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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Feb 2019

Court of Appeal

Abhilash s/o Kunchian Krishnan v Yeo Hock Huat and another

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[2019] SGCA 14Case no. Civil Appeal No 42 of 2018

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [2] Not unexpectedly, both parties engaged their own valuation experts who provided very disparate and divergent valuations using different bases. Three valuation methodologies were advanced before the court below – the income approach, the net assets value approach, and the investment value approach. The appellant relied primarily on the income and investment value approaches, while the respondents relied primarily on the net assets value approach. The valuations ranged from a low of $109,589 to a high of $75,699,572.

  3. [3] The Judge below, having disagreed with the appellant’s two valuations, eventually adopted the respondent’s net assets basis. For the appeal, the appellant is no longer relying on the two bases which were used below and has instead opted to use a third-party offer as the “best evidence” of the “fair market value” of the shares. It is axiomatic that valuation of shares in private companies is largely fact-sensitive in nature and typically reliant on expert evidence to assist the court. In deciding whether the Judge below was correct to have arrived at the “fair market value” of the shares on the net assets basis, it is essential to bear in mind the valuation bases which were advanced by the parties and crucially, the evidence before the court. This is especially so when the valuation basis put forward for the purposes of the appeal is quite different from the bases which were rejected below.

  4. [4] The key issue which confronts us in this appeal is whether a third-party offer in fact represents the best evidence of the fair market value of the shares and if not, what probative weight, if any, should be ascribed to such an offer.

  5. Facts

  6. Parties to the dispute

  7. [5] The appellant, Mr Abhilash s/o Kunchian Krishnan (“Mr Abhilash”) is a minority shareholder of the second respondent, a company incorporated in Singapore called JCS-Vanetec Pte Ltd (“JCSV”). The first respondent, Mr Yeo Hock Huat (“Mr Yeo”), is the majority shareholder of JCSV.

  8. [6] Mr Abhilash is a businessman in the aerospace industry who had set up two companies, Vanilla International (S) Pte Ltd and Vanilla Aviation Pte Ltd (“Vanilla Aviation”). Sometime in 2003, he intended to launch a business to manufacture stator vanes and other related parts for the aerospace industry in India.

  9. [7] Mr Yeo is an engineer and entrepreneur, with more than 20 years of experience in the equipment and machine manufacturing industry. Over the years, he started up and developed several engineering companies. One such company was JCS Automation Pte Ltd, which specialised in the manufacture of precision cleaning ultrasonic equipment. Its business was eventually transferred to JCS-Echigo Pte Ltd (“JCS-Echigo”) in 1999.

  10. [8] At the end of 2003, Mr Abhilash was introduced to Mr Yeo by some common friends. Mr Yeo was keen on branching into the aerospace industry. The two decided to do business together, setting up JCSV in 2004 (named JCS-Vanilla Pte Ltd at the time of incorporation).

  11. [9] Initially, the 10,000 shares in JCSV were held as follows: 50.99% by Mr Yeo, 49% by Mr Abhilash (through Vanilla Aviation), and 0.01% by Ms Elise Hong (an officer of JCS-Echigo). Thereafter, JCSV issued more shares, resulting in changes in the parties’ respective shareholdings. Currently, JCSV has 550,000 issued shares. Mr Yeo holds 78.8%, Mr Abhilash holds 13.9%, while one of Mr Yeo’s companies, JCS Group Co Ltd (“JCS Group”), holds the balance 7.3%. Mr Abhilash claims that this dilution in his shareholding was an attempt by Mr Yeo to cut him out of JCSV, but Mr Yeo claims that this was due to capital injections that he had made into JCSV.

  12. [10] One capital injection is of particular interest in this appeal. On 20 November 2015, Mr Yeo (through JCS Group) injected $1.5m into JCSV in exchange for 40,000 shares. This capital injection was significant because Mr Abhilash, both below and on appeal, claimed that the subscription of the 40,000 shares for payment of $1.5m was at an “implied price” of $37.50 per share.

  13. [11] Historically, JCSV has been a loss-making company. The audited financial statements for financial year 2007 to financial year 2015 show that JCSV has had negative earnings after tax in every single year except two – 2011 and 2015. The earnings after tax for these two years were fairly modest – $32,879 and $113,661 respectively – while the annual net losses between 2010 and 2014 were more substantial averaging around $400,000. The unaudited management accounts for financial year 2016, and January to May 2017 also indicate losses. Mr Abhilash does not contend otherwise.

  14. Procedural history

  15. The Shanghai Ossen offer

  16. [14] Mr Abhilash’s case on appeal is largely premised on an offer by a third-party to purchase all the shares in JCSV for $50m. Mr Abhilash claims that this offer was the best evidence of JCSV’s market value, and that the Judge erred in disregarding it.

  17. [15] The offer was from a Chinese entity named Shanghai Ossen Aviation Technology Co, Ltd (“Shanghai Ossen”). Shanghai Ossen was described by Mr Yeo as part of a conglomerate with annual sales exceeding RMB10b, and which has won major scientific and technological awards. Between 2015 and 2016, Mr Yeo was involved in discussions with Shanghai Ossen regarding the possibility of the latter acquiring JCSV. As a result of their discussions, two key documents were produced.

  18. [16] The first is a Memorandum of Understanding sent by way of email on 10 September 2015. Among other things, the Memorandum of Understanding provided as follows:

  19. (a) Mr Yeo and Mr Abhilash, as sellers, intended to sell “certain percentage shares” of JCSV, while Shanghai Ossen, as buyer, intended to acquire such shares.

  20. (b) Shanghai Ossen would be permitted to carry out an exhaustive due diligence over JCSV and its subsidiaries as to “legal, tax and financial, technical, labour and environmental matters”.

  21. (c) Neither party was under any legal obligation to enter into any form of legally binding transaction document.

  22. (d) Shanghai Ossen’s “expected price for the sale of 100% shares of [JCSV]” was $50m, which was “subject to the results of Due Diligence”.

  23. [17] The Memorandum of Understanding was followed by a document titled “Investment Framework Agreement”. A version in Chinese was sent by way of email on 3 June 2016, and an English version was sent four days later on 7 June 2016. Although it was contemplated in the Memorandum of Understanding that due diligence checks would be carried out by Shanghai Ossen, no such steps were in fact taken. Mr Abhilash does not contend that due diligence had in fact been done.

  24. [18] The Investment Framework Agreement set out the proposed structure for the acquisition of the JCSV shares. It included three parties in addition to Shanghai Ossen and JCSV. They were Shanghai Jiashi Aerospace Power Technology Co, Ltd (“Shanghai Jiashi”), JCS INVB Pte Ltd (“JCS INVB”), and JCS Aero Technology Pte Ltd (“JCS Aero”). Shanghai Jiashi is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shanghai Ossen. The Investment Framework Agreement contemplated that Shanghai Jiashi would own 100% of the shares in JCS Aero, which in turn would own 100% of the shares in JCSV. Among other things, the Investment Framework Agreement provided as follows:

  25. (a) Shanghai Jiashi would acquire 100% of the shareholding in JCS Aero from JCS INVB. This would give Shanghai Jiashi indirect control over 100% of the shareholding in JCSV.

  26. (b) In consideration of JCS INVB transferring 100% of the shares in JCS Aero to Shanghai Jiashi, Shanghai Jiashi would pay $50m to JCS INVB as the transfer price. The transfer price was stipulated to consist of two parts. The first part was 20% of the transfer price (ie, $10m), which would be transferred to JCS INVB’s bank account and could be drawn down by JCS INVB. The second part, the other 80% of the transfer price (ie, $40m), had to be used by JCS INVB to acquire equity in Shanghai Jiashi.

  27. (c) The transfer price of $50m was expressed to be a “tentative price” which “may be adjusted according to the results of due diligence conducted or to be conducted by Shanghai Jiashi on finance, technology and law”.

  28. (d) JCS INVB, using $40m out of the transfer price, would acquire a 42% stake in Shanghai Jiashi. The other 58% stake would be held by Shanghai Ossen.

  29. (e) Among other things, it was a condition precedent for the transfer of shares in JCS Aero to Shanghai Jiashi that Shanghai Jiashi complete its due diligence, and that no material adverse difference would be found between the result of the due diligence and the information previously disclosed to it or Shanghai Ossen.

  30. A diagram of the corporate structure of the companies contemplated under this transaction is set out below.

  31. [19] In summary, the Investment Framework Agreement contemplated a purchase price of $50m for the shares in JCSV (indirectly through JCS Aero). The $50m comprised $10m in cash and $40m in equity in Shanghai Jiashi, which would be a joint venture company with Shanghai Ossen. Ultimately, neither the Memorandum of Understanding nor the Investment Framework Agreement was signed. Nevertheless, the transaction that was contemplated (as set out in this paragraph) is what was referred to by the Judge and the appellant as “the Shanghai Ossen offer”. We will adopt this term. For present purposes, it is important to highlight two significant features of the Shanghai Ossen offer. First, it was not an unconditional offer – it was always subject to due diligence and second, the consideration is not $50m in cash but $50m in two components – $10m in cash and the balance $40m to be reinvested into the joint venture company. The significance of these two features in considering Mr Abhilash’s new argument for the appeal will be elaborated below.

  32. [20] By a letter dated 21 July 2016, Mr Yeo informed Mr Abhilash of the Shanghai Ossen offer, and sought his views as to whether he was agreeable to selling his shares to JCS Aero as part of the plan. Mr Yeo explained that under the terms of the offer, the existing shareholders of JCSV would receive $10m in cash, and a 42% stake in Shanghai Jiashi. This would require that the current shareholders of JCSV sell their shares to JCS Aero. They would in turn own shares in JCS INVB in the same proportion as their shareholding in JCSV. The $10m received by JCS INVB would be distributed to the shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. Mr Yeo went on to state that JCSV was in a weak financial position, having made net losses over the past three years.

  33. The experts

  34. [21] The parties procured experts to give evidence at the trial on the valuation of JCSV. Mr Abhilash called Mr Bakthavatsalam Sridhar Rao (“Mr Rao”) as his expert on the valuation of JCSV, while Mr Yeo called Mr Thio Khiaw Ping Kelvin (“Mr Thio”). Each of the experts filed a report in support of their respective positions. In brief, Mr Rao valued JCSV at $39,649,308 on an income method, $24,633,006 on a net assets basis, and $75,699,572 on an investment value basis. Mr Thio’s valuation yielded a mere $109,589 on a net assets basis, and, in his view, an income approach was simply not viable given JCSV’s loss-making history. Both experts also gave evidence at the trial. It is evident that there was a huge gulf between the experts’ positions.

  35. Decision below

  36. [25] The Judge then turned to consider the market value of JCSV. As between the income approach and the net assets approach, she took the view that the latter was applicable. She found that the income approach was inapplicable because JCSV was not a going concern, in the sense that it was not self-sustaining from its operating turnover. She also did not accept Mr Abhilash’s submission (and Mr Rao’s opinion) that JCSV’s intangible assets could generate future revenue for the company. At [32]–[48] of the Grounds of Decision, the Judge examined the evidence in respect of each of the three intangible assets relied upon by Mr Abhilash, and concluded that they could not reasonably be said to be sources of future revenue for JCSV. It should be noted that Mr Abhilash is not challenging this finding on appeal. Consequently, the Judge accepted Mr Thio’s assessment that, on the income approach, JCSV would have a nil valuation. She rejected Mr Rao’s valuation on the income approach as it was tainted by his projection of future sales, which formed a core part of his valuation. Left with a company with an undisputed loss-making record, the Judge took the view that the net assets basis of valuation was the applicable approach.

  37. [26] The Judge held that there was no reason to adjust the valuation that Mr Thio had reached on a net assets basis. She first noted that Mr Rao provided no counter-valuation on a net assets basis, and Mr Abhilash therefore had no basis to critique Mr Thio’s valuation. We note that although Mr Rao did initially provide a valuation on a net assets basis in his valuation report, this was not eventually relied upon, either by Mr Abhilash in his closing submissions or by Mr Rao in cross-examination when asked to comment on Mr Thio’s valuation on a net assets basis. As for the criticism that Mr Thio’s valuation failed to account for JCSV’s intangible assets, this was not correct as Mr Thio had factored them in, albeit by giving them a limited value.

  38. [27] The Judge also rejected the related submission that JCSV could not possibly be worth only $109,589 (on Mr Thio’s net assets basis) because Shanghai Ossen had expressed an interest to buy the company for $50m. Mr Abhilash had argued that Shanghai Ossen would not have come up with such an offer if it was not reasonably satisfied that the offer was justified. The Judge disagreed for three reasons:

  39. (a) It was speculative to contend that Shanghai Ossen would not have suggested the figure unless they had done their checks. No evidence on this was led by Mr Abhilash.

  40. (b) The offer was subject to a due diligence check which was never carried out.

  41. (c) The price was an offer by a specific entity at that particular time. No evidence was led on their particular reasons for doing so, and there was also no evidence that any other entities had valued JCSV in the same way.

  42. [28] As for Mr Abhilash’s submission that Mr Yeo had valued the company’s shares at $37.50 per share in his capital injection of $1.5m on the basis that he would be allotted 40,000 shares for that sum, the Judge did not accept that this represented the value of JCSV for two reasons:

  43. (a) First, Mr Rao did not challenge Mr Thio’s view that the share price for a share allotment does not necessarily reflect the value of every share in a company, especially where the company is a private company.

  44. (b) Second, the Judge accepted Mr Yeo’s explanation for the price of $37.50 per share. Specifically, Mr Yeo had explained that the $1.5m capital injection into JCSV was made because JCSV needed funds, and the number of shares issued was calibrated so as to ensure that after the capital injection Mr Abhilash’s shareholding would not be diluted excessively.

  45. [30] Finally, the Judge held that there was no reason to adjust the valuation on the basis of transactions which were impugned as being improper. Essentially, she found that those transactions were either immaterial to the valuation of JCSV, or were not improper. These findings have also not been challenged by Mr Abhilash on appeal.

  46. The parties’ cases on appeal

  47. [31] Mr Abhilash focuses his appeal on the narrow issue of whether the Shanghai Ossen offer should be relied upon as the basis for valuing the shares in JCSV. This is how Mr Abhilash has framed his case on appeal:

  48. (a) Fair market value is a measure of what a company can fetch in the market, and in determining this, the court is required to take into account offers made by a third-party to purchase the shares of a company, unless the offer is not genuine. Such offers are the “best evidence” of fair value.

  49. (b) The Judge erred in disregarding the Shanghai Ossen offer on the basis that it had “evaporated”. There was no suggestion that it was not a genuine offer, and there was nothing to suggest that had the due diligence been carried out, the offeror would have found anything of concern to cause it to withdraw or reduce its offer. It is irrelevant whether the offer had evaporated as that does not diminish the informational value of the offer.

  50. (c) There are compelling grounds to find that the Shanghai Ossen offer remains alive. Among other points, Mr Abhilash contends that the letters from Shanghai Ossen and Shanghai Jiashi purporting to set a deadline of 31 December 2016 for the acquisition of JCSV to be completed are “highly dubious”, and there is “good reason to doubt their authenticity”.

  51. [33] Before us, counsel for Mr Yeo, Mr Suresh Divyanathan, made two principal submissions:

  52. (a) First, the Shanghai Ossen offer is at best an indication of the investment value to Shanghai Ossen, and not an indication of JCSV’s fair market value. The $50m offer was therefore entity-specific.

  53. (b) Second, the Shanghai Ossen offer cannot be relied upon as a concrete offer, as it was at all relevant times subject to due diligence.

  54. Issues to be determined

  55. [35] However, before examining this issue, it is first necessary to decide whether Mr Abhilash should be granted leave to raise the new points on appeal.

  56. New points on appeal

  57. [37] Mr Abhilash seeks leave to introduce these new points pursuant to O 57 r 9A(4) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”). Mr Yeo submits that Mr Abhilash should not be granted leave.

  58. [39] The principles governing the granting of leave to raise new points on appeal was considered by this court in Feoso (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Faith Maritime Co Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 556 (“Feoso”), which at [28] endorsed the following passage from Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v Kavanagh [1892] AC 473 at 480:

  59. [40] The principles in Feoso, as well as the broader issue of when leave to introduce new points on appeal will be granted, were recently considered again by this court in Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76 (“Grace Electrical”). This court held that there is strictly speaking no legal impediment to an appellant raising new points of law on appeal even if they were not specifically pleaded provided that the existing pleadings were sufficiently wide to permit the new points to be raised. Further, the mere fact that the new point sought to be raised contradicts the case as pleaded below would not invariably lead to the denial of leave. We explained that in Feoso, leave was denied not merely because the new point contradicted the appellant’s pleaded case, but, more importantly, because further findings might well have been made or raised had the arguments been raised below. In such a case, the court would thus be “deprived of any findings and reasoning” of the court below (at [36]).

  60. [41] On the facts of Grace Electrical, the new arguments did not require any amendments to the pleadings, nor was there any need to adduce fresh evidence. The central question was whether there were other causes to a fire that had broken out, and in this regard, the court below had carefully considered the other possible causes of fire raised in the expert reports. This court held that the fact that the appellant had renounced the expert reports in the court below did not alter whatever probative value the reports might otherwise have on the issue of the appellant’s alleged negligence; the appellant was entitled to rely on all the evidence already before the court (at [37]). That said, the appellant had to contend with the fact that certain conclusions in the expert reports on the cause of the fire had not been tested in cross-examination, and the appellant equally could not ignore its own submissions below when it described the reports as “speculative”. However, these difficulties were separate and distinct from the question of whether the appellant could raise the new arguments on appeal and we concluded by stating that the following principles would apply when considering whether leave should be granted to introduce new points on appeal (at [38]):

  61. [43] That said, although a new point may be allowed, a party’s case may nonetheless be undermined or compromised by its treatment of the very point in the court below – both as a matter of submissions, and how it dealt with the point in evidence. That is the caution that this court had sounded in Grace Electrical. Consequently, while Mr Abhilash may be allowed to cast the relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer in new light on appeal, he is nonetheless constrained by the evidence that has been adduced at the trial below. In particular, he is limited by the questions that have been put to the experts on the relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer to the valuation of JCSV, as well as questions that were not put to the experts. Such an approach helps mitigate against any prejudice that might be caused to the respondents in this case. Mr Singh’s point is that the expert evidence cannot change the fact of the offer. While there is some force in the argument, it is incorrect to suggest that the experts’ treatment of the Shanghai Ossen offer in the court below is inconsequential to the ultimate question pertaining to JCSV’s fair market value.

  62. Valuation date of JCSV

  63. The relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer

  64. [53] We turn now to the main issue that arises in this appeal, namely, whether JCSV ought to be valued on the basis of the Shanghai Ossen offer. In brief, our view is that the Shanghai Ossen offer does not have the significance which Mr Singh is seeking to advance for the appeal. Although we accept Mr Singh’s general submission that an offer to acquire a company’s shares may provide some evidence of the value of those shares, that is not a rule that applies invariably. As we have highlighted above, the Shanghai Ossen offer was not an unconditional offer capable of immediate acceptance. It was subject to due diligence which, significantly, was never carried out irrespective of whose fault it was which prevented the due diligence exercise. Further, the offer was not on a cash basis but Mr Abhilash’s new argument effectively seeks a payout on the basis of an immediate payment of $50m. It is therefore unsurprising to us that neither expert attached any significance or relevance to the Shanghai Ossen offer for the valuation of JCSV. In fact, as elaborated below at [78]–[87], the experts, in particular Mr Rao, went further to explain why the offer was of no assistance in the expert valuations of JCSV’s fair market value.

  65. The relevance of third-party offers

  66. [54] Mr Singh’s submission that offers made by third-parties to acquire a particular property, such as shares in a company, are the best evidence as to the fair market value of that property is a simple one. “Fair market value”, he contends, refers to the price that a seller is willing to accept, and a buyer is willing to pay, in an arm’s length transaction, citing Re Howie and others and Crawford’s arbitration [1990] BCLC 686. Mr Divyanathan accepts this definition, though he submits that it has been misapplied by Mr Singh. We will address this point below. For now, taking this definition of “fair market value”, Mr Singh submits that evidence of an actual offer made by a third-party is the best evidence of fair market value because it is precisely an offer that a buyer is willing to pay in an arm’s length transaction (assuming that the seller is also willing to accept).

  67. [55] In support of this proposition, Mr Singh cites several authorities from Australia and Canada. We consider these in turn.

  68. The Canadian authorities

  69. [56] Reference is made to the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Nelson v Vanier [2013] BCJ No 2939 (“Nelson v Vanier”), in particular Schultes J’s comment at [28] that the “absolute gold standard” for valuers is to ask what a genuine purchaser is willing to pay in the open market. It was argued that this decision supports the proposition that even in a case where an offer is made but not eventually accepted, the significance of the offer, in terms of indicating the true value of the shares, is not diminished. As a legal proposition, we have no difficulty with this submission.

  70. [59] Accordingly, the court’s acceptance of a third-party offer as an indication of the market value of the shares even when it has been withdrawn must be understood in the context of that case. In particular, the expert had specifically spoken to the third-party who had made the offer, and the expert had himself accepted that the offer price was an indication of the fair market value of the shares. It was not a situation, as in the present appeal, where the expert had valued the company differently from the third-party offer. Further, it appears that the third-party offer in Nelson v Vanier, unlike the offer in the present case, was not subject to due diligence and was capable of acceptance but for the restraint of trade clause. It was described as the “final offer”. In other words, the value of the shares had already properly crystallised into an offer capable of acceptance, unlike in the present case. Seen in this light, the fact that the offer was not accepted because Mr Vanier did not agree to be bound by the non-competition clause was understandably also irrelevant – the expert had already determined the market value of the shares (at [32]). We also observe that this shows that even when presented with evidence of a third-party offer, the court will have regard to the evidence of the expert valuer in reaching its decision.

  71. [60] Mr Singh also relies on Grandison v NovaGold Resources Inc [2007] BCJ No 2639 (“Grandison”) in which the court held that an asset value approach to the determination of fair value was inappropriate given that the company did not have significant assets as at the valuation date, and therefore had resort to market transactions as an indicator of the value of the company.

  72. [62] In choosing between the experts, the court noted that it was not bound to adopt any particular approach towards the valuation. On the facts, “an asset value approach to the determination of fair value [was] not appropriate”. This was because Coast Mountain did not have any significant assets as at the valuation date, and its value “lay in the potential to earn income” in the event any of its projects was carried to fruition (Grandison at [158]). The court also rejected the discounted cash flow method as the valuations were “rife with speculation and uncertainty”; it provided “some evidence”, but was “not determinative” of value (at [159]). It was in this context that the court turned towards the initial offer made by NovaGold in the plan of arrangement (which Mr Grandison had objected to). We note that the offer in the plan of arrangement appears to have been made on the basis of a completed due diligence process – NovaGold was permitted to carry out due diligence up till 14 April 2006, while the announcement regarding the plan of arrangement was made on 26 May 2006 (at [42] and [53]). The court concluded that the transaction itself was the appropriate starting point in that case. Market transactions, like that one, are “indicators of prices at which parties have been prepared to buy and sell the shares”, and “depending on the circumstances, it may be the best evidence of fair value” [emphasis added]. The court went on to note that there were no circumstances in that transaction to suggest that adopting the initial offer made by NovaGold would have been unfair to a shareholder in Coast Mountain (at [165] and [166]).

  73. [63] In our view, Grandison does not stand for the expansive proposition that any third-party offer is invariably the best evidence of the value of a company. The court made it plain that the relevance of any offer would depend on the circumstances of the case. Significantly, the offer was made by NovaGold, the same party who was acquiring the shares under the plan of arrangement. In that sense, it was not strictly speaking a third-party offer. The court in Grandison resorted to the offer by NovaGold because there were issues in applying the other alternatives. We are therefore of the view that Grandison merely opens the door for the court to consider offers to purchase in certain circumstances; there is no rule that any offer, much less a third-party offer, is invariably the best evidence in all cases. Ultimately, the court will have to look at the basis of and the assumptions made by the valuers, as the court did in Grandison. There can be no dispute that this must include the terms and the nature of the offer.

  74. The Australian authorities

  75. [64] Mr Singh also relies on the decision in MMAL Rentals Pty Ltd v Bruning (2004) 63 NSWLR 167 (“MMAL Rentals”), a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, for the proposition that “a contemporaneous offer established a ‘floor’ for the value or price” of a company’s shares. Spigelman CJ was quoted as stating that it would be “absurd” to exclude the evidence of a third-party offer.

  76. [66] On appeal, Spigelman CJ endorsed the trial judge’s approach, and held that the shares had to be valued after taking into account what Mitsubishi would be prepared to pay (MMAL Rentals at [32]). The trial judge considered the fact that Mitsubishi had been willing to pay a substantial amount for the goodwill of the subsidiary, and that Mitsubishi had previously offered to take over Mr Bruning’s shares at $535,000. The trial judge concluded that a “realistic” value of the shares was $600,000 (at [36]–[44]). In Spigelman CJ’s view, this was not a different basis of valuation, but was simply an application of the net assets approach – the trial judge had simply given the goodwill in Kingmill a value (at [65]–[68]).

  77. [67] Spigelman CJ went on to consider the relevance of an offer to purchase the shares. The trial judge had used the previous offer by Mitsubishi as a “signpost”, but appeared to have used it to determine the “floor” of the fair market value of the shares, eventually awarding a sum higher than the Mitsubishi offer. Spigelman CJ held that the trial judge was right to have relied on the offer as determining the fair market value “to a very substantial degree” (MMAL Rentals at [83]). In his view, where a valuation “must refer to the special potentiality of particular property for a specific purchaser, an offer by that purchaser to purchase that property is relevant” [emphasis in original]. Such an offer was not only relevant but “highly probative”. While expert evidence may establish that such an offer is inadequate, unless there are special considerations, the offer “clearly establishes a floor”. On the facts of that case, where a particular purchaser has manifested its intention to acquire the particular property in a context where, on normal valuation principles it may appear that the value is nil, the exclusion of the evidence of an offer by that purchaser would be “absurd” (at [96]–[98]).

  78. [68] Two points about MMAL Rentals must be emphasised. First, although framed as a rejection of the Mitsubishi’s expert’s valuation, Spigelman CJ made it clear that in substance, it was more of an adjustment, insofar as the court disagreed with the valuation of an asset of MMAL Rentals (ie, the nil valuation of the subsidiary, Kingmill). Spigelman CJ (at [68]) affirmed that the valuation basis was still that of a net assets basis. Second, both the circumstances of the decision and the language used by Spigelman CJ narrow the type of third-party offers which may be relevant. The core of Spigelman CJ’s decision is that in the case of an offer by a particular purchaser for that particular property, which has special potentiality to that purchaser, that offer should be taken into account when that purchaser is seeking to acquire the shares. On the facts, the party seeking to acquire the shares was the same party who had previously made the offer, ie, Mitsubishi in both instances. It was not a third-party offer. Furthermore, it would appear that the offer was not subject to any due diligence given Mitsubishi was then an existing shareholder of MMAL Rentals. However, in the present case, the third-party who made the offer, ie, Shanghai Ossen, is not the party who is acquiring the shares from Mr Abhilash. There is simply no evidence whatsoever that the “special potentiality” of JCSV, if any, to Mr Yeo was the same as that to Shanghai Ossen.

  79. [69] Finally, Mr Singh also relies on the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Goold v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 114 ALR 135 (“Goold”). This was a decision regarding the valuation of land and not shares, but Mr Singh submits that the principles are similarly applicable.

  80. [70] In Goold, the applicants were owners of two parcels of land which were compulsorily acquired. They claimed compensation under statute, and the issue that arose was the valuation of each of the properties. Experts were called to value the properties. An aspect of the case described as “unusual” was that there was evidence of an offer to purchase each of the properties. The respondents objected to the admission of evidence concerning the offers, contending that evidence of an offer (as distinct from evidence of a concluded contract) was never admissible in connection with the assessment of value. The court held that it would be “anomalous and unjust” for the court to adopt a “blanket rule excluding offer evidence”. Such a rule might exclude “cogent evidence of the interest of a particular purchaser” in the land being valued, “a person who was willing to pay more than ordinary market price” (at 143).

  81. [71] However, the court cautioned that before placing reliance upon a mere offer, the court must consider the genuineness of the offer. The offer might be a sham or an attempt to manipulate the market for some ulterior purpose. It might have been genuine when made, but might not have led to a concluded contract, and may have been withdrawn. Hence the court cautioned that “even a genuine offer cannot be regarded as direct evidence of value”, but it is something for the court to “take into account”. How much weight is to be given to the offer is something to be determined on the facts of each case (Goold at 144).

  82. [72] As we understand it, Goold sets out the sensible proposition that an offer is evidence, but not necessarily the “best evidence”. We should add that Goold does not hold that a third-party offer forms a floor for the value of the property. Goold, though decided in the context of valuation of land, was cited in MMAL Rentals for the proposition that evidence of an offer could be considered by the court even for the valuation of shares. Indeed, there is no principled reason why it would not similarly apply to shares. That said, all that Goold and MMAL Rentals establish is that the court would not exclude evidence of a third-party offer.

  83. [74] In our view, evidence of a third-party offer is relevant but the appropriate weight to be ascribed to such offers has to be determined on the facts of each case – specifically, the terms and nature of the offer. Although, the “absolute gold standard” for valuers is what a genuine purchaser is willing to pay, a distinction has to be drawn between (a) what a (hypothetical) genuine purchaser is willing to pay; and (b) what the specific offeror (who made the offer which is the subject of consideration) was prepared to pay on the facts of a particular case. The two are conceptually distinct. The latter might be indicative of the former while the former is a conceptual approach to determining fair market value based on objective data before the court together with appropriate input from expert witnesses. Consequently, the evidence of an offer that is before the court must, in each case, be evaluated before it can be determined whether, and how much, that offer accurately indicates what a “genuine purchaser” would be willing to pay.

  84. [75] This point was brought up by Mr Divyanathan before us, albeit couched in slightly different terms. While accepting the general definition of “fair market value” as the price reached between a willing buyer and willing seller, Mr Divyanathan points out that a “willing buyer” is a hypothetical concept, and not any particular buyer who has made an offer which is accepted. He submits that it cannot be ruled out that there could be buyers who are willing to purchase an asset at a huge premium to what is the fair market value of that asset, perhaps due to special synergistic considerations which that buyer might have. In principle, we agree with this submission.

  85. [76] To conclude on this point, we accept that where there is evidence of a third-party offer to acquire shares, and that offer is shown to have been made at arm’s length, is genuine, and not speculative or conditional, the court can, and ought to, take that offer into account in determining the fair market value of the shares. These conditions are merely pre-conditions before the court can even attribute any informational value to a third-party offer – for instance, an offer that is not genuinely made would obviously be lacking in any informational value. However, we do not accept the elevation of the evidential value of such offers to the level that they invariably represent the “best evidence” of the shares’ fair market value.

  86. Expert evidence on the Shanghai Ossen offer

  87. Mr Thio’s evidence

  88. [78] Mr Thio made no mention of the Shanghai Ossen offer in his expert report. This was probably understandable given that his valuation approach was on a net assets basis. Under cross-examination, he explained that while he was aware of the Shanghai Ossen offer when he prepared his valuation, he had been instructed that the offer had lapsed, and was thus not provided with the documents in relation to the offer. On that basis, he opined that it had no relevance to his valuation.

  89. [79] When queried by the Judge on how he would regard offers in the market, such as the Shanghai Ossen offer, Mr Thio explained that it would involve a different type of valuation approach – he would be valuing the company based on the additional information of the investor, such as the synergies, contacts, or know-how that such an investor might bring in. Due to such considerations, the value of the company may be significantly higher to that investor. If, however, one is purely valuing the company, then it is the value of the company as it is that has to be assessed, and assumptions cannot be made on the basis of a particular investor coming in.

  90. [80] He also explained that he had understood that the offer was subject to certain terms and conditions. He was also instructed that Shanghai Ossen had not been given any numbers to view when they made the offer of $50m. Therefore, in his view, the $50m figure could eventually be significantly higher or lower.

  91. [81] Finally, following questions posed by the Judge, Mr Thio accepted that if it is an existing offer backed by a Memorandum of Understanding with concrete terms, he may consider that in his valuation. However, he did not say how he would consider such an offer for the purposes of his valuation. Nor was he asked to clarify or elaborate by counsel for Mr Abhilash at the trial.

  92. Mr Rao’s evidence

  93. [82] Mr Rao similarly made no mention of the Shanghai Ossen offer in his expert report. In fact, at the trial, Mr Rao confirmed that his valuation of JCSV did not take into account the Shanghai Ossen offer. It is immediately apparent that this is in stark contrast to Mr Abhilash’s case on appeal.

  94. [83] When both experts were giving their concurrent evidence, Mr Rao provided his views on how he would view an offer to acquire JCSV. He explained that there was a crucial distinction to be made between the market value of a company, and its investment value. In particular, he used the example of a company which has been awarded a massive contract. However, if such a company lacks the capacity to deliver on that contract, it would hit a ceiling in terms of its market value. That is where investment value comes in. An investor who is able bring in capital and increase the company’s capacity to deliver on the contract would then be able to reap greater value from that same company. This latter value is what he terms as an “investment value”, and exists only from the perspective of that investor.

  95. [84] With this understanding of investment value and market value, Mr Rao added that it follows that no buyer would ever transact at investment value. Such a transaction would mean that the buyer is left with no gains. The flipside of this is that, in general, transactions are entered into at a “premium to market value”. This is because the investment value is usually much higher than market value. A buyer or investor would typically apply a discount from the investment value as a buffer for its own gains. In his view therefore, offers made by potential investors or buyers are not made on a “market value basis”. In other words, Mr Rao was implying that the Shanghai Ossen offer was not representative of the “market value” of the JCSV.

  96. [85] We note that despite the fact that the thrust of Mr Rao’s evidence was that an offer by a third-party would be closer to a valuation of a company on an investment value basis rather than on a market value basis, counsel for Mr Abhilash at the trial below did not seek any clarification from Mr Rao on his evidence. Consequently, the state of the evidence, it seems to us, is that Mr Rao did not ascribe any weight to the Shanghai Ossen offer for the purposes of determining the fair market value of JCSV. In his view, the figure of $50m would be a premium to JCSV’s market value (or a discount from its investment value). However, Mr Rao did not offer any explanation as to how much of a premium (or discount as the case may be) was factored into the offer by Shanghai Ossen. It may well be that this information only resides with Shanghai Ossen. Nonetheless, it remains a fact that we have no basis to arrive at a suitable discount.

  97. Conclusion on the experts’ views towards the Shanghai Ossen offer

  98. [86] The state of the expert evidence may thus be summarised as follows:

  99. (a) Neither expert considered the Shanghai Ossen offer in their respective expert reports.

  100. (b) In Mr Rao’s case, he did not think that the Shanghai Ossen offer was relevant to the fair market value of JCSV as a matter of principle.

  101. (c) In Mr Thio’s case, he did not consider the Shanghai Ossen offer on account of several reasons – he thought it had lapsed, he was not provided the documents, and he was told it was subject to terms. Although he accepted that he would consider a sufficiently concrete offer in his valuation, this tentative view has to be measured against his evidence that an offer by a third-party would be an indication of the value of the company from the perspective of that particular investor. In any event, the Shanghai Ossen offer was not a “concrete” offer.

  102. [87] It therefore seems to us that while Mr Thio remained open in principle to consider the relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer if it had been sufficiently concrete, Mr Rao was opposed to such an approach altogether. The difficulty however is that there is no indication as to how Mr Thio would consider the Shanghai Ossen offer had it been sufficiently concrete. On balance, it would appear to us that neither expert is of the view that the Shanghai Ossen offer is determinative of the fair market value of JCSV.

  103. [88] It is well established that while the court is not obliged to unquestioningly accept expert evidence, even if it is unchallenged, the court would be slow to substitute its views for those of the expert’s in the absence of good grounds: Lo Sook Ling Adela v Au Mei Yin Christina and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 326 at [48]; Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983 at [76]. We see no good grounds on which to reject the unchallenged and consistent evidence of both experts that the Shanghai Ossen offer is not determinative of the fair market value of JCSV and more pertinently, none has been suggested by Mr Abhilash. This is to be contrasted with the approach adopted in Grandison and MMAL Rentals where the court rejected both valuations by the parties’ experts and instead accepted the earlier offers as the best evidence of the shares. It is, however, important to bear in mind that in those cases, the offers were preferred over the expert valuations because the court was satisfied that the offers were indeed “concrete”, ie, not subject to any due diligence, and that the offers were made by the same party who were seeking to buy out the other shareholder. In short, the court in those cases unlike the present case, had very good reasons to disregard the expert valuations. The fact that the Shanghai Ossen offer was genuine and serious does not impel us to disregard the experts’ assessment that the offer was not relevant to determine JCSV’s fair market value. The genuineness of an offer should not be confused with the conditional nature of the offer. We can accept that the Shanghai Ossen offer was indeed genuine and serious but the inquiry does not end there. For reasons elaborated below, when the terms of the Shanghai Ossen offer are properly examined, it is clear to us that the offer had remained conditional at all material times and was made by a third-party who saw an investment value in JCSV beyond its fair market value.

  104. [89] We note that the difficulty in Mr Abhilash’s case on appeal arises directly from the manner in which he chose to address this issue in the court below. In this regard, we reiterate the caution sounded above that while a party may well be given leave to run a new point on appeal, the state of the evidence as adduced in the court below may ultimately have an adverse impact on the new case. Had it been Mr Abhilash’s case from the start that the Shanghai Ossen offer was determinative, or the best evidence, of JCSV’s fair market value, we have little doubt that both experts would have been tested more stringently on this point. Mr Rao would also have needed to revise his report. His own testimony suggests that he would not have been minded to change his views on the relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer. As it is however, it is Mr Abhilash’s burden to prove that the Shanghai Ossen offer is good evidence of the fair market value of JCSV. This he has failed to do. His own expert had effectively excluded or at the very least substantially diminished the relevance of the Shanghai Ossen offer.

  105. The Shanghai Ossen offer was subject to due diligence

  106. [91] The most obvious difficulty is that the Shanghai Ossen offer was at all material times expressly subject to due diligence. This was the case in the Memorandum of Understanding and in the Investment Framework Agreement. Clause 3.1 of the Memorandum of Understanding states that the seller’s “expected price” [emphasis added] was $50m, “which is subject to the results of due diligence”. In the Investment Framework Agreement, cl 2.1 provides that the buyer agrees to transfer $50m “which is a tentative price, and may be adjusted according to the results of due diligence conducted” [emphasis added]. The clear wording of the relevant clauses in both documents therefore shows that the price had in fact never been firmly fixed. Mr Singh may well be right that as of 30 April 2016, there was nothing to suggest that due diligence would turn up any adverse findings. After all, he stressed that everyone expected the deal to go through. Mr Yeo himself had in November 2015 injected $1.5m capital into JCSV, which displayed a certain degree of optimism in JCSV’s continued survival and that the deal with Shanghai Ossen would likely go through.

  107. [92] However, we cannot accept that, simply because nothing appeared to be amiss at that time, the Shanghai Ossen offer ought therefore to be taken as a definitive or concrete offer to acquire JCSV for $50m. Further, optimism by Mr Yeo, whatever its degree, does not change the nature and terms of the offer. It is at best an expression of confidence. In that regard, it must be recognised that the Shanghai Ossen offer was always only a conditional offer. Had Mr Abhilash come to court on or about 30 April 2016, presenting the court with evidence that there was a conditional offer by Shanghai Ossen, expressed as subject to due diligence, to acquire JCSV for $50m, it is difficult to imagine that the court would have valued JCSV at $50m on that basis alone.

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