rays, it would have been a “persistent opacity” since it was also visible on the October 2007 X-ray. The proper follow-up then would have been to schedule a repeat consultation in six weeks’ time even if the patient was asymptomatic. This is consistent with Dr Teo’s evidence that an infection typically takes six to eight weeks to resolve. Given the marked difference in follow-up action depending on whether the opacity was present on the November 2007 X-rays, if Dr Imran was unsure if it was indeed present, he ought to have taken the more cautious route of scheduling a follow-up. We do not think that this would have been too onerous an obligation to discharge.
- [90]
[90] Dr Imran relied chiefly on the asymptomatic presentation of the Appellant, her age and non-smoking background in his defence. We would only observe that the asymptomatic presentation of the Appellant is neither here nor there – the evidence adduced in the court below showed that sufferers of early stage lung cancer are largely asymptomatic. None of the other characteristics would affect our views above, that if a specialist was unsure whether an infection had completely cleared or if an opacity had completely resolved, it would be unreasonable to discharge the patient with no follow-up appointment. This ought to be the case regardless of the patient’s age and smoking preferences. It would be even more unreasonable if the Appellant had been of old age and/or is a known smoker.
- [91]
[91] For the above reasons, we agree with the Judge that Dr Imran was in breach of his duty of care for failing to schedule a follow-up appointment despite being uncertain that the opacity had completely resolved.
CGH
- [93]
[93] We now turn to consider the possible liability of CGH. Given our decision that none of the doctors is liable in negligence (see especially [78] and [82] above and [104] below), we need not address the contention premised on vicarious liability. In so far as CGH’s primary liability is concerned, the Appellant alleged that the hospital failed to have in place a safe system of health care that ensured that there was proper follow-up on the management of her medical condition.
- [94]
[94] As the Appellant’s allegation of negligence against CGH was based mainly on its system of reporting radiology reports, we begin with a brief description of the system that CGH had in place. Although there was no such reporting system in place when the Appellant visited in 2007, by April 2010, CGH had implemented a system for reporting on X-rays. The evidence of the various doctors in this regard was largely aligned. First, the X-rays will be routed to the radiology department. A radiologist will review the X-rays and prepare a report. Depending on the findings of the radiologist, the report will be assigned a classification Level between one to five. A Level 1 classification indicates that all the findings are normal. A Level 2 classification indicates that there are some minor findings which are not clinically significant and do not require follow-up or the attention of the clinician. Levels 3 to 5 reports contain “abnormalities”. Levels 3 to 5 reports will be stamped with “attention”. Where the abnormality identified is critical, the report will be classified as Level 5 and the radiologist will directly inform the referring doctor of the result instead of waiting for the report to make its way to the relevant department. A Level 4 report would indicate that the X-ray revealed a clinically significant abnormality which may require early but not urgent intervention. A Level 3 report is one where an abnormality has been identified and for which follow-up is required but for which there is no urgency, unlike a Level 4 or 5 report.
Duty to ensure proper follow-up on a patient
- [96]
[96] We find no issues with the way X-rays are sent for reporting. But, we do have grave concerns about the treatment of the radiological reports after they have been prepared by a radiologist.
- [97]
[97] The Judge noted that there had been a gap in the evidence as to whether the follow-up process on the radiological report had been carried out in the present case. It was held, on a balance of probabilities, that it had been followed because there was no reason for CGH not to have done so in this particular case and it was also entirely plausible that the reviewing A&E senior doctor had decided not to recall the Appellant on the basis that the nodule was reported to be stable: see the Judgment at [118]. With respect, we are unable to agree with this finding. In our view, since the Appellant has shown that both the April 2010 and July 2011 radiological reports recommended that follow-up on the nodule be carried out, the evidentiary burden shifts to CGH to show that it did follow-up in some way. For example, this could be done by showing that a doctor did see the recommendation but chose not to follow it for good reason. However, there is a complete dearth of evidence in this regard. First, the X-ray request form had apparently been disposed of. But, even if it had been adduced, all that it would have shown was that the radiological report was routed back to the A&E department. It would not indicate if an A&E doctor did see, review, and conduct the necessary follow-up. Second, and more significantly, there was no record whatsoever of the senior doctor who had supposedly reviewed the radiological reports and who made the clinical decision not to recall the Appellant. Given the complete lack of evidence showing that some action was taken, we find, on a balance of probabilities, that the procedure that was in place was not adhered to and that CGH had therefore failed to ensure that there was proper follow-up for the Appellant’s case.
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